diff --git "a/case_hold/validation.jsonl" "b/case_hold/validation.jsonl"
new file mode 100644--- /dev/null
+++ "b/case_hold/validation.jsonl"
@@ -0,0 +1,3900 @@
+{"input": "Supply, plaintiff in its complaint and in its motion for summary judgment before the bankruptcy court vigorously contended that the financing statements comported with the statutory requirements and constituted the \u201cfirst and best lien\u201d on EAI of NC\u2019s assets. Plaintiff asserted that the statutory and case law established that: {\u00b6 15} \u201c[I]nadvertent omission [in plaintiffs financing statements] is not seriously misleading and does not render the Financing Statements invalid because: a) the mere omission of the words \u2018of North Carolina\u2019 when the addresses of EAI and EAI of NC are the same and the two are related companies does not result in a misleading error; and b) the coversheets specifically refer the reader to the attached Security Agreement for the signature 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 719 (<HOLDING>). {\u00b6 18} Plaintiff prevailed and the bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding a forged signature constitutes the use of that persons name and thus qualifies as a means of identification under the statute 1: recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation 2: holding decrees identification of person by name was sufficiently specific for purposes of thirdparty beneficiary status 3: holding to be sufficient the incorrect identification of debtor as platt fur co instead of the correct name of henry platt 4: holding that an action brought in the name of a person adjudicated as incapacitated instead of in the name of her guardian cannot be corrected as a misnomer", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have passed into the hands of bona fide creditors or purchasers for value, as long as any debts of the corporation are unpaid, the holders of the assets take them charged with a trust in favor of the creditors\u201d); Rice v. City of Columbia, 143 S.C. 516, 141 S.E. 705, 712 (1928) (\u201c[T]he very moment a corporation, banking or other, reaches the point of insolvency (presumptively, as a matter of course, to the knowledge of the managing agents of the corporation), certainly in the immediate prospect of dissolution and bankruptcy, its assets become impressed with a solemn trust to be distributed ratably among its creditors, subject, of course, to liens; and the managing agents become the administrators of that trust.\u201d); see also Stewart v. Ficken, 151 S.C. 424, 149 S.E. 164, 165 (1929) (<HOLDING>); Cumberland Wood Prods., Inc. v. Bennett, 308 Holdings: 0: recognizing the right of a creditor to sue a corporate director for breach of fiduciary duty 1: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 2: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 3: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 4: holding that missouri law applied to the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is corporate law that defines the contours of that duty", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "26, 2003), both of which are now final. Id. As for the Promissory Notes, they are not valid, because the Certificates of Assessment do not indicate that the original notes were accepted as payment. Id. at 3. Although Plaintiffs claimed to have \u201ccorrected\u201d the Promissory Notes, correction is \u201cneither apparent from an examination of the notes nor does it remedy their primary defect \u2014 they are not drawn on a legitimate domestic financial institution.\u201d Id. Even if the Promissory Notes were valid, \u201cjurisdiction prerequisites must be satisfied at the time the complaint is filed ... so [Plaintiffs\u2019 post factum payment would not cure their failure to satisfy the full-payment rule.\u201d Id.; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Plaintiffs\u2019 contention that Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined 1: holding that whether an action would have a conceivable effect on the bankrupt estate is determined at the time a lawsuit is filed 2: holding that the plaintiff cannot defeat federal jurisdiction by reducing his claim for damages after removal because the amount in controversy is determined by looking at the complaint when filed 3: holding that the court had discretion to allow substitution of plaintiffs to satisfy diversity jurisdiction requirements in order to give the court jurisdiction where no jurisdiction existed when the complaint was filed 4: holding that jurisdiction is determined at the time the complaint is filed and postfiling events cannot create jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s decision is procedurally sound, then we will consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.\u201d Id. at 855 (quoting United States v. Braggs, 511 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir.2008)). The district court correctly interpreted and applied the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines provide: \u201cWhere a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5Gl.l(b). The district court thus properly determined the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months was the guidelines sentence, and thus the appropriate point from which to depart downward. See United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, Holdings: 0: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 1: holding the mandatory minimum sentence to be constitutionally applicable to respondent 2: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute 3: holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence 4: holding that a sentence below a statutory minimum based on the filing of a substantial assistance motion did not eliminate the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum for purposes of sentence modification under  3582c2", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "had the error not occurred.\u201d); Bryant v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 488, 498 (2010) (per curiam) (\u201c[T]he assessment of prejudice generally is case specific, demonstrated by the appellant and based on the record.\u201d); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2000) (\u201c[A]ppellate tribunals are not appropriate fora for initial fact finding.\u201d). Accordingly, because the Board erred by failing to provide Mrs. Reliford with the opportunity to waive substitution and prejudiced her by failing to adjudicate her accrued-benefits claim against the proper factual background, the Board decision on appeal will be set aside and remanded for adjudication of Mrs. Reliford\u2019s claim based on the file as it existed at the time of her husband\u2019s death. See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, Holdings: 0: holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where the board has incorrectly applied the law failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its determinations or where the record is otherwise inadequate 1: holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where inter alia the board has incorrectly applied the law 2: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 3: holding that remand is appropriate where the board has incorrectly applied the law failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases for its determinations or where the record is otherwise inadequate 4: holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in a consistent and uniform manner subject to State criteria and oversight.\u201d N.R. \u00a7 l-1801(b)(2). When the State Critical Area Program was adopted, a local jurisdiction could choose whether to adopt a local program. If it did not, the State Critical Area Commission was directed to adopt a program for that jurisdiction. In either event, the program had to comply with the criteria in N.R. \u00a7 8-1808. See N.R. \u00a7\u00a7 8-1809 and 8-1810. Section 8-1808(d) sets forth the requirements for granting a variance from the critical area requirements. Those requirements include a finding that a failure to grant a variance would result in unwarranted hardship to the applicant. Prior to 2002, the Court of Appeals decided Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 734 A.2d 227 (1999) (<HOLDING>); White v. North, 356 Md. 31, 736 A.2d 1072 Holdings: 0: holding that the unwarranted hardship standard was less restrictive than the constitutional taking standard and meant the denial of the reasonable and significant use of the property 1: holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met 2: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 3: recognizing a new sandin standard under which there is no liberty interest and no constitutional violation  if the sandin atypical and significant hardship standard is not met 4: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and was exceedingly reluctant to reach any agreement that the tribes considered acceptable. But the gravamen of Coyote Valley\u2019s amended complaint is that the Davis Administration, rather than the Wilson Administration, has refused to negotiate in good faith; and it is against the Davis Administration that Coyote Valley seeks injunctive relief. On the record before us, it appears that the Davis Administration has actively negotiated with Indians tribes, including Coyote Valley, concerning class III gaming, and that it has negotiated despite the absence of any legal obligation to do so. Until Proposition 1A was ratified in March of 2000, the State had no obligation to negotiate with Coyote Valley over the types of class III games covered in the Davis Compact. See Rumsey, 64 F.3d 1250 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, at the time Coyote Valley filed its Holdings: 0: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 1: holding that the phrase such gaming in igra does not include all class iii gaming 2: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 3: holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states 4: recognizing that the phrase does not include every service rendered to debtor", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Second Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a state criminal restitution order is non-dischargeable under Section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court stated that Section 523(a)(7) \u201ccreate[d] a broad exception for all penal sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties, or forfeitures,\u201d and protected traditional criminal fines sufficiently to allow restitution orders to be included within the exception. Id. at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 362, 93 L.Ed.2d at 230. In the Court\u2019s view, federal bankruptcy proceedings should not be used to cir 1993) (concluding that order of restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy); Cabla v. State, 6 S.W.3d 543, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1092, 120 S.Ct. 1730, 146 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Garnett seeks to distinguish her case from Holdings: 0: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code 1: holding that apprendi does not apply to state capital sentencing schemes where judges are required to find certain aggravating circumstances before imposing a death sentence 2: holding that the bankruptcy code does not interfere with criminal sentencing schemes 3: holding only that although a party cannot interfere with its own contract a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it 4: holding that apprendi does not apply to capital sentencing schemes", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1141, 119 S.Ct. 1032, 143 L.Ed.2d 41 (1999). Federal common law deprives me of the power to grant such relief, absent the consent of the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit for Palm Beach County, Florida. As Mr. Freeman fairly argues, the relief sought by the trustee in these three counts could disadvantage the other creditors of PRSI. Thus, it will be up to the appointing court for the PRSI receiver to determine whether the relief sought by the trustee in counts five through seven should be heard in this court. Rather than dismiss those three counts at this time, however, I shall stay temporarily any determination of those three claims and grant the trustee a limited opportunity to obtain state court leave to proceed. See Matter of NNLC Corp., 136 B.R. 611 (Bankr.D.Conn.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Matter of Linton, 136 F.3d at 545 Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit under foia 1: holding that an adversary proceeding against a bank receiver is stayed pending exhaustion of administrative remedies 2: holding that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under section 1997ea 3: holding that while an original bankruptcy proceeding where the state is not named as a defendant is not a suit an adversary proceeding directly against the state would be 4: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "like the determination that inoculation against biological or chemical attack is warranted, Minns, 155 F.3d at 451 (emphasis added), or the determination of what constitutes appropriate \u201cdefense of national borders.\u201d Tiffany, 931 F.2d at 278. This case simply does not involve the exercise of \u201cprofessional military discretion.\u201d As the Third Circuit held in rejecting the argument that the discretionary function exception barred a negligence claim against the government for the conduct of a Navy employee: This case is not about a national security concern, but rather a mundane, administrative, garden-variety, housekeeping problem that is about as far removed from the policies applicable to the Navy\u2019s mission as it is possible to get. Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). These words are equally applicable here. The Holdings: 0: holding discretionary function exception is no shield to claim of negligence in failing to provide handrails or adequate lighting on footpath 1: holding asserted negligence in failure to provide adequate lighting or warning in federally controlled parking lot not shielded by discretionary function exception 2: holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision  3: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 4: holding that an agent acting outside his delegated authority is not protected by the discretionary function exception", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, provides: In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. (Emphasis added). Thus, the very terms of the Act and its subsequent interpretation by the courts have made the exercise of declaratory judgment jurisdiction discretionary. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 126, 88 S.Ct. 733, 746-47, 19 L.Ed.2d 936 (1968); Public Service Comm\u2019n, 344 U.S. at 241, 73 S.Ct. at 239; Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 804 F.2d 129, 134-35, 231 USPQ 653, 657-58 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The reason for giving this discretion to the Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action 3: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 4: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs\u2019 ordinary negligence claims because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Vanhorns were volunteers acting for a nonprofit organization within the scope of their responsibilities. A. Volunteers \u201cVolunteer\u201d is defined as \u201can individual performing services for a nonprofit organization or a governmental entity who does not receive [] compensation (other than reasonable reimbursement or allowance for expenses actually incurred) [] or [] any other thing of value in lieu of compensation, in excess of $500 per year[.]\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14505(6). An individual generally qualifies as a \u201cvolunteer\u201d if he is not compensated. Segway, Inc. v. Special Olympics Conn., Inc., 2015 WL 1244509, **7-8 (Conn.Super. Feb. 23, 2015) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); McGeorge v. Town of Hamden, 2012 WL 1434904, Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding no issue of material fact as to whether defendant was volunteer because he received no compensation 2: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 3: holding no prejudice occurred because no new information was presented on the material matter in dispute 4: holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Chief Justice. AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. (\u201cAHS\u201d), appeals from an order entered by Judge Don Davis of the Mobile County Probate Court denying its petition for an award of expert-witness fees in civil-commitment proceedings. This case presents a matter of first impression: Whether a publicly funded organization is entitled to expert-witness fees for an employee who gives expert testimony at involuntary civil-commitment hearings. I. Facts and Procedural History The board of directors of AHS, the community mental-health agency for Mobile County and Washington County, is appointed by the governing bodies that authorize and fund it. See \u00a7 22-51-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975; Ex parte Greater Mobile-Washington Cnty. Mental Health-Mental Retardation Bd., Inc., 940 So.2d 990, 1005 (Ala.2006) (<HOLDING>). An AHS employee provides expert-witness Holdings: 0: holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding a state agency as an arm of the state cannot constitute a person under  1983 because it is a sovereign entity 3: holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver 4: holding that ahs although a public corporation  21512 alacode 1975 is an independent entity rather than a state agency", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statute governing failure to appear. Defendant in this case was. Issue Five: Trial Court\u2019s Finding, by a Preponderance of the Evidence, That Arizona Conviction Was a Felony Conviction Was Not Error {34} Defendant challenges the State\u2019s proof of one of his prior convictions, contending that it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and asserting that there was insufficient evidence under any standard to show a prior felony conviction. Apprendi, by its express terms, does not apply to prior convictions. See id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (indicating that holding applies to facts \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction\u201d); see also United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414-15 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). {35} The standard of proof applicable to the Holdings: 0: holding that almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 in which supreme court held it unnecessary to prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt is narrow exception to apprendi 1: holding that almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 s ct 1219 140 l ed 2d 350 1998 expressly held that a prior conviction need not be proved to a jury and the united states supreme court has not held otherwise since 2: holding that we are bound to follow almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 even though it has been called into question unless it is explicitly overruled by the supreme court 3: holding that the supreme courts holding in almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 that the government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence remains binding precedent 4: holding that almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 remains good law and rejecting the contention that prior convictions must be admitted by the defendant or found by the jury", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "decision, however broad it may seem, is actually quite narrow in two respects. First, our decision holds only that Sheriff Arpaio lacks standing to challenge DACA and DAPA, not that those programs are categorically shielded from suit. Indeed, those programs are currently subject to challenge in a number of other circuits. See Texas, 787 F.3d at 747-55 (upholding Texas\u2019 standing to challenge DAPA based on the costs of providing drivers licenses to DAPA beneficiaries); Ariz. DREAM Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 15-15307, 81 F.3d 795, 2015 WL 300376 (9th Cir.2015) (ordering the parties, and inviting the federal government, to file briefs discussing whether DACA violates the separation of powers or the Take Care Clause of the Constitution); cf. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>). Second, today\u2019s decision does not take issue Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 1: holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state 2: holding that the state police is a state agency 3: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 4: holding mississippi lacked standing to challenge daca because the state failed to submit   evidence that any daca eligible immigrants resided in the state or produce evidence of costs it would incur if some dacaapproved immigrants came to the state", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as \u201cthe jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness\u201d and to draw inferences about the witness\u2019s reliability. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. McCullough, 631 F.3d 783, 790 (5th Cir.2011) (\u201cA defendant\u2019s Confrontation Clause rights are satisfied when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). To this end, we have previously held that a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied even when the district court limits cross-examination to basic information concerning a witness\u2019s prior convictions. See, e.g., McCullough, 631 F.3d at 791 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 Holdings: 0: holding that crossexamination about whether witness previously provided false information clearly was admissible as probative of the witnesss veracity 1: holding that the quashing of a defendants subpoena for a prosecution witnesss complete immigration file did not violate the defendants confrontation rights where the defendants crossexamination enabled the jury sufficiently to assess the witnesss credibility 2: holding no confrontation right violation where the district court limited crossexamination to basic information about the witnesss convictions and prohibited inter alia descriptions of the witnesss conduct during the incidents leading to his convictions emphasis added 3: recognizing that even evidence of a defendants and a witnesss prior bad acts was admissible to show inter alia the defendants familiarity with the witness 4: holding that testimony supporting the witnesss character for truthfulness was improperly admitted on redirect examination because there was no attack on the witnesss credibility or character during crossexamination", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the FIS engages in international diplomatic relations, see Amended Complaint, para. 34-36. At this time, the Court believes that it is premature to determine whether the FIS actually constitutes a de facto state for the purposes of jurisdiction under the TVPA. The de facto state doctrine requires the Court to make factual findings regarding the activities of the FIS. At this stage, the record contains only the bare allegations of the Plaintiffs. To make the requisite factual findings, the Court will await the further development of the record. 3. Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331 Because the ATCA supplies jurisdiction in this ease, the Court will not reach the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331 provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 246 (<HOLDING>). D. Justiciability Defendant Haddam claims Holdings: 0: recognizing the possibility that 28 usc  1331 supplies jurisdiction for violations of international law but not reaching the ultimate merits of the issue 1: holding that subject matter jurisdiction to review department of the interior decisions voiding mining claims is conferred by 28 usc  1331 2: holding that  ijinguistic consistency  required that the same arising under test be applied to the jurisdictional statute for patent claims 28 usc  1338a as is used for the general federal jurisdiction statute 28 usc  1331 3: holding that statutes conferring general jurisdiction including 28 usc  1331 do not waive sovereign immunity 4: holding that 28 usc  1331 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (determining that while the police officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the evidence was nevertheless admissible because the defendant had abandoned the drugs prior to his seizure). A panel of this court recently determined that abandoned property is subject to lawful seizure without a warrant. Wilson v. State, 825 N.E.2d 49, 51 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Hence, such property is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), trans. denied. By the same token, if property is abandoned after a citizen is improperly detained, the evidence is not admissible Wilson, 825 N.E.2d at 51; see also State v. Pease, 531 N.E.2d 1207, 1211-12 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). And the seizure of an individual does not Holdings: 0: holding extraneous evidence that defendant was using drugs admissible under rule 404b because evidence not offered to show that defendant was drug user and was using drugs at the time of the offense but to rebut the defense of consensual sex 1: holding that the trial courts damages award was against the manifest weight of the evidence because it was based upon inadmissible evidence 2: holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible 3: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiracy where the evidence did not show that individuals who sold drugs to the defendant knew that the drugs were meant to be resold 4: holding that because an improper frisk forced the defendant to abandon drugs that evidence was inadmissible", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(citations omitted). B. Here, the district court denied Oleson\u2019s motion to amend because the motion to amend was filed after the district court denied Oleson\u2019s underlying \u00a7 2255 motion. Apparently, the district court believed that a Rule 15(a) motion cannot, as a matter of law, be brought after a \u00a7 2255 habeas motion is denied. To date, this Circuit has not recognized that principle as a rule of law. Rather, we have emphasized that Rule 15 seeks to ensure that cases are . decided on thei because it was filed more than one year after the June 15, 1995 entry of judgment, and more than one year after the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (\u201cAEDPA\u201d) became effective on April 24, 1996. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255; see also United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Nor do other exceptions to the \u00a7 2255 statute Holdings: 0: holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action 1: holding that the aedpa oneyear statute of limitations applies to amendments to  2255 motions 2: holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations 3: holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion 4: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 924(c) offense. The fifth and final step in the Rybicki analysis, requires the district court to decide whether a departure, based on these appropriately classified factors, is, in fact, warranted and reasonable under the circumstances. 96 F.3d at 758; see also United States v. Terry, 142 F.3d 702, 707 (4th Cir.1998). We review the ultimate departure decision for abuse of discretion, and any factual determinations underlying this decision for clear error. Rybicki, 96 F.3d at 758. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court\u2019s decision to depart upward from a sixty-month sentence on count three to a sentence of 262 months. We agree with the district court that Scott Brooks\u2019s culpability in the death of Lock-lear and the physical injury of Floyd is at the 3 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the extent of the departure was Holdings: 0: holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range 1: holding that the defendants sentence did not violate apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties 2: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed 3: holding that an increased sentence may be imposed for harms that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants conduct even where the defendant did not directly cause the specific harm 4: holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "factual offense. For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Alston was not deprived of the Fifth Amendment\u2019s protection against Double Jeopardy. The Appellate Division\u2019s affir-mance of Alston\u2019s conviction on one count of first degree rape was neither an incorrect, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court double jeopardy jurisprudence. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, petitioner Bernard Alston\u2019s request for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and the petition is dismissed. Because petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, I decline to issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253(c)(1); Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . People v. Sandoval, 34 Holdings: 0: holding that under 28 usc  2253c1 certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right 1: holding that order denying relief under fedrcivp 60b in a habeas setting is the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding subject to the certificate of appealability requirement of 28 usc  2253c1a 2000 2: holding that a certificate of appealability issued without meeting the substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right requirement nonetheless suffices to confer appellate jurisdiction quoting 28 usc  2253c2 3: holding that if the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason would find debatable two issues 1 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling and 2 that the applicant has established a valid constitutional violation emphasis in original 4: holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "applied to appellant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment. Thus, because appellant\u2019s negligence claims fail as a matter of law, it was proper for the court to deny appellant\u2019s summary judgment motion, and his second assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed. Cooney, P.J., and McMonagle, J., concur. 1 . For at least 11 years prior to Merrill Lynch's involvement, Lesinski managed the trust as a representative of Everen Securities, Inc. In July 1999, he began working for Merrill Lynch. 2 . Appellant also commenced an arbitration proceeding against Lesinski and Merrill Lynch, pursuant to the National Association of Securities Dealers Dispute Resolution, seeking recovery for the same losses. 3 . See, e.g., Stevens v. Natl. City Bank (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 276, 281, 544 N.E.2d 612 (<HOLDING>); Natl. City Bank v. Noble, Cuyahoga App. No. Holdings: 0: holding that a constructive trust had arisen on a third partys house due to her use of trust assets which had been diverted by the paca trustee to pay the mortgage and finding that the trust beneficiary plaintiffs are entitled to a lien on the property in the amount of the diverted funds 1: holding that a trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to distribute the risk of loss within the trust by prudent diversification limiting the proportion of the total assets which are invested in any one stock or class of securities 2: holding that although a trustee is not required to watch the ticker as a speculator would    the question of the quality of judgment in holding or disposing of trust assets    coupled with evidence of failure to review or monitor the trust estate and refusal to meet with cotrustees presents a jury question on whether or not the trustee breached his duty 3: holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries  shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that they had no duty to defend against Starks\u2019s suit. Id. at 1127. But Starks was never \u201cacquitted,\u201d and it is not entirely clear whether he was \u201cexonerated\u201d when his convictions were vacated and a retrial ordered or only when the prosecutor dismissed the charges. Northfield Insurance appears to address this question, saying that \u201c[i]f the prosecution was abandoned for reasons of Starks\u2019s innocence, then May 15, 2012 [when the aggravated sexual assault charges were dismissed nolle prosequi ], is the trigger date for his malicious prosecution claim.\u201d 701 F.3d at 1131-32. By \u201cmalicious prosecution claim,\u201d the Seventh Circuit meant Starks\u2019s malicious prosecution, wrongful prosecution, and due process claims, which it was discussing collectively. Id. at 1130; see Brooks, 578 F.3d at 579 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Holdings: 0: holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  1: holding the same for malicious prosecution 2: holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated 3: holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists 4: holding that the statute applies also to malicious prosecution actions", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rule does not dispose of the case sub judien, however, because Sherwood originally made a motion for judgment at the close of its own evidence, not at the close of its opponent\u2019s evidence. The rationale for holding that merely \"renewing\u201d a motion for judgment does not preserve the issue for appeal is that the original motion for judgment is withdrawn once the party making the motion presents evidence. Smith v. Carr, 189 Md. 338, 56 A.2d 151 (1947); Md. Rule 2-519(c). Because Sherwood had already presented its evidence when it initially moved for judgment, and because it is evident that the reasons for the motion were clear to the trial judge, the issue is preserved. Hartford does not contend otherwise. See Laubach v. Franklin Square Hospital, 79 Md. App. 203, 216, 556 A.2d 682 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (citing Sergeant Co. v. Pickett, 283 Md. 284, Holdings: 0: holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived 1: holding plaintiffs reference to and attachment of franchise agreement excerpts in opposition to defendants motion did not convert motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment because plaintiff did not introduce support for arguments beyond the allegations in the complaint 2: holding that a motion to reconsider is not a second opportunity for the losing party to make its strongest case to rehash arguments or to dress up arguments that previously failed 3: holding that information contained in affidavits and depositions submitted as attachments to a memorandum were properly before the trial court and appellate court for purposes of a motion for summary judgment 4: holding that reference to memorandum previously submitted to court laying out with particularity arguments in support of motion preserves issue", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Injuries\u201d as a defense and presented expert witnesses who asserted: (1) the collision was one of low impact; and (2) that there was no me (1989) (finding the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a neuropsychologist that a motorist\u2019s behavioral changes were caused by either a combination of post-traumatic stress disorder and chronic pain syndrome or an organic affective disorder secondary to a mild brain injury \u2014 the appellate court stating the dispositive issue was whether the testimony would supply specialized knowledge that would assist the jury in determining a fact in issue). Finally, we find exclusion of the evidence was not harmless error as there was no equivalent testimony presented to this effect. Cf. Bernard v. Lott, 666 So.2d 702 (La.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in Holdings: 0: holding that because the warden and medical treatment director lacked medical expertise they cannot be liable for the medical staffs diagnostic decision not to refer plaintiff to a doctor to treat his shoulder injury 1: holding the exclusion of a neuropsychologists opinion regarding whether the plaintiff suffered a brain injury on the basis she was not a medical doctor was harmless error because additional medical experts testified about how the results of the neuropsychologists testing supported a finding of a brain injury 2: holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury 3: holding that experts medical opinion constituted no evidence because it was based upon speculation and surmise rather than reasonable medical probability 4: holding that erroneous admission of hearsay medical notes was harmless error when doctor testified and was subject to crossexamination", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201callege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court\u2019s jurisdiction to hear the cause.\u201d See Tex. Ass\u2019n. of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiffs claim should not be reached. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist, 34 S.W.3d at 554. However, \u201ca court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction is not required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so wh of immunity from liability by the defendant, and thus fails to state a cause of action upon which the relief sought can be granted, and his claim cannot be repled to state a cause of action, the trial court should not permit repleading but should dismiss the suit. See Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 378 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Brantley, 365 S.W.3d at 94 (stating Holdings: 0: holding that in the context of the federal tort claims act claims dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds are not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but for the existence of a defense 1: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern 2: holding that where plaintiff reata failed to demonstrate waiver of citys immunity from liability under tort claims act plaintiffs claims were properly dismissed and plaintiff was not entitled to replead 3: holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity 4: holding plaintiff must make some showing that an act giving rise to civil liability actually occurred finding plaintiff entitled to conduct discovery to learn identity of defendant where plaintiff offered evidence sufficient to demonstrate defendants committed an unlawful act", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "were not alleged in the indictment, whether he was an organizer or leader should not have been submitted to the jury. Because the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Soreide was an organizer or leader, and because Soreide was sentenced to 236 months imprisonment, which was below the statutory maximum of 20 years imprisonment, the district court did not unconstitutionally amend the indictment by enhancing Soreide\u2019s sentence based on his role as an organizer or leader. As to Soreide\u2019s argument that the district court failed to make the necessary findings under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a), we have held that a sentencing court is not obligated to specifically address and analyze on the record every factor set forth in \u00a7 3553(a). United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We find that the district court adequately Holdings: 0: holding that a district court does not have to state on the record that it considered every  3553a factor 1: recognizing that many of the  3553a factors are already incorporated into any guidelines determination and the  3553a factors can themselves overlap 2: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors 3: holding that to establish reasonableness of a sentence a district court need not explicitly discuss every  3553a factor on the record 4: holding a sentencing court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in  3553a", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court\u2019s] jurisprudence\u201d and that a \u201cburden of production\u201d is placed on the party seeking to rebut the presumption of regularity). Moreover, under settled Virginia law, \u201c[p]rior convictions may be proved by any competent evidence.\u201d Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 730, 652 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2007) (emphasis added) (citing Palmer v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 203, 207, 609 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2005)); see also Wilson v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 250, 254, 578 S.E.2d 831, 833 (2003). Evidence is competent for purposes of proving a prior conviction when that evidence requires \u201c[n]o conjecture or surmise ... to reach [the] conclusion\u201d that the defendant had indeed been convicted of the predicate offense or offenses. Perez, 274 Va. at 730, 652 S.E.2d at 98; cf. Palmer, 269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310 (<HOLDING>); Overbey v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 234, Holdings: 0: holding that a court may not engage in conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for which a defendant was convicted 1: holding that a nonmovant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment merely  on the basis of conjecture or surmise 2: holding a finding of fact by the commission may not be based upon surmise conjecture or speculation but must be founded on evidence of sufficient substance to afford a reasonable basis for it 3: holding that a factual finding must be supported by more than mere surmise or suspicion 4: holding a claimant must prove entitlement to benefits by the preponderance of the evidence which is not sustained by mere surmise or conjecture", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the aims of issue preclusion: to promote finality and judicial economy and to prevent inconsistent judicial decisions and endless litigation. Defendants next argue that our reasoning in Scherzinger II does not control here because this case involves the board\u2019s authority to investigate dismissals, while Scherzinger II involved only the board\u2019s authority to order the Scherzinger II custodians\u2019 reinstatement. That distinction misses the point of issue preclusion. Issue preclusion not only prevents a tribunal from deciding an issue that has already been decided, it also prevents a party, and those in privity with that party, from relitigating an issue that was already decided. See Skeen v. Dept. of Human Resources, 171 Or App 557, 560, 17 P3d 526 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 316 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a prior administrative decision actually decided ultimate factual issues that are essential to plaintiffs present claims and that issue preclusion therefore bars the relitigation of those issues 1: holding that courts should consider the merits of the litigants claims the nature of the factual issues the litigants ability to present his claims and the complexity of the legal issues 2: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator 3: holding issue preclusion bars section 1983 plaintiff from relitigating fourth amendment issue decided in state court criminal proceeding 4: holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars readjudication of issues when 1 the prior suit resulted in judgment on the merits 2 identical issues are involved 3 the issue was actually litigated 4 the issue was actually determined and 5 the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d at 863. Thus, our concern when presented with a search-and-seizure claim in the context of contractual consent is that the consent promised under the contract be voluntary. Cf. id. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862-63. Generally, contract terms are considered to be consensual or voluntary for the same basic reason that courts normally enforce contracts. Conceptually, courts enforce contracts because they are a product of the free will of the parties who, within limits, are permitted to def 82, 738 P.2d 336, 341 (1987) (\u201cA probationer, unlike a parolee, consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term.\u201d); People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, 634 (1971) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. State, 258 Ga. 424, 369 S.E.2d 909, Holdings: 0: holding condition of probation requiring probationer to consent at any time to a warrantless search by a law enforcement officer was unconstitutional 1: holding probationer may waive claims to privacy by agreeing in advance to permit searches at any time 2: holding that qatar did not by agreeing to arbitrate in france waive its sovereign immunity under  1605a1 3: holding probationer prospectively consents to searches by signing probation agreement 4: holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "540 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1345 (N.D.Ga.2007). [ 49 Thus, we must review the facts underlying each of CDC's remaining claims to determine the extent to which each claim is based on misappropriation of information. A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 150 The trial court rejected CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim on the ground that CDC failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Carsey owed CDC a fiduciary duty. The trial court did not address the issue of whether CDC's breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by the UTSA. However, Carsey argued below, and continues to argue on appeal, that CDC's breach of fiduciary claim is preempted by the UTSA. \"[An appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any l 4, 904 A.2d 652, 668 (2006) (<HOLDING>). 1153 We therefore affirm the trial court's Holdings: 0: holding copyright act preempted photographers misappropriation claim when claim did not have extra element such as breach of fiduciary duty 1: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts 2: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information 3: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was completely dependent on the facts concerning misappropriation of trade secrets 4: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "750, 752 (2d Cir. 1949). There is elaboration and analysis of this point in Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 165-169 (1983). 7 The equipment is spoken of as a \u201cmogul,\u201d possibly using that term in a sense derived from a dictionary meaning of a mogul as a locomotive used for hauling heavy trains. 8 Such a case as Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417, 419-420 (7th Cir. 1975), cited by Continental, turning on \u201cproperty damage,\u201d requires discriminating reading because the term was defined differently in the policy there at bar. A more-or-less standardized form of 1966 was succeeded by a form of 1973. Tinker, supra at 218, 232-235; 1 Long, supra at \u00a7\u00a7 11.01, 11.10. See Guerin Contractors, Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 5 Ark. App. 229, 236 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 9 \u201cOccurrence\u201d was defined in the policy as Holdings: 0: holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract 1: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 2: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 3: recognizing the increased breadth of the definition of property damage introduced in the more recent form of policy 4: holding that in a suit on a property damage insurance policy in which liability is not disputed but in which the amount of damage is disputed the amount is unliquidated", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appellant\u2019s counsel affirmatively stated that she had no objection to the amendment and that appellant waived the ten-day notice afforded at the defendant\u2019s request under article 28.10 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 28.10(a) (Vernon 1989). An indictment may not be amended on the day of trial. See State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). But in order to preserve the error for appeal, a defendant must object; otherwise, the error is forfeited. Id.; Hoitt v. State, 30 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. refd); Briones v. State, No. 2-04-00250-CR, 2005 WL 1120018, at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 12, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (not designated for publication); see also Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Garrett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 664, 669 Holdings: 0: holding if the state does not allege in the charging document the tolling of the statute in an otherwise sufficient information or indictment a defendant may by his actions waive this defense 1: recognizing that article 2810c provides that indictment or information may not be amended over defendants objection as to form or substance if indictment or information charges defendant with additional or different offense or if substantial rights of defendant are prejudiced 2: holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely 3: holding that defects errors and irregularities of either form or substance in an indictment or information must be raised by pretrial objection or are waived in postconviction proceedings indictment that failed to allege year of alleged offense contained a substantive defect but because defendant failed to object to this defect pretrial he could not raise it in a postconviction proceeding 4: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of retaliation Bell must first present evidence establishing a prima facie case \u2014 she has failed to do so. Specifically, Bell has not, and cannot demonstrate that she was terminated because of the EEOC claim she filed. Bell contends that the fact that her termination came seven months after her EEOC claim provides evidence of the causal connection. Mere timing alone is insufficient in this instance to satisfy the causation element of the prima facie case. B Even were a prima facie case established, Bell has failed to adequately refute the Bank\u2019s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Bank of America contends that it eliminated Bell and Barnhart\u2019s positions due to restructuring in the corporation. See E.E.O.C. v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Thus it falls to Bell to demonstrate that Holdings: 0: holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination 1: recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee 2: holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false 3: recognizing that even a personal grudge can constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision 4: holding that temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employers nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee was in fact pretextual", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "D.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 32-505 (providing medical review committee records a qualified privilege from discovery); Fla.Stat.ch. 766.101(5) & 395.0191(8) (1993) (stating that \"the investigations, proceedings, and records of the [medical review committee] shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence\u201d); Ga.Code Ann. \u00a7 31-7-143 (1998) (\"the proceedings and records of medical review committees shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action\u201d); Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 5/8\u2014 2101 (West 1992) (stating records of medical committees intended to reduce morbidity and mortality are privileged); Md.Health Occ. CodeAnn \u00a7 14-501 (1991 & 1994 Supp.) (providing that records of medical review committees are not discoverable); Tenn Code Ann. \u00a7 63-6-219 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Tex Health & Safety Code Ann. \u00a7 161.032(a) Holdings: 0: recognizing confidentiality essential to function of medical peer review committees and to improvement of health care and protecting the records of such committees from discovery 1: holding that hospitals may be found liable for conspiring with members of medical staff and that evidence of pretextual sham peer review proceedings presented jury question whether hospitals conspired with peer review committees in violation of sherman act 2: recognizing an individuals right of privacy in the content of health records and noting that health records are the property of the health care entity maintaining them 3: recognizing an overwhelming public interest in promoting improvement in health care through the mechanism of physician peer review 4: holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "relief, because it was filed almost five years after Dearman pled guilty. See Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015) (a motion for post-conviction relief must be filed within three years after the entry of a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea). The court also noted that the underlying statute of limitations issue was discussed on the record at Dearman\u2019s plea hearing. At her plea hearing, Dear-man\u2019s attorney acknowledged that the prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations because a warrant was issued for her arrest within about six weeks of the offense. See Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 99-1-7 (Rev. 2015) (\u201cA prosecution may be commenced, within the meaning of Section 99-1-5 by the issuance of a warrant .... \u201d); see also Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d 1153, 1158 (Miss. 1992) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 3. The circuit court correctly ruled that Holdings: 0: holding that a valid guilty plea waives a statute of limitations defense 1: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 2: holding statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a voluntary plea of guilty 3: holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea  emphasis added 4: holding entry of a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional issues", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court may not dismiss the Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 188 (finding Argentine case was at preliminary stage where formal investigation into possible misappropriation had just begun and there had not yet been any determination of actual wrongdoing). The Defendant by the Swiss District Court regarding Pablo\u2019s liability on Ms. Madanes\u2019 contractual claim would not dispose of the RICO claims in this action. For example, determining that Pablo is guilty on the contractual claim does not answer the question of whether he managed an international conspiracy; nor does a finding of innocence necessarily mean that no such conspiracy existed, especially among the other Defendants. See id.; Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 188 (<HOLDING>). The principal cases upon which the Defendants Holdings: 0: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information 1: holding that claim of misappropriation was distinguishable from claim of fraudulent inducement even though underlying facts were same 2: holding that suit arose from alleged fraudulent transfer of real property located in texas even though the allegedly fraudulent assignment occurred in california 3: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action 4: holding that even if utah law recognized tort of misappropriation such a claim would be preempted by copyright act", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "indicates \u201c[a] deliberate- and contumacious disregard of the court\u2019s authority[,] ... bad faith, or a willful disregard or gross indifference to an order of the court, or conduct which evinces deliberate callousness.\u201d Mercer, 443 So.2d at 946 (citations omitted). In the instant cause, the trial court dismissed Bonilla\u2019s first lawsuit with prejudice because Bonilla failed to attend several court-ordered depositions. Contrary to the trial court\u2019s ruling, the record in this case does not contain sufficient evidence to indicate that Bonilla exhibited the sort of wilful disregard for the court\u2019s orders which would support the sanction of dismissal, either with or without prejudice. In addition, throughout the time that Bonilla was unavailable for deposition, Apollo had been able DCA 1979) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, because the record supports Holdings: 0: holding that sanction of dismissal was warranted when plaintiff had failed to appear for deposition on multiple occasions and following plaintiffs failure to comply with orders of the court including an order that plaintiff make medical records available to the defendant 1: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 2: holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits 3: holding that dismissal is appropriate where failure to comply with courts orders prejudiced the defendants and burdened both the courts docket and the public interest in speedy litigation and the district court considered less drastic sanctions and warned the plaintiff before dismissal 4: holding that dismissal is not warranted where the plaintiff was unable to attend courtordered depositions because the military would not grant him leave time to comply with the courts orders", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "addressed only Dr. Keszler\u2019s conduct and did not mention SADI or implicate its behavior. Id. at 671. The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that \u201c[w]hen a party\u2019s alleged health care liability is purely vicarious, a report that adequately implicates the actions of that party\u2019s agents or employees is sufficient.\u201d Id. at 671-72. Although Gardner involved a corporation rather than a professional association, we conclude that its reasoning is equally applicable here. Therefore, we reject OGA\u2019s assertion, at least concerning \u201cpurely vicarious\u201d liability claims, that Dr. Brewer\u2019s expert reports concerning Drs. Jacobs and Gunn did not sufficiently implicate OGA. See id.; Ctr. for Neurological Disorders, P.A. v. George, 261 S.W.3d 285, 295 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, OGA did not object to Dr. Brewer\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that no expert reports specifically addressing conduct of professional corporation and professional association were required when plaintiffs alleged only vicarious liability based on medical negligence of entities physicians explaining that the entities conduct is not measured by a medical standard of care but rather their liability was solely vicarious 1: holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services 2: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 3: holding a condominium association had no duty to a woman who had committed suicide after the association removed the womans dog because while the association knew the dog was essential to the womans will to live the association had no authority to prevent the womans suicide 4: recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or the lodestar method in calculating fee awards. See Rawlings, 9 F.3d at 516-17; Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 532. However, the Sixth Circuit has observed a \u201ctrend towards adoption of a percentage of the fund method in [common fund] cases.\u201d Rawlings, 9 F.3d at 515; In re Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 398 F.3d 778, 780 (6th Cir.2005); see also \u00a7 21D(a)(6) of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 78u-4(a)(6) (\u201cTotal attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses award by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.\u201d) As the court observed in Fournier v. PFS Invs., 997 F.Supp. 828 (E.D.Mich.1998): The lodestar warding 30% fee); Rio Hair, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20440 at *56, 1996 WL 780512at *18 (<HOLDING>); In re Visteon Corp. ERISA Litig., No. Holdings: 0: recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge 1: recognizing that the acceptable range of fee awards is 20 to 50 of the common fund 2: holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances 3: recognizing that class counsels request for a 10 common fund award is well below the typical 2030 fee awards in class actions 4: recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Appeals, 677 A.2d 350 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996); City of Lancaster v. Lancaster County, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 476, 599 A.2d 289 (1991). 33 . Although two appellee briefs were filed, one on behalf of the Pierce plaintiffs and one on behalf of the Clifton plaintiffs, we will present their arguments collectively. 34 . Although not directly addressing the contours of a facial challenge, we have addressed the differences between facial and as-applied challenges in a number of scenarios, often for procedural purposes. See, e.g., Phila. Entm't & Dev. Partners v. City of Philadelphia, 594 Pa. 468, 937 A.2d 385, 392 n. 7 (2007) (\"[A]s-applied challenges require application of the ordinance to be ripe, facial challenges are different, and ripe upon mere enactment of the ordinance.\u201d); Beattie, 907 A.2d at 527-29 (<HOLDING>); Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 839 Holdings: 0: holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied 1: holding in the context of an asapplied challenge that when a defendant admits guilt of a substantive crime he cannot reverse course on appeal and claim the criminal statute is unconstitutional 2: recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal 3: holding that declaring statute facially unconstitutional deprives trial court of subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding section 61132b2c facially unconstitutional", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand.L.Rev. 265, 267-82 (1981), cited in R.A.V., \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring in the result). Congress has passed numerous laws that proscribe threats. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 871 (threats against the president and successors to the presidency); id. \u00a7 876 (threats by mail to injure or kidnap); id. \u00a7 1513 (retaliatory threats against informants and witnesses); id. \u00a7 115 (threats to assault, kidnap, or murder federal officials). These statutes have been consistently upheld as constitutional, despite the fact that they criminalize utterances because of their expressive content. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1400-01, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 Holdings: 0: holding that threats to inflict financial or personal harm are not true threats where no ones personal safety is threatened 1: holding that threats and fighting words are removed  from the scope of the first amendment 2: holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president 3: holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity 4: holding first amendment does not protect nonexpressive conduct", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the corporation and hardly ever harm it.\u201d Post at 893. But the dissent offers no support for this broad proposition, and we do not agree that this is a valid assumption. The dissent confuses the corporation\u2019s interests with the individual interests of its majority shareholders. But a corporate officer or director\u2019s duty is to the corporation and its shareholders collectively, not any individual shareholder or subgroup of shareholders, even if that subgroup represents a majority of the ownership. See, e.g., Redmon, 202 S.W.3d at 233; Somers, 295 S.W.3d at 11; Lindley, 349 S.W.3d at 124; Hoggett, 971 S.W.2d at 488. We do not determine the best interest of the corporation by examining only the interest of its majority shareholder^). See Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). Refusal to pay dividends, paying majority Holdings: 0: holding majority shareholder liable when he used his control of the board for the malicious purpose of  preventing dividends and otherwise lowering the value  of the stock of the minority shareholders 1: holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents 2: holding that corporate officer and majority shareholder could be held liable for acting in a manner that served his interests at the expense of the other shareholders because his interests and the corporations were not necessarily aligned 3: holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees 4: recognizing distinction between corporate officer acting on behalf of himself and corporate officer acting on behalf of his corporation", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the examination room during the questioning of Ms. Rodriguez certainly did not undermine the fairness or the validity of the trial. He was able to see and hear the entire interrogation of Carmen Rodriguez, and his attorney was present in the examination room. There is no indication in the record that the petitioner was impeded from consulting with counsel either before or after the examination. Accordingly, his exclusion from the examination room, assuming it was an error, is subject to harmless error analysis. See Feliciano, 223 F.3d at 112 (conducting portion of voir dire outside hearing of defendants subject to harmless error analysis where defendants present during entire jury selection process and were provided with opportunity to consult with counsel); Yarborough, 101 F.3d at 898 (<HOLDING>); Vilella, 49 F.Supp.2d at 238 (colloquy Holdings: 0: holding that defendants who do not object to jury instructions at trial are subject to a plain error standard of review on appeal 1: holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis 2: holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis 3: holding brief hearing not part of trial proper in defendants absence subject to harmless error standard 4: holding that where defendants counsel objected to the trial judges evidentiary rulings in evidentiary hearing but did not object to the defendants absence any claim of error due to defendants absence had been waived", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s holding in Reese indicates that escape is a continuing offense. A review of cases in other jurisdictions shows support for this characterization of the escape crime. Escape is considered a continuing offense by those courts \u2014 including the United States Supreme Court \u2014 that require an escapee to immediately submit to the authorities after an escape before the escapee can rely on a necessity defense to an escape charge. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413, 100 S.Ct. 624, 636, 62 L.Ed.2d 575, 592 (1980) (\u201c[W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that escape from federal custody ... is a continuing offense and that an escapee can be held liable for failure to return to custody as well as for his initial departure.\u201d); Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 350 (Alaska Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); Harbin v. State, 581 So.2d 1263, 1266 Holdings: 0: holding that in light of our recognition that escape presents a continuing threat of violence until the escapee is safely returned to custody we hold that for purposes of  2k21b5 every escape is sufficiently continuing such that possession of a gun subsequent to the initial departure from custody can qualify as being in connection with the escape 1: holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred 2: holding that necessity defense to escape did not require defendant to turn herself in and that escape is not a continuing offense 3: holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense 4: holding that because the necessity defense requires a defendant to turn himself in escape is a continuing offense", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Unlawful use of handgun in commission of crime.\u2014Any person who shall use a handgun in the commission of any felony or any crime of violence as defined in \u00a7 441 of this article, shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall, in addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of said felony or misdemeanor ... be sentenced to the Maryland Division of Correction[.] Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., Supp. 1982), Art. 27, \u00a7 36B(d). It is manifest that the General Assembly intended that a separate sentence be imposed upon any person convicted of a violation of Section 36B(d), \u201cin addition to any other sentence imposed by virtue of commission of said felony or misdemeanor.\u201d Id.; see, e.g., Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 145-49, 416 A.2d 265 (1980) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 990, 101 S.Ct. 1688, Holdings: 0: holding that separate sentences may be imposed for a violation of section 36bd and the predicate offense where both convictions were the result of the same act so long as the charges are brought in a single trial 1: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies as long as an alien is removable regardless of whether the predicate offense was the reason for removal 2: holding that notwithstanding code  182231s application to successive trials conviction of both the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy are permitted in virginia provided the convictions occurred as here in a single trial 3: holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand 4: holding each act of shooting from a vehicle constituted a separate and distinct crime explaining where completed offense has occurred a separate charge may be brought for a repetition of the same conduct", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an attorney\u2019s duty to provide adequate representation does not encompass the duty to foresee and protect a client from his own possible suicidal tendencies. Citing a string of cases which rigidly follow McPeake, common carrier defendant COLTS urges us to come to the same conclusion regarding COLTS responsibility to suicide decedent George Hudalc. Pennsylvania state courts and federal courts applying Pennsylvania law appear to have consistently relied on the McPeake decision. See Ferris v. Cleveland, Civil Action No. 3:10-1302, 2012 WL 2564782 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (granting a motion in limine that excluded testimony of a neuropsychologist to identify the causal relationship between a motor vehicle accident and the decedents suicide); Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (<HOLDING>); Cooper v. Frankford Health Care System, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts have statutory habeas jurisdiction over petitions filed by guantanamo detainees 1: holding that prison conditions are those aspects of prison life affecting the entire prison population 2: holding that prison guards who are employees of a private prison management firm are not entitled to a qualified immunity from suit brought by prisoners under  1983 3: recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals 4: holding that architects who designed prison were not liable for pretrial detainees suicide", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "154 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir.1998) (quotations and citations omitted). As a general rule, the grids may not be used conclusively if the claimant has nonexertional impairments that limit the ability to do the full range of work within a classification. See Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.1993); see also 20 C.F .R. \u00a7 404.1569a(c)(2) (stating that \u201c[i]f your impairment(s) and related symptoms, such as pain, only affect your ability to perform the nonexertional aspects of work-related activities, the [grids] do not direct factual conclusions of disabled or not disabled\u201d). However, they may be used to direct a conclusion if the claimant\u2019s nonexertional impairments do not significantly reduce the underlying job base. See Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This is because only significant Holdings: 0: holding that the record should contain evidence that the employee had demonstrated an ability to perform adequately 1: holding that under pwdcra the inability to perform a particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation instead the impairment must significantly restrict an individuals ability to perform at least a wide range of jobs 2: recognizing the majority rule 3: holding that the ability to perform a substantial majority of work in rfc assessment suffices for purposes of grids 4: holding that application of the grids is inappropriate if a claimant suffers from nonexertional impairments which diminish his or her ability to perform a full range of work", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as a debtor-in-possession. The Debtor has stated that he delegated to Mr. Kaplan the responsibility for preparing his financial disclosures on behalf of his estate. Transcript 8/28/2012, 54:3-56:7; Audio recording dated 10/15/2012 @ 12:47 pm, Bky. No. 12-11063MDC; Audio recording dated 10/15/2012 @ 3:14 pm, Bky. No. 12-11063MDC. Mr. Kaplan is indubitably providing accounting services necessary for the administration of the Debtor\u2019s estate. See, e.g., In re Renaissance Residential of Countryside, LLC, 423 B.R. 848, 860-61 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2010). However, from this Court\u2019s review of the record extant at the time of its decision to appoint a trustee, it did not appear that Mr. Kap-lan was an employee of the Debtor. See, e.g., F/S AirLease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 108 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Rather, it appeared that Mr. Kaplan was an Holdings: 0: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 1: recognizing  327b not applicable because party was not employed by the debtor 2: holding that the creditors committee could not sue third party aidersandabettors because the participation of the sole shareholder and decisionmaker of the debtor rendered the debtor a participant 3: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 4: recognizing that if a debtor did not satisfy section 109e and if it was jurisdictional the court could not convert debtors case because it would have no authority whatever over debtor", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(1997) (during a chase, officers saw passenger open vehicle door and drop a Crown Royal bag, typically used to contain illegal drugs, out of vehicle). 38 . The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that, where reasonable suspicion does' exist, \u201d[o]ur decisions make clear that questions concerning a suspect\u2019s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.\u201d Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 186-88, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2458-59, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). \u2019\u2019[I]f there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to identify him, to question h (Colo.2002) (<HOLDING>); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220, 273 Holdings: 0: holding that questioning of passengers on bus including asking for drivers licenses and tickets constituted consensual encounter and passengers were free to decline to answer questions 1: holding that request of passenger in vehicle lawfully stopped for traffic infraction for her identification was consensual encounter where there was no evidence that defendant was intimidated or forced to comply with request 2: holding that if random suspicionless questioning of bus passengers for inspection of identification and tickets was consensual encounter it was not a violation of passengers fourth amendment rights 3: holding officers request for passengers identification during stop constituted lawful consensual encounter 4: holding that an encounter was consensual where the defendant was comfortable during the encounter chose not to leave and acquiesced to the officers request to answer questions", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Judge. In this medical malpractice action, Raymond Santa Lucia appeals from the cost judgment rendered after a jury verdict in his favor. He first contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding from the cost judgment fees for Lawrence Forman and Dr. Hartley Mellish, the experts who provided testimony on the specific economic losses he incurred as a result of his injuries. The appellees properly concede Santa Lucia is entitled to recover these fees to the extent he can establish the fees were reasonable and necessary. See Payne v. Spier, 562 So.2d 440, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Santa Lucia also argues the trial court erred Holdings: 0: holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity 1: holding expert testimony was based on reasonable medical probability where there were multiple possible causes and expert testified that one cause was more probable than the others 2: holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover reasonable expert fees for a rehabilitation expert and economist 3: recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case 4: holding that an expert that had provided consulting services to the defendant relating to the litigation was not precluded from serving as an expert for the plaintiff", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for possession of thirty-five pounds of marijuana at an unspecified time in the past. We question whether this one-time possession charge constitutes an \u201cextensive history\u201d or \u201ctrafficking.\u201d Compare NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-31-20(A)(3) and (B) (2006) (defining trafficking as possession of \u201ca controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug; ... a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule I or II that is a narcotic drug; or . . . methamphetamine, its salts, isomers and salts of isomers\u201d with intent to distribute and stating that such trafficking is punishable as a first or second degree felony), with \u00a7 30-31-22(A)(1)(a) and (b) (defining possession with intent to distribute marijuana in an amount less than one hundred 6th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). {24} The State cites to State v. Lara, 110 Holdings: 0: holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep of the suspects garage and backyard incident to his arrest for possession of marijuana in the back yard because the government pointed to no specific articulable facts suggesting that someone else was on the premises who posed a danger to the officers 1: holding that the officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest on outstanding warrants because the officers had information that the defendant was suspected of running a methamphetamine operation on the premises other people were living there and assisting the defendant and at the time the sweep began the defendant had not yet been located 2: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene 3: holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest despite the defendants alleged involvement with narcotics and possession of weapons because the defendant did not resist and there was no noise or other evidence suggesting anyone else was present in the house 4: holding that the officers were entitled to conduct a protective sweep because they located the defendant in the house there were other people present and the defendant was actively trying to conceal drags", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or none at all.\" Id. at 110, 69 S.Ct. 463 (citing Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 160, 33 S.Ct. 66, 57 L.Ed. 164 (1912)). 52 . In support of this conclusion, the Court referenced the following precedent: (1) Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (reaffirming prior holdings that local governments may enact legislation intended to maintain the character and aesthetics of a municipality.); (2) Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) (upholding an ordinance that restricted land use to one-family dwellings on the grounds that a city's police powers encompass maintaining esthetics and societal values.); (3) Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954) (<HOLDING>) 53 . (Pl.\u2019s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 1: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 2: holding that plaintiff bears burden of production as well as persuasion 3: holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16 4: holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as very well might have been although not conclusive suffices to well ground claim", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "affairs that did not include the regulatory scheme, and therefore, Defendant cannot claim any adverse impact to his investment expectations. Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed.Cir.1994). With respect to the final factor concerning the \u201ccharacter of the government action,\u201d the Court concludes that this factor weighs against a conclusion that the Government\u2019s regulation in this case amounts to a taking. In considering the character of the government action, courts consider (1) the extent to which the action is retroactive, and (2) whether the action targets a particular individual. In this case, the Act is not being applied retroactively, and Defendant has not demonstrated that he is being singled out for application of the Act. See Brace, 72 Fed.Cl. at 356 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Holdings: 0: recognizing that an owners opinion testimony on the value of his property cannot be based on naked conjecture or solely speculative factors 1: recognizing the potential for discrimination by local officials among similarly situated property owners who are underrepresented in the general population 2: holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties 3: recognizing that individuals are generally not similarly situated when different decision makers are involved in the respective disciplinary action 4: recognizing that act and wetlands regulations are generally applicable to all similarly situated property owners and cannot be viewed as being directed solely at the plaintiffs", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "issues relating to denial of due process because of prosecutorial misconduct and a Sixth Amendment violation of being denied counsel during pre-trial proceedings were not properly raised below); White v. State, 324 Md. 626, 640, 598 A.2d 187, 194 (1991) (citing Md. Rule 8-131(a) in holding that a claim that the defendants were deprived of their constitutional right to present witnesses in their defense was not properly before the Court because the argument was not made to the trial court); In re John H., 293 Md. 295, 303, 443 A.2d 594, 598 (1982) (citing Rule 885, a predecessor of Md. Rule 8-131(a), not reaching the issue of whether a statute was constitutional because the issue of constitutionality of the statute was not argued to the trial judge n. 2, 772 A.2d 1260, 1266 n. 2 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 8-131(a) states: \u201cRULE 8-131. SCOPE OF Holdings: 0: holding that claims based on an alleged violation of double jeopardy constitute fundamental error which absent a knowing and voluntary waiver may be raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 2: recognizing in dicta the court of special appeals howell holding that double jeopardy claims may not be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 4: recognizing the general rule that a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay). Therefore, the district court was under no obligation to independently evaluate the articles and studies upon which Mr. Firstenberg\u2019s experts relied in reaching their conclusions. See Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co., 2010-NMCA-085, \u00b6 28, 148 N.M. 627, 241 P.3d 628 (stating that the district court may not consider inadmissible hearsay in deciding a summary judgment motion). {29} Rather, to the extent that Mr. Firstenberg wished to rely upon the contents of the articles and studies to demonstrate general causation, it was incumbent upon him to establish, via his experts, that the articles constituted reliable scientific authority. See Baerwald v. Flores, 1997-NMCA-002, \u00b6 18, 122 N.M. 679, 930 P.2d 816 (<HOLDING>); see also Andrews, 2011-NMCA-032, \u00b6 9 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court may rely on the testimony of an expert even if the expert did not interview the mother daughter or nonocs service providers 1: holding that an expert witnesss testimony on an ultimate issue was admissible recognizing that the expert did not specifically testify that the defendant was guilty or that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the applicable legal standard 2: recognizing that an expert may rely on an article because it is the expert who determines based on study and experience whether the article is reliable 3: holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible 4: holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "179, 183, 86 P.3d 139 (2004), our Supreme Court held that the 2002 amendments to the SRA require that sentencing courts include previously \u201cwashed out\u201d prior convictions in calculating a defendant\u2019s offender score at sentencing for crimes committed on or after June 13, 2002. Since Winings committed his crime on March 24, 2003, the sentencing court properly included his previously \u201cwashed out\u201d convictions. \u00b643 A majority of the panel having determined that the following portion of the opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. \u00b644 Affirmed. Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., and Houghton, J., concur. 1 The minute orders (one minute order pertains to the first degree burglary counts P.3d 269 (2001) (<HOLDING>). And in State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 555-57, Holdings: 0: holding that the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses and the weight of the evidence against the defendant of  3142g1 and 2 are best assessed in the charging district 1: holding that failure to identify the defendant in the information is an omission of an essential element because the primary purpose of the charging document is to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusations brought against him 2: holding that failure to identify the victim where the charge was interfering with domestic violence reporting is an omission of an essential element because the crime must be committed against a family or household member 3: holding if the state does not allege in the charging document the tolling of the statute in an otherwise sufficient information or indictment a defendant may by his actions waive this defense 4: holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the same reasons set forth in the District Court\u2019s opinion, we reject Bailey-El\u2019s contention that personal jurisdiction exists with respect to the USP Lee defendants. As the District Court correctly noted, there is no provision for nationwide sendee of process under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(d) and none of the USP Lee defendants has sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with New Jersey to confer personal jurisdiction. The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Bailey-El\u2019s complaint against Harrell Watts, the National Inmate Appeals Administrator for the BOP, holding that Watts enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity. Bailey-El argues that the Dis trict Court should have conducted a qualified immunity analysis under Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206-07, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We need not decide whether the doctrine of Holdings: 0: holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity 1: holding that even if the prison disciplinary committee failed to follow a state administrative regulation requiring the committee to convene within eight calendar days after commission of prison offense or its discovery the noncompliance did not of itself violate due process 2: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 3: holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy 4: holding that prison guards who are employees of a private prison management firm are not entitled to a qualified immunity from suit brought by prisoners under  1983", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the late arraignment or from any defect in the arraignment colloquy itself. Therefore, he has shown no violation of Idaho Criminal Rule 10 and no deprivation of due process in the arraignment that was conducted. Herrera also asserts that the district court erred by allowing the late filing of the amended information. His appellate argument implies that until the day of trial, he was entirely unaware that the amended information containing a persistent violator al legation had been filed by the prosecutor without leave of court. In the proceedings below, defense counsel never expressly said that he had not informed Herrera of the sentence enhancement allegation in the amended information that had been improperly filed months earlier. Herrera neverthel P.3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). Herrera has shown no trial prejudice Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 1: holding that the state courts determination that the petitioner could not show prejudice because he did not allege that the witness was available to testify was a reasonable application of federal law to the facts of the case 2: holding that the governments late disclosure of a statement by a government witness did not require reversal under the jencks act where the defendants were allowed a second chance to crossexamine the witness 3: holding that reversal for late disclosure of a states witness requires trial prejudice and defendants claim that he turned down an attractive plea offer because he thought the state could not prove its case without the witness does not demonstrate prejudice 4: holding that prejudice existed when an attorney was both the trial counsel and a necessary witness", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "claim under the ADA, we reject Russell\u2019s disparate treatment argument vis-a-vis her sex discrimination claim under Title VII. As explained above, in accordance with facts not genuinely disputed, we cannot reasonably infer that the infractions committed by Drew and Evans were of comparable seriousness to Russell\u2019s. C. Retaliation claim Finally, Russell argues that the District Court erred in holding that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her retaliation claim. She contends that her retaliation claim is reasonably related to, or grows out of, the substance of her allegations in the administrative charge and therefore was sufficiently exhausted. Brief for Appellant at 55-57 (citing, e.g., Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>)). In support of this argument, Russell Holdings: 0: holding that claimant exhausted administrative remedies only as to the complaints made in the original charge and factually related claims that reasonably could be expected to grow out of the administrative investigation of that charge 1: holding that regarded as claim is reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability alleged in eeoc charge 2: recognizing that a claim is administratively exhausted if it is specifically stated in grows out of or is reasonably related to the substance of the allegations in an administrative charge or complaint 3: holding individual employee may assert unexhausted retaliation claim if the later claim is reasonably related to the allegations in the employees timely filed charge 4: holding sexual harassment claim was not like or related to retaliation allegations and therefore was outside the scope of the administrative charge", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has \u201cjurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to ... a proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(b)(1) (2012). A party is an \u201cinterested party\u201d with standing to bring suit under' 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(b)(1) if the party \u201cis an actual or prospective bidder whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract.\u201d Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2013). A bidder has a direct economic interest if the alleged errors in the procurement caused it to suffer a competitive injury or prejudice. Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In a post-award bid protest, the protestor Holdings: 0: holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a  2 claim 1: holding that actual prejudice is not a necessary element of an insurers untimely notice defense 2: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 3: recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim 4: holding that prejudice or injury is a necessary element of standing", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: James Hampton Williams, II, was convicted by a jury on several counts related to his participation in a large-scale, ten-year long conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and was sentenced to life in prison. Specifically, Williams was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(a)(1), 846 (2006); one count of conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1956 (2006); one count of cocaine distribution, in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a) 27 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 312 Holdings: 0: holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment 1: recognizing that its sixth amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence 2: holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing 3: holding that the fact of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes need not be proved to a jury or admitted by defendant to satisfy the sixth amendment 4: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the FDCA.\u201d Id. Courts have struggled with applying the Supreme Court\u2019s preemption rulings to cases involving the Infuse device. Though they uniformly agree that the PMA process imposes requirements on the Infuse device, both the second step of the Riegel analysis and the scope of Buckman have prompted disagreement. This Court\u2019s view is that some of these cases have read Riegel and Buckman \u2014 especially Buck-man \u2014 too broadly, see, e.g., Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 921 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1219 (W.D.Okla.2013) (finding that fraud claims are impliedly preempted by Buckman because \u201ceven the concept of \u2018off-label use\u2019 is a creature of the FDCA\u201d), while others have read Riegel too narrowly, see, e.g., Ramirez, 961 F.Supp.2d at 988-92 (<HOLDING>). At least one court has read Riegel and Holdings: 0: holding that riegels shield drops if plaintiff alleges offlabel promotion and that most claims including design defect claims evade preemption 1: recognizing presumption against preemption presumption is properly applied to state law design defect claims against manufacturer of pacemaker fda premarket approval of device did not require preemption 2: holding that a plaintiffs claims arise under the statute that provides the federal cause of action he or she alleges 3: holding that carmark act preempted state law claims including those for liability for payment of claims 4: holding that claims including constitutional claims must be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(including changing leadership and terminating some employees) and then merged with PA\u2019s Information Technology Infrastructure group. (Moynihan Dep. at 78-79, 130-131.). At that point, the record shows that Mr. Moynihan put Patrick Kelly, the Head of the Information Technology Infrastructure practice, in charge of implementing the RIF, see Moynihan Dep. at 130-131, and Mr. Kelly testified that he decided to include Ms. Barnett in the RIF because her trade practice did not fit with the Transportation Group\u2019s practice. (Kelly Dep. at 223-224.). The court finds that PA has produced sufficient evidence to indicate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Ms. Barnett. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259-260, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The burden is now on Ms. Barnett to produce Holdings: 0: holding that an order was final for these identical reasons 1: holding that in producing nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action the employer is not obligated to support these reasons with objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard 2: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action 3: holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 4: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "evidence was sufficient to support Rawlins\u2019s convictions for first-degree aggravated rape and child abuse. However, the Superior Court committed constitutional error in permitting the People to read the prior testimony of J.J. and Melendez into the record at Rawlins\u2019s second trial because the Superior Court erred in finding that they were unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Further, this Court cannot hold that this error was harmless since the People failed to file a brief in this case, thus failing to meet its burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we vacate the Superior Court\u2019s January 16, 2014 judgment and remand for a new trial. 2 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). 3 Prior to reading JJ.\u2019s and Melendez\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness 1: holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant 2: holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination 3: holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination 4: holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant   had a prior opportunity to crossexamine", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "interest that might justify contribution limits-the interest in preventing \"circumvention of contribution limits designed to combat the corrupting influence of large contributions to candidates.\" 533 U.S. at 456 n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2351; see also id. at 456, 121 S.Ct. 2351; [Federal Election Commission v.] Beaumont, 589 U.S. [146] at 155, 128 S.Ct. [2200] at 2207 [156 L.Ed.2d 179 (20083) (\"[Rlecent cases have recognized that restricting contributions by various organizations hedges against their use as conduits for 'cireumvention of [valid] contribution limits. \" (quoting Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 456 & n. 18, 121 S.Ct. 2851) (second alteration in original)); Cal. Med. Ass'n [v. Federal Election Commission], 458 U.S. [182] at 197-99, 101 S.Ct. 2712 [69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981)] (<HOLDING>); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-36, 88, 96 S.Ct. 612. Holdings: 0: holding that congress intended the qta to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the united states title to real property emphasis added 1: holding that limits on contributions to multicandidate committees are an appropriate means by which congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this court in buckley 2: recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree 3: recognizing contribution in the appropriate case 4: recognizing a right to contribution", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction the federal courts apply federal law as to matters of procedure\u201d). As a result, any differences in procedural rules are irrelevant to the instant case. For this reason, we decline to consider the procedural discrepancies highlighted by appellants in our determination of whether the issues in the present appeal are identical to the issues presented in Canady I. Appellants additionally argue that there is no identity of issues because the state law claims covered a different time period than the federal law claims. We find this argument unpersuasive. The difference in time periods does not affect the underlying nature of the claims at issue, and therefore the difference in time periods is irrelevant in determining whether the issues were identical. See Xiong, 195 F.3d at 427 (<HOLDING>). Because appellants do not assert any Holdings: 0: holding that denial of class certification is not a judgment for purposes of the antiinjunction act while the underlying litigation remains pending 1: holding that difference in claims alleging the same violations over different time periods are immaterial in determining identity of issues for purposes of applying the relitigation exception to the antiinjunction act 2: holding that evidence of the same name and that the former conviction was in same city and same court as the present case and the fact that the defendant did not offer any testimony to rebut the prima facie evidence of identity was sufficient to establish identity 3: holding that evidence of the same unusual name with the same address in the same city for the same offense of selling liquor in the same judicial district was sufficient to establish identity 4: holding that denial of class certification in stillpending federal action lacked sufficient finality to invoke relitigation exception to antiinjunction act", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as to preclude presentation of the merits of the case should not be assessed absent a party\u2019s flagrant bad faith or counsel\u2019s callous disregard for the responsibilities of discovery under the rules.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515, 87 S.Ct. 625, 628, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), the United States Supreme Court determined that a penalty may be anything that makes the assertion of a constitutional right costly. If used properly, the privilege against self-incrimination is not a proper basis for a death-penalty sanction. The Texas Supreme Court has had occasion to revisit TransAmerican, and continues to insist that death-penalty sanctions are inappropriate absent a finding of bad faith. See Otis Elevator Co. v. Parmelee, 850 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>); Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Caldwell, 850 Holdings: 0: holding that without a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the attorney in question sanctions pursuant to this statute are inappropriate 1: holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions 2: holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion 3: holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where plaintiff refused to name coworkers who used drugs and was late in answering interrogatories because of attorneys illness because there was no indication of bad faith 4: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "form or ceremony was necessary for dedication of land, and that title to land dedicated to public use inured to the benefit of the donee, i.e., the City of New Orleans). Similarly, Plaintiffs admit that \u201cthere is no doubt .the Beauregard Equestrian Monument is inside City Park,\u201d R. Doc. 139-3 at 3, and there is also \u201cno question that the property of City Park ... has always belonged to the City, of New Orleans.\u201d See City of New Orleans v. State, 443 So.2d 562, 570 (La. 1983). Similarly, the Jefferson Davis Monument is located in the neutral ground of Jefferson Davis Parkway, which is also public property. See La. Civ. Code art. 450. Finally, State ex rel. Singelmann v. Morrison makes clear that the City has authority to remove the Monuments. 57 So.2d 238, 244 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (<HOLDING>). In all, the City owns the. property upon Holdings: 0: holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract 1: holding that the city of new orleans had the right to permit erection on public property of a privatelyfunded memorial to the memory of mother cabrini 2: holding that city rules governing taxicab rides to destinations outside of the city are not invalid merely because they incidentally embrace activities outside of the city 3: holding that a private association could not erect a memorial on public property without consent of the governing authority that the location manner and design of statues is within the discretion of the governing authorities of the city of new orleans and that the city of new orleans can require removal of monuments located on public property 4: holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the confidential informant was a buyer or recipient because the enhancement applies with respect to the undercover officer who was undisputedly a buyer and recipient. JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in full in Parts I \u2014 III of the opinion. With respect to Part TV, I would caution against deciding this case on the rationale utilized in the majority court opinion. \"While the opinion correctly states that the individual\u2019s possession of the firearm in question need not be actually unlawful, it overlooks the fact that the defendant must have had knowledge or reason to believe that the individual to whom the firearm was transferred had certain prior convictions or is under a criminal justice sentence. See United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 643-44 (11th Cir.2015) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Howard, 539 Fed.Appx. 904, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants actions fell under the unlawful possession prong where the defendant transferred at least one firearm to a known felon 1: holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act 2: holding that the government failed to prove the defendants actions fell under the unlawful possession prong bjecause the government failed to present any evidence that the defendant knew that his conduct would result in a firearm being transferred to an individual falling under the narrow guidelines definition of an individual in unlawful possession 3: holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual was not registered making the individuals possession of it necessarily unlawful 4: holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "term of the probation, the trial court should be able to weigh that violation in its reevaluation of whether the defendant should be or should have been granted probation.... Once a defendant has been sentenced, the court may revoke or modify probation, upon a proper showing of a violation, at any time before the completion of the probationary period. Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (internal citations and footnote omitted). Pugh claims the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation because her only probation violation was drinking vodka. Courts of this state have held on numerous occasions that the use of alcohol or drugs was sufficient to support the trial court's revocation of probation. See, e.g., Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 552 (Ind.1999) (<HOLDING>), reh'g denied; Crump, 740 N.E.2d at 573 Holdings: 0: holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendants probation when urinalysis tested positive for use of morphine 2: holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence 3: holding defendant cannot establish prejudice merely by alleging court held probation revocation hearing after defendants period of probation expired 4: holding defendants positive urinalysis test for marijuana use was sufficient to support revocation of defendants probation", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "mere anxiety or annoyance. Because of our ruling in Lopez, which was well argued before the trial court in this case, I would hold that the court erred in its application of the emotional distress prong of the stalking statute to the findings in this case. 127 In reviewing the trial court's application of the second element of the stalking statute to the facts in this case, the findings support the trial court's conclusion that Bayles knew or should have known that his conduct would cause emotional distress to Bailey. However, the court did not specifically find, in support of this element, that plaintiff suffered from more than anxiety and annoyance, perhaps because plaintiff put on no objective evidence thereof. CJ Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993) (<HOLDING>); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 Holdings: 0: holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness 1: holding that employee could not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under fela without a showing of physical impact 2: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress and that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 3: holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere  conclusory statements  rather they must  sufficiently articulate  true demonstrable emotional distress  including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any 4: holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "failing to \u201cproperly investigate any avenues of defense\u201d \u2014 other claims, such as the claim that counsel failed to move to suppress the drugs and failed to contact the owners of the building, present issues upon which the District Court could have proceeded. Furthermore, some of Mercer\u2019s other claims, such as the claim that the prosecution had bribed Yians and Hart, are not the type of claims that Mercer could realistically support at this stage of the proceedings; while Mercer may well fail to meet his burden of proof on these claims, he alleged sufficient facts to withstand summary dismissal. Therefore, we believe that the District Court should consider anew the various grounds for relief, and dismiss only those grounds that are truly vague and conclusory. See Thomas, 221 F.3d at 437 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court should overturn a district courts denial of a motion to amend a complaint only if the district court has abused its discretion 1: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend 2: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 3: holding that the district court erred in summarily dismissing a  1983 complaint that should have been brought as a habeas petition 4: holding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a  2255 motion where only certain claims were vague and conclusory", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as to whether there was contact between the bus and Requester\u2019s vehicle, the adjuster nonetheless reviewed them as part of the noncriminal investigation into Requester\u2019s claim against the Authority. The plain language of the noncriminal investigation exemption is also instructive. As Section 708(b)(17)(ii) of the RTKL provides, a record is exempt when it relates to a noncriminal investigation and includes \u201cinvestigative materials.\u201d The noncriminal investigation at issue (1) commenced when Requester filed a property damage claim with the Authority involving one of its buses; (2) was conducted pursuant to the Authority\u2019s self-insurance right and power; and (3) was tantamount to a systematic or searching inquiry and/or a detailed examination. Dep\u2019t of Health, 4 A.3d at 810-811 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the recordings, which the Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent 1: holding that an investigation means a systematic or searching inquiry a detailed examination or an official probe 2: holding that based upon means similar to or supported by 3: holding that after a reasonable investigation an insurer must promptly settle a claim for the value or within the range assigned to the claim as a result of its investigation 4: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "could constitute objective indicia of Israel\u2019s knowledge of the underlying felony that the State was alleging that he committed. At best, the record reveals that Israel suspected that the underlying felony alleged was Terroristic Threatening in the First Degree and made arguments based on that suspicion in his motion to dismiss; such suspicion does not rise to the lev ulars was supplied by the State and there is nothing in the record to suggest that any materials provided in response to Israel\u2019s discovery requests identified the underlying felony alleged as part of the HRS \u00a7 134-6(a) charge. Moreover, the State cannot rely on the mere possibility that the underlying felony might have been revealed by a bill of particulars or via discovery. Cf. Robins, 66 Haw. at 316, 660 P.2d at 42 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we hold that the State failed to Holdings: 0: holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted 1: recognizing that the scope of issues in interlocutory appeals is limited 2: recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position 3: recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rationale that an em ployer\u2019s duty to provide a safe work place is inseparable from its general duties as an employer. See, e.g., Royster v. Montanez, 134 Cal. App.3d 362, 184 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1982); Holzworth v. Fuller, 122 N.H. 643, 448 A.2d 394 (1982); Gore v. Amoco Production Co., 616 S.W.2d 289 (Tex.Civ.App.1981); Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 384 So.2d 17 (Ala.1980). We conclude that this case falls within the latter category of cases, where application of the doctrine would undermine the policy sought to be achieved by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law. Therefore, we refuse to apply the doctrine here and affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Federal on the wrongful death claims. See Doe v. St. Michael\u2019s Medical Center, 184 N.J. Super. 1, 445 A.2d 40 (1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Katchis v. Miami Heart Institute, Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 1: holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will 2: holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented 3: holding that workers compensation statute barred suit of medical technologist who was allegedly raped and robbed in dormitory room which she rented from the hospital at which she was employed 4: recognizing that at least for certain purposes a hospital room is fully under the control of the medical staff yet for other purposes it is the patients room  because patient understands that nurses doctors food handlers and others enter and exit hospital room in accordance with medical need and hospital routine", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of any position at the Inco plant, let alone those that were vacant or otherwise available to Plaintiff at the limited time in question. Kentucky law simply does not require the placement of a disabled worker in a job where he poses a hazard to himself or others as a form of reasonable accommodation. Blanton\u2019s primary argument on appeal is that there still remain material issues of fact that preclude summary judgment. We are not persuaded. First, although Blanton was not estopped from pursuing his claim by reason of his representations of total disability to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission and the Social Security Administration, what he related about his inability to work at the pertinent time was an important factor in the grant of summary judgment. See Blanton, 123 F.3d at 917 (<HOLDING>). Blanton had been a long-time faithful, Holdings: 0: holding that previous sworn statements made by a plaintiff in his request for disability benefits is a material factor for the court to consider in determining whether he is entitled to ada relief 1: holding if a plaintiff claiming discrimination under the ada demonstrates that his or her disability played a motivating role in the employment decision the plaintiff is entitled to relief 2: holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits 3: holding without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel that the plaintiff who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ada 4: holding that whether a person has a disability under the ada is an individualized inquiry", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. See id. In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993). Rather, t d injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of this court. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301 (D.C.Cir.2001) (recognizing that upgrade classification change from \u201creasonably anticipated\u201d to \u201cknown\u201d carcinogen caused some economic injury that could be redressed by reversing the classification). An organization has standing only if it meets a separate three-prong test. See Truckers United for Safety v. Mead, 251 F.3d 183 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Such standing exists where the organization\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 1: holding that employers have standing to sue 2: holding the homeowners association had standing to sue under the theory of promissory estoppel 3: holding that a motor carriers association has standing to sue on behalf of its members for department of transportations alleged abuses of agency authority 4: holding noncustodial father did not have standing to sue on his daughters behalf", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "318, 66 S.Ct. 154; see Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (\u201cEven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation\u2019s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State\u2019s subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.\u201d). \u00b6 15 International Shoe and the cases immediately following it addressed only in personam jurisdiction. Thus, the sole constitutional issue when a state sought to exercise either in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction continued to be the one posed by Pennoyer: Was the relevant property within the jurisdiction of the state? See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) (<HOLDING>). The hoary doe trine of Harris v. Balk, 198 Holdings: 0: holding that the basis of in rem jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state 1: holding that where prior state court had in rem jurisdiction district court could maintain in personam jurisdiction and simply deny requests for conflicting in rem relief because district court is fully capable of preventing inappropriate conversion of the suit to a proceeding truly in rem 2: holding that an action quasi in rem requires a seizure of property within the jurisdiction of the court or its equivalent 3: holding that in a quasi in rem action a district court does not have jurisdiction over the res when that property is not physically within the same state as the court 4: holding that a party cannot waive in rem jurisdiction under florida law and a court proceeding pursuant to in rem jurisdiction must actually possess in rem jurisdiction over the property that is the subject of the matter", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "assertion of jurisdiction over all co-conspirators, residents and nonresidents, based upon their involvement in a conspiracy which occurred within the forum. Under the conspiracy theory, the plaintiff must: (1) make a prima facie factual showing of a conspiracy (i.e., point to evidence showing the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant\u2019s knowing participation in that conspiracy); (2) allege specific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) show that the defendant\u2019s co-conspirator committed a tor-tious act pursuant to the conspiracy in the forum. Kohler Co. v. Kohler International, Ltd., 196 F.Supp.2d 690 (N.D.III.2002). See also American Land Program, Inc. v. Bo-naventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Plaintiff alleges as a \u201cfourth Holdings: 0: recognizing requirement that defendant conspired to commit an overt act in state in furtherance of the conspiracy 1: holding that a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an illegal act into which the defendant knowingly and voluntary enters and which is manifested by an overt act 2: holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 3: holding that telephone conversations and meetings were overt acts in furtherance of a drug conspiracy 4: holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "298 S.W.3d at 638 (citations omitted). 34 . Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. 35 . Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). 36 . Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 381-82 (citations omitted). 37 . Sw. Country Enters., Inc. v. Lucky Lady Oil Co., 991 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). 38 . Id. 39 . Id. 40 . Id. 41 . Id. at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 42 . Sw. Country Enters., 991 S.W.2d at 494. 43 . Enbridge Pipelines (E.Tex.j LP. v. Avinger Timber, LLC, 386 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tex.2012) (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558; Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.19 W.2d 147, 150 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 54 . See Gen. Motors v. Burry, 203 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly excluded doctors testimony that some of plaintiffs symptoms could be associated with alcoholism or alcohol withdrawal when no competent evidence indicated plaintiff was alcoholic or suffered from alcohol withdrawal 1: holding that delay resulting from defense counsels withdrawal based upon a conflict of interest was properly excluded from 180day time period 2: holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content 3: holding a trial courts decision involving withdrawal or discharge of counsel is subject to review for abuse of discretion 4: holding that the trial court was authorized to conclude that probable cause supported an arrest for dui when evidence showed that the officer detected the odor of alcohol coming from the defendants vehicle the defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol her breath tested positive for the presence of alcohol her speech was slurred and her eyes were red and watery and she failed the oneleg stand field sobriety test", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "property to the seller. Consequently, buyers argue that the February 24, 2013 transfer by the seller to Scenic View Farms, a de facto partnership, was not only unnecessary, but in fact transferred title to the property to Albert Misciagna and Peter Martin, and acted to frustrate, if not prevent, the transfer of good and marketable title to the property by seller to buyers as required by the agreement. In reviewing this history, we agree with the buyers\u2019 assessment of the law, but disagree that seller acted in bad faith, finding instead that seller\u2019s reliance on the advice of counsel was in good faith, albeit in error. \u201cA deed that purports to convey real estate to a nonexistent corporation has no effect.\u201d Borough of Elizabeth v. Aim Sher Corporation, 462 A.2d 811, 812 (Pa. Super. 1983) (<HOLDING>)', see also Lester Associates v. Commonwealth, Holdings: 0: holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit 1: holding that because no claims had been filed against the debtor existence of entity coverage did not make proceeds property of the estate 2: holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to enter default judgment in an in rem forfeiture action even though property owner had not consented to it because 28 usc  636c1 only requires the consent of the parties and the property owner having failed to comply with the applicable filing requirements was not a party 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that where an owner of property deeded the property to a corporation which had not been incorporated no articles of incorporation having been filed and which did not have any de facto existence before the filing of articles of incorporation over a year later the transfer was void ab initio", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "238 (stating that \"the argument by a trial counsel must be viewed within the context of the entire court-martial. The focus of our inquiry should not be on words in isolation, but on the argument as 'viewed in context.\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted). 16 . United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 179 (C.A.A.F.2005) (citations omitted). 17 . See Carter, 61 M.J. at 33; see, e.g., Gilley, 56 M.J. at 120-21 (citing Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32, 108 S.Ct. 864). 18 . See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (stating that \"[\u00a1Inappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, [do] not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding\u201d). 19 . See United States v. Carpenter, 51 M.J. 393, 396 (C.A.A.F.1999) (<HOLDING>). 20 . Appellant also alleged various claims of Holdings: 0: holding that the governments failure to argue harmless error results in a waiver of the argument 1: holding argument not waived for failure to object where party previously raised argument and district court considered and rejected it 2: holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument 3: holding that in light of the appellants failure to object to the prosecutions rebuttal argument against him any error in the prosecutions argument was harmless 4: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "passed over for promotions. See Dkt. No. 6 at \u00b6 11. Although Plaintiff does not expressly provide the allegations contained in this internal discrimination complaint, it is clear that he was alleging that he was passed over in retaliation for his advocacy in opposition to the Roman Catholic Church\u2019s handling of sexual abuse cases and in support of sexual abuse victims. Moreover, a second possible \u201cprotected activity\u201d occurred on April 6, 2011 when he reported to Defendant OASAS\u2019 Affirmative Action manager and Human Resources that Defendant Felter subjected Mm \u201cto harassment and public ridicule\u201d in front of co-workers. See id. at \u00b6 14. Although Plaintiff may have felt that he \u2022was the subject of retaliation, the amended complaint makes clear that Pl 11 F.Supp.2d 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Holdings: 0: holding that many actions taken by an employer though unfavorable to an employee do not constitute a basis for discrimination because they do not qualify as an ultimate employment decision 1: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 2: holding that complaints regarding violation of employer policies unrelated to impermissible discrimination do not fall within the scope of title vii and therefore do not qualify for protection under the statute 3: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii 4: holding the employees complaints must give adequate notice to the employer that the employee is complaining of conduct prohibited by title vii", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "take much to establish probable cause\u201d). Given everything that Raisbeck knew at the time of the arrest, it was reasonable for him to believe that Miller had sold 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (same). The phone calls that Detective Raisbeck had overheard and the surveillance of the restaurant provided even more corroboration. Although the detectives had not witnessed Miller do or say anything overtly incriminating on the day of the controlled buy, his actions were suspicious when considered in context. For example, Miller entered the restaurant with no apparent legitimate purpose only moments after Nicole had told him she \u201cneeded a hundred,\u201d a phrase Raisbeck interpreted as a request to purchase $100 worth of crack cocaine. See United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 586 Holdings: 0: holding that while some conduct consistent with drug activity may not arouse suspicion in an average citizen an officers training and experience of how drug crimes are committed may provide the officer with a different perspective and should factor into the rubric when determining the reasonableness of the officers suspicion 1: holding that a police officers opinion that a defendant was most definitely engaged in drug dealing was not proper lay testimony because it was based on the officers specialized training in narcotics and extensive experience in methamphetamine cases 2: recognizing officers qualification to offer nonscientific expert opinion of intoxication based on training and experience 3: recognizing that officers are entitled to rely on training and experience in forming belief that drug transaction has occurred 4: holding experts experience knowledge and training is considered in determining reliability", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was not a deadly weapon, its context in appellant\u2019s brief demonstrates that it is being asserted only to support the contention that the complainant did not suffer a serious bodily injury. 4 . See, e.g., Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). This is true even if the trial judge failed to give a reason or gave a wrong reason for the ruling. See id. 5 . Appellant\u2019s expert made no assessment of the extent or magnitude of the injuries to the complainant\u2019s mouth. Therefore, even if the relevant injury were confined to that solely resulting from the impact of the bottle, the expert provided no evidence that the complainant had not suffered serious injury in the form of disfigurement or impairment. 6 . See also Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tex.Crim. Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 1: holding that deadly force was unreasonable where according to the plaintiffs version of facts the decedent possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot him 2: holding that officers positioning himself next to his patrol car with gun drawn and then firing was a discretionary use of deadly force 3: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was not required where there was no evidence that decedent had attempted to assault appellant appellant could not retreat or that decedent was armed 4: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "After reviewing the transcript of the suppression hearing, we conclude that the record amply supports the district court\u2019s finding that this encounter between Cunningham and the officers was a consensual police-citizen encounter that does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See id. at 310 (listing factors appropriate for consideration in reviewing whether a seizure has occurred). Cunningham also challenges the district court\u2019s finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle. We conclude, however, that the facts of the encounter between Cunningham and the officers confirm that Cunningham consented to the search of the vehicle and that such consent was voluntarily given. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 Holdings: 0: holding that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of miranda rights a court must evaluate the totality of the circumstances 1: holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding 2: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 3: recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law 4: recognizing that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement and that voluntariness of consent depends on the totality of the circumstances", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "part; DISMISSED in part. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3. 1 . See Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that we review de novo \"whether a conviction under state law is a deportable offense\u201d); 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (stating that an alien is removable if he \"has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law ... relating to a controlled substance ..., other than a single offense involving possession for one\u2019s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana\u201d). 2 . See 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 802(6), \u00a7 812 sched. 111(a)(3) (providing that methamphetamine is a controlled substance). 3 . See United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852-53 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence 1: holding that the abstract of judgment may not sufficiently establish that the defendant pled guilty to a specific crime when the only other document provided was the charge which simply contained the generic broad statutory language 2: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error 3: holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty 4: holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "274, 280 (1969). 2 . Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(e) specifically requires an advisement of the defendant\u2019s right to compel the attendance of witnesses. 3 . SDCL 23A-27-6 provides: The report of a presentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition, and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the court. 4 . It is important to note that this is not a case where a defendant sought to contest the factual allegations contained in a presentence report. See Hansen v. Kjellsen, 2002 SD 1, \u00b6 11, 638 N.W.2d 548, 552 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, \u00b6 58, 579 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 1: recognizing the defense has a right to comment on the presentence report and may introduce evidence 2: holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error 3: holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report 4: holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The defendant argued that the victim consented to the beating because the two had an agreement that if the victim \u201cconsumed any alcoholic beverages (and/or became intoxicated), [defendant] would punish her by physically assaulting her.\u201d Id. Appropriately, the court held unequivocally that \u201cno one has the right to beat another[,] even though that person may ask for it.\u201d Id. at 31. Accordingly, we hold that consent is not a defense to a charge of assault with significa Dec. 221, 623 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1993) (\"[W]e are inclined to agree with the commentators and a number of our sister States who found consent not to be a defense to a battery based on injurious touching.\u201d). 5 . Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 514-15 (Ind.Ct.App.1993); see also Jaske v. State, 539 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ind.1989) (<HOLDING>); cf. Durr v. State, 722 So.2d 134, 135 Holdings: 0: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates 1: holding that consent to participate in the initiation into a prison gang is not a defense to the charge of battery 2: holding that assumption of the risk is not an available defense for civil battery 3: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 4: holding that in pennsylvania lack of informed consent claims utilize a battery standard that is a physician commits battery where the patient does not consent to the procedure on his person thus constituting a harmful or offensive contact", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.2001), an inmate was treated for nausea and severe headaches by the administration of various medications and other treatments before he was diagnosed with meningitis and died of that illness. Id. at 585. His widow claimed that his death was caused by the misuse of tangible property because the staff improperly administered medication and misused certain medical equipment. Id. The supreme court noted: There cannot be waiver of sovereign immunity in every ease in which medical treatment is provided by a public facility. Doctors in state medical facilities use some form of tangible personal property nearly every time they treat a patient. If there is waiver in all of those cases, the waiver of im 77, 380-82 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Ward, 280 S.W.3d at 356 (holding that alleged Holdings: 0: holding that contractors who constructed a large machine to employers specifications cannot be liable to injuries caused to employee as a result of the absence of certain safety features 1: holding that printouts from a breath test machine are not hearsay but rather the mechanicallygenerated reports automatically created by the machine they do not constitute outofcourt statements by any person or the conclusion of a third party not before the court   internal citations omitted 2: holding that state trade secret law could not protect vending machine mechanism where machine was sold to third party 3: holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though the fda did not require the use of such a machine 4: holding that allegations that injuries were caused by misuse of ekg machine did not fall within waiver provisions of ttca because plaintiff had not made affirmative allegation that ekg machine was incorrectly used or that its results were erroneous and reasoning that misuse of information produced by ekg machine caused injuries rather than device itself", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "immediate vesting of such rights in the donee.\u201d). Until the donor has absolutely and irrevocably divested herself of the title, dominion, and control of the subject of the gift, she has the power to revoke the gift. Edwards, 38 S.W.3d at 197; see also Troxel, 201 S.W.3d at 296 (\u201cAll dominion and control over the property must be released by the owner.\u201d). The donee does not have ownership of the subject of the gift until complete ownership has been transferred from the donor to the donee. Edwards, 38 S.W.3d at 197. An inter vivos gift must be absolute and not open for future reconsideration. Soto v. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB San Antonio, 868 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ ref'd); see also Dorman v. Arnold, 932 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Woodworth v. Cortez, 660 S.W.2d 561, 564 Holdings: 0: holding that as matter of law present donative intent not shown because donor intended for property to remain his until his death 1: holding that the doctrine of ademption seeks to give effect to a testators probable intent by presuming he intended to extinguish a specific gift of property when he disposed of that property prior to his death 2: holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion 3: holding that the district court did not err as a matter of law in issuing a discovery order because a death row habeas petitioner had shown good cause for seeking discovery 4: holding that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel because his statement i wanna call my lawyer when read in context did not represent a request to terminate the interrogation until his counsel was present", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "state provide him with a free transcript of the separate trial of a codefendant, the defendant must show that that transcript will be valuable to him. \u201cIn the present case, defendant did not show in the trial court and does not show on appeal how the transcript of the Audison trial would have assisted in trial preparation or impeaching witnesses. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion for the production of portions of the Audison trial transcript. 126 Mich.App. at 766-69, 337 N.W.2d at 917-18. Thus, where a defendant requested a transcript of a proceeding involving a codefendant, to which he was not a party, a number of jurisdictions have required a showing of particularized need. See People v. Russell, 7 Ill.App. 3d 850, 289 N.E.2d 106 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence 1: holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal 2: holding that a defendant was entitled to a transcript of the trial of codefendants who were tried together and convicted where one of the convictions was reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt 3: holding that where there were two possible grounds to revoke defendants probation and only one ground was relied on to revoke his probation defendant was not entitled to jailtime credit when he was later convicted on the offense that constituted the other ground it did not matter that the authorities learned about the ground for revocation while investigating the offense for which he was convicted sjection 558031 requires only that custody be related to the offense on which credit is sought because his custody was not related to the convicted offense he did not get any credit 4: recognizing that a defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Inc., 64 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1164 (M.D.Ala.1999) (finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover $115.00 in actual damages for correspondence and travel and finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs suffered actual damages in the amount of time taken away from work to prepare correspondence and travel to pick up registered mail); John-stone v. Bank of America, N.A, 173 F.Supp.2d 809, 816 (N.D.Ill.2001) (finding that plaintiff could recover for loss of time and inconvenience provided that she could establish actual pecuniary loss); Cortez v. Keystone Bank, Inc., No. 98-2457, 2000 WL 536666, *12 (E.D.Pa. May 2, 2000) (acknowledging that if the loan servicer failed to make appropriate corrections within 60 days after receiving a 2d 809, 815 (N.D.Ill.2001) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. Litton Loan Servicing LP., No. Holdings: 0: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 1: holding that plaintiffs respa claim failed as a matter of law where it did not allege actual damages 2: holding that even emotional damages could constitute actual damages for purposes of  2605f1a 3: holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages 4: holding that actual damages under respa included emotional damages", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201clook[ed] into this Court\u2019s computer.\u201d Id. at 5-6. To prevail under Rule 60(b)(2), \u201cthe movant must demonstrate that: (1) the newly discovered evidence is of facts that existed at the time of trial or other disposi tive proceeding; (2) the party seeking relief was justifiably ignorant of the evidence despite due diligence; (3) the evidence is admissible and is of such importance that it probably would have changed the outcome; and (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching.\u201d Duckworth v. U.S. ex rel. Locke, 808 F.Supp.2d 210, 216 (D.D.C.2011). Here, Walsh argues that his allegations have been confirmed by Edward Snowden. However, information that merely confirms Walsh\u2019s assertions is not new information for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(2). See Duckworth, 808 F.Supp.2d at 216 (<HOLDING>). Rule 60(b) is not \u201ca vehicle for presenting Holdings: 0: holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record 1: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 2: holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense 3: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted 4: holding that material submitted by appellant that is cumulative of evidence previously of record is not new", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "[\u00b6 19] When potential destruction of evidence is the alleged exigent circumstance, officers must provide some particularized basis for their suspicion. See Herrick I, 1997 ND 155, \u00b6 23, 567 N.W.2d 336 (stating no evidence was presented, other than the possible existence of drugs and an explained belief defendant would dispose of evidence if forewarned); cf. State v. Jones, 358 N.J.Super. 420, 818 A.2d 392 (2003) (observing \u201c[pjolice must articulate some reason that the destruction of evidence is more than a hypothetical possibility\u201d). In Richards, the United States Supreme Court held, \u201c[when] police could know the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly ... asserted governmental interest in pr , 629 N.W.2d 613, 623 (2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 498, 501 Holdings: 0: holding that the threat of imminent destruction of evidence of criminal activity created an exigent circumstance 1: holding that initial consent was not withdrawn where the undercover officer momentarily stepped out to obtain help from other officers located in the room across the hall in making the arrest 2: holding exigent circumstances existed because bathroom in hotel room was next to hallway door where the narcotics could have been particularly flushed and the suspected drug was crackcocaine which makes it not impossible that drugs were easily disposable 3: holding exigent circumstances found because detailed affidavit alleged drug transactions were conducted near the bathroom for quick disposal of the evidence 4: holding exigent circumstances demonstrated because officers knew defendant stored drugs in room across from the bathroom making destruction particularly easy", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "There was no further communication between the parties until Ryerson filed this lawsuit on June 10, 2009. Meanwhile, the EMC action settled pursuant to a 2002 agreement that provided EMC with an 8.5 million dollar \u201cpost-closing price adjustment to the Stock Purchase Agreement ... reflecting a change in the purchase price paid by EMC to Ryerson for the purchase and sale of IEMC.\u201d The settlement was later reported in Ryerson\u2019s 2003 Form 10-K as a \u201cselling price adjustment to the 1998 sale of [IEMC].\u201d FIC moves for summary judgment, citing Seventh Circuit precedent, arguing that the 8.5 million dollar \u201cprice adjustment\u201d was restitution for ill-gotten gains and therefore not an insurable \u201closs\u201d under Illinois law. Level 3 Comms. v. Federal Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908, 910-11 (7th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>)(citing cases). In response to FIC\u2019s motion, Holdings: 0: holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities 1: holding that a policyholder does not incur an insurable loss when it is compelled to return allegedly illgotten gains in connection with the purchase or sale of a company 2: holding that slusa preempts claims which allege a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or sale of securities whether or not that allegation is an element of or otherwise necessary to the putative state claim 3: holding that slusas in connection with prong extends to misrepresentations that are material to the purchase or sale of a covered security 4: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his left arm to the bar on the right side of his body. (Pelayo Dep. Tr. at 204-05, 207.) 2 . The PA defendants have not relied on the numerous cases that have found some administrative intrusions to be reasonable where the Government sought to prevent hazardous conditions. See Bd. of Ed. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (quoting Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Mich. Dep\u2019t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (upholding brief stops at a sobriety checkpoint); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The alleged liability of the PA is based Holdings: 0: holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 1: holding that the federal action at issue must be authorized 2: holding that the fourth amendment applies to searches conducted by public school officials and noting it would be anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior 3: holding random traffic stops for license and registration checks are contrary to fourth amendment 4: holding that stops for brief questioning about immigration status at the border rou tinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the fourth amendment and need not be authorized by warrant", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of two deliberately high hurdles by showing either (i) \u201cnewly discovered evidence that ... establishes] by clear and convincing evidence\u201d that the defendant was not guilty, or (ii) a \"new rule of constitutional law\u201d from the Supreme Court to be applied retroactively that invalidates the criminal conviction. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255. 2 . Because we hold that Harris is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for his counsel\u2019s failure on habeas to raise the alleged constitutional failures of his appellate counsel, we decline to reach the merits of his ineffective appellate assistance claim or of his claim that the district court erred in 1994 when it calculated his prison sentence. 3 . Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d 66, 70-71 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 224, 157 L.Ed.2d 134 (2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, Holdings: 0: holding that where state procedural rule was mandatory and unwaivable and where government filed motion to dismiss habeas petition based solely on noncompliance with this procedural rule which state court granted without explanation decision appeared to rest primarily on state law 1: holding that a coa is required to appeal the denial of a rule 60b motion from a judgment in a  2254 proceeding 2: holding that a rule 60b motion ordinarily should be treated as a successive habeas petition but declining to adopt a bright line rule equating all rule 60b motions with successive habeas petitions 3: holding that a rule 60b motion to reopen a habeas denial is barred when its factual predicate deals primarily with the constitutionality of the underlying state conviction or sentence but is permissible when it deals primarily with some irregularity or procedural defect of the habeas proceeding itself 4: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "against an unreasonably excessive use of deadly force in the form of Quando, a police canine. Even excluding the question of whether the police dog constituted deadly force, a jury well could find that, given the circumstances, the totality of force used\u2014 four blasts of pepper spray, slamming Smith down onto the porch, dragging him off the porch face down, ordering the ca nine to attack him three times, and the resultant dog bites and physical assaults on his body \u2014 was unreasonable. We have indeed held on past occasions that the use of lesser force could be unreasonable in the particular circumstances. See Santos, 287 F.3d at 853-54 (shoving can amount to excessive force when it is unreasonable); Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, Holdings: 0: holding that forcibly removing nonviolent plaintiff from her car could be excessive force 1: holding that two bursts of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate prisoners eighth amendment rights 2: holding that the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protestors was excessive force 3: holding that otherwise acceptable use of pepper spray became excessive when arrestee was offering no further active resistance 4: holding that bystander prisoners who were exposed to pepper spray when prison officials dispensed spray across their pod area to break up a fight were not subjected to excessive force", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "as the best or most efficient way to perform its duties under the Act. * . It is thus largely irrelevant that, as asserted by the insurers, \u201c[f]ive of the 15 states adopting the 1995 Model UPA in some form have also recently enacted DMF legislation,\u201d explicitly imposing a duty to search that database. A similar enactment in West Virginia, as made evident by our holding today, would unnecessarily tread upon the insurers\u2019 prerogative to decide how they will comply \u25a0with the Act. The insurers, however, persuaded the circuit court to surmise' that \u201c[s]uch legislation would be redundant or unnecessary if a duty to search already existed in the UPAs adopted by these states.\u201d Cf. United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Commw., Dep\u2019t of Ins., No. 2013-CA-000612-MR, 2014 WL 3973160 (Ky.Ct.App. Aug. 15, 2014) (<HOLDING>).. Were we to assume, however, that the Holdings: 0: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 1: holding oneyear statute of limitations applies only to children born after the statutes effective date of september 1 1975 2: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 3: holding that procedural or remedial statutes may not be applied to pending suits at the time they become effective if doing so would destroy or impair rights that vested before the statutes effective date 4: holding that duty to  search dmf imposed by new model legislation applied only to policies issued after statutes effective date of january 1 2013", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by a criminal defendant or by his counsel for the sole propose of aiding the accused and his counsel in the preparation of his defense\u201d). Appropriately, the attorney-client privilege \u201cextends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney ... in the business committed to his [or her] charge . . . .\u201d Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859); see id., 175-76 (while recognizing privilege extends to certain court personnel and agents of attorney, court refused to extend privilege to protect communication overheard by attorney\u2019s son, where son was \u201cin no way connected with the case or with the parties\u201d and had \u201cno interest in, or connection with, the professional business of the attorney\u201d); see also Pagano v. Ippoliti, 245 Conn. 640, 650 n.12, 716 A.2d 848 (1998) (<HOLDING>). B In the present case, the parties do not Holdings: 0: holding that agency is provable only by principals conduct and not by subjective beliefs of those dealing with alleged agent 1: holding that the lack of evidence of the alleged principals control over the alleged agent precludes the finding of an agency relationship 2: recognizing that statements made by agent on behalf of principal to principals attorney may be protected by principals attorneyclient privilege 3: holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal 4: holding that it is the principals conduct attitude and knowledge that determines whether an agent had apparent authority", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "marginal value to Perry of his participation in the instant case; perhaps as in Fusco, it was offered to undermine any insinuation that Perry had received funds for his participation in this case alone; or finally, perhaps the prosecution wanted to counter defense counsel\u2019s specific insinuation that Perry would benefit merely by accusing people. We simply do not know. Given these possibilities, the ambiguity in the case law, and the context of the present testimony, we cannot say that admission of the evidence constituted plain error. We conclude by emphasizing that, to satisfy the plain error standard, Smith must show that the alleged error \u201caffected] substantial rights,\u201d that is, \u201caffected the outcome of the district court proceedings.\u201d Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, \u201c\u2018[t]he plain error exception to Holdings: 0: holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice 1: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint 2: holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure 3: holding that the affecting substantial rights language of rule 52b means that the error must have been prejudicial it must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings 4: holding that burden is on government to show that error in failure to provide notice is harmless", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an appropriate sanction. 4 . This Court may not exercise sua sponte review when the Commission on Judicial Conduct recommends censure alone. R. Comm\u2019n Judicial Conduct 29(a) (\"A recommendation of censure shall be final unless the judge or disciplinary counsel files a petition to modify or reject the recommendation as provided in paragraph (c). \u201d). This Court does have the authority to review \u201d[a]ll other recommendations for formal sanctions\u201d on its own motion. Id. In addition to censure, the Commission recommended that Judge MeVay pay a fine, which it viewed as a formal sanction under Rule 18(e). We therefore exercise sua sponte review of the entire recommendation, as the reviewable sanction is insepa-rabie from censure. Cf. In re Bemis, 189 Ariz. 119, 122, 938 P.2d 1120, 1123 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Rule 5 provides in part the following: Holdings: 0: holding that the court had no power to sanction conduct that occurred in an arbitration 1: recognizing that an order of restitution  is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions 2: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291 3: holding in an attorney discipline case that because a probation order a normally nonreviewable sanction was recommended in conjunction with a censure a reviewable sanction this court could review both sanctions as they were inseparable 4: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and assistance to be provided to claimants by VA, are not retroactively applicable to proceedings that were complete before VA and were on appeal to this Court or the Federal Circuit when the VCAA was enacted.\u201d Stephens v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 191, 193 (2002) (per curiam order) (citing Bernklau, 291 F.3d at 803-06). Here, the VCAA was enacted after the September 14, 2000, BVA decision on appeal but during the 120-day period within which the appellant could file a timely NOA, see 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7266(a). Because, as of the November 9, 2000, enactment of the VCAA, the 120-day judicial-appeal period had not yet expired and the appellant had not filed an NOA, the claims denied by the September 2000 BVA decision were still pending before VA. See Teten v. West, 13 Vet.App. 560, 563 (2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the proceedings were not \u201ccomplete Holdings: 0: holding that because veteran had never before submitted due process issue to bva he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and court declined to address merits of that claim 1: holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred 2: holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there 3: holding that veterans claim had remained pending before va at time of his death because 120day judicialappeal period had not yet expired and he had not filed noa 4: holding the practice of requiring borrower to certify at closing the threeday period had expired and the transaction had not been rescinded has the serious potential for actual harm", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "operates a CTH I facility, the kind of setting DDSN has determined would constitute the least restrictive environment for Doe. We therefore affirm, but on different grounds, the district court\u2019s dismissal of Doe\u2019s freedom of choice claim. See Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220, 222 (4th Cir.2002) (observing that we \u201ccan affirm on any basis fairly supported by the record\u201d). C. Because Doe\u2019s freedom of choice claim fails as matter of law, we do not find it necessary to decide whether \u00a7 1396a(a)(23) confers a private right on individuals that may be enforced under \u00a7 1983. Even assuming Doe may proceed under \u00a7 1983 to enforce \u00a7 1396a(a)(23), Appellees are entitled to summary judgment on Doe\u2019s claim. Cf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 475-76, 99 S.Ct. 1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979) (<HOLDING>). IV. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Holdings: 0: holding it is a question of fact 1: recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists 2: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts 3: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 4: holding that the question whether a cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction and therefore may be assumed without being decided", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claim on June 21, 2012, the claim was effectively denied on August 28, 2008, when the administrator failed to act on the claim within three months after presentment. See 15 V.I.C. \u00a7 421 (directing the executor or administrator to make distributions in three-month intervals). Therefore, Ottley\u2019s claim had ripened by the time the Superior Court dismissed it. The Superior Court\u2019s dismissal of the action on the claim for reimbursement after it had ripened was pointless as Ottley could have promptly refiled the action. Rohn v. People, 57 V.I. 637, 642 n.4 (V.I. 2012) (observing that \u201csubsequent events may ripen a prematurely filed appeal\u201d (quoting Harvey v. Christopher, 55 V.I. 565, 571 (2009)); see Alejandro-Ortiz v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 872 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (D.P.R. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because Ottley could have immediately refiled Holdings: 0: holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision 1: holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay 2: holding that because the plaintiff had not perfected service within 120 days of filing the complaint the complaint was subject to mandatory dismissal 3: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons 4: holding that courts decision to dismiss the action because it was prematurely filed was pointless because the matter automatically ripened after 90 days and plaintiff could just refile complaint", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the members considered in finding the appellant\u2019s conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline and service discrediting constituted the aggravating factors that took this case out of the wholly private setting envisioned in Lawrence. \u201c[W]here, as here, the predicate sexual conduct is criminal because of some additional factor (in this case, the violation of clauses 1 and 2 of Article 134, UCMJ), the burden of demonstrating that such conduct should nonetheless be constitutionally protected rests with the defense at trial.\u201d Goings, 72 M.J. at 207 (citation omitted). The appellant\u2019s argument that the military judge was required to instruct on the Mar-cum factors pursuant to United States v. Castellano also fails under the circumstances of this case. 72 M.J. 217, 221 (C.A.A.F.2013) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Howard, 72 M.J. 406 Holdings: 0: holding that the presence of one intensity factor may be sufficient to deem the action significant in certain circumstances 1: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 2: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 3: holding in cases where but for the presence of a marcum factor the act of consensual sodomy would not be subject to criminal sanction the trier of fact must determine whether a marcum factor exists 4: holding that while a district court determination about whether an act is reasonable usually is considered to be a legal conclusion that djetermining the weight to be accorded to each factor in reaching the ultimate finding as to the existence of conditions is the special province of the trier of fact ", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the Miles court did note with respect to the Jones Act that it \u201csailed in occupied waters ... and was not free to expand remedies at will simply because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them\u201d, id., 498 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 327. As defendants here correctly point out, however, the impact of the considered and settled decision in Miles is to render it anomalous to award the nondependent survivor of a nonseaman a recovery which is patently denied to the nondependent beneficiary of a well-deserving seaman. In effect, to allow plaintiffs to recover wrongful death damages here simply because their son was not a Jones Act seaman would ironically, and improperly, leave the relatives of seamen as a less-favored class under admiralty. Cf. Truehart, supra at 937 (<HOLDING>); cf. also Whittaker, supra at 773. Finally, Holdings: 0: holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law 1: holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts 2: holding that because the general maritime law is its most generous to seamen the wards of admiralty it would refuse to craft for nonseamens survivors a remedy not available to seamens survivors 3: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 4: recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "years was not disqualifying and the Board\u2019s recommendation that the applicant be re-admitted to the Bar); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam\u2019rs re Papy, 901 So.2d 870, 872 (Fla.2005) (approving the Board\u2019s recommendation that the applicant be denied re-admission to the Bar in part because of his failure to timely file and pay income taxes); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam\u2019rs re M.A.R., 755 So.2d 89, 92-93 (Fla.2000) (approving the Board\u2019s recommendation that the applicant be denied admission to the Bar in part because of his failure to timely file and pay income taxes); Florida Bar v. Nedick, 603 So.2d 502, 503 (Fla.1992) (ordering disbarment for evading or defeating tax in violation of federal law and conviction of tax evasion); Florida Bd. of Bar Exam\u2019rs in re H.H.S., 373 So.2d 890, 892 (Fla.1979) (<HOLDING>). Compliance with the requirements of all tax Holdings: 0: holding that the alleged conduct constituting violations of the uipa and the regulations can be considered in determining whether the insurer acted in bad faith under section 8371 1: holding that in determining whether there has been a substantial contribution pursuant to section 503b3d the applicable test is whether the efforts of the applicant resulted in an actual and demonstrable benefit to the debt ors estate and the creditors 2: holding that a failure to file tax returns may properly be considered in determining whether the applicant has met the standards of conduct and fitness required under the rules 3: holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal 4: holding that conduct contained in dismissed counts may be considered by a district court in determining whether to depart from the applicable guideline range", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "complies with the \u00a7 1315(d) notice provision of publication in the Federal Register, Heraeus could receive a windfall because the lower ... rate would apply to the [post-revocation] merchandise even though Heraeus knew of Customs\u2019 change in classification three years earlier.\u201d). Nevertheless, Jewelpak contends that it need not show actual prejudice by reason of the failure to publish because \u00a7 1315(d) requires only that it show \u201cprejudice to the importing public in general, and destruction of the uniformity that section recognizes.\u201d We disagree, for such a position is without support in the statute and plainly flouts the rule in Heraeus-Amersil, as well as analogous precedents from this and other courts of appeal. See id. at 1582; cf., e.g., Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, Holdings: 0: holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence 1: holding that a legal opinion issued by the general counsel for the department of veterans affairs was not defective as applied to petitioner for faffing to comply with the publication requirement of foia because petitioner had actual notice of the opinion 2: holding that the state court ruling was objectively unreasonable where prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the petitioner murdered a known drug dealer although the state established that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer and that freezer was open and empty after the homicide the petitioner and the victim had engaged in drug transactions in the past the petitioner had a motive because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioners girlfriend and the petitioner had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon and a similar gun was seen in his home two weeks before the murder evidence placing the petitioner at the scene was conspicuously absent leaving only a reasonable speculation that the petitioner was present 3: holding that because the petitioner failed in the petition to set forth facts known to petitioner or state that petitioner has no knowledge of facts regarding the name and address of any judicially appointed guardian or person or agency awarded custody of the child by a court and failed to attach the existing custody order to the petition it was facially defective and did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court 4: holding that rule 27 is not appropriate where the petitioner seeks discovery of unknown information that the petitioner hopes will assist it in the future when the petitioner applies for judicial relief", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "false promise is a fraudulent misrepresentation which can be actionable as fraud_ ... Plaintiff argued to the jury that Capital City ... never intended to allow plaintiff to abide by the terms of the agreement, but intended to foreclose on the property from .the beginning. The 'Court finds that this theory fits comfortably within the law regarding promissory fraud. Capital .City contends that D.C. law recognizes a cause of action for promissory misrepresentation only when the promise is neither memorialized as an explicit contract term (e.g., an undertaking to provide $42,000 on a date certain) nor implied by law in the contract (e.g., the obligation to act with good faith); in other words, the misrepresentation must be a collateral statement of d 1251, 1253-54, 1259 (D.C.Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Some time ago, we observed in a footnote that Holdings: 0: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 1: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 2: holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract 3: holding that breach of collateral promise was actionable 4: holding negligent misrepresentation must be of existing fact not breach of future promise", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Marchal v. Webb, 859 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Once the movant has established a right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant. Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. The nonmov-ant must respond to the motion for summary judgment and present to the trial court any issues that would preclude summary judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. In reviewing the summary judgment, we must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor, and we will assume all the evidence favorable to the nonm tract principles. Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Smith derwriting Ass\u2019n., 73 A.D.2d 605, 422 N.Y.S.2d 123, 123 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because we find Perrot-ta breached the terms Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 1: holding the failure of the insureds to submit to an euo a condition precedent to sustaining a suit on the insurance policy required abatement of the suit 2: holding that insureds failure to list his brother as a member of the household was a material misrepresentation that provided the insurance company with grounds to rescind the policy 3: holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car 4: holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the statute as a whole. The government\u2019s argument that simple assault applies only to the \u201cassault prong\u201d of \u00a7 111(a)(1) makes little sense when considering \u00a7 111(a)(2), which punishes one who \u201cassaults or intimidates\u201d a former federal officer. If simple assault did not apply to the remainder of \u00a7 111(a)(1), we would be left with two unavailing alternatives before us: either simple assault does not apply to \u00a7 111(a)(2) at all; or that the simple assault provision applies only to the word \u201cassault\u201d of \u00a7\u00a7 111(a)(1) and (a)(2). The former does little to carry out the purpose of the statute because it would afford greater protection to those without pr ontext of \u00a7 111, the definition of simple assault is conduct in violation of \u00a7 111(a) ....\u201d) (emphasis added); Ramirez, 233 F.3d at 322 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original). Of the remaining cases Holdings: 0: holding that statute which defined sexual contact as any touching of the anus breast or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person was not vague 1: holding that punching another person is a statutory assault 2: holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body 3: holding statutory definition of all other cases assault to be any physical contact which by which a person forcibly assaults resists impedes intimidates or interferes with  4: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a fixed meaning of the term seaman. The regulations emphasize flexibility, indicating that the term\u2019s meaning is governed by the context in which it is used and the purpose of the statute in which it is found. Id. \u00a7 783.29(c). Similarly, we must evaluate an employee\u2019s duties based upon the character of the work he actually performs and not on what it is called or the place where it is performed. Id. \u00a7 783.33. As we have recognized, the FLSA as a whole is pervaded by the idea that what each employee actually does determines its application to him. Walling v. W.D. Haden Co., 153 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir.1946). Accordingly, the application of the seaman exemption generally depends on the facts in each case. See McLaughlin v. Bos. Harbor Cruise Lines, Inc., 419 F.3d 47, 51-52 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. With this framework guiding us, we will Holdings: 0: holding that objection was timely even though objection was not made until after question was answered 1: recognizing application of the doctrines may involve a fact question for the jury but not finding such a question in the case before it 2: recognizing that application of the seaman exemption is a factintensive question that can be answered in many cases only after a trial 3: holding that prejudice from a question that violated doyle was cured by immediately sustaining objection before the question was answered 4: recognizing that the right to be present can be waived in noncapital felony federal cases", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an express preemption provision, implied preemption principles should not be used to decide the preemptive scope of a statute in which Congress provided an express preemption provision. Cipollone, \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. See also Freightliner, \u2014 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. Second, Smith is factually distinguishable from the instant case because it considered the preemptive scope of the MDA\u2019s Class II regulations on a state regulatory statute. Smith, 651 F.2d at 1022 (citing Fla.Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 468.135(7); 468.136(l)-(2)). Third and most importantly, the result in Smith relies on the fact \u201cthat the Florida statute does not relate \u2018to a matter included in a federal requirement applicable to a device.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 651 F.2d at 1025 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 360k(a)(2)). See also id. at 1024 (<HOLDING>). In other words, Smith found that the state Holdings: 0: holding the state law claims were not preempted 1: holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute 2: holding that it is not 3: holding that  4681357 is not preempted because it addresses a different concern than does the mda 4: holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "presented for summary judgment purposes.\u201d Id. at 1020. Additionally, our conclusion resulted from construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff-Appellant. Id. at 1020-21. \u201cWe review the district court\u2019s refusal to take judicial notice of proffered materials for an abuse of discretion.\u201d Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir.2011). Here, we easily conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to take judicial notice of the HPL contract. The district court correctly concluded that Plaintiff-Appellant\u2019s legal argument was not the proper kind of fact that may be judicially noticed under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citation and quotation marks omitted). HPL\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding trial court order denying states petition for an order of public use and necessity for good cause appearing did not constitute a finding of fact or a conclusion of law 1: holding that a bankruptcy courts sale order is a final order for res judicata purposes 2: holding that in order for a fact to be judicially noticed indisputability is a prerequisite 3: holding it is a question of fact 4: holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damages.\u201d Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir.1988)(quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir.1979)) (internal quotations omitted). While plaintiffs are correct that \u201cconspiracy is a matter of inference,\u201d summary judgment may still be appropriate on a conspiracy claim where the nonmoving party rests merely on conclusory allegations. Here plaintiffs have presented no evidence, either direct or circumstantial of an agreement among defendants from which a reasonable jury could have inferred a conspiracy among them to inflict harm upon the plaintiffs. Earle, 850 F.2d at 845; see also Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977)(<HOLDING>). Summary judgment was thus proper on this Holdings: 0: holding that complaint alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights cannot survive motion to dismiss based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy which are not supported by references to material facts 1: holding that a civil rights claim of conspiracy must include allegations of specific operative facts 2: holding plaintiffs must provide particularized allegations as to why demand would be futile to survive a motion to dismiss conclusory allegations are not enough 3: holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed 4: holding that plaintiffs allegations of abuse did not amount to the allegations of torture required by  1605a7 to survive a motion to dismiss", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cconsidered the factors listed in U.S.C. 3553(a)\u201d and imposed a fourteen-month sentence. Parker contends that the district court procedurally erred by not adequately explaining the reasons for the fourteen-month sentence. We review a district court\u2019s revocation sentence using the same standards applied to initial sentencing decisions. United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915-16 (8th Cir. 2009). We first review to ensure that the district court did not commit a significant procedural error. United States v. Dace, 660 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2011). We then evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Timberlake, 6 e substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. 1 . The Honorable Holdings: 0: holding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines 1: holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness 2: holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range 3: holding a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the sentencing guidelines 4: recognizing a presumption of reasonableness", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "supra, at page 64. Since there is not one rule or principle of law that can dispose of the issue in all cases, J. B. Henriques, Inc. v. United States, supra, each ease, when you come down to it, must stand on its own particular facts. The applicable law under paragraph 1558 is clear. \u201cTo constitute an article 'manufactured\u2019 it is not necessary that the article be converted into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use different from that of the original article (such would be the requirement to constitute an article a \u2018manufacture\u2019), but only that the article be so processed that it be removed from its crude or primary state, though it remain a variety of the original material. * * Chas. H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, supra, 44 CCPA at page 137 (<HOLDING>) The facts here are not in dispute. The Holdings: 0: holding that the changes to as0910030 were not intended to be retrospective 1: holding that industrial wastes were not products under a products hazard exception because they were not intended for consumption sale or use by others  2: holding that where palmyra fibers were trimmed to advance the merchandise towards its intended use the fibers were manufactured under paragraph 1558 3: holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding 4: holding that conveyances were not intended to defraud creditors", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "helpful to the jury\u2019s determination of facts at issue.\u201d Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. (2012). But the comment also observes that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s gatekeeping function is not intended to replace the adversary system.\u201d Id. Rather, \u201c[c]ross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.\u201d Id.; cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786. \u00b6 12 Daubert left unclear whether the particular application of a generally reli oach of leaving challenges to an expert\u2019s application of a methodology exclusively to the jury. Such challenges are instead a proper subject of the trial court\u2019s gatekeeping inquiry. But cf. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 14 But not all errors in the application of Holdings: 0: holding that federal law governs res judicata effect of an earlier federal judgment based on federal law 1: holding that a statute of limitations defense raised for the first time during trial was waived construing a previous version of federal rule of criminal procedure 12 that was not substantively different from the current version 2: recognizing general rule 3: holding under earlier version of federal rule 702 that in general criticisms touching on whether the lab made mistakes in arriving at its results are for the jury 4: holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Gen. Stat. \u00a7 45-21.16(d). If a party wishes to challenge the clerk\u2019s findings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 45-21.16(d), the party must appeal to the judge of the district or superior court having jurisdiction within 10 days. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 45-21.16(d)(1). The trial court\u2019s review of the clerk\u2019s findings is de novo, id., and the trial court is limited on appeal to determining whether the six criteria of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 45-21.16(d) have been satisfied, In re Foreclosure of Godwin, 121 N.C. App. 703, 704, 468 S.E.2d 811, 812 (1996). The trial court is prohibited from reviewing any issue or argument that was not raised before the clerk in connection with the clerk\u2019s N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 45-21.16(d) analysis. See In re David A. Simpson, P.C., _ N.C. App. _, _, 711 S.E.2d 165, 170 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Mosler v. Druid Hills Land Co., 199 N.C. App. Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to consider debtors claim of rescission as an equitable defense to the foreclosure action where that defense was not raised before the clerk 2: holding that the trial court did not err in its refusal to consider the borrowers defense of merger on appeal since the defense was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court 3: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 4: holding that the government did not waive an affirmative defense not pleaded in the answer because it raised the defense at a pragmatically sufficient time by listing the defense in the joint pretrial order", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "advances. Moreover, this assertion is supported by Kin-man\u2019s statement that the notion of being gay was so upsetting to her that it led her to attempt suicide. If Kinman\u2019s opposition to the idea of being gay was as strong as she alleges, it is possible that any advances by a member of her own sex would have indeed been unwelcome. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in Meritor Savings Bank, the relevant question is not whether Kinman voluntarily participated in sexual relations, but rather whether the advances were unwelcome. 477 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. at 2406. To distinguish between an actual desire for a relationship on one hand, and a mere acquiescence to tendered sexual advances on the other, it is necessary to consider the power disparity be 830 F.Supp. 1288, 1297 (N.D.Cal.1993) (<HOLDING>) and Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. School District, Holdings: 0: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor 1: holding that the district was not liable under respondeat superior for a teachers sexual assault of a student even though it occurred on school grounds and during school hours because the criminal misconduct was not within the scope of the teachers employment 2: holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees 3: holding that school districts are hable for peer sexual harassment in their schools under title ix only if they have actual knowledge of the harassment and act with deliberate indifference in response to it 4: holding school district hable for teachers sexual harassment of student only upon knowing failure to act", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "while testifying.\u201d Id. at 603. The trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for mistrial ubject of expert testimony where a law enforcement agent\u2019s opinion is based on specialized knowledge derived from training or experience and beyond the understanding or experience of the average juror. See \u00a7 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2010) (allowing expert testimony on evidence at trial \u201c[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue\u201d); United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1167-69 (9th Cir.2000) (involving the testimony of a law enforcement expert who opined, in part, that \u201cgangs enforce a code of silence among their members\u201d); People v. Martinez, 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 49, 59 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Edge v. State, 275 Ga. 311, 567 S.E.2d 1, 3 Holdings: 0: holding that a gang expert could testify on what it meant to be a rat in gang culture because it was relevant to help understand discrepancies between some of the wit nesses statements to the police and their testimony at trial 1: holding that an expert in the field of gangs and gang codes of behavior including the requirements of members obedience silence and staunch defense of other gang members and the punishment meted out to a gang member who violates these requirements could testify because these were factual matters outside the experience of the average juror 2: holding that active participation in a criminal street gang means that there is a relationship between the defendant and the gang that is more than nominal passive inactive or purely technical and that defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his time and efforts to the gang 3: holding that expert testimony from a detective about the reluctance of witnesses residents of gang neighborhoods to testify in cases involving gang activity is relevant to the credibility of a witness 4: holding that experts testimony as to aspects of gang culture relevant to the case including requirements of members obedience silence and staunch defense of other gang members and the punishment meted out to a gang member who violates these requirements went to factual matters outside the experience of the average juror", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Anacleto Pacheco-Medina filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, seeking relief from his Oregon state court conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. The district court denied relief because Pacheco-Medina was not in custody at the time he filed his petition, as required by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254. The facts are known to the parties and will not be repeated herein except as necessary. I Pacheco-Medina\u2019s suspended sentence completely expired in January 2000, and he filed his habeas petition in federal district court in November 2001. Accordingly, Pacheco-Medina was not in custody under the conviction and sentence he now seeks to attack. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The fact he is now subject to an INS Holdings: 0: recognizing that federal habeas statutes require petitioner to be in custody when petition filed 1: holding that  once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it 2: holding that a habeas petitioner must be in custody under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed 3: holding that petitioner could not collaterally attack his state court conviction on a petition for review of an agency decision 4: holding that a california habeas petition is timely if filed within a reasonable time", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "from strategic decisions of the defendant\u2019s trial counsel under the guise of an \u201carbitrary fact\u201d for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 9711(h)(3)\u2019s statutory review). Commonwealth v. Diamond, \u2014 Pa.-, 83 A.3d 119, 136 (2013) (footnote omitted). Moreover, the prosecutor here was simply relaying facts. The expression that the \u201ccloak of innocence has been removed\u201d is simply another way of saying that Appellant has been convicted of first-degree murder. Thus, Appellant\u2019s suggestions of unfair prejudice are unfounded. Indeed, Appellant fully disregards the salient fact that the trial judge provided the jury with a full and correct instruction, and the presumption remains that the jury faithfully followed the judge\u2019s instructions. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 111 (2004) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the record reveals nothing more than Holdings: 0: holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions 1: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 2: recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions 3: holding that it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial courts instructions 4: holding that jurors were presumed to follow instructions similar to those in the instant case", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "nursing staff failed to exercise professional judgment); Brown v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 280 Ga.App. 847, 635 S.E.2d 184, 186-87 (2006) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant and finding plaintiffs claim \u2014 that the therapist who left her unattended in the shower after plaintiff twice complained she was slipping \u2014 sounded in ordinary negligence); Self v. Executive Comm. of the Ga. Baptist Convention Ga., Inc., 245 Ga. 548, 266 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1980) (finding the plaintiffs action was for ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice, based on her allegation that the decedent\u2019s injury was caused by the hospital\u2019s negligence in failing to properly repair a leaking bathroom fixture, of which it had notice); Landes v. Women\u2019s Christian Ass\u2019n, 504 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Iowa Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kastler, 193 N.W.2d at 102 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding movement of victim from kitchen to bathroom did not exceed confinement or removal inherent in the commission of the crime of sexual assault 1: holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action 2: holding that if subsequent to the taking and before the trial the ordinance was actually amended to permit the previously forbidden use then that of  itself was weighty evidence of the existence at the time of the taking of the fact that there was a reasonable probability of an imminent change 3: holding that the hospitals taking the plaintiff to the bathroom was nonmedical or routine 4: holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a provision that appeared in the certificate of incorporation. Stroud v. Milliken Enters., 585 A.2d 1306, 1308 (Del.Ch.1988), appeal dismissed, 552 A.2d 476 (Del.1989). In light of the three procedural means for ending a director\u2019s term in Section 141(b), I do not believe a bylaw could impose a requirement that would disqualify a director and terminate his service. Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., 2000 WL 1038190, at *12 (Del.Ch. July 21, 2000). Section 141(b)\u2019s recognition of the bylaws as a locus for director qualifications instead contemplates reasonable qualifications to be applied at the front end, before a director\u2019s term commences, when the director is \u201celected and qualified.\u201d 8 Del. C. \u00a7 141(b); see Triplex Shoe Co. v. Rice & Hutchins, Inc., 152 A. 342, 351 (Del.1930) (<HOLDING>). The concept of a bylaw that would end a Holdings: 0: holding that although wade hearing may be constitutionally mandated under certain circumstances it is not mandated in all cases 1: holding that the transfer of stock in an insolvent corporation did not constitute fair consideration to support conveyance of property to its stockholder 2: holding that a shareholder had standing to bring a direct action against a director of a corporation because the director owed the shareholder a duty separate and apart from that which the director owed to the company 3: holding under the 1898 act that neither the debtor nor its property was involved in stock ownership dispute 4: holding that bylaw requiring a director to be a stockholder mandated stock ownership pri or to entering office", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "49, 51 (9th Cir.1994); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.1989), or where disruption in the courtroom is likely in the absence of shackles, see Wilson, 770 F.2d at 1485; see also Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir.1988) (shackling was supported by evidence of prior escapes from immediate physical custody of law enforcement officers, once while handcuffed, and by defendant\u2019s disruptive behavior during trial), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1016, 109 S.Ct. 1737, 104 L.Ed.2d 175 (1989). It is improper, however, where a compelling need is not established, less restrictive alternatives are not pursued, or where the harms were not assessed. See Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir.1993) (\u201cRhoden I \u201d); see, e.g., Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 583 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint is waived by the failure to object during the witness unsworn testimony 1: holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources 2: holding that state trial judge erred by placing defendant in leg brace where the only evidence of security risk was unsworn testimony that potential witness planned to do stuff while in town to testify although error did not prejudice defendant 3: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 4: holding that judge presiding at trial may not testify in that trial as witness", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "claims on direct appeal. This court affirmed Mr. Blandin\u2019s conviction and sentence without a written opinion. Blandin v. State, 27 So.3d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (table). Mr. Blandin filed a timely motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising in Ground I the ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were previously raised in his amended motion for new trial. In summarily denying these claims, the postconviction court erroneously found them to be barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In Corzo v. State, 806 So.2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), this court held that when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal and the appellant\u2019s conviction and sentence are affirmed witho DCA 1984) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Blandin\u2019s case cannot be distinguished on Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim 1: holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced 2: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: holding that the defendants ineffective assistance of counsel claims which were raised in a motion for a new trial and challenged on direct appeal were not barred in postconviction by the doctrine of res judicata because the defendants conviction and sentence were affirmed without a written opinion expressly addressing the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "been constitutional under the 1870 Constitution. Since the 1970 Constitution is also silent on the subject, a recall statute would likely be constitutional. The 1970 Constitution gives home rule units broad legislative powers and states that those powers are to be construed liberally. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a76.) Consequently, a home rule unit could enact a valid recall ordinance. Non-home rule units such as the city of Northlake do not have such power. The issue before this court, however, is not whether a recall procedure can be enacted by ordinance. The question is whether recall can be adopted by municipal referendum. In this respect, the powers of municipalities, whether home-ruled or not, are identical. (See Pechous v. Slawko (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 576, 582-83, 357 N.E.2d 1144 (<HOLDING>).) We find that article VII of the Illinois Holdings: 0: recognizing district court application of the same rule 1: holding that the referendum powers of home rule units and nonhome rule units are the same 2: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 3: recognizing rule 4: holding that federal credit unions are governmental units within the meaning  523a8", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (\"As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate \u2018a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,' ... We have spared the defendant the need of showing probable effect upon the outcome, and have simply presumed such effect, where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary.\u201d) (citing Strickland after the Erst sentence and Cronic after the last sentence). 43 . See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 277 n.2, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989) (<HOLDING>). See also Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25, 104 Holdings: 0: recognizing some lower court cases that found a sixth amendment violation under geders v united states 425 us 80 96 sct 1330 47 led2d 592 1976one of the cases cited along with herring in cronicas footnoteto be harmless 1: holding that a court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply in order to chastise what the court views as prosecutorial overreaching  quoting united states v hasting 461 us 499 507 103 sct 1974 76 led2d 96 1983 2: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 3: holding abuse of discretion is the proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in patent cases although questions of law may in some cases be relevant 4: holding that a charge of discrimination must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests quoting conley v gibson 355 us 41 47 78 sct 99 2 led2d 80 1957", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of justice.\u201d Davis v. Superior Court (Hannah), 25 Ariz.App. 402, 403, 544 P.2d 226, 227 (1976); see also Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F.Supp. 1354, 1355-56 (D.Nev.1993) (\u201cFailure to \u2018otherwise defend\u2019 presumes the absence of some affirmative action on the part of a defendant [that] would operate as bar to the satisfaction of the moving party\u2019s claim.\u201d). A defendant in a cause of action who moves for summary judgment contests a plaintiffs claim and argues that it presents \u201cno genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A summary judgment in a defendant\u2019s favor bars satisfaction of the plaintiffs claim and necessarily defeats it. \u00b6 15 Other jurisdictions that have cons 3d 34, 962 N.E.2d 322, 324 (2011) (<HOLDING>); M & A Const. Corp. v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment 1: holding that district court has discretion when deciding to convert a defendants motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment 3: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  4: holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default  when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Palladino have not shown that on the face of Plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint their alleged misconduct was distinct from the kinds of behavior clearly established as unconstitutional sexual harassment. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 530-31 (4th Cir.1994) (acknowledging that sexual harassment is a question of fact but holding in affirming a denial of qualified immunity, that \u201c[n]o male officer could reasonably have thought in 1992 that it was not sexual harassment to announce that it was his turn to make out with a women who was subject to his command\u201d). Defendants Dorrance and Palladino are, therefore, not entitled to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Plaintiffs\u2019 sexual harassment claims on the basis of a qualified immunity defense. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 406 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In regard to the qualified immunity claims of Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 1: holding a rule 12b6 dismissal inappropriate where defendants have done nothing more than offer their bald assertions that they are entitled to qualified immunity 2: holding trial court improperly granted dismissal on ground of immunity because the defendant had qualified statutory immunity rather than absolute immunity 3: holding that the employers bald assertions that the officers thought that they were in compliance with the act did not satisfy the good faith requirement 4: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, our sole task here is to determine whether the facts have so changed that the principal duties of probation and parole officers now fall within one of the three relevant categories of principal duties of law enforcement officers enumerated in Section 41-4-3(D) of the TCA. {12} As to the first category, \u201cmaking arrests for crime,\u201d Plaintiff points to no change in the law and admits that probation and parole officers do not devote the majority of their time to making arrests. See Vigil, 1992-NMCA-033, \u00b6 19. Consequently, there is no basis for concluding that making arrests for crimes is the principal duty of probation and parole officers. See Dunn v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1993-NMCA-059, \u00b6 11, 116 N.M. 1, 859 P.2d 469 (<HOLDING>). {13} As to the second category, Plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that the director of the new mexico motor v ehicle department who has statutory authority to make arrests was not a law enforcement officer because the vast majority of his time and effort are involved in administrative matters internal quotation marks omitted 1: recognizing that the nsa qualifies as a withholding statute under exemption 3 because it refers to particular types of matters that are to be withheld internal quotation marks and citations omitted 2: holding that the decisions of administrative agencies of the state described by article vi section 29 of the constitution of new mexico include regulations adopted by a board emphasis added internal quotation marks and citations omitted 3: holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in alcohol possession cases, on the present record, the State introduced no evidence of the contents of the bottle possessed by appellant, nor did appellant admit or stipulate to the contents of the container. Cf. J.B. v. State, 705 So.2d 1376, 1379 (Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>); A.A. v. State, 461 So.2d 165, 166 (Fla. 3d Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff must make concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm denying motion to quash subpoena to undercover identity of doe defendants where inter alia plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show it could establish prima facie claim 1: holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance 2: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo 3: holding juveniles admission that he possessed beer is sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the substance was alcoholic in nature 4: holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "In Turner, the fundamental right was the right to marry, not the right to inmate marriage. 482 U.S. at 94\u201496, 107 S.Ct. 2254. In Zablocki, the fundamental right was the right to marry, not the right of people owing child support to marry. 434 U.S. at 383-86, 98 S.Ct. 673. 6 . In addition, immutability is not an absolute prerequisite to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to groups whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecting immutability requirements in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 431, 118 S.Ct. 1428, 140 L.Ed.2d 575 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Mew Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, Holdings: 0: recognizing the concept of dual paternity in which a child born into a marriage with a nonbiological father retains a legal parentchild relationship based on presumptive fatherhood for purposes of legitimacy and inheritance while becoming the child of a newlyestablished biological father for purposes of child support 1: holding that strictly speaking suits against aliens are outside the operation of all federal venue statutes 2: holding that an illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children violated the due process clause and that due process required the father to be given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 3: recognizing that because a child born out of wedlock may be legitimated by father strictly speaking illegitimacy is not an immutable characteristic 4: holding that in domestic law custody case blood tests to determine paternity of child born out of wedlock may only be ordered upon a showing of good cause under the best interest of the child standard", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "five-year statute of limitations was retroactively applied to him in violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Clearly established federal law holds that a State law enacted after the expiration of a previously-applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 619, 123 S.Ct. 2446, 2454, 156 L.Ed.2d 544 (2003). But that rule does not apply to unexpired statutes of limitations. Stogner, 539 U.S. at 618, 123 S.Ct. 2446. Thus application of a statute of limitations extended before the original limitations period has expired, as here, does not violate the ex post facto clause. See United States v. Taliaferro, 979 F.2d 1399, 1402 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The Tenth Circuit explained that the Holdings: 0: holding that the application of an extended statute of limitations to offenses occurring prior to the legislative extension where the prior and shorter statute of limitations has not run as of the date of such extension does not violate the ex post facto clause citing united states v powers 307 us 214 21718 59 sct 805 807 83 led 1245 rehg denied 308 us 631 60 sct 66 84 led 526 1939 1: recognizing nardone v united states 308 us 338 60 sct 266 84 led 307 1939 taint test as controlling authority 2: holding that an accused may not complain if the statute of limitations is extended so long as the period of time originally provided therein had not run at the time of such extension because an accused does not acquire any vested right in a statute of limitations until it has operated to bar the prosecution of the offense with which he has been charged 3: holding that a change in law does not affect the res judicata effect of judgments citing chicot county drainage dist v baxter state bank 308 us 371 375 60 sct 317 319 84 led 329 rehg denied 309 us 695 60 sct 581 84 led 1035 1940 4: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "his understanding of the charges and proceedings against him. At the hearing, the District Court stated that it had reviewed \u201cin detail\u201d a report prepared by a Bureau of Prisons (\u201cBOP\u201d) psychologist that concluded, among other things, that (1) Fox possessed a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him; (2) Fox had a capacity to assist legal counsel in his defense; and (3) Fox could rationally make decisions regarding legal strategy. Relying on that report, as well as Fox\u2019s own testimony, the District Court found that Fox was indeed \u201ccompetent to stand trial.\u201d Appellant\u2019s App\u2019x at 47-48. As the trier of fact, the District Court was well within its province to give weight to the BOP psychologist\u2019s opinion, see United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d 361, 380 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), and did not clearly err in relying as well on Holdings: 0: recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice 1: holding that it is only by looking at how similarly situated entities acted in a similar situation that a factfinder may determine what was commercially reasonable 2: holding that a court evaluating competency may reasonably rely on the expertise of a forensic psychologist associated with the bop who is presumably familiar with patients similarly situated 3: holding on the particular facts before the court that parol evidence of a dividend declaration was inadmissible because of its potential to result in disparate rights between similarly situated stockholders 4: holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "defendants ordering more than 70 Towncars, or more than $2 million in automobiles, from plaintiffs dealership in Kansas. Defendants have been doing business with plaintiff in the same manner for at least ten years. According to Danny Zeck\u2019s affidavit, defendants would place orders for Towncars with plaintiff in Kansas by mail and by facsimile. The court does not find persuasive defendants\u2019 argument that jurisdiction cannot exist because plaintiff initiated contact with defendants in California and defendants never entered Kansas. It is clear that when a party chooses to enter into a contract with a Kansas corporation, the subsequent contacts cannot be said to be \u201crandom, fortuitous, or attenuated.\u201d Marketing Group, Inc. v. Success Dev. Int\u2019l, Inc., 41 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1244 (D.Kan.1999)(<HOLDING>); World Paper Res., Inc. v. Buckeye Cellulose Holdings: 0: holding kansas comparative fault statute applied where the accident occurred in kansas and the only missouri contact with the accident was the fact that one of the parties  resided in missouri distinguishing hicks based on the lack significant contacts with missouri 1: holding that the defendant had minimum contacts with kansas because it responded to the plaintiffs offer to contract despite the fact that a contract was never formally signed 2: holding that the defendant had minimum contacts with kansas because it chose to enter into a contract with the plaintiff that was to be performed at least in part in kansas and then the defendant continued to be in contact with the plaintiff regarding the contract 3: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 4: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 10 (same); Nev. Const, art. 15, \u00a7 10 (same); Okla. Const, art. VI, \u00a7 13 (same); Pa Const, art. IV, \u00a7 8 (providing various methods of making appointments depending on office involved and time of vacancy); R.I. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 5 (same as Indiana); Tenn. Const, art. VII, \u00a7 4 (granting legislature power to establish method of filling vacancies); Vt. Const, art. II, \u00a7 20 (appointment power limited by constitution and law passed by legislature); Wis. Const, art. XIII \u00a7 9 (same). \"Several state courts have held that such provisions have the effect of authorizing the legislature to vest itself with the power to make certain administrative appointments, and that no violation of separation of powers inheres in doing so. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, 142-43 (1876) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn. 471, 125 S.W. Holdings: 0: recognizing authority of legislature to choose officers of municipal corporations 1: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities 2: recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court 3: recognizing the municipal authority to regulate traffic implies broad authority 4: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to the inference that Harris County has a policy that condones the use of excessive and deadly force against fleeing suspects both before and after the shooting death of Luis Escobar.\u201d We have held that for purposes of her section 1988 claim, Escobar\u2019s evidence raised a fact issue as to whether Deputy Goodney violated Luis\u2019s constitutional right to be free from seizure by excessive force. But the fact that the disciplinary committee had before it the same evidence entails only that the committee faced the same fact issues that would confront a jury; it is not evidence that shows the committee was acting out an unwritten policy of allowing officers to use deadly force whenever they feel their safety is threatened. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1279 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Escobar offered no other evidence of the Holdings: 0: holding that section 1983 action requires a showing of defendants personal participation in alleged constitutional violation 1: holding that section 1983 plaintiffs presented nothing but conjecture when they alleged that city officials must have known that officer was lying 2: holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in either a thirdparty beneficiary individual or associational capacity because there was nothing in the contract between a conservation district and a city concerning rates charged to the city that conferred donee  or creditorbeneficiary standing upon the plaintiffs to challenge the contracts terms 3: holding that attorney fees must be awarded where plaintiffs section 1983 claim was unreasonable and groundless 4: holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "purged when only an hour had passed between the illegal seizure and the time the defendant gave his consent to search, id. at 356. The Buchanan Court also emphasized that the defendant did not move from his location of initial detention and \u201cdid not consult with an attorney prior to consenting to the search,\u201d the latter of which forms a \u201ccrucial factor\u201d in the attenuation analysis. Id. (quotation omitted). Because \u201c[dissipation of the taint resulting from an illegal [seizure] ordinarily involves showing that there was some significant intervening time, space, or event,\u201d and none was present here, the first two factors from Brown weigh in favor of suppression. See Lopez-Arias, 344 F.3d at 630 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Griffith, 193 Fed.Appx. 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the third factor\u2014the purpose and Holdings: 0: holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action 1: holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute 2: holding that the defendants unlawful arrest in his hotel room rendered his subsequent consent to the search of his room invalid even though he signed a consent form allowing the search after his arrest because the government  completely failed to address whether there was a break in the causal relationship between the unlawful arrest and the subsequent search 3: holding that consent was the fruit of defendants arrest and that there were no intervening circumstances that would break that chain of causation under analogous facts 4: holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "has only one reasonable interpretation. The Farmworkers assert that the phrase means the home villages from which the workers traveled to Monterrey. Indeed, \u201c[t]he place from which the worker has come to work\u201d can reasonably be read to mean the home village of the worker. Alternatively, the Growers contend that the place from which the worker has come to work is Monterrey, as that was the place where the workers gathered, where they were selected to be employees, and from where they traveled collectively to the farms in Florida. This reading of the language is equally reasonable. As both interpretations provide reasonable constructions, the phrase is clearly ambiguous. See Royal Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach and Trust Co., 215 So.2d 336, 338 (Fla.4th Dist.Ct.App.1968) (<HOLDING>). In finding that the phrase clearly and Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is ambiguous and the parties suggest different interpretations summary judgment is inappropriate because an issue of fact exists 1: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 2: holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured 3: holding that a contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations 4: holding that contract language is ambiguous where it is in fact reasonably or fairly susceptible to the different constructions being advocated by the parties", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "also revealed that Cabral erroneously informed the FBI that Seda traveled to Saudi Arabia for a Hajj in 2000. Draft interview summaries revealed additional inconsistencies. For example, one draft summary of an interview with Richard contained the statement that \u201c[Richard] Cabral did not recall Sedaghaty discussing the topic of Kosovo or supporting mujahedin there\u201d while another draft of the summary excluded that same statement. Another early draft revealed a conflict about the amount of the supposed payments that were collected at the end of the Hajj. Without the suppressed materials, Seda\u2019s counsel was severely limited on cross examination, unable to explore, let alone establish, grounds for Cabral\u2019s possible bias. See United States v. Schoneberg, 396 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Taken together with the substantive issues Holdings: 0: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 1: recognizing that the defense must be given the opportunity to crossexamine a witness and explore any motive to falsely testify in order to assist government 2: holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness 3: holding that defendant had ample opportunity to crossexamine government witness including the terms of a plea agreement and that further impeachment was speculative and minimal at best 4: holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "624, 627 (relying on NRC\u2019s post-trial report to support position); ante at 175-176, 699 A.2d at 624 (citing post-trial cases to support general acceptance of polymarker testing). Despite the majority\u2019s acceptance of de novo review, the majority carefully circumscribes such review to exclude all of the evi dence that does not support its ruling. See, e.g., ante at 180, 699 A.2d at 626 (noting that \u201cthe record does not reveal whether dot-intensity analysis can be performed on a DQ Alpha test,\u201d but ignoring evidence that it can be); ante at 181-182, 699 A.2d at 626-627 (acknowledging that the HBGG result obtained for the mixed sample is unexplainable by dot-intensity analysis, but refusing to explore inconsistency until post-conviction-relief proceedings); ante at 183-184, 699 A.2d at 628 (<HOLDING>); ante at 193, 699 A.2d at 633 (\u201cIt is too late Holdings: 0: recognizing that dotintensity analysis provides an opening for crossexamination and contradictory expert testimony but refusing to remand the case for a hearing to develop such evidence 1: recognizing that independent analysis is  the only means by which the defendant can defend against expert testimony by the state  2: recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case 3: holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance 4: holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of, Mr. Voss provided to Mr. Spartin was marked with AUSA Valder\u2019s handwritten notation \"GJX#4.\u201d Mr.- Spartin testified at the criminal trial that he did\u2019not notice the mark nor was he was unaware that the statements provided to him had been presented to the grand jury. See Crim. Trial Tr. at 2610-13, 2737-38, 2754. 63 . Even Mr. Spartin concluded, based on his review of the four interview s\u00fcmmaries, that - \u201cI\u2019m not \u00e1 lawyer but Jesus, there\u2019s enough there to seem to me to hang REI from the yardarm.\u201d PL\u2019s Ex. 226 at 28 (Spartin Polygraph Tr.). 64 . Lack of probable cause is an element of the both the plaintiff's Bivens claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution and FTCA claim for malicious prosecution. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Moore-II, 213 F.3d at 709-10 (listing as an Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution action must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying criminal charge 1: recognizing tennessee law requires the absence of probable cause to maintain a malicious prosecution claim 2: holding that direct evidence linking a crime to the particular place to be searched is not required to support a finding of probable cause 3: holding that plaintiff was required to plead and prove the absence of probable cause to support his bivens claim 4: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the presentence investigation report. Without holding a hearing, or making findings of fact, the district court imposed the obstruction enhancement. The two-point enhancement increased McKnight\u2019s offense level to 43, mandating that the district court impose a life sentence on McKnight. Because of the life sentence in this case, and the absence of findings to support the obstruction enhancement, we carefully review the record and McKnight\u2019s contentions on appeal. II. Discussion The appellant McKnight first asserts error by the district court in refusing to allow McKnight to withdraw his guilty plea. We reject this claim. The record shows no abuse of discretion by the district court in rejecting this contention. See United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1295, 1298-99 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The evidence indicates that McKnight freely Holdings: 0: recognizing the late date of a motion to withdraw filed three weeks before trial 1: holding that district court abused discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea based on intervening supreme court decision that may have rendered factual basis of plea insufficient 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea 3: holding the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant did not admit to facts demonstrating the required mental state 4: holding that a district courts application of the wrong legal standard on a motion to withdraw a plea constitutes an abuse of discretion", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "did not obtain legal title to the Property until after November 27, 2002, and most likely not until December 2, 2002. 5 . When constructive fraud in the conduct of the proceedings is alleged, such a judgment may only be entertained by the court if the motion to reopen was filed within one year of the date of the judgment. TP \u00a7 14-845(a). 6 . In Mr. Bailey\u2019s affidavit and in the City\u2019s brief, there is language suggesting that, once the City acquired title to the Property by condemnation, any taxes owed were automatically abated or forgiven, or taken as paid. The City has not cited any case or statute to support that assertion, nor have we found any. Indeed, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Prince George\u2019s County, Md., 40 F.Supp. 436 (D.Md. 1941), supports a contrary assertion (<HOLDING>). Here, the City, a local municipalily, was Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 1: holding that taxes are not private property that can be physically taken by the government 2: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property 3: recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property 4: holding that when federal government acquires property through condemnation it must account for state and local property taxes interest and penalties", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "County Mun. Util. Dist. No. 9, 866 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citing McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993)). An appel late court cannot consider as grounds for reversal, issues the non-movant did not expressly present to the trial court by written response to the summary judgment motion. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Autk, 589 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex.1979). If the non-movant does not expressly present grounds that would defeat the movant\u2019s right to a summary judgment by filing a written answer or response, he is limited to arguing on appeal that the movant\u2019s motion was legally insufficient. Id. These requirements apply equally to constitutional claims. See Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (<HOLDING>). We have reviewed Fry\u2019s responses to the Holdings: 0: holding that claims including constitutional claims must be asserted in trial court to be raised on appeal 1: holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding 2: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 3: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 4: holding that a claim including a constitutional claim must have been asserted to the trial court to be raised on appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "what he was charged with doing, the maximum penalty he faced and the possibility of restitution and court costs being ordered as part of any sentence imposed. Whitepipe indicated that he was ready to enter his plea and proceeded to plead guilty to the rape charge. The court then questioned Whi-tepipe to determine whether his plea was voluntary: THE COURT: Did anyone force you to enter that plea? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Did anyone tell you, other than this plea agreement, that I would give you special treatment if you just came in today and pled guilty? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: And you are doing this under your own free will? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 28, 29, 113 S.Ct. 517 (<HOLDING>). Because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary 1: holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act 2: holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge 3: holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant 4: holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "965 (2008); State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 590-91,141 P.3d 49 (2006); In re Pers. Restraint of Isadore, 151 Wn.2d 294, 297-98, 88 P.3d 390 (2004). 11 In fact, St. Pierre explicitly stated that \u201csome errors which result in per se prejudice on direct review will also be per se prejudicial on collateral attack ....\u201d St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d at 329. 12 I note the majority\u2019s attempt to distance itself from this position. Majority at 598 n.3. The majority is correct to do that. As discussed below, however, the majority\u2019s analysis could be used to conflate harmless error review of constitutional issues with harmless error review of nonconstitutional issues. 13 See generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-11, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (<HOLDING>). 14 Accord. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, Holdings: 0: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 1: holding admission of coerced confession to he a classic trial error similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence and thus reviewable for harmlessness 2: holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  3: holding that we would not review a claim of error regarding the admission of evidence when the defendant stipulated to its admission at trial 4: holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is a \u201cfacility\u201d within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9601(9); (2) a \u201crelease\u201d or \u201cthreatened release\u201d of any \u201chazardous substance\u201d from the facility has occurred; and (3) such \u201crelease\u201d or \u201cthreatened release\u201d ' has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs. Ascon Properties v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1989). See also United States v. Bliss, 667 F.Supp. 1298, 1310 (E.D.Mo.1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F.Supp. 1283, 1289 (D.R.I.1986). In this case, it is undisputed that there has been a \u201crelease\u201d or a \u201cthreatened release\u201d from a facility and that the release triggered the incurrence of response costs by Acme. Therefore, the only issues for resolution are (1) whether the defendant dumped its waste at the Fadrowski site and (2) whether th . 1361, 1405- 06 (D.N.H.1986) (<HOLDING>). However, the plaintiff must establish some Holdings: 0: holding that there is no requirement that plaintiffs show that defendants waste caused environmental harm 1: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 2: holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm 3: holding that there is generally no constitutional requirement that defendants must always be informed of their right to appeal following a guilty plea 4: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Board as an aid to Board deliberation. Id. at 177, 95 S.Ct. 1491. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the reports had not been adopted or incorporated by the Board, as \u201cthe evidence utterly fails to support the conclusion that the reasoning in the reports is adopted by the Board as its reasoning, even when it agrees with the conclusion of a report....\u201d Id. at 184, 95 S.Ct. 1491. Certainly, in situations like Grumman, where an agency, having reviewed a subordinate\u2019s non-binding recommendation, makes a \u201cyes or no\u201d determination without providing any reasoning at all, a court may not infer that the agency is relying on the reasoning contained in the subordinate\u2019s report. See Casad v. United States Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Servs., 301 F.3d 1247, 1252-53 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Afshar v. Dep\u2019t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1143 Holdings: 0: holding that police report of witnesss statement was inadmissible because witness had not adopted report as accurate when matter was fresh in his memory 1: holding an agency could not use a policy found in a departments employee manual as the rule of law to determine a contested issue because the agency never adopted a rule containing such a policy 2: holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required 3: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency 4: holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the  grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Supreme Court has stressed that a warrantless entry into a home may be \u201clegal when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.\u201d Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (emphasis added). For purposes of the Fourth Amendment analysis in this case, it makes no difference that the officers did not enter Fisher\u2019s apartment to take physical custody of him. We have long recognized that \u201cit is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home.\u201d United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); see also United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). With these basic Fourth Amendment principles Holdings: 0: holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred while the defendant applied force directly to the victims person 1: holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction 2: holding that defendant voluntarily consented where defendants only basis for coercion was that the officers said that if he did not consent they would get a warrant which would take a while 3: holding that automobile exception applied to search of defendants tractor trailer where confidential informant who was detained at border with a trailer full of marijuana told agents that he was driving to meet the defendant to exchange trailers and defendant subsequently arrived at the location described at the time described in a tractor with an empty trailer that matched informants description 4: holding that because defendant only emerged under circumstances of extreme coercion the arrest occurred while he was still inside his trailer", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "fees. In short, all of Plaintiffs\u2019 substantive claims are examples of bootstrapping. The Court must finally address Plaintiffs claim for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. This count of the complaint fails to state a claim because after dismissal of the substantive claims there is no underlying legal action upon which to Plaintiff may receive declaratory or injunctive relief. It is well settled that an injunction is a remedy. A claim for injunctive relief does not stand alone, but requires a viable underlying legal claim. The same is true for declaratory relief, the source of which in federal court is the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201 et seq. See Collin County, Texas v. Homeowners Assoc. for Values Essential to Neighborhoods, 915 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). B. The Motion for Severance and Motion to Holdings: 0: recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding property owner not entitled to award of attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because his declaratory judgment counterclaim did not present any issues beyond the homeowners associations cause of action 3: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 4: holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The Supreme Court has stated: \u201c[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.\u201d United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). In United States v. Reeves the Tenth Circuit established that \u201c[o]pening the door to one\u2019s home is not voluntary if ordered to do so under color of authority.\u201d 524 F.3d 1161, 1167 (10th Cir.2008). The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that absent exigent circumstances, any warrant-less seizure from officials acting under the color of authority may not seize a person inside their home, or effect a seizure by ordering a person inside a home to come to the door. See United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1446 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Flowers, 336 F.3d 1222, Holdings: 0: holding that the suspect was effectively arrested when police surrounded his trailer with their weapons drawn and ordered him through a bullhorn to leave the trailer and drop to his knees 1: holding that arrest immediately out side of defendants house violated fourth amendment 2: holding that a seizure as a violation of the fourth amendment when police surrounded an individuals house for three hours planning an arrest and ordering the individual out of his home under drawn firearms believing he was a suspect in a bank robbery 3: holding that no seizure occurred where officer approached the suspect at the bus stop mentioned that he was investigating a bank robbery asked the suspect what he was doing in the area and for his identification and otherwise gave no indication that the suspect was not free to leave or to refuse to respond to questioning 4: holding police officers show of authority by announcing he was a police officer and ordering defendant to stop was an investigative seizure implicating fourth amendment protections", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "tort law; d.) the moral aspects of the defendant\u2019s conduct; and e.) the prevention and punishment aspects of liability. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts \u00a7 4, at 20-26 (5th ed.1984). Larson was deprived of his parental rights for seven years in clear violation of the custody decree. Similarly, Jessica was denied the right to a relationship with her father during a critical stage in her development. Although this precious lost time can never be regained, some form of redress undoubtedly is in order. Tort law long has protected \u201crelational\u201d interests, such as between family members, from interference. Prosser & Keeton, supra, \u00a7 124, at 915; see, e.g., In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 127 N.W.2d 548 (1964); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) (<HOLDING>). In 1978, however, our legislature abolished Holdings: 0: recognizing that third party may not recover contribution against parent where child has no cause of action against parent for negligent supervision 1: holding child could bring action for enticement of parent 2: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child 3: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended 4: holding that a superior court can adjudicate a child as a child in need of aid based on the acts of just one parent", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "loss suffered by Huffy was the direct result of the tumultuous economic environment during the class period and non-fraudulent bad news that was occurring simultaneously. Although that argument, supported by proper evidence, may demonstrate that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this issue, should this lawsuit proceed to that stage, it does not cause this Court to conclude that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead the element of loss causation. On the contrary, they have set forth their theory of loss causation in detail, and that theory is based on more than the bare assertion that the Defendants\u2019 alleged misrepresentations merely caused the value of Huffy\u2019s stock to become inflated. Accord Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 501 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1118-19 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (<HOLDING>). It bears emphasis, that, in ruling on a Holdings: 0: holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale 1: holding that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation where their only allegation was the payment of artificially inflated prices for defendants securities and their complaint failed to provide defendants with notice of what plaintiffs relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the alleged misrepresentation at issue  2: holding that plaintiffs allegations of loss causation complied with dura because they asserted that defendants misrepresentations had caused the value of the shares of stock to become inflated after which the disclosure of the true state of affairs caused the plaintiffs to lose millions of dollars 3: holding that the plaintiffs argument that the defendant caused plaintiffs inability to return to work cannot hold water because the socalled causation was insufficient to rise to the level of actionable harassment 4: holding that plaintiffs claims that defendants artificially inflated the companys share price so that they could sell their stock at a huge profit was undermined by the fact that one of the four defendants did not sell his stock during the class period", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 1326(a), enhanced by (b)(2). Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel for Gonsalez-Palomino has filed a brief stating that there are no grounds for relief, and a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. Gonsalez-Palomino has not filed a pro se supplemental brief and the government has not filed an answering brief. We have conducted an independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), and we dismiss in light of the valid appeal waiver. See United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily); see also United States v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Counsel\u2019s motion to withdraw is granted. Holdings: 0: holding that blakely and united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 are not retroactive on collateral review 1: holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing 2: holding that  3582c does not apply to a person seeking resentencing under united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 3: holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines 4: holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "given effect. These cases allow for each employee or retiree individually to decide whether to consent to arbitration of his or her own claims. Pryner further indicates that where the employee/retiree and employer/former employer agree to arbitration, \u201cthere is nothing to prevent a binding arbitration.\u201d Id.; see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d at 283 (finding \u201cthere is no real danger that Cooper would have to relitigate the same issues with individual retirees that will have already been arbitrated with the Union\u201d); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs., 266 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir.2001) (stating that dispute resolved by arbitrators was closed to further litigation by res judicata and collateral estoppel); cf. Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1280 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the arbitrator\u2019s decision would Holdings: 0: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 1: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 2: holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits 3: holding that former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata by unions prior suit where employee was not a party to the prior suit as a former union member was not in privity with the union and never authorized the union to represent his interest in prior suit 4: holding that there was abundant evidence to support the charge against a union member for helping organize a nonaflcio local union of a different name where the union member admitted at the hearing that he contacted local contractors for the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement for new union and serving as the new unions business manager", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of widely recognized authorities on endocarditis, but rather as a reluctance to accept as authoritative the materials in their entirety and to accept one particular source as the exclusive authority on endocarditis. A trial judge\u2019s decision to admit expert testimony will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. E.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.1985). In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his wide discretion in allowing Dr. Bennett to testify as an expert in the field of cardiology. Moreover, the plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Bennett relied on a particularly objectionable or unconventional scientific theory or methodology. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-97, 126 L.Ed.2d 469, 485 (1993). (<HOLDING>). Because the district court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that causation cannot be proved based on speculation 1: holding that daubert applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge 2: holding that recusal is not required on the basis of unsupported irrational or highly tenuous speculation 3: holding expert testimony remedies speculation by the court 4: holding that expert scientific testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of science and based on more than a subjective belief or unsupported speculation", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "placed in a situation that may endanger the child\u2019s life or health[.]\u201d \u00a7 30-6-KD). A child is defined as \u201ca person who is less than eighteen years of age.\u201d \u00a7 30-6-l(A)(l). Review of the criminal code, NMSA 1978, Sections 30-1-1 to 30-28-3 (1963, as amended through 2005) defines a \u201cperson\u201d as \u201cany human being or legal entity[.]\u201d \u00a7 30-1-12(E). {7} When the Legislature defined a \u201cperson\u201d as a human being or legal entity, it did not include fetuses within the meaning of a \u201chuman being.\u201d State 956 (1996) (dismissing charge of second-degree criminal mistreatment of a child, holding that a fetus was not a child within the meaning of criminal mistreatment statute where mother continued to ingest cocaine while pregnant); State v. Deborah J.Z., 228 Wis.2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). C. Due Process {11} Accepting the State\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that firstdegree sexual abuse is a lesserincluded offense of firstdegree rape 1: holding that firstdegree sexual abuse is a lesserincluded offense of firstdegree sodomy 2: holding that fetus was not a human being for purposes of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide and firstdegree reckless injury statutes 3: holding that attempted firstdegree murder may be committed knowingly or intentionally 4: holding reckless injury and attempted firstdegree intentional homicide statutes were not applicable to a mother who consumed excessive amounts of alcohol causing injury to her child postpartum", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "patients that physicians were independent contractors and provided patients with consent forms that informed patients of physicians\u2019 independent-contractor status); Peter v. Vullo, 234 N.C.App. 150, 162, 758 S.E.2d 431, 439 (2014) (noting that hospital expressly gave notice via consent form that \u25a0physician was an independent contractor); Cantrell v. Northeast Georgia Med. Ctr., 235 Ga.App. 365, 366, 508 S.E.2d 716, 718 (1998) (noting that hospital posted sign over registration desk and gave patients treatment-consent forms advising patients that physicians were not hospital employees); and Holmes v. University Health Sery., Inc., 205 Ga.App. 602, 603, 423 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1992) (noting that forms plaintiff encouraged the Bains to think that Dr. 38, 735 P.2d 460 (Ct. App. 1987) (<HOLDING>); and Gilbert, 156 Ill.2d at 526, 622 N.E.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that where hospital used balance billing its lien was unenforceable because the hospital had been paid in full for the services it provided to patient and there was consequently no debt to secure by the existence of the lien 1: holding that vicarious liability claim against union based on medical malpractice of treating physician is not preempted by erisa 2: holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed 3: holding that claim that hospital provided inadequate supervision leading to patients sexual assault by another patient constituted health care liability claim 4: holding issue of vicarious liability was for jury where patient did not have opportunity to choose physician who was provided by hospital", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "If the trial court concludes that the agreement is procedurally unconscionable, the trial court must also determine whether the agreement is substantively unconscionable on the basis that it limits discovery and noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So.2d 531, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (\u201cThe agreement herein deprives the nursing home resident of significant remedies provided for by the statutes. Specifically, it limits non-economic [sic] damages, bars punitive damages and attorney\u2019s fees, and restricts access to discovery necessary to prove statutory violations. For these reasons, we conclude that the agreement is substantively unconscionable.\u201d (footnote omitted)); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So.2d 59, 62-63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Woebse, 977 So.2d at 634-35 Holdings: 0: holding that appellate attorneys fees were incurred during the divorce proceedings and were awardable by the trial judge 1: holding agreement was substantively unconscionable because it prevented arbiter from awarding punitive damages and attorneys fees awards that were intended by the legislature to be awardable 2: holding that even though attorneys fees were not properly awardable under rule 68 costs excluding fees were mandatory 3: holding that the state is immune from punitive awards 4: holding that the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable because it precluded the award of attorney fees which were authorized in the relevant ohio consumer protection statute", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "there was no support in the text or history of \u00a7 1252 for such a construction. 533 U.S. at 351, 121 S.Ct. 2268. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit\u2019s holdings that it lacked jurisdiction over a petition for direct review, and that \u00a7 1252 did not preclude the petitioners from pursuing habeas relief in the district court under \u00a7 2241. Id. at 349-50, 352, 121 S.Ct. 2268. Thus, we disagree with the government\u2019s argument that Mr. Latu could have raised all the issues in his habeas corpus petition in a petition for direct review. We conclude that Mr. Latu properly filed a timely habeas petition to bring his constitutional claims that were not reviewable on direct review under \u00a7 `1252(a)(2)(C). See Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1145-47 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). B. Jurisdiction to review discretionary Holdings: 0: holding that review under  2241 is still available ndtwithstanding language in  1252a2c barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review 1: holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a  2241 petition 2: holding that a state court criminal judgment is final for purposes of collateral attack in federal court at the conclusion of review in the united states supreme court or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires 3: holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law 4: holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "parole is not a consequence of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace or a consequence of the withholding of legislative grace [, and t]here is no co SE2d 609) (2008) (same). 6 See Rice, 277 Ga. 649; Williams, 301 Ga. App. at 850-51 (1). 7 Earley v. State, 310 Ga. App. 110, 112 (712 SE2d 565) (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 Murray v. State, 307 Ga. App. 621, 623-24 (705 SE2d 726) (2011) (footnote and punctuation omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 9 Rios v. State, 281 Ga. 181, 181 (2) (637 SE2d 20) (2006) (punctuation omitted). 10 Murray, 307 Ga. App. at 624 (punctuation omitted). 11 Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 (1) (513 SE2d 212) (1999) (citations and punctuation omitted). 12 See id. at 582 (1) Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance 1: holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary 2: holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea 3: holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims 4: holding failure to advise of right to subpoena witnesses does not affect the validity of a guilty plea", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "satisfy the duly of fair representation implied by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 151 et seq. 7 . The relevant portion of Section 160(b) with which the Cannon court was concerned stated as follows: \u201cNo complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made ...\u201d See 832 F.2d at 304 n. 2 (emphasis supplied). 8 . See Winkels v. George A. Hormel & Co., 874 F.2d 567, 569 (8th Cir.1989) (disagreeing with Cannon majority and ruling that there is no requirement that federal procedural rules be imposed when a hybrid case is initiated in state court); Gorwin v. Local 282, I.B.T., 838 F.Supp. 116, 123 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>); Juliano v. Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc., 734 Holdings: 0: holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action 1: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 2: holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced 3: recognizing forum selection clause providing that no such claim shall be commenced prosecuted or continued in any forum other than the courts of the state of new york located in the city and county of new york or in the united states district court for the southern district of new york as clear and unambiguous expression of parties selection of exclusive forum in affirming district courts dismissal of action commenced in united states district court for the district of new jersey 4: holding that plaintiffs hybrid  301fair representation action was not time barred where plaintiff commenced timely action in state court under new york civil rules", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is not available as a defense to claims alleging medical malpractice in providing subsequent treatment. In Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1, 15, 459 N.W.2d 178, 186-87 (1990), where a patient failed to follow the instructions of his doctor to lose weight, and his weight problem was causally related to a pulmonary embolism for which he obtained negligent treatment, the defense of contributory negligence was held inapplicable in a medical malpractice case \u201cwhen a patient\u2019s conduct provides the occasion for medical attention, care, or treatment ... or when the patient\u2019s conduct contributes to an illness or condition for which the patient seeks the medical attention, care, or treatment on which a subsequent medical malpractice claim is based.\u201d Likewi ist.Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>); Matthews v. Williford, 318 So.2d 480, 483 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 1: holding that fault may not be assessed against a patient in a medical malpractice action in which a patients negligent conduct provides only the occasion for the medical attention care or treatment which is the basis for the action where the defendant doctor was treating the plaintiff patient for injuries sustained in a car accident negligently caused by the plaintiff who was driving while intoxicated 2: holding that the medical review panel is authorized to review the medical records and other submitted material pertaining to each defendants treatment of a patient and that while a medical malpractice plaintiff must as a prerequisite to filing suit present the  proposed complaint for review and expert opinion by a medical review panel there is no requirement for such plaintiff to fully explicate and provide the particulars or legal contentions regarding the claim 3: holding that conduct by the plaintiff contributing to his illness or medical condition and furnishing the occasion for medical treatment is not a defense to medical malpractice where a doctor negligently treated a man who had attempted to commit suicide 4: holding that because the warden and medical treatment director lacked medical expertise they cannot be liable for the medical staffs diagnostic decision not to refer plaintiff to a doctor to treat his shoulder injury", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Appendix at 200. On the other hand, if the arbitrator determines that the March 2002 claim qualifies as a \u201ccontrover sy or claim arising out of or relating to services ... hereafter provided by us to you or at your request,\u201d resolution of the claim is governed by the ADR provision. Id. In the event that the mediation required under the ADR provision is unsuccessful and the parties proceed with arbitration, the arbitrator will be required to rule upon Parkevich\u2019s claims related to the March 2002 sale of the property. In doing so, the arbitrator would have to rule upon Parkevich\u2019s claims, if they are presented, that the Engagement Letter violated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. See, e.g., Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 n. 4 (Ind. 1997) (<HOLDING>); W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Holdings: 0: holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy 1: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law 2: holding that an agreement in violation of explicit judicial declarations of indiana public policy in the rules of professional conduct are akin to contravening a statute and such agreements are unenforceable 3: holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements 4: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and the initiation of criminal proceedings against him, and seizing Colon-Andino\u2019s property \u2014 e.g. his weapons permit and gun \u2014 without probable cause. Each one of these factual allegations alone clearly constitutes a plausible Fourth Amendment violation. Together the claims allege malicious prosecution on the part of defendants against Colon-Andino. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has \u201cassumed without deciding that malicious prosecution can, under some circumstances, embody a violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus ground a cause of action under section 1983.\u201d Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (1st Cir.1996)); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275-76, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994)(<HOLDING>). To establish malicious prosecution under Holdings: 0: recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment 1: holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person 2: holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution 3: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause 4: holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "hr\" (Att, 4 at unnumbered page 4). According to Dr. Mash, the combined effects of PCP intoxication and Smith's low intellectual functioning and organic brain ' damage together impaired his higher order reasoning and judgment abilities such that \"he could not adequately comprehend his Miranda rights or assess the ramifications of a waiver of those rights\" (Att. 4 at unnumbered page 2). 1 24 We find that this proffered evidence is insufficient to show that trial counsel was ineffective. Specifically, we are convinced that expert testimony such as that contained in these two reports would not have changed the district court's decision on the voluntariness of Smith's waiver or our opinion on direct appeal affirming that decision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. at 2067-68 (<HOLDING>). 125 In finding that Smith voluntarily waived Holdings: 0: holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance 1: holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different 3: holding that to satisfy the prejudice prong a petitioner must establish that but for counsels errors there is a reasonable probabil ity the result of the proceeding would have been different 4: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "other disputed items should be included in the property distribution. III. Inclusion of Property that Sue Disposed of Prior to the Dissolution. The parties disagree with respect to whether other assets should be included as part of the property awarded to Sue: (1) the Blazer sold or given to Jami; (2) the cash value received by Sue when she canceled the policy on David\u2019s life; and (3) the funds from the liquidated mutual fund that were not attributable to Sue\u2019s inheritance. We begin our consideration of this issue with the observation that a spouse\u2019s disposal of assets that would otherwise be subject to division in the dissolution may properly be considered in making an equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 property. See In re Marriage of Cerven, 335 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1983) (<HOLDING>). A. The Blazer. The evidence shows that the Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: holding that an obligation is in the nature of alimony when it is intended to provide support for the spouse rather than an equalization of property rights 3: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate 4: holding that property transferred by a spouse to avoid support obligation may be considered on the issue of property distribution as well as alimony", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the total cost of the items ordered and the type of delivery the customer selected. The specific charges were identified based on the two. variables. As is apparent from J.C. Penney\u2019s disclosures, the cost of the delivery charge as a percentage- of the amount of the order declined as the amount of the order increased, thereby serving as an incentive for consumers to purchase additional items to save on delivery charges. Nowhere in the website did J.C. Penney claim that its shipping and handling charges were based upon \u201cactual cost.\u201d Indeed, the matrix chart provided by J.C. Penney plainly demonstrated that the key variables were not weight or size but cost of the item and the chosen method of delivery. See Zuckerman v. BMG Direct Mktg., Inc., 290 A.D.2d 330, 737 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Ciser v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., Holdings: 0: recognizing that where fca forfeitures were allowed for numerous projects on which no actual pecuniary loss had been incurred the governments injuries of course included not merely the amount of the fraud itself but also ancillary costs such as the costs of detection and investigation that routinely attend the governments efforts to root out deceptive practices directed at the public purse 1: holding that billing consumers for shipping and handling an amount exceeding the sellers actual costs cannot be deceptive as a matter of law when the amounts are fully disclosed 2: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs 3: holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due 4: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the victim was killed in the parking lot and that he staged her death to look like a sexual assault, the grass which was clutched in the victim\u2019s hand tells another tale \u2014 one where she was still struggling for life at the edge of the pond after being sexually assaulted. The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of twelve to zero. The trial court found such a punishment was appropriate after considering all the evidence and properly weighing the aggravators against the miti-gators. Specifically, the court found four aggravating factors, one statutory miti-gator, and numerous nonstatutory miti-gators. Upon review, we find that the circumstances of this case are similar to other cases in which we have upheld the death penalty. See Orme v. State, 677 So.2d 258, 263 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); Schwab v. State, 636 So.2d 3, 7 (Fla.1994) Holdings: 0: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac 1: holding death sentence proportionate where defendant murdered wife and children and trial court found three aggravators previous capital felony ccp and hac and two statutory mitigators extreme disturbance and no prior criminal history 2: holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery beating and strangulation of victim where there were three statutory aggravators hac pecuniary gain and sexual battery and both statutory mental mitigators 3: holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury 4: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where only the hac aggravator was found", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "fair trial.\u201d), if Ms. Battles had obtained the information upon which she presently grounds her Brady claim before the trial commenced (or, indeed, sometime before the trial ended), she would have been obliged to voice her concerns about that potentially suppressed information then. Compare United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir.1984) (\u201cWhile we strongly disapprove of delayed disclosure of Brady materials, that alone is not always grounds for reversal. \u2018As long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendant] to make use of any benefits of the evidence, Due Process is satisfied.\u2019 \u201d (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 291 (7th Cir.1979))), with United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In such a circumstance, Ms. Battles\u2019s failure Holdings: 0: holding prosecutor has affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence 1: holding that a lie by defendant to government regarding his past criminal history was exculpatory material under brady 2: holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation 3: holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession 4: holding that revelation of exculpatory material just prior to the end of trial which led the defense to move  to dismiss the case  for violating brady did not warrant reversal when following the recess defense counsel extensively crossexamined the witness possessing the purportedly exculpatory information regarding the tardilydisclosed evidence  and used the exculpatory material to strong effect in his closing argument", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that City bears the burden of demonstrating that the City Council\u2019s decision is supported by substantial evidence. (See City Motion at 13; AirTouch Opp\u2019n at 18.) The Court accepts that stipulation, and accordingly will assign the burden of proof in \u00a7 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) on the City. c. Analysis AirTouch argues that as a matter of law there was no substantial evidence to support the City\u2019s decision because the record consists primarily of the \u201csubstantiated\u201d testimony of residents whose testimony was based on their experiences with Nex-tel. There is a split in authority, and no Ninth Circuit authority, on whether a telecommunications zoning decision can be based on constituent testimony alone. Compare AT & T Wireless PCS v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); with Cellular Telephone Co. v. Town of Oyster Holdings: 0: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final 1: holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by giving summary consideration to evidence presented in a motion to reopen particularly when dealing with evidence which the bia is asked to repeatedly consider 2: holding order compelling arbitration is unappealable 3: holding that it is proper for a legislature and its members to consider constituent testimony as particularly compelling forms of evidence 4: holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "P.2d 934 (Alaska 1994); Maricopa Cnty., 136 Ariz. 528, 667 P.2d 228 (App.1983); In re Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741, 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983). I would hold that good cause exists to deviate from the adoptive placement preferences of section 1915(a). Baby Girl has resided with Appellant rated a desire and willingness to introduce Baby Girl to her Indian culture. Section 1917 permits an adopted Indian child to receive information on his or her \u201ctribal affiliation ... and ... such other information as may be necessary to protect any rights flowing from the individual\u2019s tribal relationship\u201d upon reaching the age of eighteen. 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1917. Thus, I am persuaded that Baby Girl will have a knowledge of and appreciation for her cultural heritage. See In re Robert T., 246 Cal.Rptr. at 176 (<HOLDING>). In light of the totality of the evidence, Holdings: 0: holding that where a patient is in possession of his faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult about his condition and where no emergency exists making it impracticable to confer with him his consent is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician 1: holding that the native american childs best interests were to remain with his adoptive parents since they have bonded well and have encouraged him to learn about and visit his cultural roots 2: holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion 3: holding that a suspects statements to the police to the effect that his constitution will protect him that the police have nothing along with his negative response to a police question whether he had anything to say about what he was being arrested for followed by his question who said i did this did not amount to a clear invocation of the right to remain silent under davis 4: holding that a parents rights must yield to the childs right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent healthy safe environment a parent cannot protect his parental rights by merely stating that he does not wish to have his rights terminated internal citations omitted", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was pursuant to a settlement agreement, not an IEP team decision. Outside of settlement, AACPS maintains, it has no authority to place students in non-approved schools. The parents refute all of these contentions. Although the ALJ did not reach this issue, we note that the weight of the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, supports AACPS\u2019s contentions, as does the caselaw and the statute itself. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1412(a)(10)(B) (providing that when public agencies place children in private schools, \u201cthe State educational agency shall determine whether such schools and facilities meet standards that apply to State educational agencies\u201d); Carter v. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir.1991), aff'd, 510 U.S. 7, 14, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the record fully supports the ALJ\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that though the school districts plan was adequate the parents were still entitled to tuition reimbursement under the pendency provision 1: holding that the unilateral placement of a student by the parents in an unapproved school is not by itself a bar to tuition reimbursement but public schools may not place students in unapproved schools 2: holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented 3: holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement 4: holding that a federallyfunded program in which public school teachers provided remedial education to disadvantaged children in parochial schools as well as public schools did not violate the establishment clause", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "In this case, Dr. Sklaroffs report concluded: \u201c[H]ad [Sanders] been provided episodic follow-up gastroscopic evaluations, the lesion would have been detected at an earlier moment in its natural history ... when it would have been amenable to surgical cure.\u201d The district court noted that it is unclear whether by stating that \u201cthe lesion would have been detected\u201d (emphasis added), Dr. Sklaroff was suggesting that the 2003 mass did not itself become cancerous. But even assuming, as the Estate urges, that the mass detected in 2003 later became cancerous, Dr. Sklaroffs assertion that the lesion \u201cwould have been amenable to surgical cure\u201d does not establish the probability of a better outcome nor take that probability out of the realm of conjecture. See Estate of Gibson, 91 So.3d at 625 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted); Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 964; Holdings: 0: holding that testimony taken as a whole must establish reasonable medical certainty that the negligence caused the injuries at issue 1: holding that while a foundation for an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be based on the testimony of an expert witness the experts testimony must establish that the occurrence indicates the probability of negligence 2: holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death 3: holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability 4: holding that expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish negligence where surgeon left a needle in the patients body but stating that proof of proximate cause requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "likely to do so than the Act. By contrast, the Act allows firearm counseling to continue, so it is not directly regulating medical conduct or declaring a certain form of treatment bad medicine. At the same time, the Act directly bans asking irrelevant questioning about firearms \u2014 even, indeed especially, those questions having nothing to do with medical conduct. The Act thus directly targets questioning and only incidentally advances whatever medical interests might be served by a law eliminating irrelevant questions about firearms from the doctor\u2019s office. The burden on speech is direct. The benefit to medical care is, at best, incidental and indirect. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that States cannot advance their interests in this way. See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2670 (<HOLDING>). In an attempt to salvage its claim that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the first amendment prohibits laws where the state seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain speakers 1: holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity 2: recognizing derivative standing if the bankruptcy court determines that certain conditions exist and certain prerequisites are met 3: holding that prosecutor free to comment on defendants failure to call certain witnesses or present certain testimony 4: holding that an ordinance granting greater first amendment rights to speakers who support the human services objectives of the city was impermissibly contentbased", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "any court in a civil, criminal, or other matter without the consent of the defendant.\u201d). 9 . KRS 533.256(1). 10 . The provisions permit programs that are \"authorized by the Kentucky Supreme Court and providing for the pretrial diversion of misdemeanants,\u201d KRS 533.262(2), e.g., those implemented in district court pursuant to CR 8.04. The statute also contains \"grandfather\u201d language permitting pretrial diversion programs in place as of July 15, 1998 to \u201ccontinue for the purpose of supervising persons granted pretrial diversion prior to July 15, 1998, however no new pers ding that Court of Appeals properly denied petition for writ directing trial court to exclude certain evidence because \"evidentiary errors may be corrected on appeal.\u201d); St. Clair v. Roark, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482, 485 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Cavender v. Miller, Ky., 984 S.W.2d 848, 849 Holdings: 0: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 1: holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that although double jeopardy is an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition the court in which the petition is filed may in its discretion  decline to address the merits of the petition on grounds that there is an adequate remedy by appeal 3: holding no appeal permitted from dismissal of writ petition 4: recognizing the specific need for an appropriate double jeopardy review when an appeal is taken by the state from a lower courts dismissal of the criminal charges", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "would leave the district court judge with unfettered discretion to set interest rates on judgments, which was most likely not the intent of the legislature, and which is at variance with the common law. At common law, no interest was allowed, and it is only permissible when authorized by statute. See Paradise Homes v. Central Surety, 84 Nev. 109, 116, 437 P.2d 78, 83 (1968); see also Wilson v. Pacific Maxon, Inc., 100 Nev. 479, 483, 686 P.2d 235, 237 (1984) (\u201cAs we have explained, the statutory interest rate was seven percent (7%). The judgment entered below, therefore, must be modified to provide for prejudgment interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) instead of twelve percent (12%).\u201d). Statutes in derogation of the common ng Fiberglass Corporation, 616 So. 2d 645, 647 (La. 1993) (<HOLDING>). We reject this argument based on a plain Holdings: 0: holding that courier and messenger costs are not taxable costs 1: holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla 2: holding that mediation costs are not compensable 3: holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due 4: recognizing that detariffmg would result in some increased administrative costs but anticipating those costs to be initial and fixed costs only resulting from the shift to a detariffed environment  such as the cost of developing short standard contracts", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Illinois and Florida to his declaration of intent to reside in Florida indefinitely, the court will need to determine what weight to give to the declaration. See Prakash v. American University et al., 727 F.2d 1174, 1181 (D.C.Cir.1984). This determination, as it depends upon the credibility of the declaration and Hicks\u2019s credibility as a witness, is difficult to make solely on the basis of a paper record. See Sapperstein, 188 F.3d at 856 (questioning credibility determinations based solely on affidavits in determining subject matter jurisdiction); see also Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 598 n. 4 (7th Cir.2000) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting that credibility assessments from a paper record are unreliable); Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek, 680 F.2d 37, 38 (7th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1214 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the district court is not bound by its prior factual findings determined in a preliminary injunction hearing 1: holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases 2: recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated 3: holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified 4: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may permit a doctor to exercise judgment in choosing among several courses of treatment. \u201cThe error-of-judgment rule . . . stems in part from the recognition that if there is more than one acceptable treatment option, then the selection of any one of them is not negligence. Thus, a doctor is not liable for untoward results if he or she used reasonable care in selecting one of those options.\u201d Rogers v. Meridan Park Hospital, 772 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Or. 1989). In this case, the defendants assert that in the course of treating Mrs. Francoeur, Dr. Piper had multiple options from which to choose, each of which met the standard of care, and the fact that the option he chose resulted in Mrs. Francoeur\u2019s amputation does not, standing alone, constitute negligence. The defendant argues that 995) (<HOLDING>); Deyo v. Kinley, 565 A.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Vt. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff must show that a defendant did not have an honest good faith belief in marking its products 1: holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act 2: holding term good faith in iowa code section 23272 rests on a defendants subjective honest belief 3: holding good faith and honest error in judgment instructions erroneously imply only badfaith and dishonest deviations actionable 4: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Waggoner received was to compensate him for traveling from Texarkana to Shreveport, It reasoned that $10 of the $50 per diem was intended to pay for his \u201cactual travel expense\u201d and the remaining $40 was to \u201ccompensate the employees for their travel time.\u201d The Commission also noted that \u201cthe per diem was intended to bear a rational relationship to the actual cost of the employee\u2019s transportation costs from Texarkana to the company\u2019s various work sites,\u201d The \u201ccompensated travel\u201d concept has not been fully developed or discussed in the case law. As a general rule, however, this exception applies when an employee\u2019s compensation covers' the time going back and forth from work or an allowance is made for the cost of transportation. Chicot Mem\u2019l Hasp., 9 Ark. App. at 20, 652 S.W.2d at 632 (<HOLDING>). The compensated-travel exception has also Holdings: 0: holding where the employer supplies less than the actual expense of travel exception would apply only if the reimbursement bore a reasonable relation to the actual expense of travel or was for a substantial part of it 1: holding the defendant responsible for the greater of the actual or intended loss 2: holding a plaintiff failed to show an actual injury to challenge an epa rule when the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased a piece of property or would have paid  less because the plaintiffs allegations showed only that the property was worth less to him not that the property was in fact worth less 3: holding that apprendi does not apply where the defendant was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum 4: holding that because the hospital had no actual or constructive notice that the parties were separated at the time services were rendered the separation exception did not apply", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "courts have typically focused upon the right of the employer to control its annual budgetary and discretionary functions as well as the absence of an employee\u2019s right to the continued existence of a particular means or method of compensation. In Keeling v. City of Grand Junction, 689 P.2d 679 (Colo.App.1984), for instance, the court found that an educational incentive pay program for police officers and firefighters did not create a contractual obligation. Id. at 680. The Court held that \u201cplaintiffs do not have a vested contractual right in the continuance of a particular rate or method of compensation\u201d and observed that \u201csucceeding city councils are not bound by the legislative acts of their predecessors....\u201d Id.; see also Schulz v. City of Longmont, 465 F.3d 433, 443 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Colo. Springs Fire Fighters Ass\u2019n v. City of Holdings: 0: holding that obligation to pay pension benefits gave rise to a constructive trust relationship and obligation was not discharged in bankruptcy 1: holding that a determination by the trial court of a clear and definite amount for support is necessary in establishing a partys ability to pay and in enforcing the obligation in future proceedings 2: holding that promises city made to pay annual step increases did not result in contractual obligation and municipalities retain ability to change compensation and benefits provided to employees 3: holding even in context of employee manual that policy which included agreement to provide annual salary increase of five percent did not constitute contract between city and employees and distinction between atwill employees and public employees was not dispositive in this context 4: holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "experience with the state\u2019s criminal justice system. See Garcia, 358 N.C. at 397, 597 S.E.2d at 737. When first approached by Officer Robb, defendant was told he was being detained until detectives arrived but that he was not under arrest. When he was again advised by the detectives upon their arrival that he was not under arrest, defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany them to the police station, affirmatively telling them he was \u201canxious\u201d to talk with them and answer their questions. Defendant was never restrained from the time of his initial encounter with Detectives Copeland and Taylor until the door of the investigation room was locked after defendant admitted stabbing the victim. Until then, defendant was frequently left alone in the interview room with th 2d 178, 185-87 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Although defendant focuses on his inability Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who voluntarily rode to the station with officers in a police car waited in a lobby with unlocked external doors and was told more than once he was not under arrest was not in custody 1: holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation 2: holding on direct review that defendant was not in custody when he was interviewed by law enforcement officers in a parked police vehicle which was unmarked and unlocked 3: holding on habeas review that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes and reciting among other facts that defendant was transported to a police station for questioning in an unmarked police car which was not equipped with a shield inside the car 4: holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1737 Corp. must show that the transfers were consistent with the parties\u2019 prior practices. See Savage & Assocs. v. Mandl (In re Teligent, Inc.), 380 B.R. 324, 340 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2008). Its counsel represented at oral argument that the defendant no longer employs Insignia/ESG as its property manager, and it may be very difficult to muster the documentary and testimonial evidence needed to mount a defense after so many years. City of Yonkers, 2008 WL 5272722, at *6 (\u201cTo permit an extension of the service period now, sua sponte, more than four years after the complaint was filed, would require defendants to defend a lawsuit based on actions taken more than seven years ago.\u201d); Rice v. Univ. of N.D. Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., No. 2:07-cv-11, 2008 WL 5145482, at *4 (D.N.D. Dec. 8, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Savage is responsible for the long delay, and Holdings: 0: holding recusal not required where case involved a family whom district judge had known personally seven or eight years earlier 1: recognizing the prejudice of an extension to a defendant who would be required to litigate events that occurred more than eight years earlier 2: holding that the indictment was sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement since it alleged that the defendants conduct occurred over a period of eight years 3: holding that a delay of more than eight years attributable to the normal workings of the appellate process in addressing a pretrial appeal is reasonable 4: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the amended sworn notice of claim. The parties have not yet presented their case to the screening panel or conducted any discovery. Frame promptly filed the amended sworn notice of claim, within four months of the original filing. Frame has not yet sought to file a complaint for professional negligence, and the now-sworn notice provides the Hospital with a basis for a perjury action against Frame. [\u00b6 19] Further, permitting an amended notice of claim to cure the defect caused by the unsworn notice is consistent with the purposes of the MHSA. An amendment that cures a technical defect fulfills the statutory objectives of deciding claims on their merits and encouraging the early withdrawal of meritless claims. See 24 M.R.S. \u00a7 2851(1); see also Dutil v. Burns, 1997 ME 1, \u00b6 5, 687 A.2d 639 (<HOLDING>). Permitting Frame to assert her claim under Holdings: 0: recognizing that dismissal of claim for a failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for maintaining an action for professional negligence  is akin to a dismissal for insufficient service of process or lack of subject matter jurisdiction and does not serve as an adjudication of the merits 1: holding that under federal law the dismissal of a claim as timebarred is adjudication of merits for purposes of res judicata 2: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 3: holding after we found standing following a district courts dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that the merits will be for the district court to decide on remand 4: holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 306, 309 (11th Cir.1993) (rejecting the argument that the common law D\u2019Oench doctrine is limited by a specific asset requirement). Other circuits are in agreement on this issue. See, e.g., Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1995) (rejecting the argument that the D\u2019Oench doctrine is limited by an \u201casset\u201d requirement, because such a requirement \u201cwould undercut an important purpose of that doctrine \u2014 allowing the FDIC to rely on a bank\u2019s records when insuring the bank\u201d); Brookside Assocs. v. Rifkin, 49 F.3d 490, 496 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201c[W]e hold that the common-law [D\u2019Oench \\ doctrine applies to bar suit even when the RTC does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement.\u201d); Jackson v. FDIC, 981 F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Serv. Bank Holdings: 0: holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset 1: holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists 2: holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench  doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records 3: holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest 4: holding that  1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to inquire about the proceeding; Johnson assured her things were progressing. On September 13, 2008, Neef observed that Johnson no longer appeared to work in his Newton, Iowa law office. Neef attempted to contact Johnson on numerous occasions, including visiting his former law office, calling repeatedly, and visiting Johnson\u2019s home. When Neef left a message on Johnson\u2019s cell phone informing him she was starting fraud charges and contacting the Iow to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) because he told Neef things were progressing when he had not even filed the bankruptcy petition, assured Neef he would file right away when reached by her, and once again failed to file. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att\u2019y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wagner, 768 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (Iowa 2009) (<HOLDING>). We reject the commission\u2019s recommendation to Holdings: 0: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint 1: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 2: holding repeated claims by attorney to client that documents were forthcoming constituted misrepresentations in violation of rule 3284c when the documents were not actually ready 3: holding that unauthenticated documents may be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment where the documents were not objected to or their authenticity disputed 4: holding that settlement documents were admissible under both section 90408 and federal rule of evidence 408 because the documents were offered not to establish liability but to establish violation of consumer credit laws", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "possession is sufficient.\u201d Payton, 159 F.3d at 56. And we have explained that a defendant is subject to a two-level enhancement under \u00a7 2Dl.l(b)(l) for possession of a dangerous weapon if he \u201cconstructively possessed the weapon by having. dominion ... or control over the item itself, or dominion over the premises where the item [was] located.\u201d United States v. Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 768 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pellegrini, 929 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam). We see no reason why, for purposes of the safety valve, possession would not similarly include constructive possession, at least where the defendant keeps the weapon under his personal dominion and control. See United States v. Bolka, 355 F.3d 909, 915-16 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The safety valve was intended to prevent Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not entitled to safetyvalve relief where evidence showed that he kept three firearms in the home where he sold and manufactured methamphetamine 1: holding that a defendant had constructive possession over firearms located in a residence where he lived and kept his personal effects 2: holding that a convicted felon is not entitled to return of firearms or to have firearms held in trust by third party 3: holding that a convicted felon is not entitled to have firearms returned held in trust or sold for his profit 4: holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "States v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 461, 62 L.Ed.2d 384 (1979). Relevant factors for a court to consider when examining whether a marria ivilege excepts premarital events from protection. See Clark, supra (criticizing hyper-factual inquiries necessitated by sham marriage exception to privilege; employing joint-participants exception and acts-prior-to-marriage exception to affirm trial court\u2019s finding that privilege did not apply to spouses who co-conspired to steal money from savings and loan; husband could not invoke spousal testimony privilege to avoid testifying against his wife at her criminal trial); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091, 95 S.Ct. 684, 42 L.Ed.2d 684 (1974) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness], supra Holdings: 0: holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify 1: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 2: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 3: holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative 4: holding exclusion of testimony from defendants wife at defendants trial was not required under spousal testimony privilege where both spouses participated in unlawful enterprise of transporting illegal aliens and wifes testimony concerned matters prior to their marriage", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "even if dispute would be futile, because the FDCPA requires that notice be given, that the debtor be informed of his or her rights to dispute and obtain validation of the debt, and a proper notice of dispute triggers the debt collector\u2019s obligation to obtain and provide the debtor with validation, including a copy of a judgment, I cannot say that plaintiff has failed to state a claim. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1692g. 4 . Circuits are split on whether applying the unsophisticated consumer standard to collection notices and letters under the FDCPA is a matter of law for judges to decide or a question of fact better left to juries. Compare Johnson v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.1999); Kistner v. Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC, 518 F.3d 433, 440-41 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) with Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, Holdings: 0: holding that actual apportionment of damages is a question of fact 1: holding that estoppel was a question of fact 2: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 3: holding violation of cpr is a question of law not fact 4: holding it is a question of fact", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to obtain an inheritance or a share under a partnership agreement. So defined, the factor provides clear guidance. Aggravating circumstances must provide a \u2018\u201cmeaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [death] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.\u2019 \u201d Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 392 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), the Supreme Court struck down an aggravating circumstance so vaguely worded that it failed to perform this narrowing function. See also Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 199-200, 524 A.2d 188 (<HOLDING>). We find no vagueness in the factor on its Holdings: 0: holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness 1: holding a law is void for vagueness when it offers no standard of conduct that was possible to know emphasis added 2: holding that va code  182603 is not void for vagueness 3: holding c4c factor void for vagueness unless limiting construction was given 4: holding that   750170 is not void for vagueness nor constitutionally infirm for overbreadth", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the CHINS determinations. Thus, we remand for the trial court to make proper findings and conclusions in support of its judgment. Affirmed in part and remanded with instructions. MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur. 1 . The parties do not indicate, nor could we find in the Appendices, when the children were first placed with Father during the course of the CHINS proceedings. 2 . The allegation was based on a local newspaper article, which reported that Father's attorney had been named as the Logansport city attorney and the GAL had been named as the deputy city attorney. 3 . On April 11, 2007, the trial court entered its \"Order Terminating Wardship.\u201d Appellant\u2019s App. at 126. But that order does not render the appeal moot. See Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Mother also alleges, in passing, that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 1: holding that the fact that the sale may not be fully consummated does not prevent a determination that the appeal is moot because section 363m does not require the purchaser to take irreversible steps consummating the sale before the absence of a stay will render an appeal moot 2: holding that when the consequences of the conviction are not severe and imminent an appeal is moot when the judgment is voluntarily satisfied 3: holding an appeal from a chins determination after termination of the chins case is not moot because of the potentially devastating consequences of a chins determination 4: holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "assigned the claim, and the collection service sought to have the judgment registered in Missouri. In the Missouri action, Burgess filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the South Dakota judgment was only against Dako and could not have an effect against him personally. The trial court in Mis sition that he had been doing business under variations of the name of \u201cTri-State Seed Company\u201d since about 1985. He admitted that he had entered into the contract, offered as part of exhibit 1, with Toulousaine. The name on the contract with Toulousaine was \u201cTri-State Seed & Grain.\u201d The address of \u201cTri-State Seed & Grain\u201d is Olson\u2019s home address. He admitted that he intended to cover this seed contract by purchasing seed from Palen. The stationery he 49, 560 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Rink v. NPN, Inc., 419 N.W.2d 194 (N.D. 1988) Holdings: 0: holding entitys failure to register assumed name did not affect entitys capacity to defend suit or impair validity of any contract 1: holding that private individual could not bring a claim to remove a judges name from the roll of attorneys 2: holding that negligent breach of a duty assumed in a contract does not give rise to a separate tort claim 3: holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981 4: holding that one who deals with a business entity under an assumed name may bring an action against it under the assumed name", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a party seeking modification of a foreign child-support order must register that order in the manner prescribed by the UIFSA. The father argues that \u00a7 30-3A-613, Ala.Code 1975, applied to the 2005 action and relieved him of the duty of registering the foreign support judgment. However, \u00a7 30-3A-613(a) provides: \u201cIf all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state, a court of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state\u2019s child-support order in a proceeding to register that order\u201d (Emphasis added.) We acknowledge that the mother and the father resided in Alabama in 2005 and that the children had left Missouri so that \u00a7 S0-SA-613(a) applies, see Mathews v. Mathews, 368 Ark. 252, 244 S.W.3d 660 (2006) (<HOLDING>); however, under that statute, the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that in modification proceeding trial court should have adjusted child support based on substantial timesharing even though the father had earlier agreed to pay child support without such an adjustment trial court found that circumstances had changed based on fathers reduction in income 1: holding that arkansass version of the uifsa applied to registration and modification of foreign childsupport order even though father mother and child resided in state 2: holding that court could permit grandparent or other person having substantial past contact with child to intervene in pending sapcr even though original suit requesting possessory conservatorship could not be filed by grandparent or other person and further holding that stepgrandmother had standing to intervene to seek managing conservatorship of child under section 102004b and section 1020039 where natural mother abandoned child after birth parents were divorced natural father remarried father had custody of child after father died child lived first with stepmother then with stepgrandmother and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old 3: holding that the trial courts attempt at modification of a utah child support order which was registered in south dakota was nullified due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to uifsa 4: holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "have obtained approval from the state Public Utilities Commission to ship goods on behalf of the military at reduced rates. In the present case, on the other hand, there is nothing that Temple can do to enable it to permit the military to conduct on-campus interviews. Quite to the contrary, given the Order, Temple is barred from cooperating with the military unless and until the United States changes its employment policy with respect to homosexuals. Under these circumstances, we believe that the Commission has no more right to enforce the Ordinance against Temple than did the Town of Windsor to enforce its building permit regulations against the contractor hired to construct a top-secret federal research facility. See United States v. Town of Windsor, 765 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). C. The Commission also argues that the Holdings: 0: holding that order mandating disclosure of classified information to habeas petitioners counsel was an important issue entirely separate from the merits of this case 1: holding that the town of windsor cannot enforce its buildingpermit requirements against contractor hired to build addition to nuclear facility because the impact of the local regulation would fall directly on the government and result in classified information being disclosed and a classified area being opened to town officials 2: holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights 3: holding that a district court need not inquire into the veracity of a classified affidavit unless the information it provides is insufficient or contradicted by the record or there is evidence of bad faith on behalf of the agency 4: holding that a variable annuity is properly classified as a security", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "firearms in Razzano were pursuant to a department policy rather than in connection with a court order. Razzano, 765 F.Supp.2d at 185. 7 . To the extent that the Defendants instead refer to Panzella's state-law claims, those claims cannot serve as a basis of jurisdiction, This is because the Defendants did not seek immunity from suit on those claims, and hence cannot seek an interlocutory appeal from the denial of immunity. 8 . The County also argues that its adherence to New York law regarding the treatment of the firearms did not constitute a \"policy\u201d as required for a county to be liable under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S, 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See Vives v. N.Y.C., 524 F.3d 346, 353-56, 358 (2d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Leaving aside the fact that we are here Holdings: 0: holding that a city manager was the final policymaker for purposes of section 1983 liability because of provisions in the norfolk city code requiring that all orders rules and regulations applicable to the entire police department must be approved by the city manager other than some police standard operating procedures 1: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city 2: holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law 3: holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation 4: holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiffs interests.\u201d Obstfeld, 621 F.Supp.2d at 93-94 (quoting ZB Holdings, 144 F.R.D. at 45). \u201c[A]ntagonism has generally not been found where the corporation does not, would not, or cannot express opposition to the initiation of the lawsuit.\u201d Id. at 94 (quoting Netwolves Corp. v. Sullivan, No. 00-cv-8943 (AGS), 2001 WL 492463, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2001)); see also Net-wolves, 2001 WL 492463, at *7 (\u201c[A] corporation that cannot act, a deadlocked corporation, is not considered \u2018actively antagonistic\u2019 to a lawsuit, within the meaning of Sperling and Swanson, because the corporation has not refused to sue, and will not clearly refuse to sue if it becomes able to render a decision.\u201d); Cohen v. Heussinger, No. 89-cv-6941, 1994 WL 240378, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1994) (So-tomayor, J.) (<HOLDING>); Sonn, on Behalf of WLS Assocs. v. Korein, No. Holdings: 0: holding that even assuming that the court recognized the allegaert exception that it would not apply where a firm that previously represented a corporation then represented a former director and officer of the corporation against the corporation because the duty of loyalty that the firm owes the corporation would go unprotected where the firm switches sides against its former client 1: holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state 2: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity 3: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 4: holding that case did not fall within the boundaries of the sperling exception because plaintiff and defendant were coequal owners of the corporation and the proposed complaint does not allege that defendant controlled the corporation", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "be varied by legislative action. Id. As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Ammer-man: [T]the term may be defined in different statutes or for different purposes. See 73 C.J.S. Property s. 2, p. 152. For example, Fla. Stat., s. 421.03(12), F.S.A. defines \u2018real property' for the purposes of the housing authorities law; Fla. Stat., s. 475.01(11), F.S.A. defines \u2018real property\u2019 for the purposes of the real estate license law; Fla. Stat., s. 713.01(14), F.S.A. defines \u2018real property for the purposes of the mechanics lien law. These definitions vary, because the statutory definitions usually apply only to the term as used in the particular statutory provision. Id. (emphasis added). We have recognized this legal principle. Miami Country Day Sch. v. Bakst, 641 So.2d 467, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)(<HOLDING>). Applying this principle, the brothers argue Holdings: 0: holding that section 7750214b2 florida statutes 1993 prohibited conviction for fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services and grand theft based on the same facts 1: holding section 82705 florida statutes 1993 unconstitutional and certifying the question as one of great public importance 2: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 3: holding that florida courts would apply florida law to contracts insuring real property located within the state 4: holding that a houseboat in a fixed location connected to a dock was a dwelling house within the meaning of section 22205 of the florida statutes 1993 defining when certain homesteads located on leased properties are entitled to protection from forced sale under article x section 4a", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed between man and man, either one\u2019s fellow man or society in general.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201c[F]or an offense to involve moral turpitude, it must require a reprehensible or despicable act\u201d \u2014 one \u201cthat is inherently wrong, or malum in se, rather than conduct deemed wrong only because of a statutory proscription, malum prohibitum.\u201d Id. at 921 (italics omitted). \u201cA crime of moral turpitude, moreover, necessarily involves an evil intent or maliciousness in carrying out the reprehensible act.\u201d Id. at 921-22. The BIA has long viewed prostitution-related crimes as morally turpitudinous. See, e.g., Matter of Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340, 342 (BIA 1965) (<HOLDING>); Matter of A\u2014 , 5 I. & N. Dec. 546, 549 (BIA Holdings: 0: holding that summary convictions of crimes involving dishonesty could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness 1: holding that funds were unavailable for attachment under section 1610 because they were never used for or designated for use in commercial activity 2: holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt 3: holding that renting rooms with knowledge that the rooms were to be used for the purpose of lewdness assignation or prostitution were for crimes involving moral turpitude 4: holding that absent clear congressional intent a defendant charged with transporting two women in interstate commerce at the same time could be charged with only one violation of the mann act which criminalized transporting any woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "NRCP 8(c) does not speak directly to whether a federal law granting immunity from liability qualifies as an affirmative defense, the question then becomes whether the Act falls within NRCP 8(c)\u2019s catchall provision. See NRCP 8(c). This court recently instructed lower courts and litigants on what defenses must be affirmatively pleaded under NRCP 8(c)\u2019s catchall provision, stating, \u201cAllegations must be pleaded as affirmative defenses if they raise \u2018new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff\u2019s . . . claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.\u201d\u2019 Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., 123 Nev. 382, 393, 168 P.3d 87, 94 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>)). Although CCSD and Phillips argue that Holdings: 0: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 1: recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof 2: holding that when erisas preemptive effect results in change of applicable law rather than choice of forum preemption is an affirmative defense that must be set forth in defendants answer or it is waived 3: holding that erisas preemption of state contract claims in a benefitsdue action is an affirmative defense subject to waiver 4: holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "omitted). \u201c[C]onclusions of law drawn from the fundings of fact are . . . reviewable de novo.\u201d Huyck Corp. v. Town of Wake Forest, 86 N.C. App. 13, 15, 356 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1987) (citations omitted). \u201cA law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain a vehicle and its occupants if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.\u201d State v. Jackson, 199 N.C. App. 236, 241, 681 S.E.2d 492, 496 (2009) (citation omitted). However, an officer\u2019s determination regarding potential criminal activity must be objectively reasonable, and an officer\u2019s mistaken belief that a defendant has committed a traffic violation is not an objectively reasonable justification for a traffic stop. See State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124, 127-28, 649 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2007) (<HOLDING>). A passenger in a vehicle which is stopped by Holdings: 0: holding the fact that officers belief proved to be mistaken does not negate a finding of probable cause 1: holding that an officers mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop 2: holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa 3: holding questions about a drivers purpose for traveling were reasonably related to a traffic stop for speeding 4: holding that a plaintiff must show his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which reported a total drawdown of 639,312 tons over the three-year period 2009-2011, for an average of 213,104 annually, which is much closer to the 2010 Dynamic Report than the SEC filings. Id. \u00b6 47(g). These two sets of facts are mostly ignored by defendants, who instead train their fire on what they label the \u201conly allegation in this regard,\u201d which is that \u201csome unnamed \u2018Henan L & R Dept Staff supposedly said that noncompliance with' Chinese mining regulations would create \u2018significant risks, liabilities, and penalties.\u2019 \u201d Defs.\u2019 Mem. 9 (citing Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 29, 30.). Defendants argue that under the test of Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.2000), this confidential witness is insufficiently identified to support an inference of personal knowledge. See Novak, 216 F.3d at 314 (<HOLDING>). But even if defendants are correct that the Holdings: 0: holding that a fraudulent transfer complaint need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him 1: holding that in the absence of public disclosure the court need not address whether relator was original source of the information 2: holding that a person violates  10b and rule 10b5 when he misappropriates confidential information  in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information 3: holding that fraud claims were wrongfully dismissed for insufficient particularity as they provided sufficient notice of the facts of the alleged misconduct 4: holding that confidential sources need not be named provided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information alleged", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is determined by comparing the defendant\u2019s state of mind in committing the extrinsic and charged acts. United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam). Although the age of a prior offense may depreciate its probity, we have refrained from adopting a bright-line rule regarding temporal proximity, because remoteness analyses are so fact-specific \u201cthat a generally applicable litmus test would be of dubious value.\u201d Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1311 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An appellant bears a heavy burden in establishing an abuse of the judge\u2019s \u201cbroad discretion\u201d in determining if a prior offense is too old to be probative. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). A district judge\u2019s limiting instruction can Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack 1: holding that insufficient evidence supported the defendants conviction for possession of cocaine when officers executed a warrant on a small oneroom apartment and found large quantities of crackcocaine in plain view although the defendant supplied police with a false name when they questioned him at the apartment there was no evidence that the defendant had drugs on his person or that he had ever used cocaine 2: holding that prior convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana are admissible to impeach defendant 3: holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine 4: holding in a prosecution for a large cocaine deal the district judge did not abuse his discretion when he admitted evidence that the defendant had participated in small marijuana deals approximately 15 years before the charged cocaine offenses", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the judgment of a court of the United States rendered or filed within the state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any county and upon such filing the clerk shall docket the judgment in the same manner and with the same effect as a judgment entered in the supreme court within the county.\u201d); N.Y. CPLR \u00a7 5402 (\"The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the supreme court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the supreme court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.\u201d). 105 . Cf. Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 106 . See Appellant Br. at 16 (\u201cIn this, the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims 1: holding that the fourth circuit had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a south carolina district courts order denying a motion to compel arbitration even though the district court also transferred the case to a georgia district court 2: holding that filing of appeal to federal circuit divests this court of jurisdiction to consider motion to stay court order pending appeal 3: holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits 4: holding that notice of appeal of district court opinion denying arbitration stay divested district court of jurisdiction to continue proceedings until the appeal was complete", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the error was plain, and (3) that the plain error affected his substantial rights.\u201d United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir.2005). \u201cIf all these conditions are met, a court reviewing the error may exercise discretion to correct it if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d Id. \u2018We conduct this analysis \u2018less rigidly when reviewing a potential constitutional error.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citing United States v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir.2001)). \u201cIt is well-established that a prosecutor may use a defendant\u2019s pre-arrest silence to impeach the defendant\u2019s credibility.\u201d United States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 608, 611 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238, 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (<HOLDING>)). In the present case, the prosecutor Holdings: 0: holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment 1: holding references to a defendants lack of remorse violate the fifth eighth and fourteenth amendments 2: holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments 3: holding that the government can use prearrest silence for impeachment purposes against a defendant because no government action induced the silence 4: holding that state constitution prohibits substantive use of prearrest silence", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "172. Le Doux\u2019 filings qualify as purported returns because she prepared them on official Form 1040s and signed them. See Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1997; Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1988. Le Doux admits in an attachment to these filings that she intended the IRS to treat them as tax returns: \u201cI Vera Le Doux, am submitting these as part of my ... income tax returns.\u201d Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1997, at 3; Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1988, at 3. Le Doux failed to provide information upon which the IRS could judge the return\u2019s correctness. Le Doux\u2019 returns contain zeros, not the financial information the IRS needs to judge the correctness of her return. See Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1403-1404 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Hoffman v. United States, 209 F.Supp.2d 1089, Holdings: 0: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below 1: holding blank return did not provide sufficient information despite taxpayers income being below the filing threshold 2: holding that intentional failure to file an information return is not a willful filing 3: holding that   1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below 4: holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "thirty years later or to the impact that a second power line within the same corridor might have on the remaining property. \u00b6 24. Where \u2014 as here \u2014 a new use is consistent with the general nature of an existing easement, the burdened estate may nevertheless be entitled to compensation if it is more onerous than originally contemplated. See, e.g., Minot v. United States, 546 F.2d 378, 381 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (recognizing that, where local power agency installed higher and wider transmission towers in place of existing line within easement owned by United States, power agency could be \u201cheld to account for an inverse condemnation\u201d in overburdening plaintiffs\u2019 property, although there was no basis for holding United States liable); Grimes v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 96 S.E.2d 713, 714 (N.C. 1957) (<HOLDING>); City of Sweetwater v. McEntyre, 232 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that placement of additional lines and crossarms on existing power poles by second power company imposed additional burden on easement entitling landowner to compensation 1: holding that unless that power is restricted by the principal an agent under a california statutory healthcare power of attorney has the power to execute applicable admission forms including arbitration agreements 2: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement 3: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power 4: holding that the owners of the dominant estate had the right to build utility poles along side of a road easement", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claim that neither of these prongs was satisfied. With regard to the first prong, the Defendants contend that the jury did not have a legally sufficient basis to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Defendants were objectively reckless. In order to support this contention, the Defendants point to both their non-infringement defense and the invalidity defense of obviousness. The existence of an objective risk of infringement is \u201cdetermined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding.\u201d Id. The objective prong is not established when the accused infringer puts forward a reasonable defense to infringement, even if the jury ultimately reaches a verdict of infringement. See Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Holdings: 0: holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement 1: holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement 2: holding that the objective prong of willfulness was not met where a defendants defenses were reasonable 3: holding that alleged infringer waived privilege with respect to all documents pertaining to the infringement of the patent 4: holding that the objective prong for willful infringement is generally not met where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the type of error that typically justifies remand. Id. at 1217; see Huffman, 194 F.3d at 1077-79 (defendant\u2019s failure to file notice of removal within the thirty-day period necessitated remand upon plaintiffs motion); see also Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686-87 (10th Cir.1981) (finding that remand was appropriate when the notice was defective because a co-defendant had not joined the notice of removal). Last, the court found that the sole objective sought by Congress when it amended the removal statutes was to force the parties to raise objections promptly so procedural defects cannot later be used to prejudice the other party in court. Yellow, 406 F.Supp.2d at 1219. The defendant in Yello elers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am., No. 05-144, 2005 WL 1653629, at *4 (D.Or. July 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>); Lorensen v. Jenney Mfg. Co., 158 F.Supp. 928, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants failure to attach process to its notice of removal was not fatal and did not require remand 1: holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc  1447c 2: holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal 3: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand 4: holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have found its way to the floor as a result of the actions by\" husband appellant or wife appellant. There is no evidence from which the jury might reach a conclusion as to the cause of the presence of the grape in the aisle, and jurors may not be permitted to reach conclusion based upon guess or conjecture. Nor can we accept appellant\u2019s argument to the effect that the display of non-packaged grapes on a counter some seven feet from the bags and across an aisle from the scale constitutes negligence in and of itself, since every reasonable effort was made to keep the passageway clean. Id., 419 Pa. at 234, 213 A.2d at 610. Similarly, in the present case, appellant has presented no evidence as to the cause of the presence of the grape on the floor. In addition, negligence is 481 (1990) (<HOLDING>); but see Liles v. Balmer, 389 Pa.Super. 451, Holdings: 0: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 1: holding that improper use of a summary chart was harmless because the evidence was merely cumulative and there was overwhelming evidence of the charged crime 2: holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees 3: holding that summary judgment was not improper merely because there was a possibility that literature not yet produced would support the claim 4: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(2008) (\u201cThere is no absolute rule by which to determine what contracts are against public policy, but each case must be determined from all the circumstances thereof, the courts declaring a contract void for such reason only where it is clearly contrary to the public interests .... \u201d)). In making such a determination in this case, the Court must consider competing pu 300, 319-20 (2d Cir.2009) (refusing to enforce a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement as against public policy \u201cbecause to ... [enforce it] would grant [the defendant] de facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing plaintiffs\u2019 only reasonably feasible means of recovery,\u201d while affirming the arbitrability of antitrust claims more widely); Redel\u2019s Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98-99 (5th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Fox Midwest Theatres, Inc. v. Means, 221 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy 1: holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution 2: holding that a plaintiff may not assert claims based on statements she did not view 3: holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims 4: holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents included all claims which had matured at the time of its execution", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Facts. On December 13, 2004, the court held a status conference. On December 23, 2004, the Government filed a Reply to DCI\u2019s Response to the Government\u2019s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 7, 2005, the parties filed a proposed Scheduling Order. The court held status conferences on January 11, 2005 and on January 18, 2005. On January 18, 2005, the court entered a Scheduling Order for fact discovery and expert discovery and established a trial date to commence on November 14, 2005. On July 29, 2005, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying DCFs October 7, 2004 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying the Government\u2019s November 18, 2004 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. See Die Casters Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 362 (Fed.Cl. 2005) (<HOLDING>). The Memorandum Opinion and Order confirmed Holdings: 0: holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute 1: holding summary judgment for the employer was warranted because the only evidence in support of plaintiffs claims was solomons own testimony 2: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 3: holding in the alternative that summary judgment was warranted on abuse of process claim because defendants established probable cause to prosecute plaintiffs 4: holding that if no material facts are placed in dispute this court must determine whether the circuit court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law citations omitted", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "injunction and that the injunction was not validly issued under Boys Markets, see id. at 12-13. There, injunctive relief could not be justified \u201con either ground \u2014 to enforce a contract or support arbitration \u2014 let alone both.\u201d Id. at 12. That an order staying arbitration could not be in support of arbitration was self-evident. Id. The company argued that there was no contract requiring arbitration and that it could not be forced into arbitration. Id. In addition to vacating overly broad injunctive relief and injunctive relief that did not advance the arbitral process, this court has also reversed grants of Boys Markets injunctive relief for failure to meet the traditional four-part equitable test. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 633, 511 F.2d 1097, 1100 (1st Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has Holdings: 0: holding that the insured failed to meet its burden where the insurer had reserved its rights to assert coverage defenses 1: holding that the statutory restrictions relative to an employers affirmative defenses where the employer elects not to operate under the respective workers compensation law cannot extend so as to deprive the employer of being able to require the plaintiffemployee to establish a case of negligence against the employer 2: holding that the balance of relative harms to the parties showed employer did not meet its burden 3: holding employer satisfied its burden of production 4: holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Section 2 of this article is void to the extent of the conflict.\u201d). 10 . 29U.S.C. \u00a7 1144(b)(2)(B). 11 . See generally FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990) (\"[E]mployee benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance regulation. An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer for purposes of state laws \u2018purporting to regulate insurance\u2019 after application of the deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as they apply to the plan\u2019s insurer.\"). 12 . UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 376 n. 7, 119 S.Ct. 1380, 143 L.Ed.2d 462 (1999); see also id. at 372-73, 119 S.Ct. 1380 Holdings: 0: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 1: holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued 2: holding that when an insurer denies coverage on grounds unrelated to late notice a strong presumption arises that the insurer has not suffered prejudice from the late notice 3: holding that an insurance company which chose not to defend its insured could not later deny coverage by asserting the legally obligated to pay provision in the policy after the insured reached a settlement where the injured party agreed to collect only against insurance proceeds 4: holding that a california commonlaw requirement that insurers show prejudice before they may deny coverage because of late notice regulated insurance and was saved from preemption the insurance company that issued a group disability policy as an insured employee benefit plan could not rely on the notice provisions to deny coverage unless there was prejudice", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.10(B)(2) (Vernon 1997); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Tex.App.1986); see also McKee v. American Transfer & Storage, 946 F.Supp. 485, 487 (N.D.Tex.1996). But see Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex.Civ.App.1977) (noting exceptions for merger, consolidation, and fraud). 8 . See, e.g., Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. ARCO Chemical Co., 904 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Alaska 1995) (\"When choice of law issues arise, we commonly refer to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts for guidance.\"). 9 . See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 145 cmt. d (1971) (''The courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues under the local law of a single state.\"); Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Black's Law Dictionary 448 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   1: holding that issue in motion for rehearing is waived if original brief is not sufficient to acquaint the court with the issue and does not present an argument that would allow the court to decide the issue 2: holding that a federal court is obliged to determine its own jurisdiction for each case 3: holding that under the second restatement test a court therefore conducts a separate choiceoflaw analysis for each issue in a case attempting to determine which state has the most significant contacts with that issue 4: holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. He claims that the words \u201chold as trustee\u201d establish an express trust, that all partners are trustees for the rest of the partnership, and that a partner is therefore a fiduciary within the meaning of the act. However, under this statute, the trust arises only when the partner derives profits without consent of the partnership; it is the sort of trust ex maleficio not included within the purview of \u00a7 523(a)(4). See Davis, 293 U.S. at 333, 55 S.Ct. at 153-54; Teichman v. Teichman (In re Teichman), 774 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.1985). But see Holmes v. Kraus (In re Kraus), 37 B.R. 126, 130 (Bkcy E.D.Mich.1984) (<HOLDING>). Montana has an identical code section to Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule 1: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical 2: holding that identical language in montana postconviction relief statute bars application of laches 3: holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication 4: holding that partners are fiduciaries for the purpose of  523a4 relying on michigan statute with identical language", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Hugo De La Cruz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 (\u201cBIA\u201d) dismissal of his appeal from an immigration judge\u2019s (\u201cIJ\u201d) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia due to ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De La Cruz\u2019s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel as untimely, because De La Cruz had knowledge of the alleged ineffective assistance for over a year before he filed his motion to reopen. See id. at 897-98 (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding that in order to warrant equitable tolling alien claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate due diligence in pursuing the case during the period the alien seeks to toll internal quotation marks omitted 1: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 3: holding that a petitioner must act with due diligence when pursuing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to benefit from equitable tolling of deadlines 4: holding that this court  recognizes equitable tolling  on motions to reopen  during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception fraud or error as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "County, 839 F.2d 225, 226-27 (4th Cir.1988) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)). Here, the plaintiff does refer to state law, Va.Code Ann. \u00a7 2.1-116.1 et seq. (Michie 1995 & Supp.2000) (the \u201cLaw-Enforcement Officers\u2019 Procedural Guarantees\u201d statute), as the basis of his property interest in continued employment. While this state law provides the plaintiff with such an interest, see Kersey v. Shipley, 673 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir.1982), it also \u201cprovides for more process than what the Constitution would otherwise require.\u201d Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1467 (4th Cir.1990) (emphasis in original). For this reason, the specific procedures it establishes need not be complied with fully to satisfy federal due process. See id. at 1468 (<HOLDING>) Rather, to determine whether due process has Holdings: 0: holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity 1: holding in virginia county police officers  1983 action against ms department and various county officials that the departments violation of the law enforcement officers procedural guarantees does not necessarily compel a finding of a due process violation 2: holding the evidence supported the police officers failure to follow the directives in the montgomery county police departments field operations manual 3: holding that county and district attorneys are officers within the judicial department 4: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions ", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "colloquy, the colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir.2002); United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 393 (4th Cir.2002). To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his \u201csubstantial rights.\u201d United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). A defendant\u2019s substantial rights are affected if we determine that the error \u201cinfluenced the defendant\u2019s decision to plead guilty and impaired his ability to evaluate with eyes open the direct attendant risks of accepting criminal responsibility.\u201d United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Martinez, 277 F.3d at 532 (<HOLDING>). Neither counsel nor Farley identify any Holdings: 0: holding that in conjunction an information with a narrow charge and an abstract of judgment indicating that a defendant pled guilty to that charge prove the precise elements of the offense to which the defendant pled guilty 1: holding circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea where defendant was not indicted for the charge to which he pled guilty but signed a sentencing sheet which established defendant was notified of the charge to which he pled guilty 2: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pled guilty but for the error 4: holding trial court had broad discretion to disbelieve defendants claim he would not have pled guilty but for counsels error", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the evidence was not relevant, made no determination as to whether it was constitutionally impermissible. It was therefore incumbent on Perry, in objecting to the admission of evidence about her lack of remorse, to raise the issue of due process to the trial court in order to preserve this objection for direct appeal. AFFIRMED. HOWARD and BEATTY, JJ., concur. 1 . Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issue on appeal, we decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 2 . Perry cites the following authorities in support of her argument: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (concerning references to a defendant\u2019s silence after receiving Miranda warnings); State v. Reid, 324 S.C. 74, 476 S.E.2d 695 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments 1: holding references to a defendants lack of remorse violate the fifth eighth and fourteenth amendments 2: holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that execution of juveniles violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments 4: holding that complete ban on smoking in county jail does not violate eighth or fourteenth amendments", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "wit: that DHS improperly denied his naturalization application, that the removal proceedings were invalid, that DHS\u2019s arrest and detention of him were unlawful, that DHS officials retaliated against him based First Amendment protected activity, that he should be readmitted to the United States and naturalized, and that his underlying conviction is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Abiodun, 2012 WL 3844912, at *24 (describing litigation history). Indeed, the Government here has filed a motion to dismiss that restates many, if not all, of the arguments it raised in Abiodun\u2019s prior suits. Compare, e.g., Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, at 10-11 (Heck v. Humphrey bars Abiodun\u2019s claims under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983) with Abiodun v. United States, No. 07cv1713, 2007 WL 2782542, at *1 (D.Colo. Sept. 20, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Analysis An individual\u2019s right to access to Holdings: 0: holding that heck v humphrey bars abioduns claims under the ftca 1: holding that a prisoners claim under the ftca based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question the conviction or sentence and was not barred by heck 2: holding that the plaintiffs ftca claims failed because the fbi agents were privileged to use reasonable force under texas law 3: holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims 4: holding that determination of timely filing of complaint under ftca was independent of the merits of plaintiffs ftca claim", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Cir.2009) (quoting Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 333). Because \u201c \u2018the trial court [imposing sanctions] may act as accuser, fact finder and sentencing judge\u2019 \u201d all in one, Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 334(quoting Mackler Prods., Inc. v. Cohen, 146 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir.1998)), our review of such an order is \u201c \u2018more exacting than under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard.\u2019 \u201d Wolters Kluwer, 564 F.3d at 113-14 (quoting Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir.2003)). \u201cIn order to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent power, a district court must find that: (1) the challenged claim was without a colorable basis and (2) the claim was brought in bad faith, i.e., motivated by improper purposes such as harassment or delay.\u201d Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at 336; see also id. at 337(<HOLDING>) (internal citations omitted). Although both Holdings: 0: holding it appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss a discrimination claim where claim is not supported by factual allegations 1: holding that a claim is entirely without color when it lacks any legal or factual basis conversely a claim is colorable when it has some legal and factual support considered in light of the reasonable beliefs of the individual making the claim 2: holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim 3: holding that failure to develop a legal argument supporting a claim results in waiver of the claim 4: holding that if the alleged retaliatory action occurs before the initial eeoc charge is filed a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies as to that claim by including factual information in the charge that discloses the factual basis for the retaliation claim", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "second suit must be identical with the prior action in four respects: 1) the parties must be the same or in privity; 2) the subject matter must be identical; 3) the capacity or character of persons for or against whom the claim is made must be the same; and 4) the same cause of action must be involved in both suits. Id. Petitioner does not dispute that the above elements are met, but instead argues that an exception to res judicata is applicable in the present case. We agree. {16} Res judicata does not apply where \u201cissues or matters are not determined or are reserved for future adjudication or litigation.\u201d State ex rel. Bliss v. Casarez, 52 N.M. 406, 408, 200 P.2d 369, 370 (1948) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Apodaca, 2003-NMCA-085, \u00b6 85, 134 N.M. 77, 73 P.3d 215 (<HOLDING>). According to Petitioner, the \u201c1999 Order was Holdings: 0: recognizing that res judicata does not apply unless the facts and evidence necessary to maintain suit are the same in both actions 1: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings 2: holding that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to defenses that could have been raised in a prior action 3: holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action 4: recognizing the express reservation of the plaintiffs right to maintain a second action as an exception to the doctrine of res judicata", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (laying out a four factor test for determining reasonableness in the prison context). This is so because the constitutional rights of prisoners \u2014 limited by the fact of incarceration itself and by valid penological objectives\u2014 must be balanced against the recognition that it is prison authorities who are best equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administration. See Ali v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir.1990). 7 . Following Blagman's request on December 30, 1998, defendant White advised him that services could be held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 991) (\"the mere calendar recognition of a holiday would [not] have the effect of endorsing the religion.\u201d); Florey v. Sioux Falls School District, 619 F.2d 1311, 1317 & n. 5 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See, e.g., Allegheny v. American Civil Holdings: 0: holding that much of the art literature and music associated with traditional holidays particularly christmas has acquired a significance which is no longer confined to the religious sphere of life 1: holding that recklessness even for fiduciaries is no longer sufficient 2: holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals 3: holding notice no longer required even for traditional departures 4: holding that because plaintiff no longer has available administrative remedies his action must be dismissed with prejudice", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "her liable for tortious interference. Therefore, Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss Counts III and V are granted. Under New York law, a claim for tortious interference requires \u201cthe existence of a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party, defendant\u2019s knowledge of the contract, defendant\u2019s intentional procurement of the third-party\u2019s breach of the contract without justification, actual breach of the contract, and damages resulting therefrom.\u201d Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc. et. al., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 424, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370 (1996). Where the defendants have an economic interest in the contract, however, alleging the above elements is insufficient. See White Plains Coat & Apron Co., Inc. v. Cintas Corp., 8 N.Y.3d 422, 426, 835 N.Y.S.2d 530, 867 N.E.2d 381 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (footnotes omitted). The plaintiff must also Holdings: 0: holding that economic interest defense is available inter alia where defendants were significant stockholders in the breaching partys business where defendant and the breaching party had a parentsubsidiary relationship where defendant was the breaching partys creditor and where the defendant had a managerial contract with the breaching party at the time defendant induced the breach of contract with plaintiff 1: holding in response to plaintiffs arguments that defendants had conspired with the alleged breaching party that the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties requires dismissal of the section 301 claim 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 4: holding that the measure of damages for breaching a building construction contract is ordinarily such sum as is required to make the building conform to the contract", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\u201d State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, \u00b6 26, 136 N.M. 53, 94 P.3d 796 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In New Mexico, because we recognize a fundamental liberty interest in the right to custody of one\u2019s child, parents have a due process right to meaningfully participate in a hearing for the termination of their parental rights. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Ruth Anne E., 1999-NMCA-035, \u00b6 25, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164. Generally, parents also have a right to receive effective notice and have an opportunity to participate at the permanency stage of an abuse and neglect adjudication involving their child. See Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, \u00b6 34 (<HOLDING>). However, a parent\u2019s right to be present at a Holdings: 0: holding that generally parents have a due process right to participate in a permanency hearing because the opportunity to defend against charges of abuse and neglect may prevent a termination of parental rights 1: holding that foster parents have standing to intervene to seek termination of parental rights 2: recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights 3: holding that a fathers failure to resolve his drug addiction as required by the permanency plan constituted grounds for termination of his parental rights 4: holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "years leading up to the lawsuit, and that such contacts can be considered collectively). 2. Forum Selection Clause Under Florida law \u2014 which is the minority view \u2014 \u201ca contractual choice of forum clause designating Florida as the forum cannot serve as the sole basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over an objecting, non-resident defendant.\u201d McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540, 544 (Fla.1987) (emphasis added). Such a clause may, however, be considered as a factor that weighs in favor of exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where other grounds exist to exercise such jurisdiction. See Armaly v. Practice Mgmt. Assocs., 533 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see also Desai Patel Sharma, Ltd v. Don Bell Indus., Inc., 729 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, in addition to the contacts described Holdings: 0: holding that nonresident defendants failure to make payments in florida coupled with forum selection clause sufficient for court to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant 1: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant where defendant assignee received patents from assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction in part because the unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state 2: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 3: holding no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor 4: holding that a choice of law provision is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is entitled to one-half of that portion ... in this case.\" Id. at 488-84. 127 Wife concedes that Woodward is the controlling case in Utah regarding how retirement assets are valued and divided, but attempts to distinguish the present case factually because \"the overwhelming growth of [Husband's] retirement accounts ... [occurred] during the period of the parties' marriage.\" Presumably, this is because appreciation of the accounts was greater in the later years. Wife argues that the value of Husband's accounts should be ascertained as of 1993, when the parties married, and the balance exceeding that 1993 value should then be divided between the parties. Woodward, however, made no such distinction, and treats all years of a defined benefit plan as having equal value. See id. at 488 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)). The trial court followed Holdings: 0: holding that where the trial court awarded the former husband the value of his pension plan but failed to calculate the present value of the plan case must be reversed and remanded for redetermination of equitable distribution 1: recognizing that the fact that a defendant has liability insurance can be established at trial where the issue of ownership is in dispute 2: holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition 3: holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date 4: holding that a fixed system of distribution is applicable where no present value can be established", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the federal rules, recognized that it was to be \u201cguided by court decisions interpreting these rules.\u201d Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 63 Fed.Reg. at 48,084. The majority relies on TBMP \u00a7 523.04 which states that where a party \u201cfails to file a motion to challenge the sufficiency of the response [to its discovery request], it may not thereafter be heard to complain about the sufficiency thereof.\u201d It is far from clear whether this provision was designed to deal with the supplementation requirement, or whether it was limited to deal with the failure to provide initial responses. In any event, unlike the regulations, this section of the TBMP does not have the force and effect of law. See In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1059 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). In the past, we have declined to follow Holdings: 0: holding that directive not promulgated according to apa procedure lacks force and effect of law 1: holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract 2: holding that the trademark manual of examining procedure tmep does not have the force and effect of law 3: holding that compliance with registration statute did not abrogate common law and statutory trademark law 4: holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449-58, 84 S.Ct. 1738, 12 L.Ed.2d 953 (1964)(rejecting the plaintiffs attempt to place glass and metal containers in different relevant markets based on different characteristics). News America points to ample evidence in the record supporting its contention that the consumers of at-shelf coupon dispensers do in fact view at-shelf coupon dispensers as reasonably interchangeable with other in-store marketing vehicles, despite the fact that each in-store marketing vehicle may have its own unique advantages and features. Based on the record presented, the Court cannot accept Menasha\u2019s definition of a relevant market limited to at-shelf coupon dispensers. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242, 113 S.Ct. 2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Because Menasha has failed to provide a Holdings: 0: holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent 1: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 2: holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct 3: holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others 4: holding that when an experts opinion regarding the relevant market is not supported by sufficient facts or when the record contradicts or renders the opinion unreasonable it cannot support a jurys verdict", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thereafter, the federal court granted Al-Challah's request and signed Al-Challah's proposed order dismissing her federal claims with prejudice and dismissing her state law elaims without prejudice. A complaint that is voluntarily dismissed is treated as if it never existed and, thus, cannot toll the statute of limitations. Kohlman, 509 N.E.2d at 232. Because Al-Challah voluntarily dismissed her federal lawsuit, her action did not \"fail\" within the meaning of the Journey's Account Statute. Therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that the Journey's Account Statute was not applicable by granting Barger's motion to dismiss Al-Challah's complaint as time barred. See, e.g., id.; cf. City of Evansville v. Moore, 563 N.E.2d 113, 115-116 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Holdings: 0: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 1: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 2: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 3: holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations 4: holding that the plaintiffs voluntary dismissal did not bar the application of the journeys account statute where the dismissal was not unilateral but merely occurred as a professional courtesy in compliance with the defendants request and assurance that he would waive any affirmative defense under the statute of limitations", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the benchmark well above the ALI\u2019s hope that class members might receive 100 percent recovery. And the court recognized that the cy pres fund serves the goals of civil damages by ensuring AstraZeneca fairly pays for the class\u2019s alleged losses. We asked at oral argument why AstraZeneca would be willing to pay a total sum more than the treble damages for each class member. Counsel for Plaintiff Townsend replied that the plaintiffs had insisted on AstraZeneca paying a larger sum to better represent the losses of the entire class, including those class members who would never claim their recovery. The district court\u2019s approval reflected another important concern: facilitating a settlement in a hard-fought, complex class action. See Durrett v. Housing Auth., 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Achieving settlement in such cases is not Holdings: 0: recognizing a policy encouraging class action settlements 1: holding that a schools excess policy was primary over a students homeowners policy for injuries to the student during physical education class 2: recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine 3: holding fjraud on the part of the insured in the procurement of the policy  is sufficient to defeat a recovery in an action on such policy 4: recognizing that policy determines duty", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "defendant\u2019s method of measuring the productivity of its sales staff singled her out and devalued her contribution. It is well-established that an employer may rely upon supervisor evaluations to assess an employee\u2019s performance when carrying out an employment decision. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985). As articulated by plaintiff, however, by considering the small, less time-consuming agreements the younger salesmen were able to obtain as equivalent to the those plaintiff sought, defendant intentionally undervalued plaintiffs work. As further evidence of the pretext of the methodology, plaintiff cites the following examples: that it was applied retroactively to diminish the value of her sales, th (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, plaintiff denies the Holdings: 0: holding that based upon discrepancies in defendants articulated basis for discrimination reasonable juror could infer that these were pretextual and developed over time to counter evidence suggesting discrimination 1: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination 2: holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex 3: holding that a reasonable juror could not infer discrimination based on a supervisors comments that the company needed to get rid of its old fart pilots 4: holding that a reasonable juror could infer that the shifting and inconsistent explanations given by the employer at trial were pretextual developed over time to counter the evidence suggesting discrimination", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court, Mr. Lilly\u2019s appeal is a criminal appeal subject to Rule 4(b) notice of appeal filing requirements. Mr. Lilly maintains that we have appellate jurisdiction because this appeal is subject to the timing requirement of Rule 4(a) for appeals in civil matters. According to Mr. Lilly, his petition for clarification was in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, which is a civil proceeding that would give rise to a civil appeal. B. It is true that a number of proceedings involving criminal matters are treated as civil for purposes of Rule 4\u2019s filing requirements. See, e.g., Browder, 434 U.S. at 265 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 556 (observing that habeas corpus is undeniably a civil proceeding to which the time limits of Rule 4(a) apply); United States v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 403 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 657 Holdings: 0: holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 1: holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e 2: holding that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a rule 41e motion for the return of property before a criminal prosecution has begun believing such a motion to be in effect a civil action 3: holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis 4: holding that rule 41e motion for return of seized property is treated as a civil equitable proceeding when criminal proceedings against moving party are not yet pending", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "activity. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979). \u201c[T]he transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements of the agent\u201d must all be evaluated. Id. Moreover, \u201c[e]xtreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation of circumstances in each case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduc ts of money, or large quantities of marijuana for an extremely low price. Rather, Wakefield used the market rate to determine the price of the marijuana. Furthermore, Wakefield did not make repeated requests or badger J.D.W. to buy the marijuana. Cf. Sprague, 680 P.2d at 406 (<HOLDING>). J.D.W. immediately responded positively to Holdings: 0: holding that where defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation agent did not violate the fifth amendment by contacting defendant for questioning after defendant refused to answer questions without a lawyer present 1: holding testimony of undercover drug agent regarding tips that defendant was selling drugs and description of defendant were inadmissible hearsay given the statements specifically referred to defendant 2: holding that uncharged amounts of drugs may be included as relevant conduct even if the defendant never actually possessed or distributed the drugs 3: holding that agent entrapped defendant by goading defendant and repeatedly requesting drugs from him 4: holding that evidence that the defendant and a witness sold drugs together was relevant to prove how the witness knew the defendant", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "misinformation, the analysis differs where the government affirmatively misleads an alien about the availability of relief. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbreckt, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (explaining that equity will toll a statute of limitations because of fraud or concealment). We did not find Copeland\u2019s two-year delay in seeking to exhaust his administrative remedies unreasonable where he had been misinformed by the IJ. This reasoning is equally applicable to Lopez\u2019s failure to seek judicial review in the eighteen months between his final order of deportation and his deportation. Deportation, now removal, is a civil proceeding with its own administrative procedures. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048-50, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Because it is an administrative process, Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings and noting the rules incompatibility with the streamlined administrative nature of such proceedings 1: holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings 2: holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(7th Cir.2011). ANALYSIS CVR disputes both parts of the 10(j) test. It contends there is no reasonable cause to believe that it committed unfair labor practices because it is not a successor to Berry obligated to negotiate with Local 100 ULU. Second, CVR contends that injunctive relief is not \u201cjust and proper\u201d in this case, largely because of the 16-month gap between the filing of the charge and this 10(j) petition. A. Reasonable Cause It is well settled that, under certain circumstances, a successor to an employer is subject to the predecessor\u2019s duty to negotiate with the representatives of the appropriate employee unit, and the failure to negotiate can be an unfair labor practice. See NLRB v. Burns Int\u2019l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972) (<HOLDING>). CVR contends that this successor-ship Holdings: 0: holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union 1: holding retirees are not employees within the bargaining unit 2: holding that a county had no duty to bargain with a union of its employees 3: holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement 4: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "them until after the petition, and the amount debtor was to pay to fund those benefits likewise was not determined or payable until after the petition was filed. At issue was whether the obligation to fund those unemployment benefits paid to the former employees was a pre-petition or post-petition claim against the debtor. The court ruled that because the event that under local law triggered the liability, i.e. the termination of the employees, occurred pre-petition, the claim was not a post-petition administrative expense. Id. at 515. 8 . See, e.g., Columbia Gas System, 146 B.R. at 118 (ruling that under local law debtor obligation to pay taxes arose not when it was assessed but \"when it owned and operated properly within the prior calendar year\u201d); Northeastern Ohio, 126 B.R. at 515 (<HOLDING>); In re Brent Explorations, Inc., 91 B.R. 104, Holdings: 0: holding that taxes were a claim against the estate that had to be filed in probate court thus reversing an order requiring heirs to pay taxes on estate property because the district court did not have jurisdiction 1: holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him 2: holding that plaintiff explained why statements were fraudulent where the complaint alleged that defendants statements requested port fees and customs taxes  but no such fees or taxes were due 3: holding that permit fees imposed by statute were not taxes 4: holding unemployment taxes accrued when employees were terminated not when the amount of compensation taxes are determinable", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "personally upon them. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 1457-58 (4th Cir.1997) (opining that so long as the government has suffered an injury-in-fact, the qui tam plaintiff possesses general standing as the government\u2019s representative); United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212-1214 (7th Cir.1995) (stating \u201c[o]nce we accept the premise that the United States is the real plaintiff in a qui tam action, it stands to reason that challenges to the standing of the government\u2019s representative are beside the point____Requiring an additional showing of injury on the part of the qui tam relator would be an analytical redundancy.\u201d); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1154 (declaring that Holdings: 0: holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states 1: holding that a state or agency is not a person subject to qui tam liability under the false claims act 2: holding that to be protected by the fca when confronting an employer the employee must sufficiently allege activity with a nexus to a qui tam action or fraud against the united states government 3: holding that the fca effectively assigns the governments claims to qui tam plaintiffs  who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal treasury 4: holding that plaintiff could not maintain a qui tam fca action against a municipal entity", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "An employer is found liable for negligent hiring if, at the time of hiring, the employer had reason to believe that hiring this person would create an undue risk of harm to others. Connes v. Molalla Transp. System, Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo.1992); Restatement (Second) of Agency \u00a7 213 emt. d (1958). Hence, the court does not inquire into the employer\u2019s broad reasons for choosing this particular employee for the position, but instead looks to whether the specific danger which ultimately manifested itself could have reasonably been foreseen at the time of hiring. This inquiry, even when applied to a minister employee, is so limited and factually based that it can be accomplished with no inquiry into religious beliefs. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2153, 128 Holdings: 0: holding that although courts must not become embroiled in interpreting or weighing church doctrine a claim of negligent hiring of a minister is actionable because it does not require such interpretation or weighing of religious belief but instead is merely application of a secular standard to secular conduct 1: holding that cemetery owned and operated by association of churches was not entitled to unemployment compensation tax exemption because services it provided were the same as those of secular cemeteries and therefore its primary purpose was not religious 2: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 3: recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous 4: holding application of civil rights act to pastors claim of racial discrimination would encroach upon the churchs right to be free from secular interference and to decide for themselves matters of church government", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fiduciary relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Agency \u00a7 1(1). There is no manifestation by either the federal government or the State of California of an intent to create an agency relationship under the facts of this case. First, both the Supreme Court and our predecessor court, the United States Court of Claims, have held that the federal government\u2019s conditioning a state or locality\u2019s receipt of federal funds on the state\u2019s taking a particular action does not make that state or locality an agent of the federal government. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, Pa., 369 U.S. 84, 89, 82 S.Ct. 531, 7 L.Ed.2d 585 (1962) (<HOLDING>); D.R. Smalley & Sons, Inc. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land 1: recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority 2: holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations 3: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations 4: holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where city of burlington acted under federal authority", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "[] is a matter which lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.\u201d Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Co., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir.1967). Even where a defendant does not explicitly ask for default to be set aside, a brief in opposition to default judgment will be treated as a request to have default set aside, and will be analyzed under the \u201cgood cause\u201d standard. See FDIC v. Danzig, 10 F.3d 806, 1993 WL 478842, at *2 (4th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision) (\u2018Where, as here, a court is ruling upon a plaintiff\u2019s application for a default judgment, it properly treats the defendant\u2019s opposition as a motion to set aside the entry of default, which is assessed under Rule 55(c)\u2019s good cause standard.\u201d) (citing Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>)). Therefore, as stated above, Wong\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that motion to set aside default made at least seven months after defendant learned of entry of default was not made within a reasonable time 1: holding that in considering the appellants opposition to the motion for a default judgment it is proper to apply the rule 55c standard for setting aside the entry of a default 2: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 3: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment 4: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[i]t is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the record does not contain such an issue,\u201d the movant must also \u201cidentify that part of the record which bears out his assertion.\u201d City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Assoc. Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988) (emphasis added). \u201cOnce this is done, [the moving party\u2019s] burden is discharged, and, if the record in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is then the [non-moving party\u2019s] burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue.\u201d Id. at 274. However, if the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the burden is never passed to the nonmoving party. See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). \u201c \u2018[E]ven when the non-movant bears the Holdings: 0: holding that the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial 1: holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial  citation omitted 2: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case 3: holding that an adverse party must state specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact for trial 4: holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing  that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the best mode. See United States Gypsum Company v. National Gypsum Company, 74 F.3d 1209, 1213 (Fed.Cir.1996) (quoting the inventor definitively stating \u201c[a]t the time the application was filed, I considered a perlite supplied by Silbrico ... to be the best commercially available .... \u201d)\u2022 Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants\u2019 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Invalidity under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . The court agrees with Plaintiffs that its use of various terms throughout the specification to signify a theoretical win profile do not arise to the level of semantic indefiniteness as was found in Allen Eng\u2019g Corp. v. Bartell Indus. Inc. 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed.Cir.2002)(<HOLDING>) 2 . For purposes of Defendants' Summary Holdings: 0: holding that the scope of coverage of the claims may change if a patentee has relinquished a potential claim construction in an amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or distinguish a reference 1: recognizing the validity of the holding in south middlesex with respect to parallel claims under  3604 of the fha and section 1983 2: holding that at least with respect to the constitutionally inadequate notice in that case the errors were not structural 3: holding that the argument that an additional limitation be read into claims 1 3 and 4 was only correct with respect to claim 1 and thus only claim 1 was invalid 4: holding that in the case where patentee was attempting to argue that parallel meant perpendicular with respect to a particular claim and a claim ended with an incomplete limitation the claims at issue were indefinite", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "causing significant change in benefits.\u201d Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). To constitute an adverse employment action, the conduct must be \u2018\u201cmaterially adverse\u2019 to the employee\u2019s job status.\u201d Wells v. Colo. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1213 (2003)(quoting Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d at 533). In Wells v. Colorado Dep\u2019t of Transportation, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether a supervisor\u2019s \u201cpoor treatment\u201d of the employee was sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. 325 F.3d at 1214. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the supervisor undermined her authority at a work site when they had a disagreement in front of other workers. See id. In denying the plaintiffs claim that 98, 1104 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). \u201cThere is little support for the argument Holdings: 0: recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a written warning may be an adverse employment action for purposes of a fmla claim only if it effects a significant change in the plaintiffs employment status 3: holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions 4: recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "outlining the offenses, not the later date of indictment. Id. The appeals court disagreed, holding that denial of parole due to pending charges is not equivalent to arrest on the charges. Id. at 1043. Therefore, the defendant\u2019s continued incarceration was for his prior conviction, rather than pretrial detention for the uncharged offense, and so the speedy trial clock began to run from the date of indictment. Id.; see also People v. Roscoe, 162 Mich.App. 710, 413 N.W.2d 483 (1987); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 598, 599 P.2d 529 (1979). Likewise, the Alaska Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when a defendant is indicted, rather than when arrested on other offenses or for probation violations. Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434 (Alaska Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>); Demientieff v. State, 814 P.2d 745 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges 1: holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges 2: holding attorneys must be given reasonable notice of the charges they face before the referees hearing on those charges 3: holding that  1983 claims accrued when all charges were dismissed rather than a previous date on which the conviction was vacated on the theory that the charges remained pending until the dismissal 4: holding that an exception to the charges having to do with contributory negligence  charges two three and four was insufficient to preserve issue for appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "13-3. Defendant contends that the 2010-2011 IEP does not preclude G.M. from earning a Regents diploma in the future, but that earning Carnegie credits in her mainstream classes is currently outside G.M.\u2019s ability. See Dkt. No. 15 at 24. Under the IDEA, a student with a disability is eligible to earn a high school diploma until his or her twenty-first birthday. See 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1412(a)(1)(A); 8 N.Y.C.R.R. \u00a7 100.9(e). At the time this action was brought, G.M. was fifteen years old, thus Defendant\u2019s contention that she still has ample time to earn a Regents diploma is correct. Given G.M.\u2019s significant deficits, however, Defendant\u2019s decision that G.M. would not receive Carnegie credit for her course work for 2010-2011 does not amount to a violation of the IDEA. See J.S., 586 F.Supp.2d at 86 (<HOLDING>). The record shows that G.M. struggled Holdings: 0: holding that the districts decision that the plaintiff could only pursue an iep diploma was reasonably calculated to benefit the plaintiff and was in conformity with the requirements of the idea 1: holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice 2: holding that courts must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by  giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts 3: holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "did not abuse its discretion in admitting La Mott\u2019s testimony. Wilson next argues that the statement was not made \u201cin furtherance of\u2019 the conspiracy. To be \u201cin furtherance of\u2019 a conspiracy, \u201cthe statements must further the common objectives of the conspiracy or set in motion transactions that are an integral part of the conspiracy.\u201d Kearns, 61 F.3d at 1426 (quotations omitted), \u201cmere conversation between coconspirators\u201d does not qualify as nonhearsay. United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1984) (quotations omitted). Here, Ware\u2019s statement concerned the source of the pseudophendrine pills and it is plausible that the statement was made to convince Meier, a member of the conspiracy, that the source was loyal, consistent and reliable. See Williams, 989 F.2d at 1069 (<HOLDING>); Kearns, 61 F.3d at 1425-26 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that telephone conversations and meetings were overt acts in furtherance of a drug conspiracy 1: holding that statements aimed at preventing detection and punishment were not admissible under the coconspirator exception because admission of such statements would expand exception to hearsay rule to include declarations made not in furtherance of conspiracy charged but made in furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punishment 2: holding that the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction requires that the outofstate coconspirator was or should have been aware of the acts performed in the forum state in furtherance of the conspiracy 3: holding that statements made to keep a coconspirator informed as to the groups drug supply were made in furtherance of the conspiracy 4: holding that statements by a cooperating coconspirator to known authorities made after the commencement of cooperation are not admissible under rule 801d2e because such statements are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as a witness, he did not receive any money for his actions. See infra, p. 587. 8 .Although the Third Circuit, in Klem, analyzed the definition of \"substantial burden\u201d in the context of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, this test has been used interchangeably in the RFRA context. See Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 442-43. 9 . It is worth mentioning that, though not applicable to the case at hand, the test to determine the validity of a prison regulation which impinges on prisoners' constitutional rights includes as one factor \u201cwhether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right.\u201d DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir.2004); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), 10 . The Suprem (9th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 956, 25 Holdings: 0: holding that the federal kidnapping act does not make the kidnappers motivation an ingredient of the crime 1: holding that assault and kidnapping charges do not merge as they are not the same act for purposes of blockburger  and as each required proof of an element the other did not 2: holding the connection is an element 3: recognizing that kidnapping under oklahoma law is a felony 4: holding that a kidnappers motivation is not an element of the federal kidnapping offense", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the application of the Code. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160-61, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991). This holding also applies to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See In re Thomas, 203 B.R. 64, 67 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.1996) (applying plain meaning doctrine to bankruptcy rules) (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643-44, 112 S.Ct. 1644, 118 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992)). Under the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 9001(5), a \u201ccontrolling stockholder\u201d may be designated by the Court. In the case at bar, Rubicon is unquestionably a controlling shareholder; it owns the most stock of any shareholder, [Finding of Fact No. 9.], and its percentage ownership (45%) constitutes control. See, e.g., Riggs Nat. Bank of Wash. D.C. v. Allbritton, 516 F.Supp. 164, 179 (D.D.C. 1981) (<HOLDING>); 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 80a-2(a)(9) (presuming control by Holdings: 0: holding approximately 21 percent of petitioners common stock 1: holding when defendant raised affirmative defense of total failure of consideration that even assuming the acquired stock became worthless the worthlessness of the stock did not constitute a failure of consideration when in exchange for note defendant received 2500 shares of stock   as well as all the rights privileges and benefits of a shareholder director and officer emphasis supplied punctuation omitted 2: holding that shares of stock in husbands name had not been transmuted 3: holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale 4: holding that ownership of thirtyfive percent of total outstanding shares of a stock constitutes effective control", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "first enacted section 499A.1(1), it contained the same phrases that are the subject of this litigation. Compare 1947 Iowa Acts ch. 250, \u00a7 1 (codified at Iowa Code \u00a7 499A.1 (1950)), with Iowa Code \u00a7 499A.1(1). A search of the 1946 Code shows the general assembly used language similar to section 499A.1Q) in other sections of the Code. See, e.g., Iowa Code \u00a7 504.1 (1946) (requiring incorporators of nonprofit corporations to be \u201cpersons of full age, a majority of whom shall be citizens of the state\u201d), repealed by 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1164, \u00a7 27. The use of the phrase \u201cpersons of full age\u201d denotes that the person performing the organizing has reached the age of majority and is capable of executing a contract. See Martin v. Stewart Motor Sales, 247 Iowa 204, 207-08, 73 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (1955) (<HOLDING>); cf. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 78 (3d ed. 1933) Holdings: 0: holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive 1: holding an individual not of full age who misrepresents his or her age cannot invoke the defense of infancy to void a contract 2: holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference 3: holding that comments relating to age made some three to fifteen or more years prior to plaintiffs discharge were not relevant to show that he was fired because of his age 4: holding age discrimination claim barred", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Wife disclosed some of Husband\u2019s emails to Cooke and BJR, who allegedly used the emails to obtain additional information about Husband\u2019s affair, the SCA does not punish such conduct. See Cardinal Health, 582 F.Supp.2d at 976 (\u201cWhile [the] SCA punishes the act of accessing a \u2018facility through which an electronic communication service is provided\u2019 in an unauthorized manner, the SCA does not punish disclosing and using the information obtained therefrom.\u201d). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment to Wife, Cooke, and BJR. See Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 926 (granting summary judgment to defendants who did not access plaintiffs email accounts); Cardinal Health, 582 F.Supp.2d at 977-79 (same); see also Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding agreed abatement to allow compliance with 60day notice requirement of section 74051a did not extend 120day deadline or constitute an agreement of the parties to extend 1: holding that civil liability under section 2707 does not extend to those who aid abet or conspire with a person or entity engaging in a violation of section 2702 2: holding that section 409 requires a causal connection for liability under section 405a3 3: holding that bivens liability does not extend to a corporate entity because the deterrence rationale applies only to individual actors 4: holding that prior to 1986 amendment when congress replaced with intentionally the word willfully in section 2511 to establish a civil violation of section 2511 a plaintiff had to prove that any violation was intentional or undertaken with reckless disregard", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his motion for summary judgment, predicated upon his version of the events. Here the Court considers the issue on Nuon's motion, but on Kinney\u2019s facts. 8 . An arrest without probable cause also establishes liability under the MCRA. The MCRA was intended to provide a state law remedy co-extensive with 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, except that the MCRA also reaches private action, and requires a showing that a constitutional violation was effected \u201cby threats, intimidation or coercion.\u201d See Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 718, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 822-23, 473 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). An arrest without probable cause has been found to constitute coercion within the meaning of the MCRA. See Daley v. Harber, 234 F.Supp.2d 27, 31-32 (D.Mass.2002) (<HOLDING>); Zurakowski v. D\u2019Oyley, 46 F.Supp.2d 87, 88 Holdings: 0: holding that a police officers actions in effecting arrest without probable cause constituted coercion under the mcra 1: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 2: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 3: holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 4: holding that police officers have probable cause to arrest an individual with a sufficiently similar appearance to the description in a warrant", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in 2010. In the cases where courts have denied equitable estoppel despite fraud by a fiduciary, the parties have been informed of at least some particulars indicating suspicious or fraudulent behavior. See Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623-24 (Tex.2011) (declining to- apply fraudulent concealment doctrine because plaintiffs were aware of numerous suspicious facts underlying their cause of action); Doe v. Henderson Indep. Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 631, 2000 WL 1701752, at *4-5 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (denying equitable estoppel because plaintiffs were aware of the facts of the injury they suffered even if they did not fully appreciate its practical or legal consequences); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex.1999) (<HOLDING>). The case of Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd. Holdings: 0: holding that loss to bank occurred without regard to its possible remedies when its funds in fact were diverted  through the fraud and dishonesty of its treasurer and that the bank could sue on its bond without proof that it had then sustained some actual defined loss not merely nominal as the result of the transaction in question 1: holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations 2: holding once the plaintiff who had filed a fela claim concluded that he was injured and believed the injury was caused by his employment he had a duty to investigate the situation in order to confirm or deny his belief 3: holding in a case where it was not clear whether the plaintiff suffered prejudice from the lack of notice that a plaintiff could not obtain reinstatement based on lack of notice 4: holding that once plaintiff knew it had suffered a large loss caused by the wrongful conduct of another and had sued its fund manager it was on inquiry notice to investigate its auditor as well", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "solely on theories of misappropriation or misuse of CDC's confidential information. In support of its breach of fiduciary duty claim, CDC avers that it provided Carsey \"with access to [CDC's] confidential business information and Trade Secrets,\" and that Carsey owed CDC several fiduciary duties, including \"a duty not to disclose CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information, a duty not to use CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information to compete un fairly with CDC, and a duty not to use CDC's Trade Secrets and confidential business information for the benefit of a new business.\" Accordingly, this claim is preempted by the UTSA in its entirety. See, eg., Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg., Inc., 649 F.Supp.2d 702, 724 (N.D.Ohio 2009) (<HOLDING>); Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 999 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty will not lie where the claim of breach is dependent upon the existence of a contractual relationship between the parties 1: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was solely dependent upon misappropriationoftradesecret facts 2: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it was completely dependent on the facts concerning misappropriation of trade secrets 3: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 4: holding that utsa preempted a breach of fiduciary duty claim because the factual allegations supporting that claim involved only the misappropriation of  information", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "unnecessary.\u201d Johnson v. Potter, 177 F.Supp.2d 961, 965 (D.Minn.2001); see also V[a.] v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 ... (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that \u201c[i]n every culture, certain things [both \u201csacred\u201d and \u201cprofane\u201d] acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders can comprehend\u201d and discussing cross burning as an example). Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 520 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir.2008). A reasonable jury could discredit an employee\u2019s race-neutral explanation for hanging a life-sized noose. Ibid. Here, all three plaintiffs witnessed a noose in their place of employment. Although there is evidence that the person who placed the noose did so for non-discriminatory reasons, a jury could reasonably find to the contrary. Ibid.; see also id. at 1162 (<HOLDING>). It is true that the noose by itself is not as Holdings: 0: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation 1: holding that a jury could believe that a lifesize noose prominently suspended from a large industrial wall clock was meant to evoke a hangmans noose 2: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff 3: holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified 4: holding that a jury could easily find that the noose was an egregious act of discrimination calculated to intimidate africanamericans", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was proper, even though later events which developed led to remand. Amoco Petroleum, 964 F.2d at 708 (7th Cir.1992). 11 . The Seventh Circuit clarified its Amoco Petroleum reasoning in In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir.1992) (granting mandamus in part and directing district court to explain why it remanded case). Judge Easterbrook stated as dictum in Shell Oil that the language of \u00a7 1447(c)\u2014i.e., remand is permitted \"any time before final judgment\u201d\u2014does not mean that changes after removal can eliminate jurisdiction and compel remand. Rather, \"[njeither the text of the revised \u00a7 1447(c) nor its legislative history implies that Congress altered the traditional view expressed in St. Paul [Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (<HOLDING>) ] ... that jurisdiction present at the time a Holdings: 0: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 1: holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond 2: holding events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce amount recoverable do not oust district courts jurisdiction 3: holding that review of an original removal decision and a subsequent removal order are distinct 4: holding that events occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable whether beyond the plaintiffs control or the result of his volition do not oust the district courts jurisdiction once it has attached", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The sentencing court, however, is not required to articulate every factor provided in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 so long as the record reflects these factors were considered in particularizing the sentence of the defendant. State v. Morgan, 428 So.2d 1215 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 166. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the lack of compliance with the sentencing guidelines does not necessarily require sentences be set aside if the record otherwise clearly illumines the trial court\u2019s sentencing choice and demonstrates the sentence is not arbitrary or excessive. State v. Martin, 400 So.2d 1063, on rehearing, 400 So.2 o.2d 831 (La.1992) (requiring an \u201carticulated justification for the near-maximum sentence\u201d); State v. Sanders, 542 So.2d 1134 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 848 (La.App. 5 Holdings: 0: holding that the police have an automatic right to conduct a protective search of a burglary suspect because burglary is a crime for which an offender would likely be armed 1: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 2: holding that eighteen years for a second offender convicted of simple burglary was not excessive 3: holding that in california one may be convicted of burglary even if he enters with consent 4: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argument that first-filed qui tam complaints must meet a heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b) in order to bar later-filed complaints. C. Dismissal with Prejudice Batiste argues that because Zahara\u2019s complaint was dismissed before Batiste\u2019s complaint was dismissed, his complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice (implying that Batiste would like the opportunity to amend his complaint and bring this case again). Batiste, however, waived this argument. Zahara was dismissed eighteen months prior to the Batiste dismissal. During that time, Batiste never asked for leave to amend his complaint in the district court; thus, he has waived his opportunity to file a new suit on these same grounds now. See Confederate Mem\u2019l Ass'n v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C.Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth Holdings: 0: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 1: holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made 2: holding that although district courts have discretion to deny leave to amend they may only do so for a substantial reason 3: recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court 4: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Class claims, the definition of the Class and Subclasses, the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, and the class members\u2019 right to object or request exclusion from the settlement and the timing and manner for doing so. The Notice also informed Class Members of their opportunity to be heard at the fairness hearing and to enter an appearance through an attorney, and stated that the settlement would be binding on Class Members who did not opt out of it. Furthermore, the extent of the Plaintiffs\u2019 efforts to notify potential Class Members is adequate. The Notice was mailed to potential Class Members individually based upon consumer information provided by Sparboe and the other Defendants. See Larson v. AT & T Mobility LLC, No. 10-1285, 2012 WL 2478376, at *9 (3d Cir. June 29, 2012) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the parties published a notice Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 1: holding that an absent member of a subsection 23b3 class can be bound by the results of litigation about which that member was notified and given an opportunity to be heard 2: holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages 3: holding that a class plaintiff who seeks to assert statutory rights to protect a class of which he is a member is not asserting rights antagonistic to any members of that class 4: recognizing that  individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case it is rather an unambiguous requirement of rule 23 accordingly each class member who can be identified through reasonable effort must be notified  quoting eisen v carlisle  jacquelin 417 us 156 176 94 sct 2140 40 led2d 732 1974", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "her new family,\u201d the guardianship is no longer necessary. We first address Susan\u2019s parenting petition claim because it is dispositive of her other claims at this stage of the proceedings. Susan characterizes the trial court\u2019s sua sponte dismissal of her verified parenting petition as a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Kennedy v. Titcomb, 131 N.H. 399, 402 (1989) (noting that \u201c[a] trial court has the discretion to dismiss an action sua sponte where the allegations contained in a writ do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted\u201d). In essence, the trial court ruled that Susan\u2019s petition failed to state a claim on any of her asserted bases for claiming to be a parent of Madelyn. Cf. In the Matter of J.B. & J.G., 157 N.H. 577, 580 (2008) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[I]n reviewing the trial court\u2019s order of Holdings: 0: recognizing the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in his or her child and concluding that the state must provide a parent with fundamentally fair procedures including a clear and convincing evidentiary standard when seeking to terminate parental rights 1: holding that petitioner could maintain his action seeking parental rights and responsibilities under rsa chapter 461a notwithstanding his lack of biological relationship to the child so long as he alleges sufficient facts to establish his status as a parent by other means 2: holding that if an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities  emotional financial and otherwise  his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent 3: holding that although samesex partner may have been able to prove her status as a de facto parent such status was not sufficient to establish parental rights to custody and visitation over the objection of the biological mother 4: recognizing that fathers parental rights were terminated based upon his incarceration and his behavior while in prison his history of substance abuse and the fact that his child support payments are in arrears", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "were actual corporations.\u201d); United States v. Coffman, 94 F.3d 330, 337 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[E]ven if ... [Galbraith ] were decided correctly, [it] would not carry the day for the defendants[] [because it is a case] where the fraud would have done no harm even if the defendants had not been interrupted[ ] [whereas h]ere the fraud had a real victim in its sights but was interrupted before it could do any harm.\u201d); United States v. Falcioni, 45 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1995) (noting Galbraith\u2019s \u201climited exception to use of the intended loss figure\u201d and stating that \u201cFalcioni\u2019s plan failed to result in loss, not because his victim was a non-existent entity, but rather because [an acquaintance] notified law enforcement authorities\u201d); cf. United States v. Sheets, 65 F.3d 752, 753-54 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In sum, rather than implicitly criticize our Holdings: 0: holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax 1: holding that information furnished to preparer of tax return is not privileged 2: holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others 3: holding defendant liable for intended loss created by filing false tax return for someone else even though intended victim demonstrated to irs that tax return was bogus 4: holding in tax case that the sophisticated means enhancement applied even when each step in the planned tax evasion was simple because when viewed together the steps comprised a plan more complex than merely filling out a false tax return", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "over Lloyds. \u201cAs federal courts have held on many occasions, [ ] customer-initiated bank-to-bank wire transfers do not establish the \u2018continuous and systematic\u2019 purposeful presence necessary to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank.\u201d Dtex, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 405 F.Supp.2d 639, 645 (D.S.C.2005) (and cases cited therein), aff'd. 214 Fed.Appx. 286 (4th Cir.2007) (affirming on basis of district court\u2019s \u201ccomprehensive and exhaustive\u201d opinion). The sporadic visits by Lloyds\u2019 employees to Tennessee also do not support the exercise of jurisdiction. Again, this is not the type of \u201ccontinuous and systematic conduct\u201d required to support general jurisdiction over a defendant. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tryg Int\u2019l Ins. Co. Ltd., 91 F.3d 790, 793-94 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Holdings: 0: holding that limited jurisdiction existed over foreign defendants given their intent to affect the forum their licensing agreements and coordination of release strategies noting that the three foreign defendants did more than merely have their music product end up in california by happenstance as tjhere were crosslicensing agreements between all of the members of the universal group and a coordinated plan existed among  all of the defendants to distribute the barbie girl song around the world including the united states 1: holding that foreign corporate defendants purchases and attendant activity in state were insufficient to confer texas with general jurisdiction 2: holding that a foreign defendants participation in a reinsurance pool as well as several prior reinsurance agreements with two local companies was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction 3: holding that evidence of outofstate defendants indirect ownership interests in the nursing homes operating and management companies insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in florida 4: holding that an interactive website allowing clients to bank online was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction over a foreign bank", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an indictment which tracks the statutory language is sufficient. Id. Here, manner and means was not included in the statute; therefore, it was not required to be included in the indictment. The indictment alleged the elements of the offense and was sufficient. See Flores, 33 S.W.3d at 919 (concluding an information was defective because while the statute set forth manner and means, the information did not). Appellant appears to argue here that the State did not sufficiently identify how he \u201cheld himself out as a lawyer,\u201d rendering the indictment defective. We hold that the words of the statute itself are not of \u201cindeterminate or variable meaning\u201d and, thus, tracking the statute was sufficient. See Nix v. State, 401 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); Cf. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 254, Holdings: 0: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient 1: holding indictment sufficient where the crux of the offense was not being a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state because defendant could reasonably prepare his case without further description of how he handled the affairs of his medical clinic 2: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 3: holding defendant not prejudiced by allowing the state to amend its indictment because he had more than adequate time to prepare his defense 4: holding that it is elementary that an indictment under the us constitution shall advise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in order that he may meet the accusation and prepare for his trial and that after judgment he may be able to plead the record and judgment in bar of further prosecution for the same offense", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "concealed a conspiracy, as would a letter on plain stationery meant to conceal the identity of its sender. Similarly, alleging that Defendants participated in \u201cclandestine meetings,\u201d (Id. \u00b6 99), is not tantamount to representing to others that the meetings were valid trade association meetings when in fact they were meetings in furtherance of a conspiracy. See In re Aluminum Phosphide, 905 F.Supp. at 1470 (dismissing fraudulent concealment claim because plaintiffs failed to cite specific actions by defendants to keep meetings secret). Additionally, alleging that Defendants\u2019 silence indicates acquiescence to a conspiracy, (see Pis.\u2019 Second Am. Compl. \u00b6 98), does not constitute an allegation of an affirmative act of concealment. See In re Aluminum Phosphide, 905 F.Supp. at 1470 (<HOLDING>). Merely claiming that \u201call conspiracies are Holdings: 0: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 1: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 2: holding  1319a2 imposes mandatory duty 3: holding that silence or passive conduct is not fraudulent unless parties relationship imposes duty to disclose 4: holding that erisas duty of loyalty creates a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Judge. Ramond L. Walker, Jr., challenges the ord computer printout, that Walker was arrested on May 14, 2005, and was entitled to 1379 days of credit on count one. Thus, the court awarded him an additional 3 days\u2019 credit on that count. However, Walker correctly alleged that he is entitled to 1380 days\u2019 credit on that count. The relevant portion of the trial transcript shows that he was arrested on the two robberies shortly after 11:00 p.m., on May 13, 2005. The State does not dispute this information. Thus, Walker is entitled to jail credit for that day because he was in actual custody. See Bronk v. State, 25 So.3d 701, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the postconviction court shall Holdings: 0: holding that a rule 3800a motion that does not allege that the court records show the defendants entitlement to additional jail credit is facially insufficient 1: holding that a trial court may not rescind jail credit previously awarded even if the initial award was improper 2: holding that jail credit may be granted for presentence custodial period spent under a civil commitment order at state security hospital and observing that denying credit for time relating to probationary conditions is not inconsistent with that holding 3: holding that the statutory entitlement to presentence jail credit starts with the initial arrest for a criminal offense 4: recognizing statutory credit", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "77p(f)(2). Id. \u00a7 77v(a). So understood, the Jurisdiction Provision vests the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over covered class actions asserting claims under the Securities Act (\u201cSecurities Act class actions\u201d). As a result, if a Securities Act class action is initiated in state court, that action is not barred from removal; indeed, such action must either be remov\u00e9d to federal court or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because the instant action is a putative Securities Act class action, the New York state court was not a \u201ccourt of competent jurisdiction\u201d under the Anti-Removal Provision, and the action was therefore properly removed. In. so holding, this court joins a growing consensus among district courts in the Second Circuit. Compare Hung, 2016 WL 299034, at *4 (<HOLDING>); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., No. Holdings: 0: holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive 1: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 2: holding that a state securities claim which alleged federal mail wire and securities violations as the predicate acts did not arise under federal law and thus did not create federal jurisdiction 3: holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims 4: holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over securities act class actions", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Ins. Co., 255 A.D.2d 644, 679 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1998) (insurance agent listed parking lot owner as an additional insured on certificate of insurance on policy purchased by snow removal subcontractor; although insurance agent stated it was \"routine procedure\u201d to send a copy of certificates to the insurance company, coverage was not amended to add parking lot owner to policy); Zurich Ins. Co. v. White, 221 A.D.2d 700, 633 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995) (insurance agent issued certificate of insurance to state department of transportation certifying that there were no deductibles to coverage provided to painting contractor for the state; insurance company later asserted a $500 per claim deductible for property damage claims caused by pain 43 Ill.App.3d 624, 2 Ill.Dec. 148, 357 N.E.2d 125 (1976) (<HOLDING>). A similar situation occurs in the context of Holdings: 0: holding that exclusions are invalid unless they are communicated to the certificate holder in writing 1: holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled 2: holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage 3: holding that an insurance company that does not deliver a policy to a certificate holder is estopped from asserting exclusions contained in the policy but not revealed in the certificate 4: holding that the certificate of purchase is not a claim because it does not represent a right to payment", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a third-party tortfeasor for injuries to the employee holds the amount due to the employer in trust so as to ensure that the employer\u2019s right of subrogation is protected pursuant to section 287.150. Id. at 386; Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913, 919 (1950). Finally, SVC argues that its ability to protect its lien interest might be impaired or impeded without intervention because Kinney might settle with one or more of the Defendants and then execute a release absolving all Defendants of any other liability. While this could conceivably occur, the other enforcement options mentioned in Doss would still be available to SVC, not to mention the remedy discussed in O\u2019Hanlon and Everard, supra. See generally Timmermann v. Timmermann, 891 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Mo.App. E.D.1995) (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, we conclude that SVC Holdings: 0: holding that an action against an officer was not an action against the state because the relief sought would not take away any property of the state or fasten a lien on it or interfere with the disposition of funds in the treasury 1: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 2: holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel 3: holding that any remedy against the third party which may have been available to the wouldbe intervenors prior to the commencement of the plaintiffs action would still be available to them in the event of an adverse disposition which also would not in and of itself preclude a subsequent equitable action by the wouldbe intervenors 4: holding that to the extent plaintiffs present action is based on conduct subsequent to the original action it is not barred by the prior litigation", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "whether a dispute over a side agreement that does not provide for arbitration falls within the CBA\u2019s arbitration clause, is one that this court has not previously addressed. There is a split among the circuits that have spoken on this issue. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits apply the \u201ccollateral\u201d test in determining whether a dispute over a side agreement is arbitrable. Under the collateral test, courts consider the similarity of the side agreement\u2019s subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA. If the subject matter is dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed collateral to the CBA. However, where the side agreement is \u201cintegral\u201d to the CBA, courts permit arbitration of disputes over its provisions. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2800, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, Holdings: 0: holding that when an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute  the arbitration clause is not enforceable and that the language insulating an employer from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable 1: holding that an addendum to the cba was integral to it and therefore subject to the arbitration clause 2: holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action 3: holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause 4: holding that a letter of understanding was collateral to the cba and therefore not governed by the cbas arbitration clause", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Morrissey\u2019s earlier services is clearly wrong in light of the court\u2019s other findings. They include the findings (a) that \u201cSr. Mon[z]on had never agreed to any specific hourly rates and clearly none that approached or exceeded $200 per hour,\u201d 782 F.Supp. at 905; (b) that Morrissey ha .S.2d at 382, 489 N.E.2d at 1284 (same). Based on Mar Oil\u2019s rejection of the very first bill, sent in January 1981 and asking for $75,-000, Morrissey knew that, without specificity as to time spent, Monzon would not allow the bill to be paid. Statements made by an attorney to a client in such circumstances in order to induce payment of the attorney\u2019s bills should generally be binding on the attorney. See generally Prager v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Insurance Co., 245 N.Y. 1, 4, 156 N.E. 76 (1927) (<HOLDING>); Finkelstein v. Kins, 124 A.D.2d 92, 95, 511 Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 1: holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence 2: holding that an attorneys bills are high evidence as to the maximum value of the attorneys services 3: holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5 The court, however, refused to abrogate the immunities that a landowner enjoys in relation to trespassers. Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 839, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975). 6 But see Johnson v. Blackburn, 227 Wis. 2d 249, 257-58, 595 N.W.2d 676 (1999)(\"As a general matter, a landlord owes a tenant, as well as guests of a tenant, the duty to exercise ordinary care. A landlord's duty to trespassers, however, is to refrain from willful and intentional injury.\"); Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 421, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (\"Although individuals generally owe a duty of ordinary care to all persons, we recognize that limitations do exist with respect to the imposition of a legal duty in some cases.\u201d). 7 Compare Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 445-46, 442 N.W.2d 24 (1989) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 745); Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court in pagelsdorf v safeco ins co of am 91 wis 2d 734 745 284 nw2d 55 1979 imposed a duty upon landlords to  exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises 1: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 2: holding that under either theory the duty is the same ordinary care 3: holding that a railroad had a duty to exercise this level of care even in the absence of statutorily imposed duties 4: recognizing a landlords duty for injuries sustained on leased premises where the landlord is aware that the premises are leased with intent to admit the public", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by the FTCA, which only allows compensatory damages. St. John v. United States, No. CIV 97-3051 at 34 (citing FTCA, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2674); see 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2674 n. 22 (\u201cdamages are determined by law of state where the tortious act was committed, subject to limitations that United States shall not be liable for ... punitive damages\u201d). The district court awarded $3,000 in compensatory damages based on St. John\u2019s discomfort and inability to sleep while in custody, even though bunks, a bathroom, and a sink were available in the cell. Id. at 35. The district court found no credible evidence of physical injuries and could not award damages for mental or emotional suffering under South Dakota law. Id. at 34 (citing Nelson v. WEB Water Development Assoc., Inc., 507 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>)). Nothing in the record suggests that St. John Holdings: 0: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute 1: holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 2: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 3: holding that under south dakota law compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires manifestation of physical symptoms and intentional infliction of emotional distress requires an extreme disabling emotional response 4: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "EEOC and then GE waited for an opportunity to fire him.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 590 (6th Cir.2009) (\u201cWe explained [in Hamilton v. General Electric Co.] that because plaintiff alleged that his employer heightened its scrutiny and supervision of him following his filing of an age-discrimination charge with the EEOC to find a seemingly legitimate reason to fire him, he created a question of material fact as to pretext.... As in Hamilton, Upshaw has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ford\u2019s proffered reasons for her termination were contrived following her many EEOC charges and the filing of this lawsuit.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 286 Holdings: 0: holding that it is the very definition of pretext if the employer  waits for a legal legitimate reason to fortuitously materialize and then uses it to cover up his true longstanding motivations for firing the employee 1: holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false 2: holding that to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee the court examines if there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the employers stated reason for the firing is pretext 3: holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action 4: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "attack. Rule 5-802(A). Being denied the right to vote is not part of a defendant\u2019s felony conviction and sentence. It is simply a collateral consequence of that conviction and sentence. See N.M. Const. art. VII, \u00a7 1; NMSA 1978, \u00a7 31-13-1(A) (2005). Moreover, being denied the right to vote, even if the deprivation is wrongful, does not subject a person to custody or restraint. Cummings is not alleging that his underlying conviction and sentence is illegal or that he is being denied a right that would hasten his release from custody, but only that the district court made a clerical error, which wrongly denied him the right to vote. Relief for such an error cannot be had by way of a writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Canfield v. Bradshaw, No. 3:05 CV 2343, 2007 WL 397019, at *6 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we dismiss this ease and affirm Holdings: 0: holding that because the real id act created a remedy as broad in scope as a habeas petition the act is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 1: holding that active jurisdiction arose when the petitioner was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed 2: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 3: holding that a habeas corpus petitioner who did not raise an ineffective assistance claim in his first state habeas petition satisfied the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test when counsel on the first state habeas petition was also trial counsel whose performance was allegedly inadequate 4: holding that a habeas corpus petition was not a valid avenue for seeking a determination that the petitioner was erroneously classified as a sexual predator", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it cannot provide a basis for express preemption under\u201d section 360k(a). Docket Entry No. 20 at 16-17. Numerous federal courts have rejected this argument on the basis that \u201crequirements set forth in the premarket approval for the entire device are just as applicable to the components that together form the FDA-approved device as the device itself.\u201d Hawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 346622, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 30, 2014); see, e.g., Eidson v. Medtronic, Inc., 981 F.Supp.2d 868, 882 n. 3, 2013 WL 5533081, at *8 n. 3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (citing cases and noting that \u201cthe preemption analysis should not be applied differently to the component parts of a medical device and the medical device that received PMA\u201d); see also Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 508 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). This Court concurs with that analysis. Once Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not err in determining that device as a whole was subject to pma approval even though some evidence indicated only certain components of the device were at issue 1: holding that trial court did not err 2: holding that factors as a whole were not duplicative 3: holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue 4: holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "non-signing defendants\u2019 consent, without more, is insufficient to satisfy the \u201crule of unanimity\u201d under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1446(a). The removing defendants disagree, arguing that such a representation of consent satisfies their statutory obligation. Although no case in this district has addressed this precise issue, there is some limited support for the removing defendants\u2019 position. See, e.g., Chrysler First Financial Services Corp. v. Greenfield, 753 F.Supp. 939, 941 (S.D.Fla.1991) (remanding the action because \u201c[t]he other defendants ... have not joined in the United States\u2019 petition for removal, nor has the United States indicated on the face of the removal petition whether the remaining defendants agree to removal\u201d); Jasper v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 104, 105 (M.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co. v. American Holdings: 0: holding that the question whether the defendants consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances 1: holding that the trial judge must comply with rule 3172c8 and advise all defendants in all cases that the plea may subject him or her to deportation  2: holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served 3: holding that all facts that would enhance the defendants sentence above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury 4: holding that the petition must be signed by all defendants or the signer mustallege consent of all defendants", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "rob him, and where the trial court permitted the State to call witnesses who testified that Mr. Brown was not a drug dealer. We agree. We are mindful that pursuant to section 90.404(1), Florida Statutes (2004), evidence of a victim\u2019s character is \u201cinadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a particular occasion.\u201d In the instant case, however, the defense did not seek to introduce evidence that Mr. Brown was a drug dealer as an attack upon his character. The defense sought to elicit this testimony to corroborate the defendant\u2019s testimony that he did not go to Mr. Brown\u2019s home to rob him, but instead went there to purchase drugs, and while he was there, Mr. Brown attacked him after he rebuffed his sexual advances. See Villella v. State, 833 So.2d 192, 196-97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>). Further, even if the evidence was Holdings: 0: holding that it was error to exclude corroborative evidence where evidence was vital to defendants defense 1: holding that it was harmless error for the trial court to exclude testimony regarding other insolvent companies 2: holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony 3: holding in all cases that where the evidence of guilt was sufficient any error in the exclusion of lastminute evidence and testimony was harmless error 4: holding impeachment evidence was not merely cumulative where the withheld evidence was of a different character than evidence already known to the defense", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the Fort Worth Zoo Master Plan and the Forest Park Master Plan. Appellant\u2019s point of error number one is overruled. By his point of error number two, appellant contends, even if the trial court was correct in its interpretation of Chapter 26, holding that it does not apply with respect to a change in the use of public land from one park use to another, that the construction of the Diorama in Forest Park constitutes such a substantial change in park use as not to exempt such construction from the provisions of Chapter 26. Appellant states that there are no Texas cases directly on point regarding the proper uses of parkland and cites us the following foreign cases in support of his position: Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. City of Fairhope, 281 Ala. 576, 206 So.2d 588, 590 (Ala.1968) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Thomas, 166 La. 512, 117 So. 573, Holdings: 0: holding that despite moving mobile homes onto the property a mobile home park was not in operation since regulations required permits to operate such a park and the property owner had not applied for such permits 1: holding that rental value was properly included as part of damages on action for breach of building contract where contractor failed to complete building within contracted time 2: holding that a municipal corporation was forbidden to construct an auditorium in a park as such construction would practically destroy the lot as a park and convert its use into a public square 3: holding an initial four dollar fee allowing reentry during the course of the patrons stay permitted the use of a vehicle in the park and did not constitute a charge for the recreational use of the park 4: holding that a civic center building or recreational building on property dedicated to the city as park property was inconsistent with its use as a park", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "if the jury again finds the defendants liable. V The judgment of the district court is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the jury\u2019s verdict and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. 1 . Section 3730(b) of the False Claims Act provides that a \"private person[,]\u201d commonly known as a \u201crelator,\u201d may bring a civil action for a violation of \u00a7 3729 \"in the name of the Government.\u201d 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3730(b). Such an action is known as a \"qui tam\u201d suit. The statute permits the government to take over the action and conduct it itself, or to decline to do so, in which case the relator has the right to conduct it. See id. The relator is entitled to different S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 947 Holdings: 0: holding that the requirement of an offense committed willfully is not met  if a taxpayer has relied in good faith on a prior decision of this court 1: recognizing plaintiff met this burden 2: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 3: holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law 4: holding that it is not known legally that an offense has been committed until there is a conviction", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is not automatically qualified as a business record under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law. The reason for recognizing a business record as an exception to the hearsay rule is the presumptive verity of routine recording of business transactions done on a regular basis at times close to the transactions recorded. The foundation which warrants the presumption of verity must be laid to qualify the records for admission. \u201cAlbeit it is said that a trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether the requirements of [section] 490.680 for admission are met, the trial record should reveal evidence of compliance with each requirement of the law before any deference be accorded the ruling of the court nisi.\u201d Id,.; see Nickels v. Nickels, 817 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). \u201cEre proper admission of records under Holdings: 0: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint 1: holding that the burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the party offering the expert and admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding the testimony of an accountant was insufficient to lay a foundation for the admission of certain tax and financial documents where inter alia there was no evidence the taxpayer prepared the supportive memoranda or notes in the regular course of his business nor did the record reflect the time of preparation of these documents 3: holding that in determining motion to dismiss on basis of res judicata the court could take judicial notice of all of the documents which are part of the record before it as well as the documents contained in the record before the state court without having to convert the motion to one for summary judgment 4: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\"customers\u201d of the bank. 15 . Va.Code \u00a7 8.3A-420(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: The law applicable to conversion of personal property applies to instruments. An instrument is also converted if it is taken by transfer, other than a negotiation, from a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or a bank makes or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument or receive payment. An action for conversion of an instrument may not be brought by (i) the issuer or acceptor of the instrument or (ii) a payee or endorsee who did not receive delivery of the instrument either directly or through delivery to an agent or a co-payee. 16 .Cf. Stefano v. First Union Nat\u2019l Bank of Virginia, 981 F.Supp. 417, 420-21 (E.D.Va.1997) Holdings: 0: holding that where bank account titled in the names of two married persons a presumption arises that both hold the funds in the account as a tenancy by the entirety 1: holding that plaintiffs common law conversion claim was displaced by  83a420a where bank deposited checks payable to plaintiff in another persons account without plaintiffs endorsement 2: holding the original notice and verified account did not substantiate plaintiffs claim and was insufficient for the court to enter a default judgment against the plaintiffs 3: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on claim of breach of fiduciary duty where underlying claim was a common law negligence action 4: holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1972 Comm. Note (directing courts to ask whether the finder of fact \u201cwould be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute\u201d). Although some judges may find expert testimony helpful, see, e.g., Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 (9th Cir.2005) (upholding denial of a Strickland claim where eight experts testified but none addressed \u201cprevailing legal norms\u201d), it is within a district court\u2019s discretion to exclude proposed expert testimony concerning a legal standard of care and to rely solely on the briefs, see LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1271 n. 8 (9th Cir.1998); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 613 n. 17 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court was in the best Holdings: 0: holding that denial of untimely request was not abuse of discretion 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify 2: holding that rejection of a proposed strickland expert was not a prejudicial abuse of discretion 3: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 4: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "but simply raise the correctness of a discretionary administrative decision in the facts of a single claimant\u2019s case.\u201d). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to review the Appeal Panel\u2019s determination that LTCF and Film Production Capital were the same entity. B. LTCF further argues that the CSSP chose an inappropriate NAICS code. However, the determination of the appropriate NAICS code for a single entity claimant is not the type of \u201cpressing question\u201d that warrants district court review. See Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410. Rather, it is precisely the type of discretionary factual determination that we have held the district court need not review. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 641 Fed.Appx. at 410; cf. Claimant ID 100212278, 848 F.3d at 410-11 (<HOLDING>). Even assuming that the CSSP\u2019s determination Holdings: 0: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 1: holding that district court did not abuse discretion by denying review of factual determination that claimants stores were not tourism businesses within the meaning of the settlement agreement 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form 3: holding that a sentencing determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the district court 4: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt.\u2019\u201d Milton Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep\u2019t, 568 So.2d 784, 788 (Ala.1990) (quoting 17 Am Jur.2d Contracts \u00a7 178 (1964)). \u201c\u2018The courts are averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain.... [T]he courts will not declare an agreement void on the ground of public policy unless it clearly appears to be in violation of the public policy of the state.\u2019 \u201d Id. (emphasis omitted). In Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr & Friedlander, P.C., 521 So.2d 22 (Ala.1988), the plaintiffs sued a law firm and its two attorneys, alleging, among other things, breaches of certain Disciplinary Rules (the predecessor to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct). .2003) (<HOLDING>), and B.W.T. v. Haynes & Haynes, P.C., 20 So.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law 1: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 2: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence 4: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or reopen hearing on the motion. The record is incomplete, but it appears that the trial court had not yet ruled on the initial motion to suppress. As a result, the second motion presented the trial court with the opportunity to correct the alleged error and the State was also provided the opportunity to present the allegedly material witnesses. (See People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178, 202.) Accordingly, we conclude that defendant sufficiently raised this issue at trial so as to preclude application of waiver in this instance. (See People v. Harper (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 398, 402 (recognizing error despite the absence of a timely objection in light of the \u201cpeculiar circumstances\u201d of case which suggested constitutional infringement); see also In re J.C. (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 289 (<HOLDING>).) We turn to consider whether the State met Holdings: 0: holding objection need not occur at suppression hearing 1: holding that claim was preserved for subsequent appeal by objection at original sentencing hearing 2: holding appellant waived argument by failing to assert it at suppression hearing 3: holding prosecutors withdrawal of standing objection at suppression hearing waived issue on appeal 4: holding representation at a suppression hearing by lawyer disbarred on final day of hearing not per se ineffective", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 2253(c)(1) & (B), the nature of which remains unaltered by the fact that the dismissal was on jurisdictional grounds. In sum, we hold that the district court\u2019s dismissal of an unauthorized \u00a7 2255 motion is a \u201cfinal order in a proceeding under section 2255\u201d such that \u00a7 2253 requires petitioner to obtain a COA before he or she may appeal. In so holding, we join a number of our sister courts who have reached the same result. See Resendiz v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 456 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam); Sveum v. Smith, 403 F.3d 447 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 944, 126 S.Ct. 442, 163 L.Ed.2d 336 (2005); Jones v. Braxton, 392 F.3d 683 (4th Cir.2004); see also Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123, 118 S.Ct. 1807, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998) (<HOLDING>). With this much resolved, we must next ask Holdings: 0: holding that district courts dismissal of  2255 motion as unauthorized is final order where petitioner disputed aedpas applicability 1: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 2: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 3: holding that complaint that appellee used an unauthorized procedure to obtain dismissal of appellants claims was not waived because the trial court lacked authority to enter the order of dismissal 4: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "if such rights do not exist). They argue, correspondingly, that plaintiffs\u2019 strident warning that Local Law 15 would require attorneys to violate their ethical duties to clients \u2014 by forcing an attorney seeking to collect a time-barred debt to inform the debtor of the running of the statute of limitations, an affirmative defense to litigation \u2014 is misplaced. But this argument misses the point. Unlike the New York City Council, the federal government is not obligated to draft its statutes so as to comport with New York law. Cf. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of federal law). Rather, the federal government may \u2014 and does \u2014 regulate the conduct of attorneys acting as debt collectors. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995) (<HOLDING>). New York City Council, by contrast, may only Holdings: 0: holding the fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activity even when that activity consists of litigation 1: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 2: holding that fdcpa applies to attorneys who regularly engage in consumer debt collection activities 3: holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa 4: holding that where the defendant obtained a nondefaulted debt under the mistaken belief that the debt was in default and where the defendants subsequent collection activities were based on that mistaken belief the defendant was a debt collector for purposes of the fdcpa", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "our nation\u2019s copyright laws when a defendant \u201cauthorizes\u201d another to commit infringing acts, notwithstanding the fact that such acts are committed abroad. See Peter Starr Prod. Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir.1986); ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. v. California Auth. of Racing Fairs, 785 F.Supp. 854, 862 (E.D.Cal.1992), affd in part, rev\u2019d in part, 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.1993). This line of cases has been subsequently repudiated, and it is now generally accepted that there can be no liability under the Copyright Act for authorizing an act that itself could not constitute infringement of rights secured by United States law. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093-94 (9th Cir.1994); see also Fun-Damental Too, 1996 WL 724734, at *6 (<HOLDING>); PrimeTime, 24 Joint Venture, 1999 WL 163181, Holdings: 0: holding that generalized notice of copyright infringements was insufficient to establish knowledge for the purpose of contributory liability 1: holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement 2: holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession 3: holding that mere authorization and approval of copyright infringements taking place outside the united states is not a copyright violation and does not create jurisdiction over those extraterritorial acts 4: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or desire,\u201d which might weigh in favor of construing a waiver narrowly, but rather by the \u201cneed to avoid inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness,\u201d which requires a general assessment of the equities associated with the state\u2019s participation in the bankruptcy litigation. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620, 122 S.Ct. 1640. As discussed above, the balance of these equities favors a construction of the Eleventh Amendment that would permit a debtor to assert a permissive counterclaim capped by a setoff limitation against a state that has filed a proof of claim. Second, the Supreme Court developed the \u201cnarrow construction\u201d rule as a means of interpreting a state\u2019s \u201cunequivocal expression\u201d of waiver in state statutes, state constitutions, and the like. Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Holdings: 0: holding  2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed 1: holding that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subjected to their operation 2: holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed 3: holding that a statute enacted in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed   4: holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to receive full and fair disclosures regarding the true value of a company\u2019s stock\u201d. Employers-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007). Thus, from this approach, as long as the investment advisor has discretion in determining what securities to buy and sell, it qualifies as a purchaser with standing to bring a securities fraud claim. See In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 101, 108 (W.D.Penn.2003) (basing its inquiry \u201cnot on the presence or absence of specific \u2018attorney-in-fact\u2019 language in the agreements, but on the level of discretion exercised by [the investment advisor] in the day-to-day purchase of securities for its clients.\u201d); In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 299 (D.Del.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Technologies, Holdings: 0: holding that investment advisors with authority to make investment decisions for their clients have standing 1: holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty where they alleged that the revenue sharing payments to the thirdparty service provider were excessive because the underlying mutual funds investment management fees covered all of the necessary investment managementadvisory services needed for the mutual fund 2: holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors money for real investment return on old investors funds 3: holding that an africanamerican investment advisor who accompanied two clients into a bank could assert a  51 claim alleging discrimination against the bank even though his clients were the actual customers of the bank 4: holding that an investment advisor has standing in a securities fraud litigation because its clients appointed it as their attorneyinfact", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "environment, .... 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 1500.2. The regulations further propose no fewer than nine alternate means of providing notice to the public where a proposed action will, like this one, primarily implicate local concerns. 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 1506.6(b)(3); see also Human Soc\u2019y of the United States v. Glickman, Civil Action No. 98-1950, Tr. Hr\u2019g Mot. T.R.O. at 11 (D.D.C. Jun. 23, 1998). The Court finds that FWS provided the public with insufficient information regarding the proposed action and its potential environmental impacts and insufficient time in which to comment on the Draft EA. Accordingly, the agency\u2019s approach to public involvement and consideration of what public input it did receive do not support a finding that it took a \u201chard look\u201d at the problem and alternative m 47 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); cf. Wroncy v. Bureau of Land Management, 777 Holdings: 0: holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment 1: holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail 2: holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense 3: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 4: holding that the agency failed to provide for any public participation in the ea process and ordering 45 day period for public comment on ea", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "limitations period on Plaintiffs hybrid claim. 2. Federal Tolling Principles. The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether mental incompetency may toll federal statutes of limitations. Indeed, in Atkins v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 685 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.1982), the Court explicitly left open the question of whether a plaintiffs mental incompetency could toll the statute of limitations on the Federal Employer\u2019s Liability Act. After finding that the Plaintiff had not established facts sufficient to support a finding that he was mentally incompetent, the Court stated, Because we find no issue of fact, we need not decide whether the plaintiffs in-competeney will ever toll the FELA statute of limitations. But see, Brooks v. Southern Pacific Co., 105 Ariz. 442, 445, 466 P.2d 736, 739 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Id. at 1148 (citation in original). The cases Holdings: 0: holding that the untimely petition in that case tolled the aedpa statute of limitations 1: holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed 2: holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations 3: recognizing that  2244dlds statute of limitations can be tolled 4: holding that fela statute of limitations is tolled by incompetence", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Subsection (a)(1) provides for forfeiture of \u201cany interest\u201d that the defendant \u201cacquired or maintained in violation of section 1962.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1963(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, under (a)(1) an interest is subject to forfeiture only if and to the extent that it was acquired or maintained in violation of \u00a7 1962. Forfeiture under (a)(1) is not limited to a defendant\u2019s interest in the RICO enterprise. It also includes a defendant\u2019s interest in the proceeds of the RICO violation. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21-22, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Moreover, a \u201cbut for\u201d test is used to determine whether the government has proven the required nexus between the interest in question and the RICO violation. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1213 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the only evidence of any Holdings: 0: holding that in a mixed motive retaliation case the but for test applies to pretext but further holding that the burden shifts after employee has shown pretext under the but for test to the employer to show that absent retaliation the plaintiff would have lost his job anyway 1: holding that but for test applies under a1 and that forfeiture is limited to property interests that would not have been acquired or maintained but for violation of  1962 2: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property 3: holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements 4: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by contrast, the Federal Rules of Evidence are inapplicable, see Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-85, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (endorsing the use of hearsay evidence at sentencing), and hearsay normally may be considered subject only to the modest due process requirement that it bear \u201csome minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation,\u201d United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982); see also 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3661 (\u201cNo limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.\u201d); United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F.2d 95, 97 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 Holdings: 0: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error 1: holding that judicial factfinding at sentencing is permissible  indeed required  under an advisory guidelines regime 2: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory 3: holding that the reliability analysis is not heightened by the shift from an unstructured sentencing regime to a more determinate guidelines system 4: holding that the application of the determinate sentencing law parolesuitability guidelines to prisoners sentenced under the indeterminate sentencing law does not disadvantage them", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at 1567-68 (explaining that expert provided \u201cmerely generalized testimony as to overall similarity\u201d and there was \u201cno discussion of whether or how the way\u201d part of the triple identity test was met); Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1327 (explaining that an expert\u2019s \u201coffhand and conclusory statements ... are not particularized evidence\u201d). In addition, the court finds that Honeywell\u2019s equivalence arguments were not legally insufficient. See e.g., CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc., 14 F.Supp.2d at 591 (explaining that the plaintiffs expert did not \u201cspend any time\u201d specifically discussing the doctrine of equivalents, but instead, the plaintiff chose to focus its efforts on a theory of literal infringement); LifeScan, Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 103 F.Supp.2d at 361 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the court finds that Honeywell Holdings: 0: holding that the use requirement exists for  proposed state law claims and is analyzed in the same manner as under the federal claims 1: holding that under the ambit of strickland counsel was ineffective in failing to provide in a timely manner the identity and opinion of an expert witness who tended to prove the defendants alibi defense 2: holding that the expert failed to explain how the defendants device operated in an equivalent manner to one of the patent claims 3: holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care 4: holding due process claim failed because plaintiff failed to explain how confrontation and crossexamination would have changed the outcome of his hearing", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not scientifically supported at any time. Thus, the FDA\u2019s mandate directing Abbott not to provide for retesting of samples near the cutoff \u2014 the concept on which plaintiffs base their warnings claim \u2014 remained in force as part of a conscious ongoing risk-benefit analysis by the FDA in managing a public health crisis. Plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims would directly contradict the FDA\u2019s requirements and interfere with the FDA\u2019s objectives, and therefore are preempted. IV. The Court\u2019s conclusion, that plaintiffs\u2019 state law claim is preempted by the FDA\u2019s unique regulation of the Test based on principles of implied preemption rather than express preemption under the MDA, is not in conflict with the holdings of Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at 492-502, 116 S.Ct. at 2254-58, 135 L.Ed.2d at 720-26 (<HOLDING>), or Baird, supra, 155 N.J. 54, 713 A.2d 1019 Holdings: 0: holding the mda did not preempt plaintiffs state common law claims for defective design defective manufacture and failure to warn 1: holding that plaintiffs negligence defective manufacturing defective design breach of warranty and failure to warn claims were preempted by the mda and fdca defined below 2: holding that acts of improper maintenance were insufficient to defeat plaintiffs defective design claim 3: holding that the labeling act did not preempt negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims against cigarette manufacturer 4: holding that to prevail on strict liability claim for a defective product plaintiff must show the product was defective when it left the defendants possession and control", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Rule of. Civil Procedure 23, Gomez held Pitts was not clearly irreconcilable with Genesis Healthcare. See id. Although Genesis Healthcare \u201cundermined some of the reasoning employed in Pitts ..,, courts have universally concluded that the Genesis discussion does not apply to class actions.\u201d Id. at 875. \u201cIn fact, Genesis itself emphasizes that \u2018Rule 23 [class] actions are fun-, damentally different from collective actions under the FLSA.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 875-76 (alteration in original) (quoting Genesis Healthcare, 133 S.Ct. at 1529). Because Gomez\u2019s holding that Pitts is not clearly irreconcilable with Genesis Healthcare is hot itself clearly irreconcilable with intervening Supreme Court authority, we are bound by Gomez. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Pitts remains the law of this Holdings: 0: holding that when intervening supreme court case law is clearly irreconcilable with a prior circuit decision a panel of this court is bound by the later and controlling authority and should reject the prior circuit opinion 1: holding a threejudge panel may not reexamine normally controlling circuit precedent in the face of an intervening united states supreme court decision unless the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority 2: holding that a threejudge panel may depart from circuit precedent that has not been expressly overruled when an intervening en banc or supreme court decision has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 3: holding that a three judge panel is not bound by prior circuit precedent if an intervening decision of a higher authority undercuts the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable 4: holding that a three judge panel is free to reexamine the holding of a prior panel when the supreme court has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to comment publicly on the allegations in other similar cases. See, e.g., Jackie Willis, Bill Cosby Addresses Allegations: \"I\u2019ve Never Seen Anything Like This,\u201d ETOnline (May 15, 2015), http://www. etonline! com/news/164575_bill_cosby_first_ tv_interview_since_sex_scandal/; Nick Vada-la, Bill Cosby Jokes About Sexual Assault Allegations Facing Him at Second Canadian Tour Stop, Philly.com (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www. philly.com/philly/blogs/trending/Bill-Cosby-jokes-about-Sexual-assault-allegations-at-' second-Canadian-tour-stop.html. 16 . See, e.g., Damiano, 168 F.R.D. at 491-93 (finding in favor of Bob Dylan\u2019s privacy interests, in light of plaintiff's improper commercial purpose of directly monetizing revealed material). 17 . See, e.g., Paisley Park Enters., Inc., 54 F.Supp.2d at 349 (<HOLDING>). 18 . See, e.g., Morgan, 2015 WL 3882748, at Holdings: 0: holding appearance of township attorney before zoning board did not create potential conflict where he advocated position not for his own private interest but for the publics interest 1: recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality 2: holding that the publics interest in every imaginable detail about the life of a rock star did not outweigh princes privacy concerns 3: holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records 4: holding that the privacy interests of the employee police officers did not exceed the publics right to know", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "DOT submitted a copy of the Uniform Traffic Complaint and Summons/Voluntary Assessment (Complaint) that it had received from the state of Delaware. The Complaint, which was issued by an Aider-man\u2019s Court in Newark, Delaware, indicated that Licensee pled guilty to violating a local ordinance relating to \u201cD.U.I. \u2014 Alcohol.\u201d (R.R. at 31a.) In Delaware, an Alderman\u2019s Court is a small local court with jurisdiction over misdemeanors, municipal ordinances and traffic offenses that occur within the town limits. (Trial ct. op. at 4-5.) After considering the matter, the trial court granted Licensee\u2019s appeal. In doing so, the trial court relied upon Tripson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 773 A.2d 195 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 690, 796 A.2d 320 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the Complaint appeared to come Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 1: holding that under the compact dot has the burden of proving that it received the outofstate conviction report from the party states licensing authority 2: holding that the burden of proving a violation of the idea lies on the party seeking relief during the administrative process 3: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 4: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of probable cause. Greene\u2019s assertion that Houston had no personal, \u201cfirst-hand\u201d knowledge of the location of the stolen property is immaterial. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the information in Lt. Hiller\u2019s affidavit established a substantial basis for a finding by the magistrate that there was probable cause that the stolen property would be found at 2139/2141 Ashland. See Davidson, 936 F.2d at 859. Here, the perpetrator of the crime, under direct questioning from the affiant, stated that his partner (Arnold) disposed of the stolen property at 2139/2141 Ashland. Moreover, Lt. Hiller also averred that he had personal knowledge that stolen property was located at that dwelling. Such information is enough to support a finding of probable cause. Cf. Allen, 211 F.3d at 971-72 (<HOLDING>). Greene next argues that information from the Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that experienced officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of either methamphetamine or cocaine did not by itself establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime 1: holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause 2: holding statement by unidentified confidential informant with no connection to the crime observing possession of cocaine enough to establish probable cause 3: holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 4: recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Second, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1153(a) includes as enumerated offenses under the IMCA \u201cmurder, manslaughter, ... [and] felony child abuse or neglect.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1153(a). Given that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1153(a) discusses both manslaughter, and felony child abuse or neglect, it is difficult to say that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1112(a) qualifies as defining both manslaughter and felony child abuse or neglect. A court should strive to give both of these words in the IMCA operative effect when interpreting the statute. See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503-U.S. at 35, 112 S.Ct. 1011. Allowing involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1112(a) to define both manslaughter, and felony child abuse or neglect, would run contrary to this canon of construction. See United States v. Other Medicine, 596 F.3d at 680-81 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court declines to adopt Holdings: 0: recognizing that 18 usc  113a5 could not serve as more than one enumerated crime under the imca specifically both an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years and felony child abuse or neglect 1: holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc  16 2: holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 3: holding dui causing serious bodily injury is not a crime of violence under 18 usc  16 4: holding that a conviction for simple assault under pennsylvania law does not qualify under 18 usc  16b by way of 11 usc  1101a43 as an aggravated felony", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "981 F.2d at 259; Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d at 191 n. 1; and Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1990). 101 . Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d at 281-82, quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. 102 . See Anear v. Sara Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d at 468, (suggesting tha 1304-05 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. Conley v. Eugene, 517 U.S. 1191, 116 S.Ct. 1680, 134 L.Ed.2d 782 (1996); Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d at 244-45; Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d 82, 92 (5th Cir.1992); Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1992); Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir.19 on the face of the pleadings may turn out to he so when the pleadings are pierced at summary judgment. See Johnson immons, 77 F.3d 878, 879 (5th Cir.1996), (<HOLDING>); McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 1: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 2: holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee 3: holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket 4: recognizing a district judge may dismiss a case sua sponte under either rule 41b or its inherent authority to manage its docket", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "left with Mr. Coates\u2019s agreement stipulating to a twenty-year sentence. In light of this plea agreement, we hold that Mr. Coates\u2019s sentencing challenges necessarily must fail because any error by the district court in setting the length of the sentence at twenty years was invited. See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1055 (10th Cir.2007) (\u201c[H]e has invited any error regarding the length of his sentence ... and his claims [raised] now for the first time on appeal are waived.\u201d); see also United States v. Grillo, 431 Fed. Appx. 677, 680 (10th Cir.2011) (\u201c[The appellant] received a sentence within the range she requested, so she has waived her argument that her sentence was substantively unreasonable.\u201d); United States v. Perez-Cruz, 404 Fed.Appx. 255, 257 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1831, 179 Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant waived this argument 1: holding that because at sentencing the appellant had asked the district court to impose the same sentence he now claims is substantively unreasonable the argument he seeks to make was waived 2: holding that by requesting a sentence at the low end of the guidelines it is clear  that the appellant waived any argument that he was entitled to a belowguideline sentence 3: holding that to exhaust a claim the claims raised at the administrative appeal must be so similar that the district court can ascertain that the agency was on notice of and had an opportunity to consider and decide the same claims now raised in federal court 4: holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in accordance with administrative law principles.\u201d Gailius v. INS, 147 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir.1998). Specifically, we afford Chevron deference to the BIA\u2019s statutory interpretation, applying the agency\u2019s interpretation unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law. Mejia-Orellana v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 13, 16 & n. 1 (1st Cir.2007); Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1999). IV. ANALYSIS A. Why the Moral-Turpitude Issue Matters Let us take a step back for a moment. It is uncontested that Idy is presently removable. An adjustment of status could cure this problem, if Idy is eligible. His eligibility for a status adjustment hinges on whether his criminally sanctioned reckless conduct involved moral turpitude: if so, he cannot adjust his status; if not, B.I.A.1976) (<HOLDING>). Applying Chevron deference, our sister Holdings: 0: holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude 1: holding that assault with a deadly weapon was not a crime involving moral turpitude 2: holding that illinoiss reckless conduct statute establishes a crime involving moral turpitude 3: holding that the bia did not act unreasonably in concluding new yorks first degree reckless endangerment statute is a crime involving moral turpitude 4: holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rebate method on voluntary prepayment of the contract. The Court of Appeals based this conclusion on the statement in Milhollin that \u201c... acceleration rebate practices need be disclosed only when they diverge from other prepayment rebate practices...\u201d Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, supra, 444 U. S. at p. 569. In Milhollin, the question for decision was whether under TILA, as well as Regulation Z, the existence of an acceleration clause must be disclosed on the face of a credit agreement. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, because of conflicting resolutions of this question by various federal circuit courts of appeal. See Griffith v. Superior Ford, 577 F2d 455 (8th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Hornell v. One 1976 Chevrolet, 585 F2d 978 (10th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of probable cause vitiated the need for an inquiry into an underlying motive for the arrest 1: holding that the existence of an acceleration clause need never be disclosed 2: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 3: holding that the acceleration clause was not cognizable as a large and unjustified payment 4: holding that establishment clause claim need not be predicated on coercion", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid, they were lawfully present in Legg's apartment during execution of the warrant.\" Id. at 244. The Legg court further noted: \"We recognize that an officer's reasonable good faith belief in the validity of a warrant does not cause his presence in an individual's home to be any less viola-tive of the Fourth Amendment.... Nonetheless, we conclude that the rationale of Leon should apply to render an officer lawfully present for purposes of applying the plain view doctrine as long as the officer possesses a reasonable good faith belief in the validity of the warrant and the warrant was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.\" Id. at n. 2 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Morris, 904 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2. Inadvertence Frasier claims that the Holdings: 0: holding that plain view requirement that there be a prior justification for the officers presence was met by search warrant and that even assuming that warrant was invalid good faith exception was applicable to permit admission of the evidence 1: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant 4: holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the existence of general jurisdiction. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d at 810. The Texas Instruments contract, as set forth above, was a patents cross-licensing agreement that allowed both companies to \u201cdesign and sell semiconductors without dispute from each other.\u201d Thus, it did not require performance by DENSO Japan in Texas. Moreover, the agreement contains a choice of law provision upport to U.S. Subsidiaries. Appellees argue \u201c[DENSO Japan\u2019s] U.S. subsidiary companies rely on [DENSO Japan] for technical, manufacturing, business, and legal support, which have impacted the Texas f 6) (concluding that there was no general jurisdiction and stating there must be an indication that defendant intended to serve the Texas market before personal jurisdiction can be found); Reid, 130 S.W.3d at 220 (<HOLDING>). We sustain DENSO Japan\u2019s second issue. Holdings: 0: holding sending two employees to work in texas and using an office in texas for limited purposes did not support finding of general jurisdiction 1: holding that jurisdiction existed over nonresident printing customer despite the fact that texas printer solicited the business in alabama and nonresident sent no personnel to texas because nonresident placed additional orders from which it expected to profit sent payments to texas sent and received printing materials to and from texas paid for shipping of printed goods from texas and sent payments to texas the transactions were governed by texas law and substantial part of performance occurred in texas 2: holding there was no general jurisdiction even though defendant sent  its chief executive officer to texas for a contract negotiation session accepted into its bank account checks drawn on a bank in texas purchased 4 million of goods and equipment from a company in texas and sent employees to texas for training and technical consultation 3: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 4: holding there was no general jurisdiction when there was no evidence that defendants advertised or promoted their goods or services in texas solicited business in texas sold their goods or services to a texas entity established a general business office or general business presence in texas or targeted texas markets", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "company had issued a policy which stated that the company would pay on behalf of \u201c[t]he school district ... any amount it is required or permitted to pay as indemnity to any person insured under the applicable Coverage Plan....\u201d 783 S.W.2d at 611. The applicable Coverage Plan insured the members of the board of trustees of the school district. The company defended the trustees in a lawsuit that was brought against the school district and the trustees. When the trustees were dismissed from the suit leaving only the school district as a defendant, the company withdrew the defense and the school district sued for a declaratory judgment. The court held that the insurance policy unambiguously only insured the trustees. Id. at 612. See also St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co., 548 So.2d at 1160 (<HOLDING>). The court was not persuaded by the argument Holdings: 0: holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself 1: holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee 2: holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee 3: holding that under texas law where liability of insured and liability of its agent were related and interdependent court must look to whether agents fraud was covered by policy 4: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are without intrinsic merit, we affirm the district court\u2019s dismissal of his habeas petition. I On December 11, 1994, a state trooper arrested Allen for committing an OUI offense. The State preferred charges against him. As directed by law, the Secretary of State (the Secretary) then suspended Allen\u2019s driver\u2019s license for ninety days. See 29 M.R.S.A. \u00a7 1311-A, reprinted in the appendix. It is said that every action produces an equal and opposite reaction. Having felt the lash of the administrative suspension, the petitioner moved to dismiss the pending criminal charge on double jeopardy grounds. The nisi prius court denied the motion, relying upon an opinion issued by Maine\u2019s highest tribunal (the Law Court) two months earlier. See State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me.1995) (<HOLDING>). Instead of appealing the ruling to the Law Holdings: 0: holding that suspension of driving privileges is not punishment and does not violate an individuals right not to be subject to double jeopardy or constitute a disproportionate penalty 1: holding in materially identical circumstances that an administrative license suspension did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes 2: holding that the fcas fixedpenaltyplusdoubledamages provisions does not in most cases constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy 3: holding that civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 4: holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "plain text of subsection (c) does not require the counterclaim to arise from the same \u201ctransaction or occurrence\u201d as the original claim. All that is required is that the claim \u201cbe property of the estate.\u201d USDA makes two related arguments for why Supreme Beefs setoff should be barred. First, it argues that whether claims are property of the estate turns on substantive law, in this case the FTCA. Second, it argues that the language of \u00a7 106(a)(5) \u2014 \u201c[njothing in this section shall create any substantive cl nina Marine Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 391, 395 n. 8 (5th Cir.1998) (\u201cA recoupment claim within the scope of Frederick need not also fall within another statutory waiver of sovereign immunity\u201d) (citing Frederick, 386 F.2d at 488); United States v. Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Second, and more important, accepting USDA\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that when the government waives sovereign immunity as to matters in recoupment it does so even as to those claims that ordinarily are barred by the ftca 1: holding that the ada does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity and thus does not apply to the federal government 2: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 3: holding that when state voluntarily submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding the state waives its sovereign immunity 4: holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "intended to clarify the scope of those registrations, not expand it\u201d).) However, these changes amount to far more than cosmetic adjustments to various titles; they would, if valid, affect both the titles and the content of the registered works\u2014introducing thousands of additional CardPac component files not registered in PaySys\u2019s Initial Registrations and impermissibly expanding the scope of the Initial Registrations from eight discrete component files to the entire CardPac software package. Courts have consistently rejected such attempts to squeeze additional works into a registered copyright through the supplementary registration process. See, e.g., Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ\u2019g Co., No. 09-cv-2669 (LAP), 2012 WL 1021535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Schiffer Publ\u2019g, Ltd. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a hearing would serve no purpose because the registration act and notification law subject all sex offenders as defined by the registration act to the registration and notification provisions and law enforcement authorities have no discretion to determine which offenders would be exposed to public dissemination 1: holding that supplementing a registration by adding new works impermissibly changes the content of the originally registered work in violation of 17 usc  408d and 37 cfr  2015b2 2: holding that the postmark on the registration application was the determining factor when a registration is subsequently approved 3: recognizing the plaintiffs burden of proving a violation of 48 cfr  6301c 4: holding that 8 cfr 10031d3iv merely prohibits the bia from taking new evidence into the record", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "state framework for addressing the plaintiffs\u2019 claims. New York does have a mechanism permitting the re-opening of workers\u2019 compensation claims before the Workers\u2019 Compensation Board on grounds of fraud. N.Y. WORK. Comp.Law \u00a7 123 (McKinney 1993). - Under the circumstances of this case, however, the review provided by the state administrative agency is not comparable to that afforded by the federal court. The principal defendants in this case are not proper parties to workers\u2019 compensation proceedings in New York. Furthermore, the Board cannot require a claimant to return moneys already paid. Id. \u00a7 22. The substance of the plaintiffs\u2019 RICO claims \u2014 including, for example, the alleged existence of a \u201cpattern\u201d and \u201centerprise\u201d, see McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>) \u2014 cannot be adjudicated in proceedings before Holdings: 0: holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise 1: holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute 2: holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity 3: holding that instructions allowing a jury to find an enterprise from evidence of its activity as opposed to its structure properly conveyed the holding in turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an associationinfact enterprise 4: recognizing that by accepting bribes in exchange for allowing violations of a collective bargaining agreement the defendant was conducting the rico enterprise local union through racketeering activity even though the union was harmed by the racketeering activity", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 2267, 2272, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011)). \u201c[C]ourts normally start-and stop-by looking at \u2018the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Medina-Almaguer, 559 F.3d 420, 422 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607. 602 (1990)). Sanbria-Bueno was convicted under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 846 for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841. Nevertheless, Sanbria-Bueno contends that the offense was not categorically a \u201cdrug trafficking offense\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i) because a generic conspiracy requires an overt act while \u00a7 846 does not. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Sanbria-Bueno would have this court apply the Holdings: 0: holding that an overt act may be a verbal statement or a physical act 1: holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc  846 do include an overt act requirement 2: holding that an 18 usc  1956h conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act 3: holding that proof of overt act is not required to support admission of evidence of statement of coconspirator during course of conspiracy 4: holding proof of an overt act is not required to establish a violation of  846", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "termination proceeding, without relying on any findings from the proceeding in which Father did not participate. Under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, judicially noticed facts are conclusively established in civil actions for purposes of the fact finding process and a \"party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.\" Utah R. Evid. 201(e). In addition, \"[clonsider-ations regarding a child's welfare are rarely, if ever, static. In fact, it is more likely that the child's environment is constantly evolyv-ing, thus justifying the court's continuing jurisdiction.\" In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah Ct.App.1994); see also In re A.S., 12 Kan.App.2d 594, 752 P.2d 705, 711 (1988) (<HOLDING>). \u00b611 In this case, the juvenile court granted Holdings: 0: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 1: holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime 2: holding that court must be free to examine all cireumstances evidence prior facts and orders and other relevant information in termination proceedings 3: holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence 4: recognizing that a court granted jurisdiction by statute to review the legality of administrative orders is also empowered to examine the constitutionality of the statute by virtue of which such orders were entered", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion because 39 U.S.C. \u00a7 409 states that \u201c[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this title, the United States district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against the Postal Service.\u201d He also points out that the language of section 3662 is permissive rather than mandatory. See 39 U.S.C. \u00a7 3662 (\u201cAny interested person ... may lodge a complaint ... \u201d) (emphasis added). Mr. Foster made the same arguments before the district court, and that court found them to be unpersuasive. We also consider these arguments to be unavailing. As the district court pointed out, the legislative history of \u00a7 3662 suggests that \u201cCongress intended a plaintiff to e LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep\u2019t, 670 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict 1: holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case 2: holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss 3: holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit 4: holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1989). There is no finite time limitation within which the trustee must complete its pursuit of assets of the bankruptcy estate. Partial distributions of cash on hand can be made to creditors, with additional distributions made later as the assets are collected. Thus, when jurisdiction over disputed claims is placed by law in a specialized tribunal, we expect that the litigation over the trustee\u2019s claims to recovery will be conducted in that forum. See, e.g., Hiser v. Pennsylvania Dep\u2019t of Public Welfare (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 125 B.R. 422, 431-32 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1991) (invoking primary jurisdiction doctrine to require trustee to submit claim to state Office of Hearings and Appeals for resolution); Burner v. Security State Bank (In re Burner), 109 B.R. 216, 227 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court in the instant case Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 1: holding that proper forum for debtor to challenge actions of coexecutor of debtors deceased husbands estate was state probate court not bankruptcy court 2: holding that contracts are not binding before court approval because the debtorinpossession operates as a fiduciary any actions taken by the debtor are to be in the best interests of the creditor body as a whole for that reason  the debtors actions are subject to  review by the creditors of the estate and the bankruptcy court 3: holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate 4: holding bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue injunction of state court litigation against debtors principal stating this power under 11 usc  105a  includes the authority to enjoin litigants from pursuing actions in other courts that threaten the integrity of the debtors estate", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with a finding of a one-day violation and a 762-day violation; to order a fine greater than $50,000, the trial court had to find facts beyond those evident from the verdict. 567 US at_ cts that the Oregon Supreme Court will reverse our decision in N. R. L. and extend the civil jury trial right to restitution determinations. She requests that we \u201crecognize that the law is unsettled in this area and * * * consider forestalling further litigation in this case by-anticipating the [S]upreme [C]ourt\u2019s decision in N. R. L. by reversing the trial court\u2019s restitution order in this case.\u201d Ultimately, defendant pins her hopes on N. R. L. being decided in her favor before we decide her appeal. Only then, under State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132, 136, 57 P3d 970 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003) (<HOLDING>), would any error in awarding restitution Holdings: 0: holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal 1: holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined 2: holding that the nature of the taxpayers legal interest in the subject property is determined by reference to state law 3: holding that whether error is apparent is determined by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided 4: holding that appellate courts analyze plain error by reference to the law as of the time the appeal is decided rather than the extant law at the time of the disputed trial court ruling", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "support the trial court's conclusion that the People failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Castro spoke English well enough to voluntarily consent to a search of the vehicle in which he drove. Officer Dodge and Detective D'Amour testified that Castro spoke English well enough to respond appropriately to the officers' questions and the record detailing his responses reflects the same. Even Castro's lawyer stated that she did not need to be present at the proceedings involving the Spanish speaking officer's testimony because the hearing did not concern Castro. Officer Dodge testified that Castro gave permission for the police to search the vehicle. The record contains no evidence to indicate that Castro's consent was not voluntarily obtained. See Licea, 918 P.2d at 1113 (<HOLDING>); Drake, 785 P.2d at 1265-66 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants consent is not rendered involuntary by the fact that he was in custody and was not advised of his constitutional rights before the officers requested his consent to search or by the fact that he was eighteen years old chemically messed up and tired 1: holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime 2: holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant 3: holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent 4: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "doctrine, holds that the Due Process Clause generally does not require pre-deprivation process if the deprivation results from the random and unauthorized act of a state officer. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). A State cannot possibly ensure hearings before its officers act randomly and without authority, and \u201cthe State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.\u201d Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129, 110 S.Ct. 975. Accordingly, all the process the victim of such a deprivation is due is' an effective post-deprivation state law tort remedy against the offending officer. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (<HOLDING>). Justice' Kennedy\u2019s concurrence in Albright v. Holdings: 0: holding that postdeprivation tort remedy constitutes all the process that is due for unauthorized negligent and intentional torts by state officials 1: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 2: holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy 3: holding that a federal due process malicious prosecution claim against an indiana police officer could proceed because indiana law did not provide an adequate postdeprivation tort law remedy 4: holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the letter agreements do not constitute enforceable contracts as they are unenforceable for want of mutuality. As set forth above, Connecticut choice of law principles direct that the law of Singapore govern the contract claims. Under Singapore law, mutuality of obligation is necessary for a contract to be enforceable. It is generally accepted in the common law of this country that agreements that impose no specific purchase obligation on a distributor cannot obligate a manufacturer to sell to the distributor. Billings Cottonseed, Inc. v. Albany Oil Mill, Inc., 178 Ga.App. 825, 328 S.E.2d 426, 430 (1985). In such cases, mutuality of obligation is lacking, and the agreement is therefore unenforceable. Kraftco Corporation v. Kolbus, 1 Ill.App.3d 635, 274 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1971) (<HOLDING>). \u201cAn agreement that does not expressly or Holdings: 0: holding a distributionlicense agreement unenforceable for lack of mutuality where the distributors only obligation was to maintain a record of the sales and remit royalties thereon but was not obligated to sell any of the product 1: holding that an alleged oral agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor lacked mutuality of obligation and was enforceable where the distributor had no obligation to sell any specific quantity and no obligation to meet any quotas 2: recognizing that a divorce decree obligation to hold an exspouse harmless from a debt creates an obligation between the debtor and the exspouse separate from any obligation the debtor may owe to the creditor 3: holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "allegedly used the investor\u2019s funds to execute physical trades for his account contrary to his instructions. Id. at 323. 9 . In a footnote in their sur-reply brief, plaintiffs suggest that the very fact that RCM sold their property \u2014 regardless of whether the sales were made on their behalf or for RCM\u2019s own benefit \u2014 is sufficient to make them \"sell ers\u201d under the Bimbaum rule. (P. Sur-reply Mem. 7 n. 19.) Although Caiola does make passing mention to the fact that Citibank \"purchased physical shares and options with [plaintiff's] funds,\u201d as explained above, the Court of Appeals made explicitly clear that for purposes of Rule 10b-5 standing, the \u201ckey fact is that [plaintiff] has alleged that the purchases were made on his behalf.\" 295 F.3d at 324 (emphasis added); see id. at 323 (<HOLDING>). 10 . Plaintiffs\u2019 citation to SEC v. Zandford, Holdings: 0: holding that purchaserseller requirement is met where plaintiff adequately alleges that the broker bought physical stock on his behalf and for his account emphasis added 1: holding in an age discrimination case that even though a plaintiff need not revisit his prima facie case after a trial on the merits he still must show that he has met his ultimate burden of proving that the employer terminated him because of age emphasis added 2: holding that an application is  pending from the time it is first filed  emphasis added 3: holding that bank was equitably estopped from recovering against stock broker for conversion of stock certificates that were assigned in blank and that broker had sold for a bank employee who misappropriated the stock certificates from the bank 4: holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provides that dealers who violate the statute are subject to civil penalties. The statute does not void transactions that violate the statute. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Shue, 134 Ind.App. 322, 327, 182 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1962) (\"Failure to strictly comply with title conveyancing statutes does not affect transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle. The certificate of title is not of itself proof of ownership or legal title to the vehicle.\") Although the failure to comply with Ind.Code \u00a7 9-17-8-8 may, combined with other suspicious cireumstances, raise questions about a purchaser's good faith, we find no such cireumstances here. Consequently, the Medleys were good faith purchasers for value pursuant to Ind. Code \u00a7 26-1-2-403. See, e.g., DBC Capital Fund, 551 N.E.2d at 477 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Marlow also argues that the Medleys Holdings: 0: holding that a purchaser may be a buyer in the ordinary course and defeat a security interest even if no insistence that the mso accompany delivery 1: holding that purchaser of used car from dealer was buyer in ordinary course under sections 9307 and 2403 even though lender still held certificate of title 2: holding that purchaser was buyer in the ordinary course despite fact that lender still held mso 3: holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode  26112019 4: holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statute, \u201cas a matter of public policy,\u201d against the owner of a crop-dusting plane, when the plane, piloted by the owner\u2019s partner, struck a field worker. Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir.1955). In 1957, the Iowa Supreme Court followed the Fifth Circuit and the New Hampshire Supreme Court in construing its own state statute. Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622, 625 (1957); cf. Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164, 166-67 (1972) (involving choice of law, assuming that Nebraska would follow Lamasters, but instead applying South Dakota statute with no imputed negligence absent a master-servant relationship); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. U.S., 504 F.2d 104, 114-15 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978, 95 S.Ct. 1979, 44 L.Ed.2d 470 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that 49 usc  44112 did not preempt state law imposing vicarious liability on an owner of an aircraft 1: holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft 2: holding that a federal due process malicious prosecution claim against an indiana police officer could proceed because indiana law did not provide an adequate postdeprivation tort law remedy 3: holding that once possession of an aircraft was delivered to the owner a repairman had no right to repossess the plane 4: holding that a statute imposing joint and several liability on a vehicle owner for a minors conduct while driving the vehicle with permission imputed financial liability rather than fault to the vehicles owner", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an insolvent financial institution.\u201d). While neither the D\u2019Oench doctrine nor 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 1823(e) prevents plaintiffs from asserting affirmative claims or defenses that do not depend on \u201cagreements,\u201d see Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir.1991) (citing Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-4, 108 S.Ct. 396, 402, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir.1986)), court have interpreted the term \u201cagreement\u201d very broadly. Beitzell & Co. v. FDIC (In re Beitzell), 163 B.R. 637, 647 (Bankr.D.D.C. 1993); see, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 90-93, 108 S.Ct. 396, 400-62, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987) (interpreting \u201cagreement\u201d to include all conditions to the parties\u2019 performance of the bargain); FDIC v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 58 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has noted that the term Holdings: 0: holding that an implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing constitutes an agreement under 12 usc  1823e 1: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract 2: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages 3: holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act 4: holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "United States \u201chad gained no foothold\u201d in the country). His entitlement to a removal procedure of the sort that would trigger the provisions of section 1362 was therefore limited to what Congress and the INS saw fit to provide. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that the full protections of the Due Process Clause apply only to \u201c \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States\u201d); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32, 103 S.Ct. 321, 74 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (noting that \u201can alien seeking initial admission to the United States ... has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative\u201d); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the applicable statutory Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable 2: holding that wjhatever the procedure authorized by congress is it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned 3: holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims 4: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402. We fail to see the logical connection between the fact of Archer Bank\u2019s filing of CTRs and Van Allen\u2019s guilt or innocence. The actions of Archer Bank following Van Allen\u2019s various deposits and withdrawals do not demonstrate anything material about Van Allen\u2019s state of mind. At most, the filing of CTRs may have indicated something about the knowledge of officials at Archer Bank; but such knowledge would not make it more or less likely that Van Allen knew of the reporting requirements or acted to avoid them. Whether or not Van Allen actually fooled Archer Bank has no bearing on the substantive violation under 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 5324(a). See Cassano, 372 F.3d at 878 (<HOLDING>). The multiple cases cited by Van Allen for the Holdings: 0: holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion 1: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive 2: holding that in a prosecution for willfully violating federal law against structuring financial transactions to evade bank reporting requirements the government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful 3: holding that a plaintiff must comply with the notice of claim requirements in order to maintain an action against a government employee even if the plaintiff claims that the employee acted with fraud or malice 4: holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Rushen, 705 F.2d 355, 357 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Powell v. Spalding, 679 F.2d 163, 166 (9th Cir.1982)). We are not persuaded that the trial court committed such an error. The Eighth Circuit considered a similar situation in Futrell v. Wyrick, 716 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir.1983). There, an unsuccessful habeas petitioner claimed that the introduction of police mugshots at his trial violated his due process rights. The court of appeals disagreed. \u201cThe manner in which the photographs were introduced,\u201d the court found, \u201cwas unexceptionable. The photographs were never referred to as \u2018mugshots\u2019 and all police data was removed from them.\u201d Id. at 1208. Thus, their introduction did not violate notions of fundamental fairness. Id.; see also United States v. Terry, 760 F.2d 939, 944 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The photographs in Reiger\u2019s case did not Holdings: 0: holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion 1: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 2: holding that introduction of mugshots containing no incriminating police data was not an abuse of the district court judges discretion 3: holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law 4: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "depends in part on Carrington Gardens\u2019 allegation that HUD\u2019s declaring the 241 Loan in default was wrongful. Specifically, the reason later denials of financial requests constituted breaches of the Regulatory Agreements, according to Carring-ton Gardens, is that the denials were based on a wrongful declaration of default. To the extent that Carrington Gardens must prove that HUD wrongfully declared the 241 Loan in default in order to advance its theory of the case, Carrington Gardens\u2019 claim is barred. Carrington Gardens attempts to avoid the statute of limitations problem by arguing that the \u201ccontinuing claim\u201d doctrine applies here. See Brown Park Estates, 127 F.3d at 1456-57; see also Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Department of the Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 606 n. 4 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Carrington Gardens emphasizes that its theory Holdings: 0: recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine 1: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 2: recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results 3: recognizing doctrine 4: recognizing separation of powers doctrine", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "523.1 0[ I ][c], 523-71 (15th ed. rev.Mar. 1997). It is the Plaintiffs burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the dischargeability exception is warranted. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 661, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently addressed the nondischargeability provision under \u00a7 523(a)(4) for debts arising from defal (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997) (noting that the traditional meaning of the term fiduciary is far too broad for bankruptcy purposes.); Ducey v. Doherty (In re Ducey), 160 B.R. 465, 469 (Bankr.D.N.H.1993) (noting that the term fiduciary in \u00a7 523(a)(4) is narrower in scope than the word as traditionally used under sate law); Hartwood Aviation, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 147 B.R. 779, 783 (Bankr.D.Col.1992) (<HOLDING>). Fowler Bros., 91 F.3d at 1371 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 1: holding a duty of care without more insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary relationship element of  523a4 the federal courts adopting this narrow interpretation of fiduciary for purposes of the bankruptcy code gen erally hold that an express or technical trust is necessary to trigger the defalcation provision of  523a4 2: holding that the fraud or defalcation prong of  523a4 requires the showing of an express trust 3: holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 4: holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are descriptive. The composite may be more than the mere sum of its parts. ... Common words in which no one may acquire a trademark because they are descriptive or generic may, when used in combination, become a valid trademark. 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition \u00a7 11:26 (4th ed. 2016); see also id. \u00a7 11:31 (explaining that the \u201cslight misspelling of a word will not generally turn a descriptive word into a nondescriptive mark\u201d). Examples of such composite marks include SUGAR & SPICE, MOUSE SEED, and SEASON-ALL, all of which are non-descriptive marks imbued with secondary meaning, but which are composed of generic or descriptive terms that are not themselves eligible for trademark protection. Id. \u00a7 11:26; see also Duluth News-Tribune, 84 F.3d at 1097 (<HOLDING>), (a) Effect of Registration Notwithstanding Holdings: 0: holding that if a motion implicates the merits of a cause of action the district court should find jurisdiction exists and treat the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiffs case 1: recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits 2: holding that although the mark duluth newstribune merits some level of protection the shorthand newstribune merits none 3: recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court 4: holding that a security award separable from the merits of the arbitration which was rendered prior to a hearing on the merits was sufficiently final to be reviewed under the faa", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "offer subject to the express condition that the Seller assent that this [p]urchase [o]rder constitutes the entire agreement between Buyer and Seller.\u201d Purchase order, \u00b6 1. In other words, the purchase order was a conditional acceptance. See Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond International Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1215 (6th Cir.1987) (Ralph Shrader). In Ralph Shrader, the Sixth Circuit held that, when a party limited acceptance to \u201c[t]he terms set forth on the reverse side,\u201d it was a conditional acceptance. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that language in a contract had to mimic the \u201cexpressly made conditional\u201d language of UCC \u00a7 2-207(1) in order to be a conditional acceptance. Id. n. 4; see also Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 101 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). To require the exact language of the UCC Holdings: 0: holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein 1: holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct 2: holding that a conditional acceptance can be manifested merely in a partys conduct 3: holding that performance may be valid acceptance 4: recognizing that a partys initial entry of a restricted appearance manifested its lack of consent to personal jurisdiction but that partys subsequent actions constituted a waiver of its jurisdictional defenses", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to secure a continuance on the morning of the hearing is a factor relevant to the decision-maker\u2019s consideration of the promptness and good faith of her actions. See King v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 803 A.2d 966, 970 (D.C.2002) (reversing agency\u2019s dismissal of protest for non-appearance with the observation that the petitioner who telephoned the agency within an hour of the hearing with a plausible explanation for the inability to appear was not a classic \u201cno-show\u201d). Therefore, the ALJ should have addressed it. To the extent that the ALJ deemed it necessary for Frausto to substantiate her claim that she called the clerk\u2019s office to request a continuance, the ALJ should have given her an opportunity to provide it. See Miranda v. Contreras, 754 A.2d 277, 280 (D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Starling, supra, 495 A.2d at 1162). Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial courts responsibility to inquire where matters are raised which might entitle the movant to relief under rule 60b  1: holding violation of rule 23a does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief 2: holding that rule 60b bars sua sponte relief 3: holding that rule 60b cannot provide any relief from the district courts judgment on an 18 usc  3582 motion because  3582 actions are criminal in nature and rule 60b is applicable only to civil proceedings 4: holding attorneys failure to object does not warrant rule 60b relief", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "act following Jorge\u2019s initial act of fraud, and his petition makes it very clear he is complaining that appellees\u2019 acts proximately caused him this second injury. Appellees\u2019 allegations, by focusing solely on Jorge\u2019s first act of malfeasance, do not respond to Roberto\u2019s claim and therefore provide no valid grounds for summary judgment. We conclude the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on this ground. Conclusion We reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of appel-lees and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. 1 . This analysis also holds true for appellees' statute of limitation arguments in response to Roberto's claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and conversion. See Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Herring, 970 S.W.2d 583, 586 Holdings: 0: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba 1: holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where precontract misrepresentations were directly related to alleged breach of contract 2: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 3: holding that breach of fiduciary duty justified using discovery rule to toll limitations 4: holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved under connecticut law", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because she incorrectly believed that under Arizona law, the state was required to disprove Lewis\u2019s defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 13-205(A) (providing that the burden is on the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance). The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected this claim, reasoning that although counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, Lewis had not shown prejudice. This state court decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365-66, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (per curiam); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the district court properly denied Holdings: 0: holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 1: holding that in order to show prejudice defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 2: holding that to establish prejudice there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 3: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 4: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when there is deficient performance and prejudice which is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "skepticism about the substantive validity of this monopoly lease claim based on maintenance of a single lease by an alleged monopolist.\u201d National Souvenir Center, supra, 728 F.2d at 513. Indeed, we noted that Appellees\u2019 sale of the Lynch figures to other wax museum franchisees seriously undercuts appellants\u2019 arguments that ap-pellees relied on the lease as a mechanism to discourage replacement of the figures with those of competitors during the lease term, or that leasing rather than selling significantly affected the market for figures. Id. Despite its submission of evidence of additional leases (between appellees and other museums), appellant gives us no cause to question the appropriateness of our initial skepticism. Gatlinb Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968) (<HOLDING>). However, United Shoe is clearly Holdings: 0: holding ncaas television restrictions violated  1 of the sherman act 1: holding that uniteds lease provisions violated  4 of the sherman act 2: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 3: holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act 4: holding ban violated the sherman act", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "J. Although we note that the defendant, Alvin Williams, has conscientiously reported for over ten years as required by section 954.0435(14)(b) of the Florida Statutes, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.040, which extends a deadline where the deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, is not applicable to the reporting requirements set forth in section 954.0435(14)(b), as the reporting requirement does not require a computation of time, but instead requires the defendant to \u201creregister each year during the month of the sexual offender\u2019s birthday and every third month thereafter.\u201d See Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d 1015, 1019 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 3 F.3d 148, 151 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain 1: holding that the plain language of rule 6a of the federal rules of civil procedure which authorizes the extension of a deadline where the deadline expires on a saturday sunday or legal holiday is limited to situations where periods of time must be computed and therefore class settlement optout forms that were postmarked on the first business day after the courtordered saturday deadline were not timely filed 2: holding that the drastic sanction of preclusion of expert witnesses was not warranted based on failure to furnish discovery by the discovery deadline when the deadline could have been shifted 3: holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory 4: holding that the bankruptcy court could not extend a deadline for filing a notice of appeal beyond the 20 day extension period allowed by the bankruptcy rules", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "companies engaged in the same type of business as Cereva and Pirus. This court stated, \u201cin view of [defendant\u2019s] position at EMC and access to confidential and proprietary information relating to EMC\u2019s product and marketing plans ... a restriction of one year is reasonable.\u201d Id. This court further held that, \u201d[t]he market for open storage products in which EMC and Sun [the subsequent employer] compete is worldwide.\u201d Id. The covenant not to compete in the Agreement at bar is likewise reasonable in geographical scope and length of time. III. Irreparable Harm Cereva has made a showing that it will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction fails to issue since it stands to lose customer good will which cannot be completely remedied through monetary damages. See Kroeger, supra, at 322 (<HOLDING>). IV. Balance of Harm This court is well aware Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial 1: holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea 2: holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law 3: holding courts role is to ensure that agency took hard look at the environmental consequences and convincingly documented its fonsi 4: holding that the task of quantifying the consequences of violating a noncompetition clause is a particularly hard and elusive one", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "process disrupts the process, see e.g., Acura v. Reich, 90 F.3d 1403, 1408-09 (9th Cir.1996); Federal Trade Comm\u2019n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (stating that judicial intervention before the agency process is final \u201cdenies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise.\u201d), this Court holds that aliens like Petitioner still have a right to petition a district court for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court has jurisdiction to review such petitions, especially where they involve constitutional challenges to statutes. See e.g., Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir.1999); Hinojosa-Perez v. Eddy, 55 F.Supp.2d 1001, \u2014, slip op. at 7 (D.Alaska 1999); cf. Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 120 (1st Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Henderson v. Immigration & Naturalization Holdings: 0: holding that the new stoptime rule applies to all aliens applying for either suspension of deportation under the old law or cancellation of removal under the iirira amendments 1: holding that iirira does not bar us from staying removal orders pending resolution of petitions for review 2: recognizing that after iirira habeas review remains available  to raise substantial constitutional questions 3: holding that neither aedpa nor iirira expressly repeals the availability of habeas review of deportation or removal orders 4: holding that the procedural aspects of iirira  309c apply only to ongoing exclusion or deportation proceedings and are irrelevant in cases involving aliens whose orders of deportation or exclusion were final on the effective date", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the district court felt that the maximum sentence was the appropriate punishment. Judging from the record, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by giving the maximum sentence. So long as the district court acts within the guidelines, a harsh sentence, in and of itself, does not constitute error. See United States v. Ponce, 917 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir.1990) (\"[W]e will uphold the district court\u2019s sentence so long as it results from a correct application of the guidelines to factual findin Cir.1995) (\u201cThe 100 to one ratio is extreme, but it is not the province of this Court to second-guess Congress\u2019s chosen penalty. That is a discretionary legislative judgment for Congress and the Sentencing Commission to make.\u201d); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928, 112 S.Ct. 1989, Holdings: 0: holding that no unconstitutional infirmity exists in the sentencing guidelines treatment of crack visavis powder cocaine 1: holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack 2: holding that a judge may consider the disparity between the guidelines treat ment of crack and powder cocaine offenses in deciding upon a sentence 3: holding that sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is constitutional 4: holding that the sentencing guidelines disparate treatment of crack cocaine is not racially discriminatory under the fifth amendments equal protection guarantees", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "relevant price is the price at which the government could have bought the tape from other vendors. When Coker herself relies on theory to which the government \u201cswitched,\u201d any \u201cswitch,\u201d if it was impermissible, was not prejudicial. III Coker also objects to the manner in which her sentence was calculated, and asserts that she suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. We decline to address the merits of either argument because she has withdrawn her ineffective assistance claim and waived her sentencing objections. A In Coker\u2019s first brief, her trial counsel, who continues to represent her on appeal (with Coker\u2019s apparent approval), argued that his own performance at trial was constitutionally deficient. After the government pointed out that claims of ineffective ass 94 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Circuit declared an attempt to Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing enhancements and sentencing departures are not synonymous and that a waiver for upward departures imposed by the court does not permit the challenging of sentence enhancements 1: holding that sentencing disparity produced by substantial assistance departures was intended by congress and is thus not a proper sentencing consideration under section 3553a6 2: holding that prior convictions are merely sentencing enhancements rather than elements of the offense 3: recognizing that sentencing guidelines may provide enhancements for mere possession of firearm during other offense 4: holding that adequate notice exists for upward enhancements for factors presently in the guidelines to allow an average defense counsel adequately to prepare for sentencing", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from the date on which they were taken.\u201d). Ganesan argues he is entitled to a new trial because he \u201ctimely requested\u201d the record and it was lost or destroyed \u201cwithout appellant\u2019s fault.\u201d See Tex.R.App. P. 34.6(f). The Texas Supreme Court has expressly held that \u201c[i]f a litigant has not requested the reporter to prepare a statement of the facts within three years, nor specifically requested that the notes of a proceeding be preserved beyond three years, then the litigant is not free from fault....\u201d See Piotrowski, 873 S.W.2d at 371. Because Ganesan could have requested the reporter to prepare the record within three years of the proceeding, or at minimum requested that the record be preserved, he is not free from fault. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a new trial. See id. at 370 (<HOLDING>). Appellant argues that his request for the Holdings: 0: holding appellant is not entitled to a new trial unless the reporters notes have been lost or destroyed without appellants fault and the parties cannot agree on a statement of facts 1: holding that motion for a new trial whether for guilt or punishment requires a valid legal claim a court cannot grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that he is entitled to one under the law 2: holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court 3: holding that plaintiff cannot introduce new allegations or new facts in opposition to a motion to dismiss 4: holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "City had instituted a civil proceeding (this action), that it was withdrawing its request for a restitution hearing against the criminal defendants, and that it would be very difficult to determine what the appropriate amount of restitution would be. See id. at 4-5. Although Plaintiff may be able to properly rely on these documents and statements in a motion for summary judgment or at trial, they are not properly considered in the present motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not rely on the terms and effects of these documents and statements in drafting its complaint, and Plaintiffs knowledge of their existence is insufficient for this exception to apply. See Global Network Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 458 F.3d at 156 (quotation omitted); Williams v. Time Warner Inc., 440 Fed.Appx. 7, 9 (2d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In light of this conclusion, the Court finds Holdings: 0: holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint 1: holding that a mere passing reference or even references however to a document outside the complaint does not on its own incorporate the document into the complaint itself citation omitted 2: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint 3: holding that a court may consider a document submitted by a defendant in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because it was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the court, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, \u201creserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.\u201d Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2); see also United States v. Cain, 155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir.1998). This is a narrow exception to the ordinary rule that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot appeal his conviction. United States v. Dimitrov, 546 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir.2008). To preserve an issue for appeal, a conditional plea must \u201cprecisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review.\u201d United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir.1993). All non-jurisdictional issues not specifically preserved in the conditional plea agreement are waived. See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, Holdings: 0: holding an issue was preserved in part because the trial court immediately understood the basis of the objection 1: holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection 2: holding that claim was preserved for subsequent appeal by objection at original sentencing hearing 3: holding that error was preserved by running objection because of defendants immediate objection to states specific question in combination with trial courts comments showing that it understood nature of defendants objection 4: holding that a claimed violation of the right to a public trial must be preserved for review by a timely objection at trial", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Error If a \u201c[federal] court finds that the state court engaged in an unreasonable application of established law, resulting in constitutional error, it must next consider whether such error was harmless.\u201d Howard, 406 F.3d at 122 (citations omitted). Asked must be whether the application of the law \u201chad substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d O\u2019Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (citations omitted). \u201cWhen a [federal judge in a habeas proceeding] has grave doubt about whether a trial error ... had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury\u2019s verdict, that error is not harmless. And; the petitioner must win.\u201d Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). V. Plea Agreements Plea bargaining, defined Holdings: 0: holding that statute allowing videotaped testimony of child witnesses at trial violated state constitutional right of confrontation but not sixth amendment right 1: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 2: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 3: holding that petitioners videotaped statement made after he invoked his right to counsel was wrongfully admitted at trial and not harmless error 4: holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Ninth Circuit reasoned that, \u201cto survive summary judgment, a copyright infringement plaintiff seeking to recover indirect profits damages [i.e., damages for profits that have an attenuated connection to the infringement] under 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 504(b) must proffer some evidence to create a triable issue regarding whether the infringement at least partially caused the profits that the infringer generated as the result of the infringement.\u201d Id. at 911. \u201cBecause Mackie [had] failed to adduce any non-speculative evidence that would even suggest a link between the infringement and the Symphony\u2019s supposedly enhanced revenues,\u201d summary judgment in favor of the Symphony was appropriate. Id.; see id. at 916; see also Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur 1: holding that a nexus between the corporate officers or directors official activity and the matter for which indemnification is sought must be shown though no more than a nexus whether a nexus exists is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court considering all the circumstances surrounding the proposed indemnification 2: recognizing that derogatory comments may serve as circumstantial evidence of discrimination but the plaintiff must still show some nexus between the statements and the defendants decision to terminate the employee 3: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 4: holding that no federal nexus is required", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.16, 2001); see also 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 10(a)(4). An arbitrator\u2019s interim ruling is not a final award if i ance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1991) (\u201c[Temporary equitable orders calculated to preserve assets or performance needed to make a potential final award meaningful ... are final orders that can be review Mut. Ins. Co., No. Misc. 88-0600, 1996 WL 557513, at *3 n. 8 (E.D.Pa. Sep.30, 1996) (\u201cEven though the arbitration panel\u2019s award is a interim provision for pre-hear-ing security, and the panel has not reached the merits of the case, this court may rule on motions to confirm and vacate the award.\u201d). Indeed, courts have reviewed such interim orders even when they were issued prior to a hearing on the merits. See British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 93 F.Supp.2d at 513 (<HOLDING>); Atlas Assurance Co. of Am., 1991 WL 4741, at Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal 1: holding that only claims properly presented to the bia and considered on their merits can be reviewed by this court 2: holding that a dismissal based on a jurisdictional statute of limitations does not constitute a judgmerit on the merits because a judgment on the merits can only be rendered after a court has jurisdiction 3: holding that a security award separable from the merits of the arbitration which was rendered prior to a hearing on the merits was sufficiently final to be reviewed under the faa 4: recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to use the word \"rendition\u201d in the statute of limitations. 5 . This rule is clearly analogous to, although not identical to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. 6 . Furthermore, under this same body of Michigan law, we must reject the defendants\u2019 assertion that ARCO failed to timely \"commence\" the instant renewal action (and toE the statute of limitations) because of aUegedly improper service of process by someone not an \"officer\u201d for pin-poses of the Michigan tolling statute, Mich. Comp.Laws Aim. \u00a7 600.5856(c) (West Supp. 1995). Michigan Court Rule 2.101(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 both state that an action is \"commenced\" when a complaint is filed with the court, and that rule controls insofar as it conflicts with the toEing statute. See Buscaino, 189 N.W.2d at 205-06 Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 1: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorneys fees action under  1415e4b is three years 2: holding new mexico statute of limitations for filing a  1983 action is three years 3: holding that a lender was barred from recovering repayment for loans made more than three years before filing suit where obligations without agreed repayment dates were deemed payable on demand and where the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts was three years 4: holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Wide\u2019s claims is the fact that each of these agreements contains a provision limiting the agreement\u2019s scope. The Management Agreement states that \"[t]he subject of this Agreement shall be the transfer to World Wide of the right to manage, control, use and own the State-owned or controlled block of shares in [TGK].\u201d Management Agreement \u00b6 1. And the Pledge Agreement includes an integration clause stating that \u201d[t]his Pledge Agreement constitutes and contains the entire agreement of the parties.\u201d Pledge Agreement \u00b6 21.1. Although the Pledge Agreement grants World Wide a security interest in TGK shares and assets, id. \u00b62.1, it does not itself include an agreement to repay World Wide\u2019s loans to TGK. 15 .See Strategic Alliance Agreement \u00b6 9.3 (\"If any dispute or difference ar .Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). 18 . In Count XI, World Wide asks the court Holdings: 0: holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract 1: holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract 2: holding that the court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code 3: holding that a leases waiver of trial by jury for any matters whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with this lease did not extend to a tort claim 4: holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "brother was convicted and served time in prison. The State noted that J.C.\u2019s \u201cunique situation\u201d would \u201chave any prosecutor move to remove any potential juror regardless of race, under that scenario.\u201d The State further noted that J.C. was \u201csaddened by [her brother\u2019s conviction] and ... can\u2019t necessarily not refer back to it ... in this process\u201d and that \u201c[e]ven when she was asked if the system worked fairly in her brother\u2019s case and she said [it] did, she hesitated and paused.\u201d On appeal, Carridine claims that \u201c[b]ecause a white juror [M.B.] ... had a family member involved in the criminal justice system\u201d and was seated on the jury, the State\u2019s fust reason for the peremptory challenge was a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1362 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The fact that M.B. was seated on Holdings: 0: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 1: holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons 2: holding that trial judges determination  that the prosecutors use of peremptory challenges to strike all four africanamerican venirepersons for lack of education and business experience was not pretextual  was not clearly erroneous 3: holding that reviewing record in its entirety prosecutors raceneutral reason was not a pretext where state applied this reason to strike black veniremember and most but not all similarly situated nonblack veniremembers 4: holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "government had no obligation to prove that the defendant had such knowledge. Id. at 189, 194, 118 S.Ct. 1939. Rather, the term \u201cwillfully\u201d in that context required the government to prove only that the defendant \u201cknew that his conduct was unlawful.\u201d Id. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1939. In light of these precedents, we conclude there is no basis for requiring the government to prove that a person charged with violating IEE-PA and the ITR was aware of a specific licensing requirement. While the prohibitions imposed by IEEPA and the ITR are for conduct that is not \u201cobviously illegal,\u201d see Henderson, 243 F.3d at 1173, the \u201cdanger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct,\u201d Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194, 118 S.Ct. 1939, is no greater under IEEPA than under the st 57, 61 (D.D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>). Applying these principles to the Holdings: 0: holding that proof of relevant market is essential under  2 1: holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act 2: holding that under bryan proof of willfulness under  1705c of ieepa does not require knowledge of the licensing requirements under the itr 3: holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 4: holding that a conviction under section 2422b does not require the involvement of a minor", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ended up in, than it was with someone firing from where Robert Foley was standing. Had the bullet been fired from where Robert Foley was standing, one would expect to see a shallow groove running along the wall towards the hole where the bullet gradually entered, due to the oblique angle. There was no evidence that this was the case and, consequently, the hole is consistent with someone firing from approximately where Robert Foley alleged Lynn Vaughn was standing, towards where Robert Foley alleged Rodney Vaughn was located. \u201cNewly discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.\u201d Commonwealth v. Harris, 250 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ky.2008). See also Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427, 437 (Ky.2011) (<HOLDING>). Certainly, testimony in the form of an Holdings: 0: holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision 1: recognizing an exception to the twoyear time bar imposed on rule 3850 claims when the claim asserted is based on facts that were unknown to the movant and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence 2: holding that cr 6002 allows appeals based upon claims of error that were unknown and could not have been known to the moving party by exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court 3: holding substance of claim must have been presented to state court 4: holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "SPD at issue in this case, including calling one or both of the federal offices listed in the SPD, would not have been aware of the one-year limitations period set forth in the Plan, and instead presumably would have relied on the general principles of law applicable to ERISA claims. Under those principles, an action seeking benefits under ERISA must comply with the \u201cmost analogous\u201d state statute of limitations. Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990). In this case, which was brought in Utah, the most analogous state statute of limitations is Utah's three-year statute of limitations applicable to written policies or contracts of first party insurance, Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 31A-21-313(1). Lang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent the one-year limitations period Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 1: holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination 2: holding that the virginia disabilities act constitutes the most analogous state statute of limitations for claims brought under the ada 3: holding that this statute was the most analogous state statute for purposes of erisa action filed in utah 4: holding that statute of limitations governing the most closely analogous state substantive claim controls rather than the forum states borrowing statute", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cthe only plainly discernible purpose for Article 120 was to seek to impose an additional measure of punishment upon those who had violated the laws of the Commonwealth.\u201d Plaintiffs point to the a transcript of the debates at the 1998 and 2000 Constitutional Conventions over the bill that ultimately became Article 120. Plaintiffs also rely on language from Acting Governor Cellucci\u2019s proposed amendment and his statements to the public, an amendment which was not accepted. These statements include: \u201cThe time has come to tell would-be criminals in Massachusetts that committing crimes has serious consequen Facto Clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has stated that felon Holdings: 0: holding preventative detention under the bail reform act was permissible because it was regulatory and preventative rather than punitive 1: holding that a defendants propensity to commit crime generally even if the resulting harm would be not solely physical may constitute sufficient risk of danger to come within contemplation of the bail reform act 2: holding that a prisoners claim was saved by his request for nominal and punitive damages even though he could not recover compensatory damages under the prison litigation reform act 3: holding that under the bail reform act for a defendant to have been convicted of two or more offenses constituting crimes of violence offenses must have been committed on different occasions 4: holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "totality-of-the-circumstances review was infected by its misapprehension of the standard \u201cdictated by the U. S. Supreme Court under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.\u201d App. 1229a. Whereas the focus of \u00a7\u00a7 205(a) and 206(a) is on the reasonableness of the rates charged, not the conduct of the contracting parties, FERC restricted its review to the contracting parties\u2019 behavior around the time of formation. See id., at 1280a-1284a. FERC seems to have thought it was powerless to conduct just-and-reasonable review unless the contract was already subject to abrogation based on contract defenses such as fraud or duress. By including contracts within the scope of \u00a7 206(a), however, Congress must have concluded that contract defenses are insufficient to protect the public interest. But see ante, at 547 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, nothing in the FPA or this Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption 1: holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it 2: holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified 3: holding that the mobilesierra presumption applies in all circumstances absent traditional grounds for    abrogation or illegal action by a contracting party 4: holding that fourteenth amendment is the only recognized source of authority for abrogation", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "has come to be so closely associated with \u2018means-plus-function\u2019 claiming that it is fair to say that the use of the term \u2018means\u2019 ... generally invokes 112(6) and that the use of a different formulation generally does not\u201d). Intel next argues that the functional language used in the claims does not equate to means-plus-function. See Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583 (\u201cThe fact that a particular mechanism ... is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into a \u2018means for performing a specified function\u2019 within the meaning of 112(6)\u201d). Rather, because each of the three terms at issue \u201chas a reasonably well understood meaning in the art\u201d as the name for a structure, 112, \u00b6 6 should not apply. Id.; see also Personalized Media, 161 F.3d at 705 (<HOLDING>). Last, Intel contends that when a claim Holdings: 0: holding the function of a public utility is controlling not how the term is defined 1: holding that use of term black box did not render the claim indefinite because that term was known in the field to represent video standard detector circuitry 2: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 3: holding that what is important is not simply that the element at issue is defined in terms of what it does but that the term as the name for a structure has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art 4: holding that detector is a sufficiently definite structural term to preclude the application of 112  6 even though the detector was defined in terms of its function because the term detector refers to a wellknown structure for those knowledgeable in the art", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "this language suggests is that the provisions in section 708.11(3)(b), including the provision dealing with protective orders (section 708.11(3)(b)(l)), are not elements of the offense of stalking, but rather are merely predicates to an enhanced punishment. We also note that the explanation to the 1998 amendment to section 708.11(3)(b)(l) suggests this provision is a punishment enhancement. See 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1021 (\u201cAn act relating to certain crimes against persons ... by providing for the application of enhanced stalking penalties for persons who are the subject of certain restraining or protective orders-\u201d). We have previously indicated that predicates used only for enhancement purposes are not elements of the offense charged. See State v. Tobin, 333 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Iowa 1983) (<HOLDING>). Reviewing similarly worded stalking statutes, Holdings: 0: holding that double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution of an accused who refuses to perform a condition of his guilty plea 1: holding that prior convictions are merely sentencing enhancements rather than elements of the offense 2: holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand 3: holding that a recidivist provision in theft statute providing that theft of property not exceeding 500 in value by one who has before been twice convicted of theft constitutes theft in the second degree does not violate protection against double jeopardy prior convictions are predicates for enhanced punishment rather than elements of current theft charge and hence current charge is not reprosecution of prior offenses 4: holding that nurses fiftysix prior convictions for theft made his assault on elderly female visitor foreseeable", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "yet the district court, like the hearing officer in Arlington County, succumbed to its temptation to inject itself into matters of professional educational judgment. 7 . For example, the ALJ stated that DB claimed the IEP goals drafted by Dr. McCarthy were the \"only appropriate ones for the Child,\u201d and noted that Drs. McCarthy and Antell \"testified in great detail as to the inferiority of the AACPS IEP and the superiority of the special education services that the Child is receiving at the Summit School.\u201d ALJ Op. at 24 (J.A. 29). Yet the ALJ reached a completely opposite result, holding that the IEP complied with IDEA. 8 . As discussed above, AB\u2019s report card for his year at Millersville, ante n. 3, also supports the ALJ's findings. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (<HOLDING>). 9 . Additionally, Appellees argue, relying on Holdings: 0: recognizing that among other factors the location and level of the precedent as well as its age are important factors in a qualified immunity analysis 1: recognizing that achievement of passing marks and advance ment from grade to grade are important factors in determining educational benefit 2: holding that most important factors in evaluating confusion in product configuration eases are marketing and labeling of products 3: recognizing same factors 4: holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "statistics but also all the surrounding facts and circumstances\u201d); Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F.Supp. 393, 432 n. 13 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (stating that even if plaintiff fell short of cut-offs for statistical significance, \u201cother evidence submitted in this case ... tends to support the inference of disparate impact suggested by plaintiffs statistical data\u201d). The Plaintiffs bolster their evidence on statistical significance by presenting evidence that the 2005 and 2008 exams violated the four-fifths rule. As this Court has already held, \u201ca violation of the four-fifths rule ... may demonstrate adverse impact, particularly when coupled with other statistical evidence of adverse impact.\u201d Cotter, 193 F.Supp.2d at 348 n. 12; see also Bradley, 443 F.Supp.2d at 163 (<HOLDING>). The Court also considers the fact that if the Holdings: 0: holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease 1: holding that statistical evidence that was too broad to support a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment was nevertheless admissible in plaintiffs individual disparate treatment case but noting that a valid statistical analysis must encompass the rel evant labor market 2: holding that a plaintiffs failure to establish the statistical significance of her evidence fatally undermines her claim 3: holding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie ease of statistical significance by using the fourfifths rule combined with a chisquare analysis 4: holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of disparate impact despite a lack of statistical significance based on past discrimination which reduced the number of africanamericans eligible to sit for the promotional exam", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "so requests, the arresting government shall inform his local consular post of his arrest, and he shall be permitted to communicate with the consular officials. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 101. 3 . Although Gordon\u2019s waiver of appellate rights did not encompass the sentence corresponding to his illegal reentry conviction, Gordon fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion. See Gall v. United States, - U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Gordon\u2019s 240-month sentence for this offense was imposed concurrent to the 420-month sentence for the \u00a7 846 offense. Therefore, Gordon\u2019s substantial rights were not affected by the 240-month concurrent term. See United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 593, 599-600 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 544-45 Holdings: 0: holding that sentence exceeding statutory maximum by twenty years did not affect substantial rights because defendant received equal or longer concurrent sentences on other counts 1: holding that santoss concern regarding the evisceration of congresss choice of a low statutory maximum penalty for an underlying offense did not apply where the underlying offenses carried maximum sentences of twenty years and the money laundering offense carried a lower maximum sentence of ten years 2: holding that an apprendi error was harmless where the defendant received a concurrent sentence on another count longer than the statutory maximum applicable to the count affected by the error 3: holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony 4: holding that sentencing error did not affect defendants substantial rights because error did not result in longer term of imprisonment", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "recommendations respecting plan administration is not indicative of fiduciary status. Toomey, 855 F.Supp. at 24; 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 2509.75-8(D-2). The Court concludes, therefore, that John Hancock\u2019s performance of plan design services lacks the discretionary authority in the administration of an employee benefit plan necessary to qualify it as a fiduciary under ERISA. Turning to an analysis of the other services John Hancock provides to the Plan, the Court recognizes that urging the purchase of an insurance company\u2019s plan services does not make that company a fiduciary with respect to those services. American Fed\u2019n of Unions v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc\u2019y, 841 F.2d 658, 664 (5th Cir.1988); see also Consolidated Beef Indus. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 960, 964-65 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 1670, Holdings: 0: holding that when employers serve as plan administrators they assume the role of fiduciary under erisa 1: holding that plan trustees do not breach their fiduciary duty by failing to reverse a companys decision to amend an erisa plan 2: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 3: holding that salesman of companys financial products not fiduciary to erisa plan 4: holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "issue when applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is whether the claim at issue is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment.\u201d Abboud, 232 B.R. at 798. This is not accurate. The Rooker-Feld-man doctrine bars consideration not only of issues actually presented to and decided by a state court, but also bars consideration of claims that are \"inextricably intertwined\u201d with issues ruled upon by the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; see Facio, 929 F.2d at 543. Analysis of whether a claim is \"inextricably intertwined\u201d with a state court judgment is necessary only if the claim before the federal court was not raised in the state court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303; Facio, 929 F.2d at 543; see Kiowa Indian Tribe, 150 F.3d at 1169 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the statute of limitations Holdings: 0: holding that issue preclusion extends to a matter that the court must necessarily albeit implicitly have decided 1: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court 3: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator 4: recognizing that inextricably intertwined analysis extends to issues not actually decided by the state court", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "charged the following: \u201cName calling, insults and profanity, absent the showing of special damages is not slander.\u201d The trial judge seemed troubled by the broad statement of law offered by defense counsel. The judge did not believe he could give the charge as proposed without some quote or further explanation. The judge was correct, and it would have been an incorrect statement of the law to have charged the jury that insults or profanity cannot be defamatory, as extrinsic facts may be proven to show the defamatory nature of the remarks. We find the charge as a whole was proper, and note that the judge did not preclude the defense from arguing that the alleged defamatory statements were mere insults or name-calling. Keaton v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 514 S.E.2d 570 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial Holdings: 0: holding jury charge is proper if as a whole it is free from error and reflects the current and correct law of south carolina 1: holding that sufficiency of the evidence is measured against a hypothetically correct jury charge 2: holding error in calculation of amount due on accelerated note secured by deed of trust does not require reversal of cause appellate court may correct judgment 3: holding that the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury includes the right to a complete and correct charge of the law so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions 4: holding a jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of disorder or lapsed mentality. Id. Contestants\u2019 evidence surrounds the impropriety of Estha giving family stock to non-family members. Contestants point to inferences that can be drawn from Estha singling out Cook from his other two brothers and the absence of gifts to long-time friends in favor of the charities as more than a scintilla of evidence of undue influence. In spite of these assertions, excluding collateral heirs in favor of charities is not unnatural. See Naihaus v. Feigon, 244 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding testatrix\u2019s will disposition which left bulk of estate to two synagogues and rabbi to the exclusion of surviving nieces and nephews); In Re Caruthers\u2019 Estate, 151 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ.App.-Beaumont 1941, writ dism\u2019d) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is a direct connection between Holdings: 0: recognizingpublic policy favors arbitration 1: recognizing that public policy favors limiting the duration of spousal maintenance to encourage a transition toward independence 2: recognizing this texas rule 3: holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy 4: recognizing that texas public policy favors charitable gifts", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "remedies, power to pursue equitable remedies in the context of discovery. See S.Rep. No. 89-1159 (1965), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2032, at 2466. Hoskins asks this Panel to interpret \u00a7 544(a)(2) to give a trustee all the substantive rights of the hypothetical execution lien creditor, which in California include standing to bring a claim for relief for aiding and abetting fraudulent transfers against a third party. See Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1118 (C.D.Cal.2003). Other courts within the Ninth Circuit have declined to grant a trustee standing to pursue such a claim, albeit under a different subsection of the strong arm statute. See Wyle v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs Inc. (In re Hamilton Taft & Co.), 176 B.R. 895, 902 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Ciolino v. Ryan (In re Ryan), 2008 WL 4829947 Holdings: 0: recognizing aiding and abetting conversion 1: holding that the trustee did not have power to pursue an aiding and abetting claim for relief under  544b 2: holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting 3: recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion 4: recognizing aiding and abetting trespass", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to meet their obligations in this case. 4. Feasibility of Reorganization The Court has already concluded that Liberty Bank lacks adequate protection. Supra Part 11(C). However, the staggering size of the Danleys\u2019 arrearage and the length of their delinquency also indicated that this case was filed in bad faith. Even with Stacy Danley\u2019s judgment against Alabama State University, the Danleys have no reasonable prospect of confirming a plan that would allow them to keep the properties securing Liberty Bank\u2019s mortgages. When combined with the timing of their prior bankruptcy cases and the lack of good faith in which they were prosecuted, the futility of reorganization in this case is further evidence of a scheme intended to delay or- defraud Liberty Bank. See Henderson, 395 B.R. at 904 (<HOLDING>). The Court also gave great weight to the fact Holdings: 0: holding that the objective futility of a reorganization is grounds for a finding of bad faith and for in rem relief 1: holding title company liable for bad faith 2: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 3: holding that although courts have inherent power to dismiss bad faith litigant  707a does not provide basis for dismissal on grounds of bad faith filing 4: holding that futility prejudice or bad faith may justify refusing to grant leave to amend", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.\u201d White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). To be a \u201csignificant change in employment status,\u201d the adverse action \u201cmust be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.\u201d Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir.2002). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs transfer was simply an inconvenience, not an adverse employment action, because it did not involve a change in title, compensation, responsibility or working conditions. See Russell v. Drabik, 24 Fed.Appx. 408, 413 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 Holdings: 0: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 1: holding that in order to constitute a materially adverse change in the terms of plaintiffs employment a transfer must include either diminished responsibilities a demotion evidenced by a change in salary title or benefits or other indices unique to the particular situation 2: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 3: holding that a materially adverse action is of the magnitude of a termination of employment or a decrease in salary or a material loss in benefits 4: holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property ... belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6331(a); see also id. \u00a7 6331(d)(4) (enumerating information that must be included with a notice of levy). Although plaintiff argues that the Notice of Levy was deficient because it \u201cdid not have a valid OMB number on the form[,] ... did not have a court stamp or ... complete signature,\u201d Compl. U 1, neither section 6331 nor its implementing regulations require this information, see 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6331; 26 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 301.6331-1,-2 (2006). Moreover, courts have rejected such arguments. See, e.g., Tavano v. Comm\u2019r, 986 F.2d 1389, 1389 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, section 6331(a) explicitly Holdings: 0: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice 1: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 2: holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff first received notice of an alleged deficiency from the irs not when he received a final determination of tax liability 3: holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid 4: holding that although irs failed to comply with procedures of section 6335 tax sale was valid due to ratification by taxpayer", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 405, 101 S.Ct. 1836, 68 L.Ed.2d 248 (1981); Local 334, 452 U.S. at 627, 101 S.Ct. 2546; Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). At the same time the Court has admonished federal courts not to engage in a \u201cfreewheeling inquiry\u201d into what might be the most desirable rule irrespective of congressional pronouncements. Reis, 451 U.S. at 406, 101 S.Ct. 1836 (quotation omitted). Here, there is no dispute that the SEIU constitution is a \u201ccontract between labor organizations,\u201d within the bailiwick of federal courts. See Local 334, 452 U.S. at 623, 101 S.Ct. 2546 (<HOLDING>). The SEIU constitution is an agreement between Holdings: 0: holding that labor union membership fell outside commerce 1: holding that union constitutions are contracts between labor organizations within section 301a 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 4: holding section 301a jurisdiction existed in a dispute between an international and a local union which arose under the union constitution and affirming a preliminary injunction against the suspended board members of the local", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for juror confusion about which role the lawyer is serving during trial. \u201cA witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear [to the factfinder] whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.\u201d Rule 3.7, Comment (2). See also Chapman Engineers v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 FSupp. at 957 (14) (\u201cOne of the strongest rationales for this lawyer-witness rule is to prevent jury confusion over the separate roles of an advocate and a witness.\u201d). We find, however, that concerns about possible juror confusion are not relevant to pre-trial proceedings. See Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F2d at 100-101 (II) (<HOLDING>); Pyne v. Procacci Bros. Sales Corp. &c., 1997 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 37 does not prohibit a lawyer who will testify at trial from acting as counsel in pretrial discovery 1: holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power 2: holding that correspondence between counsel cannot suffice as a rule 34 request that may be compelled through rule 37 3: holding that judge presiding at trial may not testify in that trial as witness 4: holding that lawyers who were necessary witnesses in the case under rule 37 were not prohibited from representing their clients in all pretrial matters including discovery", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Agreement provides that is governed by New York law. Settlement Agreement at \u00a7 9.6. 3 . The Levy Claimants argue that it is unclear whether CPLR 2104 applies to settlement agreements entered into by litigants in federal court in New York. See Levy Claimants\u2019 Brief at 13 (citing Kaczmarczyk v. Acme Contracting LLC, No. 06-CV-1005, 2009 WL 3739442, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2009)). The case they cite is distinguishable, however, as it did not involve an agreement that expressly provided that it \u201cshall be governed, construed, and interpreted and the rights of the parties ... determined in accordance with New York law,\u201d as does the Settlement Agreement here. Settlement Agreement at \u00a7 9.6. See also Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Sears Realty Co., Inc., 932 F.Supp. 392, 403 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>) The Court will thus apply CPLR 2104 to the Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts disagree whether federal common law or state law governs the interpretation of negotiated settlement agreement 1: holding that the court must determine whether the employees consent to the settlement agreement was knowing and voluntary 2: holding that the analysis to determine whether a claimant has established a reasonable basis to plead a claim for punitive damages is similar to the analysis applied to determine whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action 3: holding that under oregon law an agreement must be supported by consideration to be legally enforceable 4: holding that new york common law must be applied to determine whether the parties formed an oral settlement agreement and state statutory law must be applied to determine whether the agreement if any is enforceable", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Walton v. Petway, 833 So.2d 292, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). There is one exception to the Rivendell rule: a PTD award to a claimant who has not reached psychiatric MMI is not premature if he or she has reached physical MMI and the award is predicated solely on the physical injury. See McFarlane, Ferguson v. Whaley, 641 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), cited in Reyes v. Granite Constr. Co., 894 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). This exception does not apply here because the final order\u2019s award of PTD is based on the JCC\u2019s determination that a combination of physical and psychiatric conditions rendered Claimant unemployable and entitled to PTD. We REVERSE the compensation award. Claimant may seek PTD benefits again in the future. Cf. Daws Mfg. Co. v. Ostoyic, 756 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). KAHN, C.J., and THOMAS, J\u201e concur. * A Holdings: 0: holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex 1: holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change 2: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 3: holding that a claimant could pursue ptd benefits on her physical condition alone as to which she had reached mmi on her psychiatric condition alone after she reached psychiatric mmi or on both again after she reached psychiatric mmi 4: holding that a juror who initially equivocated as to her impartiality could be found impartial after she affirmatively said she thought she could be fair", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "between the employment and the injury, while \"in the course of\u201d refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Id. The test we articulate today takes into consideration the nuances of each of these phrases. 3 . In Haugen, a police officer incurred a back injury while weight lifting at home during his off-duty hours. The injured officer was following a self-designed exercise program in order to meet the physical fitness requirements provided in the job specifications for police officers. Based on the reasoning quoted above, the court held that the officer\u2019s injury was not compensable because it did not occur in the course of or arise from the officer\u2019s employment. See also Meeks v. Eddy County Sheriff\u2019s Dep't, 118 N.M. 643, 646, 884 P.2d 534, 537 (App.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 731, 885 P.2d 1325 Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury 1: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act 2: holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act 3: holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee 4: holding that an employee was not entitled to compensation for suffering an injury from selfdirected offduty athletic activity", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis of the major issues.\u201d (Emphasis supplied [by Brimmer court].) Application of these elements leads us to conclude that the first is met because both the pro-life parties and the pro-choice .parties have current, concrete rights or interests relating to this controversy. Our judgment, either allowing the initiative to be included on the ballot, or precluding its inclusion, would effectively operate upon the factual dispute between these parties. Thus, the second element is satisfied. As to the third element, our determination will have the force and effect of a final judgment upon the rights, status, or other legal relationships of the real parties in interest. See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass\u2019n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo.1982) (<HOLDING>). We also perceive this matter as one involving Holdings: 0: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 1: holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper 2: holding that the case or controversy requirement applies with equal force to actions for declaratory judgment 3: holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment 4: holding that it is not", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ZR 231/91, 1992 Neue Juristische Wochensehrift-Rechtsprechungsreport [NJW-RR] 1151 (F.R.G.). Schoeps has offered no contrary view of German law. Simply because Schoeps may be sued in his individual capacity, however, it does not necessarily follow that a declaratory judgment against one individual heir is an appropriate way to proceed. That question involves both an issue of law and an issue of discretion. The issue of law is whether there is an \u201cactual controversy\u201d for declaratory judgment purposes, ie., whether Schoeps as an individual actually has an interest adverse to that of the Museums. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201(a) (authorizing declaratory judgment remedy in cases \u201cof actual controversy\u201d); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, -, 127 S.Ct. 764, 771, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Schoeps argues that Webber bars him from Holdings: 0: holding that the case or controversy requirement applies with equal force to actions for declaratory judgment 1: holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end the controversy it is not proper 2: holding that to establish jurisdiction in action for declaratory judgment controversy must be actual and present a case for the consideration of the court wherein plaintiff is asserting some legal or property right adverse to defendant 3: holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured 4: holding that actual controversy requirement is met where there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "from seeking payment other than its authorized CJA compensation without the express permission of the district court. The district court based its decision on a misapprehension of the extent of its authority under the CJA. Nevertheless, we must affirm its judgment because, on the record before us, Mr. Shippers has not made out a case for contempt. It does not appear that Mr. Shippers\u2019 petition is based on a violation by Mr. Cain or AFTI of any specific order of the district court. See Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo win a motion for civil contempt, a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the opposing party violated a court order.\u201d (internal quotation omitted)); D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460-61 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Our ruling today does not preclude Mr. Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may order restitution despite a settlement agreement 1: holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes 2: holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement 3: holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt 4: holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "held that \u201c \u2018in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence ... suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause[.]\u201d Ricketts, 483 U.S. at 11, 107 S.Ct. 2680 (emphasis added). Here, Appellant has successfully demonstrated that, but for the Sixth Amendment violation, he would have demanded \u201ctermi nation of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.\u201d Both parties, therefore, must be returned to their original position. Once Appellant and the State are returned to the status quo ante, Appellant could be subject to trial for capital murder. Compare Chaffin v. Stynehcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187 Holdings: 0: holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence 1: holding possibility of more severe sentence on retrial after appeal or collateral attack does not violate double jeopardy or due process protections 2: holding that imposition of more severe sentence following trial de novo does violate defendants due process rights 3: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 4: holding that if defendant moved for or consented to mistrial retrial of defendant was not barred on double jeopardy grounds", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "official policy, in flicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under \u00a7 1983. Id. at 691-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (emphasis added). Here, the record does not contain any plausible allegations that the Municipality was acting in a sovereign capacity pursuant to any statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom when it terminated the contract and took over the construction site and temporarily detained OSSAM\u2019s property. There is no allegation in the Complaint that the Municipality acted pursuant to a statute, ordinance, or regulation. The complaint did state that the Municipality implemented \u201ccustoms and policies\u201d wh sometimes lead to governmental liability for breach of contract. See United States v. Winstar Corn,, 518 U.S. 839, 897, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 7 . We do not suggest here that a Holdings: 0: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous 1: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 2: holding that the enactment of firrea breached certain government contracts 3: holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts 4: holding that a breach of contract claim was properly dismissed where plaintiff did not identify the contracts allegedly breached", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in excuse. See Robinsion at 242-43. 4 . A closely related affirmative defense is the defense of entrapment by estoppel, an affirmative defense also grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Entrapment by estoppel provides an affirmative defense for action taken in reasonable reliance on assurances by government officials that the conduct is legal. See United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir.1994). We have questioned the meaningfulness of the difference between the two defenses. See United States v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir.2006). To the extent the distinction is meaningful, the main difference is that, in the case of the public authority defense, the defendant engages in conduct at the request of a government official t 257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Howell, 37 F.3d at 1204 (stating that the Holdings: 0: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 1: holding the protective order forbidding the deposition of the chairman of the judicial inquiry commission on the grounds of blanket privilege was improper 2: holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific 3: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that it would offend due process to permit criminal prosecution of an individual for invoking a privilege against selfincrimination in hearings before a state legislative commission after having been assured of his right to do so by the chairman members and counsel of the commission", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 117 F.3d 1414 at *3 (4th Cir.1997) (\u201c[b]y definition ... \u00a7 6972(a)(1)(B) excludes waste that no longer presents a danger.\u201d); See also Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that since plaintiff could not show soils under its house presented any threat to public health or environment, RCRA claim could not stand). In Leister, the Court found that plaintiffs failed to show imminent and substantial threat of harm to human health simply by pointing to the presence of a pollutant on their dairy farm, because drinking water from the well was the \u201cmost direct pathway of exposure,\u201d but a filtration system had eliminated any threat. Id.; accord Two Rivers Terminal, L.P. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 96 F.Supp.2d 432, 446 (M.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>). . Similarly, Defendant cites to Tilot Oil, Holdings: 0: recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed 1: recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater 2: holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted 3: holding that mere presence of contaminants in groundwater could not prove imminent and substantial endangerment to human health where no one was drinking the water 4: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "room. [Michael T. Flannery, First, Do No Harm: The Use of Covert Video Surveillance to Detect Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy \u2014 An Unethical Means of \u201cPreventing\u201d Child, Abuse, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 105, 155-56 (1998).] Courts in other jurisdictions have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., Buchanan v. State, 432 So.2d 147, 148 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in emergency room of hospital); Jones v. State, 648 So.2d 669, 676-77 (Fla.1994) (observing that defendant reasonably could expect that police would not make warrantless seizure of his clothing, not found in plain view, in his hospital room), cert. denied sub nom., Jones v. Florida, 515 U.S. 1147, 115 S.Ct. 2588, 132 L.Ed.2d 836 (1995); Morris v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331,157 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1967) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the order that resulted in Holdings: 0: holding warrantless search of motel room after occupant was arrested outside room for drug possession could not be justified as search incident to arrest absent other exigent circumstances 1: holding that hospital may be held liable for negligence of emergency room physicians under apparent agency doctrine 2: recognizing that at least for certain purposes a hospital room is fully under the control of the medical staff yet for other purposes it is the patients room  because patient understands that nurses doctors food handlers and others enter and exit hospital room in accordance with medical need and hospital routine 3: holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will 4: holding that warrantless seizure of defendants clothing from private hospital room was improper", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was the proper party to authorize the sale, George Bailey signed the revised Consignment Agreement in his official capacity as trustee and general partner of Orchard. Based on Crabtree\u2019s March 13, 1987, letter and the revised Consignment Agreement, Christie cannot assert that it was ignorant of the limitations on Crabtree\u2019s authority. And, \u201cone who deals with an agent knowing that his authority is circumscribed and that the agent\u2019s acts transcends the agent\u2019s powers cannot hold the agent\u2019s principal\u201d liable. State v. West, 796 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Okla.App.1990) (citing Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Wilhoit, 270 P.2d 645 (Okla.1954)) (relating to a claim of apparent authority) (emphasis added); see also Truscon Steele v. Cooke, 98 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir.1938) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>); Hartford Fire Ins. v. McAvoy, 177 Okla. 60, Holdings: 0: holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted 1: holding that the insurer is not bound by acts of the agent which are beyond the scope of his authority when the insured has notice of the limitations upon an agents authority or when the circumstances are sufficient to suggest that an inquiry should be made as to such limitations 2: holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal 3: holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it 4: holding that when an agent has limited authority and informs the third party of this limitation the principal is not bound by the agents actions that exceed that authority", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "so doing, the court cited Mercer v. Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840 (8th Cir.2002), for the proposition that \u201cno liberty interest of constitutional significance is implicated when the employer has alleged merely improper or inadequate performance, neglect of duty or malfeasance.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further explained that \u201c \u2018[describing [Brown\u2019s] conduct as malfeasance due to its capacity to damage public confidence in the [c]ounty\u2019s emergency response system adds little to the reputation injury Brown suffered as a result of the disclosure of the conduct itself.\u2019\u201d Id. \u201c[0]ur Supreme Court has held that absent a pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court, decisions of the inferior federal courts are not binding upon Pennsyl .Supp.2d 487, 498 (M.D.Pa.2011) (<HOLDING>). Due to the weight of authority supporting the Holdings: 0: holding that a similar written reprimand provided to an architect of the capitol employee was not materially adverse because it merely criticized his job performance 1: holding that competency hearing not required when judge alone raises issue of competency 2: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 3: holding that statements did not satisfy stigma prong because they concerned only professional competence 4: holding that statements did not stigmatize employee because they concerned competency and job performance", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Hicks nor White may be held personally liable for acts occurring within the scope and course of their employment. Miss. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-46-7(2). Accordingly, Craddock\u2019s individual claims against the two are dismissed. However, under the MTCA, a governmental entity such as the City may be held liable for Hicks\u2019 actions within the scope of his employment if Hicks \u201cacted in reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury.\u201d Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-46-9(l)(c). Hicks concedes that Craddock was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time of her arrest. Accordingly, the City may be held liable for her arrest if Hicks\u2019 conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard. Maldonado v. Kelly, 768 So.2d 906, 909 (Miss.2000)(<HOLDING>). While reckless disregard is not defined by Holdings: 0: holding that police officer did not exhibit reckless disregard for safety and wellbeing of others by negligently causing auto accident where officer looked both ways at intersection even though view was partially blocked 1: holding that written reprimand stating that officer failed to exercise due care and failed to comply with section 546005 were evidence that officer only acted negligently and did not raise fact issue on reckless disregard 2: holding that it is reasonable  that a police officer at the scene of  an investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety and discussing the various ways an officer may limit such movement 3: holding officers failure to adhere to policy requiring emergency vehicles to come to complete stop and failure to remember looking both ways before entering intersection did not raise fact issue as to whether officer acted in conscious indifference to or reckless disregard for safety of others 4: holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "scope of that license. See Shaver, 74 F.3d at 774-76 & n. 8; Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th Cir.1983). If one receives a license to reproduce and sell five copies, then he may reproduce and sell five copies, but no more. See, e.g., Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831-33 (8th Cir.1992) (finding that promoter was authorized to reprodu f its use exceeds the scope of its license.\u2019 \u201d Shaver, 74 F.3d at 775 n. 8 (quoting S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087); see also S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087-88 (\u201cThe critical question is not the existence but the scope of the license.\u201d); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir.1976) (noting that \u201c[o]ne who obtains permission to use a copyrighted\u201d work \u201cmay not exceed the specific purpo . 311, 314-19 (Bankr.D.Del.2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who has not sustained any damage as the result of a transfer of property cannot seek to set that transfer aside as fraudulent 1: holding that nonexclusive licensees cannot transfer their licenses without prior authorization from copyright owner but that exclusive licensees can transfer licenses without authorization 2: holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock 3: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court 4: holding that transfer was not discipline because transfer neither altered salary nor fringe benefits", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on Behalf of Bartholomew v. Foster, 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 430, 541 A.2d 393, 397 (1988), affd per curiam 522 Pa. 489, 563 A.2d 1390 (1989). We have not hesitated to effectuate the Equal Rights Amendment\u2019s prohibition of sex discrimination by striking down statutes and common law doctrines predicated upon traditional or stereotypical roles of men and women. See Hartford, 482 A.2d at 548 (applying the Equal Rights Amendment to find that the Insurance Commissioner properly disapproved of an automobile insurer\u2019s discriminatory sex-based rates); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635, 639 (1977) (plurality opinion) (\u201cTender years doctrine\u201d offends concept of equality of the sexes embraced in Equal Rights Amendment.); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 Holdings: 0: holding that the equal rights amendment requires that wife as well as husband be permitted to recover for loss of consortium 1: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 2: holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection 3: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 4: holding that the adoption acts failure to require parental consent of unwed father as well as unwed mother violates equal rights amendment", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of G.S. 75-1.1, damages may be recovered either for the breach of contract, or for violation of G.S. 75-1.1 .. . .\u201d Marshall v. Miller, 47 N.C. App. 530, 542, 268 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1980), modified and aff'd, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981). Colonial argues that there should be a division of the breach of contract action and the \u00a7 75-1.1 claim. However, as evidenced by the jury verdict, the breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors is what gave rise to the \u00a7 75-1.1 claim. Moreover, the court will not allow a defendant to divide the breach of contract action and the conduct which aggravated the breach when in substance there is but one continuous transaction amounting to unfair and deceptive trade practices. See Garlock v. Henson, 112 N.C. App. 243, 435 S.E.2d 114 (1993) (<HOLDING>). C Pre-judgment interest may be awarded on Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action 1: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 2: holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract 3: holding that where there was a breach of contract accompanied by aggravating factors that it was proper to treble the breach of contract damages 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953)) \u201c[A]n unwise, or even an unconsidered decision by the union is not necessarily an irrational decision.\u201d Air Line Pilots, supra, 499 U.S. at 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127. The arbitrariness standard has been described as \u201chighly deferential,\u201d id., and \u201cquite forgiving,\u201d Trnka v. Local Union No. 688, 30 F.3d 60, 61 (7th Cir.1994). The Sixth Circuit has stated that, \u201c[i]n essence then, to prevail, a plaintiff has the difficult task of showing that the union\u2019s actions were wholly irrational.\u201d Garrison v. Cassens Tr olding that the establishment of a two-tiered seniority system which favors one group over another is insufficient to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation); Baker v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers, Local 26b, 822 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). In Forte, supra, 2000 WL 377698, *3, an Holdings: 0: holding expert testimony is not required as a per se rule  in bad faith actions 1: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 2: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees 3: holding that unions practice in running a hiring hall that required plaintiffs to run up the stairs to receive a referral slip was demeaning but not arbitrary discriminatory or motivated by bad faith 4: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of his evidence.\u201d). Here, at the time of the court\u2019s involuntary dismissal of the entire petition, Former Husband had not yet finished presenting his casein-chief. Accordingly, \u201c[b]y denying [Former Husband] the opportunity to complete [his] case-in-chief, the trial court denied [Former Husband his] due process.\u201d A.N. v. M.F.-A., 946 So.2d 58, 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The trial court further erred in dismissing the entire multi-count petition based solely on Former Husband\u2019s inability to establish one of the listed grounds for modification. In actions involving numerous counts, dismissal of the entire case is proper only if the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case as to each of the counts. See Xamnad, Inc. v. Patio Cafe, Inc., 486 So.2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Sec. Abstract & Ins. Co. v. Fid. Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court reversibly erred in dismissing the multicount complaint in its entirety when the facts therein supported at least one cause of action 1: holding that the trial court reversibly erred in involuntarily dismissing the case before the plaintiff finished presenting its caseinchief 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 3: holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Therefore, she argues that providing corroboration for her testimony was not reasonably possible. See id. However, while Mary alleges that Ronald threatened her in private, she does not address the lack of corroboration for her other claims. Further, Mary and Ronald did not live in isolation. Mary worked outside the home and visited family members throughout the marriage. Ronald and Mary shared their home with their two adult children and a grandchild who was in Mary\u2019s custody. Neither of the couple\u2019s children, who should have known of Ronald\u2019s cruel and inhuman treatment of Mary, testified at the trial. Their children would have witnessed Ronald\u2019s controlling behavior and the negative impact Mary claims Ronald\u2019s behavior caused on her health. See Cochran, 912 So.2d at 1089 (\u00b6\u00b6 14-15) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 15. Ronald admitted at trial that he had Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 1: holding that nonsignatory wife asserting in her individual capacity claims for damages such as her own mental anguish and loss of consortium earnings companionship society and inheritance lacked the type of privity contemplated for the contracting parties to bind her to a contract that she did not sign in her individual capacity 2: holding that because a claimant testified that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment her failure to take medication for her symptoms is not a clear and convincing reason for discrediting her symptom testimony 3: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 4: holding that wife must provide corroboration for her allegations of cruel and inhuman treatment despite her claim that the parties were isolated", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(Iowa App. 1994) (same); Fox v. Contract Beverage Packers, Inc., 398 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (same); Scott v. Altmar, Inc., 272 Kan. 1280, 38 P.3d 673 (2002) (same); Hoffman v. Nat\u2019l Mach. Co., 113 Mich. App. 66, 317 N.W.2d 289 (1982) (same); Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng'g Co., 312 Minn. 404, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977) (same); Colbert v. Mississippi Marine Corp., 755 So.2d 1116 (Miss.App.1999) (same); Daniels v. Pamida, Inc., 251 Neb. 921, 561 N.W.2d 568 2 Ill.2d 341, 45 Ill.Dec. 126, 412 N.E.2d 477 (1980) (a contract of employment between the borrowed servant and the paving company was found by the acquiescence in and acceptance of the paving company's control and instructions.); Beach v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 F.Supp. 1328 (N.D.Ind.1982), aff'd, 728 F.2d 407 (7th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Bright v. Bragg, 175 Kan. 404, 264 P.2d 494 Holdings: 0: holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity 1: holding that in a bivens action service upon employee in his official capacity does not amount to service in his individual capacity 2: holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date 3: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 4: holding that although plaintiff never considered himself an employee of owenscorning his acquiescence in direct supervision by owenscorning demonstrated an implied contract of service", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cserved by delay in taking legal action.\u201d Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed.Cir.1995) (quoting BP Chemicals, Ltd., 4 F.3d at 977). 6 . Citizen relies primarily on the following two statements: \"The critical language here is the plurality of paths have a substantially equal path length inside the luminescence conversion element. That\u2019s the disputed language in this case\u201d and \"The evidence of infringement is undisputed, that everybody has homogenous white light.\u201d (Gasser Deck, Ex. 11 at 85:17-20 and 89:12-13.) 7 .Plaintiff' also cites to OSRAM's suit in Germany against Citizen, but this is not relevant because it was filed after January 18, 2005. Reasonable apprehension must exist at the time suit was filed. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (<HOLDING>); Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Barry Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed 1: holding that the presence of conclusory terms in a complaint does not insulate it from dismissal when the facts alleged cannot support the charges contained in the complaint 2: holding despite authority for the general proposition that the duty to defend is determined based on the allegations of the complaint that an insurer had no duty to defend where the underlying claim was covered by the policy based on the facts pleaded in complaint but other facts not appearing in the complaint excluded coverage 3: holding that a demand for jury trial should be denied if the issues in the original complaint and the amended complaint turn on the same matrix of facts 4: holding thatjurisdiction depends on the facts existing when the complaint is filed", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "507-08. The statement in this case about which defendant complains is distinguishable from that made by the Harbison attorney and does not amount to ineffective assistance. Trial counsel here was pointing out to the jury that specific intent was lacking in this case and that the lack of specific intent was the only difference between second-degree and first-degree murder. Defense counsel was arguing to the jury that, without specific intent, the most serious crime for which defendant could be convicted would be second-degree murder. This situation differs substantially from Harbison, where the attorney argued, \u201c T think you should find him guilty of manslaughter and not first degree.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 178, 337 S.E.2d at 506. See State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 361, 432 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The statement in the present case does not Holdings: 0: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 1: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder 2: holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways 3: holding that unlike the specificintent crime of firstdegree murder seconddegree murder is a generalintent crime for which the defense of voluntary intoxication is not available 4: holding counsel must only provide relevant facts of the crime", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for its adjusters to follow, (2) failed to train its employees on the specifics of Oklahoma insurance law, and (3) failed to independently investigate Plaintiffs insurance claim. As for Plaintiffs first two allegations of bad faith, we are not persuaded an insurer acts in bad faith under Oklahoma law by simply failing to adopt written standards or provide state-specific training to its employees. We see no basis in the record for a finding of bad faith with respect to Defendant\u2019s general handling of claims and training of employees. As for Plaintiffs third bad-faith allegation, there is no evidence in the record to support a claim that Defendant\u2019s investigation was incomplete or biased in any way. See Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 345 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff further argues Defendant acted in Holdings: 0: holding that even though insurance company could have completed claim investigation more quickly delay was not clear and convincing evidence for jury to determine presence of bad faith 1: holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred 2: holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights 3: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information 4: holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "his or her own statement concerning the lawsuit, which is in the possession, custody or control of any party. Tex.R.Civ.P. 192.3(h). 8 . This was the point at which Madden entered Hilbrich's room and found him deceased. Madden\u2019s statement does not refer to the four calls for assistance contained in Schmidt's statement. 9 . The MLIIA limits liability in any health care liability claim where final judgment is rendered against a physician or health care provider to an amount not to exceed $500,000; however, this limit is adjusted for inflation, or deflation, under a formula based on the consumer price index. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art 4590i \u00a7\u00a7 11.02(a), 11.04 (Vernon Supp.2001). 10 . See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of Houston v. Moore, 43 S.W.3d 553, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] no pet.) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Because this case is not subject to Holdings: 0: holding that prejudgment interest may inelude compound interest 1: holding that prejudgment interest in suit filed before september 2 1987 not governed by article 5069105 section 6 2: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion 3: holding that section 1602 of the mliia which became effective september 1 1995 requires that judgments include prejudgment interest 4: holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(Tex. 1981); Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., 47 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000), aff'd, 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.2001). Appellants were bound by the division orders because they accepted royalty payments based on the unit percentages under the division orders, and they did not revoke the division orders: See Tex. Nat. Res.Code Ann. \u00a7 91.402(g); Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107-08. Section 91.402(h) of the Texas Natural Resources Code does not render obsolete the \u201cexcuse\u201d defense or the longstanding rule that division orders are binding until revoked. Cabot Corp., 754 S.W.2d at 107 \u2014 08; see Sun Oil Co., 626 S.W.2d at 734 (estoppel based on division orders is valid and binding until division order is revoked); Neel v. Killarn Oil Co., 88 S.W.3d 334, 341-42 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), disapproved on other grounds, Hausser v. Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs had waived their right to arbitrate where they had consistently resisted arbitration and only when an unfavorable judgment was entered against them at trial did they seek to compel arbitration 1: recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury 2: holding that the rights of an aggrieved party are substantially affected if the outcome either would have or may have been different had the error not occurred 3: holding that if claimants had signed new division orders they would have waived their rights to a larger royalty payment 4: holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "acted well within its statutory authority in requiring Oncor to prepare and provide the direct-assignment study and did not exercise that authority arbitrarily and capriciously. Next, we consider Oncor\u2019s arguments on the merits of the use of direct assignment in setting wholesale rates. The Commission responds that Oncor\u2019s attempt to engage this Court in consideration of the merits is premature (ie., the issue is unripe) because the Commission has not yet decided to use that methodology in setting Oncor\u2019s rates and is merely exploring the option by requesting further information in the form of the study. We agree with the Commission. See City of El Paso v. Public Util. Comm\u2019n, 839 S.W.2d 895, 923 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1992), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 883 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). The ripeness doctrine aims to conserve Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review 1: holding unripe appellants issue contending that commission failed to consider excess capacity of electric generating unit that was not yet operational 2: holding that although the issue of coverage had not yet been decided appellants action under 8371 was a separate claim and the dismissal of that claim was instantly appealable 3: holding that the appellants claim that the circuit court failed to make specific findings of fact relating to issues raised at an evidentiary hearing on the appellants postconviction petition was not preserved for review because the appellant did not raise the issue in the circuit court 4: holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and plaintiffs believe AIG should reimburse the. United States for those payments: \u201cAIG, et al.\u201d is DEMANDED to REIMBURSE \u201cthe Government, Social Security Department\u201d for \u201call\u201d past paid Social Security Disability Payments made (4/28/1999-present) which [must be] Funded \u201cout-of AIG, et al. legitimately owned Asset\u2019s\u201d \u2014 \u201cAIG, et al.\u201d is the cause in fact of said Disability (i.e\u201e Life-Altering Injuries) and therefore,' Responsible As A Matter of LAW. Regardless, plaintiffs may not bring a social security claim in this court. The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under the Social Security Act. See Addams-More v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 312, 315, aff'd, 296 Fed.Appx. 45 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citing Marcus v. United States, 909 F.2d 1470, 1471 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>)). The statute at 42 U.S.C, \u00a7 405(g) (2012) Holdings: 0: holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over claim for interim social security benefits during pendency of administrative proceedings 1: holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms 2: holding that the tucker act gives the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction over cda claims only when a decision of the contracting officer has been issued under section 6 of the cda  3: holding that the tucker act does not provide independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases 4: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it, inquired about whether he was on probation or had any warrants and if he could run a records check). For a police officer\u2019s verbal inquiries to amount to a seizure, \u201csomething more than just asking a question, requesting information, or seeking an individual\u2019s cooperation is required of an officer\u2019s conduct.\u201d State v. Backstrand, 354 Or 392, 403, 313 P3d 1084 (2013). That \u201csomething more\u201d can be \u201cthe content or manner of questioning, or the accompanying physical acts by the officer, if those added factors would reasonably be construed as a \u2018threatening or coercive\u2019 show of authority requiring compliance with the officer\u2019s request.\u201d Id. (quoting Ashbaugh, 349 Or at 317); see also, e.g., State v. Zaccone, 245 Or App 560, 563-67, 261 P3d 1287 (2011), rev den, 355 Or 381 (2014) (<HOLDING>). In light of the circumstances here, Haugen\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation 1: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 2: holding that the defendant was not seized when two officers approached the defendant on a public street and asked him questions 3: holding that a mistrial was not required after a police officer testified that he had once chased the defendant after the defendant had fired a gun where the testimony was a logical response to the prosecutors questions the statement was not made maliciously the evidence against the defendant was great and the jury was instructed to disregard the testimony 4: holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of care, or proximate cause. The only expert testimony in the record concerning the standards of care applicable to the settling defendants, any breach of those standards of care, or any proximate cause is, as pointed out by Chesser, wholly conclusory and constitutes no evidence. See, e.g., Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711-12 (Tex.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1799, 140 L.Ed.2d 939 (1998). For example, Dr. Stephen Koch, one of Chesser\u2019s experts whose testimony Appel-lees point to as providing evidence of the settling defendants\u2019 standard of care, breach, and causation, simply testified: Q. You render opinions as an \u2014 as an expert witness in this case that Dr. Dad-dyo \u2014 Adedokun was neg 820 (Tex.2009) (<HOLDING>); Coastal Transp. Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Holdings: 0: holding evidence legally insufficient 1: holding evidence legally insufficient to support causation because patels opinions were conelusory and provided no evidence 2: holding evidence legally sufficient 3: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement 4: holding evidence legally insufficient to support causation because dr beyler may be qualified in fire research but his testimony in this case lacks objective evidencebased support for its conclusions", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "omitted). The listing for mental retardation sets out four distinct ways to establish disability. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, \u00a7 12.05(A)-(D). We focus here on hsting \u00a7 12.05(C): \u201c[m]ental retardation refers to significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period: i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22\u201d and \u201c[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.\u201d Mr. Smith correctly argues that the ALJ did not specifically address fisting \u00a7 12.05(C). The ALJ cites to the standard for e 214 (10th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Smith believes that the ALJ failed at Holdings: 0: holding failure to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law did not preclude meaningful appellate review 1: holding meaningful appellate review is impossible where it would require drawing factual conclusions on al js behalf and court would not be reviewing for substantial evidence 2: holding that reviewing courts will review the engineers decision for substantial evidence 3: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 4: holding it is impossible to apply the substantial evidence test where the alj has failed to sufficiently explain his decision", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 181 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Jones, 529 U.S. at 852-54, 120 S.Ct. 1904. In contrast to Jones, the instant statutes, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 401, 3559(a)(1), and their terms are neither ambiguous, nor are they susceptible to two potential interpretations. Thus, the principle in Jones of choosing between two viable constructions does not apply to the instant action. As in the present case, when the language of the statute is not open to another intellectually honest interpretation, the proper course of action is to adopt the plain meaning of the statute while highlighting the awkward or unwise result to Congress for it to amend the statute. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (<HOLDING>), superseded by 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367 (1990 Supp.) Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims had pendant jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that was part of the same case as a claim over which the court of federal claims had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc  1498b 1: holding that exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claims was proper on the basis of supplemental jurisdiction even though the plaintiffs had erroneously claimed diversity jurisdiction because a legitimate federal question was also presented and the state law claims formed part of the same case or controversy as the federal claim 2: holding that a court may exercise pendant personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant with respect to state law claims that arise out of a nucleus of operative facts common to a federal antitrust claim 3: holding that a federal court may adjudicate claims for which there is no independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction if the nonjurisdictional claims are related to other claims for which the does have jurisdiction 4: holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). Our courts have recognized the authority of a trial court to grant a verdict in arrest of judgment to prevent entry of judgment on the insufficiency of the indictment or some other fatal defect appearing on the face of the record. Id. at 286, 337 S.E.2d at 886 (Ness, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Brown, 201 S.C. 417, 23 S.E.2d 381 (1942) (ruling that motion for arrest in judgment should have been granted where trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose sentence); State v. Cooler, 30 S.C. 105, 8 S.E. 692 (1889) (finding that the fact a juror was a member of the grand jury that indicted defendant was not grounds for arrest of judgment); State v. Jeter, 47 S.C. 2, 24 S.E. 889 (1896) (<HOLDING>); State v. Blakeney, 33 S.C. 111, 11 S.E. 637 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 1: holding that trial court erred in denying motion for judgment of acquittal when state failed to prove venue 2: holding trial court erred in denying defendants motion for arrest of judgment where indictment was insufficient 3: holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds 4: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "immunity because its contract with a federal agency was not the result of lobbying, and did not involve the First Amendment right to petition the government. Because that case concerned copyright misuse, the Ninth Circuit gave this issue cursory treatment. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled, in the company of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, that a so-called commercial exception to antitrust immunity does not exist. See In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 86 (9th Cir.1982); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1572 (11th Cir.1996) (rejecting as erroneous district court\u2019s reliance on \u201cperceived commercial exception\u201d). See also Independent Taxicab Drivers\u2019 Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607, 613 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted)\u2014a circumstance not unlike Holdings: 0: holding that the government contractor defense applies in situations in which the government makes the informed decision not to include a specification or require a warning because in the governments view one would be unnecessary or problematic 1: holding in land use situations courts have concluded in order for a regulatory takings claim to be ripe there must be a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue 2: holding that noerrpennington extends to situations where the government enters into a contractual relationship with a private entity at least in situations where the government engages in a policy decision and at the same time acts as a participant in the marketplace  3: holding that the government may intervene in the marketplace to protect consumer welfare 4: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "caused by Visa\u2019s absence from this litigation. Any such harm would result from FIFA\u2019s alleged conduct in awarding Visa sponsorship rights it could not legally give. We would be significantly broadening both Rule 19(a)(2)\u00ae and the principle discussed in Crouse-Hinds if we found that because the outcome of this case may impact a separate contract involving a different party, that finding would transform the action into \u201can action to set aside a lease or a contract.\u201d Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 701 (quoting Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1325). Crouse-Hinds involved an actual .action to set aside a contract; here we have an action that could in the future impact a third party\u2019s rights under a separate contract. We, therefore, do not find Crouse-Hinds controlling here and decline to b Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), we do not find this reasoning applicable Holdings: 0: recognizing actions to quiet title are equitable in nature and a court sitting in equity has jurisdiction to quiet title as a remedy for fraud 1: holding that federal government may not under michigan law attach lien to entireties property to satisfy individual tax liability of one spouse 2: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety 3: holding that a lien holder who is not served and joined as a party to a tax suit cannot have his lien extinguished by the tax sale 4: holding that in an action to quiet title by aggrieved tax payer against government seeking to recover automobiles sold to satisfy tax lien purchasers of automobiles were necessary parties", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 516.16; and (4) A symbol or letter in its records denoting that the Plaintiffs were regarded as section 7(i) exempt commissioned salespeople, as required by 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 516.16. Although the Plaintiffs may be correct that the Defendant failed to comply with the DOL\u2019s recording requirements, such a failure would not result in a finding that the retail-service exemption is inapplicable. Rather, this Court has determined that, when an employer fails to comply with the DOL\u2019s recording requirements, the Court should simply issue an injunction requiring the employer to comply with those requirements in the future. Reich v. Cole Enter., Inc., 901 F.Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.Ohio 1993), aff'd, 62 F.3d 775 (6th Cir.1995); see Brennan v. Valley Towing Co., Inc., 515 F.2d 100, 111-12 (9th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, even though the Defendant may Holdings: 0: recognizing that when the employer had failed to comply with the reporting requirements of 29 cfr  5162 an order requiring prospective compliance was proper but that additional sanctions for the past violation were not necessary 1: holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record  even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions 2: holding that substantial compliance with the requirements for maintaining nonimmigrant student status under 8 cfr  2142f does not constitute substantial compliance with the requirements for obtaining an extension of stay under 8 cfr  2141c 3: holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined 4: holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the complaint. Gregorian, 871 F.2d at 1523; Pena, 770 F.2d at 815. Hammer contends that he first learned of the complaint approximately two years after it was filed. The bankruptcy court concluded that appellees effected service when they sent, by first class mail, a summons and complaint to Hammer at the address listed on his bankruptcy petition. Service in this fashion is expressly authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b)(9). Hammer initiated these proceedings by filing his petition, and it was his responsibility to apprise the bankruptcy court of his forwarding address. See Pena, 770 F.2d at 815 (affirming default judgment where defendant foreign corporation failed to provide correct address to state licensing authority); see also In re Muzquiz, 122 B.R. 56, 59 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tex.1990) (<HOLDING>). Hammer was properly served under the Holdings: 0: holding that rule 415f worked to cure deficiencies in service of process in action to enforce a judgment lien on real estate where service was provided at debtors last residential address known to lienholder because address was used during underlying lawsuit lienholders attorney checked county record to verify address information debtor did receive summons and residential address was on the former situs of debtors business 1: holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there 2: holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss 3: holding service not defective where debtor had failed to notify court of his new address 4: holding service of process defective when the return receipt is not signed by the addressee", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the maximum allowed homestead exemption by that amount. See, e.g., In re Stanley, 2010 WL 2103441 at *1 n. 1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 20, 2010) (finding that a debt- or\u2019s available wildcard exemption was limited to any available amount not claimed under a homestead exemption). 15 . As a result of the court\u2019s amendment of Provision A to reflect a combined homestead exemption of $60,000.00, this figure is also incorrect. 16 .\"The exemptions provided in The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(d), are not applicable to residents of [North Carolina], The exemptions provided by this Article and by other statutory or common law of this State shall apply for purposes of The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(b).\u201d N.C. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 lC-1601(f). See In re Connor, 419 B.R. 304, 306 (Bankr.E,D.N.C.2009) (<HOLDING>); In re Cain, 235 B.R. 812, 815 Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce 1: holding that north carolina has jurisdiction over a claim arising from an accident in mississippi because the original offer of employment was accepted over the telephone while the employee was in north carolina 2: holding that because north carolina has opted out of the exemptions provided under 11 usc  522d the exemptions available for bankruptcy debtors in north carolina depend upon the law of north carolina 3: holding that a debtor is required to claim any exemptions under north carolina law because north carolina is an opt out state under 11 usc  522b 4: holding that north carolina court lacked personal jurisdiction over illinois bank even though some of its customers resided in north carolina and loan proceeds were used in north carolina", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the district court erred in enhancing their sentence based upon a conviction subsequent to another conviction found in the same proceedings. The Smith court rejected the defendants\u2019 argument that Apprendi required that the jury make specific findings as to whether the multiple counts qualified as subsequent offenses under \u00a7 924(c)(1)(C). Id. The Smith court averred that \u201c[bjecause Ap-prendi does not apply to increases of the mandatory minimum, Harris, Deal, and McMillan preclude the Appellants\u2019 argument.\u201d Id. at 349; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (upholding a statute that permitted a sentencing court to find facts that raised the mandatory minimum sentence); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We cannot hold that Deal has been overruled Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida in postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision 1: holding that decision in penn survives lehmann 2: holding that where a conviction survives an apprendi challenge under plain error review a sentence appropriate for that conviction also survives 3: holding that the decision in mcmillan survives apprendi 4: holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "argues that, even if he was delivered to the State of California under Article 14, UCMJ, the issuance of a military discharge certificate (Form DD-214) while he was still in civilian custody vitiated the article, thereby terminating military jurisdiction over him. The cases cited by the petitioner in support of his argument are inapposite. They address the issue of jurisdiction in the context of an accused awaiting trial on pending charges before a court-martial. In this case, jurisdiction over the petitioner had already attached before issuance of his dishonorable discharge certificate; it continues through sentence and punishment. Rule for Courts-Martial 202(c)(1), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.). See also Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 24 L.Ed. 1118 (1878)(<HOLDING>). The issuance of the discharge certificate Holdings: 0: holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 1: holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a  2241 petition 2: holding that principle of continuing jurisdiction permitted execution of military sentence despite lapse of many years and appellants severance of all connection with the military 3: holding that  2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence 4: holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "examining radiologist, determined that an x-ray of the claimant\u2019s left knee was normal. (Tr. 547), that Dr. Chaplynsky stated that an x-ray of the lumbar spine showed no evidence of fracture or malalignment, and that Dr. Saluja observed that an MRI of the lumbar spine was normal. (Tr. 547). As will be explained below, the Court finds that Third Circuit precedent does not mandate substantial weight to be given to VA disability determinations, the ALJ gave sufficient consideration to Plaintiffs VA disability rating, and the weight accorded to the VA rating is supported by substantial evidence. i. VA Disability Compensation The VA disability rating process is substantively different from the social security disability determinations. See e.g., Bowyer v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 549, 552 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Hannington v. Sun Life & Health Ins. Co., 711 Holdings: 0: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 1: holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding 2: holding social security disability payments and military disability payments are separate property after dissolution of marriage 3: recognizing that there are significant differences in the definition of disability under the social security and va systems 4: holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "435 U.S. 313, 319, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978), and Congress exercised its authority to regulate and define the government of the Virgin Islands through the Organic Act, originally passed in 1936, and substantially revised in 1954 (when it became known as the Revised Organic Act (\u201cROA\u201d)). See 48 U.S.C. \u00a7 1541 et seq. The keystone of the government\u2019s argument is that while the ROA lists the specific provisions of the United States Constitution that are applicable to the Virgin Islands, it omits any mention of the Eleventh Amendment. The United States argues that the deliberate omission of the Eleventh Amendment expresses Congress\u2019s intent to exclude the Virgin Islands from the protections afforded by that Amendment. See Gov\u2019t of V.I. v. Bryan, 818 F.2d 1069, 1072 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The GVI counters with cases such as Harris v. Holdings: 0: recognizing that any attributes of sovereignty the virgin islands has derive from the revised organic act 1: holding that amendment to bankruptcy act was unconstitutional because it infringed upon state sovereignty 2: recognizing that virgin islands supreme court would essentially have the final word on the interpretation of local virgin islands law 3: recognizing the virgin islands legislature as the sovereign author of local jurisdictional law including section 39c even before passage of the 1984 amendments to the revised organic act sometimes referred to as the virgin islands constitution 4: recognizing that palmyra is under united states sovereignty", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by a prosecution witness, that there was a third individual involved in the October 8 robbery \u2014 specifically, a second individual riding in the van. Notably, counsel observed that the jury had \"all the instructions on aiding and abetting,\u201d and he did not accept the court\u2019s invitation to comment further on the court\u2019s proposed response. 6 . Under the Government\u2019s theory of the case, Hopson appeared on the scene of the crime as the driver of the getaway van. 7 . We agree that the Government adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional element as presently interpreted by this court. For example, Sanese's owner testified that S\u00e1nese uses money from its vending machines to purchase a variety of out-of-state goods. See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). 8 . We note that Hopson apparently failed to Holdings: 0: holding that because the victims which were robbed of money by the defendant did substantial business in beer wine and tobacco products virtually none of which originated in the state where the victims did business the government had demonstrated a de minimis effect on interstate commerce 1: holding that the requisite effect on interstate commerce for a 18 usc  1951 conviction is demonstrated by inter alia evidence that restaurant robbed by defendant had often purchased food products from outofstate vendors and that the money taken by defendant would have been used to buy more food products 2: holding that dairy products that originated outside of texas and shipped to texas then stopped in dallas were part of a continuous movement in interstate commerce the truck drivers who delivered the products locally in texas were engaged in interstate commerce for purpose of the motor carrier act exemption 3: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 4: holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to include all his arguments in one petition. Therefore, we cannot expect that he would have known that the effect of the delay, over which he had no control, would be the loss of his ability to file a petition at all. The facts of this case constitute one of the rare occasions in which equitable tolling under AEDPA is appropriate. The court chose to accommodate the government\u2019s delay in providing King with the voir dire transcripts by issuing a modified scheduling order and in doing so equitably tolled the statute of limitations, given the circumstances of this case. See In re Maughan, 340 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir.2003) (ordering time to file extended until the adverse party produced missing documents); Glamer v. United States Dep\u2019t of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Otherwise, the government could prevent any Holdings: 0: holding under the federal tort claims act that plaintiff armed with the facts about the harm done to him is obligated to protect himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community and to excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations statute 1: holding that because the va failed in a legal duty to glarner by not providing him with the proper form his claim under the federal torts claim act was equitably tolled 2: holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations 3: holding that  2401b of the ftca can be equitably tolled 4: holding that because the pro se plaintiff failed to raise a claim under the rehabilitation act we would not consider this claim for the first time on appeal", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or applying these statutes, Cable One argues classifying it as a telecommunications company under A.R.S. \u00a7 42-14401 is contrary to these authorities. We reject this argument. These authorities concern regulation, not taxation. \u00b6 47 Although Congress and the FCC have imposed various regulations on VoIP providers and have preempted a variety of efforts by the states to regulate VoIP providers, neither Congress nor the FCC has taken any action to preempt state taxation of VoIP providers. See generally Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024 (excluding voice services utilizing Internet protocol for which there is a charge from moratorium barring state taxes on \u201cInternet access\u201d); In re Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22404, \u00b6 1 (2004) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm\u2019n. v. F.C.C., Holdings: 0: holding that state laws must yield to federal law when the former poses a substantial threat to federal laws ability to accomplish its mission 1: holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation 2: holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims 3: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 4: holding that in interpreting a contract we look to the conflict of laws rules of  the forum state  to determine which states laws will be controlling", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ford Motor refused. The parties thereafter appeared before the Policy Board, which affirmed the notice of termination, effective 30 days thereafter. Lanham Ford then filed suit in the Prince George\u2019s County Circuit Court, following which the case arrived here. Lan-ham Ford complains that Ford Motor provided it with insufficient due process prior to and during the hearing before the Policy Board and asks this Court to grant it a new hearing with additional due process rights. III. In its Motion to Remand, Lanham Ford argues that Ford Motor has failed to present prima facie evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold for federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1332(a); see also Lupo v. Human Affairs Int\u2019l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273-4 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). It reiterates the argument that the object of Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the party seeking to exercise jurisdiction by clearly alleging facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction 1: holding that the burden is on defendant as the party invoking removal jurisdiction to establish the existence of a sufficient amount in controversy 2: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 3: holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "complaint. See also Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cAn employer\u2019s belief that an employee is unable to perform one task with an adequate safety margin does not establish per se that the employer regards the employee as having a substantial limitation on his ability to work in general.\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994); Partlow v. Runyon, 826 F.Supp. 40, 43-44 (D.N.H.1993) (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir.1986) (\u201c \u2018An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped [under the Rehabilitation Act] simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job.\u2019 \u201d)). See also, Horton v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 1993 WL 356894 *4 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 3, 1993) (<HOLDING>). B. Is Plaintiff a \u201cQualified Individual with Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs evidence showing that defendant refused to allow her to work as flight attendant because of her weight failed to demonstrate that defendant perceived her as substantially limited in any major life activity 1: holding that evidence of discussions with a supervisor regarding a health condition submission of various doctors notes to a former supervisor hospitalization and the occurrence of several telephone calls reporting her hospitalization was insufficient to show a record of disability because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her impairment substantially limited a major life activity 2: holding that plaintiffs attempt to amend her allegations through opposition would not be allowed inasmuch as complaint did not identify any major life activity that had been jeopardized due to her alleged mental impairment 3: holding that evidence that defendant provided plaintiff with certain accommodations for her condition was insufficient to establish that defendant regarded her as disabled for purposes of ada absent showing that the defendant maintained any misperceptions about her condition 4: holding that plaintiffs claim that she was disabled because her major life activity of breathing was substantially limited by her respiratory condition would provide a basis for protection under the ada", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cannot be materially distinguished. The officers initiated the search of this automobile without consent or probable cause. Only under the proper circumstances may an automobile be validly searched as a search incident to arrest. Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss.1979). This ease did not present the proper circumstances constituting a valid search incident to arrest. Without relying on hindsight, the analysis does reach the point where the officers allegedly smelled marijuana since they were unlawfully in the automobile in the first place. Townsend was away from the car when arrested, and the car was closed up for towing. He had no access whatsoever to the car at the time of the search. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864-65, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The majority has essentially looked at the Holdings: 0: holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle 1: holding that search of golf bag was not legal as search incident to arrest because it was not in passenger compartment of vehicle or otherwise within arrestees immediate control 2: recognizing that permissive search of car compartment incident to arrest is based on the fact that compartment is within reach of the arrestee 3: holding police incident to arrest of occupant of automobile may search entire passenger compartment of vehicle 4: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "judgment entry makes clear that what the district court did was properly, albeit belatedly, decide questions of law on the basis of undisputed facts. The interpretation of an insurance policy presents a question of law for the court, not the jury, to decide. See, e.g., Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 (8th Cir.1996); Marren v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 84 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.1996). Although the district court should have recognized appellants\u2019 right to a jury trial, the district court correctly decided that it, and not the jury, was the decision-maker on the issue of contract interpretation, even though it effected that decision by improperly declaring the jury advisory. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gerhardt Enterprises, Inc., 40 F.3d at 191-93 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637, 645 Holdings: 0: holding that a trial courts judgment must comply with the statutory requirement that the judgment contain written findings of fact and conclusions of law 1: holding that court is not required to state findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying  3582 motion 2: holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment 3: holding courts attempt to recognize actual jury verdict was improper in wake of landgraf but affirming judgment on basis of courts own findings of fact and conclusions of law 4: holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on the merits, and it is undisputed that he was in no way involved in the condemnation proceedings that were conducted in the state court action. The parties agree that the declaration of taking was not filed against Koschoff until July 1, 2010 \u2014 a full fifteen years after the conclusion of the other plaintiffs\u2019 condemnation proceedings. Both claim and issue preclusion require that the parties in a prior and latter suit be identical or in privity to each other. See Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 42-43 (Pa.Super.2000) (res judicata requires identity of persons and parties to both actions; an issue may be precluded if the party against whom it was asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case). Koschoff was n, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, the doctrine prevents \u201ccases Holdings: 0: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 1: holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review  of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions 2: recognizing district court application of the same rule 3: holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar 4: holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "2005). 2 . This court has not prohibited the filing of successive motions under rule 3.800(b)(2) so long as the motions are filed prior to th\u00e9 initial brief. Generally, we try to accommodate counsels\u2019 efforts to resolve sentencing issues for defendants while they still have legal representation. There is a point, however, where such motions can become an abuse of the system. In this case, all of the issues raised in .the second motion could have been discovered in time to be filed with the initial motion. 3 .We note that in Conroy we stated that the period could be extended for good cause, but not after it had expired. 933 So.2d at 687. 4 . We are aware that some existing case law has reviewed similar issues under rule 3.800(b). See Yisrael v. State, 938 So.2d 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). 5 . We note that although Mr. Griffin's cost Holdings: 0: holding the constitutional issue was not preserved and thus declining to issue an advisory opinion 1: holding that the issue of the applicability of section 8211 of the real property article to the facts of the case had not been preserved for appellate review where the issue was raised for the first time in the appellants motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 2534 2: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   3: holding a crime and time letter admissible where issue was preserved by motion under rule 3800b 4: holding under former circuit court rule 76 the denial of the defendants directed verdict motion was not preserved for appeal where he failed to renew the motion after presenting evidence", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "inquiry, then, the Board had no reason to consider the absence of enforcement. Finally, Guardsmark argues that the Board erred, by failing to consider the chain-of-command rule\u2019s purpose, namely \u201cto establish a method for efficiently reporting problems and having problems resolved- [in order .to] maintain an orderly work progression and resolve problems in a prompt manner.\u201d Guardsmark\u2019s Opening Br. 15. Although efficient resolution of disputes - may well represent a valid business purpose, Guardsmark never argued, neither here nor before the Board, that this purpose represents a special circumstance necessary to employee discipline or company production. Cf. Stanford Hosp.; 325 F.3d at 338 (citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492-93, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 57 L.Ed.2d 370 (1978)) (<HOLDING>). Nor did the company argue, as it must to Holdings: 0: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 1: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 2: holding that in the context of solicitation rules such circumstances are required to justify restrictions on solicitation during nonworking time 3: holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition 4: holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a claim under \u00a7 1500, the claim pending in another court must arise from the same operative facts, and must seek the same relief.\u201d Id. Because the claim in the district court sought \"distinctly different\u201d relief than the claim in this court, this court was not divested of jurisdiction under \u00a7 1500. Id. at 1554. 11 . Because the court finds that plaintiffs did not have a claim \u201cpending\u201d in the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts when they filed in this court, the court need not address whether their \u201cclaims\u201d are the same in both courts for the purposes of \u00a7 1500. Cases in this court that have involved later-filed district court actions have not been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under \u00a7 1500 even if both claims were the same. See Hardwick, 72 F.3d at 885 (<HOLDING>); Teegarden, 42 Fed.Cl. at 255 n. 3 (\"The court Holdings: 0: holding that notice of appeal did not divest the district court of jurisdiction at the time it was filed because a motion for reconsideration was pending 1: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 2: holding that the laterfiled district court action did not divest this court of jurisdiction even though the court below had found that there was no material difference in the operative facts in the two actions and were the same claims for the purposes of  1500 3: holding that summary judgment on one claim that reduced amount in controversy below statutory minimum did not divest court of jurisdiction 4: holding that a 19day difference between the filings of the state court and federal court actions was immaterial given the absence of progress in the statecourt action and the substantial proceedings that had occurred in the federal court action", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "viewed with caution, considering the incentives to lie in order to avoid punishment or to shift blame to another person. Id. (citing Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)); Cantelon, 85 S.W.3d at 460 (noting same policy served by article 38.141 regarding informants); see Burton v. State, 442 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (approving instruction). When the State relies upon testimony that is required by statute to be corroborated, it is error for the trial court not to instruct the jury that the defendant cannot be convicted on such testimony unless there is other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense and that evidence showing only the commission of the offense is insufficient. See, e.g., Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 690 (same); Holdings: 0: holding that failure to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony must be carefully scrutinized weighed with great care and received with caution was plain and reversible error 1: holding failure to instruct jury on requirement of corroboration of informants testimony is error 2: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error 3: holding failure to instruct jury as to requirement of corroboration of accomplice witness testimony was error 4: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "property be abruptly and unexpectedly plucked from the embrace of the person, not from that person\u2019s figurative biosphere,\u201d and reversed a conviction where the victim\u2019s purse was sitting on the bench beside her when it was taken. Here, Thomas argues that the jury instruction allowed the jury to convict if the property was taken from \u201cthe custody of the victim.\u201d Thomas did not object to the instruction, however, and thus is entitled to relief only if the instruction can be said to constitute fundamental error. An erroneous instruction rises to the level of fundamental error where \u201cthe error in the instruction relate[s] to an element of the crime that is a contested issue.\u201d Caldwell v. State, 920 So.2d 727, 731 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 369 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862, 863 Holdings: 0: holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis 1: holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error 2: holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review 3: holding jury instruction that inaccurately defines element of crime is fundamental error if the inaccurately defined  element is disputed and the inaccurate definition is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict  4: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Rule 56 motion. Therefore, summary judgment in granted in favor of the Defendants as to the allegations of inequitable conduct. Summary judgment is denied as to the allegations of prior art and prior sales insofar as they repeat the allegations on that issue which are set forth in Court I of the Amended Complaint. 4. Count V: Defamation And Trade Libel The Plaintiffs cannot recover on their claim that the Defendants disparaged the Plaintiffs or the Plaintiffs\u2019 products through knowingly false accusations of infringement unless the accusations of infringement were false. See El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 623 F.Supp. 1038, 1043-44 (E.D.N.Y.1985), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under the law of New York, the Holdings: 0: holding that police report of witnesss statement was inadmissible because witness had not adopted report as accurate when matter was fresh in his memory 1: holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that investigative report regarding potential premises liability claim was protected work product 3: holding that an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the uniform commercial code is a product liability action within the meaning of the products liability act if as here the action is for injury to person or property resulting from a sale of a product 4: holding that nyciv rights l  74 forbids liability for the publication of a substantially accurate report of any judicial proceeding and this provision applies to an action for product disparagement", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "performance on the contract, potential errors in the work performed, and the ultimate breach of contract where MLS stopped all performance. Since the breach of contract stems from the performance or lack of performance of professional services, the proper statute of limitations is KRS 413.245. II. Gardiner\u2019s cause of action has accrued and is time barred Cross-appellant, WHF asserts that even if the proper statute of limitations is KRS 413.245, the action is not time barred because the action against MLS has not yet accrued. In particular WHF asks this Court to hold that damages would not accrue until the damages are \u201cfixed and nonspeculative.\u201d Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent, 882 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Ky.1994). See also Meade County Bank v. Wheatley, 910 S.W.2d 233 (Ky.1995) (<HOLDING>). Such a standard would toll the statute of Holdings: 0: holding that for setoff purposes    a debt is due when the bank has the power to deem the debt due not when the bank actually exercises that power 1: holding that damages were not fixed until a bank actually sold certain property and the deficiency between the price of the house and debt owed was apparent 2: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 3: holding that vehicle debt imposed on debtor by divorce court was debt owed to or recoverable by financing bank not exwife so not a domestic support obligation 4: holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "James\u2019s wife, Kellie James, about a statement from his former wife, Glenda Kyser: \u201cIsn\u2019t it true ma\u2019am that Glenda Kyser told you, warned you when you got together with Mr. James that you better watch out for any kids that you have because of sexual abuse?\u201d ROA, Vol. I at 26 (quoting transcript from second trial). Ms. James denied having that conversation with Ms. Kyser. Id. Mr. James argued in his petition that because \u201cMs. Kyser was not at trial for [him] to confront or cross-examine in open court,\u201d the prosecutor\u2019s question violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Id. The district court determined the prosecutor\u2019s question was not testimonial and therefore did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (<HOLDING>). The district court concluded appellate Holdings: 0: holding that testimonial statements are subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause even if they are otherwise admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances 1: holding of crawford applies only to testimonial hearsay 2: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 3: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings 4: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "NODs. Respondent\u2019s Br. 16; see 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.109(b) (1990). Procedurally, however, the government\u2019s main argument is that \u201cAG in actuality challenges the June 1985 RO decision regarding the finality of the April 1983 RO decision,\u201d Respondent\u2019s Br. 10-11, and that AG can only challenge the 1985 decision through a CUE claim as a result of that decision\u2019s finality. The government further states that \u201cAG had an opportunity to directly appeal the June 1985 determination and argue the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine ... but he did not do so and that decision also became final.\u201d Id. at 11. Thus, according to the government, a challenge to the 1983 determination would instead have to be brought as a CUE claim. See Cook v. Pnncipi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The government is right that AG did not Holdings: 0: holding that pursuant to 38 usc  5109a a final ro decision may be revised upon a showing of cue 1: holding that a claim before an ro remains pending until a final decision is rendered 2: holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack 3: holding vcaa inapplicable to claim that ro decision contained cue 4: holding that cue existed in ro decision that had reduced veterans benefits where court found that it is evident that cue existed therein", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(quoting DeVetter v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 516 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Iowa 1994)). The plaintiffs assert section 516A.1 evidences a public policy that all automobile insurance policies include UIM coverage unless rejected by the named insured. The public policy underlying the UIM statute is not so broad, however. As we have discussed, this court has consistently recognized that section 516A.1 requires UIM coverage only for persons \u201cwho are protected by the liability coverage.\u201d Hornick, 511 N.W.2d at 373. Here, Scott is not protected by the liability coverage, and therefore, chapter 516A does not require that he be protected by the UIM coverage. Consequently, the public policy of chapter 516A is not thwarted by enforcement of the named driver exclusion. Cf. Lopez, 890 P.2d at 196 (<HOLDING>); Gheae v. Founders Ins. Co., 854 N.E.2d 419, Holdings: 0: holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage 1: holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy 2: holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver 3: holding nearly identical named driver exclusion was plain and unambiguous and excluded claim brought under um coverage 4: holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "are \u201cother than a constituent element of a \u2018criminal prosecution,\u2019 \u201d the Court has held that certain constitutional protections afforded in the context of a criminal prosecution (e.g., Fifth Amendment protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Sixth Amendment\u2019s right to counsel, etc.) are inapplicable in proceedings before a grand jury. See id., at 49, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (citing cases). In light of those holdings, and recognizing the historical function of the grand jury as an independent investigatory body which acts as a buffer between the citizenry and government, the Court has been reluctant to measure the enforceability of grand jury subpoenas against the same standards applicable to search warrants. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346, Holdings: 0: holding that a grand jury subpoena seeking a voice exemplar did not implicate fourth amendment rights but suggesting that even if it had at most the government would have been required to demonstrate that the grand jury subpoena was reasonable 1: holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the fourth amendment when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable 2: holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc  7602 may challenge the subpoena 3: holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena 4: holding that because a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable  the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the subpoena recipient who seeks to avoid compliance but recognizing that a court may be justified under some circumstances in requiring the government to reveal the general subject of the grand jurys investigation before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of persuasion", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the experts must share the same board certification as the defendant physician to testify as to the standard of care at issue. In the present case, it is uncontested that neither expert shares the board certification with the defendant physician, Dr. Nix. Dr. Zenilman and Dr. Vaccaro are not board certified family physicians; Dr. Zenilman is a board certified infectious disease physician (internal medicine with a subspecialty board certification in infectious diseases.) Dr. Vaccaro is a board certified orthopedic neurosurgeon. Since it is uncontested that the experts do not share the same board certification as Dr. Nix, they must fall under exception (e) to qualify under the MCARE Act to provide standard of care testimony. See, Anderson v. McAfoos, 618 Pa. 478, n.5 (Pa. 2012)(<HOLDING>). At this stage in the proceedings, the court Holdings: 0: recognizing subsection e as the sole exception to the boardcertification requirement 1: recognizing exception 2: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 3: recognizing the searchincidenttoarrest exception to the warrant requirement 4: recognizing such an exception", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "time, is essentially moot. The whole issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court was acting without Jurisdiction in entering the Amended Final Judgment of Default hinges on the inclusion of the \u201cexecution issue\u201d language that was included in the Amended Final Judgment of Default. The purpose of such language was to enable Appellee to enforce the judgment. However, at this time, Appellee is not in a position to execute upon or otherwise enforce its rights under the judgment because this Court, in Appeal Number 93-939-CIV-T-17B, set aside the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s damage determination and remanded the case for an evi-dentiary hearing on damages. Such hearing has yet to take place and until is does this issue is essentially moot. See Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION This Court has carefully reviewed Holdings: 0: holding that when an appellate court determines that it lacks jurisdiction the only thing it can do is dismiss the appeal 1: holding that an appeal is properly dismissed as moot when an appellate court lacks power to provide an effective remedy for the appellant should it find in his favor 2: holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original 3: holding that the appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal for his discovery violation allegations 4: recognizing that an effective waiver is not an absolute bar to appellate review", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or discrimination .... \u201d Id. at 49.60.215. The plain tiffs in this case argue that the \u201ctask or function\u201d inquiry \u201cdirectly or indirectly\u201d resulted in discrimination. Pi\u2019s Comp., docket no. 1, p. 20. Washington state courts have noted that state law relating to disability discrimination substantially parallels federal law, and courts should look to interpretations of federal anti-discrimination laws, including the ADA, when applying the WLAD. See Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1229 (E.D.Wash.2001); see MacSuga v. County of Spokane, 97 Wash.App. 435, 442, 983 P.2d 1167 (1999) (commenting in dicta that the WLAD and ADA \u201chave the same purpose\u201d and state courts therefore may look to federal cases for guidance); see also Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs did not address the issue of Holdings: 0: holding that claims under the adea and the nyshrl are subject to the same analysis 1: holding that courts should employ the same analysis to evaluate claims under the ada and the wlad 2: holding the same 3: holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act 4: recognizing the same analysis applies under the wlad and title vii", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as respondent [sic] superior.\u201d It is clear from Sanderson\u2019s complaint and it can not be seriously disputed that Sander-son\u2019s claims against the defendants are for actions taken in their official capacities. [\u00b6 11] For purposes of valid service of process, suing state officials solely in their official capacities, as opposed to suing them in their individual or personal capacities, is tantamount to suing the State itself. See Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 189 (N.D.1991); see also N.D.C.C. \u00a7 32-12.2-03(1) (stating an action for an injury proximately caused by alleged negligence, wrongful act, or omission of state employee occurring within the scope of the employee\u2019s employment must be brought against the State). Cf. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Artis v. Francis Howell North Band Booster Holdings: 0: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity 1: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 2: holding a complaint against a public official or employee must explicitly state it as being brought against the person in the persons individual capacity or else the complaint will be construed as suing the person only in the persons official capacity 3: holding that a plaintiff who wishes to sue a state official in his personal capacity must so specify in her complaint so that if a plaintiffs complaint is silent about the capacity in which she is suing the defendant we interpret the complaint as including only officialcapacity claims 4: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "letter \u201caffects the internal membership decisions\u201d of HC HCEA from admitting desired members and controlling the content of its recruiting speech, but the record shows that HCEA did not adjust its recruiting methods, much less turn away willing members, in response to the Board\u2019s letter. While we must \u201cgive deference to an association\u2019s view of what would impair its expression,\u201d Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653, 120 S.Ct. 2446, we agree with the district court that \u201csuch deference has its limits.\u201d Thus, we need not accept HCEA\u2019s claim of impairment when it has failed to demonstrate how the Board\u2019s letter either disrupts its ability to associate or substantially weakens its message by imposing restrictions on association. See U.S. Citizens Ass\u2019n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Because the Board\u2019s letter did not Holdings: 0: holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause 1: holding that exclusion of religious groups from universitys open forum policy violated the first amendment 2: holding that for purposes of statutory construction expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other 3: recognizing that a court must afford deference to a groups view of what impairs its expression yet finding that the plaintiffs failed to show how the affordable care acts individual mandate significantly burdened the groups expression 4: holding since the sidewalk is a nonpublic forum the regulation must be reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speakers view", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "above the \u201cPhysician\u2019s Signature\u201d line. The court agrees with defendants that Dr. Eisenstein, as limited partner of the Centre, through which he delivers medical services, signed the lien in connection with a debt owed to the Centre. Therefore, this exclusion applies. Defendants also argue that the \u201ccommon ownership\u201d language in \u00a7 1692a(6)(B) excludes Dr. Eisenstein from \u201cdebt collector\u201d status. Kang responds that this section is inapplicable because the Centre is not a limited partnership and Dr. Eisenstein is not a limited partner of a medical provider. However, Kang admits in his Rule 12M Response that Dr. Eisenstein is a partner of the Cen-tre. Courts have broadly interpreted both FDCPA exclusions. See Meads v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 686 F.Supp. 330, 331 (S.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>). Based on the language of the FDCPA, many Holdings: 0: holding that two citicorp affiliates were not debt collectors under fdcpa because they were corporate affiliates of creditors parent corporation 1: holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa 2: holding that fdcpa was intended to protect consumers from communications initiated by debt collectors not consumers 3: holding the de minimis flow of products between the parent and its foreign affiliates ranging from 01 to 6 indicated a lack of corporate unity 4: holding stay would not extend to separate legal entities such as corporate affiliates partners in debtor partnerships or to codefendants in pending litigation", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "consistent with this opinion. 1 . West 2000. 2 . West 2000. 3 . Emphasis added. 4 . Emphasis added. 5 . Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court addressed future costs; they are not at issue here. 6 . In re Soileau, 488 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir.2007) (citing In re Berryman Prods. Inc., 159 F.3d 941, 943 (5th Cir.1998)). 7 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(7). 8 . 260 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1133 (6th ed.1990); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1153 (7th ed.1999)). 9 . See, e.g., Pa. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (\u201cWhen analyzing a bankruptcy statute, the Court, of course, looks to its plain language.\u201d); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43, 107 S.Ct. 353, 93 L.Ed.2d 216 (1986) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Kelly, 479 U.S. at 48 n. 9, 107 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: recognizing that this courts construction of a statute becomes as much apart of the statute as the words of the statute itself and that change is a matter that addresses itself to the general assembly not this court 1: holding that the starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself  quoting blue chip stamps v manor drug stores 421 us 723 756 95 sct 1917 44 led2d 539 1975 powell j concurring 2: holding that if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous a court must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended 3: holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo 4: holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "29, 2003. In the default judgment, the court indicated that it had conducted a hearing on the motion for default judgment on December 16, and was aware of Hogan\u2019s motions to dismiss and opposition to the motion for default judgment. Nevertheless, the court entered judgment against Hogan in the amount of $111,422.50. Hogan correctly argues that the lower court erred in entering a final default judgment against him where the complaint failed to allege any allegations against him, much less allege a cause of action. In Becerra v. Equity Imports, Inc., 551 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the court held that the failure to state a cause of action is a fatal pleading deficiency not curable by a default judgment. See also Bd. of Regents v. Stinson-Head, Inc., 504 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Both of these cases contain quotes from Holdings: 0: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 1: holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor 2: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment 3: holding that any doubt as to the propriety of granting relief must be resolved in favor of the party when the party is not responsible for the error that caused the default judgment 4: holding that party obtaining a default judgment is only entitled to the relief prayed for in complaint", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the March order. The district court in fact denied Liberty\u2019s Motion to Enforce the March order \u201cgiven the non-specific language\u201d thereof, and thus recognized that the March order, in invalidating the DPS as an offset against a dealer\u2019s claimed retail rate, did not preclude Ford from requiring a dealer to substantiate its claimed retail rate. Slip op. at l. This court repeatedly has refused to uphold orders entered as sanctions based on conduct that did not violate a clear, specific mandate. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1342, 1352 (3d Cir.1995) (reversing imposition of sanctions where decree sought to be enforced lacked \u201can unambiguous provision\u201d prohibiting the conduct at issue); Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 771 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald v. Holtzman, Holdings: 0: holding that bjroad nonspecific language in an order does not give a party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt and thus cannot support imposition of sanctions 1: holding that while imposition of the most serious sanctions such as witness exclusion triggers a burnet analysis imposition of lesser sanctions like monetary compensation does not 2: holding that due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond before imposition of rule 11 sanctions 3: holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion 4: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "declared \u201cthat privileges, in general, are not favored in the law and therefore should be strictly construed.\u201d Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857 (R.I.1991) (citing Jordan v. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District, 701 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.1985)). Mindful that the primary function of the judicial process indisputably is truth-seeking, we have \u201cdeclared that privileges do not aid the quest for truth, the core function of the adversary process[.]\u201d Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, oviding for privileges \u201cmust not be used as a shield to obstruct proper discovery of relevant information[.]\u201d Moretti, 592 A.2d at 858 (emphasis added). A party may not hide behind confidentiality to avoid disclosure of unfavorable evidence. See State v. Guido, 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Doe, 717 A.2d 1129, 1135 Holdings: 0: holding letter that came into evidence without objection may be used to establish any material fact 1: holding that a statute providing for confidentiality of medical records may not be used to shield relevant and material evidence from legal process 2: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 3: recognizing records material to selfdefense claim outweigh victims interest in confidentiality 4: recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rights in denying his motion to reopen. \u201cThe decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen ... is within the discretion of the Board....\u201d 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.2(a). Thus, we generally review the BIA\u2019s denial of -.a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. See Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir.2004). The Attorney General contends that we lack jurisdiction to review most Mr. Rodriguez-Reyes\u2019s claims, and the remaining claims are without merit. We agree. A. This Court has no Jurisdiction to Review the BIA\u2019s Removal Order First, we have no jurisdiction to review Mr. Rodriguez-Reyes\u2019s claims related to the BIA\u2019s order affirming the IJ\u2019s denial of his application for cancellation of removal, because he failed to file a timely petition for review of that order. See id. at 1361 (<HOLDING>). We therefore dismiss the petition for review Holdings: 0: holding that we will not review portions of an ijs ruling that are not adopted by the bia 1: holding the bia did not err in affirming the ijs denial of a continuance request where there was no prima facie approvable visa petition pending and alien had not applied for status adjustment 2: holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional 3: holding that review of questions not raised to the bia is barred 4: holding appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review bia order affirming ijs denial of asylum because alien did not file petition for review within 30 days of bia order as required by 8 usc  1252b1", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "effectively vindicate the alleged harm. On this point, the government argues that the true harm from disqualification is grounded in separation of powers. It points out that Congress has mandated that the United States Attorney for each district represent the government in all cases occurring within that district. See 28 U-S-C. \u00a7 547. Further, although not noted by the government, the Constitution grants the Executive the power to \u201ctake care that the laws are faithfully executed.\u201d U.S. Const, art. II, \u00a7 3. Although caselaw is admittedly vague on the exact scope of this power, it is clear that this constitutional provision vests the Executive with substantial discretion in choosing when and how to prosecute cases. See, e.g., United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Holdings: 0: recognizing that prosecutors are vested with wide discretion in determining how and when to file criminal charges 1: holding the tca vests court with authority to grant mandamus relief 2: holding the constitution vests the federal government with exclusive authority over relations with indian tribes 3: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution 4: holding that the constitution vests prosecutors with significant discretion in choosing when and how to prosecute", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "time in their reply brief). The BIA did not violate petitioners\u2019 due process rights. It is undisputed that the BIA mailed its decision to petitioners\u2019 attorney of record, that he received it, and that petitioners failed to inform the BIA of their change of address. Further, the record shows that the IJ told petitioners that they were required to inform the agency if they changed their address and that he gave them the change of address form. We lack jurisdiction to consider petitioners\u2019 remaining contentions because they arise from the agency\u2019s underlying decision to deny cancellation of removal. Petitioners failed to seek review of that decision within the 30-day time limit prescribed by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(1). See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (<HOLDING>). DENIED in part, DISMISSED in part. *** This Holdings: 0: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding that a time limit for filing a complaint as a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings is not jurisdictional 2: holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional 4: holding that the statutory time limit for filing a petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable lolling", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "regarding the Rolling Stone article (Demand No. 16). On January 12, 2016, the court held a hearing on the motion to compel. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. Discussion The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party \u201cmay obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party\u2019s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). \u201cInformation within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.\u201d Id. Moreover, the discovery rules are to be accorded broad and liberal construction. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); see also Care-First of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). If a party fails to produce requested Holdings: 0: holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted  j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery 1: holding that subsequently enacted federal statutes trump the rules of civil procedure 2: recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery 3: holding discovery rules apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953). Under Lauritzen, according to Hawkspere, United States law governs. B. \u201c[W]here the parties specify in their contractual agreement which law will apply, admiralty courts will generally give effect to that choice.\u201d Chan v. Soc\u2019y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir.1997) (enforcing choice-of-law clause in marine passenger ticket). \u201cIn the absence of a contractual choice-of-law clause, federal courts sitting in admiralty apply federal maritime choice-of-law principles derived from the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Lau-ritzen ... and its progeny.\u201d Id.; see Sundance Cruises Corp. v. The Am. Bureau of Shipping, 7 F.3d 1077, 1081 (2d Cir.1993); see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Richards v. Lloyd\u2019s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, Holdings: 0: holding that courts should enforce a choiceoflaw clause when it is part of a freely negotiated private international agreement 1: holding that the trial courts denial of appellants motion to enforce settlement agreement constituted an important issue 2: holding that the union owes its representatives a duty to enforce the terms of the negotiated collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that a court may only enforce a settlement agreement if it constitutes an enforceable contract 4: holding that trial court is without authority to modify a settlement agreement but may enforce and interpret it", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of appeal, Davis learned that neither McCulley nor his sister would be able to pay for the appeal. In his motion, Davis further states that he advised McCulley in writing that he would not represent him on appeal and advised him how to file a pro se appeal. Davis notes further |sthat McCul-ley filed his own notice of appeal and indicated to him that he would pursue the appeal himself. Davis further states that he did not attempt to lodge the record and does not know how the record arrived at the clerk\u2019s office. Nonetheless, Davis states that he does not want McCulley to lose his right to appeal and further states that if the motion for rule on clerk is granted, he intends to file a motion for leave to withdraw. The majority cites Sanders v. State, 329 Ark. 363, 952 S.W.2d 133 (1997) (<HOLDING>), for the proposition that, when an attorney Holdings: 0: holding limited in lupo v lineberger 313 ark 315 317 855 sw2d 293 294 1993 1: holding limited by hammon v state 347 ark 267 66 sw3d 853 2002 2: holding a writ was appropriate when the authorization was not limited as to time and not limited to specific healthcare providers 3: recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 4: holding that lien avoidance under  522f is not limited by state exemptions", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See also Matter of Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d 686, 689 (7th Cir.1992) (finding no district court jurisdiction in the absence of a timely notice of appeal from the bankruptcy court). of appeal within 10 dismissing the peti- But the order refusing to convert the Chapter 7 proceedings from New York into the Chapter 13 proceedings in Illinois was not a final order. It did not bring the Illinois Chapter 13 petition to an end; virtually the entire dispute remained, involving the same parties and the same issues. Even though the concept of finality is relaxed in the bankruptcy context, see In re Jartran, Inc., 886 F.2d 859, 861-62 (7th Cir.1989), this order was interlocutory in the purest sense of the word. See Caldwell-Baker Co. v. Parsons, 392 F.3d 886, 888 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Young, 237 F.3d 1168, 1172-73 Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine 1: holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable 2: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 3: recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment 4: holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.\u201d See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So.2d 81 (Ala.2000). In that case, a copy of a garage-liability policy was attached to the complaint, and the defendant filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. This Court stated that the fact that the garage-liability policy was attached to the complaint and considered by the trial court did not require that Thompson's motion for a judgment on the pleadings be converted to a motion for a summary judgment, citing Wilson v. First Union National Bank of Georgia, 716 So.2d 722, 726 (Ala.Civ.App.1998)(<HOLDING>). JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts consideration of documents attached to the complaint whose identity and authenticity were not in dispute did not require conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for a summaiy judgment 1: holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity 2: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint 3: holding that unauthenticated documents may be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment where the documents were not objected to or their authenticity disputed 4: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable ", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "maximum. The sentences imposed by the district court were below the statutory maximum and within the range prescribed by the Guidelines for the quantity of drugs the court determined to have been involved in the appellants\u2019 crime. Even under pre-Booker law, defendants faced the possibility of sentences anywhere within the applicable statutory range. Id. (internal citation omitted). We therefore found nothing improper in the application of Booker to cases pending on direct review and joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in so holding. See id. (collecting cases). The instant appeal raises the same issue in a slightly different context. That is, Fairclough claims that the District Court (as 005) (same); United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 110-13 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because Fairclough\u2019s ex post facto argument Holdings: 0: holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker 1: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range 2: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause 3: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines created sufficient risk of increased sentencing range 4: holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in sentencing defendant above guidelines maximum where district court assumed guidelines to be advisory prebooker", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the officer to personal jurisdiction where the officer \u201cis a \u2018primary participant\u2019 in the alleged wrongdoing\u201d or \u201chad \u2018control of, and direct participation in the alleged activities.\u2019 \u201d Matsunoki Group, Inc., 2009 WL 1033818 at *3-4 (citing Wolf Designs, Inc. v. DHR Co., 322 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1072 (C.D.Cal.2004), in turn citing Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Wyatt Technology Corp. v. Smithson, No. CV 05-1309 WMB (RZx), 2005 WL 6132329, *6 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 30, 2005) (\u201c[I]f the agent is ... \u2018actively and personally involved in the conduct giving rise to the claim,\u2019 he may be subject to jurisdiction in the plaintiff[\u2019]s forum state,\u201d quoting Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Industries, Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>)); accord Balance Dynamics Corp., 204 F.3d at Holdings: 0: holding defendants could not be guilty as parties when the state failed to show they knew the criminality of the conduct they assisted 1: holding that request for attorneys fees and damages to attached property in a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment  said to be totally unnecessary to the inquiry of the jurisdiction  constituted a submission by defendant to the exercise of jurisdiction over it personally by the court 2: holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents 3: holding that the court could exercise jurisdiction over corporate officers who actively and personally involved themselves in conduct violating the lanham act notwithstanding the fact that the defendants acted as agents when they did so 4: holding corporate officers and board members liable where they were actively engaged in the management supervision and oversight of the corporations affairs", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with the practice both parties followed previously.\u201d Id. at 499. Moreover, in regard to the general practice in the industry regarding the time of payment, the transferee \u201cintroduced testimony ... that it is \u2018common\u2019 in the tracking industry \u2014 even when 30-day payment terms are required by contract \u2014 for payments \u2018to be made over a 30-day period\u2019 (i.e., after 30 days from the date of invoice) and that it is \u2018[v]ery common\u2019 in the industry \u2018that people pass the 30 day period.\u2019 \u201d Id Thus, the Eighth Circuit apparently did not require proof that particular industry members consistently paid late. See also Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 1033 (finding that the evidence showed that \u201cpayment within 30 days is within the outer limits of normal industry practices\u201d); U.S.A Inns, 9 F.3d at 684-85 (<HOLDING>). A similar approach was posited in Holdings: 0: holding that the transferee provided sufficient evidence that its transfer comported with industry standards the transferee proved that probably eight to ten percent of its accounts were on a similar pay schedule as the debtors and that working with delinquent customers as long as some type of payment was forthcoming was common industry practice 1: holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole 2: holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds 3: holding that a trustee is not required to avoid the initial transfer from the initial transferee before seeking to avoid it and recover from subsequent transferees and noting that this conclusion is consistent with case law that has disallowed automatic recovery from a subsequent transferee following the avoidance of an initial transfer through a stipulated judgment or default when the transferee had not been a party to the underlying avoidance proceeding 4: holding that a trustee may settle with an initial transferee and still pursue recovery against a subsequent transferee but notwithstanding the trustee will still be required to prove that the transfers  were fraudulent and improper in connection with its suit against the subsequent transferee because the trustees settlement with the initial transferee did not involve any determination on the merits as to the initial transfers and in this way the subsequent transferee will be afforded its due process rights to contest the avoidability of these initial transfers", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Mfrs. & Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 330 S.C. 152, 498 S.E.2d 222, 226 n. 1 (1998). 9 . See O\u2019Rear v. B.H., 69 So.3d 106 (Ala.2011) (doctor allegedly molested his minor patient); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. D.A.C., 710 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (teacher allegedly molested one of his minor students); see also D.B.C. v. Pierson, 2014 WL 2155017 (N.D.Ala. 2014) (adults who owned modeling agency photographed and published sexual 68 (M.D.Fla. 1989) (under Florida law, 15 year old\u2019s intent inferred); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F.Supp. 815 (D.Alaska 1987) (16 year old\u2019s intent inferred); West Virginia Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 216 W.Va. 40, 602 S.E.2d 483, 493 (2004) (<HOLDING>); Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d Holdings: 0: holding that employers intent may be inferred through circumstantial evidence 1: holding that the rule applies regardless of the comparative fault of the employer versus the employee 2: holding intent may be inferred from large amount of marijuana 3: holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor 4: holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The defendant also argues that this appeal raises an issue of first impression for the appellate courts of this state, namely, whether a court has jurisdiction over a motion for contempt after a once delinquent obligor comes into compliance before a hearing. We note, however, that this court addressed a strikingly similar argument in Rocque v. Design Land Developers of Milford, Inc., 82 Conn. App. 361,844 A.2d 882 (2004). In Rocque, the defendant had argued that \u201cthe court had no jurisdiction to consider the motion [for contempt] because the defendant, at the time [of the hearing], was in compliance. In its memorandum of decision, the [trial] court \u2018emphatically\u2019 disagreed, stating that \u2018[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce its orders an onn. 725, 737, 444 A.2d 196 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Although the trial court found the Holdings: 0: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing a trial courts inherent authority to dismiss a cause of action with prejudice for violations of court orders 3: holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power  to santion attorneys for  violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom   4: recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "6 Section 7 of the NLRA provides that \u201c[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 157. It also broadly protects the right of employees to \u201c \u2018engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.\u2019 \u201d Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 179 Wn. App. 110, 119, 317 P.3d 511 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 157). Picketing intended to induce an emp & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 304-05, 97 S. Ct. 1056, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1977) (no federal preemption of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress although the conduct was arguably an unfair labor practice); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61, 86 S. Ct. 657, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1966) (<HOLDING>). 9 The NLRA permits the NLRB to seek a federal Holdings: 0: holding that state jurisdiction over claims by union members against employer for false arrest false imprisonment and malicious prosecution were not preempted under garmon 1: holding that false statements in a labor dispute that were injurious to employers reputation were not preempted 2: holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative 3: holding the state law claims were not preempted 4: holding that false statements are constitutionally protected", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "see United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000). We have considered Lisi\u2019s remaining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED in part and the appeal is DISMISSED in part. 1 . Lisi also argues Aat he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Touger in connection with Ae motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because Touger failed to submit evidence that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance on Ae part of Zelin. But any such claim would depend on the existence of such evidence, none of which appears in the present record. Accordingly, any such claim would have to be made by a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255. See Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1993) Holdings: 0: holding aat ineffective assistance claims are appropriately brought in  2255 petitions  because resolution of such claims often re quires consideration of matters outside the record on direct appeal 1: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral proceedings not on direct appeal 2: holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be decided on direct appeal where the district court has developed a record on the ineffectiveness issue 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: holding that because ohio law required ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claims be raised in an application to reopen the direct appeal of the criminal case such claims were part of the direct appeal entitling defendant to the assistance of counsel", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "personnel salaries by 2087, the number of working hours in a year. Def.\u2019s Statement at 2-3. The court finds this manner of calculating an hourly rate both reasonable and appropriate. The total number of hours spent and the number of personnel used by defendant, however, were not reasonable. As outlined in this court\u2019s previous order of sanctions, Austin\u2019s misbehavior began with his response to Defendant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 21,1994, and ended with the completion of trial on June 14,1995. Persyn, 35 Fed.Cl. at 711, 713. All fees and costs incurred by defendant before and after this time period shall be excluded from the sanction because the costs were not incurred as a direct result of Austin\u2019s offensive pleading and misconduct. See Hendrix, 971 F.2d at 400-01 (<HOLDING>). Thus, work-hours spent by defendant outside Holdings: 0: recognizing that failure to hold a hearing constitutes ah abuse of discretion only where there is evidence that the jury was subjected to influence by outside sources 1: holding that dismissal of indictment was abuse of discretion when delay attributable to the government was twelve months 2: holding that a trial court should calculate an employers contribution due for the third partys future payments by using affidavits and other evidence to determine a lump sum amount and reduce the amount to its present value as of the date of the contribution judgment 3: holding that approximating the amount of the injured partys expenses attributable to attorney misconduct using a cutoff date was not ah abuse of discretion 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Hudson Court cited Bell with approval and at no point overruled Bell\u2019s holding or analysis. Moreover, Hudson does not stand alone. It is one of a pair of opinions issued the same day on the constitutionality of cell searches. In the other case, Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 1 2 (6th Cir.1988) (ruling Hudson inapplicable in a strip search case because it \u201cdealt with the search of a cell as opposed to the search of an individual\u201d); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that \u201cprison inmates retain protected privacy rights in their bodies, although these rights do not extend to their surroundings\u201d and citing Hudson and Bell); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. Holdings: 0: holding that even after hudson the prisoners privacy interest in the integrity of his own person is still preserved under bell 1: holding that hudson overruled bells assumption and abrogated convicted prisoners fourth amendment rights 2: holding that government has obligation to provide for health needs of incarcerated prisoners 3: holding that governments asserted interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees is substantial under central hudson 4: holding that incarcerated prisoners have fourth amendmentprotected privacy interests after hudson and despite hudsons broad language", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Barman, D.O., and Richard I. Malamut, M.D.), a Crozer-Chester nurse (Nora Marden, R.N.), Joan K. Richards, the president of Crozer-Chester, and John and Jane Doe, a physician and an attorney, respectively. Because our analysis is the same for all of the defendants, we will refer to them collectively as \"defendants.\u201d 3 . Defendants set forth many arguments for why we should dismiss Dr. Klavan\u2019s state law claims; however, because of our determination that the defendants are not state actors and our decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Dr. Klavan s state law claims, we will not address those arguments. 4 . The Supreme Court's 1982 \u201cLugar trilogy\u201d guides our \u201cstate action\u201d inquiry. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 Holdings: 0: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding that a creditors joint participation with the state in a prejudgment attachment transformed the creditor into a state actor for the debtors  1983 claims challenging the validity of the state statutes but not for the creditors alleged misuse of the statutes because that conduct could not be attributed to the state 3: holding that private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the state 4: holding that the creditor did not satisfy the foregoing requirement because it was trying to exercise the avoidance power for itself as a sole creditor not for the benefit of the debtors estate or the creditors as a whole", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "try to read into this brief footnote more than is warranted. In light of the complexity and confusion in the law on this issue, it is hard to believe that this somewhat Delphic footnote will bear the weight which Defendants place on it. 71 . It is noteworthy that cases involving the FTC\u2019s determinations of materiality are consistent with the Court's finding here, even though such cases are brought pursuant to the FTC Act rather than the RICO statute. As a general rule, deceptive advertising or claims permit an inference \"that the deception will constitute a material factor in a purchaser\u2019s decision to buy.\u201d FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 13 L.Ed.2d 904 (1965); see also FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40-43 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); FTC v. Wilcox, 926 F.Supp. 1091, 1098 Holdings: 0: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 1: holding that deceptive advertising touting defendants low tar cigarettes created an inherent tendency to deceive consumers and was material 2: holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers 3: holding that federal law did not preempt commonlaw fraud claim against cigarette manufacturer based on advertising of light cigarettes 4: holding under new york law the issue of whether plaintiffs and class members would have purchased the product had they known an allegedly deceptive advertising claim was false can be established with common proof", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and article I, section 8 to determine if different results might be achieved under the two constitutions because the case only concerns the relatively humble inquiry of whether an alleged grant of consent for police to conduct war-rantless, suspicionless searches pursuant to a parole agreement is voluntary in the constitutional magnitude of the word \u201cvoluntary.\u201d Thus, our decision hinges on the meaning and spirit of consent to justify the government\u2019s intrusion without regard to the constitution. Moreover, consent is an exception to the requirements of both the Iowa and Federal Constitutions, and it would be inconsistent with our judicial role under the circumstances to eschew our state constitution and interpret the issue under the Federal Constitution unless 2d 339, 341 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Some courts have concluded probationers do Holdings: 0: holding that consentsearch provision of a probation agreement was voluntary even though defendant would have been sent to prison if he rejected it 1: holding that defendants testimony that he did not see a provision in the agreement because the plaintiffcounterparty failed to direct him to the provision was insufficient as a matter of law to establish fraud and defendant was therefore bound to the terms of the provision 2: holding probationer voluntarily accepted consentsearch provision by accepting probation 3: holding defendants agreement to consentsearch provision not coerced merely because it was one of two undesirable options 4: holding consentsearch provision in parole agreement was coerced and involuntary", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "have been exhausted. By the same token, the federal habeas tolling provision should not be invoked except when a federal claim remains unexhausted in state court. Tolling is the complement of the exhaustion requirement. We hold, therefore, that a state petition for post-conviction or other collateral review must present a federally cognizable claim for it to toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2244(d)(2). Austin\u2019s post-conviction complaint regarding the missing language of his indictment failed to satisfy this requirement. However, his second complaint in the state post-conviction proceeding, regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, does raise a federal constitutional claim. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (<HOLDING>). But, as noted above, it was filed in the Holdings: 0: holding the sixth amendment right to effective assistance extends to a criminal defendants first appeal as of right 1: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel 2: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 3: holding that defendants are entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel on their first appeal as of right 4: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\u201d 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99. Heeding this mandate, some prevailing case law inclined to the pleading leniency Conley demanded. In securities fraud cases, despite the particularity required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) for averments constituting the circumstances of the fraud asserted and the scienter requirement Hochfelder propounded, some courts permitted generalized pleadings or relaxed specificity of the requisite fraudulent intent to survive motions to dismiss, relying for authority on the language of Rule 9(b) itself, which provides that \u201cmalice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind, may be averred generally\u201d. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); see also Cosmas, 886 F.2d at 12 (noting that Holdings: 0: holding that court may satisfy factual basis requirement by examining presentence report 1: holding that plaintiff may satisfy the state of mind pleading requirement simply by saying that scienter existed 2: holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter 3: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 4: holding that petitioners allegation that it is the owner of adjoining property does not satisfy the pleading requirement", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to consider all three factors of volume, price, and impact.\u201d Id. at 115 (emphasis added). Second, the report indicates that, when \u201cdetermining the effect of [LTFV] imports on the domestic industry,\u201d the Commission must ask whether the imports \u201care materially injuring the domestic industry!,]\u201d id. at 116 (emphasis added), supporting the requirement of a material contribution to the overall harm by the LTFV imports themselves. The Senate Report to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 also states that the \u201claw does not * * * contemplate that the effects from [LTFV] imports be weighed against the effects associated with other factors].]\u201d S. Rep. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 74 (1979). See also Citrosuco Paulista v. United States, 12 CIT 1196, 1228, 704 F. Supp. 1075, 1101 (1988)(<HOLDING>); Metallverken Nederland B.V. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 1: holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury 2: holding that the exclusion from category of compensable injuries of an injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is in the nature of an affirmative defense to employer and that it was not the claimants burden to prove an injury was not idiopathic but instead the employers burden to prove that it was 3: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  4: holding that the commission may not weigh causes and an affirmative injury determination is warranted if ltfv imports contribute even minimally", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(6th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom. Wood v. McMackin, 479 U.S. 1036, 107 S.Ct. 889, 93 L.Ed.2d 842 (1987); Watters v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381, 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837, 105 S.Ct. 133, 83 L.Ed.2d 74 (1984). A. Accidental Homicide Petitioner alleges that the trial court deprived him of his rights to due process of law.and a fair trial by giving incomplete and misleading instructions on accidental homicide. Specifically, petitioner contends that the trial judge did not explain the elements of accidental homicide and removed the concept of innocence in excusable homicide by instructing on negligent, not accidental, homicide. Respondent argues that petitioner is precluded from raising this claim. The Court agrees. Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal. The Michig ) (<HOLDING>). Petitioner therefore is barred from raising Holdings: 0: holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense 1: holding that if the state court addresses both the procedural default and the merits of a federal claim in the alternative a federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim 2: holding that the cause and prejudice standard applies when a state court relies on the procedural default but also discusses the merits 3: holding that aedpa only applies where the state court adjudicated the constitutional issue on the merits 4: holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court denied the motion, but did clarify that \u201cthe Lummi U & A should include nearshore waters immediately to the south of San Juan Island and Lopez Island.\u201d The Lum-mi appealed both the district court\u2019s original decision and its denial of their motion for reconsideration. Standard of Review The parties disagree over what standard of review we should apply in analyzing the district court\u2019s conclusion that the law of the case holds that the Lummi U & A does not include the waters west of northern Whidbey Island. The Klallam argue that the correct standard of review is abuse of discretion, and that there are only five circumstances under which a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the ease, none of which applies here. See Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d at 452-53 (<HOLDING>). Abuse of discretion, however, is the standard Holdings: 0: recognizing that the trial court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary decision 1: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 2: holding law of the case principles do not prevent this court from revisiting a prior ruling if that ruling was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice 3: recognizing that four reasons for granting a rule 59e motion are manifest errors of law or fact newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence manifest injustice and an intervening change in controlling law 4: holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "good cause is not shown. See In re Madar, 218 B.R. 382, 383 n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1998); Byrd, 94 F.3d at 219. Since Madar was decided, the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed Byrd. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 n. 10 (6th Cir.1998), amended, 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.2001); Leisure v. State of Ohio, No. 00-4569, 2001 WL 700866, at *1 (6th Cir. June 11, 2001). Because the latter case is unpublished, it has no precedential force. See, e.g., Salamalekis v. Commissioner of Soc. Security, 221 F.3d 828, 833 (6th Cir. 2000). As in Byrd, the Sixth Circuit in Catz simply assumed without discussion that Rule 4(m) requires a finding of good cause. Thus neither case is binding. See Madar, 218 B.R. at 383 n. 1; see also Wise v. Department of Defense, 196 F.R.D. 52, 56 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (Rice, J.) (<HOLDING>); Slenzka v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 204 F.R.D. Holdings: 0: holding that rule 4m permits extensions in the absence of good cause and explicitly declining to follow catz or byrd 1: holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause 2: holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause 3: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 4: recognizing controversy over the continuing use of catalyst theory but explicitly declining to rule on it", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and Recommendation, ahead of the deadline for filing objections,, and enter an order consistent with the Magistrate Judge\u2019s recommendation. As officers of the Court, J.A. Besteman Company\u2019s counsel indicated in their filings that, as of July 7, 2006, Carter\u2019s Inc. is no longer in operation. Further-, J.A. Besteman Company states, \u201c[i]t is unclear what action Carter\u2019s Inc. is tak ing or will take, including bankruptcy, or as to what will happen to its assets impressed with Besteman\u2019s PACA trust.\u201d PL\u2019s Br. at 2 (Docket # 14). Clearly, time is of the essence in this matter. Given the precarious situation presented in this case, the Court has conducted an expedited, yet careful, review of the Magistrate Judge\u2019s Report and Recommendation. See McGill v. Goff, 17 F.3d 729 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds Kansa Reins. Corp. Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal 1: holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation 2: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court 3: holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error 4: holding that by blindly adopting the magistrate judges findings apparently without ever having received a report and recommendation the district court violated  636b1", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which is a \u201cbedrock requirement\u201d of jurisdiction under the Constitution, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997), citizen plaintiffs, like other plaintiffs, must satisfy all relevant Article III requirements. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). The \u201cirreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact \u2014 an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.... Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct c rvs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 563, 112 Holdings: 0: holding that if the harm alleged in fact affects the recreational or even the mere aesthetic interests of the plaintiff that will suffice for standing purposes citing sierra club v morton 405 us 727 73436 92 sct 1361 31 led2d 636 1972 1: holding that harms to  aesthetic conservational and recreational as well as economic values are cognizable injuries for the purposes of demonstrating standing quoting assn of data processing serv orgs inc v camp 397 us 150 154 90 sct 827 25 led2d 184 1970 2: holding that plaintiffs had established an injury in fact because the challenged activity directly affected their recreational aesthetic and economic interests 3: holding in suit under the cwa that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened  quoting sierra club v morton 405 us at 735 92 sct 1361 4: holding that plaintiffs adequately pled injuryinfact to allege nepa violations where the plaintiffs had used the affected area for cultural and religious ceremonies for countless generations", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and Texas Crude\u2019s assignees\u2019 interests in the remaining 12.5 percent of the working interest. Defendant Burlington has also asserted a claim for indemnity against Texas Crude based on those parties\u2019 [JOA] that may or may not become ripe, depending on final resolution of the question of law decided by this Order. 6 . The parties agree that the assignments at issue are unambiguous; they just disagree about what the assignments unambiguously mean. 7 . The 25% gas royalty provision also stated that it is \"free and clear of all production and post-production costs and expenses.\u201d Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder, 483 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. 2016). But the majority in Hyder noted that \"[tjhis addition has no effect on the meaning of the provision\u201d and may be regarded as surplusage. Id. (<HOLDING>). 8 . Burlington suggested at oral argument Holdings: 0: holding that the pricereceived basis for payment in the lease is sufficient in itself to excuse the hyders from bearing postproduction costs 1: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 2: holding that the costs of severance taxes transportation processing and treatment are considered to be postproduction costs and are therefore borne proportionately by the lessee and the royalty owner 3: holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim 4: holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Wiggins was cited to support the arguments regarding the need for a reasonable investigation for mitigation evidence. The application then stated that such \u201cdeficient performance of trial counsel raises a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different\u201d and cited the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The general rule is that arguments not raised before the district court are waived on appeal. State Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Beta Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir.2009). Errant headings in briefs, though, do not waive arguments. Balentine raised a Sixth Amendment argument. Both the magistrate judge and this court ruled on it. See Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 409 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Balentine\u2019s claim was for ineffective Holdings: 0: holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review 1: holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal 2: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 3: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   4: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "will be granted only as to those issues that respond to an issue raised in a petition for reconsideration, the scope of a cross-petition for reconsideration is limited to those issues raised in a petition for reconsideration. In the present case, Eagle Water\u2019s cross-petition for reconsideration was not filed within twenty-one days of the IPUC order certificating certain areas to United. Therefore, Eagle Water\u2019s cross-petition for reconsideration was not timely as a petition for reconsideration and was necessarily limited in scope to those issues raised in United\u2019s petition for reconsideration. A party may seek judicial review of an order of IPUC in accordance with I.C. \u00a7 61-627. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Intermountain Gas Co., 100 Idaho 368, 373, 597 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1979) (<HOLDING>). I.C. \u00a7 61-627 provides: After a petition for Holdings: 0: holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack 1: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 2: holding that final orders of ipuc are generally not subject to collateral attack and should be challenged either by a petition for reconsideration or appeal to this court in accordance with ic  61627 3: holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders 4: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and seven years imprisonment plus a $10,000 fine for Count Four, unauthorized possession of ammunition. He argues that the crimes of unauthorized possession of a firearm and unauthorized p mendment, no person may \u201cbe subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.\u201d U.S. CONST, amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to imprisonment and monetary penalties, and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted). In determining whether two crimes are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes: The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the V.I. 2005) (<HOLDING>). To convict under title 14, section 2256 of Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense 1: holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded 2: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 3: holding that whether the defendant is a member of a group specifically authorized to possess firearms is an affirmative defense rather than an element of the crime 4: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(5th Cir.1986) (same). 49 . In re Stonebridge Techs., Inc., 430 F.3d 260, 269 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (\u201cIt is well-established in this circuit that letters of credit and the proceeds therefrom are not property of the debtor\u2019s bankruptcy estate.\u201d); see also In re Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.1989) (\u201d[W]e conclude that the surety bond at issue in this case is not \u2018property of the estate,\u2019 within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 541.\u201d). 50 . 516 F.3d 301 (5th Cir.2008). 51 . Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted). 52 . In re Trinity Gas Corp. (Reorganized), 242 B.R. 344, 350 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1999) (\"[T]he obvious purpose of \u00a7 541(a)(7) is to include property and rights which are acq . See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 327, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court 1: holding that a bankruptcy court could not use jurisdictional bootstraps to exercise jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist 2: holding that district court did not have jurisdiction over any claims that could not exist independently of a contract 3: holding under former jurisdictional limit that diversity jurisdiction did not exist where plaintiff sought damages of exactly 5000000 4: holding that bankruptcy court could not enjoin third party tort claims that would not affect estate", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "evidence presented to the district court in support of Echo\u2019s motion. As in Atlantic Richfield, the evidence upon which Echo relied was of a general nature; the plaintiffs\u2019 arguments, like those that failed to persuade the Atlantic Richfield court, are entirely based on ratios derived from financial statements \u2014 ie., the Average Return on Equity and Average Return on Receivables \u2014 without any specific proof as to how the withheld amounts were deployed. Compare J.A. 2685-86 (Echo\u2019s motion), and Aplee. Br. at 21-23; with Atlantic Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1158-59. Indeed, Echo\u2019s own expert noted his \u201cunderstanding that [HRSI] did not escrow the[ ] withheld monies and such funds were commingled with the working capital of the corporation.\u201d J.A. 2729; cf. Atlantic Richfield, 226 F.3d at 1159 (<HOLDING>). Echo not only failed to carry its own burden Holdings: 0: recognizing that the specific proof requirement has the effect of permitting large corporate defendants to shield themselves against claims for moratory interest simply by eomingling funds with other corporate assets 1: holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract 2: holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors 3: holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant 4: holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that because the City had no control over Judge Travis in his judicial capacity, it had no power to authorize or ratify his conduct and thus could not be responsible for his acts. Plaintiffs contend Judge Travis was a city policy maker because the actions of municipal judges may constitute official municipal policy if the judge holds absolute sway over particular tasks. In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir.1980), the court found that under Texas law, county judges have duties such as presiding over county commissioners and preparing the county budget which can constitute official county policy making. A city may be liable for a judge\u2019s acts if those acts are in accordance with city policy. Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3215, Holdings: 0: holding that city managers single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability 1: holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation 2: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city 3: holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning 4: holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cEmbedded Software\u201d warranty. No record evidence supports Plaintiffs claim that his television\u2019s inability to process a native 1080p signal through its HDMI ports is software-related. To the extent this claim is based on Mitsubishi\u2019s use of the phrase \u201c1080p\u201d to describe Plaintiffs television, under Cal. Com.Code \u00a7 2813, it also fails. Notwithstanding counsel\u2019s argument to the contrary, Plaintiffs television satisfies his expert\u2019s definition of 1080p, insofar as it is ready to receive a native 1080p signal through its antenna if and when broadcasters begin transmitting in 1080p. Plaintiffs belated reliance on the television\u2019s \u201cParts\u201d warranty is unavailing, as he never invoked that warranty below. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Harik v. Cal. Teachers Ass\u2019n, 326 F.3d 1042, Holdings: 0: holding that a court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found 1: holding that the district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact where the evidenceis not set forth in the moving papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found 2: holding that the court is not obligated to comb the record in order to make the plaintiffs arguments for it 3: holding that a district court need not comb the record to find some reason to deny a motion for summary judgment particularly where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found 4: holding that while a district court has discretion to consider other materials in the record it has no obligation to do so where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that it could conveniently be found", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Barnes appeals from the district court\u2019s summary judgment in favor of AT & T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program (Plan). We review de -17, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (explaining that a conflict of interest is but one \u201cfactor\u201d that courts consider in determining the deference to afford an administrator\u2019s decision). Barnes\u2019s arguments as to why the court should review the Plan\u2019s decision de novo are unpersuasive. Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 415 Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions although administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit them 1: recognizing the conflict 2: holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court 3: holding that the court discounts deference given to administrators decision to the extent to which it was influenced by a conflict of interest 4: holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "applicable. The California court in Gionfriddo characterized the information conveyed by the defendant as \u201cmere bits of baseball\u2019s history.\u201d Id. Significantly, the California court further held that the First Amendment protects \u201crecitations of [baseball] players\u2019 accomplishments. \u2018The freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, and the publication of daily news is an acceptable and necessary function in the life of the community.\u2019 (citations omitted). \u2018Certainly, the accomplishments ... of those who have achieved a marked reputation or notoriety by appearing before the public such as ... professional athletes ... may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in print or on radio and television.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the manner in which CBC uses the Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment protection for news gathering 1: holding that students action wearing black armbands was expressive conduct entitled to first amendment protection 2: holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim 3: holding that because the defendants parody baseball cards disseminated information the trading cards were entitled to full first amendment protection 4: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "In Beach Resorts International, there was neither a contractual agreement nor an applicable statute authorizing an award of attorney\u2019s fees. The court noted that the mechanic\u2019s lien statute, pursuant to which the proceedings were initiated, authorized attorney\u2019s fees to the \u201cprevailing party.\u201d The court held, however, that there was no need to impose a lien to enforce the arbitrator\u2019s award, since the defendant voluntarily paid the amount awarded, and therefore the plaintiff\u2019s recovery was pursuant to the arbitration clause and. not the mechanic\u2019s lien statute. Id. at 691. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for attorney\u2019s fees. See Consolidated Labor Union Trust at 549. Compare Fitzgerald & Company, Inc. v. Roberts Electrical Contractors, Inc., 533 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). There are other cases which also reach the Holdings: 0: holding university grievance committee hearing was not an arbitration proceeding even though hearing had significant characteristics of arbitration without substantial evidence to support an arbitration agreement 1: holding that a subcontractor whose dispute with a contractor and a surety insurer was settled through arbitration could be awarded attorneys fees pursuant to sections 627428 and 627756 even though the arbitration award had been paid in full 2: holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction 3: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 4: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to establish their prima facie EPA claim, plaintiffs must show the employer paid male and female employees different wage rates for substantially equal work. Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 226 F.3d 937, 941 (8th Cir.2000). Plaintiffs offer the differing tuition remission plans afforded faculty of St. John\u2019s and St. Ben\u2019s to prove their disparate pay claim. The EPA\u2019s regulations support plaintiffs\u2019 view that a disparity in fringe benefits support an EPA claim. 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1620.11. Defendants do not dispute that each college\u2019s professors perform approximately equivalent work and receive comparable salaries at each institution. See Sorenson Aff., Ex. C, at 76. They do, however, challenge plaintiffs\u2019 choice of the male comparator. See Strag v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943 (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hofmister v. Mississippi State Dept. Health, Holdings: 0: holding that an individual who was selected employed controlled trained and paid  by the employer was an employee emphasis added 1: holding that an epa plaintiff must show she has selected an appropriate comparator 2: holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa 3: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 4: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Supreme Court in Heller. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. This Court finds further support for its conclusion in recent decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court, which has also concluded that Heller and McDonald affirm a Second Amendment right to bear arms in the home but not outside of the home. See People v. Williams, 2011 IL App (1st) 091667-B, 357 Ill.Dec. 247, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1153-54 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (finding that the 355 Ill.Dec. 193, 959 N.E.2d 221, 227-28 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (same); Mimes, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d at 77 (same); People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 939-40, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011) (same); Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 142-50, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (same); Dawson, 403 Ill. App.3d at 510, 343 Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (<HOLDING>). This Court concludes that the Illinois UUW Holdings: 0: recognizing that the right to bear arms is fundamental 1: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: holding that us supreme court cases do not define the fundamental right to bear arms to include activity barred by the auuw statute 4: holding that because defendants did not prevent plaintiff from acquiring another weapon they did not impede plaintiffs right to bear arms", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Ray\u2019s conviction on this basis unless the instructions amounted to plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(d) & 52(b); United States v. Douglas, 371 Fed.Appx. 562, 565 (6th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir.2006)). \u201cIn the context of challenges to jury instructions, plain error requires a finding that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.\u201d Newsom, 452 F.3d at 605 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Where there is evidence that the jury is confused over a central legal issue not covered by the original jury instructions, \u201ca district court abuses its discretion by not clarifying the issue.\u201d United States v. Nunez, 889 F.2d 1564, 1567-69 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). \u201cA district court, however, should refrain Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts decision to delay jury instructions and deliberations did not warrant a presumption of prejudice 1: holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present 2: holding that the district court was required to give a supplemental jury instruction where the original instructions did not address whether there could be a conspiracy comprised of a single defendant and an undercover officer a legal issue that was key to the jurys deliberations 3: holding that it was not plain error for the court not to give a self defense jury instruction where the defendant did not request one 4: holding that although the instruction at issue could have been worded more specifically the jury instructions as a whole did not mislead the jury as to the law", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "would unilaterally determine the date and thus might have an incentive for manipulation. Plaintiff itself cites a number of cases holding that a party\u2019s mail room or internal filing policies should not control the date when a letter is deemed to have been received. E.g., Kasler/Continental Heller/Fruin Colnon v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 187, 189 (1985); Alpine v. United States, 19 Cl.Ct. 802 (1990). The court\u2019s interpretation of the term \u201cnotify\u201d as issuance in this case rather than receipt is consistent with that of the Boards of Contract Appeals, which have found 41 U.S.C. \u00a7 605(c)(2)(B) notification letters to be timely even when issued very late in the 60-day period, and not received at all within that period. See John C. Grimberg Co., (1991 ASBCA) 91-3 BCA 1124, 074, 1991 WL 128196 (<HOLDING>); Defense Systems Company, Inc., (1997 ASBCA) Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy rule equivalent to rule 6a ala r civ p should be construed to give the benefit of extending the deadline for submission to the day after the holiday regardless of whether the deadline is expressed as the last day of a period of days or as a date certain 1: holding that a notification letter issued and dated one day before the deadline was timely without reference to when it was received 2: holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a 3: holding that a telephone request to the court for a continuance the day before the trial was to start was a nullity 4: holding that the plain language of rule 6a of the federal rules of civil procedure which authorizes the extension of a deadline where the deadline expires on a saturday sunday or legal holiday is limited to situations where periods of time must be computed and therefore class settlement optout forms that were postmarked on the first business day after the courtordered saturday deadline were not timely filed", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "held that if a demand for repayment of an oral loan is not made within a reasonable time analogous to the statute of limitations, the claim is barred. See DeSouza, 708 So.2d at 993. The decisions in Stoudenmire and De-Souza are in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions that have held or recognized that statutes of limitation for actions based on oral promises to pay money that do not contain provisions for the time of repayment begin to run from the date the promises were made. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins To Run Against Action Based On Unwritten Promise To Pay Money Where There Is No Condition Or Definite Time for Repayment, 14 A.L.R.4th 1385 (1982 & Supp.2001); see also In re Estate of Musgrove, 144 Ariz. 168, 696 P.2d 720 (Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Estate of Whitehead, 895 S.W.2d 129, Holdings: 0: holding in an action on a verbal agreement which failed to specify time for repayment that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until reasonable time for repayment had passed 1: holding trial court abused its discretion by not extending the time for service where the statute of limitations had run and where service had been achieved at the time of the hearing on the motion to dismiss 2: holding that the statute of limitations for a miscalculation of benefits claim began to run at the time at which some event other than a denial of a claim should have alerted the claimant to his entitlement to the benefits he did not receive 3: holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made 4: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first[.] Id. \u00a7 1306(a)(1). There is a split of authority on the issue of whether life insurance proceeds acquired by a debtor more than 180 days after filing a Chapter 13 case are property of the estate. However, \u201c[t]he overwhelming majority of courts to have addressed this issue \u2018agree that \u00a7 1306 modifies the \u00a7 541 time period in Chapter 13 cases.\u2019 \u201d Carroll v. Logan, 735 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Vannordstrand v. Hamilton (In re Vannordstrand), 356 B.R. 788 (10th Cir. BAP 2007) (collecting cases)); accord Dale v. Maney (In re Dale), 505 B.R. 8, 13 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). But see In re McAllister, 510 B.R. 409, 420 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2014) (<HOLDING>); In re Key, 465 B.R. 709, 712 Holdings: 0: holding that an executor named in a will is not subject to the nonresident restriction set forth in  43222 1: holding that the specific date restriction set forth in  541a5 controls and that  1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction 2: holding valid an ownedbutunscheduled restriction in a um policy 3: holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion 4: holding that grantee of restriction may enforce covenant in equity", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976). Such agreements may be justified by the employer\u2019s need to protect itself from unfair competition by former employees. See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 391, 690 N.Y.S.2d 854, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (1999) provide for any geographic limitations. Plaintiffs introduced no evidence to support the proposition that a covenant restricting competition of the kind at issue in this case, anywhere in the world, is reasonable in terms of scope; nor have Plaintiffs pointed to any cases in this jurisdiction that would support the Court drawing such a conclusion. Indeed, the case law suggests just the opposite. See, e.g., Silipos, Inc. v. Bickel, No. 06 Civ. 2205(RCC), 2006 WL 2265055, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>); Heartland Sec. Corp. v. Gerstenblatt, No. 99 Holdings: 0: holding that a restrictive covenant will be upheld where a franchisor has a protectable interest in the sale of his franchise 1: holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes 2: holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable 3: holding that the restraint of a covenant not to compete must be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case and that only a legitimate business interest may be protected by the covenant 4: holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "firearm in violation of \u00a7 5861(d), the court stated: \u201cThe term \u2018firearm\u2019 is not used in its conventional sense; instead it is specifically defined for purposes of the National Firearms Act.\u201d As the Supreme Court has observed, the National Firearms Act as amended in 1968 \u201cis a regulatory measure in the interest of public safety.\u201d United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971); see United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 820 (10th Cir.1986). Contrary to Dwyer\u2019s assertion, possession of an unregistered weapon is not akin to \u2018simple\u2019 possession. Rather, the statute making possession of an unregistered weapon illegal is targeted at specific weapons deemed to be particularly dangerous. See United States v. Rivas-Palacios, 244 F.3d 396, 397 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brazeau, 237 F.3d 842, 845 Holdings: 0: holding possession of an unregistered firearm is presumptive evidence of unlawful violent intentions and therefore involves the substantial risk of violence necessary to label the possession a crime of violence 1: holding unlawful possession of any unregistered firearm involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another will occur 2: holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible 3: holding that kidnapping involves a serious potential risk of physical injury to the kidnapped person 4: holding that exception did not apply to uncharged federal offense of unlawful possession of unregistered firearm even though defendant already had pending state charge of armed robbery involving the same weapon", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "makes, particularly when those arguments are raised only in passing.\u201d United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.2008). In his sentencing position paper, Escalon-Velasquez did not argue that a within-Guidelines sentence would waste government resources. His counsel raised the issue only at the end of his presentation, stating cursorily that \u201cthe resources that we would expend in incarcerating him any longer than necessary for him to be \u2014 for him to be deported should also be taken into consideration.\u201d (Sentencing Hr\u2019g Tr. 14.) We therefore conclude that the argument was raised \u201conly in passing,\u201d and the court was not required to address explicitly this mitigating argument to satisfy the constitutional requirement of procedural reasonableness. Cf. Madden, 515 F.3d at 611-12 (<HOLDING>). Escalon-Velasquez\u2019s second critique\u2014 that the Holdings: 0: holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error 1: holding that a party cannot preserve an argument if it presents only a skeletal or undeveloped argument to the trial court 2: holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error 3: holding sentencing court did not commit procedural error when record showed court had psr heard oral argument from both parties and was aware of section 3553a factors 4: holding that the district court did not commit a  significant procedural error  by not explicitly addressing an undeveloped mitigating argument quoting gall 552 us at 50 128 sct 586", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "ch. 13, \u00a7 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 16 (codified at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c)). 3 .The Texas Supreme Court subsequently held that the statutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases includes the right to effective counsel. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex.2003) (\"we believe that '[i]t would seem a useless gesture on the one hand to recognize the importance of counsel in termination proceedings, as evidenced by the statutory right to appointed counsel, and, on the other hand, not require that counsel perform effectively\u2019 \u201d). The supreme courts of several other states have examined statutes that provide a right to counsel and have held that the right to counsel entails that such counsel be effective. See Patchette v. State, 374 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1985) (<HOLDING>); Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Iowa Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel 1: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 2: holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel 3: holding that statutory grant of postconviction applicants right to courtappointed counsel in proceeding arising out of prison disciplinary hearings necessarily implies that that counsel be effective 4: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "waived his opportunity to challenge the district court\u2019s ERISA ruling when he failed to contest it in his initial appeal. See Kesselring v. F/T Arctic Hero, 95 F.3d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (\u201cSince appellant failed to raise this issue in its first appeal, it is waived.\u201d). We previously vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider the unrelated issue of whether Schoenfeld\u2019s debt was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code, and did not disturb the district court\u2019s order as it pertained to Schoen-feld\u2019s violations of ERISA. In addition, contrary to Schoenfeld\u2019s contention, the satisfaction of his debt did not moot the injunctive relief designed to protect against future violations of ERISA. See F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); S.E.C. v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing mootness if it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur citation omitted 1: holding that injunctive relief is not moot based on voluntary cessation unless the defendant shows that it is absolutely clear his wrongful activities cannot reasonably be expected to recur 2: holding that dismissal is inappropriate unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that an error cannot be plain unless it is clear under current law quotation omitted", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "cash flow in nine months, when the equity in the real estate is also considered, Magnolia\u2019s interest in cash collateral is adequately protected. Debtor\u2019s argument is flawed for several reasons. First, whether Magnolia\u2019s interest in the hotel room revenues is characterized as personal property or as real property, Magnolia has a continuing security interest in the revenues under \u00a7 552(b)(2). Unlike other forms of cash collateral, a pre-petition security interest in hotel room revenues continues to attach to post petition revenues. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(b). Under these circumstances, the offer of a replacement lien on the post-petition rents is meaningless because the creditor already has a lien on these assets. See In re Buttermilk Towne Center, LLC, 442 B.R. 558, 566 (6th Cir. BAP 2010) (<HOLDING>); In re Las Torres Dev., LLC, 413 B.R. 687, Holdings: 0: holding that the state has no obligation to provide adequate housing 1: holding preliminary hearings in colorado do not provide adequate opportunity for crossexamination 2: holding that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government 3: holding that future rents do not provide adequate protection for the debtors expenditure of prior months rents 4: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "So the statute and all the Guideline references, including the Policy Statement of the Sentencing Commission, are consistent with our construction of the statute, which is that the authority of a district court to depart from the Guidelines following a motion by the government under \u00a7 3553(e), acknowledging substantial assistance, is not limited so that a finite sentence must be imposed, rather probation is authorized. Id. at 859-60. Thus, under Wilson, there was no limit on how low the district court in this case could have departed under \u00a7 3553(e) as long as the extent of the departure was reasonable under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742(e). This reading of Wilson is con sistent with decisional law from one of our sister circuits. Cf. United States v. Auld, 321 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). It has been suggested, and interpreted by Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure 1: holding that after granting the governments motion for downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the district court did not err when it determined that the starting point for departing downward was the higher statutorily required minimum sentence and not the lower otherwise applicable guideline range 2: holding that the district courts use of an incorrect method for calculating the amount of drugs at issue was harmless because the end result under either method would have resulted in the court departfingj downward from the guidelines range and rendering a sentence within the statutory maximum of 240 months imprisonment and njothing in the record moreover suggests that the district court would have imposed a sentence of less than 240 months 3: holding that a motion under  5k11 permitted a downward departure from the guideline range but that the departure could not extend below the statutory minimum sentence absent an additional motion by the government under  3553e 4: holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from the Office of the State Engineer, and the hearing examiner denied their application in 2001. Applicants appealed to the district court, as provided for by NMSA 1978, \u00a7 72-7-1 (1971). The district court denied the application, and Applicants appeal from this order. Additional facts appear below as they pertain to the decision. DISCUSSION ISSUE ONE: The district court correctly interpreted and applied the Templeton doctrine. {4} Applicants argue that the district court incorrectly interpreted New Mexi co law governing ground water wells that are used to compensate for a surface water shortage. We review the question of whether the district court properly interpreted the applicable law de novo. See Gallegos v. N.M. Bd. of Educ., 1997-NMCA-040, \u00b6 11, 123 N.M. 362, 940 P.2d 468 (<HOLDING>). {5} New Mexico law recognizes that an Holdings: 0: recognizing that the standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and construction is de novo 1: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo 2: recognizing de novo standard of review 3: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 4: holding that this court is not bound by the conclusions of law reached by the trial court and the applicable standard of review for such issues is de novo", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and loss of interaction opportunities to qualify as materially adverse on their own. However, Ghori-Ahmad offers a clearer example of materially adverse action in alleging that USCIRF reduced her workload and downgraded the quality of her assignments.' Such allegations require precisely the kind of fact-bound contextual inquiry that the Supreme Court prescribed in Burlington Northern. See Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (\u201cWhether a particular reassignment of duties constitutes an adverse action for purposes of Title VII is generally a jury question\u201d). Changes in job duties and responsibilities are not actionable where they cause a purely subjective harm to reputation or satisfaction, but may at a certain magnitude become materially adverse. See id. at 364-65 (<HOLDING>); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 Holdings: 0: holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion 1: recognizing possible adverse action where reassignment left plaintiff with significantly different  and diminished  supervisory and programmatic responsibilities 2: holding a transfer or reassignment may rise to the level of an adverse employment condition if it is a significant change in working conditions 3: holding that a teachers reassignment with a 17000 decrease in salary to take place one year following a teachers reassignment constituted an adverse employment action notwithstanding that the teacher was not demoted 4: holding that a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities is not an adverse employment action", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a personal attack in a Council meeting and not on the expressive content of the personal attack. Scroggins v. City of Topeka, Kan., 2 F.Supp.2d at 1371. On the other hand, two district court cases out of California have concluded that a very similar restriction to Section 5Ff were facially invalid viewpoint-based speech restrictions. In Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 F.Supp. at 725, Judge Timlin struck down a policy providing that \u201c[n]o oral or written presentation in open session shall include charges or complaints against any employee of the District, regardless of whether or not the employee is identified by name.\u201d 936 F.Supp. at 725. Judge Timlin wrote: District\u2019s policy clearly contains content-based prohibitions on speech, despite defendant 713 (C.D.Cal.l993)(<HOLDING>). Baca v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 936 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 1: recognizing that the first amendment prohibits laws where the state seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain speakers 2: holding that an ordinance granting greater first amendment rights to speakers who support the human services objectives of the city was impermissibly contentbased 3: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 4: holding city could not enforce through administrative adjudication a city ordinance limiting vehicle weight", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "were available both in 1994, when the ordinance was adopted, and in 1999, when the earlier dispute was settled. 2008 WL 2079044, at *20. 4 . This does not mean that a municipality must identify the exact locations to which adult establishments may locate, \"as opposed to identifying the general areas that remain available and proving that such areas contain enough potential relocation sites that are physically and legally available to accommodate the adult establishments.\" Hickerson, 146 F.3d at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 . The Court's assertion of the time, place, and manner test in Young notably omitted that test's traditional content-neutrality requirement. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Even if such a requirement applies to zoning Holdings: 0: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication 1: holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment 2: holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication 3: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 4: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The movant carries the burden of demonstrating that dismissal is appropriate. Intel Corp., 496 F.Supp.2d at 408. However, Bankruptcy Rule 7009 further provides that Fed.R.Civ.P. 9 applies in adversary proceedings. While Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) provides that: \u201call averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity,\u201d Rule 9(b) only applies to allegations of actual fraud. Furthermore, this Court takes the view that claims of constructive fraud, i.e. fraudulent transfers, are evaluated using Rule 8(a)(2). A fraudulent transfer complaint \u201cneed only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him.\u201d In re Astro-Power Liquidating Trust, 335 B.R. 309, 333 (Bankr.D.Del.2005) (<HOLDING>). Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), made applicable to this Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim 2: holding that a constructive fraud count need not comply with rule 9s heightened pleading standard 3: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 4: holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "explained upward deviation based primarily on Sterling\u2019s criminal history without making an upward departure under the guidelines. This is the proper procedure when imposing a non-guideline sentence. See United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir.2006). Whether an upward departure would have been warranted is immaterial, because the court made an upward deviation outside the guidelines range, instead of an upward departure. See id. at 708 n. 3. Sterling\u2019s assertion that the sentence imposed was unreasonable because the court imposed a non-guideline sentence instead of an upward departure story and offense conduct as found by the district court, the extent of the deviation, while large, was not unreasonable. See United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 491-93 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants 121month sentence was reasonable even though his codefendants sentences ranged from 41 to 53 months imprisonment because the defendant had coordinated the offense 1: holding upward departure from 41 months of imprisonment to statutory maximum of 120 months for unrepentant conartist with long criminal history reasonable 2: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect 3: holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not 4: holding that where a defendants guideline range is 121 to 151 months and his statutory minimum sentence is 240 months and the government moves for a downward departure pursuant to both  3553e and  5k11 the starting point for the departure is 240 months and the court is not limited to the low end of the guideline range in determining the extent of the departure", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "we will vacate and remand for new findings if the agency\u2019s reasoning or its fact-finding process was sufficiently flawed. See Cao He Lin v. DOJ, 428 F.3d 391, 406 (2d Cir.2005). Because the IJ found that Veretelnikov was credible and the BIA did not disturb that finding, we assume his credibility. See Yan Chen, 417 F.3d at 271-72. We conclude that the BIA properly reversed the IJ\u2019s grant of the petitioners\u2019 application for asylum. Even assuming that Veretelnikov had established that the treatment he faced at the hands of the Uzbekistani government was on account of a protected ground, he failed to establish that \u201cany future punishment for his failure to perform mandatory military service for which he contracted constitutes persecution.\u201d See In re A-G- 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (BIA 1987) (<HOLDING>). As the BIA found, \u201cin light of the Holdings: 0: holding that it may not 1: holding military service disability payments are community property 2: holding that under the 1948 version of csrs civil servants were required to meet the fiveyear service requirement exclusive of military service  3: holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service 4: holding that a government may require military service and may enforce that requirement using reasonable sanctions", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cI never thought of that. I can ask them to come.\u201d That Lu was insufficiently prescient about the type of additional corroborating evidence the IJ would require fails to justify an inference that his roommates would have testified unfavorably or that Lu is not currently practicing Falun Gong, especially given that he offered to have them come testify as soon as the government attorney brought it up. Because none of the BIA\u2019s proffered grounds supports its adverse credibility determination, we must take Lu\u2019s testimony at face value. Kaur, 379 F.3d at 890. Lu testified that, as a direct result of his Falun Gong practice, he was detained, beaten, electrically shocked, dragged into a courtyard, and tied to a tree for three hours. See Zhang v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 720-21 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the BIA never reached the issue, we Holdings: 0: holding that a showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of future persecution 1: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 2: holding that retaliation for opposition to government corruption can constitute persecution on account of a political opinion 3: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 4: holding that the persecution of falun gong practitioners constitutes persecution both on the basis of spiritual and religious belief and on the basis of political opinion", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). See State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 285-86 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (in context of probation revocation, \"[d]ue process is satisfied when an opportunity is accorded to be heard in a court at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner\"). 38 See State v. Beyer, 2001 WI App 167, 247 Wis. 2d 13, 633 N.W.2d 627 (Beyer's appeal regarding delay in holding the probable cause hearing for his initial commitment); cf. State ex rel. Jones v. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 195 Wis. 2d 669, 674, 536 N.W.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"Due process requires that Jones have a parole revocation hearing within a reasonable time ... and prevents ... indefinite detention. . . .\"). 39 Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 326; cf. Watts, 122 Wis. 2d at 72 (<HOLDING>). 40 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Holdings: 0: holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable 1: recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board but concluding that the ideas mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parents choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate 2: holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement 3: holding that personal jurisdiction can be premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce 4: holding that a private alternative placement need not meet the criteria of a fape", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "act in rendering such services or in conducting such sports program.\u201d This case seeks to answer whether providing bleachers and supervising spectators falls under the ambit of \u201csports program.\u201d No available case law construes \u00a785V. Nonetheless, judicial construction of the \u00a785K of the same chapter does provide adequate guidance. \u00a785K limits the lia bility of charitable organizations for torts committed in the course of activities conducted to directly accomplish its charitable purposes. The provision caps liability at $20,000. The Supreme Judicial Court has broadly construed the statute stating that only activities with no connection to the organization\u2019s charitable purpose fall outside of the statute\u2019s protection. Missett v. Cardinal Cushing High School, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 5, 11 (1997) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[P]ainting a building ... or maintaining Holdings: 0: holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials 1: holding that a school may not prohibit expressive activity unless there are facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities 2: holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours 3: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school 4: holding that extracurricular activities like a high school dance are within the charitable purpose of conducting a school for learning even where the organization charged admission", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "loss, as required by I.R.C. \u00a7 465. Because the Tax Court did not address those arguments, and because we agree that Crispin\u2019s CARDS transaction fails to satisfy the economic substance doctrine, we do not address the Commissioner's other arguments. 16 . The Tax Court noted that the true net cost of the CARDS transaction to Crispin was only $72,926, primarily the structuring fee paid to Chenery and the cost of the Pullman Opinion. The ordinary loss actually reported by Murus, by comparison, was $7,641,706. 17 . With exceptions not relevant in this case, \"[t]he basis of property shall be the 7) (same), Gilman v. Comm\u2019r, 933 F.2d 143, 151 (2d Cir.1991) (same), and Massengill v. Comm\u2019r, 876 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir.1989) (same), with Heasley v. Comm\u2019r, 902 F.2d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>), Gainer v. Comm'r, 893 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that when the irs totally disallows a deduction the underpayment is not attributable to a valuation overstatement but rather to claiming an improper deduction 1: holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant 3: holding that valuation should occur on the date of the trial at which property issues are determined 4: holding that dismissal of indictment was abuse of discretion when delay attributable to the government was twelve months", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "stop. The agent responded, \u201cI could see him as plainly as I can see him sitting there, actually probably a little bit closer.\u201d This evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the person who had committed the crimes in question was indeed Robert Castaneda. III. Because we conclude that the evidence presented prior to the initial close of the prosecution\u2019s case was sufficiently strong to identify Castaneda, we need not reach Castaneda\u2019s second contention. The explicit identification presented after the reopening did not affect the outcome of the case, and therefore even if we were to assume that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to reopen its case, any such error was harmless. See United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The judgment below is AFFIRMED. * This order Holdings: 0: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that federal appellate courts are authorized to engage in constitutional harmless error analysis in the first instance when a state appellate court does not undertake such an analysis and that such error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that the improper denial of a defendants opportunity to impeach for bias is subject to harmlesserror review in which the reviewing court must determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129, 113 S.Ct. 580, 121 L.Ed.2d 513 (1992). \u201c[T]o determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look both to \u2018the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,\u2019 as well as the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.\u201d California Div. of Labo preempts a state law wrongful death cause of action based upon an insurance company\u2019s negligent administration of a claim. Spain, 11 F.3d at 132. \u201cERISA preempts Appellants\u2019 wrongful death action because the state law in its application directly \u2018relates to\u2019 the administration'and disbursement of ERISA plan benefits.\u201d Id. See also Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489, 494 (9th. Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Washington state courts have also recognized Holdings: 0: holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations 1: holding that breach of good faith and fair dealing claim requires showing of breach of contract 2: holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa 3: holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa 4: holding that where the conduct forming the basis of the plaintiffs breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim is the same conduct forming the basis for the breach of contract claim the claims merge and there is no separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "delegate to local school boards the responsibilities of providing educational services, \u201c[t]here is no question but that local boards of education acts as agencies of the state when they are fulfilling the statutory duties imposed upon them pursuant to the constitutional mandate of article eighth, \u00a7 1.\u201d Id. at 258, 438 A.2d 88. The court concludes that the torts allegedly committed by the defendants-assault, infliction of emotional distress and negligence-stem from the defendants providing special education services pursuant to a delegated state responsibility. The defendants are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity from liability on counts five, six and seven of the complaint. See Todd M. v. Richard L., 44 Conn.Supp. 527, 539-40, 696 A.2d 1063 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 14, 1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Milhomme v. Levola, No. Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to defendants who were providing transportation services to a disabled child as part of the childs iep 1: holding that a determination of the proper esy services must be contemplated by the childs iep and linked to his or her developmental goals 2: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action 3: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 4: holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a full investigation into Acosta\u2019s behavior. Later that month, a new federal monitor advocate was assigned to the Minnesota region. In March of 1996, Costilla was required to go to a meeting where Acosta would be present. Although she talked to her supervisor about not attending, the supervisor again told her that she could not avoid meetings that Acosta would attend. The supervisor added that Costilla needed to be strong and attend the meeting because Minnesota\u2019s connection to the national level depended on it. Due to the state\u2019s untimely action, Costilla brought a complaint against the state in January 1996 alleging: sexual harassment under the MHRA; intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of contra age Realty Corp., 507 F.Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 Holdings: 0: holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action 1: holding employer hable for requiring hotel worker to wear sexually reveahng costume that lead to harassment by public 2: holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees 3: holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers 4: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and creditors. Although the bankruptcy court seemed to agree with Judge Crabb that federal courts have jurisdiction to assess the validity of a lien asserted against the debtor\u2019s estate in light of federal law, in its view she applied \u201cthe wrong federal law.\u201d Id. According to the Ridgely court, had Judge Crabb followed cases holding that broadcasting licenses qualify as property of the estate within the meaning of section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, see id. at 377-78, she would have ackn F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1992)). Second, the fact that a license of this sort may constitute property of the estate within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code does not necessarily mean that a creditor may hold a security interest in the license. See In re Smith, 94 B.R. 220, 221-22 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1988) (<HOLDING>). Whatever the practical benefits might be to Holdings: 0: holding that a trustees interest in letter of credit proceeds acting as a security deposit is property of the estate 1: holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate 2: holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest 3: recognizing that distributees interest to estate property is subject to divestment until estate is closed 4: holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "equally conclusory. Moreover, both in the complaint and in Rojo\u2019s opposition to summary judgment, the incompletely-developed argument appears in paragraphs and under headings concerning the alleged absence of consideration for the contractual amendments. The district court thus did not err by responding to conclusory statements with brief conclusions. Second, Rojo\u2019s argument that DB violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing was waived. Rojo mentioned that claim for the first time in his memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment. We have refused to address the merits of claims raised for the first time at that stage of the litigation. See Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.2006); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Holdings: 0: holding that district court was justified in brushing aside further argument not alleged in complaint but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment 1: holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 2: holding that an argument raised for the first time in response to defendants motion to dismiss instead of in an amended complaint was not properly raised before the district court and would not be considered on appeal 3: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived 4: holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "contact with each other was the municipal court\u2019s direction to him as a condition of the suspension of his 180-day jail sentence. According to Salupo, the girlfriend would not have been committing an unlawful act if she met him. {\u00b6 7} The state submitted a copy of Salupo\u2019s prior conviction for telecommunications harassment and domestic violence to the trial court. The order provided, \u201c[Salupo] is to have no contact with [his former girlfriend] as a condition of jail suspended.\u201d The state did not present evidence of any order prohibiting the girlfriend from having contact with Salupo. Had the girlfriend met with Salupo, she could not have been charged with violating the condition of his suspended sentence. See State v. Lucas, 100 Ohio St.3d 1, 2003-Ohio-4778, 795 N.E.2d 642, at syllabus (<HOLDING>). Salupo, therefore, did not try to induce the Holdings: 0: recognizing aiding and abetting trespass 1: recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion 2: holding that an individual who is the protected subject of a    protection order may not be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the restrainee under the protection order in violating said order 3: recognizing aiding and abetting conversion 4: holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with respect to Direct and October. Ms. Goren alleges that Direct and October knew that there was \u201cno basis\u201d for certain statements on Dr. Wallach\u2019s tape (\u201cDead Doctors Don\u2019t Lie\u201d), R.21 \u00b6 32, that unspecified misrepresentations regarding New Vision products appear in \u201cfree literature published and/or distributed\u201d by Direct, R.21 \u00b6 63, and that Direct and October \u201cconducted or participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise [New Vision]\u201d through a pattern of racketeering activity. R.21 \u00b6\u00b6 110 & 118. These conclusory allegations fail to specify the time, place and content of any of the misrepresentations attributed to these defendants and therefore fall short of the particularity demanded by Rule 9(b). See Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317 Holdings: 0: holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim 1: holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet rule 9bs particularity requirement where they did not present any evidence at an individualized transactional level 2: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 3: holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action 4: holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in 2012, including his failure to successfully complete the 2012 PIP. Dr. Chawla does not claim that Ms. Garfield or Ms. Kaplan acted with discriminatory animus and does not raise a material dispute with Ms. Garfield\u2019s assessment of his 2012 performance, including that, after May 10, 2012, he continued to \u201cmake reporting and other errors,\u201d \u201cto not perform work assigned to him by his leader,\u201d \u201cdelegate[ ] tasks assigned to him by his leader,\u201d and \u201ccommunicate in a confrontational and nonproductive manner that prevents meaningful conversation.\u201d Docket No. 37-8 at 9-11. Thus, Dr. Chawla\u2019s attempt to cast doubt on LMC\u2019s other stated reasons, namely, Dr. Chawla\u2019s work performance prior to 2012, does not cast doubt on LMC\u2019s predominant reason for termination. Cf. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1126-27 (<HOLDING>). It is not incumbent upon the Court to Holdings: 0: holding that because plaintiff cast doubt on the employers dominant stated reason for her termination failure to address the other less consequential reasons for her termination does not entitle farmers to summary judgment 1: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship 2: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 3: holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim 4: holding that the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the persons primarily responsible for plaintiffs termination when coupled with the timing of plaintiffs termination and the conflicting reasons given by defendants agents for the termination might well persuade a jury that defendant fired the plaintiff in retaliation for  the letter sent by her attorney to defendants general counsel", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "his plea to count 35 thus fails. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the factual resumes submitted in support of Hildenbrand\u2019s and Stone\u2019s guilty pleas are sufficient to sustain their convictions. The remaining issues appellants raise are related to their sentences. Because the defendants waived their right to appeal their sentences, we DISMISS THE APPEAL of their sentences, and AFFIRM their convictions. 1 . Count 36 alleged forfeiture of assets. 2 . See also our discussion of the similar term \"benefit\u201d infra under \u00a7 666 relating to Stone\u2019s conviction. 3 . That the benefit is intended ultimately to pass to the low-to-moderate-income purchaser of the program homes does not change the result. See Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 677, 120 S.Ct. 1780, 146 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000) Holdings: 0: recognizing that there may be multiple beneficiaries of federal programs 1: holding that an agreement may provide elements of a plan by setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be entitled to care 2: holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust 3: holding that beneficiaries could not sue attorneys of the trust for legal malpractice because beneficiaries are not direct recipients of the attorneys services 4: recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court reserved jurisdiction to determine at a later date the appropriate amount of attorney fees and costs relating to the bank\u2019s collection efforts, we conclude that the summary judgment was final. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greenway Enters., Inc., 23 So.3d 52, 55 (Ala.Civ.App.2009). In Liberty Mutual, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: \"Rule 58(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., states, in pertinent part, that '[tjhe entry of the judgment or order shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs.\u2019 Hence, the failure to tax costs did not affect the finality of the summary judgment. Holman v. Bane, 698 So.2d 117, 119 (Ala. 1997). Pursuant to caselaw, the failure to award attorney fees also does not render the summary judgment nonfinal. See Gonzalez, LLC v. DiVincenti, 844 So.2d 1196, 1201 (Ala.2002) (<HOLDING>).\u201d 7 .The Dotsons have since filed for personal Holdings: 0: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment 1: holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same 2: holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees 3: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 4: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the circumstantial evidence was not inconsistent with a passenger having placed the gun on the seat when they fled. See 724 So.2d at 1215. See also Bailey v. State, 442 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). In Daniels v. State, 718 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the defendant was driving a car when it was stopped by police. While the defendant was being handcuffed, a passenger was alone in the car. Police subsequently found a gun in the car that was not readily visible. This court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, holding that the State did not show that the defendant had actual knowledge of the gun or other circumstances from which the jury could possibly infer knowledge. See 718 So.2d at 1275. See also Green v. State, 586 So.2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, there was no evidence Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs 1: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger 2: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 3: holding that a defendant who had borrowed a car for a limited period of time had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cars locked trunk where it was the very person from whom he had borrowed the car who first called the police after he failed to return the car 4: holding that a defendant exercised control over a firearm that was found in a vehicle he was driving", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Amend Notice of Removal Within the thirty-day period prescribed by \u00a7 1446(b), a defendant may freely amend its notice of removal. Blakeley v. United Cable System, 105 F.Supp.2d. 574, 578 (S.D.Miss.2000). And the majority of courts\u2014including the Fifth Circuit\u2014recognize that even after expiration of this thirty-day period, a defendant may still amend its removal petition in order to cure defective allegations of jurisdiction. See Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 920 n. 9 (5th Cir.2001); (\u201c[Pjrior to judgment, a party may amend its pleadings to allege omitted jurisdictional facts\u201d); Whitmire v. Victus, Ltd., 212 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that \u00a7 1653 should be broadly construed); D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). The authorization for such amendments derives Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to join all the defendants in a removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect 1: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand 2: holding that removal was proper where the petitioning defendant stated that all parties agreed in its notice of removal and the petition was followed by the supplemental consent signed by each of the parties but filed outside the 30 day period 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition 4: holding that amendment of removal petition was properly allowed to correct jurisdictional allegations in removal petition which were defective or faulty due to defendants failure to specifically allege the citizenship of the parties at the time the suit was brought and at the time the removal petition was filed missing allegation was not a fatal omission which could not be cured by amendment", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "omnibus clause did not contain such an express limitation; it merely adopted the \u201ccorruptly, by threats or force\u201d formula of \u00a7\u00a7 1503 and 1505. In any event, however, the omnibus clause of \u00a7 1512 was not enacted. After the Senate had passed its version, the House debated that bill together with its own victim protection bill. A section-by-section analysis of the House bill indicates that the House Judiciary Committee was also aware that some courts were interpreting \u00a7 1503 narrowly. 128 Cong.Rec. 26,350 (1982). The analysis cites Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (applying the ejusdem generis rule and stating that \u201cthe manner in which the statute may be violated would ordinarily seem to be limited to intimidating actions,\u201d id. at 757), and United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, neither the bill that passed the Holdings: 0: holding that  1503 is not violated merely by making a false statement id at 21718 1: holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement 2: holding that an attorney who made false representations to a court did not violate okla rpc 33 because that rule addresses professional misconduct as an advocate for making false statements to a tribunal not false statements by a lawyer as a witness 3: holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement 4: holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and only reviews for abuse of that discretion. Austin v. U.S. Bank of Wash., 73 Wash.App. 293, 869 P.2d 404, 410 (1994). A trustee abuses his or her discretion only when they act \u201carbitrarily, in bad faith, maliciously, or fraudulently.\u201d Id. Here, the record contains no evidence that Ms. Montague abused the considerable discretion the Trust Agreement vested in her. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Blume, 65 Wash.2d 643, 399 P.2d 76, 79 (1965) (upholding summary judgment against trust beneficiaries claiming bad faith where the trustee\u2019s actions were \u201cwell within the bounds of reasonable judgment\u201d). The record indicates that Ms. Montague administered the trust consis tent with the terms of the trust agreement, and Mr. Vaughn has submitted no evidence to the contrary. Id. (<HOLDING>). Mr. Vaughn contends that Ms. Montague abused Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 1: holding that the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty when its actions were consistent with the trust instrument 2: holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument 3: holding that a debtor could not relitigate the claim that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty because the bankruptcy court had already held that the trustees actions were not improper 4: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "first publication took place before the beginning of the policy period.... The policy defines \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as injury, other than \"bodily injury,\" arising out of one or more of the following offenses: d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization\u2019s goods, products or services; or e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person\u2019s right of privacy. \u201cAdvertising injury\u201d is defined as: injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses: a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organization\u2019s goods, products or services; b. Oral or written publication of mate 8 Pa.Super. 326, 614 A.2d 295 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . The insurer\u2019s unjustified refusal to Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred in looking beyond the allegations of the complaint to determine whether a duty to defend arose 1: holding that attorneys fees can be awarded only from time duty to defend arose 2: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required 3: holding that a thirdparty claimant could be awarded attorneys fees and penalties pursuant to  221220 because the insurers failure to defend was arbitrary and capricious 4: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "lay jurors. As the trial court concluded, \u201c[I]n my judgment he presents a specialized knowledge that the rule talks about that would assist the jury in assessing whether or not the offender\u2014 whoever the offender ... \u2014 derived sexual gratification from his actions.\u201d (R. 78.) Cf. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 594, 116 L.Ed.2d 618 (1991)(hold-ing testimony of expert witness could testify that pictures would be of sexual interest to pedophiles especially when \u201c \u2018contested materials are directed at ... [such] a bizarre deviant group that the experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the material appeals to the prurient interest.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984)(<HOLDING>); and United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 Holdings: 0: recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to fbi agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents 1: holding that the trial court improperly allowed a hydrologist to testify regarding safe warehousing practices where he lacked the education employment or other practical experiences to testify as an expert 2: holding that government agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants modus operandi 3: holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff nor the' defendants have questioned the Court\u2019s authority here. The Court is issuing legal conclusions on a motion to dismiss; issues of fact are not considered. A review of the Court\u2019s conclusions would thus be de novo. See Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014). In the event a superi- or court determines that some or all of the causes of action here are not constitutionally core proceedings or not properly subject of this Court\u2019s authority, the conclusions here are submitted as proposed conclusions. See Stern v. Marshall, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (addressing constitutional authority of bankruptcy court); Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2165, 189 L.Ed.2d 83 (2014) (<HOLDING>); and Galaz v. Galaz (In re Galaz), 765 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding that by its nature could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case is a core matter subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court 1: holding that stem does not change bankruptcy courts authority to decide fundamental core procedures of bankruptcy court 2: holding that the bankruptcy court has constitutional and implied statutory authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings 3: holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority 4: holding district court may treat bankruptcy courts findings and conclusions as proposed", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "threat. Further, he was hitting the building with the bat, which could be a form of intimidation. (R. 47, Sent. Tr. 8, PagelD# 146). We agree with the district court that Wagoner\u2019s conduct evidenced an intent to carry out his threat against Carey, warranting application of the 6-level increase under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2A6.1(b)(l). Wagoner told Carey, \u201cIf you do not give me my check by Friday, I will come and terminate you.\u201d (R. 30, Notice of Factual Basis 2, Pa-gelD# 86). On Friday, Wagoner went to the SSA office with an aluminum bat and said, \u201cIf I do not get my money today someone is going to get hurt.\u201d (Id.). Going to where Carey worked on the stated deadline with an aluminum bat establishes a nexus between Wagoner\u2019s conduct and his threat to \u201cterminate\u201d Carey. See Newell, 309 F.3d at 402 (<HOLDING>). Because the district court properly applied Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants purchase of a firearm and ammunition on the same day that he made a threat demonstrates that his threats are more than mere puffery and evidences an intent to carry out the threats 1: holding that threats to inflict financial or personal harm are not true threats where no ones personal safety is threatened 2: holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm 3: holding that threats standing alone  constitute past persecution in only a small category of cases and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm  4: holding that threats to fire employees based on legitimate concerns about productivity do not constitute harassment because any threats made to these plaintiffs  were no greater than justified by their lack of sales", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not, plead an antitrust injury causally linked to Andrx\u2019s alleged anticom-petitive behavior. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Friedman, 83 F.Supp.2d 179, 185-87 (D.D.C.2000) (\u201cCourt cannot find that Bio-vail can establish that it has suffered \u2018antitrust injury.\u2019 \u201d). On February 2, 2000 Bio-vail moved for reconsideration under FRCP 60(b) and on February 4, 2000 it filed a notice of appeal (No. 00-5050). The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration and Biovail noticed its appeal of that decision (No. 00-5396) on November 3, 2000. This court granted Biovail\u2019s motion to consolidate the appeals. III. Analysis We give de novo review to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See NRA v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 126 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1507 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe complaint should not be dismissed unless Holdings: 0: holding that antitrust standing is question of law reviewed de novo 1: holding that whether consent was valid under the fourth amendment is a question of law to be reviewed de novo 2: holding that the threshold question of whether to adopt a doctrine is reviewed de novo 3: holding the ultimate question of probable cause should be reviewed de novo 4: holding question of law applied to undisputed facts reviewed de novo", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "risk of harm. The depressions in the walkway had been there since it was constructed more than eighteen years ago. Yet, there was no evidence of other falls attributable to this condition. Nor was there evidence of any complaints about this condition. Dietz argues that her own deposition testimony regarding the circumstances of her fall, while not conclusive evidence, constitutes sufficient evidence of the unreasonable risk of harm to defeat summary judgment. We disagree. Standing alone, Dietz\u2019s testimony does no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of an unreasonable risk of harm. We conclude Dietz failed to bring forth evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm. See Brinson, 228 S.W.3d at 163 (<HOLDING>). We, therefore, hold the trial court properly Holdings: 0: holding evidence insufficient to support conviction for possession when none of the defendants had any proprietary interest nor previous association with the premises and there was no evidence of how long the defendants had been on the premises prior to the arrival of the police 1: holding evidence insufficient to support conviction when none of the defendants had any proprietary interest nor previous association with the premises and there was no evidence of how long the defendants had been on the premises prior to the arrival of the police 2: holding premises owner had no duty to protect when the risk the police officer was subjected to was one inherent in that occupation 3: holding that negligence in premises defect context generally means failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate unreasonable risk of harm created by premises condition about which owner or occupier of land is aware 4: holding the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner when the evidence showed no one had been injured by the condition in question and the premises owner had received no complaints about the condition in question during a tenyear period", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "elements of the crime. Second, Manuel claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felony murder because the jury could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Peterson was shot \u201cin the perpetration of\u2019 or \u201cin the flight from the perpetration of\u2019 the underlying felony of attempted sale of a controlled substance. Point One Manuel complains that Instruction No. 5, the verdict director for felony murder, failed to submit all of the essential elements of the crime. The State proffered the verdict director for felony murder, and Manuel\u2019s counsel stated that he had no objection to the instruction. Manuel' thus concedes that his allegation of error regarding the instruction is not preserved for appellate review. State v. Vaughn, 11 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Mo.App.W.D. 2000) (<HOLDING>). He nonetheless requests that we review the Holdings: 0: holding that failure to object in a timely fashion to a magistrate judges report and recommendation generally constitutes a waiver of the defaulting partys right to appeal provided that the parties received clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object 1: holding that failure to brief an argument constitutes waiver 2: holding failure to brief argument constitutes waiver 3: holding that neither failure to object to an instruction nor an express statement of no objection to an instruction waive plain error review pursuant to rule 3020 4: holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. Id. at 321-22, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted). B Since St. Cyr, lower courts have split over two questions essential to this case: whether reliance must be established objectively, subjectively, or even at all, and whether petitioners who proceed to trial have suffered retroactive effects under \u00a7 304(b) of IIRIRA. Following the Third, Fourth, and Sixth \u25a0 Circuits, we .2000) (Alien must have \u201cactually and reasonably relied\u201d on availability of relief for IIRIRA\u2019s repeal of \u00a7 212(c) to have retroactive effect); Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As discussed in Section II.C below, a Holdings: 0: holding that the repeal of  212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr petitioner did not so choose to rely upon the agreed upon terms of a plea and because his case did not present the same concerns of quid pro quo benefit for an exchange between a defendant and the government 1: holding that a defendant did not waive his right to be present at an ex parte encounter between the judge and juror because he was not present at the time of the communication and therefore had no opportunity to object when the error was committed 2: holding that the government did not present sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict in a  2251 case because the government did not provide evidence to prove that the defendant intended to create a visual depiction of the sexual conduct 3: holding that the fine print terms at the bottom of an invoice imposing attorney fees were not terms upon which the parties agreed and therefore did not become part of the contract 4: holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "case-by-case appraisal aimed at determining whether a particular sentence, when rendered, could fairly be said to have been based on the guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 606 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam); United States v. Franklin, 600 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir.2010). One court of appeals, reading the language of section 3582(c)(2) broadly, has held that a district court has authority to reduce a sentence imposed pursuant to a C-type plea agreement. See United States v. Cobb, 584 F.3d 979, 985 (10th Cir.2009). We begin our analysis with the elementary proposition that a court, within wide limits, should interpret a plea agreement according to principles of contract law. United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d 146, 151 (1st Cir.2000); cf. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 28 (<HOLDING>). Once a defendant knowingly and voluntarily Holdings: 0: recognizing certain limits to this analogy 1: recognizing this presumption 2: recognizing this method 3: recognizing this distinction 4: recognizing this rule", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to the Court of Appeals on direct review) violated ex post facto principles when it retroactively applied the remedial holding of Booker at his sentencing. We hereby reject this claim for the same reasons stated in Vaughn. In short, there was no ex post facto problem with the District Court\u2019s application of the remedial holding of Booker at sentencing because Fairclough had fair warning that his conduct was criminal, that enhancements or upward departures could be applied to his sentence under the Guidelines based on judicial fact-findings, and that he could be sentenced as high as the statutory maximum of ten (10) years. See Vaughn, 430 F.3d at 524. We see no need to adopt a different rule in this context. See United States v. Austin, 432 F.3d 598, 2005 WL 3317773 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cross, 430 F.3d 406 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause 1: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 2: holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in sentencing defendant above guidelines maximum where district court assumed guidelines to be advisory prebooker 3: holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in applying remedial holding of booker at sentencing 4: holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "degradation and that Toyobo\u2019s manufacturing process was not functioning properly); \u00b6 67 (alleging that Toyobo omitted from report on Zylon degradation in extreme conditions data reflecting degradation in non-extreme conditions).) These misrepresentations tainted all of the vest manufacturers\u2019 claims for payment from the government, as the government has alleged that \u201cthe Zylon fiber [Toyobo] sold for use in Zylon body armor was defective and degraded more quickly than Toyobo and the Zylon Vest Manufacturers represented[,]\u201d and \u201c[a]s a result ..., the United States paid for defective Zylon body armor.\u201d (Id. \u00b6 1.) Thus, the complaint states a \u00a7 3729(a)(1) claim under a fraudulent inducement theory. See Honeywell, 798 F.Supp.2d at 22, 2011 WL 2672624, at *6; Westrick, 685 F.Supp.2d at 137 (<HOLDING>). The government has set out in detail the Holdings: 0: holding the government was required by law to correct a defendants misrepresentations at a sentencing hearing and doing so did not violate the plea agreement 1: holding that government pled sufficiently an fca claim by alleging that defendants misrepresentations about zylon degradation induced the government to pay claims for payment 2: holding that an assignment was recognized by the government because the government issued a check made payable to the assignee as payment under the contract 3: holding that the government can use prearrest silence for impeachment purposes against a defendant because no government action induced the silence 4: holding that the term claim was not limited to claims submitted for payments due and owing from the government but included claims for favorable action by the government upon applications for loans", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "between the allegations of the complaint, and the focus of Sure-Snap\u2019s plan of reorganization. Id. at 874-75. Further, all such allegations could have and should have been raised in determining the lender\u2019s claim. By providing for the validity and amount of the lender\u2019s claim in the plan, the debtor was barred by res judicata from relitigating the issue post-confirmation. Id.; accord, D & K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 1996 WL 224517 at *3 (N.D.Ill.1996), aff'd, 112 F.3d 257, 259 (7th Cir.1997) (parties agreed that elements of res judicata had been satisfied and in the Confirmation Order, the Court found that Defendant had not acted in bad faith in proposing a plan or in resetting the interest rate); Eubanks v. F.D.I.C., 977 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Howe, 913 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir.1990) Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings 1: holding that lender liability claims are noncore and thus not barred by res judicata effect of bankruptcy proceedings 2: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 3: holding that the lender liability claims of the debtor are precluded by res judicata 4: holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "them a constitutional duty of care. See Doe v. New York City Dep\u2019t of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir.1981); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 475-76 (6th Cir.1990); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir.1993); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 890-93 (10th Cir.1992); Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 796 (11th Cir.1987) (en bane); see also Hernandez v. Tex. Dep\u2019t of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 880 (5th Cir.2004) (assuming such a duty); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851-52 (7th Cir.1990) (only reaching duty to place, not duty to monitor). But see Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Like such children, Tron not only looked to Holdings: 0: holding that natural parents could not lose parental rights to foster parents where the foster agreement contemplates a surrender of custody for only a temporary period of time 1: holding that a state had no affirmative duty to a child placed voluntarily by his parents into foster care since he was in the custody of his foster parents who were not state actors rather than in the states custody 2: recognizing emotional bond between foster parents and child although ultimately determining foster parents did not have rights of parents in dependency action under chapter 2644 rcw 3: recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child 4: holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "could conceivably have made efforts to conceal Moore\u2019s scar, this practice might itself have undermined the reliability of the identification by artificially altering Moore\u2019s facial features. In any event, we need not opine on the permissibility or advisability of such precautions. For present purposes, it suffices that the state court reasonably concluded that the police were not required to conceal Moore\u2019s scar. See, e.g., United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting challenge to photo array based on the defendant\u2019s distinctive \u201cskin discoloration\u201d); United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1360 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that photo array was not suggestive despite the defendant\u2019s \u201cdistinctive eyebrow\u201d); Taylor v. Swenson, 458 F.2d 593, 596-98 (8th Cir. 1972) (<HOLDING>). Moore relies almost exclusively on United Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant was entitled to counsel at a postindictment lineup 1: holding that lineup was admissible even where the defendant stood out because of a facial scar and a filed down tooth 2: holding photographic lineup not suggestive where defendant was only subject wearing jacket or jacket and red shirt 3: holding inconsistent out of court statements otherwise admissible not admissible against government in criminal prosecution 4: holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "liberal visitation, was in the children\u2019s best interests. Cf. Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 1143-44, recognizing that a lower court may enforce custody provisions pending appeal); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 314 S.E.2d 132, 133 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (providing that a trial court has contempt power while an appeal is pending). 15 While a contempt order is not independently appealable, see Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners, 116 Nev. 646, 5 P.3d 569 (2000), it may be challenged in the context of an otherwise substantively proper appeal. See Consolidated Generator v. Cummins Engine, 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). 16 Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev. 551, 559-60, 729 P.2d 1328, 1333-34 (1986). 17 EDCR 5.12(a). 18 Halbrook v. Halbrook, 114 Nev. 1455, 971 P.2d 1262 (1998) (<HOLDING>); see also NRS 125.150(3) (providing that the Holdings: 0: holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity 1: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 2: recognizing that a district court has the authority to award attorney fees in postdivorce proceedings involving child custody 3: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 4: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1972, decided March 10, 1972, Pa. Commonwealth Ct., aff\u2019d, 451 Pa. 404, 304 A. 2d 491 (1973), (regarding which tribunals in Pennsylvania enjoy jurisdiction to entertain appeals from decisions of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board regarding municipal and county employees under the Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P. L. 563, \u00a71502, as amended, 43 P.S. \u00a71101.1502); see also Hartman v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 409, 295 A. 2d 850 (1972), (regarding which tribunals in Pennsylvania enjoy jurisdiction to entertain appeals de novo from decisions of the Department of Transportation regarding suspension of motor vehicle inspection station licenses). However, cf. Pittsburgh v. P.U. C. and Duquesne Light Company, 3 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 546, 284 A. 2d 808 (1971), (<HOLDING>). We reach this conclusion reluctantly not Holdings: 0: holding that other statutory procedures incident to appeal set forth in article xi of the public utility law act of may 28 1937 p l 1053 as amended 66 ps 1101 et seq are not repealed by enactment of the aoja 1: holding that denial of vsf benefits to disabled retirees does not violate the ada the rehabilitation act 29 usc  791 et seq or the age discrimination in employment act of 1967 29 usc  621 et seq and that plaintiffs due process and first amendment claims were frivolous 2: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration 3: holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc  1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc  101 et seq 4: holding buckhannon applicable to the equal access to justice act 28 usc  2412 et seq which authorizes attorneys fees for prevailing parties", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "965, 975 (3d Cir. 2010)). As we explained in Hughley, \u201c[b]ecause it is well established that the court of last resort for a state or territory is not bound by decisions of its regional federal court of appeals or any other lower federal court \u2014 even those interpreting the United States Constitution \u2014 but need only follow the United States Supreme Court, the possibility of future review by this Court could provide a justification for the Superior Court to consider [a petitioner\u2019s] habeas corpus petition on the merits,\u201d even where the issues raised in the petition have already been addressed by the Appellate Division and Third Circuit in an appeal taken before this Court\u2019s creation. Hughley, 61 V.I. at 337-38; see also Hodge v. Bluebeard\u2019s Castle, Inc., 62 V.I. 671, 685-92 (V.I. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Hamed v. Hamed, [63 V.I. 529, 534-35 (2015)] Holdings: 0: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions 1: holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels 2: holding that this court considers third circuit and appellate division case law as persuasive authority only 3: holding that this court is not bound by decisions of the appellate division or the third circuit even where those decisions concern the same parties and legal issues 4: holding that this courts review of board decisions is limited to final orders or final decisions", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the contents of the conversation took place was to look for evidence. To do that, the police should have had a warrant. There was no exigency, the tape was not about to leave their possession. Furthermore, Deputy Roed's inspection of the printout's contents constituted a search regardless of whether she was lawfully in possession of the printout. Legal possession of an article does not endow law enforcement officials with any concomitant authority to also search the contents of the article. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (Stevens, J. concurring), (stating that, \"[t]he fact that FBI agents were lawfully in possession of the boxes of film did not give them authority to search their contents.\"); United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Robert Rewolinski had a legitimate Holdings: 0: holding that a promise by fbi agents that defendant would serve no time on state charges if he cooperated in the federal investigation was unauthorized 1: holding that a foia request sent to fbi headquarters and that made no reference to new york did not obligate the fbi to search records held in its new york field office 2: holding that the plaintiffs ftca claims failed because the fbi agents were privileged to use reasonable force under texas law 3: holding that the contents of a notebook were not protected speech based in part on the fact that appellant made no effort to communicate the contents of the notebook to the public 4: holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1999). Neither the Rhode Island legislature nor the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet established or recognized the existence of an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence. While both the magistrate judge and the district court judge concluded that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would not create such a tort, we see no need to delve into the unchartered waters of Rhode Island law and endeavor to prophesize whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court would adopt an independent tort for spoliation of evidence. Compare, e.g., Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 773 N.E.2d 420, 426 (2002) (declining to recognize an independent tort for spoliation of evidence) with Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 127 N.M. 729, 987 P.2d 386, 404 (1999) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the magistrate judge and the Holdings: 0: recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence 1: holding no intentional spoliation occurred where defendant was not on notice that evidence was relevant to claim 2: holding absent some independent tort contract agreement voluntary assumption of duty or special relationship of the parties the new tort of the intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence should not be recognized in kansas 3: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 4: holding that tort remedy for intentional spoliation was not novel but included under elements of tort of fraudulent concealment", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "discretion. See Florida Parole & Probation Comm\u2019n v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817 (Fla.1985). As we observed in Florida Parole Commission v. Brown, 989 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), an abuse of discretion may be established in various ways, including a showing that the Commission deviated from the legal requirements imposed upon it, such as the obligation to review the inmate\u2019s complete record and to articulate the basis for its decision. In the petition for writ of mandamus filed in the circuit court, Thomas asserted that the Commission had not complied with rules 23-21.0155 or 23-21.0161, Florida Administrative Code, and failed to articulate the basis for its decision. We conclude that this claim stated a basis for relief. See Alday v. Fla. Parole Comm\u2019n, 58 So.3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). Rule 23-21.0155 provides that when the Holdings: 0: holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release 1: holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole 2: holding that where the capital defendants future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits the defendants release on parole due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible 3: holding that an important part of due process in the context of parole revocation is a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole 4: holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county. Id. at 469-70, 73 S.Ct. 809. Defendants claim that these cases apply only where the state has provided for a direct primary, whereas New York has opted for an indirect delegate primary election followed by a convention at which those delegates vote on the nomination. This variation in the process of public choice does not release the State from its First Amendment obligations. The animating principle in Classic and Terry is that constitutional protection extends to each State-created or State-endorsed \u201cintegral part of the election machinery,\u201d not merely to one particular kind of primary election. Classic, 313 U.S. at 318, 61 S.Ct. 1031; see also Terry, 345 U.S. at 469, 73 S.Ct. 809; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 849 (<HOLDING>). Consistent with that view, we previously held Holdings: 0: recognizing that electoral restrictions that affect a political partys ability to perform its primary functions  organizing and developing recruiting supporters choosing a candidate and voting for that candidate in a general election  can constitute severe first amendment burdens 1: holding that it violated the first amendment to prohibit announcement of views on disputed legal and political issues by candidates for judicial election 2: holding that ohio election law forbidding all anonymous political leafletting violated the first amendment but noting that the right to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct 3: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment 4: holding that primary election ballot filing fee violated fourteenth amendment and noting that the primary election may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of texas", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "S. E. 2d 613, 615 (1966) (\u201c[The plaintiff] must allege all the elements of a cause of action for the tort the same as would be required if there were no allegation of a conspiracy\u201d); Lesperance v. North American Aviation, Inc., 217 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 31 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1963) (\u201c[Conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless something is done which without the conspiracy would give a right of action\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 779 (1962) (\u201c[A] conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless something has been done which, absent the conspiracy, would give a right of action\u201d); Chapman v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 769, 772 (WD Mo. 1957) (<HOLDING>); Olmsted, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 218 Holdings: 0: holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual was not registered making the individuals possession of it necessarily unlawful 1: holding that a plaintiff who charged the defendants with conspiring to perpetrate an unlawful purpose could not recover because the defendants committed no unlawful act 2: holding that unlawful restraint could not even be an included offense 3: holding that because original interception was not unlawful subsequent use by prosecutor could not be found unlawful 4: holding that conspiracy requires an agreement to accomplish either an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "inmate's infection correctly and advising the inmate on methods to avoid spreading the infection\u201d might suffice to satisfy PHS\u2019s asserted duty), the present appeal also was not allowed to consider protocols for repleading. 18 . The General Assembly has undertaken to prescribe various duties through legislation. See, e.g., 40 P.S. \u00a7 1303.504 (reflecting a duty of physicians to obtain informed consent and prescribing limitations on liability for breach). 19 . Accord Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cnty. Gen. Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192, 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007) (\"[I]t is the Legislature\u2019s chief function to set public policy and the courts' role to enforce that policy, subject to constitutional limitations.\u201d); Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 408, 773 A.2d 770, 111 (2001) (<HOLDING>); Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386, Holdings: 0: recognizing the general assemblys superior ability to examine social policy issues and to establish appropriate substantive legal standards 1: recognizing the legislatures superior ability to examine social policy issues and determine legal standards so as to balance competing concerns 2: recognizing standards to determine discrimination are the same under the ra and the ada 3: recognizing courts obligation to examine the circumstances as they existed at the time the original order was entered 4: holding where no further factual development is necessary to further illuminate the legal issues presented ripeness concerns are not implicated", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), prohibits the state\u2019s use of the accused\u2019s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The State asked a police detective about a statement Kemp made after his arrest. On cross-examination, Kemp\u2019s counsel asked the police detective about other aspects of Kemp\u2019s statement. During the redirect examination of the police detective, the prosecutor asked Detective Salgado: Q: At some point, sir, in that same conversation with Mr. Kemp, did you.actually come out and ask him questions about the apartment complex parking lot and how Hector Juarez may have gotten in the vehicle with Mr. Kemp. A: Yes, I did. Q: At that point, sir, did Mr. Kemp express reluctance to answer your question about the parking lot? Transcript of June 3,1993, at 87. Kemp\u2019s objection to th 38,1240 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, Kemp\u2019s motion for a mistrial was Holdings: 0: holding that prejudice from question concerning the treatment of defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity to be cured by immediately sustaining objection and by a curative instruction to the jury 1: holding that potential prejudice can be cured by an appropriate iimiting instruction 2: holding that where an objection is sustained and curative instruction given and no further relief such as a mistrial additional curative instruction or striking of the offending comment is requested there is nothing for the appellate court to review 3: holding that any prejudice resulting from a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor was cured by trial courts proper instruction on applicable law 4: holding that prejudice from a question that violated doyle was cured by immediately sustaining objection before the question was answered", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have clarified the issue for certiorari if the court had done so here. We hold that the court of appeals did not err in declining to hear oral argument. II., REFUSAL TO ADDRESS THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUE 120 On certiorari, Brown argues that the court of appeals erred when it refused to address the merits of the trial court's grant of summary judgment and claimed Brown had not adequately briefed the issue in her initial brief. Brown claims that the merits of the summary judgment, in particu s, 105 N.C.App. 499, 415 S.E.2d 201, 203-04 (1992) (denying appellees' motion to dismiss appellants' reply brief because new issues addressed in appellants' reply brief were in response to issues raised in appel-lees' briefs); The Doctors' Co. v. The Ins. Corp. of Am., 864 P.2d 1018, 1028 (Wyo.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review \u00a7 559 Holdings: 0: holding argument is waived when raised for first time in reply brief 1: holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief 2: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived 3: holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 4: holding that issue first raised in appellees brief and then answered in appellants reply brief was properly raised for review", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are recoverable irrespective of the NCP. Gache v. Town of Harrison, N.Y., 813 F.Supp. 1037, 1046 (S.D.N.Y.1993). Weyerhaeuser can be held liable so long as it caused defendants to incur response costs, even if no actual migration of contaminants from the Wolcott Site or Canal D to the Damen Site is shown. See Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 78 F.3d 285, 289-90 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 763, 136 L.Ed.2d 710 (1997), (observing that \u201cCERCLA unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation.\u201d); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1154 (1st Cir.1989) (same); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Weyerhaeuser\u2019s arguments that there is Holdings: 0: holding that when an indictment charges several acts conjunctively under a statute which subjects several alternative acts to the same punishment the government need only prove violation of one of the alleged acts to prove violation of the statute 1: holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred while the defendant applied force directly to the victims person 2: holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise 3: holding that a cercla plaintiff need not directly link acts of each generator defendant to the environmental harm that prompted the cleanup 4: holding that the underlying suit did not seek to prevent unjust enrichment or to deprive defendant of the net benefit of its allegedly wrongful act but rather the underlying settlement was calculated by determining the individual harm suffered by each plaintiff", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "be deduced from the high percentage of Mexican-American students attending L.C. Smith and the failure of the freedom-of-choice plan, Plaintiffs contend. Most importantly, Plaintiffs claim that the ability grouping system of RISD is itself a vestige of past discrimination: the district court\u2019s refusal to so find is clearly erroneous. Our review here of the district court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cRISD has been a unitary system for a sufficient period of time that all vestiges have been erased\u201d is controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, which provides that findings of fact \u201cshall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). United States v. Texas Education Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1002, 71 L.Ed.2d 295 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir.1975) Holdings: 0: holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous 1: holding clearly erroneous the district courts finding that a 1970 plan had eliminated all vestiges of the previous dual system and created a unitary school 2: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 3: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 4: holding that the district courts key finding that petitioner is salvador mondacavega is not clearly erroneous", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "245 B.R. 672 (10th Cir. BAP 2000). 13 . See K.S.A. \u00a7 40-414; Osment v. Trout (In re Trout\u2019s Estate), 156 Kan. 120, 123, 131 P.2d 640 (1942); see also In re Douglas, 59 B.R. 836, 837 (Bankr.D.Kan.1986); In re Chadwick, 113 B.R. 540, 545 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1990). 14 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1306(a)(1) & (2) (emphasis added). 15 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1327(b) (emphasis added). 16 . In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). 17 . \u00a7 362(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 18 . In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). 19 . \"[T]he plan may \u2014 ... (9) provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan or at a later time, in the debtor or in any other entity....\u201d 20 . In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 542 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 21 . In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 958 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>). 22 . In re Root, 61 B.R. 984 (Bankr.D.Colo. Holdings: 0: holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case 1: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 2: holding that following confirmation of the debtors chapter 11 plan the internal revenue service could collect a nondischargeable tax claim that was not listed in the irss bankruptcy claim 3: holding that the office of recovery services of the utah dept of social services was free to collect its postpetition debt for child support from a tax refund that was not dedicated to the plan and therefore vested in the debtors upon confirmation 4: holding that confirmation vests in the debtor property of the estate not dedicated to the plan", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(Tr. 63). Dale Riley, Assistant Director of the Division of Adult Institutions, described Level I as a modern design with an observation bubble or security control area in each wing where an officer can visually observe all cell doors. The locked doors are controlled from that unit. In contrast, Level II and III are older cell units and there is no comparison with Level I in terms of providing security and observation. (Tr. 120). We are satisfied that the statute and regulations at issue contain neither \u201cparticularized substantive standards\u201d to guide decisionmakers, Nash, 781 F.2d at 668, nor \u201cmandatory language requiring decisionmakers to act in a certain way,\u201d id, which would be applicable to an inmate already assigned to administrative segregation. See Williams, 852 F.2d at 378-79 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the district court did not Holdings: 0: holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity when deciding whether to open or continue an investigation or when deciding to enter a parents name in a central register of abusers all of which are administrative or investigative by nature rather than prosecutorial 1: holding that social security regulations and procedures precluded a bivens action 2: holding that in deciding whether to request an attorney to represent an indigent plaintiff they should first determine whether the indigents position was likely to be of substance 3: holding that regulations 20121010 20121040 and 20212060 did not contain substantive criteria for the committee to use when deciding whether to reclassify an inmate they merely establish procedures 4: holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "group insurance policies); Bass v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.3d 792, 797, 518 P.2d 1147, 1150, 112 Cal.Rptr. 195, 198 (1974) (\u201c[W]e have held that the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group insurance policies ... and that accordingly the insurer shares responsibility for the employer\u2019s mistakes.\u201d); Caldwell v. United Bus Corp., 177 Cal.App.3d 381, 383-84, 223 Cal.Rptr. 7, 8 (1986) (\u201cThe general rule in California is that the employer is merely the agent of the insurer in performing the duties of administering group health insurance policies.\u201d). Other jurisdictions as well have adopted a similar approach to the agency question. See, e.g., Middleton v. The Russell Group, Ltd., 126 N.C.App. 1, 483 S.E.2d 727, 734 (1997) (<HOLDING>), and eases cited therein; Abbiati v. Buttura & Holdings: 0: holding that the employer may be considered the insurers agent where the employer with the consent of the insurer performs routine administrative functions such as assisting in the processing of claims 1: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 2: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 3: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 4: holding that an employer who performs administrative functions under a group insurance policy as in the instant case is deemed to be the agent of the insurer citing elfstrom", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to exhaust their tribal remedies before presenting their dispute to the district court.\u2019 \u201d Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1378 (10th Cir.1993)). It is unnecessary, however, for the court to engage in a detailed comity analysis because when none of the recognized exceptions to the doctrine apply, and the dispute concerns a \u201creservation affair\u201d or the dispute \u201carises on the reservation\u201d \u201cthere is no discretion not to defer\u201d to the tribal courts. Kerr-McGee, 115 F.3d at 1507 (quoting Zah, 5 F.3d at 1378). Thus, federal courts may abstain without first analyzing the comity and tribal sovereignty issues discussed in National Fanners. See Potaluck Corp. v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, No. 99-2051, 2000 WL 1721797, at *2 (D.Kan. Aug.23, 2000)(<HOLDING>); See also Calumet Gaming Group-Kansas, 987 Holdings: 0: holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe 1: holding that plaintiff who filed suit in federal court could not later file a declaratory judgment petition in state court making allegations substantially similar to those made in federal court and seeking resolution of primarily the same issues 2: holding that plaintiffs failure to raise his constitutional claims in the military court system bars him from raising them in federal court 3: holding that neither the tribe or its tribal court was necessary to the determination of the tribal courts jurisdiction given that the district courts judgment would be binding on the absent party and they did not have a legally protected interest at issue noting that the tribe was not a party to a relevant agreement or treaty with any party to the suit 4: holding that plaintiff a private corporation who had a contract dispute with tribe must exhaust its remedies in the tribal court system before it may raise the same issues in federal court", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the SDWA, regardless of whether it ever installs a filtration system. In essence, the water system\u2019s compliance with the avoidance criteria makes the water safe from the EPA\u2019s perspective \u2014 a point conceded by the United States at trial. We fail to see how accomplishment of the Act\u2019s substantive goals is undermined by overlooking past violations of regulatory deadlines that have no bearing on the current or future purity of the water delivered to consumers. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 310, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (noting that purpose of injunctive relief is to deter future violations, not to punish past ones) (citing Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329-30, 64 S.Ct. 587); cf. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Moreover, given that the Holdings: 0: holding that district court had discretion under clean water act to determine which form of relief is best suited in the particular case to abate current violations and deter future ones 1: holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit 2: holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act 3: holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking 4: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "truth or falsity of the statement when a private plaintiff sues a non-media defendant on a private issue. We have held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity in this situation. El-Khoury v. Kheir, 241 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). We have also held that the defendant bears the burden of proving the statement was substantially true in this situation. Rodriguez v. Printone Color Corp., 982 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Vice v. Kasprzak, 318 S.W.3d 1, 17 n. 9 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 73.005 (establishing truth of statement in action for libel as a defense) (Vernon 2011); Randall\u2019s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). We do not need to resolve this conflict, Holdings: 0: holding truth is affirmative defense to slander in suits between private individuals 1: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 2: holding that truth is a complete defense to defamation 3: holding that truth is a complete defense to an action for libel 4: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claims are subject to abandonment pursuant to 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.158(a).... [T]he Secretary correctly argues that appellant\u2019s contention is without legal merit because the abandonment pursuant to 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.158(a) cannot be set aside or waived on grounds of alleged ignorance of regulatory requirements. The Supreme Court has held that everyone dealing with the Government is charged with knowledge of federal statutes and lawfully promulgated agency regulations. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947). Thus, regulations are binding on all who seek to come within their sphere, \u201cregardless of actual knowledge of what is in the [r]egulations or o emonstrate reliance on the allegedly defective denial notices.\u201d); Burks-Marshall, 7 F.3d at 1349 (<HOLDING>). In light of the above discussion, the Court Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant developed his argument sufficiently to raise the issue for appellate review 1: holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint 2: holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court 3: holding that an appellant has no standing to raise a due process issue where he has not shown that the alleged deficiency in the notice had any connection in fact with his own failure to seek review of the denial of his claim 4: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "supervision, hiring, training, entrustment, and retention are subsumed in her general negligence claim against Bestway. According to Bestway, the court must grant summary judgment in Bestway\u2019s favor as to the negligent supervision, hiring, training, entrustment, and retention claims. The Alabama Supreme Court has not addressed the issue at hand. This court must apply Alabama law to decide the issue. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Alabama recognizes the torts of negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent training, and negligent retention. Bruch v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Ala.1985) (outlining elements of negligent entrustment), CP & B Enters., Inc. v. Mellert, 762 So.2d 356, 362 (Ala.2000) (<HOLDING>), Big B. Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So.2d 999, Holdings: 0: recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention 1: recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress 2: recognizing torts of negligent hiring supervision and retention 3: holding that for a plaintiff to recover on claim of negligent hiring the negligent hiring of the employee must have been the proximate cause of the injury at issue 4: holding that a cause of action or negligent hiring training and retention can proceed only if the alleged negligence leads to the commission of one of the torts enumerated in the tort claims act", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "exercise our discretion to address the error. The state posits only one reason why we should not correct the error: \u201c[d]espite several opportunities to bring the alleged error to the trial court\u2019s attention\u2014 by demurring to the indictment, excepting to the jury instructions, moving for judgment of acquittal or requesting merger at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel failed [to] alert the court below to the error defendant now claims was obvious.\u201d Although defendant\u2019s failure to preserve the error is an appropriate consideration, see Ailes, 312 Or at 382 n 2, we have repeatedly held that, in most circumstances, the state does not have a compelling interest in salvaging multiple convictions when only one is lawful. See, e.g., State v. Donner, 230 Or App 465, 469, 215 P3d 928 (2009) (<HOLDING>). In our view, that is the overriding factor at Holdings: 0: holding that tgiven that our burden in reviewing and correcting the error is minimal and that sentencing defendant according to the law serves the ends of justice we elect to exercise our discretion to correct the error here 1: holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal 2: recognizing that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the alj  3: holding we elect to adhere to our precedent in newman  4: holding the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the error satisfies each prong of the plain error test", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and $100.00 in process server fees, see Bill of Costs, ECF No. 23-7. Of this total, WMATA contests only the $100.00 process server fees. Def.'s Opp'n at 5 (citing Zdunek v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 100 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D.D.C.1983); Harvey v. Mohammed, 951 F.Supp.2d 47, 73 (D.D.C.2013)). As the plaintiff rightly notes, see PL\u2019s Reply at 10-12, however, the non-binding authority relied upon by WMATA in contesting reimbursement of these costs did not consider tins Court's local rules, which explicitly provide that \"[c]osts of service of summons and complaint\u201d are taxable. LCvR 54.1(d)(2). Consistent with this Court\u2019s local rules, reimbursement of these costs to the plaintiff will be ordered. Accord Law Office G.A. Lambert and Assoc. v. Davidoff, 72 F.Supp.3d 110, 120 (D.D.C.2014) (<HOLDING>); Youssef v. FBI, 762 F.Supp.2d 76, 85 Holdings: 0: holding costs of translating summons and complaint into german necessary to file this complaint and  therefore taxable 1: holding pursuant to bankruptcy rule 7004b9 that because the creditor mailed the complaint and summons to the debtors attorney and to the address listed in the debtors bankruptcy petition service of process was sufficient even if the debtors were out of the country and did not actually receive notice of the complaint and summons 2: holding defendant waived complaint 3: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 4: holding that a formal summons and complaint were unnecessary because the motion before the court is not an independent action", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201conly if the resulting error was not harmless.\u201d United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1048 (11th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). An error is harmless if it \u201chad no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.\u201d Id. (quotation omitted). Relevant evidence \u201cmay be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d Fed.R.Evid. 403. Presentation of cumulative evidence exists where testimony of several witnesses would be the same, and one witness\u2019s testimony would be sufficient. See United States v. Haynes, 554 F.2d 231, 234 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, even assuming that the testimony of Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 1: holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony 3: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative 4: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "principles outlined here to assess whether Cricket has proven that the class includes more than 100 members. 5 . To the extent Cricket argues that its evidence categorically proves jurisdiction because Scott did not provide any rebuttal evidence, we reject that contention. Although Dart Cherokee states that \u201cboth sides submit proof\u201d when a plaintiff challenges removal, 135 S.Ct. at 554, we do not read that to mean that if only one party submits proof it automatically carries the day. Rather, Dart Cherokee clarifies that a motion to remand challenging the amount in controversy reopens the record allowing both parties to submit evidence. When only one party submits evidence, we accept it as uncontroverted but must still test whethe 6 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdictional terms are those that congress clearly states as threshold limitations on a statutes scope 1: holding that criminal statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional but are a bar to prosecution which can be waived by a knowing and voluntary guilty plea 2: holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations 3: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional 4: holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under rules that are designed to serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends they are asserted to promote ... the Constitution permits judges to exclude evidence that is repetitive ... only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.\u201d Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, \u201c \u2018[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\u2019 \u201d Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988)); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even where a district court Holdings: 0: recognizing a criminal defendants right to present a complete defense 1: holding that rules of evidence only infringe on a defendants right to present a defense where they are arbitrary or disproportionate or infringe on a weighty interest of the accused 2: holding that the constitutional right to present a defense is not violated by the exclusion of a defendants proffered evidence where he is otherwise given the opportunity to present his defense and crossexamine the key prosecution witnesses 3: holding that the sixth amendment right to present a meaningful defense does not entitle a defendant to present evidence on a question of law 4: holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "due constituted an act of default. On March 1, 1985, as we have seen, the bank loan was still outstanding, the subordination agreements were in force, and the bank had not given Tri-County consent to pay Culp and Newton. Payment in those circumstances would have violated the subordination agreements. Failure to perform a prohibited act cannot be treated as an event of default. Consequently, the corporation\u2019s failure to pay interest on March 1, 1985, afforded Culp and Newton no immediate basis to sue on the notes. Cf. P.M. Finance Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 F.2d 786 (3rd Cir.1962) (observing that a \u201ccomplete\u201d subordination destroys a creditor\u2019s power to demand payment at a fixed maturity date); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Straile, 23 A.D.2d 363, 260 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1965) (<HOLDING>). Culp and Newton have argued that Tri-County Holdings: 0: holding in the case of complete subordination that no action lies against the debtor but that a separate action may lie against a guarantor 1: recognizing that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government as it lies against private litigants and acknowledging merrill as the leading case in the courts modern line of estoppel decisions 2: holding that an employees action against her employer for negligent supervision lies not in tort but with an action for breach of contract 3: holding that an action against a tribal enterprise is an action against the tribe itself 4: holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the case doctrine applies when a defendant is granted a new trial and precludes the defendant from re-litigating the admissibility of evidence when the same issue was already raised and previously decided adversely to the defendant. Commonwealth v. McEnany, 732 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal granted, 562 Pa. 667, 753 A.2d 816 (2000), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 565 Pa. 138, 771 A.2d 1260 (2001). \u00b6 9 Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of law of the case does not have an absolute preclusive effect. Benson v. Benson, 425 Pa.Super. 215, 624 A.2d 644, 647 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 637, 639 A.2d 22 (1994). Most jurisdictions similarly hold the law of the case doctrine is not an absolute rule. See, e.g., State v. Moeck, 280 Wis.2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783, 789 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687, 694 (Fla.2003) Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law 1: holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case 2: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 3: holding law of case doctrine is not absolute rule that must be inexorably followed in every case 4: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "costs of defense. A jury trial was held in June 1986 to determine the reasonable costs of defense and IFF was awarded $834,913. IFF now seeks to recover its legal costs in connection with defending the declaratory judgment action brought by CU. Discussion It is well settled, under New York law, that an insured may recover the reasonable legal expenses which it incurred in defense of a declaratory judgment action brought by the insurer to free itself from its obligation to defend; however, the expenses incurred in prosecuting claims against the insurer are not recoverable. See Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 389 N.E.2d 1080, 416 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1979); Johnson v. General Mutual Insurance Co., 24 N.Y.2d 42, 298 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939, 246 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Hurney v. Mattson, 59 A.D.2d 934, 399 N.Y. Holdings: 0: holding on summary judgment before the question of the insurers obligation to indemnify was decided that the insurer was liable for the costs of the insured in defending the declaratory judgment action because it breached its duty to defend 1: holding in a case where the insurer brought a declaratory judgment action and the insured filed a counterclaim that 60 of the costs were attributable to defending and 40 to prosecuting 2: holding that insured may recover legal fees incurred in defending itself in a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer but not for those incurred in prosecuting cross claims and counterclaims against insurers 3: holding that insured who brought third party action against insurer could recover costs incurred in defending insurers counterclaim for declaratory relief since the insureds posture in the counterclaim was that of a defendant 4: holding that insured could recover the costs of defending a declaratory judgment action brought by the injured party to compel the insurer to defend but could not recover the costs associated with prosecuting crossclaims against the insurer", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "475(c) is not categorically a forgery offense. See Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 877 (9th Cir.2008). Therefore, Ramirez\u2019s crime cannot be an aggravated felony under the categorical approach. If a state statute is \u201ccategorically broader than the generic definition of a crime,\u201d as here, we then apply the modified categorical approach. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (applying a two-step analysis, using first a categorical approach and then a modified categorical approach). However, because California Penal Code \u00a7 475(c) is missing an essential element of the generic forgery offense, we may not analyze this case under a modified categorical approach. Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, Ramirez has not Holdings: 0: holding modified categorical approach unavailable where the statute of conviction was missing an element of the generic definition 1: holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary 2: holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime 3: holding that courts may consider a plea agreement and other documents contained in the record of conviction when applying the modified categorical approach 4: holding that the modified categorical approach does not apply to statutes that contain an  indivisible set of elements sweeping more broadly than the corresponding generic offense meaning that the statute of conviction has an overbroad or missing element", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "abridged in any way. The PCRA court\u2019s ruling is supported by the record and is free of legal error. As noted, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 801 provides -for education and experiential qualifications for defense counsel in capital cases. At issue here are the educational requirements, which mandate \u201c18 hours of training relevant to representation in capital cases, as approved by the Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education Board.\u201d Pa.R.Crim.P. 801(2)(a). Our June 4, 2004 order adopting Rule 801 utilized \u201cphase-in\u201d language, directing counsel to receive six credits for the time period prior to Attorney Speice\u2019s appointment on September 2, 2005. The parties herein agree that six hours of capital case educational training were required at the tim , 193 (2010) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding that the fact that an ineffectiveness claim is raised and adjudicated on direct appeal will not procedurally bar an ineffectiveness claim in a proceeding under 28 usc  2255 where new reasons are advanced in support of that claim 2: holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not 3: holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo 4: holding that a lawyers inexperience in capital cases does not render him presumptively ineffective as inexperience alone is not equivalent to ineffectiveness rather all the elements of an ineffectiveness claim must be satisfied", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "their allegation that the defendants were required to comply with the unsigned May 31, 2000 IEP, rather than the previous, signed February 3, 2000 IEP. At the time the plaintiffs filed this complaint, the California superior court had issued a ruling enforcing the February 3 rather than the May 31 IEP. The plaintiffs appealed that decision to the California court of appeal and at the same time filed this action. We affirm the district court\u2019s dismissal of this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because, at the time the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint was filed, the district court could not find in their favor on any of their claims without determining that the California superior court\u2019s decision enforcing the February 3 IEP was wrong. Doe v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine justified Holdings: 0: holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine forecloses federal jurisdiction when a decision in favor of a federal litigant would wholly undermine the state courts ruling 1: holding that rookerfeldman bars subject matter jurisdiction where but for the statecourt judgment the plaintiff would have no claim 2: holding rookerfeldman inapplicable where the district court could and did find that the plaintiffs constitutional claims had merit without also finding that the state court erred 3: holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff 4: holding that federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear case notwithstanding rookerfeldman doctrine where plaintiff filed federal suit while certiorari petition to new mexico supreme court was pending in similar state court action", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to sue on the contract rather than being relegated to a cause of action for quantum meruit. Vance, 677 S.W.2d at 482. The doctrine of substantial performance recognizes that the contractor has not completed construction, and therefore is in breach of the contract. Id. Under the doctrine, however, the owner cannot use the contractor\u2019s failure to complete the work as an excuse for non-payment. Atkinson, 270 S.W. at 850. \u201cBy reason of this rule a contractor who has in good faith substantially performed a building contract is permitted to sue under the contract, substantial performance being regarded as full performance, so far as a condition precedent to a right to recover thereunder is concerned.\u201d Id. (citing Linch v. Pans Lumber & Grain Elevator Co., 80 Tex. 23, 15 S.W. 208 (1891) (<HOLDING>)). Substantial performance is regarded as a Holdings: 0: holding that with respect to a businesss routine practice the plaintiff must show regularity over substantially all occasions or with substantially all other parties with whom the defendant has had similar business transactions 1: holding that a contractor who had substantially complied with the building specifications substantially performed 2: holding that an insured has substantially complied with the change of beneficiary provisions of a life insurance policy when he has done all that he could to comply with the provisions 3: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where the governments specifications were impossible to meet government changed the specifications but did not change the price to be paid original contractor refused to perform and new contractor was paid more to meet new specifications 4: holding that insured substantially complied with the manner of changing the beneficiary as required by the policy", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the town manager statute in the codification of laws regulating town officers. See 1917 G.L. \u00a7 3992 (\u201c[T]he overseer of the poor shall be under the control and direction of the selectmen, and may, for cause, be removed by them.\u201d). And the term was recognized by the courts as placing a limit on the discretion of employers to terminate employment at will. See Rutter, 89 Vt. at 26, 93 A. at 848 (stating that under city charter that requires cause for removal \u201cthere must be something which in law amounts to incapacity, negligence or bad conduct, to sustain the removal\u201d). The Legislature continues to use the term \u201cfor cause\u201d as a limit on an employer\u2019s removal power, even absent use of the word \u201conly.\u201d See, e.g., Turnley v. Town of Vernon, 2013 VT 42, \u00b6\u00b6 13-19, 194 Vt. 42, 71 A.3d 1246 (<HOLDING>). Clearly the Legislature was cognizant of the Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: recognizing that 24 vsa  1931a which states that officers shall hold office during good behavior unless sooner removed for cause authorizes town to remove police chief only for cause 2: recognizing cause of action 3: holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council 4: holding that under state law the police commissioners are not authorized to remove police officers at will but for good and sufficient cause and after due hearing emphasis added", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Moreover, the fact that Manigault bent from the waist and turned after King\u2019s bullet struck him did not make it unreasonable for Martinez to fire his weapon at a nearly simultaneous time. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact exist over whether the officers used deadly force in an objectively unreasonable manner. In addition, the Manigaults\u2019 claim that the officers approached them son in a way that violated his Fourth Amendment rights must fail. Although the officers were trained to maintain a distance of at least 21 feet when facing a suspect carrying a knife, their abandonment of this protocol cannot form the basis for a remedy under \u00a7 1983 or deprive them of qualified immunity. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194, 104 Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in  1981 by state governmental units 1: holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law 2: holding suppression is not a remedy for violation of vienna convention under federal law 3: holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation 4: holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the court. Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 270. The existence of a duty \u201cdepends upon the foreseeability of harm: if a reasonably prudent person would have on take an affirmative action to aid or protect another, unless there is a \u201cspecial and definite\u201d relationship between the parties. Id. (citing Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (1997)). However, the government must exercise reasonable care in performing responsibilities it has assumed and \u201cconform to the standards which it sets for itself.\u201d Dreyer v. United States, 349 F.Supp. 296, 305 (N.D.Ohio 1972), aff'd sub nom. Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626 (6th Cir.1975); see also Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 373 F.2d 227, 236 (2d Cir.1967) (\u201cIt is now well es Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). In Freeman, the Sixth Circuit held that Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims 1: holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person 2: holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong 3: holding that the faa controllers fully performed their duty to the plaintiffs based on what they knew and should have known about a planes lack of deicing equipment 4: holding that the hospital knew or should have known of the necessity to control based on a similar prior instance of inappropriate sexual conduct with a minor", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of a traditional \u201cmarket rate\u201d is especially pro blematic in the context of claims brought under the BLBA and the LHWCA, in view of their general prohibition of fee agreements between counsel and prospective claimants. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 928(e); 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 802.203(f); Cox, 602 F.3d at 290 (observing that \u201c[t]he highly regulated markets governed by fee-shifting statutes are undoubtedly constrained and atypical\u201d). However, despite such difficulties, a prevailing market rate still must be determined in BLBA and LHWCA cases before the relevant agency adjudicator may decide an attorney\u2019s reasonable hourly rate. Cox, 602 F.3d at 290; see also Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (<HOLDING>). Although Eastern challenges the reliability Holdings: 0: holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area 1: recognizing that rates awarded in other cases do not set the prevailing market rateonly the market can do that 2: holding that reasonable fees must be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel 3: holding that the fee applicant must produce specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award 4: holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "colluding with her or providing her with false information about the incident, to use concerns about his diabetic condition as a pretext for removing him from the public-works program. Finally, Davis asserted that there were similarly situated, non-homosexual, insulin-dependant diabetic inmates who participated in the public-works program and who were allowed to continue working in the program after this incident. The combined effect of these alleged facts, taken as true at this stage of the litigation, lead us to conclude that Davis has stated a plausible claim that he was improperly removed from the public-works program based upon the defendants\u2019 anti-gay animus. Dismissal of this claim was improper. See Johnson v. Enable, 862 F.2d 314 (table), 1988 WL 119136, at *1 (4th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The district court mistakenly relied on a Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoner stated a valid equal protection claim when he alleged he was denied a work assignment because of his sexual orientation 1: holding sexual orientation is fundamental to a persons identity 2: recognizing harassment claim under equal protection clause based on sexual orientation 3: holding that sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable 4: holding that a prisoner stated a valid free exercise of religion claim where he alleged that prison officials refused to allow him to receive certain religious books", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "through his lawful deputy\u201d (Doc. 26 at 9; see id. at 2), and Garcia-Contreras does not contest this {see Doc. 29 at 6-7). This is consistent with the parties' indications that service was accomplished through personal delivery. (See, e.g., Doc. 4 at 5 (referring to \"the delivery of the complaint ... to the Plaintiff\u201d).) Because the court's resolution of this claim rests ultimately upon the timing, not the manner, of service, the manner of service is not dispositive. 16 . To the extent Defendants\u2019 position relies upon the assumption that only communications with the consumer can constitute \"collection of the debt,\u201d they have not provided any authority to support it and it is contrary to case law. Cf., e.g., Edeh v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 748 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1035-36 (D.Minn.2010) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, No. 10-3441, 413 Fed. Appx. 925, 2011 Holdings: 0: holding that reporting of historically accurate debt may violate the fcra when the reporting did not include that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy or that the debt was in dispute 1: holding that reporting a consumers debt to a creditreporting agency constitutes collection of the debt under  1692gb 2: holding that an entity engaged in collection activity on a defaulted debt acquired from another is a debt collector under the fdcpa even though it may actually be owed the debt 3: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 4: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7 213(a)(1). An employee working in a \u201cbona fide administrative capacity\u201d is someone: (1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week ...; (2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer\u2019s customers; and (3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 541.200(a) (emphasis added); see also Foster v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.2013). An employee who satisfies all three elements falls within this \u201cadministrative exemption.\u201d See Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (\u201cRenfro II\u201d) (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Although the parties do not dispute that Holdings: 0: holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute 1: holding that an employer must establish all three elements of the defense with regard to its employees in order to prevail 2: holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim 3: holding that an employer did not regard the plaintiff as disabled 4: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "revealed sufficient evidence to confirm the original allegation of [sic] Mr. Bhatt and several supervisor\u2019s [sic] destroying or dismissing citations. This investigation found, however, insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the allegations linking Mr. Bhatt or anyone else to criminal activity in obtaining illegal monetary benefits.\u201d Calix, the author of the report, however, testified, \u201c[A] ticket that\u2019s destroyed in the sense I wrote it down meaning V, 2003 WL 21750608, at *3-*6 (Tex. App.-Austin Jul. 30, 2003, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (stating there was legally insufficient evidence plaintiffs subjective belief \u2014 that the conduct she reported violated the law \u2014 was objectively reasonable); Duvall v. Tex. Dept, of Human Servs., 82 S.W.3d 474, 482-83 (TexApp.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Tex. Dep\u2019t of Criminal Justice v. Terrell, 18 Holdings: 0: holding although there was some evidence plaintiff subjectively believed conduct he reported violated the law there was legally insufficient evidence this belief was reasonable 1: holding probationer who did not receive notice of specific offenses she was believed to have committed but had notice of probation terms states attorney believed were violated and of the facts constituting violation was not harmed 2: holding that the proper standard to apply  is to assume that the facts have occurred as reported and then determine  whether those facts constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law 3: recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial 4: holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "428 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)). While we do not approve of Safety's failure to acknowledge Cinergy's letters, given the facts of this case, including the fact that Safety had issued excess umbrella policies that would not be implicated until after the primary and umbrella policies, we cannot conclude that Safety's silence equated to an express denial of coverage. Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that Safety waived its right to arbitrate by failing to respond to Cinergy's letters. See, eg., Protective Ins., 428 N.E.2d at 661 (noting that \"the failure of [the insurance company] to respond to the demand to defend letter is not evidence that [the insurance company] intended to waive its right to deny coverage\"); see also MPACT, 802 N.E.2d at 910 (<HOLDING>). In addition, we agree that Safety did not act Holdings: 0: holding that substantial participation requires particular facts relating to each djefendants specific role in the preparation of each of the allegedly misleading statements 1: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 2: holding the rationale of thomas requires waiver to apply to each issue not included in an objection 3: holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal 4: holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "ranged from 6 to 9.2 ounces.\u201d WP Art. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 . Bassolino faces an additional hurdle in reaching even this contingency, as he claims to have purchased a product \u2014 chicken fingers. \u2014 -that is identified in neither the Press Release (which refers only to chicken tenders), DCA Rpt. at 2, nor the Moll Affidavit (which refers to chicken legs, chicken thighs, rotisserie chicken halves, split chicken breasts, and wing buckets), Moll Aff., Ex. A, as a product tested by the DCA. Plaintiffs' counsel conceded at argument that chicken fingers and tenders are \"different form[s] of produc\u00e9is]\u201d that are \"marketed differently.\u201d Tr. 19-20; cf. White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Restaurants LLC, 21 Mass.L.Rptr. 565, 2006 WL 3292641 (Mass.Super.Ct. Oct. 31, 2006) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs\u2019 argument that it can be inferred Holdings: 0: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 1: holding that tacos burritos and quesadillas are not sandwiches 2: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 3: holding that arguments which are not sufficiently developed are waived 4: holding that ijssues that are raised only in the argument part of the brief and are not contained in the point relied on are not preserved for review", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on vagueness grounds. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2320, 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012). It follows, therefore, that because the Guidelines are \u201cequivalent\u201d to regulations, which are subject to constitutional challenges such as vagueness, the Guidelines should also be subject to vagueness challenges. Indeed, the Supreme Court has resolved both constitutional challenges to the Guidelines as a whole and individual Guidelines provisions. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (upholding Guidelines as constitutional, not an excessive delegation of legislative power or a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992) (<HOLDING>). And in Stinson, the Court explained that Holdings: 0: holding that where a statute provides a procedure for judicial review of a bid protest a party may not circumvent the established procedures and was obligated either to pursue its right to judicial review or to file its declaratory judgment action in compliance with the procedures for administrative appeal set out in the statute 1: holding that the action of denying parole is not an adjudication subject to judicial review 2: holding that the governments refusal to file a substantialassistance motion under ussg  5k11 is subject to judicial review for unconstitutional motive 3: holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record 4: holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a class be treated the same, unless the creditor who is being treated less favorably agrees to less favorable treatment.\u201d). Thus, the Amended Plan satisfies 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1122 and 1123(a). Further, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1123(b), the Amended Plan properly preserves the Debtor\u2019s ability to prosecute the Adversary Proceeding. See In re Tex. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 52 F.3d 1330, 1335 n. 4 (5th Cir.1995) (explaining that a debt- or may retain post-confirmation causes of action if the plan so provides). However, to the extent that the Amended Plan makes a blanket reservation of causes of action that may be pursued by the Debtor, these generic causes of action may not be preserved. See Dynasty Oil & Gas, LLC v. Citizens Bank (In re United Operating, LLC), 540 F.3d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in this particular respect, the Amended Holdings: 0: holding that a debtor cannot appeal a confirmation order on the basis that it unfairly discriminates against a class of claims 1: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence 2: holding that controlling shareholder of postconfirmation debtor could not pursue unlisted preconfirmation claim on behalf of creditors 3: holding that a debtor must make a specific and unequivocal reservation of claims that would effectively put its creditors on notice of any claim it wishes to pursue after confirmation 4: holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "103. Because plaintiffs simultaneously filed a request for release of lien and an administrative claim for damages, the government argues they failed to file a proper request for certificate of release \u201cprior\u201d to filing their administrative claim for damages. As such, the government argues plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because their administrative claim for damages did not literally include a copy of a request for a certificate of release filed in accordance with \u00a7 401.6325-1\u00a9. The standard for taxpayer compliance with the statutory and regulatory requirements is high. See Venen, 38 F.3d at 103 (failure to petition IRS correctly constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. United States, 28 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Veglia v. United States, 1996 WL 392159, *3-4 Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal under 42 usc  1997ea was required even though case had gone to trial as inmate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies 1: holding there is no statutory requirement that a taxpayer exhaust administrative remedies before filing a complaint in the tax court 2: holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include issue in case brief 3: holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff sent a letter to the attorney general grieving the initial agency determination instead of following the administrative appeal process specified by agency regulations 4: recognizing harsh result but holding that taxpayer who addressed letter to revenue officer rather than district director as required by regulation failed to petition irs correctly and thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on the child\u2019s dependence upon her.\u201d Id. at 75-76 (citing Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal.App.3d 206, 169 Cal.Rptr. 282 (1980)). \u00b6 17. As with Mississippi\u2019s premises liability and teacher liability doctrines, California\u2019s spousal liability is based on the foreseeability of the husband or wife\u2019s behavior. \u201c[WJhere a child is sexually assaulted in the defendant wife\u2019s home by her husband, the wife\u2019s duty of reasonable care to the injured child depends on whether the husband\u2019s behavior was ented evidence that she had reported to her teacher that she had been slapped, scratched, and kicked by her classmates in the past, creating a jury issue of whether her teacher should have foreseen her being injured by her classmates. Summers, 759 So.2d at 1214 (\u00b6 48); see also Doe, 930 S.W.2d at 927 (<HOLDING>). \u00b621. In contrast, Perlman had known Adkins Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment 1: holding that the elevenyearold victims twentyonemonth delay in reporting her grandfathers inappropriate sexual conduct was adequately explained where the child testified that she did not tell anyone about the incident because her grandfather told her not to tell she did not think anybody was going to believe her and she felt scared and threatened by the defendant 2: holding that a grandmother could be held liable for failure to protect her granddaughter from a known risk of sexual abuse by the grandfather 3: holding evidence granddaughter told her grandmother she was being molested by her grandfather was sufficient to raise factual issue about grandmothers knowledge of husbands sexual activities 4: holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the ordinary course of the business of the partnership.\u201d N.Y.Ptnrship L. \u00a7 24. The liability of any partner is limited to wrongful acts occurring \u201cwhile the defendant was a partner\u201d, Halperin v. Edwards and Hanly, 430 F.Supp. 121, 125 (E.D.N.Y.1977). Thus, before a defendant may be found liable for the acts of his partners it must be found: (1) that the partner committed the acts at issue in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership and (2) that the defendant was a partner at the time the acts were committed. Because the nature of their liability is joint and several, it has been held that a partner is not an indispensible party in an action naming other partners or the partnership as parties defendant. See Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369 F.Supp. 426, 438 (N.D.Miss.1974) (<HOLDING>). Instead, it has been held that a plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation 1: recognizing that where liability is joint and several among multiple parties complete relief may be granted with respect to any one of them 2: recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several 3: holding that a lump sum verdict on punitive damages against all defendants was improper since there can be no joint and several liability or contribution 4: holding that all partners are not indispensible parties defendant where state law provides for partners joint and several liability", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (observing that \u201c[i]dentification of the source of [ballot referendum] advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected\u201d). Citizens United only confirmed the breadth of Congress\u2019 power in this regard. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 915 (\u201cEven if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election\u201d); see also Doe v. Reed, \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2819-22, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirement for petition signatories); Natn\u2019l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). C Real Truth advances several other reasons Holdings: 0: holding that ors 1660651e 1985 was unconstitutional because it potentially reached areas of communication that would be constitutionally privileged and it incorporated a definition of obscenity that was unconstitutionally vague 1: holding that a court cannot construe claims to read an express limitation out of the claim or render it meaningless 2: holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant 3: holding that state express advocacy definition without an electioneering communication limitation was not vague 4: holding that threat as used in the coercion definition as that definition is incorporated into section 3605s witnesstampering prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of threat was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition in that case hatred contempt and ridicule", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the technical complications. The judgment, however, should have complied with the technicalities, that is, it should have been entered in the name of the actual plaintiff. 5 . Even if the law were otherwise, the right to a setoff here would be far from clear. Mr. Bozeman and General Motors were not joint tortfeasors. See D\u2019Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 435 (Fla.2001) (treating person who caused wreck and crashworthiness defendant as successive, not joint, tortfea-sors). Setoffs generally are available only with respect to joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., Ellingson v. Willis, 170 So.2d 311, 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), overruled on other grounds, Devlin v. McMannis, 231 So.2d 194 (Fla.1970); see also Gordon v. Marvin M. Rosenberg, D.D.S., P.A., 654 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). If damages were indivisible, these defendants Holdings: 0: holding that the separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to establish jurisdiction 1: holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts 2: holding that settlement with one defendant could not be setoff from verdict against second defendant where the claims were separate and distinct ie involving different elements of damages 3: holding that a claim for damages based on creditors failure to honor a rescission notice is separate and distinct from any claims associated with disclosures at the time of closing 4: holding that a plaintiff could not add civil claim based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally  and relate to the conduct of different individuals from facts in administrative charge", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "who had not filed a notice of appearance as co-counsel, attended the hearing on behalf of Coutts. Nevertheless, the hearing proceeded as scheduled. When the trial court inquired of coverage counsel if he was prepared to present evidence, coverage counsel stated to the court: \u201cThis can be decided as a matter of law.\u201d At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Coutts\u2019s motion. On appeal, Coutts maintains, inter alia, that the trial court erred because it failed to afford the appellant an evidentia-ry hearing. This argument is without merit, as Coutts\u2019s coverage counsel affirmatively advised the court that no eviden-tiary hearing was necessary and that the issue could be decided as a matter of law. See Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>); Behar v. Southeast Banks Trust Co., N.A., 374 Holdings: 0: holding that a party failing to make a timely objection to evidence at trial cannot as a matter of law be heard to complain on appeal that its admission is error constituting an irregularity in the proceeding 1: holding that defendant may not complain of error he invited and further holding that reversal cannot be based on such error 2: holding that a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal 3: recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court 4: holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "protect its interest by \u201cdo[ing] and pay[ing] whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and the Lender\u2019s rights in the property ....\u201d Nothing in these terms requires the lender to purchase the cheapest insurance or the insurance that provides the most value for the borrower. Thus, Standard Mortgage did not act on Robinson\u2019s behalf when it force-placed insurance coverage; it acted to protect its oum interest in the mortgaged property\u2014an interest that Robinson threatened by breaching her own contractual duty to maintain insurance coverage. So although Robinson sprinkles her complaint with the \u201ckickback\u201d label, the commissions and portfolio monitoring that SM Insurance provided to Standard Mortgaged were \u201cnot. ,kickback[s] in any meaningful sense.\u201d Cohen, 735 F.3d at 611 (<HOLDING>); see also Feaz, 745 F.3d at 1111 (agreeing Holdings: 0: recognizing in a materially similar situation the authority of mortgage electronic registration system inc to assign both the note and deed of trust on behalf of the original lender and the lenders successors and assigns 1: holding lender might be held responsible for buyers alleged damages where facts indicated lenders active participation in the sale of the residence or the existence of a special relationship between the lender and the borrower 2: holding that commission paid to mortgage lenders affiliate for forceplacing insurance was not a kickback when the lender was subject to an undivided loyalty to itself and it made this clear from the start 3: holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full 4: holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 300 days of any discrete act of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(e)(l). The latest date on which Plaintiff learned definitively of her impending termination was October 5, 2005, the date of a second letter Defendant sent to Plaintiff. That letter clearly and unequivocally told Plaintiff that her position would be eliminated and that she could be re-employed by Defendant through a 60-day bidding process. The letter dated October 5, 2005, if not the earlier letter relaying the same message on September 28, 2005, was the adverse employment action that triggered the running of the 300-day statute of limitations. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Plaintiff did not have evidence Holdings: 0: holding that  2401a statute of limitations on procedural challenge began to run at the latest on the date the challenged regulation was amended 1: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 2: holding that when the representations and warranties were made on the date of closing the statute of limitations began to run on that date even though the contract imposed cure and repurchase obligations on the defendant 3: holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run 4: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). With this caveat in mind and after careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly ruling that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, groundless, or brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. All defendants initially argued the plaintiffs\u2019 antitrust claims were frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, and brought in bad faith based on the immunity provided by HCQIA and TMPA. But, not all of the plaintiffs\u2019 claims relied upon actions allegedly taken in the context of a peer review or medical committee; therefore, any immunity under HCQIA and TMPA did not entirely shield the defendants from liability. See Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Jeung, 264 F.Supp.2d at 574 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant 1: holding that allegations of refusal to provide coverage and that other physicians openly attacked plaintiffdoctors before nurses and in neurosurgical group meetings cannot be brought within hcqias immunity 2: holding that none of the physicians insurers had a duty to provide coverage since the effects of the negligence first manifested themselves prior to the coverage periods of any of the three policies 3: holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency 4: holding that issue not raised in first appeal cannot be attacked in later appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "their cumulative impacts. Even if the fire-lines had only a small impact, \u201c[cjumula-tive impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.\u201d 40 C.F.R. 1508.7 Further, the Forest Service fails to explain how such post-fire \u201crehabilitation\u201d could eliminate the effects from the construction and existence of the fire-lines. As plaintiffs expert demonstrated, and the Forest Service does not dispute, \u201c[flirelines cause significant and persistent reductions in soil productivity via elevated erosion, compaction and the removal of all organic matter, which is critical to soil productivity.\u201d (See AR 8772 [Rhodes Declaration] \u00b6 18.) Such significant effects must be disclosed within the EIS. See City of Carmel, 123 F.3d at 1160 (<HOLDING>). The Forest Service also asserts that the Holdings: 0: holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific infestation and reforestation program where impacts of site specific program were the same as those considered in the programmatic eis 1: holding that a cumulative impacts analysis was insufficient where the agency had examined single projects in isolation because there were several foreseeable similar projects in a geographical region that added to the cumulative impacts 2: holding supplemental eis not necessary for sitespecific infestation and reforestation program where impacts of sitespecific program were the same as those considered in the programmatic eis 3: holding agency had burden to describe other area projects and detail the cumulative impacts of these projects 4: holding that eis must provide a useful analysis of the cumulative impacts of past present and future projects", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of protection for \"free citizens\u201d from the rights accorded pretrial detainees (under the Fourteenth Amendment) and criminal convicts (under the Eighth Amendment). See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843, 118 S.Ct. at 1715. 4 . This statement has led at least one court to refer to Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, specifically his reliance on the Fourth Amendment\u2019s text, as only adopted by a plurality. See Lamont v. Woods, 948 E.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that \"[t]o a plurality of the Court, the use of the phrase \u2018the people\u2019 suggested that the Framers of the Constitution intended the amendment to apply only to \u25a0those persons who were part of or substan tially connected to the national community\u201d). But it does not throw Chief Justice Rehnquist\u2019s holding,, that only aliens 329 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign citizen with no substantial connections to the us has no claim under the fifth amendments takings clause 1: holding that prior circuit precedent that the fifth amendments takings clause subsumes or preempts substantive due process claims was undermined by lingle 2: holding that no takings claim can arise unless a permit is denied 3: holding that taxes are not takings unless the government tries to achieve through special taxes what the takings clause of the fifth amendment forbids if done directly 4: holding that rights in a government benefits program were not vested property for purposes of the takings clause of the fifth amendment", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "does not state an actionable claim for a deprivation of equal protection under the ADA. See Manning v. N.M. Energy, Minerals & Natural Res. Dep\u2019t, 2006-NMSC-027, \u00b6 45, 140 N.M. 528, 144 P.3d 87 (\u201cThe ADA provides [a] remedy . . . when a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving an individual of . . . equal protection[.]\u201d); Fofey v. Horton, 1989-NMSC-061, \u00b6 8, 108 N.M. 812, 780 P.2d 638 (stating that an equal protection claim requires the plaintiff to allege or otherwise demonstrate that the at-issue conduct constituted impermissible state action). {37} Furthermore, the district court\u2019s mere adjudication of Mr. Firstenberg\u2019s lawsuit does not constitute \u201cstate action\u201d within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. See King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 671 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as the United States Supreme Court in Holdings: 0: recognizing that consensual policecitizen encounters do not implicate constitutional protections 1: recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify 2: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 3: recognizing that a state courts adjudication  of private rights is not sufficient state action in the sense necessary to implicate constitutional protections 4: holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of food and water, and threats to rape or otherwise harm relatives. The security forces killed many of their torture victims and mutilated their bodies before returning them to the victims\u2019 families. There are persistent reports that the families are made to pay for the costs of the execution, before the bodies are returned to them. Iraqi refugees arriving in Europe often reported instances of torture to the receiving governments and \u2014 as was the case with a group of refugees arriving in Italy in June \u2014 displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims. The BIA must take this into consideration when assessing whether an applicant qualifies under the Convention. Cf. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Al-Saher was informed that if he told anyone Holdings: 0: holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution 1: holding that absent past persecution an alien can demonstrate eligibility for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of future persecution by demonstrating that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 2: holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution 3: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 4: holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Turnover Action against the Debtor\u2019s law firm were taken in his official capacity on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and within the scope of his statutory duties to investigate, collect assets and property of the estate, and seek turnover of materials relating to the Debtor\u2019s financial affairs and interests. C. Conclusion The essence of GKH\u2019s contention that the Trustee acted ultra vires or outside the scope of his authority is that the Trustee acted improperly or even wrongfully in filing the Avoidance and Turnover Actions without a reasonable legal basis. However, a showing that the Trustee\u2019s actions were wrongful or improper \u201cdoes not equate to a transgression of his authority.\u201d Cutright, 2012 WL 1945703, at *8; see also McDaniel v. Blust, 668 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Satterfield, 700 F.3d at 1236 (refusing to Holdings: 0: holding that agency could not claim confidentiality for tax returns that had been exhibits in tax court and were therefore public records 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax 3: holding that if state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions the general or residual statute for personal injury actions should be used for 1983 actions 4: holding barton applied to claims that counsel for the trustee sought court orders to obtain irrelevant personal income tax records because the actions even if wrongful were taken in the context of attempting to prove the adversary action", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that just as the IJ may not rely on his or, her own speculation and conjecture, neither may the IJ rely on the speculation and conjecture of a government report. The conclusions in Agent Schultz\u2019s report derive from his analysis of general trends and conditions in Sri Lanka, not from individualized facts about Suntharalinkam or the evi dence presented before the IJ. Moreover, the IJ must conduct an individualized credibility analysis, and it is improper to rely exclusively on a general assertion in a government report to declare an applicant not credible. See Ge, 367 F.3d at 1126 (to the extent that the IJ relied on blanket statements in the State Department report regarding detention conditions in China, the IJ\u2019s finding was not sufficiently individualized); Shah, 220 F.3d at 1069 (<HOLDING>). Here, Schultz bases his conclusion that Holdings: 0: holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience 1: holding that an ij need not first identify the particular pieces of missing relevant evidence and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant when he or she is not otherwise credible 2: holding that an ij made an explicit credibility when the ij found testimony not credible based on several enumerated inconsistencies 3: holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible 4: holding that the ij may not rely on a factually unsupported assertion in a state department report to deem an applicant not credible", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "imaginary, or frivolous.\u201d Id. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Id. We will not affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment unless the evidence could not support any reason able inference in favor of the non-movant. Id. Summary judgment is seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases because such cases inherently require the resolution of factual disputes that turn on inferences, rather than direct evidence, of discriminatory animus. Id. However, if a defendant can establish that an essential element of a discrimination claim cannot be established as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 381 (<HOLDING>). Analysis Fuchs asserts three points on Holdings: 0: holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial 1: holding that defending party may establish a right to summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff after an adequate period of discovery has not been able to produce and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact to find the existence of any one of the claimants elements 2: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 4: holding that rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. A statement is false if untrue when made and then known to be untrue by the person making it or causing it to be made. Govt. Sug. Jury Instr. No. 27-28 (emphasis supplied). The district court denied both of Roster\u2019s good faith defense instructions, concluding that the \u201cknowledge\u201d element of the mail fraud and false statement charges encompassed any good faith defense. We agree with the district court\u2019s conclusion. An action taken in good faith is the other side of an action taken knowingly. United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 265 (7th Cir.1986); cf. Brimberry, 961 F.2d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). On the mail fraud charges, the district Holdings: 0: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions 1: holding that requiring the jury to unanimously find liability for exemplary damages necessarily includes a finding on the underlying theory of liability 2: holding that the law presumes that the jury will follow the courts instructions 3: holding that the district courts instructions requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted willfully to convict on income tax evasion necessarily encompassed the defendants theory on good faith reliance 4: holding the trial courts subsequently corrected instruction that the jury must find the defendant personally committed the offenses in order to convict the defendant on those charges did not prejudice the defendant", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the officer\u2019s unlawful conduct (e.g., an unconstitutional search or arrest). The evidence must be such that it would not have been obtained but for the unlawful conduct of the investigating officer. We are of the opinion that G.S. 15A-974(2) requires, at a minimum, this sort of causal connection between violations of Chapter 15A and the evidence objected to if such evidence is to be suppressed. In so holding, we do not decide that a mere \u201ccause in fact\u201d or \u201cbut-for\u201d relationship is sufficient ipso facto to require exclusion of evidence obtained as a consequence of substantial violations of Chapter 15A. In certain cases, intervening circumstances might \u201cdissipate the taint\u201d of unlawfulness so that such evidence would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, supra (<HOLDING>). We leave all such decisions to future cases. Holdings: 0: holding that the government may not introduce evidence obtained through violations of the fourth amendment 1: holding that only materials which were included in the pretrial record and that would have been admissible evidence may be considered 2: holding admissible certain evidence which would not have been obtained but for violations of constitutional requirements 3: holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible 4: holding that evidence that would not have been obtained but for an unlawful search must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "discharge claim. 2. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Caldwell on Sorenson\u2019s retaliatory discharge claim, because he did not raise a triable issue of fact regarding a causal link between his involvement in a protected activity and an adverse employment action. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding a plaintiff must show the following for a prima facie case of retaliation: \u201c(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link between the two\u201d). Sorenson did not allege facts showing that his age-discrimination complaint was a but-for cause of any adverse employment action. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2534, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Hard-age v. CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, Holdings: 0: holding the third element of the test requires a plaintiff to show that his or her protected activity was a butfor cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer 1: holding in the title vii context that the plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him know of the employees plaintiffs protected activity 2: holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action 3: holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity 4: holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "55, 604 N.E.2d 117, 119 (1992); Kappel v. Fisher Bros., 6th Ave. Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 1039, 387 N.Y.S.2d 251, 355 N.E.2d 305, 306 (1976)). Such limitation of liability stems from \u201cthe basic common-law principle that \u2018an owner or general contractor [sh]ould not be held responsible for the negligent acts of others over whom [the owner or general contractor] had no direction or con trol.\u2019 Ross, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d at 88 (quoting Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Coiy., 44 NY.2d 290, 405 NY.S.2d 630, 376 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (1978)). Liability in the absence of direction or control over the worksite may attach only where the person to be charged in fact caused the defective condition giving rise to injury. See Murphy v. Columbia Univ., 4 A.D.3d 200, 773 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (N.Y.App.Div. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Here, the record demonstrates clearly that Holdings: 0: holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control 1: holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment 2: holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment 3: holding that proof of control was not required where the injury arose from the condition of the work place created by or known to the contraetor 4: holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to the same amount of money if Husband opts to increase his disability benefits, thereby decreasing his military retirement, (2) calls for direct payment by the Military Finance Center where the parties were not. married for ten years during Husband\u2019s military service, and (3) provides for retained jurisdiction to supervise and enforce the payment of military retirement pay. The Trial Court denied the motion for new trial on November 20, 2002. Husband appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW \u00b6 5 Because a divorce action is one of equitable cognizance, a trial court has discretion to divide the marital estate. Teel v. Teel, 1988 OK 151, \u00b6 7, 766 P.2d 994, 998. We will not disturb a trial court\u2019s order dividing marital property unless we find the court abused its discretion or that its (N.M.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); and Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 Holdings: 0: holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits 1: holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits 2: holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits 3: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa 4: holding that federal law does not prohibit a marital settlement agreement which provides for indemnification if husband takes voluntary action to reduce wifes share of military retirement benefits as along as the disability benefits are not specified as the source of the payments to wife", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "notified of infringement rests on the alleged infringer. To the extent that Newbridge contends that it was not put on notice of infringement, the Court likewise rejects Newbridge\u2019s contention, as the record demonstrates otherwise. (See e.g. Tr. 1218-1219, 1487-1489, 3220-3222, 3266, PX 839). In addition to the foregoing failure to investigate and/or obtain valid opinions of counsel, the Court notes the existence of other aggravating factors against New-bridge including the prolonged nature of Newbridge\u2019 infringement (Tr. 1487, 1816, 2967), its failure to discontinue its infringement once notified of Lucent\u2019s law suit, and its failure to take remedial action to remedy its alleged infringement. See e.g. Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1328 (Fed.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Based on the jury\u2019s findings of willful Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees 1: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding that enhanced damages and attorneys fees are appropriate where the district court found that the infringer did not procure a patent search and continued to manufacture and sell infringing products after the law suit was filed against it 4: holding that attorneys fees and costs spent by an insurance company to defend against civil suit filed by defendant are not recoverable under the vwpa", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The district court denied Wade\u2019s subsequent 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 habe-as corpus petition and we affirm. 1. We assume, as does the respondent warden, that the introduction at trial of Wade\u2019s co-defendant\u2019s statements violated the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (\u201cStatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are ... testimonial under even a narrow standard.\u201d). But, \u201c[hjabeas relief on a trial error claim is appropriate only if the error results in \u2018actual prejudice.\u2019 \u201d Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Davis v. Ayala, \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 192 L.Ed.2d 323 (2015)); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Wade has not demonstrated that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review 1: holding that a  455b violation is subject to harmless error review 2: holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis 3: holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error 4: holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "homestead exemption, even though the title of the property is held by a revocable trust. In the case at hand, Mary is the trustee and one of the beneficiaries of the Mary D. Fitton Revocable Trust. She is also the person who formed the trust. The property in question is her principal place of residence. She was married at all times pertinent to the mortgage and conveyances at issue. Relying on the reasoning in Richardson, and case law from this court relied upon therein, we hold that, according to the facts presented, Mary Fitton was entitled to a homestead exemption even though the title to the property was held by her trust. Furthermore, the fact that the trust holds the property as a tenant in common does not affect the outcome. See Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289, 38 S.W. 345 (1896) (<HOLDING>). As for the Bank of Little Rock\u2019s argument Holdings: 0: holding that when a husband first acquired property and then conveyed it to his wife they could not hold the property as tenants by the entirety or joint tenants because the four unities did not coincide so the deed created a tenancy in common with a right of survivorship 1: holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property 2: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead 3: holding that marital property was not attachable for the sole debts of the husband because it was held in tenancy by entirety 4: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety is exempt from attachment or execution for the sole debts of husband", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "while working for The District at Project Forward.\u201d (Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary Judgment, p. 7.) But Thomas\u2019s position at Project Forward, another program in the District where Thomas was employed before the STAR Academy, is irrelevant. Moreover, by her own testimony, plaintiff knew before she even began working at the STAR Academy that plaintiff was explicitly told that he was not a supervisor at Project Forward and that he should not hold himself out to be. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that even if Thomas was not a supervisor, he \u201cmasqueraded\u201d as one. But if plaintiff erroneously thought that Thomas had some supervisory role in relation to her, her belief was not clearly reasonable, and cannot create liability for the district. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the record from which Holdings: 0: holding that false arrest is one means of committing false imprisonment 1: holding that amtrak was a state actor 2: holding that a supervisor was not similarly situated to another supervisor with the same title where the former could not perform the latters duties 3: holding that such a physician was a state actor under  1983 4: holding that in cases where there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor when he in fact was not the victims mistaken conclusion must be a reasonable one", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "made some positive efforts in collecting rebates which should be commended. At this juncture, the most pertinent issue is how best to expend Federal Defendants\u2019 limited resources to accomplish the purpose of the Court\u2019s decrees-the enforcement of the regulatory duties. This suit comes at a time of frugal federal budgets and limited resources for federal officials. Doubtless the conservation of these resources will assist them in fulfilling their regulatory duties generally and more specifically the ones at issue in this suit. Finally, if for no other reason, compensatory sanctions are inappropriate because competent proof of the amount of losses and attorney fees have not been submitted to the Court. See O\u2019Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Gen. Signal Corp. v. Donallco, Inc., 787 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss 1: recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative 2: holding that 25 surcharge added to fees that otherwise would be compensatory was a criminal contempt sanction even though it was payable to the adverse party and not to the court reversing order for sanctions because court did not follow procedural requirements for criminal contempt 3: holding that a trustee can recover damages in the form of costs and attorneys fees under section 105a as a sanction for ordinary civil contempt 4: holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under  1291", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the blood draw was reasonable under a general Fourth Amendment balancing test outside of any exception. Finally, it argues that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless blood draw, namely, the difficulty that the law enforcement officers would have faced obtaining a warrant late at night when tasked with investigating a large-scale fatality accident. a. Whether the Texas implied-consent statute is its own exception to the warrant requirement The State argues that the Transportation Code provides its own exception to the Fourth Amendment\u2019s warrant requirement. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have rejected the contention that a statute may create a per se exception to a warrant requirement. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-63 (<HOLDING>); Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d at 797-800 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment 1: holding that the statutory definition of responsibly connected provided a per se rule 2: holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis 3: holding such agreements to be per se illegal 4: holding expert testimony is not required as a per se rule  in bad faith actions", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). a. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to convict Connelly of the false statement charge. A rational jury could have concluded that (a) E.J.R.C. was truthful when she testified that Connelly threatened her with jail if she did not perform oral.sex; (b) Connelly, an experienced police officer and former tribal prosecutor, fully understood the FBI agents\u2019 questions; and (c) Connelly was not credible because his statements to Agent Kimball and Agent Smiedala about whether he threatened E.J.R.C. with jail were inconsistent. See, e.g., Selby, 557 F.3d at 978 (<HOLDING>). b. Moreover, we find no inconsistency between Holdings: 0: holding that persecution of a woman because of her government job or her husbands position as a police officer was not on account of a particular social group 1: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 2: holding that no rational jury could conclude there was no intent to distribute where the defendants possessed 3000 pounds of marijuana 3: holding that it was appellants burden to prove that her husbands death occurred in the scope of employment and that she was eligible for widows benefits 4: holding a rational jury was entitled to conclude that a government officials misstatement regarding her husbands employment was not an inadvertent mistake", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of exceptional circumstances ordinarily required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b). See, e.g., White v. General Services Administration, 652 F.2d 913, 915-16 (9th Cir.1981). Morse argues that \u00a7 706(f)(5) should not be construed to authorize reference to a magistrate when neither side wants the reference. The court disagrees. The statute calls for the judge \u201cto assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(f)(5). If the case cannot be scheduled for trial within 120 days after issue has been joined, the judge has the discretion to appoint a master. Id. Nothing in Title VII conditions this authority on the consent of the parties. See, e.g., Brown v. Wesley\u2019s Quaker Maid, Inc., 771 F.2d 952, 954-55 (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 116, 93 Holdings: 0: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 1: holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard 2: recognizing that mixed questions of fact and law that are essentially factual in nature should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard as opposed to the generally administered de novo standard 3: holding that magistrates findings following a nonconsensual reference of a title vii ease are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard 4: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "law, our review is de novo. See, e.g., State Police Ass\u2019n of Mass. v. Comm\u2019r, 125 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1997). Persons subject to the federal estate tax are required to file estate tax returns within fixed time parameters. I.R.C. \u00a7 6075. If such a person fails to file an estate tax return in a timeous manner, he has the burden of showing \u201cthat such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.\u201d Id. \u00a7 6651(a)(1). In the absence of such a showing, \u201cthere shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return\u201d a late-filing penalty. Id. Imposition of this penalty is mandatory unless the failure to file on time was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. See Comm\u2019r v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 224, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944) (<HOLDING>); Plunkett v. Comm\u2019r, 118 F.2d 644, 649 (1st Holdings: 0: holding pennsylvanias similarly worded sixyear statute of limitations for paternity actions unconstitutional 1: holding defendant could not recover attorneys fees under predecessor to statute 38001 when defendant did not present contract claim 2: holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001 3: holding latefiling penalty mandatory absent reasonable cause under a similarly worded predecessor statute 4: holding that the statute is mandatory", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is insufficient ground for diversion from the presumption set forth in Holmes. The trial court is afforded the discretion to determine whether a sufficient showing has been made to necessitate questioning by the court on whether juror exposure actually transpired. Pure conjecture that jurors might inadvertently violate admonitions not to read outside newspaper articles is insufficient to require court ex- animation of the jurors. See People v. Green, 323 Mich. 128, 35 N.W.2d 142 (1948). The Holmes presumption is sufficient to permit the trial court to deny a request to question the jury unless the court has reason to believe that such inquiry would be fruitful. See United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39, 50 (D.C.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). IV The majority finds that the reasonable Holdings: 0: holding that trial court not required to conduct a voir dire on counsels unsubstantiated suspicion where issue was whether jurors had overheard any part of a bench conversation 1: holding that the extent to which parties may examine prospective jurors on voir dire lies within the trial judges discretion 2: holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice 3: holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under rule 43 4: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on which he relied is barred \u201cfrom seeking relief pursuant to FDUTPA, as he acted unreasonably.\u201d Rosa v. Amoco Oil Co., 262 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1368 (S.D.Fla.2003). Here, the terms of the reinstated contract are inconsistent with the alleged misrepresentations upon which the Buyer supposedly relied. The contract provided that TRG made no representations regarding governmental approvals and expressly re moved any references to the \u201cIntended Use\u201d of 218 units for the property. As such, the Buyer could not justifiably rely on any representations from TRG concerning governmental approvals and the number of units that could be built on the property. The trial court should have granted TRG\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. See St. Joseph\u2019s Hosp. v. Cowart, 891 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the Holdings: 0: recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party 1: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 2: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 3: holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party 4: holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the initial inquiry, it likewise cannot be rewarded for engaging in the most cursory of investigations into this child's heritage, notwithstanding Mother\u2019s unequivocal assertions that Father was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation. I construe the events following that initial response from Cherokee Nation as Appellants\u2019 good-faith reliance on the tribe\u2019s representations that Baby Girl was not Cherokee and ICWA was not applicable. Ignoring the bonding that occurred here is simply ignoring the reality of this case. 72 . By way of supplemental citation, Father contends Mother\u2019s preference that Baby Girl be placed with Appellants is, standing alone, insufficient to constitute good cause warranting deviation from section 1915(a). See In re T.S.W., 276 P.3d 133 (Kan.2012) (<HOLDING>). I do not disagree. Although I recognize that Holdings: 0: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence 1: holding placement preference of birth mother alone does not constitute good cause to deviate from placement preferences under icwa 2: holding that perjured testimony standing alone does not constitute fraud upon the court 3: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 4: holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cexercised some level of oversight\u201d over a contractor\u2019s activities. Burn Pit, 744 F.3d at 339. Instead, a court must inquire whether the military clearly \u201cchose how to carry out these tasks,\u201d rather than giving the contractor discretion to determine the manner in which the contractual duties would be performed. Id. (emphasis added); see also Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 467 (3d Cir.2013) (stating that plenary control does not exist when the military \u201cmerely provides the contractor with general guidelines that can be satisfied at the contractor\u2019s discretion\u201d because \u201ccontractor actions taken within that discretion do not necessarily implicate unreviewable military decisions\u201d); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359-61 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The second Taylor factor concerns whether \u201ca Holdings: 0: holding that a contract for aviation services in afghanistan did not manifest sufficient military control to present a political question because the contractor retained authority over the type of plane flight path and safety of the flight 1: holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion 2: holding that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment 3: holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment 4: holding that contract charged primary contractor with a duty of care for all employees on the work site including employees of its subcontractors where contract required primary contractor to comply with applicable state and federal safety statutes and regulations made primary contractor responsible for reviewing safety programs of its subcontractors and primary contractor employed a safety officer to oversee its subcontractors operations", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to testify, violates his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under the United States Constitution as well as his confrontation rights under the Texas Constitution. The State argues that, because Hale does not point out any distinction in the analysis we are to apply under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and under the Texas Constitution, we should not apply a separate analysis and should overrule his second point. We agree, and we analyze Hale\u2019s contention under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause only. See, e.g., Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 917, 118 S.Ct. 305, 139 L.Ed.2d 235 (1997); Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Hale\u2019s second point. We review de Holdings: 0: holding that the idaho constitution provides no greater protection from double jeopardy than does the federal constitution 1: holding that appellate court assumes appellant claims no greater protection under state constitution than that provided by federal constitution when state and federal claims not briefed separately 2: holding missouri constitution requires stricter separation of church and state than does federal constitution 3: recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution 4: recognizing exception under state constitution", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ha-beas relief unless the state court\u2019s decision \u201cwas contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1), or \u201cwas based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,\u201d id. \u00a7 2254(d)(2). B. Analysis Mr. Morehead argued in his \u00a7 2254 application that his conviction violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on \u201cthe suppression of evidence [Ms. Burbach\u2019s academic records] which would have revealed perjury to the jury.\u201d Aplt. App. at 10. He contended the suppression was contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, which hold due .2012) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Mr. Morehead does not contest the Holdings: 0: holding claims not raised in  2254 application are forfeited 1: holding that a coa is required to appeal the denial of a rule 60b motion from a judgment in a  2254 proceeding 2: holding a coa applicant forfeited a claim of error in district courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing by not seeking a hearing in his  2254 proceeding 3: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 4: holding that the magistrates recommended order terminating temporary supervision and placing the child in permanent guardianship was not supported by competent substantial evidence because the magistrate failed to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing violated the fathers due process rights", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "development of a full factual record.\u201d Appellant\u2019s Opening Br. 13. Sarvis\u2019s demand for discovery, however, misapprehends the nature of a motion to dismiss. Here, the district court properly recognized that \u201c[t]o survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must \u2018provide enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face,\u2019 \u201d Sarvis, 80 F.Supp.3d at 696 (quoting Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009)), and that to reach facial plausibility, Sarvis must \u201cplead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\u201d Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The pr rtarian Party of Ill., 591 F.2d 22, 25-27 (7th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>). It remains far from clear, moreover, that Holdings: 0: holding illinois high school associations version of the transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding that where racial bias motivated its original enactment a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violated the equal protection clause 3: holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause 4: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "general and conclusory allegation that \u201cAxesa\u2019s actions and omissions undoubtedly created a hostile work environment.\u201d In order to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs cannot rest on conclusory allegations. See Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005). Moreover, in their objections, Plaintiffs did not cite to any specific record citation in support of this assertion. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to again comply with Local Rule 56(e). This Court also notes that Plaintiffs failed to object to the Magistrate Judge\u2019s conclusion that Cintron\u2019s comments were \u201ctoo mild\u201d to form the basis for a hostile work environment claim. Therefore, this Court need not effect a de novo review of this portion of the Magistrate Judge\u2019s reasoning. Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons just stated, this Court finds Holdings: 0: holding the failure to file objections to a magistrates report issued pursuant to 28 usc  636b1 waives the right to appeal all issues both factual and legal 1: holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation 2: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court 3: holding that failure to object in a timely fashion to a magistrate judges report and recommendation generally constitutes a waiver of the defaulting partys right to appeal provided that the parties received clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object 4: holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Opinion at 4-5. His fears are unfounded. First, the state action requirement, operating entirely apart from the standing requirement, would obviously screen out the vast majority of consumer-preference grievances, for a consumer aggrieved about the disappearance of his favorite brand would have to find a cause of action against a governmental body or face dismissal for failure to state a claim. In any event, of those claims that remain, the independent causation requirement of the standing requirement would bar the tenuous claims Judge Silberman fears from ever reaching the merits. Only those consumers who could prove that a \"substantial likelihood,\u201d see Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 75 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. at 2631 n. 20, existed that the governmental 2232, 2241, 65 L.Ed.2d 184 (1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, Holdings: 0: holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion 1: holding that a city could not sell bonds below par value effectively raising the interest rate because that would change the terms of the bond measure that voters approved 2: holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market 3: holding that plaintiffs seeking to purchase lands in imperial valley had standing to to compel application of federal reclamation requirements to those lands because that measure would likely lead although not compel some landowners to sell their lands at below market value 4: holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the district judge cannot analyze it and make his final decision in time to avert harm to the plaintiff due to delay, then the plaintiff can move for a preliminary injunction. That would be the kind of case in which a court of appeals might grant a stay of administrative action if that court was the first tier of judicial review of the agency\u2019s action, rather than the district court. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 705; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass\u2019n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C.Cir.1958); Busboom Grain Co. v. ICC, 830 F.2d [74,] 75 [(7th Cir.1987) ]. The standard is the same whether a preliminary injunction against agency action is being sought in the district court or a stay of that action is being sought in this court. Id.\u201d); Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 812 F.2d 288, 290 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Kansas ex rel. Graves v. United States, 86 Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss 1: holding that a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion were insufficient to prevent the plaintiff from dismissing by notice 2: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict 3: holding that a motion for a  705 stay should be judged by the same standard as a motion for a preliminary injunction 4: holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "nonbreaching provisions of FIR-REA and other factors, caused its wounded bank damages. Def. Mot. at 64-65; Def. Reply at 84-88. Plaintiffs principal response as to causation is an argument that it need only show that the breach was a \u201csubstantial\u201d causal factor, not the \u201csole\u201d cause, in its wounded bank damages, and that it has made such a showing. Pl. Response at 88; see Energy Capital, 47 Fed.Cl. at 395 (\u201c[T]he Court will require the Plaintiff to prove that the breach was a \u2018substantial factor\u2019 in causing its losses.\u201d). The court finds that the \u201csubstantial factor\u201d standard is appropriate. The court now considers whether plaintiff has furnished sufficient evidence to support a finding that the breach was, in fact, a substantial causal factor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>). In support of its claims of $130.1 million in Holdings: 0: holding that it is clearly settled that where there is a failure to establish an essential element of the defamation cause of action the case becomes one of law for the court 1: holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case 2: holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial 3: holding that rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial 4: holding that rule 56c requires summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys ease and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that \u201cthe notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order being appealed from is entered.\u201d Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Because Mr. Lilly filed his notice of appeal more than 10 days after the district court entered its order granting his petition for clarification, our appellate jurisdiction is contingent on whether this appeal is properly labeled \u201ccriminal\u201d or \u201ccivil.\u201d The Government continues to urge us to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. According to the Government, we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the district court lacked' jurisdiction, in the first instance, to entertain Mr. Lilly\u2019s petition for clarification. Moreover the Government submits that, even if Mr. Lilly\u2019s petition was properly before the dist Cir.) (<HOLDING>), amended on other grounds, 919 F.2d 57 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that rule 4as timing requirements apply to an appeal from an order granting or denying a criminal defendants motion for the return of property under fedrcrimp 41e 1: holding that federal court may not issue writ of coram nobis for state prisoner 2: holding same for writ of error coram nobis 3: holding that rule 4as time limits govern an appeal from a district court order granting or denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis 4: holding that in the absence of a valid excuse for delay a coram nobis petition is subject to denial", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the district court was as follows: Q: ... Now, you were convicted of abuse of a household member in the year 2000, correct? A: Yes. Q: And the charge that you were convicted of included you hitting \u2014 was it your former girlfriend? A: Yes ma\u2019am. Q: Okay. And so you were convicted of hitting your former girlfriend? A. Yes. 2 . Another example is that the Hawaii statute applies to all \"persons related by consanguinity,\u201d including both \"children\u201d and \u201cparents,\u201d while the federal statute applies only to one specified blood relationship \u2014 that in which the defendant is the parent of the victim. 3 . The only document in the record that suggests how Nobriga\u2019s assault met the section 709-906(1) standard is a police report, which we are barred by Shepard from considering. See 125 S.Ct. at 1263 (<HOLDING>). 4 . Such a post hoc admission is not Holdings: 0: holding that courts applying taylor may only look to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual ba  sis for the plea was confirmed by the defen dant or to some comparable judicial record of this information 1: holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information 2: holding that court could look only to the statutory definition of a crime the charging document written plea agreement transcript of plea colloquy and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented in determining if prior conviction qualified as a generic burglary for purposes of enhanced sentencing under armed career criminal act 3: holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record 4: holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "individuals from discrimination on account of their sexual orientation. In 1974, a New Jersey court held that the parental visitation rights of a divorced homosexual father could not be denied or restricted based on his sexual orientation. In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J.Super. 486, 489, 324 A.2d 90 (Ch.Div.1974), aff'd per curiam, 142 N.J.Super. 499, 362 A.2d 54 (App.Div.1976). Five years later, the Appellate Division stated that the custodial rights of a mother could not be denied or impaired because she was a lesbian. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J.Super. 425, 427, 404 A.2d 1256 (App.Div.1979). This State was one of the first in the nation to judicially recognize the right of an individual to adopt a same-sex partner\u2019s biological child. J.M.G., supra, 267 N.J.Super. at 625, 626, 631, 632 A.2d 550 (<HOLDING>); see also In re Adoption of Two Children by Holdings: 0: recognizing the concept of dual paternity in which a child born into a marriage with a nonbiological father retains a legal parentchild relationship based on presumptive fatherhood for purposes of legitimacy and inheritance while becoming the child of a newlyestablished biological father for purposes of child support 1: recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined 2: holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home 3: recognizing importance of the emotional benefit of formal recognition of the relationship between the nonbiological mother and the child and that there is not one correct family paradigm for creating supportive loving environment for children 4: holding that a mother and her two children failed to establish a  1983 claim where there was no evidence that threats made to the mother were directly aimed at the relationship between parent and child", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "79 N.E.2d at 423. For all of these reasons, and under our deferential standard of review of the determinations of administrative agencies, we affirm the Board\u2019s award of worker\u2019s compensation benefits to Payne for the subsequent shoulder injury resulting from his fall on April 18, 2009. Affirmed. FRIEDLANDER, J., and RILEY, J., concur. 1 . Citing Muncie Ind. Transit Authority v. Smith, 743 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), Moorehead claims that Payne was required to establish the causal connection between the two injuries by expert medical evidence. Appellant's Br. at 3. But the holding in that case, requiring medical evidence to establish a causal relationship between the employment and the injury, is limited to injuries not caused by \u201ca sudden and unexpected event.\u201d Id. at 1217 Holdings: 0: holding expert testimony necessary to establish the existence of a causal relationship between a particular toxin and its effect on the human body 1: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the citys decision was arbitrary and capricious when it was contrary to the evidence and based solely on speculation arising from prior unrelated acts 3: holding that the boards decision was contrary to law because it was based solely on smiths testimony and is not supported by medical evidence which shows a causal relationship between smiths employment and his carpal tunnel syndrome 4: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "19, are preemptive. See supra \u00b6\u00b6 19-21. T39 Contrary to the majority's view, these definitions are not preemptive because the doctrine of equitable adoption is not premised on our ability to judicially define the statutory term \"child\" or \"parent.\" The version of the probate code in effect when Williams' Estates was decided provided for intestate succession by a decedent's \"child\" or \"issue.\" Utax CopE \u00a7 74-4-5(1)-(2) (1958). We did not reach our holding in Williams' Estates by judicially defining these statutory terms, as the majority suggests. See supra \u00b6 20. Instead, w 638, 645 (N.M.Ct.App.1985) (applying the equitable rule \"authoriz[ing] an award of attorney fees for services rendered which confer a benefit upon the estate\"); In re Estate of O'Keefe, 583 N.W.2d 138, 140 (S.D.1998) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms 1: holding that creditors of a trust beneficiary were prohibited from intervening in an action involving a dispute between the trustee and a beneficiary concerning distribution of the trust corpus 2: holding that the cireuit court had the equitable authority to partially disqualify a beneficiary from inheriting from an estate because of his fraudulent acts 3: holding single coexecutors release of mortgage debt paid to estate was valid and binding on estate because acts of any coexecutor in respect to the administration of the effects of the estate are deemed to be the acts of all as where one releases a debt or settles an account of a person with the deceased or surrenders a term or sells the goods and chattels of the estate his act binds the others characterizing conversion of decedents personal property into cash as act in due course of administration of estate 4: holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The evidence at trial established that Defendant: (1) was informed of the delivery to his property and suggested that it be done at night, (2) was also informed when the truck arrived, and (3)was informed the next day when the drivers left his lot. Defendant claims that the only evidence of affirmative conduct on this occasion was his suggestion that the unloading take place at night. This evidence, stand ing alone, Defendant argues, is insufficient to support his aiding and abetting conviction. Defendant also argues that his previous act of giving the key to his property cannot be considered as evidence here because such only aided a general scheme of possession of marijuana, not the specific offense on October 4, 1998. See United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). We conclude, however, that Defendant\u2019s assent Holdings: 0: holding that the government must prove actual subjective knowledge and that a defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known 1: holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them 2: holding that under a similar statute the government need only show that the defendant had the intent to carry on illegal activity and that the crime occurred in conjunction with interstate travel 3: holding that broker willfully aided and abetted manipulative wash and match trades scheme when he knew or had reason to know that such trading was economically irrational 4: holding that the government must show that defendant aided and abetted the specific crime not just the overall scheme", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1415(e)(2). The only evidence outside the administrative record the plaintiff proffers is a report from Dr. Daniel Ling. See Pl.\u2019s Resp., Exhibit 27. Thus, the court will decide the defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion based on the administrative record and Dr. Ling\u2019s report. 2 . Shortly after the death of the plaintiff\u2019s mother, Mr. O'Toole began dating Ms. Fulgham. Ms. Fulgham took an active role in the plaintiff's education. In October of 1993, Mr. O\u2019Toole and Ms. Fulgham were married. 3 . The plaintiff controverts this key fact. However, the plaintiff does not refer to anything in the record supporting her contention as required by Fed.RXiv.Pro. 56 and D.Kan. Rule 56.1 and, therefore, the fact is deemed uncontroverted. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir.l995)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact 1: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 2: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 3: holding that in order to withstand summary judgment the nonmovant must identify a genuine issue of material fact by reference to an affidavit a deposition transcript or a specific exhibit incorporated therein and that a court need not search the record to find uncited evidence which controverts a material fact 4: holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and hold that 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 410 continues to protect any money accruing from the lease of Indian trust land, even after it has been distributed to a Native American and placed in a personal bank account. 1. Jurisdiction \u00b614 \u201cWhere a federal statute is silent on the question of jurisdiction, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.\u201d Law Offices of Vincent Vitale, PC v. Tabbytite, 942 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Alaska 1997) (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-08, 82 S. Ct. 519, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1962)). Because 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 410 does not purport to impose exclusive federal jurisdiction, Washington courts have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 410 bars garnishment of the funds in the Harrisons\u2019 bank accounts. See Vitale, 942 P.2d at 1147 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction Holdings: 0: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land 1: holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction over indian claims to land allotments 2: holding that alaska state courts had jurisdiction to determine application of 25 usc  410 to proceeds of condemnation action on indian trust land 3: holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws  including the execution of a search warrant  unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction 4: holding that county law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest indian at ballpark located on indian trust land", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that, in addition to recruiting Hayes to prepare returns for Ellerbe, she twice hired him \u25a0 to prepare her own returns. The first return included deductions not supported by the information Peeples had provided to Hayes, and Peeples was audited as a result. She testified that she subsequently instructed Hayes \u201cto do my taxes, but only put the figures on my taxes of what I give you.\u201d J.A. 564-65. The jury could reasonably infer that Peeples would not adhere to this policy for herself and yet provide Hayes with false information about her sister\u2019s taxes. This inference is particularly strong in light of the substantial similarities connecting the misstatements in the Ellerbe return with those in other returns prepared by Hayes. Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). B.Counts 12 and 13: Ronald Gullette Like Holdings: 0: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 1: holding that evidence that two halfsisters suffered similar sexual abuse tended to show that they were abused by their common parent or grandparents 2: holding that although there were six occurrences under the general liability policy there was only one sexual abuse occurrence where sexual abuse occurrence was defined as a single act or multiple continuous sporadic or related acts of sexual molestation or abuse caused by one perpetrator 3: holding that similar fact evidence regarding prior act of sexual misconduct by defendant was properly admitted to show the defendants common scheme plan or design to sexually exploit his patients and that such evidence is relevant even if it is not uniquely similar 4: holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the government from bringing unfounded suits or engaging in arbitrary or unjust administrative behavior. That goal is in part achieved by rectifying the \u2018disparity in resources and expertise of ... individuals and their government.\u2019 \u201d Oguachuba, 706 F.2d at 98-99, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4984. 6. Other District Courts Have Looked Beyond the Statutory Language of the EAJA and Held Attorneys Can Be Paid the Award of Attorney\u2019s Fees Directly Other district courts that have engaged in analysis beyond the plain meaning of the EAJA, have held that awards of attorney\u2019s fees under the EAJA can be paid directly to attorneys. The Northern District of Alabama determined that the Savings Clause dictates that attorney\u2019s fees can be payable directly to the attorney because .D.F1.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the district court cases Holdings: 0: holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees 1: holding that payment of eaja fees directly to the attorney also is consistent with the broad purpose for enacting the eaja  if the commissioners narrow position was adopted there would be a substantial risk that counsel for a successful plaintiff might not be paid which would have a chilling effect on the willingness of attorneys to represent indigent claimants in social security cases thus thwarting the primary purpose the eaja was enacted 2: holding that the eaja application satisfied the eaja content requirements because it contained among other things an itemized statement of the fees sought  supported by an affidavit from the appellants counsel 3: holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja 4: holding that a cause of action based on eaja will be deemed to have survived the death of the aggrieved party and  the personal representative of the deceased partys estate or any other appropriate person may be substituted as the prevailing party to whom payment of an eaja award may be made", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a complaint\u2019s factual allegations. Id. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993). Accordingly, to determine whether a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must examine the applicable substantive law and the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. Preliminary Injunction Standard To determine whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider: (1) the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and, (4) the impact of an injunction upon the public interest. Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. 78 F.3d 1111, 1123 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The essence of this standard is \u201cwhether the Holdings: 0: holding that trademark infringement under michigan common law is governed by the likelihood of confusion standard 1: holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion 2: holding that as in an action alleging infringement of a mark likelihood of confusion is the essence of an unfair competition claim 3: holding that the use of the shoneys name over any subsidiary product line mark  reduces the likelihood of confusion 4: holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). A fundamental miscarriage of justice is established by showing that the alleged constitutional violation \u201chas probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent\u201d of the crime for which he has been convicted. Murray, supra, at 496,106 S.Ct. 2639. Under the circumstances of the instant case, Mercer has demonstrated cause and prejudice such that the court has jurisdiction to entertain his claim for federal habeas relief that the reasonable doubt instruction was unconstitutional. Specifically, cause is established by the novelty of the issue of whether the reasonable doubt instruction given at Mercer\u2019s trial imper-missibly lessened the prosecution\u2019s burden of proof. Reed, supra, at 17-20, 104 S.Ct. 2901 (<HOLDING>). Further, the previously unrecognized Holdings: 0: holding fact that a constitutional claim is so novel that it is not reasonable for counsel to raise it until after the supreme court articulates that such claim is a basis for federal habeas relief constitutes cause for failure to raise that claim in accordance with applicable state procedures 1: holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure 2: holding that a plaintiff is not required to state the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim only the facts underlying it 3: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate 4: holding that failure to raise an issue until it is brought up at oral argument constitutes a waiver", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.1987) (\u201cJustice demands a speedy resolution of child custody and child support issues.\u201d). Section 153.0071 serves the first goal of peaceful resolution by providing procedures for alternate dispute resolution. However, because section 153.0071 is silent on the options available to a court when an arbitrator\u2019s award is vacated, the second goal of a speedy resolution is not served, as is clear in this case. Nevertheless, until the Legislature amends the Family Code provisions on arbitration, we are bound by section 153.0071\u2019s silence, this court\u2019s decision in Koch, and the provisions of the TAA. Accordingly, the trial court did not have discretion to rule on a claim or controversy that the parties agreed to submit to binding arbitration. See Koch, 27 S.W.3d at 97 (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court was limited to Holdings: 0: holding that where the trial court had referred the parties to arbitration but it was ambiguous as to whether the court had also dismissed the underlying case dismissal and referral to arbitration should really be construed as an order to stay litigation pending arbitration which under koczak and umana was not a final appealable order 1: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 2: holding that because taa is silent on whether section 171089b includes right to order parties to trial when the arbitration is vacated explicit language of statute should be followed 3: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 4: holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "from the scene.\u201d Id. \u201cAs Plaintiff drove away, [Sgt. Sloan] jumped onto Plaintiff's car and fell off the vehicle as Plaintiff ultimately left the scene.\u201d Id. Plaintiff attributed defendants\u2019 actions on February 13, 2004 to \"retaliation for the earlier incident in which Plaintiff drove away from his home, causing Defendant Sloan to fall off of Plaintiff\u2019s vehicle.\u2019\u2019 Id. \u00b6 21 (emphasis in original). 2 . Because plaintiff's common law claims are dismissed as untimely, the Court need not determine whether plaintiff complied with the mandatory notice requirements of D.C.Code \u00a7 12-309. Plaintiff's compliance or lack thereof has no impact on his constitutional claims. Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1510 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073, 105 S.Ct. 2153, 85 L.Ed.2d 509 (1985) Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs noncompliance with dccode  12309 cannot bar federal claims 1: holding that a procedural rule that is not firmly established and regularly followed cannot bar federal court review 2: holding that federal evidentiary standard for impeachment by prior conviction should apply to dccode offenders tried in federal court 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding that  1997ee did not bar plaintiffs first amendment claims", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "49, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (\u201cThe traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a \u00a7 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.\u201d (internal quotations omitted)). The Tenth Circuit has stated that whether there is a real nexus in a particular case depends on the circumstances of the case: The under color of law determination rarely depends on a single, easily identifiable fact, such as the officer\u2019s attire, the location of the act, or whether or not the officer acts in accordance with his or her duty. Instead one must examine \u201cthe nature and circumstances of the officer\u2019s conduct and t f Pawnee Cnty., Okla., 894 F.2d 1176, 1182-92 (10th Cir.1990)(<HOLDING>). In Jojala, v. Chavez, the plaintiff was a Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant who was an elementary school teacher on contract only from august to may who sexually abused children at a nonschoolsponsored summer camp over the summer did not act under color of state law 1: holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law 2: holding that a nurses aide who sexually assaulted a patient while under heavy sedation was not acting under color of state law because as there was no allegation it was the aide who sedated the patient the sexual assault conduct   could have been done by anyone who wandered into the patients room 3: holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee 4: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "restitution ... is ... to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for ... conduct.\u201d). 19 . Gonzalez, 647 F.3d at 66-67. 20 . Clay, 537 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 1072. 21 . Id.; see also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993) (\"A judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication .of guilt and the sentence.\u201d). 22 . See, e.g., United States v. Certified Envtl. Serv., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 99-102 (2d Cir.2014) (reviewing restitution order as part of appeal from a criminal judgment); see also 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3664(o) (\"A sentence that imposes an order of restitution is a final judgment.\u201d). 23 . 560 U.S. 605, 618, 130 S.Ct. 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010). 24 . Id. at 617-18, 130 S.Ct. 2533. 25 . 375 U.S. 169, 174-75, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 26 . 757 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (11th Cir.2014). Holdings: 0: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 1: holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable 2: holding an order imposing sex offender registration after the juvenile courts initial disposition can be a final appealable order 3: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 4: holding that where district court committed defendant to custody but held off on imposing final sentence defendant could have appealed from initial imposition but the appeal following final order imposing full sentence was also timely", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201crepeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.\u201d Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2084, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). We are aware of no case that would preclude a reasonable officer from believing there was probable cause to detain a person who alluded to committing suicide. Cf. Stoot v. City of Everett, 582 F.3d 910, 922 (9th Cir.2009) (granting qualified immunity where plaintiffs did not cite \u201ca single case squarely holding that an officer cannot rely\u201d on a particular victim\u2019s statements in making an arrest); F.E. Trotter v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that a violation could not be clearly established where no case had held so previously); see also Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). While the dissent discounts Hall\u2019s statement Holdings: 0: holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had 1: holding officer did not violate fourth amendment by taking defendant into custody under  5150 where it was reasonable to infer from facts known to detaining officer that plaintiff was at least temporarily disordered and as a result of mental disorder was a danger to herself 2: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 3: holding that a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to detain a person under section 5150 after she alluded to committing suicide despite her protest that the officer should have known the allusion was merely hyperbole 4: holding arrest was valid because there was probable cause of cdw even though officer incorrectly believed at the time that he had probable cause of ppw", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "review conducted by the Department of Children and Family Services, Office of Administrative Hearings. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(a)-(b). If the parent fails to make a timely review request, the parent is deemed to have waived the right to contest the certification, and the Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement must notify the United States Department of the Treasury of the past-due support owed by the parent. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.014(4)(d). The Secretary of the Treasury is required to withhold from a tax refund \u201can amount equal to the past-due support.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 664(a)(l)-(2). The Department shall retain the intercepted tax refund \u201cup to the amount of past-due support assigned to the department as a condition of eligibility for temp Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). The Department further claims that the trial Holdings: 0: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding that the propriety of an order modifying child support without proper pleading notice and opportunity to be heard may be raised for the first time on appeal 2: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered 3: holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to future PIP benefits by executing the release. In so arguing, Bear River relies on language in its insurance policy with the Walls stating that the insured shall not be entitled to receive \u201cduplicate benefits.\u201d However, as Bear River recognizes in its brief, the duty to pay PIP benefits to the insured is governed by Utah law. Utah\u2019s no-fault statute requires that insurance policies bought to satisfy the security requirements of Utah law contain provisions providing for minimum PIP benefits. See Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 31A-22-302(2) (1994). Therefore, an insurance policy may not limit the insured\u2019s right to receive minimum PIP benefits as provided by Utah law, as this would violate those provisions of the Utah no-fault statute. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 233-36 (Utah 1985) (<HOLDING>); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, Holdings: 0: holding household or family exclusion clause in automobile insurance policy contravenes statutory requirements found in utahs nofault statute as to minimum benefits which must be provided to all persons sustaining personal injuries 1: holding that the mcca was not obligated to indemnify a claim under a california automobile insurance policy that was reformed into a michigan nofault automobile insurance policy five years after the subject accident and stating that the mcca can refuse to indemnify claims paid under mcl 5003163 2: holding that united states in ftca action may rely on immunities available to a private automobile owner covered by new jerseys nofault insurance law even though it was not literally the owner of an automobile under the new jersey statute 3: holding that household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile liability insurance are contrary to public policy 4: holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "did not err in concluding that Tenala had failed to carry its burden to show adverse possession of the disputed strip after 1984. C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Holding that Mayo Adversely Possessed a Portion of the Northern End of Lot 5D, but Erroneously Determined the South Boundary Line of the Mayo Lot. Tenala does not dispute that the Ma-yos\u2019 physical encroachments and use of the northern end of Lot 5D possess the requisite characteristics for acquiring a fee simple estate; Tenala argues instead that the better public policy would be to award an easement. Tenala\u2019s arguments are contrary to the existing law, which holds that fee simple title is acquired if all of the required elements of adverse possession are met. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 849 (Alaska 1984) (<HOLDING>). The law has long recognized adverse Holdings: 0: holding that   1635f completely extinguishes the right of rescission at the end of the 3year period 1: holding that title automatically vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period if all the requirements are met 2: holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end 3: recognizing that insurance policy may lapse if the statutory renewal notice requirements are met 4: holding that even if statutory requirements are met courts must inquire into totality of the circumstances to determine if waiver was knowing and voluntary", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "therefore, our review is limited to a determination of whether the admission of this evidence amounted to \u201cplain error.\u201d \u201cPlain error\u201d has been defined as including error so grave as to deny a fundamental right of the defendant so that, absent the error, the jury would have reached a different result. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 22, 409 S.E.2d 288, 300 (1991). The Confrontation Clause prohibits testimonial statements from an unavailable witness being presented at trial without the defendant having an opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to trial. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 187 (2004). It is clear that Ms. Charlesworth\u2019s report was testimonial in nature. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, \u2014, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 321-22 (2009) (<HOLDING>). There was no evidence that defendant had an Holdings: 0: holding that lab reports are accusatory and subject to confrontation clause 1: holding that testimonial statements are subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause even if they are otherwise admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances 2: holding that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay 3: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 4: holding that reports of chemical analyses were testimonial in nature and subject to the confrontation clause requirements", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(1979). Accordingly, in the interest of justice, SMUD is granted 30 days to amend the June 9, 1998 Complaint to articulate the regulatory takings claim discussed in the December 16, 2002 Response at 15 and properly allege the threshold elements discussed above. The Government\u2019s motion to dismiss as to Count IV is denied. 2. Count V \u2014 Taking Of Real Property Claim. The complaint also alleges that the Government\u2019s breach has \u201cforced SMUD to devote economically valuable real property to the storage of the SNF in the ISFSI. The government has taken this real property by denying SMUD its rights as owner of this property to put it to other valuable economic uses.\u201d Compl. at \u00b6 72; see also id. at \u00b6\u00b6 71-73. Real property is constitutionally protected. See Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1328-31 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, taking these allegations as true, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 1: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest 2: holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond 3: holding that inmates have a property interest in their money 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in vested contractual rights", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 665, 726 P.2d 341, 342 (1986)); Garrity v. Overland Sheeps kin Co. of Taos, 121 N.M. 710, 718, 917 P.2d 1382, 1390 (1996) (same); Tabet Lumber Co. v. Romero, 117 N.M. 429, 431, 872 P.2d 847, 849 (1994) (same). At issue in the vast majority of summary judgment eases presented to New Mexico\u2019s appellate courts is the first prong; that is, whether there are genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Silva v. Town of Springer, 121 N.M. 428, 433, 912 P.2d 304, 309, (Ct.App.) (concluding that a material disputed factual issue existed precluding the grant of summary judgment), cert. denied, 121 N.M. 375, 911 P.2d 883, and cert. denied, 121 N.M. 444, 913 P.2d 251 (1996); Blauwkamp v. University of N.M. Hosp., 114 N.M. 228, 233, 836 P.2d 1249, 1254 (Ct.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). In such cases, the rationale behind the Holdings: 0: holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity 1: holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves 2: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 3: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 4: holding that plaintiffs re sponse to defendants motion for summary judgment indicated the existence of material issues of fact", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.\u201d See Hahn v. Mirda, 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 (2007). Here, because Ford, as discussed above, owed plaintiffs no duty to disclose the risk that its ignition locks would fail, Ford is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs\u2019 fraudulent concealment claim. See Oestreieher II, 322 Fed.Appx. at 493 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding because plaintiff had not alleged defendant made a misrepresentation or that the alleged defect posed a safety risk the district court  properly dismissed plaintiffs  fraudulent concealment claim 1: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim 2: holding that alleged defects in special interrogatories could not be the basis for a new trial when counsel had not pointed out the alleged defect to the court 3: holding plaintiffs misrepresentation claim preempted where the only alleged misrepresentations shown by plaintiff were those contained in their labeling or safety data sheet 4: holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-2-l(A)(l); SCRA 1986, 14-201. Defendant\u2019s conviction is AFFIRMED. IT IS SO ORDERED. MONTGOMERY and FROST, JJ., concur. 1 . Defendant raised numerous other issues in his docketing statement. These issues, however, are deemed to be waived as defendant did not brief or argue them on appeal. See State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 311, 772 P.2d 322, 345, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 291, 107 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). 2 . The record does not contain evidence that the State intentionally deprived defendant of the shoes. However, the State \"concede[d] that it may have breached its duty to the defendant [to preserve that evidence].\" See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 368, 369, 600 P.2d 820, 821 (1979) Holdings: 0: holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence 1: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 2: recognizing the practical difficulties of contemporaneous objections to a trial judges conduct 3: recognizing states duty to preserve relevant evidence where practical 4: holding that the states duty to preserve evidence attaches at the time the state has gathered and taken possession of the evidence", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "population. Cf. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 986 (\u201c[T]he district court need not define common terms that are readily understandable to the jury.\u201d). Even accepting the debatable proposition that \u201cad hoc\u201d is beyond the understanding of the average juror, we conclude that the jury would have been able to understand what type of structure a RICO enterprise must have (i.e., one that provides \u201ca mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the entity on an on-going continuous basis\u201d) from the remainder of the instruction. Moreover, we have previously held that a district court is not required to define terms that would normally be beyond the general knowledge of jurors if the terms have been covered extensively during the trial. United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1486 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the structure of the alleged Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury on quantity was harmless in part because the testimony regarding quantity was extensive detailed and uncontroverted 1: recognizing that the term expense may be used to define disbursements even though the term is used in accrual accounting 2: holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it 3: holding that a district court properly denied the defendants request for a mistrial following a witness statement that the defendant had  an extensive criminal record  because the remark was isolated and the district court gave an immediate curative instruction 4: holding that the district court was not required to define pro forma because of extensive discussions regarding the term at trial", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "probability that a randomly chosen person, other than the suspect, has the genetic profile of the evidence DNA?\u201d The probability is, by the State\u2019s expert\u2019s own calculations, no more than one in 170. C. Even had the State used the correct figures in calculating the number of people who could have contributed to the DNA material found at the scene, the use of the unmodified product rule in making those calculations was erroneous. The use of the unmodified product rule in calculating population frequencies from DNA loci is unsupported by the scientific and legal authorities. While the product rule is clearly generally accepted as an accurate theoretical proposition, the issue is whether the product rule can be applied to individual DNA frequencies. See Cauthron, supra, 846 P.2d at 514-15 (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 1: holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a dna expert because the defenses theory was that the defendants dna was planted so the dna evidence would not seem to be an issue 2: holding in regard to admission of dna statistical evidence and product rule calculations that the expert must show more than the theory for the evidence to be admitted the theory must be valid in its application 3: holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 4: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "summary judgment on all claims by all eleven transitory employees whose contracts expired on or before April 30, 2013. (Docket No. 98 at 11-12.) Because Defendant Rodr\u00edguez-D\u00edaz did not become the HR Director until June 5, 2013, Defendants argue it is impossible that he would have participated in the non-renewals of these employees\u2019 contracts. Id Plaintiffs admit that those employees have no claims against co- Defendant Rodriguez-Diaz. (Docket No. 106 \u00b6\u00b6 3-10, 12-15.) Rodriguez-Diaz is not personally liable for those claims. 10 . Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs\u2019 Article 1802 claim, arguing that because Section 1983 already covers the conduct complained of here, the tort claims under state law do not stand. See Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air, Inc., 137 D.P.R. 1 (1994) (<HOLDING>). As in their motion for judgment on the Holdings: 0: holding that claims for relief premised on alleged negligent wrongful or unauthorized conduct by the irs are based in tort and not within the jurisdiction of this court 1: holding article 1802 claims only survive where the conduct alleged of is based on tortious or negligent conduct different from the conduct covered by other specific labor laws involved 2: holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas 3: holding that where no wrongful conduct by the defendant was alleged ie a breach accompanied by violence intimidation defamation fraud or other tortious conduct other than the breach of its contractual obligation under its bylaws no claim for tortious interference can lie 4: holding that if the underlying conduct is wrongful only by virtue of the labor laws then the rico claim is preempted", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(7th Cir.2001). Nor must we consider the preliminary question of whether the Superintendent should be deemed to have waived any objection to that hearing by not raising the issue on appeal. See Aeid, 296 F.3d at 64 (declining, where this Court could dispose of the case on its merits, to address the argument that the respondent had waived any objection to an evidentiary hearing by repeated failures to object to the hearing); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir.2003) (declining to address \u201cwhat steps a respondent must undertake to preserve an objection, predicated on \u00a7 2254(e)(2), to a district court decision to grant a habeas petitioner an evidentiary hearing,\u201d where the district court had not erred in holding the hearing); cf. Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 16 . In Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 Holdings: 0: holding that a district court has the power to raise the aedpa limitations period sua sponte because the defense implicates values beyond the interests of the parties 1: holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal 2: holding that a district court has the discretion to raise a  2254 timeliness consideration sua sponte 3: holding that a district court has the authority to raise the aedpa statute of limitations on its own motion 4: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "underlying offenses were charged under different indictment numbers; and separate judgments were imposed as to each conviction. The district court also f he armed robberies occurred on different dates with different victims. Moreover, only one of those armed robberies involved an accomplice. Rather, as shown above, the gist of defendant\u2019s argument for why these four cases are related under \u00a7 4A1.2(a)(2) is that they were consolidated for purposes of sentencing. However, the district court did not clearly err in finding that they were not so consolidated based upon the separate indictments under which the cases were charged, the trial court\u2019s entry of separate judgments in those cases, and the lack of a consolidation order. See United States v. Carter, 283 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Odom, 199 F.3d at 324 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding same and citing cases 1: holding that order could be appealed because ajlthough the district court did not make an express finding there is no doubt that the district court intended its orders to be final judgments for purposes of appeal 2: holding that even though the state trial court rendered its judgments in the defendants prior cases on the same day with their sentences to run concurrently the district court did not clearly err in finding that those prior cases were not consolidated for sentencing due to cases separate indictments and judgments and the absence of a consolidation order 3: holding that although not essential to the outcomes of two previous cases the court of appeals should have followed the texas supreme courts statements in those cases 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "access to firearms, \u201ccould be construed as conscience-shocking\u201d behavior sufficient to render summary judgment inappropriate). As pled, Booker and Peagler ignored known or likely injuries and abuse to Chandler, chose not to further investigate such possible abuse, and ignored the danger posed by his continued residence in Jon Phillips\u2019s home. See Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 920 (10th Cir.2001) (finding caseworker\u2019s failure to investigate bruises and continued allegations of abuse, as well as responsibility for court order granting custody to caretaker, could be conscience-shocking behavior sufficient to survive dismissal). Of course, discovery may inform the context of Booker\u2019s and Peagler\u2019s actions such that their behavior was not conscience shocking. See Weise, 507 F.3d at 1265 (<HOLDING>). However, construing all inferences in Holdings: 0: recognizing that the denial of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage does not preclude a renewal of that defense at summary judgment after further factual development has occurred 1: recognizing that interlocutory appeals are permitted both at appeal of denial at dismissal stage and at later appeal of denial of summary judgment after further factual development 2: holding that factual disputes will result in denial of summary judgment only when they pertain to the qualified immunity defense 3: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 4: holding that an interlocutory appeal lies from a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "whom the estoppel is sought, and consequently changed its position to its prejudice. Id.\u201d 758 So.2d at 555. Joe Jr. argues that the holding in Jin-right is limited to the situation in which a petitioner in bankruptcy omits a potential claim in his schedule of assets and then later sues on that claim. We do not read Jinright so narrowly, however, and we can find no indication that our supreme court, in outlining the elements that must be proved to establish judicial estoppel, confined its statements to the bankruptcy context. We hold that the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable here for at least two reasons. First, Robert and Joe Jr., the parties asserting the estoppel, were not parties to the Florida divorce action. Cf. Singley v. Bentley, 782 So.2d 799 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). Second, the parties claiming the estoppel did Holdings: 0: holding that a farmer was not estopped to recover against a harvester for underpayment on 27000 bushels of sweet potatoes by the farmers claim in filing for federal cropdisaster benefits that his crop had produced only 15000 bushels the harvester was not a party to the farmers application for benefits 1: holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability 2: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 3: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits 4: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "emphasizes, furthermore, \u201c[T]he Lebron Court explained that while Amtrak is part of the Government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of Government \u2014 -such as the obligation to respect an artist\u2019s First Amendment rights' \u2014 Amtrak is not part of the Government for purposes of the inherent powers and privileges of the Government.\u201d Pl.\u2019s Opp. & Reply at 8 (emphases in original). AAR\u2019s due-process challenge plainly belongs in the former camp. Just as the Government is obligated to respect individuals\u2019 First Amendment rights, see Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399, 115 S.Ct. 961, so too is it constitutionally required to respect their due-process rights. Consistent with the standard Plaintiff itself enumerates, then, Amtrak is a governmental entity in the context of this claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). Perhaps recognizing that Lebr\u00f3n poses an Holdings: 0: holding that amtrak is part of the government for purposes of the first amendment because the government created amtrak by special law to further governmental objectives and retained authority to appoint a majority of amtraks corporate directors 1: holding a federal credit union not to be a government actor for constitutional purposes 2: holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government 3: holding that where the government inter alia retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of a corporation the corporation is part of the government for purposes of the first amendment 4: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "find under the First or Fifth Amendments for discrimination in federal employment. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2406, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (refusing to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a disciplined federal employee because of the remedies available from the Civil Service Commission); see also Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483-1484 (10th Cir.1990) (applying Bush to First Amendment claim of teachers for the Bureau of Indian Affairs). Second, Mr. Belhomme\u2019s claim under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 fails as a matter of law because this section applies to actions by state and local entities, not to the federal government. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 & n. 2, 83 S.Ct. 1441, 1444 & n. 2, 10 L.Ed.2d , 820 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of Holdings: 0: holding that the age discrimination in employment act was not preempted by the nlra 1: holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to prove discrimination in mixed motive cases under title vii 2: holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii 3: recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap 4: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this standard is \"much weaker\u201d than that mandated by the patent law under 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 102. Softel, Inc., 118 F.3d at 969. In Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380, 54 USPQ2d 1810 (2d Cir.2000), the Second Circuit held: New York law in submission-of-ideas case is governed by the following principles: Contract-based claims require only a showing that the disclosed idea was novel to the buyer in order to furnish consideration.... By contrast, misappropriation claims require that the idea at issue be original and novel in absolute terms. Id. at 380, 208 F.3d 368, 54 USPQ2d at 1817. While Nadel was an idea-submitter case, the New York courts have required an identical showing of \"novelty\u201d to support a trade secret claim. See Softel, Inc., 118 F.3d at 969 n. 11 Holdings: 0: holding that new york law applies to this matter 1: holding that new york law requires the same showing of novelty in trade secret claim as in submission of ideas claim and quoting murray v natl broadcasting co inc 844 f2d 988 994 2d cir1988 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 4: holding that new york law requires this same showing of novelty in a trade secret claim as in submissionofidea cases", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "estoppel, breach of contract, conversion, fraud and misrepresentation, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with a business relationship, and tortious interference with a contract relationship) relate to the defendants not paying plaintiff for services preformed in the plaintiffs employment capacity. Since the Agreement defines or \u201cpertains to\u201d the employment capacity of the plaintiff, these common law claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. The Agreement states that arbitration is appropriate in \u201cany dispute arising under this Agreement to the maximum extent allowed by applicable law.\u201d That would include plaintiffs claim for defamation in violation of state law. See McGinnis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 812 F.2d 1011, 1013 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>) In this case, the alleged defamatory Holdings: 0: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 1: holding that a clause limiting arbitration to employment termination extends to a defamatory comment made after such termination about employees service 2: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 3: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship 4: holding that the close connection in time between the complaint and termination indicated that complaints could have been a motivating factor for employees termination", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "issues touching upon Plaintiffs\u2019 Count II, which count the Court has yet to rule upon. The Court will not presently rule upon Plaintiffs\u2019 reconsideration request as it respects their Count III given that a future hearing has been scheduled and not yet held regarding the same. However, the Court will now enter its decision regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 Count II. Because the Court\u2019s decision regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 Count III affects the Court\u2019s decision regarding Plaintiffs\u2019 Count II, the Court will first say a few words regarding such Count III. The Court ruled in the I.R.S.\u2019 favor on Count III because the Court determined, in turn, that the I.R.S. is not bound by the terms of the Plan and the Confirmation Order. The Court held that the I.R.S. is not so bound because 23, 127 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1986) (<HOLDING>)), as well as the U.S. Supreme Court\u2019s decision Holdings: 0: holding that the sec does not qualify as a creditor of the estate bound by the confirmed plan pursuant to  1141a and that therefore the sec would thus not be barred from enforcing the securities laws with respect to the violation arising out of the plan notwithstanding its confirmation by court order 1: holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power 2: recognizing such an exception 3: holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a 4: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "WL 2063555, at *5 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 28, 2008); Burdett v. Harrah\u2019s Kansas Casino Corp., 294 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1227 (D.Kan.2003); Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 492, 504 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.2000); Dewey v. Associated Collectors Inc., 927 F.Supp. 1172, 1174 (W.D.Wis.1996); West v. Costen, 558 F.Supp. 564, 584 (W.D.Va.1983). 8 . The Brushes (but not Wells Fargo) point to two default letters that were sent in February and March 2008. (Docket Entry No. 36-2, Exs. 3, 4). The August 2009 loan modification agreement that Wells entered into with Mrs. Brush modified the original promissory note and cured the prior default. As a result, Wells Fargo was required to send the Brushes new notices after Mrs. Brush defaulted anew under the loan modification agreement. See Gatling, 2012 WL 3756581, at *11 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The Brushes allege that as a result of Holdings: 0: holding that a debtor may not silently transform a health education assistance loan nondischargeable under 42 usc  292fg into dischargeable debt by entering into a settlement agreement that is approved by the court pursuant to which the debtor consents to judgment against him 1: holding that a mortgagee is required to send new legal notices if a debtor who had previously defaulted on a note defaults again after entering into a loan modification agreement 2: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank 3: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met 4: holding that where a mortgagee is acting on behalf of the note holder there is no disconnection between note and mortgage and the mortgagee may foreclose", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 [, 315 (1966)]; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [, 1204 (1927)]. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to t 7 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 (1967) (\u201cThe agency\u2019s particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved\u201d), and has relaxed the probable cause standard for searches, in others, see, e.g. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 Holdings: 0: holding that search of the passenger compartment of an automobile limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons 1: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger 2: holding that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous  he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him 3: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 4: holding that a limited search of the outer clothing of a suspect for weapons is reasonable where the officer has a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "forth a prima facie case of gender discrimination. IV. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 1 . Seibert\u2019s PDA claim fares no better. Seibert alleged that she requested, but was denied, accommodation in the form of a reclining chair. Because this allegation was not asserted in Seibert\u2019s EEOC charge, she has failed to preserve her claim and it must therefore be dismissed. See 29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 626(d). Seibert raised new claims in her response to Lutron\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment that she was \"singled out and forced to use her vacation time simply because she was having post natal problems with her twins.\u201d Even if these claims were timely raised, they lack merit. See Piantanida v. Wyman Center, Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir.1997) Holdings: 0: holding the confrontation clause of the united states constitution does not apply at sentencing under the us sentencing guidelines manual and the procedural protections afforded a convicted defendant at sentencing are traditionally less stringent than the protections afforded a presumptively innocent defendant at trial 1: holding that an individual charged with criminal contempt is entitled to the full procedural protections afforded the defendant in any other criminal proceeding 2: holding that presumption of regularity is afforded to clerks of court performing their official duties 3: recognizing similar duties 4: holding that postnatal childcare duties are not within the protections afforded by the pda", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1015 (1893), where a landowner, the City of Anderson, granted contractors the right to construct a sewer along one of its streets and we held: \"and if [the contractors], in the construction thereof, unlawfully entered upon appellee's property, to her injury, [the contractors] alone are answerable therefor.\"). The Neals rely on decisions from other jurisdictions that impose liability on landlords when the landlord acquiesced in the tenant's creation of a nuisance. See, e.g., Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F.Supp. 355, 360 (M.D.N.C.1997) (owner who knows about contamination on his land and does nothing to remedy the situation is responsible for the migration of that contamination to another's property); Reynolds v. Pardee and Curtin Lumber Co., 172 W.Va. 804, 310 S.E.2d 870, 876-77 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Sta ples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 235 Holdings: 0: holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass 1: holding tenants leasing house by oral agreement were coinsureds both landlord and tenants had liability insurance 2: holding landlord and tenants obligations mutually dependent 3: holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant 4: holding that a landlord may have a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its tenants in common areas", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Adversary Complaint, the Court concludes that under the law of either jurisdiction, Plaintiffs-Appellees have sufficiently alleged individual damages to state non-derivative claims. See e.g., Kramer v. Western Pacific Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del.1988) (recognizing that \u201cthe distinction between derivative and individual actions rests upon the party being directly injured by the alleged wrongdoing and holding that an individual action requires the plaintiff to allege either an injury which is separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or a wrong involving a contractual right of a shareholder which exists independently of any right of the corporation\u201d); Bio-Scientific Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Todd, 149 Ill.App.3d 845, 103 Ill. Dec. 171, 501 N.E.2d 192 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs-Appellees\u2019 Adversary Complaint Holdings: 0: holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees 1: holding under maryland law that a breach of fiduciary duty claim alleging loss in share value shareholder must allege an injury distinct from an injury to the corporation 2: holding that shareholders claim is derivative if the alleged injury affects the shareholder indirectly in his or her capacity as a shareholder and describing the inquiry as whether the gravamen of the pleadings alleges injury to the plaintiff upon an individual claim as distinguished from an injury which directly affects the shareholders as a whole 3: holding that a shareholder lacks standing to bring a suit based on loss in value to his or her shares as this injury derives from and thus is not distinct from the injury to the corporation 4: holding that cause of action for injury to corporations property or for impairment or destruction of its business is vested in corporation as distinguished from its shareholders", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "2354, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). Constructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a result of discrimination or retaliation, \u201cto the point that they become \u2018sufficiently extraordinary and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or her employer.\u2019 \u201d Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Turner, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d at 1026). These discriminatory or retaliatory actions are best handled within the employment relationship. Poland, 494 F.3d at 1184. The employee can recover for any additional acts of harassment suffered until he resigns. See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. -, -, 136 S.Ct. 1769, 1782, 195 L.Ed.2d 44 (2016) (<HOLDING>). The First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Holdings: 0: holding that rights accrue only when an employee vests 1: holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns 2: recognizing that  1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated 3: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 4: holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and its companion, United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965), have since been extended to provide immunity to private efforts to influence courts, federal and state agencies. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). The counterclaimants protest that this doctrine does not immunize an entire course of wrongful acts simply because Bristol requested government approval and licenses as part of its allegedly tortious scheme. They rely on Allied, Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. that the scope of antitrust protection depends on the \u201csource, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue.\u201d 486 U.S. 492, 499, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988) (<HOLDING>). \u201cAn anticompetitive, private tortious scheme Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that an antitrust injury is an injury that is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny 2: holding that anticompetitive actions of private standardsetting body could not be considered either valid governmental action or incidental to a valid effort to influence government action and thus were subject to antitrust scrutiny 3: holding that a private antitrust action for injury sounds in tort and is subject to a three year statute of limitations 4: holding that an acceleration clause is not subject to antitrust scrutiny where plaintiffs conceded that they could be procompetitive in some circumstances but noting that noag clauses are subject to antitrust scrutiny", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 39.407(14); Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.250(b). The \u201cin controversy\u201d and \u201cgood cause\u201d requirements are also included in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(a), which provides for mental examinations in civil actions. In a case involving a mental examination of a father in a dissolution modification action, this court explained the \u201cin controversy\u201d requirement under rule 1.360(a). See Williams v. Williams, 550 So.2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). For a parent\u2019s mental health to be \u201cin controversy,\u201d \u201cthe condition must directly involve a material element of the cause of action.\u201d Id. at 167. But see In re T.M.W., 553 So.2d 260, 262-63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (assuming the. parent\u2019s mental condition was in controversy because custody was at issue); In re S.N., 529 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). In Gasparino v. Murphy, 352 So.2d 933 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that a proceeding under section 547 is a core proceeding 1: holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding 2: holding simply that padilla was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review without further analysis 3: holding that a witness who testifies in one proceeding may not be compelled to give further testimony in a different proceeding 4: holding that the mothers mental condition was implicated in a dependency proceeding without further analysis", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "For this reason, the DHO\u2019s failure to produce and review the work-crew log was not prejudicial to Mitchell, and the error, if any, was harmless. B. Failure to Provide a Written Statement of Reasons Mitchell\u2019s second claim, that the DHO failed to provide a written statement of the reasons for her finding of guilt, is contradicted by the record. The DHO filled out a form titled \u201cDisciplinary Hearing Report.\u201d (R. at 33.) In a section labeled \u201cEvidence relied on for finding of Guilt,\u201d the DHO explained that she relied on the librarian\u2019s description of the incident and the fact that Mitchell produced no evidence to the contrary. (Id.) We have no difficulty in concluding that this written statement meets the due process requirements announced in Wolff. See, e.g., Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1445 (<HOLDING>)-, Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay 1: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 2: holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report 3: holding that an officers hearsay statement was not cumulative to the eyewitnesss testimony where the officers statement provided the only evidence of a possible motive for the shooting and where the officers statement was based on his own observations not the eyewitnesss observations 4: holding that written statement that inmate was found guilty on the basis of officers report satisfied wolff", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "after that, the State offered Exhibits 4, 5, and 6, and they were admitted over Orsag\u2019s counsel's objection. Therefore, we disagree with Orsag that no testimony was elicited concerning State\u2019s Exhibit 4. 3 . We note that Woodling did not specifically testify she was aware of prior \u201cconvictions\" as the State asserts, but she testified she was with Orsag in 1995 when he was stopped for DWI in Harris County (Exhibit 5), and she \"knew about\u201d Orsag\u2019s \"DWI in Brazos County\u201d (Exhibit 4). This, in conjunction with her confirmation that the prior judgments reflect Orsag's signature, is some evidence to support the prior convictions. See Thomas v. State, No. 2-08-125-CR, 2009 WL 2356891, at *6 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth July 30, 2009, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). 4 . As discussed below, we assume for Holdings: 0: holding that copies of defendants convictions contained in pen packet were admissible under public records exception 1: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 2: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 3: holding defendants brothers testimony that he knew the defendant had served time in the penitentiary for something happening at the mhmr home and his identification of his brothers photograph in a pen packet was sufficient to prove up the defen  dants prior conviction for sexual assault 4: holding that the officers had sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant was inside the residence to execute the arrest warrant because the officers relied on the anonymous tip given to the defendants parole officer the drivers identification of the defendant as meaty in a photograph and his assertion that meaty was in the residence at that time selling drugs", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "indicated that the offense was sexually motivated and that the person who committed the offense did so for sexual gratification. Simmons argues that the trial court erred in admitting Neer\u2019s testimony into evidence because, he says, the evidence was based on scientific analysis and did not meet the Frye standard. Initially, we find it imperative to note that the evidence offered through Neer\u2019s testimony was not \u201cprofile\u201d testimony. \u201cProfile\u201d evidence attempts to link the general characteristics of serial murderers to specific characteristics of the defendant. Such evidence is of little probative value and extremely prejudicial to the defendant since he is, in a sense, being accused by a witness who was not present at any of the crimes. See Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 55 (Del.1991) (<HOLDING>). Neer\u2019s testimony did not accuse Simmons of Holdings: 0: holding that fbi agent was properly allowed to testify as expert on serial murders 1: holding that testimony of fbi agent regarding bank tellers out of court identification was properly admitted under 801d1c 2: holding that the trial court improperly allowed a hydrologist to testify regarding safe warehousing practices where he lacked the education employment or other practical experiences to testify as an expert 3: holding that an expert is not competent to testify as to statutory interpretation 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "F.3d at 282; compare Tilot Oil, 907 F.Supp.2d at 967-68 (rejecting groundwater contamination as ISE per se, but finding that \u201ca lack of ongoing remediation might allow a finding of endangerment to the environment\u201d even without any clear showing of threat to the nearby river). Since the Wellfield\u2019s environment shows no overt signs of stress, and mere presence of C8 is not enough to show imminent and substantial endangerment, Defendant claims it is entitled to summary judgment on any RCRA environmental endangerment claims. Plaintiff responds that the uncontrovert-ed presence of C8 in the Wellfield\u2019s groundwater, as well as complete absence of any remediation effort, is sufficient to show imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>). The Interfaith Court, relying on the New Holdings: 0: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 1: holding that coconspirator liability for a  924c offense may be established under pinkerton liability 2: holding no liability existed under the circumstances 3: holding liability under rcra for contamination to groundwater and rivers because the ise provision imposes liability for endangerments to the environment including water in and of itself 4: holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that would provide [them] with a reasonable basis for a belief that the key representations in the statements provided to investors\u201d were not misleadin ever, does not end the inquiry. Even though Plaintiffs were not the law firms\u2019 clients, Kutak and Stinson cannot escape liability if, during the course of their work on the Official Statements, they knowingly or recklessly omitted facts that rendered these offering documents false or misleading. Under the Ninth Circuit\u2019s substantial participation test, Kutak and Stinson, as the primary drafters of the language in the Official Statements, had a duty to exercise reasonable care and to disclose relevant facts that undermined the statements that they actually drafted or otherwise prepared. See Homestore.com, 347 F.Supp.2d at 800 (<HOLDING>). This is so because when Kutak and Stinson Holdings: 0: holding that statements which put the sources of the defendants revenue at issue gave rise to liability under section 10b because the company failed to disclose the improper conduct that generated that revenue 1: holding that puffing does not give rise to fraud liability under mississippi law 2: holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement 3: holding that an auditor intricately involved in the creation of misstatements and omissions may be liable under  10b even if the statements could not be reasonably attributable to him 4: holding that the creation drafting editing or making of the statements at issue can give rise to liability under  10b", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "consider whether this Court erred (1) by applying the \u201cgeneral rule\u201d that suicide is an unforeseeable intervening cause of death, even though there was a special relationship between a detention officer and his prisoner, who committed suicide while in custody; and (2) in reversing the denial of the officer\u2019s motion for summary judgment. 23 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord Harvey, 260 G he exception to the general rule regarding proximate cause and suicide did not apply when there was no evidence that an inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he killed himself and when the inmate appeared calm, controlled, and appeared to know what he was doing); Dry Storage Corp. v. Piscopo, 249 Ga. App. 898, 900 (550 SE2d 419) (2001) (<HOLDING>). 29 See supra footnote 27. 30 Although the Holdings: 0: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself 1: holding that a suicide victim did not kill himself during a rage or frenzy or in response to an uncontrollable impulse when although his physical or psychological pain was obvious and he specifically attributed it to the alleged tortfeasors negligence he recorded a videotape just before he committed suicide in which he appeared to have control of himself and to have known exactly what he was doing 2: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 3: holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail 4: holding that an inmates suicide was an unforeseeable intervening act for which a detention officer was not liable when inter alia there was no evidence that the inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he took his own life but was instead calm and controlled and appeared to have known what he was doing", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "pleading, the defense was preserved and dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint was affirmed. Shotzman v. Berumen, 363 Ark. 215, 229, 213 S.W.3d 13, 20 (2005); Wallace v. Hale, 341 Ark. 898, 900, 20 S.W.3d 392, 394 (2000); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 315 Ark. 136, 140-41, 865 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (1993). In contrast, where a party had knowledge of a pending action and did not raise the specific Rule 12(b) defenses in the responsive pleading, the defenses were waived. Posey v. St. Bernard\u2019s Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 164, 226 S.W.3d 757, 764 (2006) (Defendant asserted a statute-of-limitations defense but failed to raise the defense of insufficient service of process in its responsive pleading.); Galley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 362 Ark. 568, 575, 210 S.W.3d 40, 44 (2005) (<HOLDING>); S. Transit Co., Inc. v. Collums, 333 Ark. Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived its impropervenue defense where its responsive pleading which asserted the defenses of failure to state facts to state a claim and failure to join a necessary party  did not assert the defense of improper venue 1: holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court 2: holding that the failure of all defendant to join in the petition for removal mandated remand to state court 3: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second 4: holding that defendant had waived any defense of improper venue when he made the argument only after filing a motion for summary judgment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a separate motion. 7 . In referring to aliens entitled to voluntary departure as \u201cfavored,\u201d we follow the same characterization as used by the Supreme Court in Dada which stated, \u201cWe must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was designed to remove this important safeguard [motion to reopen] for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law.\u201d Dada, 554 U.S. at 18, 128 S.Ct. 2307. 8 . This case is distinguishable from cases where the alien filed a motion to reopen during the seven-month window, but explicitly requested a stay of the voluntary departure period pending adjudication of the motion indicating that the alien had no intention to relinquish the voluntary departure agreement. See Blackman v. Att'y Gen., 414 Fed.Appx. 415 (3d Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Ramirez-Mena v. Holder, 324 Holdings: 0: holding bia did not err in determining request for stay of voluntary departure is not an implicit request for a withdrawal of voluntary departure 1: holding motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status constituted a withdrawal of the request for voluntary departure and the adjustment motion was therefore not barred based on failure to depart within the voluntary departure time allowed 2: holding the respondent  implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead  elected to remain to pursue his motion 3: holding the bia did not err in denying aliens motion to stay voluntary departure period pending determination on the motion to reopen 4: holding that bia did not err in denying motion to reopen that was filed after expiration of aliens voluntary departure period because alien had failed to depart", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1998); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1175 n. 5 (Alaska 1987). 11 . 666 P.2d 438 (Alaska App.1983). 12 . See id. at 450. 13 . See id. 14 . Id. 15 . See id. 16 . Id. at 451; see also Jones v. State, 576 P.2d 997, 1001 (Alaska 1978) (\"Having specified a particular purpose for the offer, Jones is not in a position to now claim error because the evidence might have been admissible on other grounds.\"). 17 . See, e.g., Trobough v. French, 803 P.2d 384, 385 (Alaska 1990) (where a litigant failed to object to her adversary\u2019s conduct during trial and never requested a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion in granting the new trial because the plaintiff did not \"formally object to the questioned acts at the time they were committed\"); Moss v. State, 620 P.2d 674, 677 (Alaska 1980) (<HOLDING>); Petersen v. State, 838 P.2d 812, 816 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief 1: holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify 2: holding that it was incumbent upon counsel to renew his attempt to obtain the witness testimony and that by failing to do so defendant waived his request 3: holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "process expeditiously, \u00a7 1129(e) alone attempts to govern the court\u2019s involvement in that process. 13 . Moreover, to have denied the Motion to Extend Time on November 5th because the Debtor at that point had not been able to make the requisite showing would have been tantamount to denying it due process \u2014 the right to be heard, to have all of its evidence on the issue considered, when it had done all it could do to timely put the issues and that evidence before the Court and when the hearing on the Motion to Extend Time had already been commenced. 14 . Section 1121(e)(3)(c) requires that a court sign the an order extending the time period to obtain confirmation before the existing has expired. See In re Caring Heart Home Health Corp., 380 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The Court notes that the Debtor did submit a Holdings: 0: holding that if the attorney general issues a scope certificate the action must be removed to federal court and the united states must be substituted as the party defendant by the plain language of 28 usc  2679d2 no discretion is given to the district court 1: holding that where a defendant controlled the board of directors it is manifest then that there can be no expectation that the corporation would sue him and if it did it can hardly be said that the prosecution of the suit would be entrusted to proper hands 2: holding that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous no need exists for the court to examine the legislative histo ry and the court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute 3: holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language 4: holding that the language of the third requirement in section 1121e3 is abundantly clear and must be read as conclusive  if no signed order exists prior to the expiration of the 45 day deadline then no extension can be granted", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "planning issues.\u2019\u2019); December 31, 1986 letter from NRC to Edison (\"The NRC is looking for strong evidence of progress at Pilgrim prior to restart.... Further, you should note that we plan to complete a SALP review prior to reaching a position regarding the restart of the Pilgrim facility.\u2019\u2019). SALP is an acronym for \"Sytematic Assessment of Licensee Performance.\u201d 9 . It does mean that there is judicial review of this action. See section IV, infra. 10 . The other grounds for a mandatory hearing set forth in \u00a7 2239(a) are not relevant to this case. 11 . Because we find that no hearing was required, we need not decide whether the Commonwealth is a \"person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding\" entitled to a hearing under \u00a7 2239. Cf. Belotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). 12 . To the extent that the Commonwealth is Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the commonwealth resulted from a mistaken view of the law by earlier courts 1: holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth 2: holding that the commonwealth cannot revoke a drivers license without due process required by the constitution 3: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 4: holding that the commonwealth was not such a person with respect to an earlier amendment of pilgrims license", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and other African-American students, to expel him from the school. This claim, however, is fatally flawed because the -Sixth Circuit has determined that a corporation cannot conspire with its own agents or employees. Johnson v. Hills & Dales General Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839-840 (6th Cir.1994); Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509-510 (6th Cir.1991); Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir.1984). As a result, plaintiffs \u00a7 1985(3) claim also fails as a matter of law. Furthermore, because the \u00a7 1986 claim is dependent upon establishing a \u00a7 1985(3) violation, plaintiffs\u2019 \u00a7 1986 claim necessarily fails. Bartell, 215 F.3d at 560; Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Browder, 630 F.2d at 1155 (same). The Holdings: 0: recognizing that it would be anomalous to find a violation under  41 without a prior finding of a violation of  431 1: holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985 2: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 3: holding no violation of the travel act 4: holding that  1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "States v. Garcia, 672 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1982) (concluding that the \u201cpoint of origin has no bearing on the reasonableness of a [border] search so long as a border crossing has been established\u201d). Here, the Government does not dispute that D.E. did not cross the border and was not in the process of crossing the border when his vehicle was searched. C. Reasonable Suspicion Was Required for the Search of D.E.\u2019s vehicle When CBP officials seek to search an item or person on the basis of general \u201ccontact with the border area,\u201d without evidence that the item or person has crossed the border or is in the process of crossing, reasonable suspicion is required. United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89 S.Ct. 999, 22 L.Ed.2d 126 (1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McGlone, 394 F.2d 75, 78 Holdings: 0: holding that certain police stops of limited duration that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation are legal 1: holding that lprs are entitled to full procedural due process at the border even when returning to the united states 2: holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 3: holding that persons who have direct contact with a border area or whose movements are reasonably related to the border area are not subject to search absent suspicion 4: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "dismissal is proper under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1404. Up until recently, \u201c[t]he Fifth Circuit [had] declined to address the \u2018enigmatic question of whether motions to dismiss on the basis of forum selection clauses are properly brought as motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) [or] 12(b)(3).\u2019 \u201d Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 961 (5th Cir.1997). Most district courts in the Fifth Circuit followed the direction of Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc. v. MIRA M/V, 111 F.3d 33 (5th Cir.1997), in which the Fifth Circuit, without commenting on the district court\u2019s procedural choice, affirmed a district court\u2019s granting of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue based on a forum selection clause See Ambraco, Inc. v. M/V CLIPPER FAITH, no. 06-9966, 2007 WL 1550960 at *1 (E.D.La., May 25, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Very recently, the Fifth Circuit shed some Holdings: 0: recognizing circuit agreement that a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause is proper under rule 12b3 1: holding that a motion to dismiss based on a forumselection clause should be treated as a rule 12b3 motion to dismiss for improper venue 2: holding that a forumselection clause may be enforced under rule 12b3 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue 3: holding that since the fifth circuit has accepted rule 12b3 as a proper method for seeking dismissal for improper venue based on a forum selection clause the court need not decide whether a rule 12b1 motion  is appropriate 4: holding that when a forum selection clause designates  an arbitral forum  the proper remedy is dismissal", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a state treats a filing as timely and resolves it on the merits, the federal judiciary will not second-guess that action, for the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action.\u201d). Dr. Martinez also contends that even if the grievance process was unavailable during the 15-day filing period, Spada was required to exhaust his administrative remedies once he had access to grievance forms. But Dr. Martinez has provided no basis for concluding that Spada\u2019s untimely grievance would have been accepted and resolved on the merits. Notably, there was no requirement that Spada utilize the grievance process after the 15-day period expired, which is the foundation of Dr. Martinez\u2019s position. See, e.g., Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, some courts have held that in Holdings: 0: holding that an administrative remedy which is unknown and unknowable is unavailable 1: holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable 2: holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances 3: holding that an administrative remedy was made unavailable after correctional officers did not respond to a grievance and there was no regulation addressing such a situation 4: recognizing that officials failure timely to respond to grievance could be basis for prisoner to show he exhausted available administrative remedies", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at 1871-72 (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)); see also Dunham, 967 F.2d at 1124; Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992). The district court\u2019s conclusion below was not clearly erroneous, as we are not left with the \u201c \u2018definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370, 111 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). We have in the past upheld as race-neutral peremptory challenges based on the failure to attain a certain educational level. See Marin, 7 F.3d at 686-87; United States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 142 (7th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 1022, 106 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror 1: holding raceneutral basis for preemptory challenge was pretext where stated reasons for challenge not supported by venirepersons statements 2: holding prebatson that challenge to africanamericans who had limited education was raceneutral 3: holding the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than the law required is a valid raceneutral reason for excluding a juror 4: holding that there was a raceneutral reason the states use of a peremptory challenge against a venireperson who had a very individualistic hairstyle", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an attorney in the circumstances of this case.\u201d Nearly two years after first requesting relief from the Court of Veterans Appeals, Cox once again sought a writ from the court. This time, however, Cox\u2019s request was more modest than the first. Cox sought a writ of mandamus only to compel the Board to issue a final decision on his petition for attorneys\u2019 fees. The court acknowledged that pursuant to the All Writs Act (AWA), 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651(a) (1994), it had the power to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to issue a final decision. The court determined that such a writ would be justified \u201cin aid of\u2019 the court\u2019s jurisdiction under the AWA because, absent a final decision by the Board, the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 7252(a) (1994). See In re Wick, 40 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). However, as before, the court declined to Holdings: 0: holding that a court of veterans appeals decision interpreting 38 usc  8713 overruling the secretarys prior interpretation and remanding back to the board was a final and appealable decision 1: holding that a board decision is required to vest the court of veterans appeals with jurisdiction over a claimants appeal 2: holding that a claim that is constitutional in name only does not create jurisdiction over an appeal from the veterans court 3: recognizing that failure by state to provide the required certification deprives appeals court of jurisdiction over appeal 4: holding that where the board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 usc  7104e the period within which to appeal to the court of appeals for veterans claims did not commence to run", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "fear of cancer were not authorized. See id. 674 A.2d at 239-40. There are two ways to analyze the phenomenon of exposure-only causes of action. First is the monolithic view \u2014 i.e., that there is only a single cause of action based on exposure to asbestos, for which there are multiple remedies (some of which may not be available). Second is the \u201cpolylithic\u201d view (for lack of a better word), that there are multiple causes of action for exposure to asbestos (some of which may not be available) \u2014 i.e., there is one cause of action for increased risk of cancer, one cause of action for medical monitoring costs, etc. It is largel (1989); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 744 P.2d 705, 707-11 (Ct.App.1987) (same); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the installation of asbestoscontaining materials caused immediate physical injury to the building because asbestos is ultrahazardous 1: holding that injury does not occur upon exposure to asbestos but rather upon development of disease 2: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim 3: holding that present physical injury caused by exposure to asbestos is essential element of claims for mental anguish and medical monitoring costs 4: holding dollar amount is not an essential element", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in Los Angeles, it also existed in or had any effect on the Malibu area. Rather, the City uncritically adopted the findings of the Los Angeles County ordinance, an ordinance that applies not only to a much broader geographic area than Malibu, but also to all forms of rental housing. Thus, the City\u2019s position is not based on actual facts, but instead on the notion that because other courts have accepted the monopoly argument in other contexts and other geographical areas, this Court is compelled to accept it as applied to mobile home housing in Malibu. See, e.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. at 12, 108 S.Ct. at 857-58 (accepting monopoly argument where plaintiffs did not dispute it); Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal.3d 129, 160-64, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 488-91, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024-27 (1976) (<HOLDING>). The difficulty with the City\u2019s position is Holdings: 0: holding that findings made by lower courts showed rational basis for monopoly argument in the specific context of apartment rentals in alameda county 1: holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification 2: recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review 3: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 4: holding that the lower courts findings were insufficient as a matter of law and remanding for the court to make the findings required under ars  25403", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "EEOC charges on a deferral basis, the time for filing a charge of employment discrimination is 180 days of the alleged unlawful occurrence. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(e)(l). The parties agree that the 300-day rule applies in Arizona, a deferral state. 8 . As an initial matter, we doubt that the EEOC is subject to the same strict timing requirements with respect to exhaustion of remedies in Title VII as a private party before bringing a class suit. \"Title VII claimants generally establish federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies.\u201d Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990). However, it makes little sense for an agency to exhaust remedies before itself. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288, 122 S.Ct. 754, 15 -41 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The district court misconstrued EEOC v. Holdings: 0: holding eeoc could maintain an action alleging discrimination against women and minority groups although the original charge alleged only discrimination against males 1: holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex 2: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 3: holding eeoc could maintain action alleging discrimination against male employees in the administration of the retirement system although original charge was filed by female alleging discrimination on the basis of her sex 4: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "provides that a business representative is not an officer, and leaves to the District Council the option of providing the local unions with business representatives or allowing them to either elect or appoint their own representatives. Given this grant of discretionary authority to the District Council, it cannot be said that individual local unions have a vested right to elect business representatives. 944 F.2d at 614-15. It will be observed that the 2000 Constitution, providing for the appointment of business representatives by the District Council, represents the exercise by the District Council of a discretionary authority which the Ninth Circuit held the earlier version of section 31B conferred upon it. See also Lathers Local 42-L v. UBC, 73 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Local No. 267 v. UBC, 992 F.2d 1418, 1424 Holdings: 0: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it 1: holding that the remedies are exclusive 2: holding that bylaws granting exclusive control of business representatives to a district council did not violate the ubc constitution 3: holding the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause of the wyoming constitution or the fourteenth amendment to the united states constitution 4: holding authority to control limits duty to control", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "successive. See ante, at 891-92. The Washington Supreme Court reached this conclusion, however, only after reviewing the merits of the petition: This petition is both repetitive and untimely. RCW 10.73.090, .140. The only possible basis on which Mr. [Dictado] could avoid both of these procedural bars is if this petition rested on newly discovered evidence, which would constitute both an exception to the statute of limitations and good cause for failing to raise the new issue earlier.... Although Mr. Guloy did not provide his affidavit until February 5, 1997, it ... does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. Mr. Guloy did not recently recant testimony he gave against Mr. Dictado. Mr. Guloy did not testify at all at that trial, nor were any of his hearsay statements admit iz.1998) (<HOLDING>); Galindo v. Johnson, 19 F.Supp.2d 697, 698, Holdings: 0: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 1: holding that because defendant did not raise a newly discovered evidence claim or amend his postconviction motion after the evidentiary hearing the issue was not timely presented to the trial court and was not cognizable on appeal 2: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 3: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed 4: holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "action). Nevertheless, insofar as the PHRA can be generally analogized to a combination of actions in tort and contract, pre-Seventh Amendment common law required a jury trial in such actions. C. Wright, supra, at p. 610. A far greater aid to this Court\u2019s Seventh Amendment inquiry, and properly the crux of any Seventh Amendment analysis, is the nature of the remedy sought by the plaintiff. Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir.1990), citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2793, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). As made clear in her prayer for relief in Count III, plaintiff seeks remedies that are both equitable, e.g., reinstatement, and legal, e.g., compensatory and punitive damages. Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Since the plaintiff seeks a determination of Holdings: 0: holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages 1: holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages 2: holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated 3: holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies 4: holding that equitable relief under  502a3 does not include compensatory and punitive damages", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The Sales Associate acknowledges that he/she is not an employee nor a partner, but a Sales Associate with an independent contractor status, with no rights of [worker\u2019s] compensation, salary, pension, sick leave, sick pay, or other attributes of an employee relationship. The Sales Associate will not be treated as an employee with respect to the services performed by such salesperson as a real estate agent for federal tax purposes. Finally, after the relationship ended, MacDougall could not use any remaining prospects, listings, or referrals. Nevertheless, several facts suggest that Weichert exerted substantial control over MacDougall. MacDougall worked in an office maintained by Weichert, a Weichert manager supervised MacDougall\u2019s work, Weichert requir 1, 30, 539 A.2d 744 (App.Div.1988) (<HOLDING>); Giudice v. Drew Chem. Corp., 210 N.J.Super. Holdings: 0: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 1: holding that discharge of employee to avoid paying commissions on future transactions did not violate clear mandate of public policy 2: holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy 3: holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby 4: holding that discharge of employee for having distributed expired drugs at employers direction did not violate clear mandate of public policy because the discharge implicated only the private interests of the parties", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to \u00a7 1302(b)(1), which incorporates the duties specified in, among others, \u00a7 704(a)(9). These courts have held that because a trustee is required to perform certain statutory duties after conversion, other functions, such as the distribution of funds and the filing of claims objections, are a logical extension of the trustee\u2019s authority to complete the administration of the chapter 13 estate. See In re Pegues, 266 B.R. at 334-35 (citing Hardin and Galloway). These decisions fail to distinguish between post-confirmation reporting duties and substantive administrative matters related to a chapter 13 trustee\u2019 ude that the payments received by the Trustee are not held in trust pending distribution and that creditors have no vested interest in the funds held by the Trustee upon conversi (<HOLDING>); Calder v. Job, 973 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that payments made to a debtor from inter vivos trusts within 180 days of filing the petition are not interests by way of bequest devise or inheritance and are not part of the bankruptcy estate 1: holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption 2: holding that the corpus of an inheritance is not included in a parents gross income but that the interest generated by an inheritance is 3: holding that income payment debtor received from spendthrift trusts or was entitled to receive by terms of the trusts within 180 days of filing of debtors bankruptcy petition constituted bequests and became property of debt ors estate under  541a5a 4: holding inheritance received by debtor more than 180 days after filing but before conversion is property of chapter 7 estate", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "filed on June 7, 2007, we must resolve the ambiguity in favor of Anival. Vazquez, slip op. at 3 (citing Grey v. Grey, 111 Nev. 388, 892 P.2d 595, 597 (Nev. 1995) (\u201cThe testimony illustrates that the date of receipt... by the clerk\u2019s office is, at the very least ambiguous. Accordingly, we are compelled to resolve the ambiguity in Roxanne\u2019s favor.\u201d)). 4 See Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Haw. 1, 193 P.3d 839, 846-47 (2008); Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 868-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (noting \u201cpotentially devastating\u201d collateral consequences for parent of expired \u201cchild in need of services\u201d order, including impacts on future presentence investigations, in-court impeachments, and child custody determinations); Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Piper v. Layman, 125 Md. App. 745, 726 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm 1: holding expired child abuse protective order not moot because of possible effect on future custody determinations 2: holding appeal from abuse prevention order not moot due to orders expiration because of collateral consequences including effect in future proceedings and stigma 3: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation 4: holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "we reach the obvious conclusion that vanity plates are an unlikely means by which to engage in meaningful \u201cassembly and debate,\u201d Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, or other expressive activity. Because vanity plates are physically restricted by size and shape and by the state\u2019s interests, including that of vehicle identification, vanity plates are a highly limited and extremely constrained means of expression. The very character of license plates also suggests that they are not a designated public forum. In light of all of the circumstances described above, we hold that Vermont has not intended to designate, and has not designated, its vanity plates as a public forum. Cf. In re Denial of the Application for the Custom Plates, 170 Or.App. 542, 13 P.3d 531 (2000) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). But see Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum 1: holding that a state statute authorizing the rejection of vanity plates deemed contrary to public policy violated the first amendment because it granted unfettered discretion to state officials 2: holding that a vanity plate is not a public forum 3: holding that a vanity plate is a designated public forum where a state allows groups to place various slogans and designs on license plates 4: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "guilty of some possession crime, the jury had a choice between convicting Hernandez of possession with intent to distribute or acquitting him. It is not possible to say with confidence that the jury chose the former option because the government met its burden. The jury may have decided that given the overwhelming evidence against Hernandez, it did not want to acquit him of that charge, and so chose the only other option available to it\u2014conviction of intent to distribute methamphetamine. Eliminating the option of finding Hernandez guilty of simple possession from the jury\u2019s province, under the circumstances of this case, substantially influenced the verdict and was not harmless error. The error of not giving the lesser included jury instruction on simple p Cir.1974) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 3 . See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that possession of the equivalent of 279 pounds of marijuana valued at 279000 dollars justified the district courts refusal to provide a lesser included instruction 1: holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction 2: holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger 3: holding that possession of more than thirtyfive pounds of cocaine valued at between 5 and 7 million ruled out a simple possession jury instruction 4: holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "devoid of any meaningful difference; for the heart of our holding in Blow was a recognition of the \u201cdeeply-rooted legal and societal principle that the coveted privacy of the home should be especially protected.\u201d Blow, 157 Vt. at 518, 602 A.2d at 555. This heightened expectation of privacy rendered it objectively reasonable to expect that conversations in the privacy of one\u2019s home would not be surreptitiously invaded by warrantless transmission or recording. \u201c[W]arrantless electronic participant monitoring conducted in a home,\u201d we held, \u201coffends the core values of Article 11. tution to hold that \u201cthe expectation that one\u2019s conversations will not be secretly recorded or broadcast should be recognized as reasonable\u201d); see also Commonwealth v. Brian, 652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Both cases recognized the risk that Holdings: 0: holding that while an individual has a right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home there is no corresponding privacy right to purchase such material 1: holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business 2: holding that an individual can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home through the use of any electronic surveillance 3: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 4: holding that an individual using prescription drugs has a right to expect that such information will customarily remain private", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "coverage. Id. at 238 (explaining that the plan participant was not covered at the time of the alleged misrepresentation). In holding that the plaintiffs claim was not preempted by ERISA, the court stated the \u201cprovider\u2019s state law action ... would not arise due to the patient\u2019s coverage under an ERISA plan, but precisely because there is no ERISA plan coverage.\u201d Id. at 246. Further, the fact that the plaintiffs damages Am., 101 F.3d 600, 606 (8th Cir.1996) (declining to extend preemption to state law claims of a third party provider because it \u201cwould not further the Congressional goal of protecting the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans\u201d); Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc. v. Group Health Ins. of Okla., Inc., 944 F.2d 752, 756 (10th Cir.1991)(<HOLDING>). As there is no binding Fourth Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 1: holding that plaintiff is a plan participant and he is seeking to recover for the plan as a whole these are the only requirements on the face of the statute itself 2: holding that an erisa insurers declaratory suit seeking a favorable interpretation of a standard policy clause against a party having no obligations under the plan was not an action to enforce the plan terms 3: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 4: holding that an action by a health care provider to recover payment from an insurance carrier is sufficiently distinct from an action by a plan participant against the insurer seeking recovery of benefits due under the terms of the insurance plan and therefore preemption in the former case would stretch the connected with or related to standard too far", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "*13-*14 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014, pet. denied) (mem.op.).' Thus, a party is a prevailing party by \u201cobtainfing] an award of specific enforcement of [a] settlement agreement and an end to the ongoing litigation in the case.\u201d Id. at *14. Here, McCulley and TBW Development obtained specific performance of their settlement agreement with Palavan by having Palavan\u2019s claims against them dismissed. McCulley and TBW Development were prevailing parties and were entitled to an award of attorneys\u2019 fees. For the same reason, Palavan\u2019s argument that the dismissal of his claims mooted McCulley\u2019s and TBW Development\u2019s breach of contract claims must fail. Dismissal of Palavan\u2019s claims established that McCulley and TBW Development prevailed, not that their claims were mooted. See 3) Holdings: 0: recognizing that appellate court may reverse trial courts judgment when it is based on an erroneous conclusion of law 1: holding an appellate court cannot reverse a trial courts judgment absent properly assigned error 2: holding appellate courts cannot reverse judgment  on grounds not raised on appeal 3: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 4: recognizing appellate court may not reverse a summary judgment on a basis not raised by the appellant on appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "reading of the statute would defy the intent of the legislature in enacting the current version of section 115B.06. The purpose of the statute was to cut off liability for past actions. See Arkla, 1993 WL 61827, at *2; Werlein, 746 F.Supp. at 910. If the statute were construed to allow liability any time there is continuing migration of contaminants from one property to another after July 1, 1983, the statute would provide little protection for those whose actions occurred entirely before that date. Thus, in this context, the only reasonable interpretation of the \u201cplaced or came to be located in or on the facility\u201d is that it refers to when Carney placed the hazardous substances or allowed the hazardous substances to be placed on the Walker site. See Arkla, 1993 WL 61827, at *2 (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that Carney placed or put Holdings: 0: holding the relevant event under section 115b06 is when the defendant placed the hazardous substance on the source site 1: holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations 2: holding that sophistication of investor is relevant factor in determining when plaintiff placed on inquiry notice 3: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint 4: holding that it was reasonable to conclude that a defendant intended to use a truck to facilitate the transportation of drugs when the defendant arrived at the site of drug activity in the truck and had no alternative means of leaving the site after obtaining the drugs", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "reasonable doubt \u201cwithout regard\u201d to the historical practice of juries. To the extent the district court repeated the prosecutor\u2019s statement in sustaining the defendants\u2019 objection, it was to illustrate that the district court\u2019s instructions would render the prosecutor\u2019s remark irrelevant. And, as noted above, before the jury deliberated, the district court gave the jury detailed instructions on the meaning of reasonable doubt. Even assuming some residual prejudicial effect remained, the prosecutor\u2019s statement did not affect Ortiz\u2019s and Rolon\u2019s substantial rights because \u2014 in light of the substantial independent evidence of their guilt \u2014 no reasonable probability exists that this statement altered the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As we note elsewhere in our discussion, Holdings: 0: holding reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 1: holding that to establish stricklandpierce prejudice in the appellate representation context the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been different but for counsels deficient performance 2: holding that counsels failure to question the venire regarding the zehr principles did not constitute ineffective assistance where there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different 3: holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea 4: holding that improper prosecutorial references did not raise a reasonable probability that but for the remarks the outcome would be different due to sufficient independent evidence establishing guilt", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "circuit court stated an incorrect reason for its denial.\u2019 \u201d Long v. State, 675 So.2d 532, 533 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), quoting Swicegood v. State, 646 So.2d 159, 160 (Ala.Crim.App.1994). For the reasons that follow, we find that the circuit court was correct in summarily denying all but one of Bearden\u2019s claims. I. Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment or to impose the sentence. He makes two arguments in this regard. First, Bearden contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because, he says, the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for his arrest was not properly verified. Although couched in jurisdictional terms, this claim does not present a jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., Sumlin v. State, 710 So.2d 941 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we agree with the circuit court Holdings: 0: holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest 1: holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity 2: holding that arrest warrant permits police to enter residence of person named therein to make arrest 3: holding that challenges to an arrest warrant are not jurisdictional 4: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to shooting Milem. He signed the statement at 8:20 p.m. The following morning, Norris was brought before a magistrate for a probable-cause determination. At trial, Norris\u2019s attorney moved to suppress Norris\u2019s confession on two grounds not at issue in this appeal. The Tennessee trial court held a hearing, denied the motion, and admitted the confession. A jury convicted Norris of second-degree murder in June 1999, and he was sentenced to twenty-one years of imprisonment. After the trial, Norris\u2019s new attorney who would also be his appellate counsel moved for a new trial. At a hearing on the motion, he argued that Norris\u2019s confession should have been suppressed because: (1) it was the fruit of an illegal arrest under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (<HOLDING>); and (2) Norris was held for investigative Holdings: 0: holding that statements obtained following an illegal arrest are no less tainted than is physical evidence obtained after the same 1: holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall 2: holding that a confession obtained in violation of miranda was admissible for impeachment 3: holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights  ie whether it was involuntary  or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda  4: holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "component of the res judicata doctrine. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the original criminal proceedings in Krahn were insufficient to invoke collateral estoppel in the later malpractice case because the claimed error by Krahn\u2019s criminal lawyer in plea negotiations was not \u201c \u2018actually and necessarily litigated and determined\u2019 in the denial of her motion to vacate the criminal judgment against her.\u201d Krahn, 43 Ohio St.3d at 108, 538 N.E.2d 1058, quoting Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978. The Supreme Court by no means suggested that collateral estoppel was completely inapplicable in the context of a criminal conviction when, as here, matters genuinely were litigated and determined. Id. at 107, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (<HOLDING>). Decisions in Ohio other than Krahn relative Holdings: 0: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 1: holding that the facts prevent the invocation of collateral estoppel as a bar to krahns cause of action in this case 2: holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cactively endeavor[] to ensure compliance\u201d with the FLSA. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir.2003), cert. granted on different issue, 2005 WL 405752 (2005); see also Herman, 172 F.3d at 142; Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1995); Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121, 129 (3d Cir.1984). If the employer fails to show good faith, an award of liquidated damages is mandatory, even if the court finds that the employer did not act willfully. Cox v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.1990). In Alvarez the court held that the employer\u2019s \u201cex post explanations\u201d for why it did not take affirmative steps to ensure compliance were insufficient to demonstrate good faith. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 910; see also First Citizens, 758 F.2d at 403 (<HOLDING>). In Bratt, by contrast, the employer had a Holdings: 0: holding that the employers bald assertions that the officers thought that they were in compliance with the act did not satisfy the good faith requirement 1: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 2: holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act 3: holding that evidence was admissible under the good faith exception where the affidavit contained a detailed description of the nature of the offense the premises to be searched the items for which they were searching and the transaction which led the informant to believe that the drugs would be in this apartment 4: holding that plaintiffs did not satisfy particularity requirement where plaintiffs assertions were based in part on the statements of unnamed former employees", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and thereby rendered him ineligible for long-term disability benefits. B. Watson\u2019s Eligibility to Sue Under ERISA \u00a7 404(a) 1. Equitable Relief Sought ERISA \u00a7 409(a), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1109(a), establishes that claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA \u00a7 404(a) are for the purpose of making \u201cgood to [an employee welfare] plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach\u201d and \u201cto restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary,\u201d id. Thus, compensatory damages are only available to restore a plan to its uninjured condition; individuals cannot obtain compensatory or punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Degnan v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 42 Holdings: 0: holding compensatory and punitive damages constitute legal remedies 1: holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under  502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan 2: holding that a plan participant or beneficiary may not recover extracontractual damages in an erisa suit for breach of fiduciary duty under  502a2 and 409a only the plan may recover damages in such cases 3: holding that fiduciary could not be held personally liable to plan participant or beneficiary for extracontractual compensatory or punitive damages 4: holding that punitive damages do not need to be proportional to compensatory damages", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at least $300,000 because of injury to two or more persons in any one accident or, at the option of the insurer, up to at least $300,000 in a single limit for these coverages, except for policies issued under the Assigned Risk Plan. Also, at least $5,000 for damage to property of others in any one accident. Additionally, insurers may offer higher benefit levels than those enumerated above as well as additional benefits. However, an insured may elect to purchase lower benefit levels than those enumerated above. Your signature on this notice or your payment of any renewal premium evidences your actual knowledge and understanding of the availability of these benefits and limits as well as the benefits and limits you have selected. 75 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 1791. 2 . For example, compare Hughes, at 539 (<HOLDING>), with Brethren Mutual Insurance Company v. Holdings: 0: holding insureds failure to comply with notice provision in insurance policy resulted in no coverage for a newly acquired car 1: holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor 2: holding insurance application containing umuim coverage limits and insureds signature was insufficient for  1734s purposes 3: holding that liability insurance policy that expressly excluded coverage for the insureds intentional acts did not cover punitive damages award assessed against the insured and stating in dictum that public policy forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages 4: holding insurance application with umuim coverage designation and insureds signature was suffi cient for  1734s purposes", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(1987) (noting that \"where the employer effectively proves that a claimant's disability has been removed altogether, it is not required to prove that suitable work was available to the claimant because it can be presumed that employment is generally available to able-bodied persons.\") 7 . Where the Board has not taken additional evidence, our standard of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed, or necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Haines v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Clearfield County), 146 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 437, 606 A.2d 571 (1992). 8 . See Rite Aid Corporation v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Bupp), 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 548, 552, 535 A.2d 763, 765 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Economy Decorators v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Holdings: 0: holding that because a suspension admittedly is a concession that disability is continuing  claimant need only show that the work provided by the employer on which the suspension is based is no longer available to claimant whereupon total disability payments must be reinstated as of the date of termination of that employment 1: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 2: holding claimant suffered permanent total disability where functional disability was only twentyfive or thirty percent claimant was fiftynine years of age claimant had little or no education and the injury kept the claimant from performing physical work 3: recognizing that in suspension situations when a claimants lightduty job ends under circumstances where neither the claimant nor the employer bears any culpability the employer must either find other suitable and available work for the claimant or resume payment of benefits 4: holding that claimant moving for summary judgment on its claim must conclusively prove all the essential elements of the claim and that claimant has the burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that claimant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to reimburse the widow for the amount she paid to satisfy the mortgage on the condominium before her husband\u2019s death, even if she did so under the mistaken belief that she was the titleholder to the property. Reversed and remanded for proceedings in compliance herewith. 1 . The appellants argue certain of the widow\u2019s claims are barred by res judicata. Because the claims made in the amended complaint filed by her in this action are different from those made by the appellants in Aronson I, there is no res judicata defense available to the appellants in this case. See AMEC Civil, LLC v. State Dep\u2019t of Transp., 41 So.3d 235, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Jones v. State ex rel. City of Winter Haven, 870 So.2d 52, 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Pipkin v. Wiggins, 526 So.2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Three requirements must be satisfied for Holdings: 0: holding res judicata did not bar current litigation when prior litigation between the parties involved one breach of obligation under a joint venture agreement and instant litigation was based upon a different cause of action from a subsequent interference with the same agreement 1: holding that entry of judgment in the underlying litigation does not moot an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene if one of the parties keeps the underlying litigation live by pursuing an appeal 2: holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business 3: holding hospitals prior litigation conduct in criminal case constituted waiver of right to arbitrate where prior litigation involved developing evidence as part of strategic plan for defense of civil suit for damages 4: holding that the current party was sufficiently identified with the parties to the prior litigation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Code does not survive intermediate scrutiny, and is void on its face because the statute is overbroad, reaching a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. See Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1587. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we hold subsection 21.15(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code is void on its face as it fails intermediate scrutiny and violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it is over-broad. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Thompson\u2019s application for writ of habeas corpus and remand this matter to the trial court to enter an order dismissing the prosecution, i.e. all charges against Thompson on alleged violations of section 21.15(b)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. See Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 297 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 1 . Thompson does not argue or provide Holdings: 0: holding statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague on its face and remanding case to trial court to enter order dismissing prosecution 1: holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court 2: holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter 3: holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend 4: holding that when the trial court signed an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint but refused to enter a final judgment on that order the order refusing to enter judgment was appealable under former ors 190102a", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Id. Similarly in Green v. Green, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in holding that unvested stock options may be considered marital property, reasoned that restricted stock option plans, like pension plans, are a form of employee compensation. 64 Md.App. 122, 494 A.2d 721, 728 (1985). The court also reasoned that the options constituted marital property because the husband acquired such options while he was married. Id. According to the court, although the options have an \u201cunassignable, unsalable\u201d character and no fair market value, they are nonetheless an \u201ceconomic resource.\u201d Id. Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property. See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect 1: holding that stock options that could be purchased but not sold without company consent during marriage were community property even though value of options was dependent upon employee spouses postdivorce employment 2: holding that like pension benefits stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage 3: holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property 4: holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "2678589, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (relating to lead paint exposure); McField v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 992 F.Supp.2d 481, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (same). 30 . McField, 992 F.Supp.2d at 487. 31 . Id. at 488 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 766) (internal citations omitted). 32 . Wright, 479 U.S. at 429-30, 107 S.Ct. 766. 33 . Johnson vs. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 442 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2006); DeCambre v. Brookline Hous. Auth., 826 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2016). 34 . Wright, 479 U.S. at 425, 107 S.Ct. 766. 35 . Id. at 419, 107 S.Ct. 766. 36 . Id. 37 . Id. at 429, 107 S.Ct. 766; see McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing a Section 1983 claim against a public housing authority to enforce Section 1437a). 38 . See Johnson, 442 F.3d at 361 (<HOLDING>); DeCambre, 826 F.3d at 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. Holdings: 0: holding congress did not exceed its authority in enacting the mdlea 1: holding that because federal regulations have the force of law they may create enforceable rights under  1983 2: holding federal regulations have the force of law and may create enforceable rights 3: holding housing statutes create no rights in tenants for purposes of section 1983 4: holding that congress intended to create enforceable rights in participating section 8 tenants to the same extent as it did in enacting the statute implicated in wright", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "We noted that Stein\u2019s holding was based on the \u201ctessellated scheme\u201d of Rule 4(a) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d), regarding notice of judgment. Id. at 1252 (quoting Stein, 197 F.3d at 426). Because Mackey\u2019s appeal was untimely not for lack of notice, but because his counsel had failed to continue representing him in court \u2014 a scenario for which no rule parallel to Rule 77 exists \u2014 we concluded that the Federal Rules were not so comprehensive as to leave no room for Rule 60(b)(6). We recognized that \u201c[a] federal habeas petitioner \u2014 who as such does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel \u2014 is ordinarily bound by his attorney\u2019s negligence.\u201d Id. at 1253 (quoting Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir.2012)). However, we then reasoned from Maples, 132 S.Ct. at 923-24 (<HOLDING>), and Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 Holdings: 0: holding that attorney abandonment constitutes an extraordinarycircumstance that allows a federal court to disregard the state procedural bar to hearing a habeas petition 1: holding that the district court  did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for reinstatement where membership in good standing in the state bar was required before attorney could be admitted to the federal bar and applicant had not been readmitted to state bar 2: holding that a prisoners failure to pursue an appeal in state court is a procedural bar to federal habeas relief unless the petitioner shows both cause for failing to bring the state claim  and actual prejudice from the failure to consider his federal claims 3: holding that if the state court addresses both the procedural default and the merits of a federal claim in the alternative a federal court should apply the state procedural bar and decline to reach the merits of the claim 4: holding that a state procedural default will not bar consideration of a federal claim on habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(citing State v. DeLuna, 110 Ariz. 497, 500, 520 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1974)). Nevertheless, an indigent defendant is not \u201centitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.\u201d Moody, 192 Ariz. at 507, \u00b6 11, 968 P.2d at 580 (citing State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 591, 858 P.2d 1152, 1194 (1993)). But when there is a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict between a defendant and his appointed counsel, that defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated. See id. Accordingly, this court has held that if a defendant is forced to go to trial with counsel with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication, a resulting conviction must be reversed. See id. at 509, \u00b6 23, 968 P.2d at 582 (<HOLDING>). \u00b67 Therefore, as the court of appeals Holdings: 0: holding that a trial courts erroneous denial of the defendants counsels application for admission pro hac vice violated the defendants sixth amendment right to choice of counsel and amounted to a structural error requiring no showing of prejudice 1: holding that a trial courts erroneous denial of a request to change counsel deprives a defendant of his sixth amendment right to counsel which infects the entire trial process requiring automatic reversal quoting bland v cal dept of corr 20 f3d 1469 1478 9th cir1994 overruled on other grounds by schell v witek 218 f3d 1017 102425 9th cir 2000 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 4: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the work independent contractors perform for property owners. Applying this rule, the Parkers contend that the undisputed facts establish that Mr. Patel, through his deemed agent D & S Builders, created the defective condition that caused their injuries. The authority cited by the Parkers does not support adoption of such a rule. These decisions turned on the property owners\u2019 constructive notice of the dangerous condition. See Sanders v. State, 783 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989) (noting that the State had at least constructive notice of the exposed cement that caused injury because a State employee had periodically replaced the wood chips in that area of the playground); Frazer v. Horton Automatics, No. E2006-00102-COA-R9-CV, 2006 WL 3001013, at *7 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 23, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Hamby v. State, No. W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV, Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor personally and as to his nonestate property but that the stay persists as to property of the bankruptcy estate 1: holding that subsequent property owners were bound by prior owners agreement to restrict building density and preserve certain portions of land as a condition of the original zoning approval 2: holding that the doctrine of strict liability applies where an owner of residential property brought a claim against the owners of a gasoline station immediately adjacent to a private residence after gasoline leaked into the property owners well 3: holding that the property owners duty of reasonable care included maintaining the automatic doors into the building and concluding that disputes of material fact remained as to the property owners constructive notice that the automatic doors were closing too quickly 4: holding that if property is not part of the individuals estate at the time he files a bankruptcy petition no automatic stay provision applies to the property", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "its Order of May 16, 2003, and, find good cause exists to issue a new Order,\u201d entitling plaintiff to present his case and put forth all evidence before a jury. Under the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 685, 746, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code \u00a7 6330 (pertaining to levies) to provide certain due process protections in connection with tax collection matters. Under \u00a7 6330(a), the IRS is required to give notice to the taxpayer before imposing a levy of his/her right to request a collection due process hearing with the IRS Appeals Office within thirty (30) days of the notice. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6330(a)(3)(B). Following the hearing, the IRS sends a Notice of Determination to the taxpayer that summarizes the matters raised 2 (N.D.Ohio Dec. 11, 2001) (<HOLDING>). In light of the above, the Court denies Holdings: 0: holding that a reviewing court can only address matters raised by the taxpayer at the cdp hearing 1: holding that a reviewing court will not address those issues not raised below or not addressed by the trial court 2: holding that under florida law a court hearing a case on a motion for a summary judgment can only consider those issues raised by the pleadings 3: recognizing the general rule that an appellate court will not address matters that were not raised or decided in the trial court   4: holding that a question that is not raised or passed upon in the lower court cannot be considered by a reviewing court", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "but this does not mean that he is incapable of alleging facts which would merit legal relief. In interpreting which claims can be dismissed as \"clearly baseless\" under \u00a7 1915(d), the Neitzke Court referred to a \"fantastic or delusional scenario,\" not a \"fantastic or delusional\u201d person. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. 3 . Hudson negates the dicta in Miller, 948 F.2d at 1567, where we stated that the Wilson v. Seiter, \u2014 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement cases applies as well to nonemergency excessive force claims. 4 . Moreover, the allegations may state a claim under a substantive due process analysis. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (<HOLDING>). See also McGill, 944 F.2d at 347-49 Holdings: 0: holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation 1: holding that government actor must intentionally abuse his or her power as a state official to harm state employee in order to sustain substantive due process violation 2: recognizing a plaintiffs  1988 claim predicated on an alleged violation of his substantive due process rights 3: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 4: holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "regarding the school; the implication, therefore, is that Finlay would have received his standard commission for bringing business to the MARQUES if in fact he ever brought such business from the school. The fact that the Ship\u2019s Regulations provided that the captain was solely responsible for the safety of the ship and those on board does not make Finlay liable for the ship\u2019s unseaworthiness, because a shipowner\u2019s duty to provide a seaworthy ship is nondelegable. See Sieracki, 828 U.S. at 94 n. 11, 66 S.Ct. at 877 n. 11. Holding Finlay to be an owner pro hac vice because the Ship\u2019s Regulations made him solely responsible for the safety of the ship would defeat the rule of nondelegability, for it would absolve the owners of liability for unseaworthiness. See Ramos, 423 F.2d at 917-18 (<HOLDING>). That plaintiffs\u2019 decedents had no contact Holdings: 0: recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself 1: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor 2: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor 3: holding that owner could not be hable for unseaworthy conditions arising after he has parted with control over his vessel under a demise charter and that a shipowner cannot escape liability by delegating partial control of his vessel to an independent contractor 4: holding authority to control limits duty to control", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a \u00a7 3.203(a)-qualifying document, but also as to the consequences, under that regulatory interpretation, of failing to submit such a document prior to the RO\u2019s decision to seek verification from ARPER-CEN. Indeed, in a scheme where VA\u2019s initial inquiry to ARPERCEN carries such potentially outcome-determinative consequences, the duty to notify the claimant as to what evidence she may submit would be of even greater importance. Similarly, in the context of such an interpretation, or more so, if \u00a7 3.203(a) is not applicable here, VA\u2019s failure to inform the appellant that she should \u201cprovide any additional personal data pertaining to her husband, such as any aliases he may have used during military service\u201d, would also be a notice error . Cf. Sarmiento v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 80, 85 (1994) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by D\u2019Amico v. Holdings: 0: holding that a fax requesting employment information and verification did not convey information regarding a debt but also noting that the senders name and logo did not make explicit that the request was from a debt collector 1: holding that when claimant supplies new identifying information va must submit additional request to arpercen for verification of service 2: holding that a party must submit a proposed instruction to preserve an objection for appeal 3: holding that general allegations of a need for additional discovery will not suffice the person presenting such a claim must show what discovery has been obtained why it is inadequate and the what additional information he expects to obtain from additional discovery 4: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201chave his cake and eat it too.\u201d Id. at 282. Under basic principles of contract law, \u201c[d]efendants must take the bitter with the sweet.\u201d Id. at 283; see also United States v. Cianci 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir.1998) (\u201cUnder the law of this circuit, [a defendant] cannot renege on his agreement\u201d). \u201cWhen the government breaches a plea agreement, the general rule is to remand the ease to the district court for a determination whether to grant specific performance or to allow withdrawal of the plea.\u201d United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 241 (3d Cir.1998). However, \u201cwe have allowed for an exception when the circumstances dictate that there is only one appropriate remedy for the defendant.\u201d Williams, 510 F.3d at 427; see, e.g., United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 941 (3d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 241 Holdings: 0: holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea 1: holding that permitting withdrawal of the defendants plea would be an empty remedy as he had already served much of his sentence 2: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea 3: holding that prosecution is generally entitled to specific performance or withdrawal of plea following defendants breach but because the government waived its right to withdrawal of plea only the possibility of specific performance remained 4: holding that because the defendants challenge to his sentence implicated his plea agreement the defendants request must be construed as a petition for postconviction relief", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "particularity forfeits review under the \u201charmless error\u201d rule. See Scarfo, 54 F.3d at 944; Linn v. Andover Newton Theological School, Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989); Elwood, 815 F.2d at 175-76; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Zermani, 200 F.2d 240, 245 (1st Cir.1952). Consequently, appellate review is lim ited to determining whether a miscarriage of justice would occur were the asserted error not corrected. -See Scarfo, 54 F.3d at 940. WorldCom can demonstrate no miscarriage of justice. First, the \u201cfair market value\u201d standard defined by the district court, see supra 28-29, provided the jury with a just and reasonable measure of damages under Massachusetts law in these circumstances. See Mechanics Nat\u2019l. Bank of Worcester v. Killeen, 377 Mass. 100, 384 N.E.2d 1231, 1239 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N.E. 153, Holdings: 0: holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale 1: holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market 2: holding in action for breach of contract caused by wrongful foreclosure and sale of shares of stock plaintiff was entitled to recover the fair market value of the stock at the time of its sale 3: holding that chapter 8 of colorados ucc applied to the sale of shares in a corporation whose entire stock was held by one individual 4: holding stock transfer restriction in corporate bylaws did not prevent levy against and sale of stock by third party in order to pay judgment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "time prior to the closing of this transaction, Buyer agrees that such filing shall constitute a material breach of the terms of both this Purchase and Sale Agreement and its lease with Seller and Seller may ... retain any and all monies paid to it by Buyer, whether in the form, of earnest money or lease payments, as liquidated damages which sum Buyer and Seller agree would be fair and reasonable liquidated damages to Seller for such breach of this Agreement.... Thus, although the amendments to RE-21 did not specifically state that making the earnest money non-refundable was an advance election of remedies, when Phillips availed himself of the earnest money, he foreclosed his ability to pursue actual damages. See, e.g., McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720, 720-21 (1960) (<HOLDING>). Further, the parties\u2019 intent is supported by Holdings: 0: holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without sellers knowledge and consent 1: holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla 2: holding that the sellers retention of the deposit evidenced an election of liquidated damages by the seller 3: holding that liquidated damages under fair labor standards act constitutes compensation for the retention of a workmans pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages 4: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this would constitute a miscarriage of justice. The offense of loitering and prowling contains two elements: first the accused must be loitering and prowling in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens; and second, the loitering and prowling must be under circumstances that threaten the public safety. State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, Bell v. Florida, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975). With regard to the second element, \u201cthe p an open convenience store constitutes loitering and prowling in a manner unusual for law-abiding citizens, there was no evidence introduced at trial indicating that appellant\u2019s actions were creating an imminent threat to the safety of persons or property in the area. See T.W. v. State, 675 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(<HOLDING>); R.D.W. (holding that juvenile\u2019s and two other Holdings: 0: holding that police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after observing a group of men huddled around a closed store at 2 am 1: holding that change in schedule  from working 600 am to 230 pm with sundays and mondays off to working 730 am to 400 pm with sundays and tuesdays off  did not constitute adverse employment action 2: holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am 3: holding that juveniles presence one foot from closed pawn shop at 400 am while carrying chain saw case did not create imminent threat to the safety of persons or property in the area 4: holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which the defendant was a passenger when the officer saw the vehicle come out from behind a closed building at 330 am and the building had been recently burglarized", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a \u201ccustom, rule, and/or procedure among international long-haul carriers [by failing] to warn, advise and/or take adequate precautions to inform passengers of the risk of DVT.\u201d Pis.\u2019 First Am. Compl. at \u00b6 20. Many courts have recognized that failing to carry out routine procedures in the usual way can constitute an accident under the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir.1998) (applying a hot compress to relieve ear pain, which is a routine procedure, can be an accident if the water is excessively hot); Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F.Supp.2d 651, 669 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (failing to divert an airplane w to warn is irrelevant to the accident inquiry. Cf. Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 181 F.Supp.2d 396, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The Sprayregen is inapposite; it involved an Holdings: 0: holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated 1: holding that ordinary turbulence is not an accident and that the flight crews failure to knock on the lavatory door to warn the plaintiff of the turbulence was irrelevant to the accident inquiry 2: holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident 3: holding that summary judgment on plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory was precluded both because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to the cause of the accident and whether or not one of the defendants had exclusive control over the instrumentality of the accident 4: holding that probable cause was clearly present justifying the taking of a blood sample without the defendants consent when it was established that the defendant was involved in an automobile accident and the police noticed liquor on his breath at the scene of the accident and at the hospital", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "True, the Ohio General Assembly has tasked the county offices with implementing the NVRA; but, as previously explained, the General Assembly also tasked the Director with the power to enforce any county transgressions of federal law. This is not an either-or proposition. The fact that some states, like Ohio, delegate the administration of public assistance programs to counties or municipalities should not mean that those states are free of all statutory obligations. See New York, 255 F.Supp.2d at 79 (\u201cIt would be plainly unreasonable to permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.\u201d); see also Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The federal food stamp program is Holdings: 0: holding that new york could not avoid its obligations under the rehabilitation act by delegating authority to localities to deliver federally funded services 1: holding that a financial guaranty payable in new york is a contract to perform services in new york subjecting foreign guarantor to jurisdiction under  302a1 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding that the plaintiff in an eviction proceeding by a private landlord in federally funded section 8 housing could assert claims for violations of the rehabilitation act and fha as affirmative defenses with regard to nopet policy 4: holding that post2001 new york was clearly subject to suit under section 504 of the rehabilitation act", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "decline to set a particular amount that constitutes a substantial reduction; this is a question for the trier of fact to determine, examining the totality of the circumstances. Because the commissioner did not consider whether Terry acted reasonably by leaving when faced with a reduction in pay and whether exhausting her alternatives by testing would have been futile, we remand for a new hearing. Terry requests attorney fees. RCW 50.32.160 provides that if this court overturns or modifies the commissioner\u2019s ruling, the claimant is entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Accordingly, Terry is entitled to attorney fees upon timely filing an affidavit of attorney fees with this court. Agid and Ellington, JJ., concur. 1 Tapper v. Employment Sec. Dep\u2019t, 122 Wn.2d 397, 406, 858 P.2d 494 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 2 Sweitzer v. Department of Empl. Sec., 43 Holdings: 0: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 1: holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact 2: holding that the court may not overturn the administrative law judges factual findings as long as they are supported by competent substantial evidence 3: holding that it is the commissioners findings of fact to the extent they modify or replace the administrative law judges findings that are relevant on appeal 4: holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "these circumstances, and assuming, solely for the purpose of this argument, that Maine law requires that a power of sale foreclosure auction meet the standard of commercial reasonableness, we cannot' agree with Oceanic\u2019s argument that a fact-finder could\" rationally conclude that the sale was commercially unreasonable. [\u00b633] Finally, Sloan\u2019s Cove\u2019s decision not to hire a licensed auctioneer does not render the sale unreasonable or require invalidation of the sale. \u2018 Oceanic points to the auctioneering licensing statute, 32 M.R.S. \u00a7 285 (2015), which requires a person \u201cwho engages in the business of auc-tioneering, professes or advertises to be an auctioneer or advertises the sale of real, personal or mixed property by auction\u201d to hold a valid auctioneer\u2019s license. The pow per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Williston v. Morse, 51 Mass. 17, 23 (1845) Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper 1: holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale 2: holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale 3: holding that an auction sale by an unlicensed auctioneer did not invalidate the sale 4: holding that failure to comply with rule requiring notice of sheriffs sale requires voiding of sale", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the state would choose to prosecute at trial put defendant at a disadvantage as he tried to defend against the charges. That is because the state\u2019s method of charging, combined with a late election, allows the state to present evidence of a defendant\u2019s multiple bad acts and then to select, mid-trial, which of those will be considered as a charge for the jury to decide. That approach to charging undermines efforts by Oregon courts to prevent \u201cother acts\u201d evidence from being introduced in contravention of the principle in OEC 404(3) that such evidence \u201cis not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.\u201d See, e.g., State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172, 184-85, 282 P3d 857, modified on recons, 352 Or 622, 292 P3d 522 (2012) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial court did not know Holdings: 0: holding that absent a defendants stipulation the state must first introduce evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the charged act occurred before the trial court can admit uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent 1: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff 2: holding that the government may not be permitted to introduce other crimes evidence in its case in chief to prove intent unless the defense disputes intent during opening statements 3: holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce direct evidence of the controlling nature of defendants relationship with the victim", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(1984) (citing Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 55, 373 A.2d 505, 507 (1977)); see also McCullock I, 981 F.2d at 658 n. 2 (\u201cThe Ostrowski court applied a single standard to plaintiffs claims of negligent failure to warn and strict products liability.\u201d). So, under Vermont law, to sustain a verdict premised on a \u201cfailure to warn\u201d theory, plaintiff must provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find: (1) that defendant owed a duty to warn plaintiff; (2) lack of warning made the product unreasonably dangerous, hence defective; and (3) defendant\u2019s failure to warn was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. Menard, 135 Vt. at 54, 373 A.2d at 506; see Ostrowski, 144 Vt. at 308, 479 A.2d at 127; see also Hobart v. P.J.\u2019s Auto Village, Inc., 136 Vt. 287, 289, 388 A.2d 419, 420 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Scronce v. Howard Bros. Discount Holdings: 0: holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury 1: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 2: holding that whether the negligent acts of parties combined to become the proximate cause of the injury was a question for the jury 3: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 4: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "any commercial transactions and does not offer any products or services. (Id.) The \u201ccore notion\u201d of commercial speech is that it \u201cdoes not more than propose a commercial transaction.\u201d Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 66, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983) (citations and quotations omitted); see Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184. However, the \u201cboundary between commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to be clearly delineated.\u201d Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184. On one end of the spectrum, an advertisement is \u201cclearly commercial speech.\u201d Id. at 1185; see e.g. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 409; Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097-98. On the other end of the spectrum is speech that, when viewed as a whole, expresses editorial comment on matters of interest to the public. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185 (<HOLDING>); Montana, 34 Cal.App.4th at 793-95, 40 Holdings: 0: holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity 1: holding that magazine article that used an altered photograph of a male celebrity to showcase a designer gown was noncommercial speech because the article did not have the sole purpose of selling a particular product complemented the magazine issues focus on hollywood part and present and combined fashion photography humor and visual and verbal editorial comment 2: holding that a state law violates article i when it has the likely effect of disadvantaging a class of candidates for national office and has the sole purpose of indirectly creating qualifications in addition to those set forth in article i 3: holding that expelled student whose role in controversy merited only short blurb in a nine page magazine article did not assume position of prominence 4: holding newspapers article reporting that police officer had stated he and others planned to kill the city mayor was not capable of an innocent construction so as to be nonactionable whether read alone or in the context of the entire article the court rejecting the defendants assertion that the remainder of the article gave it a different innocent meaning and finding the entire focus of the article is the threat by a police officer on the life of the mayor and noting the headline announced policeman threatened mayor", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not unconscionable); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735 (Md. 2005) (arbitration provision in loan agreement not unconscionable, even though only the mortgagor was permitted to go to court, it prohibited class action claims, arbitration fees were not disclosed, and mortgagee was required to waive right to jury tria 85 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (arbitration provision requiring purchaser of automobile to resolve all claims in arbitration but not requiring dealer to resolve any claims in 04) (arbitration provision that provides \"a judicial forum for practically all claims\" that automobile dealer could have against purchaser but assigning any claims by the purchaser to arbitration unconscionable); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861-62 (W.Va. 1998) (<HOLDING>). See cases cited at 1 Farnsworth, supra note Holdings: 0: holding that where a debtor borrowed money from a third party to pay off the holder of a pmsi in the collateral the effect was to extinguish the pmsi the court noted that a finding that the lender enabled the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral as  9107 requires may be possible where a nonselling lender has given value prior to the time the debtor acquires rights in the collateral 1: holding unconscionable an arbitration provision in a consumer lending contract that binds the consumer to relinquish his or her right to a day in court and virtually all substantive rights while the lender retains the right to a judicial forum for purposes of collection and foreclosure proceedings deficiency judgments and all other procedures which the lender may pursue to acquire title to the borrowers real or personal property 2: holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone 3: holding that the lender was subject to the dtpa because the borrowers purpose in obtaining the loan was the purchase of a house 4: holding lender loses right to a premium when it elects to accelerate the debt and declining to allow lender to avoid the consequences of its choice of acceleration", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 1105, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 (1996); see also United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (10th Cir.1987) (\"A defendant t.Ct.App.1994) (reversing for failure to instruct on justifiable use of nondeadly force, noting \"it is the nature of the force and not the end result that must be evaluated\u201d); White v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Ky.1960) (\"[Wjhere no deadly weapons are involved and the defendant is entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, an unintentional homicide, he is entitled to a further instruction on the theory of defense against ordinary assault and battery, against the menace of mere bodily harm as distinguished from the threat of death or great bodily harm.\u2019\u2019); State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn.1998) (<HOLDING>). We cannot therefore agree with the dissent Holdings: 0: holding that illegal use of a weapon is one of the predicate offenses for manslaughter where there is no intent to cause death or great bodily harm 1: holding that although the first shot might have been justified in selfdefense a second shot to the victims body cannot be so justified when danger of death or great bodily harm ceases 2: holding that where use of reasonable nondeadly force causes death defendant entitled to instruction on selfdefense 3: holding it error to give selfdefense instruction requiring that defendant believe his actions were necessary to avert death or great bodily harm when defendant claimed that the victims death was accidental 4: holding that when both parties agree that the facts of the case entitled defendant to a selfdefense instruction failing to so instruct the jury was error", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "P.3d 170, 177 (Okla.2007). Stewart involved an action for damages for personal injuries caused when the driver-employee of a tractor-trailer rear-ended the Stewarts\u2019 vehicle. 241 F.Supp.2d at 1218. Stewart, relying on Marrier, sued the driver and the commercial carrier that employed the driver, asserting a private cause of action under section 14704(a)(2). Id. at 1219. The Stewart court respectfully disagreed with the reasoning in Marrier. Finding the language in section 14704(a)(2) \u201cambiguous and inconsistent with other language in the statute,\u201d the federal district court looked \u201cto the legislative history for guidance in interpreting the statute.\u201d Id. The Stewart court relied, in part, on Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. New Prime, Inc., 192 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Stewart, 241 F.Supp.2d at 1221. In Holdings: 0: holding that section 14704a2 authorizes private action for damages and injunctive relief to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act and its implementing regulations 1: holding that  1132a3b authorizes the award of appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of erisa 2: holding that liquidated damages provision did not provide adequate remedy at law or prevent injunctive relief 3: holding that section 14704a authorizes private actions for damages  to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act 4: recognizing that implicit in language of  9 allowing civil action for damages or injunctive relief or both was a plain legislative intent to afford victims of discrimination the legal remedy of compensatory damages", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at 993. B. The People next argue that the evidence discovered by the arresting officers is admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Subsection 16-3-308(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), provides that \u201c[ejvidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer, as defined in subsection 18-1-901(3)(1), C.R.S., as a result of a good faith mistake or a technical violation.\u201d \u201cGood faith mistake\u201d is defined in subsection 16-3-308(2)(a) as \u201ca reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts or law which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.\u201d See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 Holdings: 0: recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule 1: holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should not bar the use of evidence obtained by police officers acting in good faith and with reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant 2: holding that the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment applies to civil forfeiture proceedings 3: holding that an exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule applies where the police would have obtained the evidence if no illegality had occurred 4: holding that with respect to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule article 1 section 11 of the wisconsin constitution affords additional protection than that which is afforded by the fourth amendment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the res judicata doctrine bars Donald\u2019s action against him. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, \u201cprevents the relitigation of factual issues already decided if the identical issue was determined by a prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding.\u201d Portland Co., 2009 ME 98, \u00b622, 979 A.2d at 1287 (quotation marks omitted). [\u00b6 19] A party to a current proceeding may assert collateral estoppel defensively to bar the opposing party from relitigating factual issues resolved against it in a prior proceeding and which were decided by a prior final judgment, even though the party asserting collateral es-toppel was not a party to the prior proceeding. See Brewer v. Hagemann, 2001 ME 27, \u00b6 8, 771 A.2d 1080, 1033 (<HOLDING>); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 768 Holdings: 0: holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action 1: holding that a civil claim is barred by collateral estoppel even though the prior adjudication was in criminal proceedings and the parties are not the same because the matters were actually litigated and decided in the prior trial 2: holding that the plaintiff could not show surprise when the plaintiff had received the additional terms from the defendant prior to the agreement 3: holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated 4: holding that the defendant though not a party to the prior litigation could assert collateral estoppel defensively to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating factual issues that the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the first place. If [it] prevails], the only appropriate remedy is a declaration that the [Ordinance] is invalid and an injunction forbidding its enforcement.\u201d Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699 n. 10 (emphasis in original). Waterfront cites to no case awarding anything other than injunctive relief to a plaintiff who asserts that it was harmed by the mere enactment of a zoning law, where the plaintiff has not applied for a permit. See also Rumber v. District of Columbia, 595 F.3d 1298, 1300 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2010) (claim for compensatory damages did not save from mootness an action to enjoin eminent domain against a property because \u201cno property ha[d] been taken from [the] plaintiffs\u201d); Angino v. VanWagner, No. 1:CV-05-1748, 2009 WL 2859041, at *14-15 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 3, 2009) (Vanaskie, J.) (<HOLDING>). Limiting the available remedy to an Holdings: 0: holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative 1: holding that a  1983 claim for damages was not prohibited by claim preclusion because the plaintiff could not have sought damages in his prior article 78 proceeding arising out of the same facts 2: holding such damages available where local law silent on issue speculative nature of damages does not preclude recovery 3: holding that damages were not available to a plaintiff who challenged an ordinance under a due process theory because the plaintiff had not sought a permit and therefore any claim for damages was purely speculative 4: holding that plaintiff could not request damages for a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance under the first amendment because the provision had not yet harmed the plaintiff", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Span and did not take his threats seriously. For example, counsel grilled Epps about his failure to immediately report Span\u2019s threat to the staff at the Metropolitan Correction Center where Epps was detained at the time. But Epps\u2019s testimony about \u201cLil Ride\u201d showed that he had good reason to take Span seriously. Epps knew that Span had tried to coerce \u201cLil Ride\u201d into recanting, and he had reason to believe, based on Span\u2019s plot to kill \u201cLil Ride\u201d, that Span would resort to violence. This knowledge explains why Epps would have recanted his statements, and why he might have hesitated to report Span\u2019s threat to authorities. The testimony about \u201cLil Ride\u201d thus tended to rehabilitate Epps and lend plausibility to his story. See United States v. Holly, 167 F.3d 393, 394-95 (7th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we agree with appellate coun sel Holdings: 0: holding that testimony by witnesses that the defendant threatened a witness is sufficient to support acharge of retaliation 1: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 2: holding that district court could admit evidence under 404b that defendant in insurance fraud case had threatened and abused witnesses in order to explain why witnesses initially told investigators defendant was not involved 3: holding that the failure to call certain witnesses was not ineffective assistance because witnesses already presented similar evidence and counsel is not required to present cumulative evidence 4: holding it was not error to admit incourt identifications for the first time without notice to defendant since witnesses had not made pretrial identifications and counsel had the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the district court committed no error in denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and add a claim for disparate impact discrimination based on Department of Education regulations promulgated under \u00a7 602. 8 . Noteworthy among the district court cases are the following. In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep\u2019t. of Envtl. Prot., 145 F.Supp.2d 505 (D.N.J.2001), the district court had issued an injunction and declaratory judgment against the commissioner of the state's environmental protection agency for issuing air permits that the court determined had a disparate impact in violation of the regulations passed pursuant to \u00a7 602 by the Environmental Protection Agency. When the Sandoval decision was issued, the district court set a briefing schedule and th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Not only are the Eleventh Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by congress courts may not create a cause of action absent statutory intent 1: holding congress must unambiguously confer federal rights on the plaintiff 2: holding that congress cannot confer the executives standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through citizensuit provisions 3: holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court 4: holding that congress cannot consistent with the constitutional principles of the separation of powers confer standing on a qui tam plaintiff who has suffered no cognizable injury to allow that plaintiff to prosecute an fca action on the governments behalf", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "... and by any paraprofessional person employed by such ... attorney ... based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title: and (2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 330(a) . The award of compensation as well as the time of the award, and the amount of such award is within the discretion of the Court. In re Land, 138 B.R. 66 (D.Neb.1992), aff'd, 994 F.2d 843 (8th Cir.1993) (Table); 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 330 and 331. Further, an attorney must apply to the Court for compensation or reimbursement of expenses as set forth in Rule 2016(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proc e Golden Triangle Film Labs, Inc.), 164 B.R. 670, 671-72 (M.D.Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); Kenneth Leventhal & Co. v. Spurgeon Holding Holdings: 0: holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute 1: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed 2: holding that an attorney could be required to disgorge any fees already received if he failed to indicate the specific nature of any services preformed or to produce documentary evidence that he was entitled to such fee 3: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees 4: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Mr. Robbins asserts that the district court erred in calculating the tax-loss amount attributable to his crimes, a determination which affects his sentence under the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2T1.1. On guideline issues, we review legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and give due deference to the district court\u2019s application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir.2006). In determining the total tax loss, \u201call conduct violating the tax laws should be considered as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan unless the evidence demonstrates that the conduct is clearly unrelated.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2T1.1, cmt. n. 2. See also United States v. Hayes, 322 F.3d 792, 801-02 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The tax loss proved at trial amounted to Holdings: 0: holding that tax loss may include amounts in returns prepared by the defendant but not included in the indictment 1: holding crimefraud exception applied to testimony of attorney and accountant who prepared his clients tax returns during grand jury investigation for tax evasion 2: holding that tax returns and tax return information cannot regain their confidential status once the returns have become part of the public record by their use in a public trial 3: holding that the lower court erred both in requiring production of copies of the defendants income tax returns and in receiving the returns into evidence over objection 4: holding that tax returns are privileged under the statutes that prohibited the tax board and employees from disclosing any information and this privilege should not be nullified by allowing third parties to obtain the information by demanding copies of the returns", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "executed U-4 registration agreement. ISSUES I. Does Ottman\u2019s defamation claim fall within the scope of the U-4 registration agreement? II. Does compelling arbitration violate Ottman\u2019s right to a jury trial? III. Is Ottman pursuing a baseless claim? ANALYSIS Whether a party has agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is a matter of contract interpretation, which we review de novo. See Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn.1995) (agreement to arbitrate matter of contract interpretation); Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn.1979) (contract interpretation subject to de novo review). We resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Mem\u2019l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (<HOLDING>); see also 9 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1-15 (1988) (codifying Holdings: 0: holding any doubts concerning scope of arbitrable issues resolved in favor of arbitration 1: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage 2: holding that we resolve doubts about the usefulness of expert testimony in favor of admissibility 3: holding that a settlement agreement is an arbitrable subject when the underlying dispute is arbitrable 4: holding that statutes and ordinances are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of constitutionality", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "objected to arbitration on numerous grounds, including that the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable. Although the District Court found that the arbitral forum was unavailable, it neither addressed substitution of a different arbitrator under \u00a7 5 of the FAA nor reached Mr. Inetianbor\u2019s claim of unconscionability. Mr. Inetianbor does not ask us specifically to affirm on the grounds that the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable, but he has repeatedly maintained on appeal that the agreement was a sham. I agree and conclude Congress did not intend for the federal courts to compel arbitration in such circumstances and that we should exercise our discretion to affirm the District Court on this alternate ground. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Stewart v. Happy Herman\u2019s Cheshire. Bridge, Holdings: 0: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by record 1: holding that judgment may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record 2: holding that in reviewing a district courts decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo the decision can be affirmed on any ground that finds support in the record including an alternate ground 3: holding that a grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any independent ground revealed by the record 4: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "groundwater. Thus, although the PCE contamination (as Sen try now argues) was not actually known or discovered by Greenbriar until 1996 (after the expiration of the Sentry policies), it may have \u201cmanifested itself\u201d \u2014 that is, it may have been discoverable through reasonable testing \u2014 during the effective terms of each of the Sentry policies. Even if, as Sentry urges, \u201cmanifest\u201d could be taken also to mean \u201cdiscovered,\u201d there would be, at most, an ambiguity in the meaning of \u201cmanifest\u201d in this case, because \u201cdiscoverable,\u201d as shown supra, is at the very least an equally plausible definition of the term. The existence of such an ambiguity requires application of well-settled rules of construction as aids in the interpretive enterprise. See, e.g., Partnership Umbrella, 530 S.E.2d at 160 (<HOLDING>); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Walton, 244 Va. Holdings: 0: recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect 1: holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder 2: holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous 3: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 4: holding that rules of contract construction are to be applied where the language used is ambiguous", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the first part of MCL 600.5851(7) establishes a specific time in which a person under the age of eight must file a claim, with Miller, supra at 202, which defines a statute of limitations as a statute requiring a person to bring a claim within a specified time. In other words, statutes like MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 600.5852 contain language that \u201csaves\u201d a claim that may otherwise be barred, while the language within MCL 600.5851(7) \u201cgives\u201d two distinct periods in which this particular class of claimants may file suit. Thus, the plain language of MCL 600.5851(7) provides an alternative limitations period (the tenth-birthday rule) that, depending on the facts of a particular case, may provide a plaintiff with more time than the \u201cgeneral\u201d two-year period to sue. Miller, supra at 202 (<HOLDING>). Key to this conclusion is both that the Holdings: 0: holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant 1: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 2: holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach 3: holding that the discovery rule within mcl 6005838a2 is an alternative to the other periods of limitation and it is itself a period of limitation 4: recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. See id. at 584, 108 S.Ct. at 1986. The Court remarked that to allow the jury to consider evidence that was materially inaccurate was error. See id. at 590,108 S.Ct. at 1989. The present case does not parallel the situation addressed in Johnson nor the vast majority of cases that have relied upon Johnson to determine whether evidence of a criminal conviction or conduct may be properly admitted at sentencing. Instead of a materially inaccurate criminal conviction, we confront purportedly materially inaccurate testimony. Notwithstanding the difference, Hernandez must still establish that Grigson\u2019s and Erdmann\u2019s testimonies were false and material. See Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 497 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Although neither the Supreme Court nor this Holdings: 0: holding that the petitioners federal habeas action accrued when a witness executed an affidavit recanting the testimony he gave during a prisoners murder prosecution not on the date that the state supreme court rejected the prisoners claim 1: holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person 2: holding that habeas prisoners eighth amendment claim failed because he had not adequately shown that erdmanns testimony was false or material 3: holding that a prison official can violate a prisoners eighth amendment rights by failing to intervene 4: holding that because pretrial detainees fourteenth amendment rights are comparable to prisoners eighth amendment rights the same standards apply", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "bad faith while negotiating his losses: \"WHEREAS, Farmers has denied that any such promise was extended to Goodwin, but has nevertheless agreed to pay to Goodwin the sum of $50,000 . . .\u201d. (Italics ours.) Clerk\u2019s Papers, at 27. Likewise, the agreement cannot be said to extinguish Bacon\u2019s liability, as it required commencement of a lawsuit against Bacon, nor did Plaintiff receive full payment, as he would receive any award beyond $50,000, whether from Bacon or Sandoz. Thus, Plaintiff remained the real party in interest, and CR 17 did not compel admission of the test uding the seven federal circuits, that have addressed FIFRA preemption since the United States Supreme Court\u2019s explanation of express preemption analysis in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 120 L. N.Y. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Upon engaging in our own analysis of the Holdings: 0: holding fifra preempts no commonlaw claims 1: holding that fifra preempts breach of warranty claims based on labeling 2: holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims 3: holding fifra preempts implied warranty claims 4: holding fifra preempts inadequate label claims but not claims for failure to warn through other channels", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "opinion supplements and amends a letter opinion I issued on June 15, 2007 denying cross-motions for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed, see R. 4:46-2(c), and my bench opinion of September 7, 2007 in which I made certain factual findings but did not decide the merits of these appeals. This opinion is based on the certifications and documents submitted in connection with the summary judgment motions as well as the testimony and documents presented at a plenary hearing on September 7, 2007, and my evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. 3 Under I.R.C. \u00a7 1031(a), the \u201ctaxpayer\u201d must effect the exchange, that is, the same taxpayer must be transferor and transferee in the exchange transaction. See Chase v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 874, 1989 WL 38262 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 4 Because single member limited liability Holdings: 0: holding that a transaction did not satisfy the requirements of  1031a when a partnership sold property and individual partners acquired the exchange property 1: holding that tjhere is a strong legal presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property 2: recognizing that partnership property is a type of ownership 3: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property 4: holding under oregons larceny statute which is based on new yorks larceny statute that a partner cannot be charged with the theft of partnership property because oregon adheres to the commonlaw rule that partners cannot steal partnership property", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (internal citation omitted); Natho v. Shelton, No. 03-11-00661-CV, 2014 WL 2522051, at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 30, 2014, no. pet. h.) (\"When a fiduciary intentionally breaches his duty by self-dealing and thereby gaining a benefit for himself, willful and fraudulent acts are presumed.\u201d). Thus, under Texas law, Whitting-ton\u2019s intent is likely presumed as a matter of law. 13 . Some courts, noting that it could be difficult to \"prove a negative\u201d \u2014 that is, to prove reliance on facts that were not disclosed\u2014 have focused their inquiry on whether the concealed information was material, that is, whether it would have affected decision-making had it been disclosed, a standard plainly met here. See Titan Grp. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding in securities law context that in cases involving nondisclosure of material facts  materiality rather than reliance  becomes the decisive element of causation 1: holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana 2: holding that such information is not material under securities law 3: holding in a securities fraud action that a court may only find the lack of materiality where a jury could not reasonably find materiality 4: holding that reliance is not a required element of securities fraud in a state enforcement action in idaho", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Connecticut. Consequently, the court has no information on the precise content of these histories, and must base its decision solely on the records from Connecticut. See footnote 4, supra. 9 . Camara\u2019s birth date and driver's license expiration date are not protected. In the definition of \"personal information,\u201d section 2725(3) lists an individual's \"photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information....\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2725(3). Applying the interpretive doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the statute cannot be read to apply to an individual's birth date nor his driver's license expiration date. See Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 370 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Courts turn to the traditional canons of Holdings: 0: holding that application of the doctrine of expressio unius is proper where the statute identifies a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand thus raising the inference that a similar unlisted term was deliberately excluded 1: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court 2: holding that the term occurrence was defined to mean any happening or series of happenings arising out of or due to one event taking place during the term of this contract 3: holding that contract terms were ambiguous where the specific term that appellant argued should control a more general term was itself susceptible of two reasonable interpretations 4: holding that where a statute uses the disjunctive term or the provisions of the statute plainly encompass two distinct situations", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and the district court will be ordered to enter a judgment of acquittal on both of those counts on remand. 1 . Inasmuch as we are vacating each of the defendants\u2019 convictions on Counts 2 through 13, and Inge\u2019s convictions on two counts, we need not address the claims of error that pertain to sentencing. We will, however, address certain evidentiary rulings that are challenged in this appeal as the same issues may again arise if the Defendants are retried on the tax evasion charges. 2 . The Donatos were charged in Counts 14 through 17 and McKee in Counts 18 through 21. 3 . Courts of Appeals are split on whether a constructive amendment to an indictment are per se reversible error under plain error review. Compare United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 712-13 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187, Holdings: 0: holding that it is per se reversible error to prohibit adverse inference questioning of the venire 1: holding the erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes per se reversible error 2: holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis 3: holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis 4: holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the subject: Plaintiff included a copy of the 2001 EEOC Complaint with his application on June 30, 2005 \u2014 twelve days before Plaintiffs interview with Schlem-mer. {See Michael Henshaw Decl. \u00b6 4, June 19, 2007) Plaintiff had earlier stated at oral argument that it was Schlemmer who first brought up the 2001 EEOC Complaint. (Mem.Op.4, Apr. 4, 2007) The only genuine issue is which party first broached the subject. For purposes of Plaintiffs prima facie case, it is sufficient that Defendant was aware of the protected activity, regardless of which party first brought up the issue. Defendant argues, however, that in Title VII retaliation cases, \u201cgenerally the passage of time ... tends to negate the infer- enee of discrimination.\u201d Price, 380 F.3d at 213; see also Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657 (<HOLDING>). Although Defendant\u2019s argument is true, Holdings: 0: holding that although evidence that the alleged adverse action occurred shortly after the employer became aware of the protected activity is sufficient to make a prima facie causation case the opposite is equally true  a lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action  negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two 1: holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation 2: holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection 3: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than two months after protected activity 4: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.). Other courts of appeals have enumerated comparable requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Sloan, 505 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 524 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir.1989). Beyond these generalities, the case law has been uneven. For example, several courts have indicated that something more than the stain of conviction is needed to show continuing collateral consequences. See, e.g., Fleming v. United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90-91 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam); United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 429-30 & n. 33 (5th Cir.1998); Hager, 993 F.2d at 5; United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (3d Cir.1988); see also United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Other courts have indicated that continuing Holdings: 0: holding that defendants have a federal constitutional right to make a collateral attack on a prior conviction only when that conviction was obtained without the assistance of counsel 1: holding that  once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it 2: holding that the exception is applied only in exceptional situations  3: holding that continuing collateral consequences arise only in situations where the disability is unique to a criminal conviction 4: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Corr., 364 Fed.Appx. 499, 500 (10th Cir.2010). On September 19, 2014, after additional state-court proceedings, Mr. Chase filed a second \u00a7 2254 application in federal district court again asserting ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his plea. He supported his argument with alleged new law\u2014Lafler v. Cooper, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). The district court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction and denied a COA, determining that the application was second or successive. The court declined to transfer the application to this court because Lafler did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and therefore it would not apply retroactively to Mr. Chase\u2019s conviction. See In re Graham, 714 F.3d 1181, 1182-83 (10th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Chase now seeks a COA from us. He asserts Holdings: 0: holding ineffectivetrialassistance claim may be brought in 28 usc  2255 proceeding regardless of whether claim could have been raised on direct appeal 1: holding that a claim under booker does not fit within the savings clause of 28 usc  2255 2: holding that constitutional claims are extraneous resentencing issues that a court cannot address during a  3582c2 proceeding and that a defendant is entitled to raise constitutional challenges to a sentence by making a collateral attack under 28 usc  2255 3: holding that equitable tolling is available for petitions filed pursuant to 28 usc  2255 4: holding in 28 usc  2255 proceeding that lafler does not establish new rule of constitutional law", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his motion to reconsider. In re Jin Di Lu, No. A97 162 780 (B.I.A. Jan. 16, 2008). We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. Where, as here, an alien files a timely petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider, but not from the underlying decision for which reconsideration is sought, we may review only the denial of the motion to reconsider. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 265 F.3d 88, 89-90 (2d Cir.2001). To the extent that Lu challenges the BIA\u2019s denial of his motion to reconsider, we find that the BIA reasonably denied his motion where he failed to specify errors of fact or law in its prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.2(b)(1). See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen 1: holding that the bia does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider where the motion merely repeats arguments that the bia has previously rejected 2: holding the finality of a bia order is not affected by a subsequent motion to reconsider 3: holding that merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the bia does not constitute specifying errors of fact or law as required for a successful motion to reconsider alteration omitted 4: holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Criminal Appeals. The Air Force Rules of Practice and Procedure provide further guidance on the granted issue: When a case is remanded directly to the Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (hereinafter CAAP), it shall, when practical, be referred to the same numbered panel that last decided the case. A.P.C.C.A. R. 2.2(b). Nothing in the UCMJ, or rules of procedure provide Appellant the right to select a panel, or have his case considered by any particular panel. Article 66, UCMJ; A.F.C.C.A. R. 2.2(b); United States v. Vines, 15 M.J. 247, 249 (C.M.A. 1983). By law, the court may review eases en banc or in panels, and the chief judge of the court has broad authority to assign, remove and reassign judges to cases on the court\u2019s docket. See Vines, 15 M.J. at 249 (<HOLDING>). In Vines, the accused\u2019s case was sent to the Holdings: 0: holding that the panel is bound by decisions of prior panels 1: holding that statements made only to supervisor and chief by police officer were matters of public concern 2: holding that a prior panel decision is binding on subsequent panels 3: holding that there are no restrictionsstatutory or regulatoryon the authority of the chief judge as administrative chief of the court to assign cases to panels as he wishes in addition the power to change panel assignment once made is likewise unrestricted 4: holding the chief of police was an atwill employee because the parties agreed that the chief of police was an appointed officer and the citys charter stated that officers shall be appointed and may be removed by the mayor with consent of the council", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "deliberative process and then to discuss that information with her. The standard only requires physicians and counselors to make reasonable efforts. They need not be mind readers, as long as they reasonably attend to the circumstances of their individual patients____ The reasonably prudent patient standard thus takes into account each woman\u2019s unique circumstances. [Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Commonr-Law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. Ill. L.Rev. 489, 533.] The physician\u2019s obligation, therefore, does not \u201ccompel disclosure of every risk ... to any [pregnant] patient[,]\u201d but rather only \u201cmaterial risks to a reasonable patient.\u201d Largey, supra, 110 N.J. at 213, 540 A.2d 504. E.g., Jones v. United States, 933 F.Supp. 894, 902 (N.D.Cal.1996) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 127 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.1997), cert. Holdings: 0: holding that notice and authorization were ineffective to toll statute because release failed to include information on plaintiffs physicians for previous five years and portion requiring her to identify her treating physicians was also incomplete 1: holding that military physicians did not have duty to disclose to patient that penicillin they had prescribed for her could interfere with effectiveness of her birth control pills because existence of such drug interaction was unproven and danger of interference occurring appeared to be extremely remote 2: holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied 3: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 4: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "P. 44, 47, 48(a), that the State had failed to argue accomplice liability and arguing that D.B. had not been given an opportunity to present a defense to this alternate theory. Although a post-judgment motion on an issue is not necessary if D.B. had otherwise raised the issue, a timely postjudgment motion may in some instances be used to preserve an issue not previously raised if the court considers and rules on the issues raised in a postjudgment motion. Cf. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, \u00b6 23, 215 P.3d 152 (\" [OJnee trial counsel has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal. \" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (<HOLDING>). 111 D.B.'s failure to object either at trial, Holdings: 0: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 1: holding issues not raised to and ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review 2: holding issues not raised before the district court are not preserved for appeal 3: holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings are preserved for appeal 4: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 597-98 (7th Cir.2011) (noting that the \u201cdistrict court\u2019s denial of any discovery was all the more unreasonable because [the producing party] had refused to meet with [opposing counsel] to negotiate a reduction in the amount of discovery sought and ... refuse[d] \u2022 to present any evidence of the burdens that granting, [the] discovery request would impose.\u201d). Finally, no undue burden exists because the discovery requests being compelled through this Order are sufficiently tailored. The discovery requested here is narrower than the discovery requested in In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano as Mesa Power is requesting documents that directly relate to the foreign proceeding and that date from within a reasonable time period. Compare In re Consorcio Ecuatoriano, 685 F.3d at 999 (<HOLDING>), with Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Holdings: 0: holding that rejection of the appellants rule 56f request for additional discovery was proper where the information as to which he sought discovery was immaterial to the question of whether he is liable 1: holding that discovery was appropriately tailored as it limited the request to information within a six year time period relating to one specific contract and the deposition of a person most knowledgeable 2: holding that a blanket bond contract provision requiring a party to bring suit within one year after discovery of the loss was not unreasonable 3: holding that abusive acts within one month of receipt of deposition notices may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more than one year earlier 4: holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in light of the instruction in Sheppard that \u201cconflict-free counsel is not necessary when the motion\u2019s allegations are conclusively refuted by the record.\u201d Smith v. State, 21 So.3d 72, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). In Smith, we applied Sheppard under facts similar to those in the instant case, where the trial court struck a represented defendant\u2019s pro se motion as a nullity. There, we conducted a de novo review to determine whether the trial court\u2019s decision to strike the appellant\u2019s motion would be affirmable even if reached for the wrong reason. We found that even where allegations \u201care sufficient to invoke the requirement to hold a limited hearing under Sheppard\u201d a harmless error analysis would be appropriate. Id. at 76; see also Johnson v. State, 22 So.3d 840, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). Here, the transcript of the plea colloquy Holdings: 0: holding that where the coercion alleged to enter a plea is legally insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing or appoint conflictfree counsel 1: holding that postconviction allegations directly refuted by the trial record are without merit 2: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 3: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit 4: holding that a trial courts failure to hold a sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3170z motion are conclusively refuted by the record", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Based on this language, Ross argues the restitution statutes must be construed as reaching only those victims affected by wire transactions alleged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. We disagree with the government\u2019s claim that Ross cannot attack the restitution order because we affirmed it in the first appeal. Apprendi was decided after the first appeal, and announced a new (although not watershed) rule of constitutional law. See United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.2001), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 848, 151 L.Ed.2d 725 (2002). Since Ross relies upon Apprendi, and this appeal is a direct review of Ross\u2019s resentencing, he is not barred from attacking the restitution order. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because Ross raised his Apprendi challenge in Holdings: 0: holding that a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions should be applied to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final 1: holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past 2: holding that all newly declared rules must be applied retroactively to all criminal eases pending on direct review 3: recognizing that the pipeline theory allows a defendant to seek application of a new rule of law if the case is pending on direct review or not yet final and the defendant timely objected at trial 4: holding newly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases state or federal pending on direct review or not yet final with no exception", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "evidence supports a finding that Van Winkle did not suffer from disabling pain during the relevant period. To determine whether a claimant suffers from debilitating pain, the court applies the following two-part test announced in Duncan v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir.1986): First, we examine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. If there is, we then examine: (1) whether objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the objectively established medical condition is of such a severity that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged disabling pain. See also McCormick v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 861 F.2d 998, 1002-03 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Van Winkle did not suffer from disabling pain Holdings: 0: holding that the bankruptcy reform act effectively overruled wrenn 1: holding the plain legal prejudice test applies to voluntary dismissal under the code 2: holding that the bankruptcy reform act of 1978 publ no 95598 92 stat 2549 precluded dismissal of cases pending before enactment of the reform act in order to refile under the act 3: holding that the plaintiff could bring an asapplied challenge to the bipartisan campaign reform act despite the court upholding the statute on its face 4: holding that the duncan test applies to the reform act of 1984 and to the commissioners superseding regulations on pain", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "L.Ed.2d 403 (1987); United States v. Overmyer, 899 F.2d 457, 465 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939, 111 S.Ct. 344, 112 L.Ed.2d 308 (1990). In denying Lee\u2019s Motion to Dismiss, the district court relied on United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320 (6th Cir.1987), and United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301 (4th Cir.1998). In Sivift, this court held that a false statement\u2019s failure to lead the tribunal astray is irrelevant for 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1623 analysis. 809 F.2d at 324. The court stated that \u201ca false declaration satisfies the materiality requirement if a truthful statement might have assisted or influenced the grand jury in its investigation.\u201d Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 165 (6th Cir.1979)); see also United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1049 Holdings: 0: holding that allegations of influence by an unnamed person outside the jury required the holding of an evidentiary hearing to determine extrinsic influence 1: holding that equally consistent circumstances of influence cannot be considered as evidence of undue influence 2: holding that materiality does not require a showing that the creditors were prejudiced by the false statement 3: holding that a statement is material if it has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a decision making process showing of actual influence unnecessary to prove materiality 4: holding that the standard for determining whether false statement is material under 19 usc  1592a is whether statement has a natural tendency to influence or was capa ble of influencing the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "details of the previous molestation and thus failed to show that the prior molestation was similar to the current offense. We also conclude that Oatts did not offer specific details of the videotape and thus failed to show that the conduct in the videotape was similar to the current offense. Oatts failed to show that either the prior molestation or videotape were similar to the current offense. Oatts also failed to show that the evidence was relevant or that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the exclusion of the evidence violated Oatts\u2019s right to cross examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. See Grant, 75 F.Supp.2d at 217-218 (<HOLDING>); People v. Hill, 289 Ill.App.3d 859, 225 Ill. Holdings: 0: holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 1: holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment 2: holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape 3: holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law 4: holding that the trial court did not commit constitutional error by excluding evidence about the pri or rape of the tenyearold victim when she was five years old because the defendant did not proffer evidence that the prior rape was similar to the current incident", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice,\u201d); see also Sargent v. Baxter, 673 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (\u201cA grantor\u2019s recording of a deed ... is generally presumed equivalent to delivery\u201d). Thus, even if the Declaration clearly creates an easement for access to the dock on Parcel A, it was not a recorded document at the time that the Davids took the property. And due to the summary nature of the proceedings below, there is no evidence in the record that the Davids took possession of Parcel A with any knowledge of the Declaration or any other indication of a possible easement for access to the dock on Parcel A. See Kirma v. Norton, 102 So.2d 653, 657 (Fla.1958) (<HOLDING>); cf. Flanigan\u2019s Enters., Inc. v. Shoppes at Holdings: 0: recognizing that chapter 7 trustee as hypothetical bona fide purchaser takes title to the real property free from all equitable liens 1: holding that under mississippi law a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice unless there is actual notice or circumstances which would put a purchaser on inquiry notice 2: holding that generally a bona fide purchaser without notice of easements takes the property free of such easements 3: holding that one who acquires legal title with notice of a prior equitable interest in the property is not a bona fide purchaser 4: holding that a bona fide purchaser may be considered in privity with its predecessor", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that a municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 for a single decision by its properly constituted legislative body, regardless of whether that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so again in the future, because even a single decision by such a body unquestionably constitutes an act of official government policy. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Justices Stevens and O\u2019Connor, each writing separately, agreed with this portion of the plural 520 U.S. 781, 784-88, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (plurality); Dallas I.S.D., 153 F.3d at 216-17; and Flores, 92 F.3d at 263. See also Jett v. Dallas ISD, 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); and Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, Texas, 181 F.3d at 617 (<HOLDING>). 166 . See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786-87, 117 Holdings: 0: holding that the determination of whether there was joint access and control for actual authority is a fact question reviewed under the plainerror standard but a determination of whether the government reasonably relied on a third partys consent is a question of law to be reviewed de novo 1: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 2: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city 3: holding that determination as to whether an official has been delegated final policymaking authority is a question of law for the court not one of fact for the juiy 4: holding that the question of whether a municipal official is a policymaking official is a matter of state law to be decided by the court", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was an effort to get recklessness in, which would have changed the standard from the second circuit.\u201d). 4 . As ove the truth of the information contained in them, but to show the lack of scienter on the part of the defendants. See Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 82 F.3d 877, 885 n. 10 (9th Cir.1996). 7 . The argument over the stop ship reports exemplifies the problem with the generalized allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. If plaint also require direct involvement. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 1471, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972) (approving of primary liability of bank employees who made a market in securities despite bank representations that its duty was to individual clients); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 464 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Holdings: 0: holding defendants liable for their various roles in fraudulent marketing of bonds 1: holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity 2: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 3: holding that state officials may be personally liable for actions taken in their official capacity 4: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by the United States. Claims for vessel owner negligence under \u00a7 905 were delineated in Scindia, where the Court held that a vessel owner may be liable in tort for injury to an LHWCA employee if the vessel owner (1) fails to warn the repairman\u2019s employer of a hidden danger that is known, or should have been known in the exercise of reasonable care, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622; (2) actively involves itself in repair work and negligently causes injury, id.; or (3) fails to intervene upon discovering a dangerous condition and the employer\u2019s failure to correct it. Id. at 175-78, 101 S.Ct. at 1626-28. Contribution may be had against a person where the original plaintiff could have enforced liability against him. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 495 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Because, if the United States had been a Holdings: 0: holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought 1: holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution 2: recognizing a right to contribution 3: recognizing necessity of release of joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought 4: recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. AFFIRMED. DELL, C.J., and FARMER, J., concur. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. GLICKSTEIN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the majority on the merits of the action, but disagree on the award of attorneys\u2019 fees by the trial court. As to that, I would reverse and remand with direction to apportion appellant\u2019s responsibility for same in accordance with the interest he received. See \u00a7 64.081, Fla.Stat. (1993); Diaz v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 649 So.2d 232 (Fla.1994) (<HOLDING>); Daugharty v. Daugharty, 441 So.2d 1160 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that cotenants of property each possessing a onehalf interest in property are each hable for onehalf of the attorneys fees awarded 1: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 2: holding imposition of constructive trust on onehalf of brothers interest in decedent mothers real property for benefit of sister was particularly appropriate where there was evidence mother had orally stated that brother and sister should share all of her property equally even though deed for real property listed brother as sole owner 3: holding party should have segregated attorneys fees for fraud claim from attorneys fees for contract claim based largely on the difference between the essential elements of each claim 4: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of Pinewood on the date of the judgment between Ritchie and defendants. After the judgment, defendants were granted a preliminary injunction against Ritchie and all companies in which he maintains an ownership interest \u201cfrom selling, disposing of, secreting, transferring or encumbering any assets until the post-judgment collection proceedings are completed[.]\u201d Among those entities enjoined by the lower court was Pinewood, and, by extension, the assets Pinewood holds as trustee. Pinewood was not a named defendant in the injunction. According to the complaint, neither Ritchie nor Pinewood maintain an ownership interest in those trust assets. The preliminary injunction was later vacated by this Court. Harris v. Pinewood Dev. Corp., 176 N.C. App. 704, 707-08, 627 S.E.2d 639, 642 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs allege that while that appeal was Holdings: 0: holding that district courts order granting motion for default judgment was erroneous  because a default judgment cannot be entered until the amount of damages has been ascertained  1: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction 2: holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases 3: holding that nc gen stat  1355 does not allow a preliminary injunction to be entered until either a judgment has been returned wholly or partially unsatisfied or the terms of nc gen stat  1355 are met 4: recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "MDCR found \"probable cause\u201d that Bassett was (1) subjected to disparate scrutiny based on her race, and (2) retaliated against because she had attempted to pursue \u201clegitimate channels\u201d to stop the alleged discriminatory behavior in her employment. While not determinative on the question of discrimination, the finding of probable cause demonstrates that upon distillation of all the evidence presented, reasonable minds could disagree over the material fact of retaliation and intentional discrimination. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n. 39, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976) (prior administrative findings made in employment discrimination claim admissible at trial under Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(c)), cf. Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Bassett\u2019s charge, cross-filed with the Holdings: 0: recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony 1: holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility 2: recognizing admissibility of eeoc reasonable cause determination but declining to adopt per se rule of admissibility 3: holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given 4: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "request for a new penalty hearing and Ellio re to state such a ground [for relief] in the [PCRA] petition shall preclude the defendant from raising that ground in any proceeding for post-conviction collateral relief\u2019). Even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that Elliott preserved his Brooks claim by referencing trial counsel\u2019s failure to meet with him prior to trial in the context of the separate issue challenging counsel\u2019s failure to investigate evidence of Elliot\u2019s prior bad acts, he would not be entitled to relief on the merits of the claim. It is clear that a majority of this Court in Brooks expressly required that counsel representing a defendant in a capital murder trial conduct a substantive, face-to-face consultation with the defendant prior to tri 90, 896 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Bundy, 421 A.2d at 1051 Holdings: 0: holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not 1: holding that to establish ineffectiveness on the basis of alleged inadequate pretrial consultation the defendant must establish that counsel inexcusably failed to raise issues that had they been proffered would have entitled him to relief 2: holding that where counsel has failed to file or perfect an appeal despite the defendants request it is clear that the defendant need not demonstrate that but for the ineffectiveness of counsel such an appeal would have succeeded or even would have merit 3: holding that it would be improper for original trial counsel to raise the issue of his own alleged ineffectiveness in a posttrial habeas corpus case 4: holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "statistically significant disparities in the compensation of black employees relative to white employees, are evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that intentional discrimination occurred. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs generalized statistics are insufficient to support Plaintiffs claims of intentional discrimination. As the Supreme Court has noted, while statistical evidence may allow the District Court to \u201cdetermine ... that the (racial) composition of defendant\u2019s labor force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices .... such general determinations, while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable 9 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff has failed to provide any Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs had stated a claim for intentional discrimination under the ada and  504 1: recognizing that sjtatistical evidence is used to demonstrate how a particular employment practice causes a protected minority group to be under represented in a specific area of employment for example hiring or promotion and stating that the statistical analysis must show a disparity that is sufficiently substantial 2: holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions 3: holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria 4: holding that disparities in compensation were due to a number of permissible factors including seniority experience and performance", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "us would certainly fail to protect a defendant\u2019s best interests and might leave the conviction on otherwise time-barred offenses vulnerable to collateral attack Id. at 309. We can glean at least four legal principles from court decisions involving the two distinct scenarios discussed above: First, the statute of limitations is waivable by a defendant, either expressly or through his own actions. Tucker, 459 So.2d at 306; Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1982) (observing \u201ca defendant may by his actions waive this defense.\u201d) Second, because it is waivable, the statute of limitations necessarily cannot be considered \u201cjurisdictional,\u201d at least not in the sense of depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rodriguez v. State, 441 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (<HOLDING>); Farrar v. State, 42 So.3d 265, 265 (Fla. 5th Holdings: 0: holding statute of limitations is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time but noting other ohio appellate courts have held the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and may be waived if not asserted at the trial level 1: holding statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a voluntary plea of guilty 2: holding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment it is one which can be waived 3: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional 4: holding that the statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional and defendant expressly waived it observing in dicta that a statute of limitations defense should be raised no later than the trial", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "had no reasonable strategy for such omission, Elliott has failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice by establishing what evidence a further investigation would have revealed that would have changed the outcome of the trial. Similar to our holding in Issue I, absent a proffer of information that trial counsel could have uncovered and used to impeach the bad act witnesses\u2019 testimony, Elliott\u2019s claim that he was prejudiced by a deficiency in his investigation or preparation fails. See Harvey, 812 A.2d at 1197 (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for not undertaking further investigation where appellant failed to show that doing so would have provided material evidence or would have been helpful to his defense); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292, 304 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Contrary to Elliott\u2019s contentions, the Holdings: 0: holding conjecture that additional investigation might have yielded valuable information is insufficient to establish prejudice for ineffective assistance claim 1: holding that a defendant must show actual prejudice to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 2: holding that defendants mere allegations of ineffective assistance were insufficient to prevail on such a claim 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or loss of evidence qualifies as spoliation. In Milwaukee Constructors II, 177 Wis. 2d at 532, we adopted the process for evaluating the details, significance and sanctions concerning allegations of destruction of evidence set forth in Struthers Patent Corp. v. Nestle Co., 558 F. Supp. 747, 756 (D.N.J. 1981). Struthers instructs that in reviewing the conduct of the offending party, the trial court should consider not only whether the party responsible for the destruction of evidence knew, or should have known, at the time it destroyed the evidence that litigation was a distinct possibility, but also whether the offending party destroyed documents which it knew, or should have known, would constitute evidence relevant to the pending or potential litigation. See id. at 756, 765 (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 16. This two-part analysis makes perfect Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims 1: holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable 2: holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful 3: holding that a request is sufficiently clear if the administrator knew or should have known that plan information was requested 4: holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Brown v. Crowe, 963 F.2d 895 (6th Cir.1992). That cannot be said to be the case here, especially in view of the fact that the \u201cprior restraint\u201d cases cited in the plaintiffs\u2019 appellate briefs simply are not applicable to the facts of this case. Hence, even if the issue had been squarely presented, we could not find in the plaintiffs\u2019 favor based on the authority submitted on appeal. There remains the equal protection question, which is raised here under the Fifth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause. The district court held that the claim was non-cognizable because the Equal Protection Clause protects against inappropriate classifications of people, rather than things. This position has been adopted by several courts. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Bailey, 234 Conn. 455, 662 A.2d 1226 (1995)(<HOLDING>); California Rifle & Pistol Ass\u2019n v. City of Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding that the state law violated equal protection principles 3: holding that a state weapons ban did not violate equal protection principles because the plaintiffs challenge related to classifications among weapons not persons 4: holding that ch 980 does not violate principles of equal protection", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "status under Law 100. Law 100 prohibits discrimination by an \u201cemployer\u201d based on the protected characteristic of, among other factors, age. P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 29 \u00a7 146. The term \u201cemployer\u201d is defined as \u201cany natural or artificial person employing laborers, workers or employees, and the chief, official, manager, officer, managing partner, administrator, superintendent, foreman, overseer, agent or representative of such natural or artificial person.\u201d P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 29 \u00a7 151(2). As discussed above there is no evidence in the record to support Plaintiffs\u2019 contention that Buck had any control over PRMMPs employment practices nor that it had any employment nexus with the Plaintiffs. Therefore, Buck is not liable under law 100. See Santini-Rivera v. Serv Air, Inc., 94 JTS 121, p. 182 (<HOLDING>). C. Buck\u2019s status under ERISA. Plaintiffs Holdings: 0: holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law 1: holding that the legislation in question is exclusively concerned with labor matters its subject is strictly the employeremployee relationship translation ours 2: holding that the critical element in determining whether the provisions of the norrislaguardia act apply is whether the employeremployee relationship is the matrix of the controversy 3: holding that the jurisdictional reach under section 955a is strictly a question of law 4: recognizing employeremployee relationship between county school board and teacher", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(7th Cir. 2012) (\u201cAlthough it is possible that the drugs found on January 18 were already in his possession as early as January 11, it is at least equally likely that they were not. For all we know, Sims sold the last of his January 11 drug supply to the officer that day and then acquired additional cocaine before his arrest on January 18.\u201d). But Pham fails to contend, much less show, that he possessed the drugs confiscated on February 28 as early as February 12. See, e.g., Def. Br. 11 (citing Sims without tying it to this case); Reply 2 (\u201c[U]nder these particular facts, two drug convictions, one consisting of a sale and the other of finding of the stash from that sale, warrant a finding of one criminal episode.\u201d); see Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Pham does, however, make the more complex Holdings: 0: holding a party waives an argument made for the first time on reply 1: holding argument is waived when raised for first time in reply brief 2: holding that arguments cannot be made for the first time in reply papers 3: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived 4: holding that argument raised for the first time in reply brief was deemed abandoned", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that Legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). See also, Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (upholding withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) against a substantive due process challenge); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A Gray, Holdings: 0: holding that statements within a firmly rooted hearsay exception do not violate the confrontation clause 1: holding that the withdrawal liability provisions of the mppaa do not violate the taking clause 2: holding the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under 18 pacsa  7508 do not violate the equal protection clause 3: holding that the mandatory life sentence provisions of 21 usc  841b1 do not violate the eighth amendment 4: holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "On its face, ORS \u00a7 652.610(3) prohibits an employer from withholding \u201cany portion of an employee\u2019s wages unless ... [t]he employer is required to do so by law[.]\u201d ORS \u00a7 652.610(3)(a) (emphasis added). Because neither the Internal Revenue Code nor its implementing regulations \u201crequire\u201d an employer to withhold tax on estimated tips, an employer, like Starbucks, who does so pursuant to the permissive authority granted by federal law is in violation of the Oregon statute. This is precisely the type of conflict that is addressed by federal preemption. When a state law specifically prohibits an activity that is authorized by federal law, the state law must give way. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32-34, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1108-09, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, Holdings: 0: holding a federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in towns with less than 5000 residents preempted a state statute prohibiting banks from selling most types of insurance 1: holding that a federal statute 12 usc  92 which expressly permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns is a statute which specifically relates to the business of insurance and preempts a state statute which prohibits banks from selling insurance 2: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 3: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 4: holding that comptroller of currencys holding that annuities both fixed and variable are not insurance within the meaning of 12 usc  92 2000 a provision allowing banks to sell insurance products in towns with less than 5000 inhabitants was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and stating that fixed annuities more closely resemble insurance than do variable annuities ", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the need for \u201crehabilitation.\u201d Appellant\u2019s Br. at 7. Because \u201c \u2018reasonableness\u2019 is inherently a concept of flexible meaning,\u201d United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115, district courts necessarily enjoy broad discretion in imposing sentences within a statutory range. \u201cAlthough the brevity or length of a sentence can exceed the bounds of \u2018reasonableness,\u2019 we anticipate encountering such circumstances infrequently.\u201d United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d at 100. This is not such a rare case. Bethea\u2019s sentence represented the bottom of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range determined by reference to an offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. Contrary to Bethea\u2019s assertions, the district judge explicitly considered the issue of rehabilitation. See Sentencing Tr. at 13 (<HOLDING>). Noting Bethea\u2019s eleven prior convictions, the Holdings: 0: holding that sentence is reasonable when the district court properly addresses sentencing factors of  3553a 1: recognizing that  3553a requires the sentencing court to consider educational and other correctional treatments 2: holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error  if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range  as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a 3: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors 4: holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the  3553a factors or to discuss each of the  3553a factors", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "conclusory and far from artful,\u201d Jennings v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.1982), we construe Henley\u2019s complaint as alleging a violation of her right to be free from the use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment inasmuch as she is asserting that certain individual defendant 5 (8th Cir.2001) (\u201cIntentional sexual harassment by persons acting under color of state law violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is actionable under \u00a7 1983.\u201d). To the extent that Henley\u2019s complaint asserts the violation of rights secured by the Constitution and committed by persons acting under color of state law, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing her section 1983 action for failure to comply with Title VIPs procedural requirements. See, e.g., Notari, 971 F.2d at 588 (<HOLDING>); cf. Jennings, 672 F.2d at 716 (concluding Holdings: 0: holding section 1983 provides remedy only if plaintiff proves elements of malicious prosecution under state law and establishes that misuse of the legal proceedings was so egregious that he suffered deprivation of rights secured by fourteenth amendment 1: holding that plaintiffs may bring a section 1983 claim for damages to vindicate their rights under idea 2: holding plaintiffs allegations defendant acted under col or of state law to violate rights secured by the fourteenth amendment are sufficient to defeat summary judgment of plaintiffs section 1983 claim 3: holding a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the united states to state a claim under  1983 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So.2d 812 (Miss.1972); Brennan v. Biber, 93 N.J.Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (Law Div.1966), aff\u2019d, 99 N.J.Super. 247, 239 A.2d 261 (App.Div.1968); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946); Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931); Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90 A. 353 (1914); McGarr v. National Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320 (1902). 7 . See, e.g., Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So.2d 96, 100 (1965) ((overruling earlier suggestion in Durden v. Barnett, 7 Ala. 169, 170 (1844), that the parental claim ought to be recognized)); Baxter v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 19 Cal.3d 461, 138 Cal.Rptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871, 874 (1977); Shattuck v. Gulliver, 40 Conn.Sup. 95, 481 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Curtis v. County of Cook, 109 Ill.App.3d 400, Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fees and costs may not be awarded as child support when they are incurred in a suit to modify the parentchild relationship that does not involve the enforcement of a child support obligation 1: holding that the clear and convincing standard must apply in terminating the parentchild relationship after the children have been adjudicated dependent or neglected 2: holding that de facto parentchild relationship does not support a finding of qualifyingrelative status 3: holding that consortium is not a part of the parentchild relationship 4: holding that destruction of the parentchild relationship includes grief and mental anguish", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "motion for summary judgment on this basis, they do not discuss those proceedings in their brief. 30 . See Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex.1993) (stating the general rule that a reviewing court cannot affirm summary judgment on grounds not presented in the motion); see also Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 15 Couch On Insurance 3d \u00a7 216:34 (2007) (indicating that settlement with an insurer does not release claims against the insurance agency or agent if claims against them are specifically reserved or if the claim against the insurer, which sounds in contract, is separate from the claim against the agency). 31 . The two-year statute of limitations applicable to the Insureds' negligence cla t *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 9, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>). 37 . However, evidence of trust and reliance Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth 1: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 2: holding that an insurance agent owed no duty to explain the terms of the insurance policy to the insured or to advise him on other alternative policy coverages citing critchfield v smith 151 sw3d 225 230 texapptyler 2004 pet denied moore v whitneyvaky ins agency 966 sw2d 690 692 texappsan antonio 1998 no pet and pickens v tex farm bureau ins cos 836 sw2d 803 805 texappamarillo 1992 no writ 3: holding insurance agent has no duty to advise insured of amount of insurance necessary to cover all potential losses 4: holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argument that he ever sought promotion to any job other than the job to which he was promoted. It is certainly true that a plaintiff\u2019s promotion does not mean he may not be a representative of a class with respect to promotions, but it is equally certain that it is a factor which may be evaluated in considering whether such a person satisfies the requirements of Rule 23. Compare Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 516 (N.D.Ill.1977) (\u201csince plaintiff was hired, promoted, and given an opportunity to transfer, as the undisputed facts show, she cannot properly represent a class consisting of people who were allegedly denied those opportunities because of sex.\u201d); Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 275, 62 L.Ed.2d 189 (1979) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the fact that Mr. Spears Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in not decertifying the class on the basis of facts adduced at trial including the fact that scott seeks to lead a challenge against the same university hiring policies which resulted in his employment 1: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 2: holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact 3: holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment 4: holding that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying the class without permitting class counsel reasonable time to determine whether a new class representative could be substituted", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "request with a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred, or (b) when the sought-after assistance would only support a meritless claim, or (c) when the sought after assistance would only supplement prior evidence. Id. (internal citation omitted; emphasis added). Gutierrez has not shown the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant additional investigative assistance. \u201c[Gutierrez\u2019] right under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 848(q)(9) to the assistance of experts where reasonably necessary to press his habeas claims does not entitle him to a federal evidentiary hearing when he has failed to ... develop his evidence in state court\u201d. Turner v. Johnson, 106 F.3d 1178, 1184 n. 16 (5th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted); see also Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056, 125 S.Ct. 866, Holdings: 0: holding petitioner cannot show a substantial need for investigative assistance when the claims he seeks to pursue are procedurally barred 1: recognizing that ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims not premised on procedurally barred claims can be raised for the first time on appeal by new appellate counsel and are not limited to habeas review 2: holding that claims raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred from consideration in a rule 3850 motion 3: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself 4: holding that successive motions for postconviction relief are procedurally barred", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Agreement. For example, assume that Aviall and Cooper entered into a contract that provided only that Aviall would assume liability for Cooper\u2019s pre-closing debt to Jones Company. If Jones Company made demand on Cooper, who in turn made demand on Aviall, who then refused to pay the debt, Cooper could presumably bring a breach of contract claim against Aviall for failing to honor its contractual obligation to assume liability for the Jones Company debt. But this right would be based on a contract that reflected that this was the parties\u2019 objective intent. In the present case, however, the Agreement has other relevant provisions, and the contract must be interpreted as a whole. See, e.g., Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. FDIC, 16 F.Supp.2d 698, 707 (N.D.Tex.1998) (Fitzwater, J.) (Texas law) (<HOLDING>). Section 1.03 and other provisions that impose Holdings: 0: holding that court must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be rendered meaningless 1: holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence 2: holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions 3: recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions 4: holding that a contract should be read to give reasonable meaning to all provisions of that contract", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The district court and Wilson appear to have assumed that the failure to follow the requirements of the ICE Directive was sufficient to warrant suppression. Such an assumption is untenable in light of Moore and Whren. The ICE Directive that Rourke violated provided that a designated customs officer\u2019s \u201c[u]se of [customs] authorities without first having been coordinated and approved by the appropriate SAC is strictly prohibited.\u201d Wilson has not suggested, however, that, as a general matter, the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to obtain supervisory authorization prior to making a vehicle stop justified by probable cause, nor are we aware of any authority that could support such a suggestion. Cf. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Instead, Wilson\u2019s Fourth Amendment argument Holdings: 0: holding that failure of irs agent to follow irs electronic surveillance regulations before recording conversations between taxpayer and agent did not require suppression of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer accused of bribing irs agent since irs was not required by constitution to adopt its regulations governing electronic surveillance violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions 1: holding that irs agents did not violate the fourth amendment by conducting surveillance in violation of regulations requiring prior authorization because neither the constitution nor any act of congress requires that official approval be secured before conversations are overheard or recorded by government agents with the consent of one of the eonversants 2: holding that the government can usually satisfy its burden of demonstrating the propriety of an irs summons through an affidavit of one of its agents 3: holding that agents violation of irs regulations did not mandate exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of violation 4: holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "will be deemed acquiescence in the setting of that date.\u201d Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.1999), reh\u2019g denied. Where a defendant \u201cseeks or acquiesces in any delay which results in a later trial date, the time limitations of the rule are also extended by the length of those delays.\u201d Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Ind.1999), reh\u2019g denied. We first address Hill\u2019s argument regarding the seven-day delay between March 12, 2001 and March 19, 2001. The trial court offered the State its choice between the two dates, and the State chose March 19, 2001 as the trial date. However, Hill failed to object to the later trial setting. Thus, Hill acquiesced to the later trial date and waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. See, e.g., Vermillion, 719 N.E.2d at 1202-1205 (<HOLDING>). We now address Hill\u2019s argument regarding the Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial 1: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 2: holding that the defendant acquiesced to the rescheduling of the trial and thus waived the right to object to the sevenday delay 3: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial 4: holding plaintiffs waived their right to appellate review of the admission of an experts testimony by failing to object to it at trial", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and tenuous,\u201d SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir.1997), but if that information comes from an insider and concerns actual and serious merger discussions, \u201ca lesser level of specificity is required [to establish materiality].\u201d Id. As the Supreme Court has recognized, \u201c \u2018[i]nside information as regards mergers ... can become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser- transactions-and this even though the mortality rate of mergers at such formative stages is doubtless high.\u2019 \u201d Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988), quoting SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47-48 (2d Cir.1976); see also Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156 (2d Cir.1992) (same); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). In fact, even disclosures about tender offer Holdings: 0: holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause 1: holding that such information is not material under securities law 2: holding that even though negotiations had not jelled to the point where a merger was probable information disclosed regarding those negotiations was material in light of the potential profits 3: holding that although the defendant was able to impeach the prosecution in certain respects the suppressed information was material under brady because there was a significant difference between the suppressed material and the information to which the defense had access 4: recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the United States Code only serve as \"prima fa-cie\u201d evidence of the law unless they are enacted as \"positive law,\u201d in which case they too serve as legal evidence of the laws. Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Serv., 214 F.3d 179, 182 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2000); see 1 U.S.C. \u00a7 204(a) (\"[WJhenever titles of such Code [of Laws of the United States] shall have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein contained, in all the courts of the United States.\u201d). Title 7 has not been enacted into positive law. See 1 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 204, United States Code Titles as Positive Law. In this case, therefore, the court is not bound by the codifier\u2019s placement of FETRA in Title 7. Cf. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 98 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 1082, 12 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964) (<HOLDING>). 16 . It is also unsupported by the Holdings: 0: holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that upon approval by congress a compact between states becomes federal law that binds the states 2: holding that where congress has directed the agency to issue a rule without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule  congress has amended the law and does not offend the constitution 3: holding that when congress has not enacted a codification as positive law a change of arrangement by the codifier without the approval of congress which places portions of what was originally a single section in two separate sections should be given no weight 4: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Scott (1931) 113 Cal.App. Supp. 778, 783 [296 P. 601].) A dissolute person is one who is \u201c \u2018indifferent to moral restraint\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018given over to dissipation. . . .\u2019 \u201d (People v. Jaurequi, supra, 142 Cal.App.2d 555, 560.) The terms \u201clewd\u201d and \u201cdissolute\u201d ordinarily include conduct found \u201cdisgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable [or] loathsome\u201d under contemporary community standards. (Silva v. Municipal Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 733, 741 [115 Cal.Rptr. 479].) This impressive list of adjectives and phrases confers no clarity upon the terms \u201clewd\u201d and \u201cdissolute\u201d in section 647, subdivision (a). Indeed, \u201cthe veiy phrases and synonyms through which meaning is purportedly ascribed serve to obscure rather than to clarify those terms.\u201d (State v. Kueny (Iowa 1974) 215 N.W.2d 215, 217 (<HOLDING>).) To instruct the jury that a \u201clewd or Holdings: 0: holding the term lewdness undefined in the iowa abatement statute to be vague 1: holding the phrase open and gross lewdness unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 3: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague 4: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "unconstitutional as violative of his right to equal protection. After careful consideration, for substantially the same reasons stated in the district court's March 13, 2003 order, we `conclude that the district court did' not err in holding that Mr. Latu suffered no prejudice from the defects in the notice. The defects were cor rected and Mr. Latu was given all the time he needed to meet the charges. We reject Mr. Latu\u2019s argument that, because the initial notice was defective, the attorney general\u2019s subsequent acts in effecting his removal were ultra vires. An official act does not become ultra vires if the officer was statutorily empowered to act but may have acted erroneously. See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1229-30 (10th Cir.2002); cf. Noriega-Lopez, 335 F.3d at 883 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Latu received all the process he was due. Holdings: 0: holding that the bia rule is reasonable 1: holding that the ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation orders because deportation however severe its consequences has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure 2: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte 3: holding that because congress did not specifically state that deportation terminates supervised release it remains intact even after an aliens deportation 4: holding that bia acted ultra vires because statute did not give it authority to issue deportation orders", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Vasquez-Lopez and Barragan-Sanchez, we relied on the aliens\u2019 previous voluntary departure agreements in rejecting their arguments for relief. Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173-74 (rejecting alien\u2019s argument that the voluntary departure period did not begin until after our review, in light of the \u201cspecific policy\u201d of voluntary departure to encourage prompt departure); Vasquez-Lopez, 343 F.3d at 974 (\u201cWhile the statute provides some incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing \u2018presence\u2019 so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.\u201d); Barragan-Sanchez, 471 F.2d at 760-61 (<HOLDING>); cf. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 324,112 S.Ct. 719 Holdings: 0: holding confessions voluntary and noting that these men were not young soft ignorant or timid they were not inexperienced in the ways of crime or its detection nor were they dumb as to their rights 1: holding that aliens continuous presence in the country was interrupted by voluntary departure under threat of deportation proceedings 2: holding that because aliens two previous voluntary departures were the result of implied agreements and were not therefore strictly voluntary they constituted significant departures that precluded a finding of seven years continuous presence in the united states under a rule that excused absences that were brief casual and innocent 3: holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was appealable 4: holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "'we need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor need we accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts'\" See Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 2010 UT 29, \u00a710, 232 P.3d 999 (quoting Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1979)). 4 . The alleged malicious intent on the part of NCR falls more appropriately within a claim of malicious prosecution, under which an actor may be liable for initiating or procuring \"criminal proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged ... if (a) [the accuser] initiates or procures the proceedings without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice, and (b) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused.\" Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 653 P.3d 1042 (<HOLDING>). 7 . Because statutory amendments made Holdings: 0: holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 1: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute 2: holding that emotional pain and a need for counseling combined with physical pain medical bills loss of employment and a need for sexual therapy supported a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 3: recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 4: recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Good cause exists \u201conly when some outside factor^] such as reliance on faulty advice, rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented service.\u201d Prisco v. Frank, 929 F.2d 603, 604 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (discussing \u201cgood cause\u201d under the former Rule 4(j)), superseded in part by rule as stated in Horenkamp, 402 F.3d at 1132 n. 2. Even in the absence of good cause, a district court has the discretion to extend the time for service of process. Horen-kamp, 402 F.3d at 1132; see Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 663, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 1643, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court concluded that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that in the 1993 amendments to the rules courts have been accorded the discretion to enlarge the 120day period even in the absence of showing good cause 1: holding that the plain language of the rule broadens a courts discretion to extend time for service even if good cause has not been shown 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause 4: holding that after the omnibus date the trial courts discretion controlled and such discretion is exercisable upon a showing of good cause by a defendant who has missed the deadline", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); and Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir.1995). The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, effective April 26, 1996, moved the relevant statutory provision addressing dismissal for frivolousness from former subsection (d) of Section 1915 to new subsection (e)(2)(B) and expanded the scope of that statute to expressly authorize dismissals of lawsuits as frivolous regardless of whether a filing fee or any portion thereof had been paid. See Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 136-37 (5th Cir.1996); and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(e)(2)(B)\u00ae. 89 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833; and Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d at 1434. 90 . See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831; Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir.1997), (<HOLDING>); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 Holdings: 0: holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims 1: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that a state prisoner may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness 4: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress holding that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 and also recognizing a de minimus standard for 8th amendment excessive force claims", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "instant case is analogous to Niedland, in that Plaintiffs post-trial submissions c one at issue in Marba, the size of the grant and the fact that it was issued for purely private purposes leads me to find that the Dongan grant violated the public trust doctrine. Plaintiff therefore cannot claim title to the foreshore adjacent to his property from this source. Furthermore, while the Dongan Grant to Christopher Billopp did indeed encompass lands to the low water mark, this land was later confiscated by the State after Captain Billopp\u2019s attainder for treason during the Revolutionary War. The 1779 Act of Attainder has been found to be valid by the Second Circuit numerous times, as recently as 1992. See Robins Island Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 959 F.2d 409, 415 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). While Plaintiff does not dispute the validity Holdings: 0: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 1: recognizing forum selection clause providing that no such claim shall be commenced prosecuted or continued in any forum other than the courts of the state of new york located in the city and county of new york or in the united states district court for the southern district of new york as clear and unambiguous expression of parties selection of exclusive forum in affirming district courts dismissal of action commenced in united states district court for the district of new jersey 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution 4: holding that in adjudicating property rights affected by new yorks act of attainder of 1779 neither the supreme court nor any court of new york state has ever declared the act to be invalid", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 345 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.2003). As Judge Spatt has already recognized in this case, the holding in the district court\u2019s decision in Pechinski required more than the mere fact that the fee at issue was associated with the termination of the debt obligation to the lender defendant; rather, the district court also specifically relied upon the fact that the fee at issue in that case was related to a service requested by the borrower \u2014 processing fees regarding a refinancing with another lender \u2014 and would not have otherwise been required by the borrower in the lifespan of the loan. See McAnaney, 357 F.Supp.2d at 586 (\u201cPechinski held that the fees were not finance charges because they were not required by the creditor\u201d); see also Pechinski, 238 F.Supp.2d at 643 (<HOLDING>). The critical inquiry in determining whether a Holdings: 0: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 1: holding that the defense of insufficient process was waived because it was not raised by the defendant in its answer but later in its response to the plaintiffs request for default judgment 2: holding that the defendants violated tila as a matter of law by failing to disclose as part of the finance charge the charge imposed for payment of federal express delivery 3: holding that required courier fees must be included in the finance charge 4: holding that the charged assignment fee was not includable in the finance charge where it was imposed because of plaintiffs specific request that defendant assign the mortgage to another lending institution", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "N.E.2d 870, 873; Erie Cty. United Bank v. Berk (1943), 73 Ohio App. 314, 317, 28 O.O. 500, 501, 56 N.E.2d 285, 287. Where there are facts that could lead reasonable minds to conclude differently regarding whether the intervening cause broke the causal link, the question should be submitted to the jury, and summary judgment is not appropriate. Cascone, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. In a case based upon an intentional tort such as fraud or tortious interference, however, where the intervening act complained of is the act of the plaintiff, an analysis of intervening cause is tantamount to a comparative negligence claim, which is no defense to an intentional tort. See Hardiman v. Zep Mfg. Co. (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 222, 14 OBR 250, 470 N.E.2d 941, paragraph two of the syllabus (<HOLDING>). The evidence in the instant case showed that Holdings: 0: holding invalid an instruction regarding intervening cause of act of plaintiff as a defense to strict liability in a case when the former contributory negligence may have been a defense 1: recognizing contributory negligence as a defense to professional malpractice claims 2: recognizing defense in securities case 3: holding that contributory negligence in the sense of mere carelessness or inadvertence is not a defense in strict liability cases 4: holding that defense of contributory negligence would implicate sensitive military judgment regarding power generation", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the proposition that the addition of the word \u201cblack\u201d to a race-neutral insult does not constitute race-based harassment that would support a hostile work environment claim. No. AMD 04-3422, 2006 WL 173690, at *4 (D.Md. Jan. 25, 2006). In that case, the Court found racial harassment that included the use of phrases such as \u201cblack dummy\u201d and \u201cblack bitch\u201d did not create a hostile work environment. While the Rose court held that those insults were not racial in nature, this Court has identified a number of other cases within the Fourth Circuit wherein the use of the word \u201cblack\u201d as a modifier for otherwise racially-neutral insults was, in fact, considered race-based harassment. See, e.g., Finch v. Smithfield Packing Co., No. 5:99CV10-BR, 2000 WL 33682696, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 10, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Jenkins v. City of Charlotte, No. Civ. A. Holdings: 0: holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of an automobile where the officer received a dispatch that a black male in a black bmw with a temporary license tag was selling controlled substances and the officer observed a person in an automobile fitting that description less than one minute later 1: holding that the white defendants association with a black defendant was not sufficient to give them standing to join in the black defendants batson challenge 2: holding that articulable facts sufficient to support a stop included a telephone call that two black males were selling drugs at a particular location discovery of the juvenile at that location with another black male and the juveniles nervous body reflexes 3: holding that unequivocal examples of racial animus included instances when plaintiff was instructed to keep his black ass off the phone and was called a black son of a bitch and a black motherfucker 4: holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that there was a racially hostile work environment when plaintiff was subjected to several statements involving racial epithets and a nude black doll was hung from a noose in his locker", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that has been or may be reasonably incurred, (b) the loss of use of the land, and (c) discomfort and annoyance to him . as an occupant.\" (Emphases added). Bonewitz and Dellinger presented evidence regarding the approximate value of their home absent the nuisance, as well as evidence that their home is not currently marketable. Thus, the evidence shows that the home's value has been greatly diminished by its close proximity to Parker's business. A proper measure of damages shall be calculated as the difference between the market value of the Bonewitz home if the Parker By-Products myeceli-um-drying operation ceased and its current market value with an active nuisance next door. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Public Serv. Co. v. W.J. & M.S. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620, 627 (1936) (<HOLDING>). Further, Bonewitz and Dellinger presented Holdings: 0: holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages 1: holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market 2: holding measure of damages for unabated nuisance affecting greenhouse was the depreciation of the market value by reason of the continuance of a permanent nuisance 3: holding that if respondents suit is one for permanent damages to the land the measure of damages is the decreased value of the land 4: holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "403, 406 (9th Cir.1993)). WCSPA appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene in a case that the district court has since decided, through the Order on Remedy and the subsequent final judgment, from which neither party has appealed. Because the underlying litigation is over, we cannot grant WCSPA any \u201ceffective relief\u2019 by allowing it to intervene now. The appeal is therefore moot. See United States v. Ford, 650 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir.1981) (dismissing as moot an appeal of a denial of a motion to intervene where the underlying litigation was voluntarily dismissed) (\u201cSince there is no longer any action in which appellants can intervene, judicial consideration of the [intervention] question would be fruitless.\u201d); cf. Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1109 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). The \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading Holdings: 0: holding that the appellate court should have construed the notice of appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate the judgment as an attempt to appeal from the underlying judgment 1: holding that appellate court had jurisdiction over claimants appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration separable from underlying judgment despite claimants failure to appeal from the underlying judgment because the reconsideration motion raised changes in the relevant medical criteria 2: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself 3: holding that an appeal from a denial of a rule 59e motion should have been construed as seeking review of the underlying judgment 4: holding that entry of judgment in the underlying litigation does not moot an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene if one of the parties keeps the underlying litigation live by pursuing an appeal", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the ODC. Second, the parties stipulated that Mr. Duffy\u2019s conduct was knowing and intentional\u2014the most culpable mental states. See In re Hernandez, 46 So.3d 1244 (La. 2010) (stating attorney knowingly and intentionally violated duties owed to public, legal system, and legal profession by failing to appear in court on several occasions and failing to cooperate with ODC).- Third, we find there is ample basis to support the ODC\u2019s finding that Mr. Duffy\u2019s conduct caused harm. Mr. Duffy adversely affected his clients by failing to attend hearings on their behalf and failing to -respond - to his client relating to an appeal. Likewise, Mr. Duffy\u2019s conduct toward the ODC and his criminal conduct are harmful to the public and to the legal profession. See In re Baer, 21 So.3d 941, 943 (La. 2009) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the fourth Jordan factor, we have Holdings: 0: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 1: holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute 2: recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court 3: recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar 4: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "[the witness] had motive to fabricate her allegations against defendant\u201d); State v. Muldrew, 229 Or App 219, 230, 210 P3d 936 (2009) (concluding that the trial court\u2019s exclusion of defendant\u2019s proffered impeachment evidence\u2014the statement in the officer\u2019s report\u2014was not harmless because it was the \u201ccrucial piece of evidence that the jury needed in order to evaluate [the officer\u2019s] credibility\u201d). Thus, I would conclude that the jury had an adequate opportunity to assess the officers\u2019 credibility absent the consideration of evidence of the use-of-force policies. In determining if exclusion of bias evidence is harmless, we are also required to consider whether the particular evidence regarding the officers\u2019 credibility was important to the outcome of the trial. See Titus, 328 Or at 482 (<HOLDING>). The majority does not address this necessary Holdings: 0: holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added 1: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 2: holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility 3: holding that the quashing of a defendants subpoena for a prosecution witnesss complete immigration file did not violate the defendants confrontation rights where the defendants crossexamination enabled the jury sufficiently to assess the witnesss credibility 4: holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to market instability. If the large-volume purchasers chose not to opt out, their interests will presumably not be maligned with Plaintiffs. 15 . Specifically, Defendants contend that transaction prices during the relevant time period were affected by a United States Antidumping investigation and by Saskatchewan prorationing legislation. (Defs.' Mem. in Opp. to Class Cert. at 22.) Plaintiffs claim, however, that Defendant potash producers filed a petition with the United States International Trade Commission alleging Canadian potash was being \"dumped\u201d into the United States in furtherance of their conspiracy to fix potash prices. (TAC \u00b6\u00b6 48-49.) 16 . This is an element essential to an antitrust price-fixing claim and one common to the class. The fact that some Plai (D.Mass.1981) (<HOLDING>); Hedges Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Holdings: 0: holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 1: holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation 2: holding that injury to broker through loss of commission was not antitrust injury 3: holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage 4: holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that a nonspeculative reduction in the attorney\u2019s income would result from the implementation of a new Social Security regulation. In each of these cases it would be anomalous for the attorney to be able to bring suit to challenge the statute or regulation, instead of a person protected by the constitutional provision or law asserted as the basis for the challenge \u2014 the injured worker, the medical malpractice plaintiff, or the Social Security claimant. Of course it may be harder for such a person to bring suit than for a lawyer to bring suit, since lawyers are often better off than their potential clients, and they are after all lawyers. But it still can\u2019t be that lawyers would generally have standing in such situations. See Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1408-09 (3d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>) Cf. Lambert v. Turner, 525 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 1: holding that attorney and law firm lacked prudential standing to challenge a state statute which provided that a wrongful death action could only be brought on behalf of a fetus if the fetus was born alive and noting that we can not help but wonder how the lawyer and law firm plaintiffs can seriously challenge the district courts ruling as to their lack of standing 2: holding that the lack of shareholder standing under texas law does not implicate constitutional standing 3: holding that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant 4: holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Kenner\u2019s remaining contentions are Holdings: 0: holding that state prisoner seeking only monetary damages in  1983 suit need not exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to  1997e if such remedies do not provide for the award of monetary relief 1: holding that an inmate seeking only money damages must complete any prison administrative process capable of addressing his complaint and providing some form of relief even if the process does not provide for the recovery of monetary relief 2: holding that the burden of proving a violation of the idea lies on the party seeking relief during the administrative process 3: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 4: holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "120 S.Ct. 1362; Morales. The Supreme Court has, however, noted that the question is a matter of degree and indicated that the party challenging the law has the burden of \u201cestablishing that the measure of punishment itself has changed.\u201d Morales, 514 U.S. at 510, n. 6, 115 S.Ct. 1597; Garner, 529 U.S. at 255, 120 S.Ct. 1362; see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-294, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (refusing to accept \u201cspeculation\u201d that the effective punishment under a new statutory scheme would be \u201cmore onerous\u201d than under the old one). Therefore, given the Supreme Court\u2019s jurisprudence on this issue in Morales and Garner, it is now clear that retro active changes in the laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (<HOLDING>); Garner, 529 U.S. at 256, 120 S.Ct. 1362 Holdings: 0: holding the application of change in law regarding the timetable for being eligible for parole board hearings was not an increase in punishment violative of the ex post facto clause 1: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause 2: holding change in ultimate parole decisionmaker from board to governor does not violate ex post facto clause 3: holding that a change in parole law violates the ex post facto clause if the change in the law created a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes 4: holding that a change in parole policies without altering the underlying substantive standards does not violate the ex post facto clause", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that when a defendant \u201cvoices a seemingly substantial complaint\u201d about his attorney, the district court should inquire into the matter. McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir.1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, \u201c[i]f the reasons are made known to the court, the court may rule without more.\u201d Id. at 934 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the motion to withdraw and appoint substitute counsel and motion to reconsider, together with a seventeen-page handwritten letter prepared by Bliss, set forth in detail Bliss\u2019 and his counsel\u2019s concerns. Having thus been apprised of Bliss\u2019 concerns, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled on the motions without hearings. See United States v. Simeonov, 252 F.3d 238, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, by granting an extension of time Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to continue for purposes of hiring private counsel on eve of trial where defendant had several months to do so and failed to articulate sufficient reasons for his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel when reasons for defendants dissatisfaction with his attorney were made known to court through a letter and orally at sentencing 4: holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.\u2019 \u201d Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68, 106 S.Ct. 423). Second, Ex Parte Young does not apply to suits seeking damages; it only applies to suits seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The Court has said that suits for damages are suits against the state even if only the official is named as a defendant, because a damage remedy would require payment out of the state\u2019s treasury. Id. Third, Ex Parte Young does not apply if the relief sought is \u201cfully as intrusive\u201d on a state\u2019s sovereignty as a levy on funds in the state treasury. Coeur d\u2019Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 287, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (<HOLDING>). Fourth, Ex Parte Young does not apply to Holdings: 0: holding that because plaintiff did not apply for a job he could not be rejected in a title vii case 1: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 2: holding that a renter who stole a motor home had void title not voidable title and could not convey good title 3: holding that arbitration agreement that did not provide for award of attorney fees to successful title vii claimant was unenforceable because the right to attorneys fees  is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from violations of title vii 4: holding that plaintiff could not use ex parte young to seek title to submerged lands", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "arising out of the lessee\u2019s failure to satisfy its financial obligations for services rendered on the leased premises. If, as appellant argues, a lessor could avoid liability simply by disclaiming liability in the lease without including such a disclaimer in the recorded short form, the purpose behind section 713.10(1) would be frustrated. Furthermore, section 713.10(2), which mandates that a notice regarding multiple leases on a parcel of land include the specific language contained in the various leases prohibiting a lessor\u2019s liability, supports our interpretation of section 713.10(1). In other words, if a lessor desires to protect its interest from mechanics\u2019 liens arising out of improvements made by a lessee, the document that is recorded in the clerk\u2019 , 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (<HOLDING>); Budget Elec. Co. v. Strauss, 417 So.2d 1143, Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant contractor failed to prove the existence of a lease provision requiring the lessee to make the improvements at issue which could have the effect of subjecting the lessors property to a lien 1: holding that the mere fact that the parties to a lease may contemplate that the lessee will make improvements to the property is insufficient to subject the lessors interests to mechanics liens and that the lease must instead expressly or impliedly require the requirements to be made 2: holding that a lienor under a contract with a lessee is entitled to a lien against the lessors interest only where the lease expressly or impliedly requires the lessee to make improvements to the leased property 3: holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease 4: holding that the lease at issue which set forth that the tenant may at its own expense make alterations and improvements did not require the lessee to make the improvements and that the alterations and improvements did not constitute the pith of the lease", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM: William Andrew Kinsey, III, challenges the district court\u2019s dismissal of his motion, which he had styled a \u201cmotion for clarification.\u201d In his motion, he argued that the language of his judgment of conviction does not clearly indicate that his restitution payments are to begin while he is incarcerated. On appeal, he argues that the district court improperly dismissed his motion and characterized it as a successive motion to vacate filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255. Whether a district court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo or plenary review. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). We may review a district court\u2019s jurisdiction Holdings: 0: holding that claimed errors of law are subject to plenary review 1: holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review 2: holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar 3: holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law 4: holding that a district courts determination of its jurisdiction to resentence a defendant is subject to plenary review", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "damages; and (6) the risk of duplicative recoveries or complex apportionment of damages. Balaklaw, 14 F.3d at 797 n. 9 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 459 U.S. at 537-45, 103 S.Ct. 897). In the context of health care antitrust litigation, courts have observed that physicians may not be the most efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443-44 (concluding that physician-plaintiffs seeking to join cartel were not efficient enforcers of antitrust laws); Korshin v. Benedictine Hosp., 34 F.Supp.2d 133, 140-41 (N.D.N.Y.1999). Nevertheless, where a physician\u2019s interest coincides with the patient\u2019s interest, a physician may be a proper enforcer of the antitrust laws. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 274-75 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 142 Holdings: 0: holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation 1: holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit 2: holding that plaintiffphysician was efficient enforcer of antitrust laws 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing 4: holding that the fcc was not given the power to decide antitrust issues and that its actions do not prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "logic to conclude that the act of showing Spartin the other witnesses\u2019 grand jury statements in October 1986 caused Spartin to state that the plaintiff knew of the conspiracy during his grand jury testimony in September 1987, but not during his polygraph examination in December 1986. Therefore, the plaintiffs argument that the Inspectors\u2019 violation of the secrecy rules \u201ctainted\u201d Spartin\u2019s grand jury testimony by causing him to state a \u201cphony opinion\u201d necessarily fails. Whatever the reason for the apparent change in Spartin\u2019s opinion between December 1986 and September 1987, the plaintiff offers no evidence \u2014 only conclusory allegations\u2014 that the opinion Spartin offered at the grand jury hearing was swayed by the Inspectors\u2019 violation of the secrecy rules. See Greene, 164 F.3d at 675 (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff has presented no Holdings: 0: holding that unsubstantiated representations will not withstand summary judgment 1: holding that plaintiff who provides evidence of acts more severe than a lack of due care may withstand summary judgment motion on a failure to protect claim 2: holding that an employees unsubstantiated testimony that he was better qualified than employees that were not subject to adverse employment actions was insufficient to defeat summary judgment 3: holding that unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence 4: recognizing that the decedents claim should withstand summary judgment despite counsels concession  that he will be unlikely to prevail at trial", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as to how long it will last, a reasonable duration may be implied by the nature of the contract or from the surrounding circumstances. The law does not say specifically how long would be reasonable. That\u2019s for you to decide. When a contract fixes no time for its duration, and none can be implied by the nature of the contract and surrounding circumstances, the contract may be terminated at the will of either party. (Appellant\u2019s App. at 495.) Specifically, Pot-latch argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer a reasonable duration to the oral contract. Potlatch cites several cases holding that a contract of indefinite duration may be terminated at will. See, e.g., Union Nat\u2019l Bank v. Federal Nat\u2019l Mortgage Ass\u2019n, 860 F.2d 847, 853 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Gary Braswell & Assoc. v. Piedmont Indust., Holdings: 0: holding that traditional commercial contract provided for termination at will under arkansas law 1: holding requirement in contract to provide notice for termination but not limiting reasons for termination constitutes atwill employment relationship 2: holding in a successor liability case that questions of traditional tort law unrelated to the contract were properly governed under forum law 3: holding that where an oral contract was removed from the statute of frauds by clear and convincing evidence under arkansas law the defendant could not terminate the contract at its will only a contract of indefinite duration may be so terminated  4: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "subject: We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Whatever may have been the rule in Costello, it cannot be applied in a Title VII action involving untimely fifing with the EEOC. It is because the \u201cstatutory requirement is analogous to a statute of limitations,\u201d Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir.1996), that dismissal for failure to comply with the requirement is a judgment on the merits. See PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896-97 n. 2 (2d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Although the result envisioned by the Holdings: 0: holding that application of res judicata requires that a prior adjudication include a ruling on the merits 1: holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata 2: holding that dismissal of case on statute of limitations grounds is final judgment and barring appeal has res judicata effect 3: holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits 4: holding that under federal law the dismissal of a claim as timebarred is adjudication of merits for purposes of res judicata", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the Insureds at the time of the late filing, balanced against the error made by Dave, was not great. The trial court agreed and determined that the damage to other insureds should Dr. Dave\u2019s claim be allowed was \u201cvery minimal, if at all.\u201d Given the relatively small size of Dr. Dave\u2019s claim \u2014 \u201cin excess of $15,000\u201d \u2014 compared to the total of medical malpractice coverage claims in this receivership \u2014 approximately $21.8 million \u2014 we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the conclusions of both the special master and the chancellor that allowing Dr. Dave\u2019s claim would have no appreciable adverse impact on the rece ure to take precautions to assure that a deficiency claim was timely filed is not excusable neglect); In re Nickels Performance Sys., Inc., 169 B.R. at 652 (<HOLDING>). These decisions are consistent with our own Holdings: 0: holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect 1: holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment 2: holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable 3: holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants 4: holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is generally used there for purposes other than to describe offenses that are punishable under its provisions .... Specifically, the term \u2018felony\u2019 is primarily used in 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 802(13) to trigger statutory sentence enhancement for repeat offenders.\u201d Id, Indeed, there is only one instance under the Controlled Substances Act where the term \u201cfelony\u201d is used to describe a punishable offense, see 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 843(b) (1999) (making it unlawful to use a communication facility \u201cin committing or causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter\u201d), and case law makes clear that only a felony under federal law satisfies the felony element of this offense. See, e.g., United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We thus find the BIA\u2019s rationale with respect Holdings: 0: holding that defendants conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute which was classified as a misdemeanor under south carolina law was properly deemed a felony for career offender purposes because offense was punishable by up to five years imprisonment 1: holding that a defendants conviction for two possession of marijuana counts could not be supported by his possession of two marijuana cigarettes dropped from his hand and again for his possession of several packets of marijuana found in a nearby jacket during the same search 2: holding there was no violation of  843b where a telephone was used to obtain possession of marijuana since possession is only a misdemeanor not a felony under 21 usc  844a 3: holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession 4: holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Having noted the substantially identical testimony, however, I do not find it necessary to decide whether the statement relates to this other excerpt. 51 . El-Hage argues that \"Mr. al Fadl's claim that al Qaeda sought to fight the U.S. in Somalia represented the only evidence of any violence al Qaeda contemplated against the U.S. prior to Mr. El-Hage\u2019s return to the United States in September 1997.\u201d As discussed, infra, this argument is entirely without merit. 52 . I note that, although the value of the actual 3500 Material is quite minimal, even this minimal value would likely require a new trial if the Government's failure to produce the statements had been truly intentional, or under circumstances justifying a presumption of intentional suppression. See Hilton, 521 F.2d at 166 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that a new trial is warranted if the evidence is merely material or favorable to the defense where the government has either 1 deliberately suppressed evidence or 2 ignored evidence of such high value that it could not have escaped its attention 1: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material 2: holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment 3: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 4: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "without deciding, that these requirements provide authority for the proposition that counsel has a right to know the numerical breakdown of the jury, we do not find that the district court\u2019s decision to withhold this information amounted to fundamental error. {59} \u201cTo constitute a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, the particular proceeding or act in question must be one at which, or in connection with which, the accused\u2019s constitutionally protected rights may be lost or adversely affected.\u201d State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 120, 428 P.2d 658, 659 (1967). Although Defendant maintains the information was \u201ccritical knowledge\u201d he needed to decide whether to agree to a mistrial, he does not show how he was prejudiced. Cf. Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823, 826 (D.C.Ct.App.1988) (<HOLDING>). The jury\u2019s note did not indicate whether it Holdings: 0: holding that in reviewing a jury instruction this court must review the entire instruction and look at all the evidence on the record to determine whether there was error and whether that error prejudiced the complaining party 1: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 2: holding that whether the majority favored conviction or acquittal was a critical factor in the defendants decision whether to request a shotgun instruction since precedent prohibited the instruction in such circumstances 3: holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction 4: recognizing that the decision of whether to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "accompanied by fraud or other inequitable conduct of the remaining parties. Mullin v. Eaton, 19 A. 371, 372 (N.H. 1889) erefore, qualitatively different from an action challenging title. Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Here, the petitioners asserted that, by Holdings: 0: recognizing this distinction 1: recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell 2: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel 3: recognizing distinction between two types of waiver 4: recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1990) (<HOLDING>); Molina, 520 So.2d at 321 (\u201cThis court has Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion in finding violation where state presented no evidence that defendant ever received the instruction from probation officer and thus knew about the condition 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendants probation when urinalysis tested positive for use of morphine 2: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding violation was willful and substantial 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendants probation before the defendant completed his executed sentence 4: holding trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation where greater weight of evidence did not show violation was willful", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "I was coming in and out and I could feel it. I could feel every time he kicked me.... Borlawsky Dep. at 51-2. I assume that observing intimate activity of an arrestee without justification can sometimes be a Fourth Amendment violation, but the plaintiffs evidence simply does not make that case here under the circumstances of involuntary admission to a psychiatric ward on a doctor\u2019s advice with concern for the plaintiffs risk to herself or others. See Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 447 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that inadvertent, occasional, casual and restricted observation of inmate\u2019s body by an officer of opposite sex does not violate the Fourth Amendment and emergency circumstances, like harm to oneself, allows more direct observation); Ellis v. Meade, 887 F.Supp. 324, 332 (D.Me.1995) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, kicking an arrestee can amount to Holdings: 0: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 1: holding that officers view of plaintiffs shower in light of his suicide watch did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant 4: holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in the first.\u201d); Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (referring to the doctrine against claim-splitting as \u201cthe \u2018other action pending\u2019 facet of the res judicata doctrine\u201d). Thus, in assessing whether the second action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same. See The Haytian Republic, 154 U.S. at 124, 14 S.Ct. 992 (\u201cThere must be the same parties, or, at least, such as represent the same interests; there must be the same rights asserted and the same relief prayed for; the relief must be founded upon the same facts, and the ... essential basis, of the relief sought must be the same.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Curtis, 226 F.3d at 140 (<HOLDING>); Serlin, 3 F.3d at 223 (\u201c[A] suit is Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing curtis ii claims arising out of the same events as those alleged in curtis i which claims would have been heard if plaintiffs had timely raised them 1: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 2: holding that some of the claims raised in the plaintiffs complaint were not properly raised in its 60day citizen suit notice thus the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims 3: holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "crimes and crimes involving only accidental, negligent, or reckless conduct. It listed crimes which, \u201cthough dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one normally labels \u2018armed career criminals.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 146-47, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (citing as examples \u201cArk.Code Ann. \u00a7 8-4 \u2014 103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2007) (reckless polluters); 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 1319(c)(1) (individuals who negligently introduce pollutants into the sewer system); 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1365(a) (individuals who recklessly tamper with consumer products); [18 U.S.C.] \u00a7 1115 (seamen whose in s reckless endangerment statute is not a crime of violence under Begay)-, Gray, 535 F.3d at 131-32 (same with respect to New York reckless endangerment statute because it \u201cdoes not criminalize purposeful or deliberate conduct\u201d); Smith, 544 F.3d at 786 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60 Holdings: 0: holding that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under section 16 1: holding that one can be convicted of attempted manslaughter under the subsections of section 765205 that require intentional conduct but not under the subsection that only requires the mens rea of recklessness 2: holding that the enhanced minimum sentence for discharging a firearm requires no additional mens rea specific to the firing of the gun 3: holding that those crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the acca 4: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "603 P.2d at 525-26 (relating to RAJI 21); see also Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 103 Ariz. 515, 446 P.2d 458, 463 (1968) (relating to RAJI 23). 5. The district court did not err in denying Suenos a new trial. Suenos has not established any valid grounds for a new trial, such as \u201c(1) manifest error of law; (2) manifest error of fact; and (3) newly discovered evidence.\u201d Brown v. Wright, 588 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam). 6. The district court did not err in declining to strike Suenos\u2019s motion for attorney\u2019s fees as untimely. The time limit was not jurisdictional. See Arizona Local Rule 54.2(b)(2) (setting due date as 14 days but allowing alternative deadlines); see also Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 673 P.2d 927, 930 n. 2 (Ct.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the district court found that Holdings: 0: holding that a time limit for filing a complaint as a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings is not jurisdictional 1: holding that section 1144 is a jurisdictional limitation 2: holding time limitation on statement of costs is not jurisdictional and late filing is within courts discretion 3: holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional 4: holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court considers constitutionally impermissible factors in imposing a sentence. Nawaz v. State, 28 So.3d 122, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Reliance on constitutionally impermissible factors is a violation of a defendant\u2019s due process rights. See Ritter v. State, 885 So.2d 413, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); see also Holton v. State, 573 So.2d 284, 292 (Fla.1990). Examples of factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process include the race, religion or political affiliation of the defendant. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). \u201c[S]imilar principles apply when a judge impermissibly takes his own religious characteristics into account in sentencing.\u201d United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970, Holdings: 0: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so 1: holding that judge violated due process by stating at sentencing that those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from moneygrubbing preachers or priests 2: holding that it violated due process for one adjudicator to act as grand jury and judge for same defendants 3: holding that because restitution hearings are a part of sentencing and have nothing to do with a defendants guilt or innocence the rules of evidence do not apply 4: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as we do, that public participation in preliminary hearings provides a significant and positive role on the functioning of the judiciary. Id. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. B. Judicial Documents [\u00b6 20] While not specifically. finding that the First Amendment right to access attaches to judicial documents, the United States Supreme Court has observed, \"It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records[.]\" Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 LEd.2d 570 (1978). Additionally, numerous federal courts have affirmed the right of public access to judicial documents pursuant to the First Amendment. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 Holdings: 0: recognizing that corporations have first amendment speech rights but declining to address the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the first amendment 1: holding that a district judge does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the guidelines sentence should apply 2: holding no presumption of openness applies to midtrial hearings into juror misconduct because of the disruptive effect on the ongoing trial 3: holding that agency decisions enjoy a presumption of correctness 4: holding that docket sheets enjoy a presumption of openness under the first amendment", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "rule we only consider cases involving issues in dispute; we shall not address moot, abstract, academic, or hypothetical questions.\u201d). We also have held that \u201c[a] case is moot if it raised a justiciable controversy at the time the complaint was filed, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake in the controversy.\u201d Seibert v. Clark, 619 A.2d 1108, 1110 (R.I.1993). See also Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 378 (R.I.2007); In re New England Gas Co., 842 A.2d 545, 554 (R.I.2004) (concluding that because the underlying labor dispute had settled, New England Gas no longer had a continuing stake in the controversy, thereby rendering the case moot); Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Providence, 754 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I.2000) (<HOLDING>). One narrow exception to the mootness doctrine Holdings: 0: holding the case to be moot where construction of the pro ject had been entirely completed 1: holding that the settlement of a dispute generally renders a case moot 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim was moot because the construction project which was the subject of the dispute had been completed 3: holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit 4: holding that complaint seeking to enjoin highway construction project pending completion of environmental impact statement for larger project no longer presented any live controversy after highway project was completed and thus was moot and provided no basis for federal court jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See Chamberlain, 589 F.2d at 840-42. It insisted on an appropriate explanation for why the exempt documents could not reasonably be segregated from non-exempt material. See Pac. Fisheries, 539 F.3d at 1148. FOIA is not designed \u201cas a substitute for civil discovery.\u201d Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 360 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1103, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982). The fact that the Cheungs wish to use the documents they seek in their civil tax proceeding does not make Exemptions 3 and 7(A) inapplicable. Indeed, it is precisely because of the uses to which the Cheungs might put the documents that the exemptions are applicable. The district court properly denied Shannahan\u2019s discovery requests for information concerning the nature and origins of documents he requested. See Lane, 523 F.3d at 1134 (<HOLDING>). The Cheungs\u2019 problem is partly of their own Holdings: 0: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 1: holding that unauthorized disclosure of documents does not constitute a waiver of the applicable foia exemption 2: holding that in foia cases discovery is limited because the underlying case revolves around the propriety of revealing certain documents 3: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 4: holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "voluntarily waived his right to counsel. For that reason, his appellate counsel\u2019s failure to raise a Faretta argument on appeal does not meet Strickland\u2019s prejudice prong. First, Rose was fifty-five years old at the time of sentencing, had obtained a GED and had no history of mental- or physical-health issues. See Nelson, 292 F.3d at 1301 (concluding, under \u00a7 2254, that nothing in the defendant\u2019s history undermined the reasonableness of the state court\u2019s determination that his waiver was valid where the defendant was fifty years old and had obtained a GED). Second, he had extensive contact with counsel prior to his decision to proceed pro se, including three court-appointed lawyers in this very case. In fact, one had represented him through a jury trial. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 647-48 (<HOLDING>); cf. Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1066 (explaining Holdings: 0: holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute 1: holding that representation by counsel until the first day of trial likely exposed the defndant to the complexity of his case and the legal process 2: holding that courts should consider a number of factors including the type and complexity of the case and whether the indigent is capable of adequately presenting the case 3: holding that when evaluating a settlement agreement the court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the parties nor is it to run consideration of the adequacy of the settlement into a trial or a rehearsal of the trial  rather the cjourts responsibility is to reach an intelligent and objective opinion of the ultimate success should the claims be litigated and to form an educated estimate of the complexity expense and likely duration of such litigation and all other factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise 4: holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when before the state introduced the evidence complained of on appeal counsel for the state in the presence of the accused and his counsel stated the agreement and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel without objection", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "satisfied section XIV of Procedure 00-01-003, they still did not establish that Mr. Pavey, who could not write his own grievance and did not have access to help from his fellow inmates, did not reasonably rely on the assurance that his excessive-force allegations would be investigated. We make one final observation. Section 1997e(a) may prove to be irrelevant if further development of the record shows that prison officials rendered the established grievance procedures unavailable to Mr. Pavey by lending him no assistance in creating what would qualify as a written grievance while at the same time isolating him from other inmates who might have assisted him. Mr. Pavey always has insisted \u2014 and the defendants never have denied \u2014 that he was confined to his cell in pain co 2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that threats to an inmates safety after his use of the prison grievance system supported a retaliation claim 1: holding nonexhaustion to be an affirmative defense 2: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms 3: holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause 4: holding that defendants are estopped from raising nonexhaustion as an affirmative defense when prison officials inhibit an inmates ability to utilize grievance procedures", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "residence; awarded the wife $4,000 per month in periodic alimony and $50,000, payable in 5 annual installments of $10,000, as alimony in gross; awarded the wife one investment account valued at approximately $31,000 out of the husband\u2019s sizable financial portfolio; and awarded the wife $42,916.37 in attorney fees. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in the award of custody to the husband, in the awards of alimony and the division of property, and in the award of attorney fees. I. Custody and Visitation The wife argues that the trial court\u2019s award of custody to the husband is a punishment for her alleged marital indiscretions, and she argues that, as such, the award of custody is an abuse of discretion. See Etheridge v. Etheridge, 375 So.2d 474 (Ala.Civ.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). She also argues that the trial court should Holdings: 0: holding that personal jurisdiction is not required to make an outofstate parent a party to custody action where the state court has subject matter jurisdiction under the uniform child custody jurisdiction act 1: holding that psychological parent was not entitled to custody or visitation 2: recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party 3: holding fact that the parties failed to communicate and had continuing hostility does not constitute a material change in custody to warrant modification of custody 4: holding that although adulterous conduct can be considered in determining custody adultery in and of itself does not automatically bar an award of custody to the adulterous parent", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "471-72, 199 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (1947); see also Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 490-91 (Tex. 2016) (recognizing that when agreement cannot be performed without violating law or public policy, it is per se void). Courts will not enforce an illegal contract, particularly when the contract involves the doing of an act prohibited by statutes that were enacted for the protection of the public health and welfare. See, e.g., Merry Homes, Inc. v. Luu, 312 S.W.3d 938, 949-50 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (affirming judgment declaring lease void when lease required use of leased premises only for purposes prohibited by ordinance because of leased premises\u2019 proximity to school); Swor v. Tapp Furniture Co., 146 S.W.3d 778, 783-84 (Tex. App.\u2014Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Peniche v. Aeromexico, 580 S.W.2d 152, 155 Holdings: 0: holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license 1: holding oral agreement for finders fee void because finder was not licensed realestate broker in violation of real estate license act 2: holding that the purchaser could bring a 93a claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered 3: holding that a contract for sale of real estate was not void where the broker failed to obtain the required licenses 4: recognizing implied private action for violation of the real estate brokers and salesmen license act", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "County Jail officers\u2019 alleged unconstitutional actions, his liability must be based on something more than the theo L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). \u201cThe inquiry into causation must be a directed one, focusing on the duties and responsibilities of each ... individual defendant] whose acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in a constitutional deprivation.\u201d Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1381 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). See also Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435, 1446-47 (11th Cir.l993)(finding liability where sheriff was on notice of prior similar incident, thus inferring notice), vacated 514 U.S. 35, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995)(vacated for lack of jurisdiction); Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir.l991)(<HOLDING>); Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding sheriff liable for inter alia failing to properly investigate possible battery 1: holding no liability existed under the circumstances 2: holding summary judgment appropriate where plaintiff failed to establish product identification 3: holding a sheriff could not be liable for implementing county policies where no underlying violation of decedents rights had occurred 4: holding supervisory liability existed where sheriff failed to establish policies regarding accurate identification of suspects and where sheriff knew of prior instances of mistaken identity", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "AEP that existed when Worth filed his complaint, and Worth nowhere disputes the district court\u2019s finding, supported by an unchallenged agency affidavit, that HUD \u201cwill not renew the AEP that was in effect when MD-714 was operative.\u201d Worth v. Jackson, No. 02-1576, slip op. at 11 (Jan. 5, 2004); Jackson Decl. at 2, Sept. 10, 2003 (stating that the AEP \u201cwill not be renewed or reissued\u201d); see also United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass\u2019n, 393 U.S. 199, 203-04, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (finding in the mootness context that whether \u201cthe likelihood of further violations is sufficiently remote to make injunctive relief unnecessary ... is a matter for the trial judge\u201d). That ends the matter. See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363-65, 107 S.Ct. 734, 93 L.Ed.2d 732 (1987) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the Supreme Court has Holdings: 0: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself 2: holding that noncompete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where 1 the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working and 2 the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment 3: holding that amendment to the challenged statute mooted the claim when the state had expressed no intention to reenact the prior law 4: holding that a statutes expiration mooted any challenge to the statute", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "officers, and \u201cwas told by all officers present that [plaintiff] was the aggressor.\u201d 202 F.3d at 635. We also held that a charging officer at the station house was immune, because he \u201cheard consistent versions of the events from at least three eyewitnesses,\u201d who were all police officers, while only one account\u2014that of the plaintiffs girlfriend\u2014 differed. Id.; see also Lee, 136 F.3d at 104 (finding arguable probable cause where officer arrested plaintiff husband for domestic abuse of his wife based upon the wife\u2019s statement, but only after conferring with a physician who examined the wife and advised that although she seemed disoriented, intoxicated, or mentally impaired, she could accurately relate the facts about her alleged assault at the hands of her husband); Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 (<HOLDING>). By contrast, here, McGee has alleged facts Holdings: 0: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 1: holding that director of crisis center who was private individual and who acted under color of state law by conducting strip search of female detainees for contraband at request of police officer had qualified immunity from  1983 suit arising out of searches because she acted as agent of officer who also had qualified immunity 2: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 3: holding that officer had qualified immunity from  1983 action brought by arrestee because officer had probable cause to arrest based on statements of a witness store clerk who signed a criminal information and deposition detailing the theft and establishing each of the elements of the crime of larceny 4: holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and Brown\u2019s arrest.\u201d). The problem is that Williams was not seen or heard from until fourteen months after the crime when he was arrested in Georgia. While Deputy Lucius patrolled Samspon Park looking for Williams, he did not offer any details supporting his efforts. There was no information that Williams was not at his usual haunts or had not reported for work. And there was no testimony that the police inquired of Williams\u2019 -family and friends beyond the day after the crime. While Detective Hollis testified that he attempted to locate Williams\u2019 friends, family members, and girlfriends, he did not give a time line or indicate that, he actually came into contact with any of these people beyond the day after the crime. Cf. Diaz-Gonzalez v. State, 932 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). This lack of evidence also supports the Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonable juror could infer defendant knew of the officers investigation for a crime that occurred a few months before his arrest because the investigating officer went to the residence of the defendants exwife made ten separate visits to the defendants business during which he informed those present that he wanted to talk to the defendant about something that happened on the date of the crime and gave this information to the defendants alibi witness 1: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene 2: holding that no valid arrest had taken place before the search of the defendants person was conducted even though prior to that point a police officer had approached the defendant displayed his badge informed the defendant of his suspicions that the defendants luggage contained drug contraband informed the defendant of his constitutional rights and detained the defendant for twenty minutes after he had accompanied the officers to a police office located in the airport 3: holding that officers failure to talk to asserted alibi witnesses did not constitute a violation of the defendants constitutional rights 4: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "previously through the exercise of due diligence, the defendant must establish that the newly discovered evidence probably would have produced a life sentence. Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 571 (Fla.2001); see also Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) (\u201c[T]he newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.\u201d); Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla.1992) (\u201cThe Jones standard is also applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should have been imposed.\u201d). Because the trial court denied Van Poyck\u2019s motion solely on the basis of the pleadings, making a legal rather than a factual determination, this Court evaluates each of these matters de novo. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Timeliness and Due Diligence Apart from Holdings: 0: holding that whether statements are testimonial is a legal issue subject to de novo review 1: holding that pure questions of law that are discernible from the record are subject to de novo review 2: holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review 3: recognizing that the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review 4: holding questions of law related to class certification are reviewed de novo", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it is not probative enough to meet Todd\u2019s burden of production that Montoya acted with deliberate indifference. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 528-29 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201cNorthwest\u2019s rewiring of the CAWS is circumstantial evidence, if only of a weak and suspect sort, that the CAWS as it existed at the time of the accident was not foolproof.\u201d). Even if the evidence is not technically with rule 407\u2019s scope: (i) rule 407\u2019s underlying concerns are persuasive when evaluating the probative value of the evidence; and (ii) the circumstances of Montoya\u2019s resignation in light of the other evidence in the record make the inference of wrongdoing one can draw from his resignation a weak one. See Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 Fed.Appx. 639, 646-47 (10th Cir.2003) (unpublished)(<HOLDING>). It is the proverbial scintilla of evidence Holdings: 0: recognizing that while the evidence at issue was admissible under rule 407 its probative value was minimal 1: recognizing the probative value of objective and reliable hearsay evidence 2: recognizing high probative value of evidence providing conduct that was part of the very act charged 3: holding that inextricably intertwined evidence is intrinsic evidence that is admissible if its probative value outweighs the danger of prejudice 4: recognizing that rule 608b prior bad acts evidence admissible as probative of truthfulness is subject to rule 403 balancing", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5 . DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex.1990) (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 187 (1971)). 6 . Id. at 678 (quoting Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 187 (1971)). 7 . Id. (\"Florida has a substantial relationship to the parties and the transaction because Wackenhut's corporate offices are there, and some of the negotiations between DeSantis and George Wackenhut occurred there.\u201d). 8 . Uniform Arbitration Act \u00a7 1 ef seq. 9 . Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code \u00a7 171.001 et seq. 10 . 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). 11 . Id. at 403 olo.Rev.Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-22-221. 26 . Uniform Arbitration Act \u00a7 28. 27 . Compare Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Holdings: 0: holding that the faa did not preempt california law permitting court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation where parties had selected california law in a standard choice of law provision 1: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision 2: holding fee splitting provision of arbitration agreement unconscionable under california law 3: recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired 4: holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Control Officer ... may issue a citation to the owner of such animal specifying the section or sections of this chapter so violated and identifying the specific nature of the violation. Such citation shall impose upon the owner the obligation of appearance to answer the charges specified in the citation ... at the time and place indicated on the citation. LMCO \u00a7 91.073(A). If an officer decides to issue a violation notice in lieu of a citation, that notice must \u201cstipulate a compliance date and associated fee and late fee, as well as a waiver provision providing that the person to whom the violation notice is issued waives all rights to protest such violation and waives all rights to a hearing on the issues relating to that viola tion.\u201d LMCO \u00a7 91.073(B). LMCO \u00a7 91. 57 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the circumstances as here Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of other allegations of torture was inadmissible in part because it was not similar to the allegations made by defendant 1: holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment 2: holding that because the allegations purportedly suppressed by the government were not material an evidentiary hearing further exploring the  allegations themselves and the governments knowledge of the allegations is unnecessary 3: holding that a parking citation provided adequate notice where it was reasonably calculated to inform the vehicle owners of the allegations against them and the procedures available to obtain a hearing to contest the allegations 4: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(citing Sahadi v. Reynolds Chem., 636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1980)); see also Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cSpreading the former duties of a terminated employee among the remaining employees does not constitute replacement.\u201d). Novotny\u2019s reliance on this argument, therefore, is misplaced. Novotny also argues that she was treated differently than similarly situated males. Novotny\u2019s argument in support of this statement is difficult to follow. Novotny appears to argue two distinct claims: 1) a pre-termination claim of discrimination, and 2) a claim of discrimination related to her termination. The Court reviews each of these claims. Novotny first asserts that she was discriminated against prior to her termination. Novotny claims that her calend th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Agnew v. BASF Corp., 286 F.3d 307, 310-11 Holdings: 0: holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action 1: holding that an employee accepted as a matter of law changes to an employment agreement by continuing employment with the company after he received notice of the changes 2: holding that reassignments without salary or work changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims 3: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 4: holding that poor evaluations alone do not constitute an adverse employment action", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "work on the project \u2014 including the land surveying tasks. In addition, there is substantial evidence that the construction documents produced by MLS were to be approved by either Comer or another engineer. Gregory Gardiner in his deposition even stated that he believed the services performed by MLS were engineering by nature and that the surveying services were incidental to the engineering work. While his statements are not dispositive as to the nature of the contract, they show that Gardiner believed MLS was to perform engineering services for his company. Under such circumstances, we believe that both the engineering and land surveying services encompassed by the cohtract are properly classified as professional and thus, are subject to KRS 413.245. See Vandevelde, 744 S.W.2d at 433 (<HOLDING>). It is important to note that while this Holdings: 0: holding that a corporate entity must be represented by licensed counsel 1: holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task 2: holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied 3: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice 4: holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "77 F.Supp.3d at 1187-88, 2014 WL 7473806, at *27. These cases all stand for the same thing: at the pleading stage, the existence of a Monell policy is a \u201cconclusion\u201d to be built up to, rather than a \u201cfact\u201d to be baldly asserted. When there is no formal written policy and the \u00a7 1983 plaintiff is relying upon a practice or custom, some courts appear to look for a specific number of prior similar incidents \u2014 often saying that two or three instances will not suffice. See Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir.2014)(\u201cAlthough this court has not adopted any bright-line rules for establishing what constitutes a widespread custom or practice, it is clear that a single incident \u2014 or even three incidents \u2014 do not suffice.\u201d); Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Eugene v. Alief Ind. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a section 1983 plaintiff asserting police misconduct must allege a pattern of similar incidents in which citizens were injured or endangered by policyconsistent misconduct or that serious incompetence or misbehavior was general or widespread throughout the police force 1: holding that a finding of misconduct under section 44303626 requires intentional repeated instances of misconduct or violations of explicit policies after the employee has received warnings 2: holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance  than an affirmative statement of misconduct 3: recognizing that the court sanctions more harshly for cumulative misconduct than for isolated misconduct 4: holding that two instances of misconduct do not indicate a persistent and widespread pattern of misconduct that amounts to a city custom or policy of overlooking police misconduct", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201d Town of Milford v. Boyd, 434 Mass. 754, 759-60 (2001), citing Gillette Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 425 Mass. 670, 674 (1997), in turn quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 Mass. 490, 497 (1984) (stating that \u201cwords of a statute must be construed with other statutory language and the general statutory plan\u201d). In other words, in order to be consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole of G.L.c. 207, it is necessary that \u00a7\u00a711 and 12 be read together 05, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that a zoning ordinance\u2019s likely infringement of the plaintiffs First Amendment rights constituted irreparable harm where the city\u2019s threat to enforce the ordinance operated as a prior restraint on adult bookstores); T&D Video v. City of Revere, 423 Mass. 577, 582 (1996) (<HOLDING>). See also, Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Holdings: 0: holding that an infringement on the right to vote necessarily causes irreparable harm 1: holding that even a temporary deprivation of first amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm 2: holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction 3: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 4: holding that plaintiffs necessarily demonstrated irreparable harm because they showed a substantial likelihood that their first amendment rights had been infringed", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "intended to preclude separate convictions and sentences for the ongoing criminal conduct and underlying crimes used to establish such conduct. We too think the Iowa legislature sought to encourage the imposition of such cumulative sentences. B. Merger pursuant to Iowa Code section 701.9. Iowa Code section 701.9 \u2014 Iowa\u2019s merger statute \u2014 provides: No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is convicted; If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, th\u00e9 court shall enter judgment of guilty of the greater offense only. Our resolution of Reed\u2019s double jeopardy claim renders this section inapplicable. See Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344 (<HOLDING>). IV. Corroboration of Accomplices\u2019 Testimony. Holdings: 0: holding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits courts from imposing greater penalties than the legislature intended 1: holding that if double jeopardy clause is not violated because legislature intended double punishment section 7019 is not applicable and merger is not required 2: holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court 3: holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 4: holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 655 (4th Cir.1977); In re the Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir.1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir.1976); In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600, 605 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1976). However, all of these cases come from an era when disqualification orders were widely presumed to be immediately appealable. See generally Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800, 804-05 (2d Cir.1974) (en banc) (collecting cases). Since then, the Supreme Court has refused to allow interlocutory appeals in every disqualification case that has come before it. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424, 430, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 270, Holdings: 0: holding that an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is not a final judgment 1: holding that final judgment in a criminal case means sentence 2: holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that an order authorizing a sale is a final judgment 4: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "likely to have had counsel at the interrogation had he been arraigned on December 12, 2003, instead of December 19, 2003. This is particularly true given that Nguyen apparently was already represented by counsel concerning the indicted charges and could have requested the presence of his counsel at the December 15 interview. This does not, however, end the Sixth Amendment analysis. Although there is no evidence that the government conspired to deprive Nguyen of counsel, the government must still bear the burden of showing, as under the Fifth Amendment analysis, (i) that he was apprised of his right to have counsel appointed and to consult with counsel and (ii) that he knowingly waived that right. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298-99, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In this regard, the evidence makes clear (i) Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment generally permits interrogation of a represented person only 1 if it was the defendant and not the government who initiated the interrogation and 2 if the defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel 1: holding that the same waiver standard applies when assessing whether a defendant has waived his sixth amendment right to counsel during a postindictment interrogation as when assessing whether a defendant has waived his fifth amendment right to counsel preindictment 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 4: holding that waiver of counsel during pcr review requires a judicial inquiry into whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). A claimant can demonstrate pretext \u201cby showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant\u2019s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.\u201d Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir.2000). \u201cRegardless of which option is used, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of producing \u2018sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably reject [the defendants\u2019] explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him.\u2019 \u201d Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.2001) (alteration in original)). See also Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff can establish pretext only by showing that her employers explanation is a he 1: holding that temporal proximity together with evidence of a retaliatory atmosphere and the employers statement supported an inference of retaliation and satisfied the second part of the manzer pretext showing 2: holding that a plaintiff can establish a causal link by showing that the employers decision  was based in part on knowledge of the employees protected activity 3: holding that a petitioner did not make a prima facie showing of illegal discrimination because the petitioner needed to point to more facts than the number of africanamericans struck in order to establish a pattern of strikes supporting an inference of discrimination 4: holding that statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff showing an employers pattern of conduct toward a protected class is relevant to a showing of pretext and can create an inference of discrimination", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and with the DPS\u2019s position in this appeal that sections 522.102(a) and 522.103 of the transportation code apply only to a person who is driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his arrest. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 522.102(a), 522.103; see also Tex. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Safety v. Chavez, 981 S.W.2d 449, 451 (TexApp. \u2014 Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). That is, an individual stopped for DWI in a noncommercial vehicle who refuses to submit a breath specimen does not automatically lose his commercial driving privileges for one year. However, section 522.089 mandates the automatic disqualification of a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle at least for the period of time that person\u2019s license is suspended under any law. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 522.089(a); Chavez, 981 S.W.2d at 453 (<HOLDING>). In accordance with the Code of Construction Holdings: 0: holding that district court lacked authority to dismiss charges of driving under the influence reckless driving operating a motor vehicle without a seatbelt and operating a motor vehicle without insurance without states consent where dismissal was at gonzalezs request based on absence of arresting officer 1: recognizing that section 522089 applied to chavez even though he was not driving a commercial motor vehicle at the time of his arrest 2: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  3: holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition 4: holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a motion to compel arbitration filed by the Loudermilks, the trial court lacked jurisdiction; because the Loudermilks never demonstrated that their claims were within the warranty\u2019s scope or that they satisfied the warranty\u2019s conditions precedent to arbitration; and because the Loudermilks\u2019 failure to file a motion to compel or to provide notice of their intent to arbitrate their claims against Appellants deprived Appellants of their right to present defenses to arbitration and to object to the court\u2019s appointment of an arbitrator. We address these contentions in turn. A. Trial Court Jurisdiction It is clear that the trial court here had jurisdiction o ending the outcome of arbitration. Brooks v. Pep Boys Auto. Superctrs., 104 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In short, we are not aware of any authority, Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial court possesses continuing jurisdiction pending arbitration rather than requiring the filing of an additional lawsuit concerning pending arbitration or postarbitration matters 1: holding that completed arbitration pending appeal mooted district courts order directing arbitration 2: holding that where the trial court had referred the parties to arbitration but it was ambiguous as to whether the court had also dismissed the underlying case dismissal and referral to arbitration should really be construed as an order to stay litigation pending arbitration which under koczak and umana was not a final appealable order 3: holding that purpose of stay pending arbitration is twofold it relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the district courts order to arbitrate 4: holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "aimed at establishing a defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a crime. See Tenn. R.Evid. 404(b). The State contended that it was offering evidence of prior sexual misconduct not to prove the character of the defendant but, rather, primarily to corroborate the testimony of the victim concerning the incidents alleged in the indictment as well as to show the state of intimacy between the defendant and the victim, to explain the circumstances surrounding the charged offenses and to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim. Accordingly, the State argued that the evidence of the defendant\u2019s prior sexual misconduct was admissible under those limited circumstances. In support of its argument, the State cited several cases including State v. Lockhart, 731 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>), overruled by State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824 Holdings: 0: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 1: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 2: holding that evidence of incest with the same victim prior to or after the offense charged is admissible to corroborate proof of the incident relied upon for conviction 3: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony 4: holding that evidence of uncharged incest with the same victim is admissible to illustrate the relationship existing between the defendant and the victim", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "related sentence. (Id.) In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that when a defendant has been convicted and sentenced on mulitiplicitous charges, \u201c[t]he conviction as well as the sentence on one of the two mulitiplicitous counts must be vacated, to \u2018avoid both the punitive collateral effects of multiple convictions as well as the direct effects of multiple sentences.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d 1230, 1239 (9th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 850 F.2d 563, 569 (9th Cir.1988) and quoting United States v. Palafox, 764 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir.1985)); see also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). Here, because the Holdings: 0: holding that proof of an overt act is not required in a  846 conspiracy 1: holding that the greater offense is  by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it 2: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 3: holding that a guilty verdict on a  848 charge necessarily includes a finding that the defendant also participated in a conspiracy violative of  846 conspiracy is therefore a lesser included offense  we adhere to the presumption that congress intended to authorize only one punishment accordingly one of petitioners convictions as well as its concurrent sentence is unauthorized punishment for a separate offense and must be vacated 4: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and the debtors, provides the basis for a lien even after discharge since the mortgage does not purport to affect the debtor's personal liability. The Court agrees. \"Therefore the Court finds that the law is with the plaintiff and accordingly grants relief by declaring that a valid, pre-filed lien which has not been avoided during the bankruptcy proceedings is not extinguished by the discharge of the debtors and remains enforceable in rem after the discharge even if there is no approved reaffirmation agreement. More specifically, the lien of Water-field's real estate mortgage is enforceable in rem against the real estate described in the mortgage.\" 24 B.R. at 624 (emphasis supplied). See also R.L. Shirmeyer, Inc. v. Ind. Revenue Bd. (1951), 229 Ind. 586, 594, 99 N.E.2d 847, 850 (<HOLDING>) The Ruths attempt to limit the effect of this Holdings: 0: holding witness not licensed as real estate appraiser could not testify as expert on real estate valuation where statute made it unlawful to engage in real estate appraisal without license 1: holding the real estate sale proceeds 2: holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate 3: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 4: holding that granteepurchasers who acquired real estate subject to an existing mortgage while not personally lia ble did take real estate charged with the payment of the debt and such property became the primary fund out of which said mortgage must be paid", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "evidence of alcoholism, which helped to explain the respondent\u2019s conduct, but did not excuse it); Florida Bar v. Rodriguez, 489 So.2d 726 (Fla.1986) (disbarring attorney for the conversion of client funds and admitted commingling of clients\u2019 moneys despite mitigating evidence relating to alcoholism and rehabilitation). Additionally, this case also involves other conduct that is extremely troubling, including the forgery of a judge\u2019s signature on two orders, the forgery of a client\u2019s signature on a guilty plea, and the forgery of a client\u2019s signature on a check so Gross could deposit the funds of the check and use them for his own personal means. These acts alone can also constitute independent grounds for disbarment. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Kickliter, 559 So.2d 1123, 1124 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Gross attempts to distinguish this Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who converted partnership money to his own use without authorization and without disclosure to his other partners 1: holding that even with substantial mitigation disbarment was warranted for an attorney who had forged his chents signature on a will when the chent died without signing and then submitted this forged document into court 2: holding that a party failed to meet this burden when he presented no corroborating evidence by the persons who could have given testimony regarding the execution of the deed such as the person signing as witness to his signature and the notary public who subscribed as having notarized his signature or a handwriting expert in support of the contention that his signature to the deed was forged 3: holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction where an attorney misappropriated funds from his real estate partners 4: holding that an attorney was subject to disbarment based on his willful disobedience of a probate court order requiring him to return excess attorney fees paid to the executor of an estate", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rests with the Commission to show that the funds in the possession of [the relief defendant] are ill-gotten.\u201d FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F.Supp.2d 373, 392 (D.Conn.2009) (citations omitted). \u201cThe ill-gotten gains must be linked to the unlawful practices of the liable defendants.\u201d Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F.Supp.2d at 392. Where \u201cit would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace specific ... [fraudulently obtained funds], a freeze order need not be limited ... to funds that can be directly traced to defendant\u2019s illegal activity [because] ... the defendant should not benefit from the fact that he commingled his illegal profits with other assets.\u201d Byers, 2009 WL 33434, at *3 (citations omitted); see also SEC v. Aragon Capital Mgmt., LLC, 672 F.Supp.2d 421, 443 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). If disgorgement of \u201cfraudulently obtained Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant compensated himself by spending investors funds for his own expenses 1: holding that tracing proceeds of illegal funds is unnecessary and where tainted funds have been commingled with potentially legitimate funds the sec is entitled to obtain disgorgement from the entire pool of funds 2: holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable 3: holding that even if the sec succeeded in showing defendants violated the exchange act or sec rules the sec is not entitled to a permanent injunction or an officerdirector bar 4: holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and would not have progressed to cardiopulmonary arrest. Although Mr. Smith\u2019s clinical condition had a mortality of about twenty percent prior to the arrest, the above-discussed failures of Dr. Bolton, Dr. Russell, Dr. Suominen, PA Dizney, McElravy, Hammonds, and Gill probably led to the arrest and the sequelae that probably ensued and in reasonable probability led to his progressive weakness, increasing renal dysfunction, and multi-system organ failure and his death. These statements, all contained within the four corners of Dr. Halkos\u2019s report, sufficiently link Dr. Halkos\u2019s causation opinions to the facts and adequately describe the chain of events allegedly leading to Mr. Smith\u2019s death. See Patel v. Williams, 237 S.W.3d 901, 905-06 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The trial court acted within its discretion Holdings: 0: holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report 1: holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation 2: holding that earlier events set the stage for what followed and that factual disputes regarding those events were material 3: holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself 4: holding expert report sufficiently set forth causation when it presented a chain of events beginning with a contraindicated prescription and ending with the patients death", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claims that the district court\u2019s Case Management Order expressly limited discovery to the primary liability issues, namely CERCLA, the Spill Act, and breach of contract, and expressly stayed discovery on its state common law claims until after resolution of the threshold liability issues. While WCI raises a colorable claim, we nonetheless decline review of this issue, as WCI\u2019s claim is raised for the first time on appeal and is not preserved for appellate review. See Plott v. General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir.1995) (stating that this Court generally will not review a post-judgment claim asserting a need for discovery where the non-movant failed to advance such claim before the district court); see also Vance ex rel. v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). WCI\u2019s failure to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit Holdings: 0: recognizing that while summary judgment is improper if the nonmovant is not afforded a sufficient opportunity for discovery it is the nonmovants responsibility to inform the district court of the need for discovery by filing an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f of the federal rules of civil procedure or filing a motion requesting additional discovery 1: holding that the court was precluded from considering whether the district court had abused its discretion in ruling on defendants summary judgment motion before allowing plaintiff to conduct requested discovery where the plaintiff had not filed an affidavit pursuant to rule 56f and stating that  when a party does not avail himself of relief under rule 56f it is generally not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule on the motion for summary judgment  citation omitted 2: holding that entry of summary judgment while a motion for additional discovery was pending should be construed as an implicit denial of the motion for additional discovery 3: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 4: holding that rejection of the appellants rule 56f request for additional discovery was proper where the information as to which he sought discovery was immaterial to the question of whether he is liable", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CWs credibility and his use of a gun. In light of the unrebutted fact of CWs death improperly admitted during the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument, the latter issue was of particular importance, as discussed supra. In sum, given the lost opportunity to confront CW in relation to the unavailable discovery, the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated Nofoa\u2019s right to confrontation as guaranteed by article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, we hold that the circuit court erred in allowing admission of CWs preliminary healing testimony at trial We additionally hold that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Mundon, 121 Hawai'i 339, 368, 219 P.3d 1126, 1155 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We are unable to say the error was harmless Holdings: 0: holding constitutional error may be harmless if court can  declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  quoting state v napeahi 57 haw 365 373 556 p2d 569 574 1976 1: holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a constitutional error is harmless where it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained 4: holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fractures and a large gash on his cheek. The wall, floor, and door to the restroom were covered with blood. Next to the restroom door, the police found a metal forming stick covered in blood. 2 . Friday afternoon at 3:00 p.m. is the routine time for arraignment hearings in Peoria County Circuit Court. 3 . Herman Cornish is a retired Peoria police officer. 4 . However, Geraldine testified at trial that she felt that she had no choice but to permit the police to take her fingerprints. 5 . Like Geraldine, Laurie testified at trial that she felt that she had no choice but to permit the police to take her fingerprints. 6 . Ms. Schumann is Plaintiffs' counsel of record in this matter. 7 . See People v. McClinton, 59 Ill.App.3d 168, 174-75, 375 N.E.2d 1342, 1348, 17 Ill.Dcc. 58, 64 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed 3: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 4: holding that photographic identification coupled with the officers knowledge that a crime had been committed provides probable cause for a warrantless arrest", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "regarding the reliability of expert evidence, as well as its decision to admit or exclude such evidence, for abuse of discretion. See Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 154 (3d Cir.2000). As we have discussed above, WARN Act liability does not turn on whether a party is a \"parent\u201d or a \"lender,\u201d or whether a \"lender\u201d behaved in typical fashion. Indeed, we have already acknowledged that GECC may well have been a parent of CompTech. Thus, because we have declined to create separate standards of liability for lenders and parents, regardless of whether the District Court was correct in concluding that Myers\u2019s affidavit was lacking in a factual basis, his opinion was ultimately not germane and no hearing was necessary. Cf. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the District Court's Holdings: 0: holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits 1: holding that in limine hearings are encouraged when courts are concerned with the factual rather than legal dimensions of the evidence 2: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 3: holding under both florida law and faa that factual affirmative defenses are properly decided by the arbitrator rather than the court 4: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "bands and subjecting them to excessive monitoring and racially-derogatory remarks); Johnson v. Smith, 878 F.Supp. 1150 (N.D.Ill.1995) (cross burned in front yard of African-American family and brick thrown through their window); People Helpers v. City of Richmond, 789 F.Supp. 725 (E.D.Va.1992) (police \u201cbullied\u201d their way into and selectively searched handicapped and African-American plaintiffs\u2019 apartments). While this Court has, as Plaintiffs note, recognized that \u201cviolence or physical coercion is not a prerequisite to a claim under \u00a7 3617,\u201d Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.N.J.2000), the conduct complained of must nevertheless be of sufficient magnitude to permit a finding of intimidation, coercion, threats or interference. See, e.g., Babin, 18 F.3d at 347, 348 (<HOLDING>). That said, the actions allegedly taken by Holdings: 0: holding that actions of defendants in engaging in economic competition did not rise to the level of interference with the rights of plaintiffs and that actions of neighbors while interfering with plaintiffs negotiations were not direct enough to state a claim for violation of  3617 1: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 2: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions 3: holding that rookerfeldman did not bar the plaintiffs federal action where a pennsylvania state court had previously dismissed the plaintiffs petition for review of an agencys decision for failure to comply with the pennsylvania rules of appellate procedure since the extent of the plaintiffs compliance with those rules had no bearing on the merits of the plaintiffs constitutional claims 4: holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "mitigating circumstances in this case. We believe the testimony demonstrated Johnston to be a generally honest lawyer. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Isaacson, 565 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Iowa 1997) (\u201cWe consider a lawyer\u2019s general character for honesty ... in applying sanctions.\u201d). In addition, he acknowledged he violated our disciplinary rules in certain respects. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Tofflemire, 689 N.W.2d 83, 93 (Iowa 2004) (\u201cA mitigating factor is the attorney\u2019s recognition of some wrongdoing.\u201d). Furthermore, the prior discipline imposed on Johnston carries little weight as an aggravating factor under the circumstances of this case. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Johnston\u2019s previous discipline was imposed Holdings: 0: recognizing a heightened interest in ensuring discipline in police departments 1: holding that torture is something more severe than the kind of treatment that would suffice to prove persecution 2: recognizing prosecutors implicit obligation to refrain from suggesting more severe sentencing alternatives 3: holding that seconddegree manslaughter was not a crime of violence and thus was not an aggravated felony warranting an aliens removal 4: recognizing a previous reprimand was an aggravating circumstance warranting more severe discipline", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Commerce\u2019s determination in the Final Results. (Pis.\u2019 Br. on Jurisdiction 2-5.) In deciding between the appropriate bases for jurisdiction, the \u201c \u2018mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction, by either a party or a court, cannot be controllingt;]\u2019 \u201d instead, the court \u201c \u2018look[s] to the true nature of the action ... in determining jurisdiction.\u2019 \u201d Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Williams v. Sec\u2019y of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557 (Fed.Cir.1986)). In this case, Plaintiffs challe t the time that the rule goes into effect because the relevant harm has already been inflicted: an interested party has lost the opportunity to alter the agency\u2019s decision through full participation in the regulatory process. See, e.g., Wind River, 946 F.2d at 715 (<HOLDING>); Thrift Depositors of Am., Inc. v. Office of Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy 2: holding that grounds for a cause of action for facial or procedural challenges to a regulation will usually be apparent to any interested citi zen within a sixyear period following promulgation of the decision and because the governments interest in finality outweighs a latecomers desire to protest the agencys action as a matter of policy or procedure 3: holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action 4: recognizing cause of action", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "believed that he was acting \u201cin the usual course of his business or employment.\u201d See United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir.1995). To qualify under the employee or agent exception to registration under \u00a7 822, the person must be employed in the \u201clegitimate distribution chain\u201d of the controlled substance. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir.1973). Any possession or distribution outside of the legitimate distribution chain is unlawful. United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (2d Cir.1986). Thus, if the possession is not in the \u201cusual course of the registrant\u2019s lawful professional practice,\u201d then it is not in the legitimate chain of possession and therefore not within the \u00a7 822(c) exception. See United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344, 1350 (8th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Here, Smith was directed by his employer to Holdings: 0: holding  1227a2bi limits the meaning of controlled substance for removal purposes to the substances controlled under  802 1: holding that defendants ability to pay may be considered in assessing penalty under controlled substances act 2: holding that a company registered with the new york department of state is found for purposes of rule b 3: holding that both the unlawful possession and unlawful use prongs were met and noting that the firearm transferred to the individual was not registered making the individuals possession of it necessarily unlawful 4: holding that mere fact that defendant was employee of company registered to possess and distribute controlled substances does not make otherwise unlawful conduct lawful", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a contract or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Id. We have noted that actual litigation is not required for relief under our declaratory-judgment statute. Jessup v. Carmichael, 224 Ark. 230, 272 S.W.2d 438 (1954). However, the statue does require that litigation be pending or threatened. Id. We have also noted that while Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-111-104 recognizes a party\u2019s right to a declaratory judgment, a justiciable controversy is required. Mastin v. Mastin, 316 Ark. 327, 871 S.W.2d 585 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The justiciability requirement was discussed Holdings: 0: holding that the insurers declaratory relief action presented a justiciable controversy for the injured parties even though the insured tortfeasor had suffered a default judgment 1: recognizing that a justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy that is ripe and appropriate for judicial determination as opposed to a dispute or difference of contingent hypothetical or abstract character 2: holding that the case presented no justiciable controversy and that a review of the matter would render an improper advisory opinion 3: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 4: holding that when the government conceded that a taxpayer has a right to monetary relief a justiciable case or controversy no longer exists and any declaratory interpretation would not be incident to a judgment", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Rules \u00a7 303A.02(b)(v) (providing that a director is not independent if he or she \"is a current employee ... of a company that has ... received payments from, the listed company for property or services in an amount which, in any of the last three fiscal years, exceeds the greater of $1 million, or 2% of such other company\u2019s consolidated gross revenues\u201d). And, even if the amount paid to Stephens Cori exceeded $1 million, Byorum would still be considered independent under the NYSE rules, because that relationship is stale (i.e., she was paid over three years before the MFW transaction). 56 . Dinh Dep. 173:4-10. 57 . Id. at 14:8-15:4, 80:17-24. 58 . See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del.1995); see also, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). 59 . Dinh Dep. 72:5-75:21. 60 . Pis.\u2019 Br. in Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that a defendant director was not disinterested on account of his business relationship with the company whose board he sat on because he was a man of comparatively modest means 1: holding that willfully violating the prohibition on engaging in business as a brokerdealer or agent without registering with the state means the defendant acted intentionally in the sense that he was aware of what he was doing 2: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 3: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 4: holding that allegation that company paid a director 50000 in consulting fees was not enough to demonstrate that the director lacked independence as plaintiffs had failed to allege that 50000 was material to the director", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "language, the purpose of the statute, the evil to be corrected, the legislative history, and the pertinent case law that has applied the statute or similar enactments.\u201d McKnight v. State, 906 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Because we base our decision on language that was not part of the 1985 statute construed in Dixon, we do not certify conflict with that opinion. Addressing another issue on appeal, we note that Hile\u2019s in-court description of his conversation with Longval on the videotape was admissible over a hearsay objection. Longval\u2019s statements to Hile were not hearsay under section 90.801(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2004), because they described and gave significance to ambiguous acts, her conduct on the videotape. See Stotler v. State, 834 So.2d 940, 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (<HOLDING>). Reversed and remanded. GUNTHER and HAZOURI, Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court may allow jurors to review a videotape of a witness previous statements under circumstances that will assure that such statements are not given undue weight or emphasis 1: holding that a witness could testify about statements made to him by a police department investigator because the statements were an admission by partyopponent and were thus not excluded by the hearsay rule 2: holding that defense witnesss incourt recitation of defendants out of court statements which where inaudible on surveillance videotape were not hearsay because they were statements describing ambiguous acts or verbal parts of acts 3: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made 4: holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the applicable substantive standard. Thus, if the substantive law required clear and convincing evidence to support an element of the claim or defense, the court might grant summary judgment if, in considering a motion for directed verdict on the same evidentiary basis, it would have concluded that the evidence presented was so \u201cone-sided\u201d it failed to satisfy the plaintiff\u2019s burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-14. Given this rule, in cases in which the burden is greater than a preponderance of the evidence, analytical constructs that turn on such concepts as \u201cscintilla of the evidence\u201d and \u201cslightest doubt\u201d are no longer useful. This court has already adopted Anderson\u2019s holding in conjunction with first amendment cases. See Dombey, 150 Ariz. at 486, 724 P.2d at 572 (<HOLDING>). There are, of course, other civil cases in Holdings: 0: holding that on a motion for summary judgment the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient and there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff 1: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff 2: holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to section 101 challenges 3: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 4: holding that where the new york times clear and convincing evidence requirement applies the summary judgment inquiry will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either plaintiff or defendant", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a landlord-tenant relationship, the court of appeals held that the dispute necessarily involved a dispute over title, which would require a court to determine the owner of the real estate by analyzing the contract for deed. Id. at 733-35. Consequently', on appeal,\" did not have jurisdiction to make such a determination. See Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Geldard, 214 S.W.3d at 209. When a court\u2019s void judgment, is appealed, we have jurisdiction t\u00f3 declare the judgment void and render judgment dismissing the c\u00e1se. Kilpatrick v. Potoczniak, No. 14-13-00707-CV, 2014 WL 3778837, at *2 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] July 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) (per curiam). We vacate the county court\u2019s judgment as void and dismiss the forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction. See id. (<HOLDING>). 1 . The notice was sent on behalf of \"the Holdings: 0: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 1: holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution 2: holding that personal injury action arising during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings was property of the estate 3: recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect 4: holding county courts judgment of possession was void because it was ren dered during pendency of bankruptcy stay and dismissing forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the form of a guaranteed minimum benefit. See IRS Rev. Rul. 2008-7, at 12 (\u201cOrdinarily, a period of zero annual rate of accrual followed by a period of positive annual rates of accrual would result in a plan failing to satisfy the 133 1/3% rule. However, because there is no ongoing accrual under the pre-conversion formula for these participants for service after the January 1, 2002 effective date of the conversion amendment, the lump sum-based benefit formula is the only formula under the plan ... and, pursuant to the special rule of \u00a7 411 (b)( 1 )(B)(i), that formula is treated as if it were in effect for all other plan years.\u201d). 19 . Again, although not binding, Revenue Ruling 2008-7 supports this interpretation of the statute and regulations. See IRS Rev. Rul. 2008-7, at 10-12 (<HOLDING>), 18-19 (noting that if the applicable interest Holdings: 0: holding that new rule applied purely prospectively primarily because of reliance factor 1: recognizing district court application of the same rule 2: recognizing rule 3: holding interest rate and conversion factor for future years constant in application of 13313 rule and applying the rule only prospectively 4: holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "must show that he is a \u2018refugee\u2019 within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, i.e., that he has suffered past persecution on account of \u2018race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,\u2019 or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution on these grounds.\u201d Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(42)). Once an asylum applicant has established eligibility for asylum, the decision whether to grant asylum rests with the discretion of the Attorney General, see 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(b)(1), and is generally not reviewable unless \u201cmanifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion,\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(4)(D); see also Melendez v. United States Dep\u2019t of Justice, 926 F.2d 211, 216-18 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). The BIA originally held that application of Holdings: 0: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 1: holding that while bias findings of fact informing decision whether applicant is eligible for asylum are reviewed for substantial evidence ultimate discretionary determination whether to grant asylum is reviewed for abuse of discretion 2: holding that a district courts decision on whether to hold a daubert hearing is reviewed only for abuse of discretion 3: recognizing that the decision of whether to give a jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court appreciates that there is a declining market for the PRRS vaccine which may limit the duration of Boehringer\u2019s patent. Moreover, Schering has informed the Court that Bayer Corporation and other companies now market competing vaccines which will also affect the PRRS market. Therefore, it appears that the PRRS vaccine market is more competitive now such that the ability to compensate Boehringer for its losses will be more difficult to determine. These limitations on the commercial success of Boehringer\u2019s patent and the effective duration of its patent, even if not caused by Schering\u2019s conduct, is an indication that Boehringer\u2019s Patent has a shortened duration and thus, Boehringer\u2019s need to enforce its right to exclusivity is more acute at this time. See Polymer, 103 F.3d at 975 (<HOLDING>); Bell & Howell Document Management Products Holdings: 0: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 1: holding that evidence that the infringer was not the principal or the sole cause of the patentees lost sales does not rebut the presumption of irreparable harm 2: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 3: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for child support from May 16, 1986, to March 18, 1989. That portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment which awards attorney fees to Lisa which were properly allocable to her attorney\u2019s representation of Gary is REVERSED, and we REMAND this cause to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount of attorney fees. In all other respects, the trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed. SMITH, J., concurs and dissents with opinion. 3 . We note that the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution has been held to be co-extensive with article 1, section 3 of the Texas Constitution. See Twiford v. Nueces County Appraisal Dist., 725 S.W.2d 325, 328 n. 5 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704, 711, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1944) (<HOLDING>). We base our interpretation of section 13.42 Holdings: 0: holding that white persons may state a claim under section 1981 and noting  the racial character of the rights being protected  1: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations 2: holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983 3: holding that states are persons but conceding that this change was not envisioned as broadening the class of persons who could be held liable under the act 4: holding that this section article 1 section 3 guaranteeing all persons equality of rights was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discrimination", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "violations of the law, had their applications granted in or around the same time Plaintiffs had their applications denied. Moreover, a number of the examples cited by Plaintiffs involved licensees who had been convicted of crimes unrelated to alcohol and none of the examples involved licensees who had been convicted of alcohol related crimes and who had provided false information on their application. Id. at \u00b6 36A. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for violation of their right to equal protection of the law because they have not shown that individuals similarly situated to Plaintiffs were treated differently. See, Vukadinovich v. Board of School Trustees of Michigan, 978 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 114 S.Ct. 133, 126 L.Ed.2d 97 (1993) (<HOLDING>) The Court grants Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss Holdings: 0: holding that default judgment could not be rendered after the defendant had served plaintiff with a copy of a motion to dismiss that had not then been filed 1: holding that the district court had discretion where plaintiff sought to amend a count that had been dismissed with prejudice 2: holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract 3: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 4: holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "faculty representatives. See \u00a7 23-40-104(l)(b), 7 C.R.S. (1997). 8 . We note that Tenth Circuit authority, while mirroring the three-factor analysis we adopted in Simon, recognizes this factor as most important. See Sonnenfeld v. City & County of Denver, 100 F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir.1996); Haldeman v. State of Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 473 (10th Cir.1994). 9 . Section 24-30-1517(2) excepts from coverage the University of Colorado at Boulder, Denver, and Colorado Springs and the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center. 10 . Our conclusion squares with the body of Tenth Circuit decisions which, applying a similar analysis, have consistently found state universities to be arms of the state. See, e.g., Watson v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 575, 577 (10th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Mascheroni v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Holdings: 0: holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits 1: holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 2: holding that utah waived eleventh amendment immunity by causing removal to federal court and litigating merits of 42 usc  1983 action 3: holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment 4: recognizing general proposition and specifically finding university of utah medical center entitled to eleventh amendment immunity", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 1566,1571 (11th Cir.1990). In this case, the summary to the Revised Commentary states that the Commentary \u201capplies and interprets the requirements of Regulation Z\u201d and that the revisions \u201cprovide guidance\u201d on certain issues addressed therein. 61 Fed. Reg. 14952. Moreover, for reasons discussed more specifically below, the Board\u2019s interpretation applying TILA and Regulation Z to pawnbrokers is in accordance with the prevailing law. Therefore, the Revised Commentary applies to the case at hand unless it is demonstrably irrational. The Board\u2019s application of TILA to pawnbrokers is not demonstrably irrational. Although few courts have addressed the issue, those which have uniformly hold that pawnbrokers are subject to TILA See Burnett v. Ala Moana Pawn Shop, 3 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hyde v. Hutto Enterprises, Inc., 1994 WL Holdings: 0: holding that  1447c applies to counsel 1: holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 2: holding tila applies to pawnbrokers 3: holding exemption applies to nondebtor 4: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction over plaintiffs entire complaint. Def.\u2019s Opp. at 3-10. The Court will decline to do so. I. Motion For Leave to File an Amended Complaint Defendant does not assert, and the Court does not find, that plaintiffs proposed amendments would trigger the Foman factors of undue delay, prejudice to defendant, or futility. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227. Plaintiff has amended her complaint only once before, and even if she is seeking to amend her complaint again solely to return to Superi- or Court, as defendants allege, this is not necessarily evidence of forbidden bad faith. If defendant\u2019s claims are correct, here, plaintiff has simply \u201cdeleted causes of action that ERISA completely preempts].\u201d Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, if the motions were denied, the ERISA Holdings: 0: holding that there was no waiver where attorney general appeared in federal court answered a complaint responded to discovery and later moved to amend its answer to the complaint in order to raise states eleventh amendment immunity 1: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 2: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 3: holding in an appeal from the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 that when the papers before the sixth circuit indicate that the plaintiff could submit an amended complaint that would state a claim upon which relief can be granted the proper course is to remand to permit the plaintiff to amend 4: holding that a plaintiff had not engaged in improper forum manipulation when she simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to drop claims that were completely preempted by erisa and to remand the case to state court", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was proper. The order of the trial court is therefore, AFFIRMED. SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. 1 . Section 440.49(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides workers\u2019 compensation coverage \"in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d Section 440.11(1) provides that the employer\u2019s liability for such workers\u2019 compensation \"shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer ... to the employee.\u201d 2 . Larson, supra, citing to Montanaro v. Guild Metal Prods., Inc., 108 R.I. 362, 275 A.2d 634 (1971). 3 . The employer did not object to this practice. See Serean v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 277 So.2d 732 (La.App.1973) cited in Larson's, supra at Section 21.60, (<HOLDING>). 4 .Whether this lobby was also used by the Holdings: 0: holding that accident which occurred thirty minutes before work was within the course where employee customarily showed up early and employer never objected 1: holding that employer did not have duty to protect allegedly intoxicated employee from risk that employee would have automobile accident after leaving work 2: holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment 3: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 4: holding that issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the question of whether an employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment for purposes of insurance coverage when the employee was simply sitting in his vehicle in his employers parking lot waiting for the business to open at the time the accident occurred", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere sur-plusage.\u201d Id. G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(d)(2) provides that a non-urban area may be annexed if it is \u201cadjacent, on at least sixty percent (60%) of its external boundary, to any combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an area or areas developed for urban purposes as defined in subsection (c).\u201d (emphasis added). CP&L properly notes that \u201c[o]rdinarily, when the conjunctive \u2018and\u2019 connects words, phrases or clauses of a statutory sentence, they are to be considered jointly.\u201d Lithium Corp., 261 N.C. at 636, 135 S.E.2d at 577. However G.S. \u00a7 160A-48(d)(2) does not use the word \u201cand\u201d alone; the statute also includes other words which bear on its meaning. See Builders, Inc., 302 N.C. at 556, 276 S.E.2d at 447 (<HOLDING>). Notably, the statute uses the word Holdings: 0: holding that a contract must be read as a whole in order to give a reasonable and harmonious meaning and effect to all of its provisions citation omitted 1: holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language 2: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 3: holding that a contract should be read to give reasonable meaning to all provisions of that contract 4: recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the progression of his kidney disease, much less prevented it. Dr. Atta\u2019s ultimate opinion was that no matter what Nurse Jordan did or didn\u2019t do, Mr. Clanton was going to progress to end-stage kidney disease. Dr. Atta opined that Kevin Clanton would live 29.7 years after his first kidney transplant, or until he is approximately 65 years old. Unlike Mr. Clanton\u2019s treating physicians and expert nephrologist, Dr. Atta opined that the half-life of a transplanted kidney is twelve years, and he believes Mr. Clanton will need only one more kidney transplant. Cathlin Vinett-Mitchell Cathlin Vinett-Mitchell was retained by the Government to develop a life care plan for Kevin Clanton. She is a registered nurse with a specialty in rehabilitat DAK, 2013 WL 595766, at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 15, 2013) (<HOLDING>); Duque v. United States, Case No. 05-1417, Holdings: 0: holding that physicians statement during the course of treating the plaintiff was admissible under rule 801d2d when offered against the government in ftca medical malpractice case 1: holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability 2: holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party 3: holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations 4: holding that statement about deceased veteran made by va intake clerk during an interview with va legal counsel was admissible under rule 801d2d when offered against the government in ftca medical malpractice case", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(same). In this case, as in OBert, there was no question that Rasanen\u2019s excessive force claim had to proceed to the jury. Brown claimed that he shot Rasanen while struggling to regain control of his own gun after Rasanen had lunged at the officer and Brown felt his gun pointed against him. Such a scenario plainly demonstrated \u201cprobable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm.\u201d Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694; see generally Florida v. Harris, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (describing probable cause as \u201cpractical,\u201d \u201ccommon-sensical,\u201d \u201call-things considered\u201d standard for assessing probabilities in particular factual context); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff never contended otherwise. Instead, Holdings: 0: recognizing probable cause as fluid standard that does not demand hard certainties but only the sort of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent men not legal technicians act 1: holding that probable cause inquiry is whether considering totality of the circumstances there is a fair probability that contraband  will be found in a particular place 2: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime 3: holding that probable cause does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false 4: holding that new york law reasonable cause standard is equivalent to fourth amendments probable cause standard", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "AT\u2019s claim for damages against OFC. Because OFC had not breached its finance lease, and had no contractual obligation to provide conforming goods, AT did not state a claim against OFC for which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Milledgeville Water Co. v. Fowler, 129 Ga. 111, 58 S.E. 643, 644 (1907) (\u201cwhere contract relations exist, the parties assume toward each other no duties whatever besides those the contract imposes\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the district court appropriately awarded fees to OFC under the terms of the lease, which provided that \u201cLessee shall reimburse Lessor for all charges, costs, expenses and attorney\u2019s fees.... \u201d See Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. Muscogee Iron Works, 265 Ga. 790, 462 S.E.2d 367, 368 (1995) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award 1: holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity 2: holding the contract was not authorized by law 3: holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages 4: recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(J.A. at 179.) The district court reasoned that \u201c[i]f the parents believed that [FBDS was] denying the hool Disk 200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 79 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that the IDEA\u2019S authorization to courts to grant \u201cappropriate\u201d relief \u201cencompasses the full range of equitable remedies and therefore empowers a court to order adult compensatory education if necessary to cure a violation\u201d); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir.1994) (same); Pihl v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir.1993) (same); Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Ed., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir.1991) (same); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Compensatory education involves Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal 1: recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years 2: recognizing appropriateness in some circumstances of award of compensatory education beyond age 21 and re manding for determination of whether it should be awarded 3: recognizing that family court cannot eliminate compensatory part of maintenance award 4: recognizing appropriateness in some circumstances of award of compensatory education beyond age 21 and remanding for determination of whether it should be awarded", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "S.W.2d 426, 431-2 (Mo. banc 1985). \u201cA duty may .... be imposed by the legislature or the common law based upon a relationship between the parties,\u201d or \u201cimposed by a court under the circumstances of a given case based upon what the tort-feasor knew or should have known.\u201d Strickland, 849 S.W.2d at 132; See also, Hoover\u2019s Dairy, Inc., 700 S.W.2d at 431. However, no duty is owed to persons outside \u201cthe orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance.\u201d Krause, 787 S.W.2d at 710, quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad fireworks company personally hable for employee\u2019s injuries where president personally held a board directly against spinning spool of fuse to prop it up, with the fuse catching fire and burning employee operating the machine); Tauchert, 849 S.W.2d at 574(<HOLDING>); Biller, 795 S.W.2d at 634(finding corporate Holdings: 0: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 1: holding summary judgment improper against employee where supervisor had personally arranged the faulty elevator hoist system 2: holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed 3: holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them 4: holding that where there was no evidence that program director was personally or directly involved in alleged violation of constitutional rights or that as supervisor she knew about allegedly unlawful conduct and facilitated approved or deliberately ignored it summary judgment was properly granted in her favor in  1983 action", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "We addressed a similar circumstance in Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2001). In Frazier, a crime-scene investigator challenged the district court\u2019s conclusion that his job\u2019s essential functions included being able to run, carry a firearm, and physically restrain offenders. Frazier, 254 F.3d at 1250-51. We agreed with the district court that these were essential functions, regardless of how infrequently a crime-scene investigator may have to do them. We explained that even \u201cassuming that an investigator may be required to perform these physical activities infrequently, the potential for physical confrontation with a suspect exists any time [the plaintiff] conducts a crime scene investigation.\u201d Id. at 1260; see Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees Holdings: 0: recognizing the potentially dire consequences of not requiring a corrections officer to be able to run restrain violent offenders or respond to emergencies 1: holding that a pro se party must be advised of consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion including an explanation that the failure to respond  may result in the district court granting the motion and dismissing the case 2: holding that unable to respond constitutes no response 3: holding that the secretary of corrections is not a law enforcement officer under the tca 4: holding that legitimate law enforcement interests were served by local police officers delay while waiting for state police officer to arrive to conduct dwi investigation because state officers had more dwi experience and local officers needed to be available to respond to emergencies", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provides that a statement made by a child is admissible only if, inter alia, \u201cthe child has at some time before the making of the statement received from the magistrate a warning that the child may remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement the child makes may be used in evidence against [him].\u201d Tex. Fam.Code Ann. \u00a7 51.095(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also \u00a7 51.095(a)(5). In Sosa v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a warning of rights made to any adult defendant that differs only slightly from the language of the statute governing the admissibility of evidence \u2014 in that case, article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure \u2014 complies with the statute as long as it conveys its exact meaning. 769 S.W.2d 909, 915-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Subsequent criminal cases, many unpublished Holdings: 0: holding that defendants prior arrests were insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel even though he told dea officers that he understood his rights 1: holding that defendants written statement was voluntarily made when he was read his rights three times during course of evening in accordance with miranda and article 3822 and on each occasion defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights that he wished to waive them and that he wished to talk with fbi agents 2: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 3: holding that defendant received requisite notice under rule 11 where inter alia he acknowledged at plea hearing that he had read the information understood it and discussed it with his attorney 4: holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is not the test.\u201d Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). III. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 and Constitutional Claims Defendants correctly argue that plaintiffs \u00a7 1983 claim, through which he seeks vindication of a variety of constitutional rights, is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The time limitations for \u00a7 1983 claims are governed by the state\u2019s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (\u201cWhen Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law ... \u201d); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004) (<HOLDING>). In Connecticut, the limitations period for Holdings: 0: recognizing a fouryear statute of limitation for fraud claims 1: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations set out in 28 usc  2244d applies to  2241 petitions 2: holding that new uniform fouryear statute of limitations in 28 usc  1658 only applies to lawsuits made possible by post1990 enactments 3: holding that fouryear residual statute of limitations applied to claim for commonlaw rescission 4: holding that 28 usc  2401 is a jurisdictional statute of limitations", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "be \u201cfutile\u201d because the state courts\u2019 procedural rules, such as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048-53 (1996); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a) & (b); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (post-conviction review is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding); 32.4(a); Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court\u2019s decision). A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty, 303 F,3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). This type of procedural default is known as Holdings: 0: holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief 1: recognizing untimeliness under ariz rcrim p 324a as a basis for dismissal of an arizona petition for postconviction relief distinct from preclusion under rule 322a 2: holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule 3: recognizing a defendant may seek postconviction relief pursuant to rule 32 ariz rcrim p on ground that trial counsel had been ineffective by inducing defendant to enter guilty plea 4: holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "serious potential risk of physical injury to another,\u201d 466 F.3d at 613-14, 615 (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Nonetheless he argues that, in light of language in other opinions and the Golden dissent, we should reconsider our holding in Golden. See Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727 (in dicta) (noting that future research establishing whether failures to report or return to jail actually present a serious risk of physical injury might call into question the characterization of such crimes as violent felonies); Golden, 466 F.3d at 616-19 (Williams, J., dissenting) (reasoning that failure to report to jail does not create a serious risk of physical injury, and opining that characterizing it as such raises due process concerns); United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). But in Chambers we recently rejected a Holdings: 0: holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of  4b12a2 2: holding that  16 encompasses conduct that constitutes a crime of violence ie breaking into and entering a persons home see ussg  4b12a2 burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence and conduct that almost certainly does not ie breaking into and entering a vehicle  3: holding that  459 is categorically a crime of violence under guidelines  4b12a2 because the usual or ordinary firstdegree burglary in california involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical violence and injury to others 4: holding that a peaceful failure to return to a halfway house is not a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a2 a provision analogous to  924e2bii", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of cocaine. We review the district court\u2019s denial of a section 2241 petition de novo, see Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1178, 120 S.Ct. 1214, 145 L.Ed.2d 1115 (2000), and we affirm. Quintero contends that the district court erred by dismissing his section 2241 petition, alleging that the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to file a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). This contention is without merit. The district court correctly determined that Quintero\u2019s claims were more properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255, and that his inability to bring a second or successive motion under section 2255 does not render federal habeas relief ineffective or inadequate. See Moore, 185 F.3d at 1055 (<HOLDING>); Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that a subcontract agreement could not circumvent the requirements of section 327a 1: holding that a petitioner may not circumvent the requirements of the aedpa by filing a section 2241 petition 2: holding that  2253clas requirements apply when a state habeas petitioner is proceeding under  2241 3: holding that utility customers mailing of a petition did not constitute the filing of the petition as filing was not effectuated until the petition was received by the clerk 4: holding that a petitioner may amend a habeas petition rather than filing a second or successive petition when the first petition has not yet reached a final decision", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a train of vehicles; that is registered in Indiana and manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1956, must be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear that, when lighted, complies with this section. The trial court construed this statute as requiring \u201conly that a motor vehicle be equipped with at least one (1) tail lamp mounted on the rear that when lighted emits a red light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear.\u201d App. p. 29. This construction of the statute apparently relies only upon subsection (a); however, subsection (c) applies to vehicles manufactured after January 1, 1956, such as Cunningham\u2019s vehicle undisputedly was, and requires two operating tail lamps. See Freeman v. State, 904 N.E.2d 340, 342-43 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). We recently re-addressed Section 9-19-6-4 in Holdings: 0: holding that court did not err by refusing to charge jury with exercise of judgment instruction where issue was whether nurse had duty to constantly monitor patient because case did not involve selection between one of two courses of treatment or two schools of thought 1: holding in light of several red flags  that brokers reliance on approval of firm and its lawyers did not negate finding that he acted willfully 2: holding in light of this courts decision in harkness ii that section 774 was not an unconstitutional infringement on this courts exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law 3: holding that section 91964 requires vehicles to have two constantly illuminated tail lamps that emit red light that a rearmounted brakeonly red light does not satisfy this requirement and stop of vehicle was justified where one of vehicles tail lamps was burned out 4: holding that a false light claim requires pleading and proof of special damages", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the portion of the statute affecting Sharper Image. As appellant. argues, however, \u201c[t]he demarcation between the favored and non-favored classifications of taxpayers in Eastern, i.e., between agricultural and fishing interests on the one hand, and airlines on the other, was not itself an unconstitutional distinction,\u201d whereas in this cas\u00e9 the line separating taxable and nontaxable publications has been drawn based on unconstitutional criteria, i.e., the contents of those publications. Because appellant\u2019s constitutional claim thus involves a content-based approach to taxation of publications, it does appear, contrary to appellee\u2019s assertion, that appellant has standing. See Arkansas Writers\u2019 Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1726-27, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) (<HOLDING>). See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 Holdings: 0: holding that publisher of general interest magazine had standing to challenge constitutionality of sales tax scheme which exempted sales of newspapers and religious journals even though it did not publish such newspapers or religious journals 1: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 2: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  3: holding that iowa sales and use tax law as amended is of general application 4: holding property lien for nonpayment of sales tax was beyond boroughs authority to collect sales tax", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "frauds. Mineral interests are treated as real property interests and are therefore subject to the rules relating to real property, including the statute of frauds. See Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 134 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997). Therefore, a lease of mineral rights for longer than one year must be in writing. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. \u00a7 26.01(b)(5). Thus, if the Letter Agreement here is a contract with a missing term, then it must meet the statute of frauds. If the future agreement is covered by the statute of frauds, then the agreement to make a future agreement must also meet the statute of frauds. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. C. Springs, 300, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (citing Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex.2007) (<HOLDING>)). If the Letter of Agreement is an agreement Holdings: 0: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 1: holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds 2: holding a court must find among other things clear evidence of the existence of an oral agreement for part performance to remove the contract from the statute of frauds 3: holding that where an oral contract was removed from the statute of frauds by clear and convincing evidence under arkansas law the defendant could not terminate the contract at its will only a contract of indefinite duration may be so terminated  4: holding sufficient part performance of an oral trust agreement is required to remove it from the statute of frauds", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.\u201d Id. {14} A statutory scheme providing for the receipt of government benefits may give rise to property interests protected by the due process clause. In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court determined that the private interest affected by state action was the claimant\u2019s continued receipt ofbenefits, which was a source of income, pending a final decision on his claim for Social Security disability benefits. See 424 U.S. at 339-40. Similarly, a private interest affected by state action is a claimant\u2019s continued receipt of welfare benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (<HOLDING>); Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (\u201ca person receiving Holdings: 0: holding that an administrator was not in substantial compliance with  1133 where the initial denial notice omitted one of the grounds later relied on for the denial of benefits 1: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 2: holding that the pretermination hearing has one function only to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare departments grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits citations omitted 3: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 4: holding that the district courts application of batson was clearly erroneous but then reviewing the record to make our own determination as to the validity of the objection", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that if the appropriator does not own the land he intends to irrigate, at least rightful possession - that is, a possessory interest - is necessary to his acquisition of a valid water right. This requirement is satisfied by lawful entry and settlement on public lands or a bona fide intent to acquire title to both land and water, or by one holding lands under contract for its purchase. Also acceptable is rightful possession of land under a contract with the owner the nature of which does not appear in the record. Hutchins, at 263-64. See also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 216 Mont. 361, 702 P.2d 948 (1895) (validating stockwater rights appropriated by lessees on and for use on school trust land, even though ownership accrued to state); Sayre v. Johnson, 33 Mont. 15, 81 P. 389 (1905) (<HOLDING>); Bullerdick v. Hermsmeyer, 32 Mont 541, 81 P. Holdings: 0: holding that appropriation protects the right of an earlier appropriator to the extent of his beneficial use against a later appropriator 1: holding that land that is permanently appropriated to an inconsistent use is abandoned 2: holding that subsequent patent did not convey lands that had previously been appropriated it is a familiar principle of public land law that statutes providing generally for disposal of the public domain are inapplicable to lands which are not unqualifiedly subject to sale and disposition because they have been appropriated to some other purpose the general words of the granting act are to be read as subject to such exception 3: recognizing validity of water right appropriated to irrigate land appropriator only occupied on public domain 4: recognizing validity of water rights appropriated on public domain for use on school trust land even though appropriator did not own or intend to patent place of use", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1150, 1155 (2d Cir.1978) (an employee \u201conly needs to demonstrate that [she] possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.\u201d). Tomassi suffered an adverse employment action because her employment was terminated. See Cordoba v. Beau Deitl & Assoc., No. 02 Civ. 4951, 2003 WL 22902266, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.8, 2003). Finally, the fact that her responsibilities were taken over by a newly-hired 25-year-old is enough to warrant the inference \u2014 at the prima facie stage \u2014 that Tomassi was the victim of age discrimination. See id. (terminating an employee in the protected age group while retaining a 27 year old and 34 year old is enough to warrant the inference that the plaintiff was the victim of age discrimination); see also Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, Insignia and MetLife can rebut Holdings: 0: holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar 1: holding that it is wellsettled that rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues presenting the case under new theories  or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple 2: holding that when a 56year old employee was replaced by a 40year old employee this qualified as someone substantially younger for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case 3: holding inference is warranted when a 67 year old is replaced by a 59 year old 4: holding that a change between old and new rules was fundamental to a degree that impacts our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs challenges to the old rules", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "this case, argued that \u201cthe sole significance of [roadlessness] is that the [roadless] parcel is potentially eligible for wilderness designation.\u201d Id. at 1077. Because the Forest Service was not required to consider permanent protection for the areas at issue, see id. at 1074 (citing the Washington State Wilderness Act, Pub.L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (1984)), the Forest Service maintained that \u201cthe fact that a parcel of ... land is roadless is, in itself, immaterial and need not be addressed in NEPA documents.\u201d Id. at 1078. We rejected that argument, observing that roadlessness has environmental significance apart from permanent wilderness preservation and, as a result, \u201c[t]hat the land has been released by Congress for nonwilderness use does not excuse the agency from comp ir.1997) (<HOLDING>). We review final agency action under \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding a rod to be final agency action 1: holding it well settled that a final eis or the record of decision issued thereon constitute  final agency action  2: holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action 3: holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized 4: holding that it appears wellestablished that a final eis or the rod issued thereon constitute the final agency action for purposes of the apa and collecting cases", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "must provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the property owner, see Systems Contractors Corp. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 571, 575-76 (5th Cir.1998) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)), for \u201c[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount,\u201d Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The \u201croot requirement\u201d of due process is \u201cthat an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.\u201d McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Dept. of Bus. Regulation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 37, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 58 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Here, the state provides unsuccessful bidders Holdings: 0: holding that a state court injunction was an adequate predeprivation remedy in a condemnation case where the property owner received notice 30 days before the demolition and could file an injunction that automatically halted any demolition plans by the city 1: holding that the relevant inquiry when assessing irreparable injury is whether there is an adequate remedy in the absence of an injunction 2: holding that the failure of the applicant to file a bond before the issuance of the temporary injunction renders the injunction void ab initio 3: holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case 4: holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "which was so inflammatory that it necessarily prevented a fair trial. Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir.1998); see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 923 (9th Cir.2006) (\u201cEven if there are no permissible inferences the jury can draw from the evidence in question, due process is violated only if the evidence is of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has made \u201cvery few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a violation of due process\u201d; specifically, it has never \u201cmade a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ.\u201d Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101; see McGuire, 502 U.S. at 70, 112 S.Ct. 475 (<HOLDING>). The court of appeal was not objectively Holdings: 0: holding violation of rule 23a does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief 1: holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation 2: holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process 3: holding that admission of relevant evidence generally not due process violation warranting habeas relief 4: holding that evidence of specific competitive injury establishes irreparable injury warranting injunctive relief", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). In this respect, she needs only to prove that she has suffered an adverse personnel action that was causally-related to her engaging in protected activity. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, 843 F.2d 1395, 1423 (D.C.Cir.1988). Here we have a proposed stipulation by the defendants that the plaintiff at all times relevant to her retaliation claim engaged in protected activity. This means that at the forthcoming trial the jury should be informed generally about the plaintiffs prior allegations of sexual harassment, but not about the specific events underlying the same. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence mandates such a procedure. See Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 702 F.2d 1037, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Thus, at trial, the jury shall be informed of Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true 1: holding that speech about financial assistance and handling racial discrimination does not qualify as protected speech 2: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 3: holding in a retaliation case that the trial court correctly excluded testimony about the details of the plaintiffs race discrimination complaint where the defendant had stipulated to the protected nature of the plaintifps speech 4: holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(6) whether the alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. In applying these factors, only the \u201cclearest proof\u2019 that a law is punitive in effect will overcome a legislative categorization to the contrary. Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 Pa. 487, 505, 832 A.2d 962, 973 (2003). There is not the \u201cclearest proof\u2019 of the seven factors that are required to demonstrate that 24 P.S. \u00a7 1 \u2014 111(e)(1) is so punitive in either its purpose or its effect so as to negate the General Assembly\u2019s intent that it be civil in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Regarding the first factor, while the lifelong ban from certain employment positions is hars 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898) (<HOLDING>). Regarding the third factor, the employment Holdings: 0: holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment 1: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 2: holding that the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction 3: holding that prohibiting felons from practicing medicine is not punishment 4: holding that forbidding felons from working as union officials is not punishment", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "also could have gone forward with filling its land without a permit. The cease and desist order (or, in this case, the injunction) was the point at which the agency first asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the landowner. Up to that point, no permit was required either in Tabb Lakes or here. To the extent Boise argues that the ESA did hot give the district court the power to enjoin logging without a permit, its argument is not well taken. First, as discussed above, a takings claim before'the Court of Federal Claims cannot ask that court to review the propriety of a district court\u2019s handling of a case. Second, as the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held, the district court did have the authority to enjoin Boise from logging. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the esa 1: holding that even though irreparable harm is not required it had been shown and weighed in favor of issuance of the preliminary injunction 2: holding that a threat to harm another person is a crime of violence 3: recognizing that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 4: holding that if defendants violated substantive or procedural provision of esa a court does not have traditional equitable discretion instead any threatened harm is per se irreparable harm and  public interest always favors the imposition of an injunction", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and which did not provide any indication of the grounds on which it was based. We noted that a requirement that District Courts accompany such orders with some articulation of their reasoning would not impose a serious burden, would assist parties in crafting appellate briefs responsive to dis-positive issues, and would clearly frame appellate review. Thus, we exercised our supervisory power \u201cto require the district courts in this circuit to accompany grants of summary judgment hereafter with an explanation sufficient to permit the parties and this court' to understand the legal premise for the court\u2019s order.\u201d Vadino, 903 F.2d at 259. Other situations in which we have established similar supervisory rules include, e.g., Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citation and internal quotation marks Holdings: 0: holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision 1: holding that a court entering a directed verdict pursuant to rule 50 should set forth an explanation sufficient to permit this court to understand the legal premise for the courts order 2: holding that appellate court will not remand a case to the district court for a violation of rule 50 if the district courts rationale is apparent from the record 3: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 4: holding that a trial court had the authority to impose a default judgment as a sanction for violating a rule 16 scheduling order pursuant to rule 37b2 stating we agree with the basic premise that a default sanction can under certain circumstances be an appropriate response to a violation of a rule 16 order after all the express terms of rule 37 permit a trial court to impose sanctions when a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of money, funds, or other assets from the financial institution. United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 580 (11th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 847 (4th Cir.1994)). Any conduct charged in the indictment which may have placed the bank at a financial risk occurred prior to June 19, 1987. Once Anderson had control of the money, the scheme ended. Otherwise, under the government\u2019s theory, the scheme could continue as long as Anderson maintained control of the money, thus defeating the purpose of criminal statutes of limitations. So long as she did not take part in any additional conduct that would have placed the bank at a separate, distinguishable risk, the statute of limitations continues to run. Cf. United States v. Meador, 138 F.3d 986, 994 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The conduct on which the government hangs its Holdings: 0: holding that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose 1: holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused 2: recognizing risks in construing statutes of limitations in favor of repose 3: holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 4: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiffs, the allegations do not satisfy their minimal pleading requirements. Accordingly, plaintiffs do not satisfy the requirements of prudential standing, and their Equal Protection claim is dismissed. Even if the court were to conclude that plaintiffs had standing to pursue their Equal Protection claim, it would nonetheless fail on the merits. As defendants correctly point out, any burden on the right to interstate travel here is minimal and insufficient to constitute a deprivation. They cite several cases in support of their contention that \u201csomething more than negligible or minimal impacts on the right to travel is required ...\u201d in order to invalidate a state action allegedly discriminating against the fundamental right to travel. Kan. v. U.S., 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also Barber v. State of Haw., 42 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 1: holding that the wright amendment an air traffic regulation restricting air traffic from love field in the dallasforth worth area did not violate the right to travel because any impact on interstate travel  even air travel to and from the dallasfort worth area  is negligible 2: holding that an air traffic controllers failure to report weather conditions from another faa location to a planes pilot was not negligent 3: holding that the construction of a median in a roadway that causes traffic traveling to and from an abutting property to travel a cireuitous route does not constitute a compensable taking under indiana eminent domain law 4: holding that time was compensable where the crew was required to travel in the employers vehicle to job sites", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of paternity, the party so requesting a jury has the right thereto.\u201d 4 In the trial court, respondent argued in his memorandum opposing the department\u2019s effort to change the trial from a jury trial to a court trial, in part: \u201cno legislative intent is present on the face of the legislation that would indicate a retroactive application of the legislation is appropriate. Absent such clear intention, the presumption is that the legislation should not be applied to pending cases.\u201d 5 The dissent resorts to legislative history without a determination that there is an ambiguity. The fact that two statutes appear to conflict does not amount to an ambiguity that would allow the court to rely on legislative history. See J.R. Simplot Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 321 Or 253, 262, 897 P2d 316 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Further, the dissent\u2019s analysis is Holdings: 0: holdingafter considering the statutes whole text legislative history and purpose  that a consumer fraud provision did not impose criminal sanctions 1: recognizing longstanding precedents that permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text 2: holding that even where there are  contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear 3: holding that the court does not examine legislative history when the statutes text and context are not subject to more than one plausible reading 4: holding that we may consult legislative history as an aid to the interpretation of ambiguous text", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Univ., 979 F.2d 552, 553 (7th Cir.1992). In this case, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Zakaras\u2019 claims were filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act. The \u201caccrual date\u201d of a plaintiffs claim is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run. Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir.1990). In cases of alleged discriminatory demotion (or termination), the period begins to run on the date the employee is notified that he will be demoted. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 259, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (\u201climitations periods commenced to run when the [adverse employment action] was made and [the employee] was notified.\u201d); see also Murrell v. USF & G Ins., 81 F.Supp.2d 912, 921 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>). The pivotal question, therefore, is when did Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 2: holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "dismissals of Counts I (Knowingly Presenting False Claims t strict court properly dismissed Smith\u2019s case in response to the violation. The procedural requirements of the False Claims Act, including its seal provision, \u201care not jurisdictional, and violation of those requirements does not per se require dismissal.\u201d Lujan, 67 F.3d at 245. Further, \u201c[n]o provision of the False Claims Act explicitly authorizes dismissal as a sanction for disclosures in violation of the seal requirement.\u201d Id. Thus, the False Claims Act, on its face, neither mandates nor expressly supports dismissal with prejudice. But we recognize that every other circuit to consider this issue has read such authority into the False Claims Act. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Summers v. LHC Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 287 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Lujan, 67 F.3d 242 (9th Cir.1995) (creating a Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to raise his constitutional claims in the military court system bars him from raising them in federal court 1: recognizing autonomy of state and federal bars 2: holding that the requirements for establishing a rehabilitation act violation are similar to those for establishing an ada violation 3: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal 4: holding that violation of the seal requirements bars qui tam plaintiffs from qui tam status", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "prior perjury conviction and her acknowledgment of guilt for that offense \u201c \u2018did not influence the [fact finder], or had but slight effect.\u2019 \u201d Clay, 262 Va. at 260, 546 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764, 66 S.Ct. at 1248, 90 L.Ed. at 1566). Because I believe our prior holdings in Cole and Craddock compel the conclusion that the trial court\u2019s error was not harmless, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 5 . Even if Pierce had later opted to testify, our case law would support the conclusion that this decision would not render harmless the court\u2019s knowingly erroneous admission of impeachment evidence in the Commonwealth\u2019s case-in-chief. Cf. Purvis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 298, 309-10, 522 S.E.2d 898, 903 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The majority asserts \"LeBray testified Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was harmless error 1: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 4: holding erroneous refusal to sever offenses in bench trial is not harmless error where only fact that would render refusal harmless is defendants decision to testify and clear evidence establishes that the trial court  used the harmless error doctrine  prospectively  as a basis to disregard an established rule of law  quoting hackney v commonwealth 28 vaapp 288 296 504 se2d 385 389 1998 en banc", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that this court has consistently approved of consideration by the district court as relevant conduct pursuant to \u00a7 lB1.3(a) conduct that was uncharged, that was charged in a count that was subsequently dismissed, or that was charged in a count of which the defendant was acquitted). We perceive no rational basis upon which to conclude that consideration of such relevant conduct for purposes of departure would create any greater difficul 5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (same); United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337, 341 (10th Cir.1990) (same), disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1118, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); and United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir.1990) (same), with United States v. Harris, 70 F.3d 1001, 1002-04 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); and United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 Holdings: 0: holding it was unfair for the trial court to rely upon factors already considered in the presumptive sentence as a basis for a durational departure 1: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts 2: holding that only factors specifically prohibited by the sentencing guidelines cannot form the basis for a downward departure 3: holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing 4: holding that conduct from dismissed counts cannot be relied upon as a basis for departure", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the time for filing them petition did not begin to run until their attorney received the BIA\u2019s decision on September 15, 2008, and that since their petition was filed less than 30 days later, it was timely filed under section 1252(b)(1). Even if the time for filing a petition for review begins to run only when the BIA mails its decision to the petitioner\u2019s, or petitioner\u2019s counsel\u2019s, address of record, Radkov v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir.2004) (dicta); Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting cases), but see Nowak v. INS, 94 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir.1996) (rejecting that proposition), that does not help petitioners here, who concede that the BIA mailed the decision to the correct address. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 392; cf. Radkov, 375 F.3d at 99 (<HOLDING>). Respondent suggests that petitioners may ask Holdings: 0: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen 1: holding that the bia did not err in putting the burden of proof to demonstrate grounds for granting a motion to reopen on the alien 2: holding that even if  the mailing  somehow went awry without any fault on the part of the bia that circumstance alone would not excuse the failure to file a timeous motion to reopen 3: holding that the bia does not err by denying a motion to reopen without an opposition from the government 4: holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Illinois, 386 U. S. 300 (87 SC 1056, 18 LE2d 62) (1967) (informant had provided information to affiant 15 or 16 times within the past year, resulting in numerous arrests and convictions); Clyatt v. State, 126 Ga. App. 779 (1), 781 (192 SE2d 417) (1972) (\"within the past 90 days the informant had furnished information which resulted in the arrest of one person and the recovery of various illegal drugs\u201d); Tomblin v. State, 128 Ga. App. 823 (1) (198 SE2d 366) (1973) (informant used \"numerous times\u201d in past and personally known to affiant for several years). Otherwise the police would be enabled to obtain search warrants to enter private homes on the basis of assertions so vague and conclusory that they could never be challenged. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, \u2014 U. S. \u2014 (57 LE2d 667) (1978) (<HOLDING>). In summary, we find that the language used in Holdings: 0: holding that a warrant was needed to perform an administrative search upon private property 1: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause 2: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 3: holding that a defendant has a right to challenge the factual assertions in a search warrant upon a preliminary showing that they are untrue 4: holding that the fourth amendment requires that a defendant be allowed an opportunity to challenge the veracity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is presumed when one spouse voluntarily separates from and abandons the other spouse without adequate legal reason. See Commonwealth ex rel. Udis v. Udis, 174 Pa.Super. 624, 101 A.2d 144, 145 (1953); 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 \u00a7 2 (1981). Moreover, the law fails to require that the abandoned spouse, Kim in this case, be blameless. See 27 Am.Jur.2d Proof of Facts 737 \u00a7 3 (1981); see also Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 172 A.D.2d 719, 569 N.Y.S.2d 107, 108 (N.Y.App.Div.1991). \u00b6 38. A determination of whether Kim\u2019s conduct rose to the necessary level should be based upon factual findings showing that Kim\u2019s fault factually supported an independent ground for divorce or an independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation. See Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 222 Va. 53, 278 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1981) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 39. The evidence in the record satisfied Holdings: 0: holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home 1: holding that temporary cessation of sexual relations for less than two months prior to wifes hospitalization where wife worked and financially contributed to the family was insufficient to show wilful desertion 2: holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was at least somewhat capable of supporting herself where evidence of wifes depression and other mental health problems was uncontested but where other evidence showed that these conditions did not totally bind her to the family home and that wife had been financially successful in the past 3: holding that defendant who had been married for ten years was the main breadwinner for wife and two children and did chores for wifes grandmother did not have unusual family circumstances 4: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than two months after protected activity", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as lacking in plausibility, and could reasonably have found 1950) (same); Kilduff v. Kalinowski, 136 Conn. 405, 71 A.2d 593, 594-95 (1950) (same). B. The Union\u2019s Liability 1. Standard of Proof The Union argues that the Johnsons\u2019 suit stems from a labor dispute and that therefore its liability should be governed by the \u201cclear proof\" requirement of the Norris-La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 106, infra. Johnson sued his labor union for the harassment he suffered after testifying against other Union members at an arbitra tion hearing. Whether the events underlying the suit can be characterized as a labor dispute for the purposes of \u00a7 106 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is a close question. See Columbia River Packers Ass\u2019n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145-47, 62 S.Ct. 520, 521-23, 86 L.Ed. 750 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained 1: holding that the district court erred in not determining whether the amount in controversy necessary to create diversity jurisdiction was met at the time of removal 2: holding that the critical element in determining whether the provisions of the norrislaguardia act apply is whether the employeremployee relationship is the matrix of the controversy 3: recognizing the motives of the officer as a critical factor in determining whether a particular instance of excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation 4: recognizing that the critical question is whether any present violation exists", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "passenger gua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy\" in the car or its contents. Id.; see also State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (finding defendant passenger did not have an expectation of privacy in the car itself where he left some personal items in the glove box). T9 Bissegger argues, however, that she has standing to challenge the search of her personal belongings left in a closed container in the car. Although Utah appellate courts have not addressed this precise issue, other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly held that a separate search of a car passenger's personal belongings left in the car gives the passenger standing to challenge the search. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); People v. Manke, 181 Ill.App.3d 374, 130 Holdings: 0: holding that a car passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his closed plastic shopping bag found on the floor of the car 1: holding that a car passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of his companions car 2: holding evidence did not connect defendant to narcotics found in individual bags inside a larger bag in a car following the defendants car when the only connection was his fingerprints on outer bag and when the driver and passenger of the car in which the drugs were found exhibited nervousness and other factors indicating consciousness of guilt 3: holding that car passenger had legitimate expectation of privacy in his jacket found crumpled on the back seat of car 4: holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "potentially actionable claim against it \u2014 patent infringement \u2014 lies exclusively in federal court. In sum, the City argues that, because there is no possibility of liability against it if suit were ever filed in state district court, the state district court, likewise, has no jurisdiction over the Rule 202 petition. Even if we were to agree that the state district court would have no jurisdiction over the City for the claims that U.S. Filter seeks to investigate, the district court would have jurisdiction over Altivia. For example, if the depositions reveal facts constituting a civil conspiracy between the City and Altivia, U.S. Filter could pursue a claim against Altivia, even if the City were immune. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (<HOLDING>); B.K. v. Cox, 116 S.W.3d 351, 358-59 Holdings: 0: holding that  1983 does not override a states eleventh amendment immunity 1: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 2: holding that immunity given judge under section 1983 does not inure to benefit of those accused of conspiring with him 3: holding that  1983 does not override states eleventh amendment immunity 4: holding that qualified immunity under  1983 does not apply to actions brought under  521", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to remain on bond pending sentencing. The court construed \u201cexceptional\u201d as meaning \u201ca unique combination of circumstances giving rise to situations that are out of the ordinary.\u201d See Lea, 360 F.3d at 403 (quoting United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1991)). It also favorably cited United States v. Lippold, 175 F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y.2001), which stated that \u201ccircumstances that are \u2018purely personal\u2019 do not typically rise to the level of \u2018exceptional\u2019 warranting release.\u201d See id. The court then concluded that there was \u201cnothing \u2018exceptional\u2019 about going to school, being employed, or being a first-time offender, either separately or in combination\u201d that merited the defendant\u2019s release pending sentencing. See id. at 403-04; see also Lippold, 175 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (<HOLDING>). The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of Holdings: 0: holding that hcv constitutes an objectively serious medical condition 1: holding that the district court erred when it departed based on defendants status as a single mother with three children under the age of four one of whom was being breastfed and where incarceration would require placing the children in foster care 2: holding that when the plaintiffs child was examined only once by a physician and was not required to be absent from day care for more than three days he had no serious medical condition within the meaning of the fmla 3: holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release 4: holding that the district court erred when it departed based on the defendants status as a single mother with three children under the age of four one of whom was being breastfed and where incarceration would require placing the children in foster care", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Justice \u00a7 6-3.6 commentary at 6.39-40 (2d ed.1982 supp.) (footnotes omitted and alterations made in James I ). 12 . See James II, 739 P.2d at 1316; see also Evans v. State, 822 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Alaska App.1991). 13 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316. 14 . Id. 15 . 663 P.2d 967 (Alaska App.1983). 16 . Id. at 970. 17 . Id. 18 . James I, 730 P.2d 811. 19 . - Id. at 814. 20 . Id. 21 . Id. at 814-15. 22 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1315. 23 . Id. 24 . Id. 25 . Id. at 1316. 26 . Kelly, 663 P.2d at 969. 27 . Id. at 970. 28 . James I, 730 P.2d at 819 (Singleton, J. dissenting). 29 . Id. at 815. 30 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316. 31 . James I, 730 P.2d at 815 (Bryner, C.J., concurring). 32 . O'Dell v. Anchorage, 576 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1978). 33 . See State v. Jones, 759 P.2d 558, 570 (Alaska App.1988) (<HOLDING>). 34 . James II, 739 P.2d at 1316; Kelly, 663 Holdings: 0: holding there is no constitutional right to an attorney much less an effective attorney in state postconviction proceedings 1: holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role 2: holding a defendant must either supply an affidavit from his former attorney or show why the attorney will not supply an affidavit 3: holding an arrestee has the right to contact an attorney but not a specific attorney who is unavailable when called 4: holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Corp., No. 02-681, 2007 Mass.Super. LEXIS 442, 2007 WL 3260199, *4-5 (Mass.Super.Ct. Sept. 25, 2007). But neither court held, as this Court does, that trial courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs\u2019 claims. Indeed, in concluding that a plaintiff suing for allegedly defective Gen-3 buckles stated a cognizable claim, a Florida court noted: This case turns on a relatively simple question, at least as to damages \u2014 Is a car with defective seatbelt buckles worth less than a car with operational seatbelt buckles? Common sense indicates that it is, but, at this stage of the case, we need not decide that issue. Rather, we only determine that Collins is entitled to go forward with her case. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d 988, 989-90 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Court relies in part on Rivera v. Holdings: 0: holding that no products liability claim lies in admiralty when commercial party alleges injury only to product itself resulting in purely economic loss insofar as the tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself 1: holding that allegations of intentional acts causing injury resulted in the complaint falling outside the coverage of an insurance policy insuring only against accidental injury 2: holding that florida consumer protection statute did not require that a defect manifest itself by failing to operate in an emergency or by causing injury  actual injury in form of insufficient product value was enough and whether allegations have merit remained to be decided 3: holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage 4: holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "error affected defendant\u2019s substantial rights requires the defendant to \u201cshow a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.\u201d United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). If there is \u201cevidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant\u2019s decision,\u201d there is no effect on the defendant\u2019s substantial rights. Id. at 84, 124 S.Ct. 2333. To affect a defendant\u2019s substantial rights, there must be \u201cnothing in the record [that] indicates that the defendant independently knew or was advised of the correct\u201d mandatory minimum sentence. United States v. Smagola, 390 Fed.Appx. 438, 442 (6th Cir.2010) (unpublished); see also United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 906 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). While the record does seem to show that Holdings: 0: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release 1: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses 2: holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule 3: holding that the failure to notify the defendant of the term of supervised release and its possible effect on his sentence was not harmless error where nothing in the record suggests that the defendant understood that his sentence would include supervised release and there was no written plea agreement by which he might have been warned 4: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that information.\u201d). Rather, Beckley sought to supplement that report with relevant evidence relating to the topic of most concern to the trial court-information that was otherwise absent. 5 . While there is some contention in the brief that the motion for a continuance was not filed as quickly as it could have been because of informal discussions occurring between the State and Beckley's trial counsel relating to further psychological testing, that evidence is not contained in the record and we do not consider it here. 6 . Even if the dissent were correct in noting that the trial court \u201cwas well informed as to the detail and extent of Beckley\u2019s perverse conduct,\u201d infra \u00b6 36, that is not the question. The question is whether Beckley was denied the statutory right to pre (S.D.1988) (<HOLDING>). Beckley's motion was filed six days prior to Holdings: 0: holding that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in denying a continuance because she acted within reason by accommodating the attorney 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance to allow defendant to present mitigating evidence in the form of letters and affidavits from family members when they were not requested until the day before the hearing 2: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance requested by telephone when the party requesting same was served with notice of the proceeding less than one hour before the hearing 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form 4: holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "case the debtor was clearly aware of the Plaintiffs\u2019 claim, as evidenced by the fact that the lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs led to the bankruptcy filing. Thus, equity requires the allowance of the informal proof of claim because debtor\u2019s sole argument is that Plaintiffs failed to follow a procedural step. Defendant Schoch argues that Nikolout-sos \u201cis distinguishable from the case at bar because the creditor in that case filed a Complaint to Determine Dischargeability and specifically told the Court that the Complaint was being filed as an informal proof of claim.\u201d [Docket No. 51, \u00b6 44, Response to Plaintiffs\u2019 Position Statement] While that may be accurate, an informal proof of claim can come in many forms. See, e.g., In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring  a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee 1: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 2: holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee 3: holding that letters notifying the trustee of a debt constitute an informal proof of claim 4: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "case: Equitable estoppel ... comes into play only after the statute of limitations has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because his conduct has induced another into forebearing suit within the applicable limitations period. considering equitable estoppel as an avoidance of the statute of limitations involved plaintiffs that recognized the basis for the suit during the limitations period. The law in the district courts of appeal, on which we relied in both Morsani and S.A.P., has been identical. Every case that has applied the doctrine to avoid a statute of limitations defense involved plaintiffs who knew of their cause of action (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (<HOLDING>); Salcedo v. Ass\u2019n Cubana, Inc., 368 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 1: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 2: holding that when the department of insurance acknowledged that it had received an accident report of a claim within the statute of limitations  it was thereafter estopped after the expiration of the statute of limitations to deny receipt of the claim 3: holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff 4: holding that failure of the property appraiser to strictly comply with statutory notice provisions tolls the running of the sixtyday period within which to bring an action contesting a tax assessment", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "photographs, items of personal hygiene, or other effects of a private nature whose public disclosure could offend a student\u2019s reasonable expectations of privacy. Here, however, the search of KP.\u2019s bag was conducted in the privacy of the principal\u2019s conference room. Only school officials, no students, were present. More importantly, the search was presumably limited in good faith to actions necessary to uncover a metal object like a pistol. Such a search would not include an intentional hunt for other contraband, although if discovered, such items need not be ignored. For example, such a search would not entail reading written materials, scrutinizing photographs, activating cellphones, or inspecting small pockets, crevices, wallets, containers, or purses too small to harbor a gun. U 6) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 Holdings: 0: holding that a random visual and manual search of bags and packages carried onto the new york city subway was minimally intrusive 1: holding that a search of bags carried onto an airplane was minimally intrusive 2: holding that random searches of subway passengers carryon bags which include the visual inspection of the contents of such bags to be minimal 3: holding tacit consent to search of person was insufficient to prove consent to search bags where bags were not in defendants actual possession defendant merely pointed out bags at officers request and officer never specifically asked for consent to search bags 4: holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to \u201cwillfully and unlawfully entering] a building with the intent to commit theft\u201d where the building was an \u201cinhabited dwelling house [or other residential building] ... within the meaning of Penal Code section 460.\u201d By pleading guilty, Rodriguez admitted the factual allegations in the indictment. See United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir.1995). Because Rodriguez\u2019s conviction included the unlawful entry requirement absent in California\u2019s statutory definition of burglary, his conviction meets the definition of \u201cburglary of a dwelling\u201d under Taylor and is, therefore, a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2L1.2, cmt. n. l(B)(iii); see also Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d at 852-52 (<HOLDING>). Rodriguez\u2019s alternate argument, that his Holdings: 0: holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary 1: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 2: holding that a california burglary conviction was burglary under a modifiedcate gorical approach because velascomedina pled guilty where the indictment alleged unlawful entry 3: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 4: holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "who received it. Finally, Mr. White\u2019s affidavit claims Continental has spent \u201cwell over $100,000 in promotion and advertising\u201d of its esp\u00ae product line over the past seven years, and has benefitted from the promotional efforts of its nationwide distributor, Fisher Scientific. (Id. \u00b6\u00b6 9, 15.) This evidence lacks probative value for a variety of reasons. Continental\u2019s alleged $100,000 promotional expenditure, over a seven year period, amounts to a paltry $15,000 per year, often the cost of a single advertisement in a national publication. Continental offers no evidence as to how it put these funds to use, nor does it provide a coherent explanation as to how these expenditures contribute to secondary meaning. See Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 872 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Notably, White fails to itemize the amounts Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses 1: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 2: recognizing importance of itemizing promotional expenses because not all such expenses contribute to the creation of secondary meaning 3: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 4: holding that in an agreement where the father agreed to pay reasonable expenses to the extent that such expenses are not provided by any scholarship grant or other assistance for his sons education those expenses did not include loan repayment because it was not one of the forms of enumerated assistance", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "repayment or it was convenient for him or her to do so, and the statute of limitations would begin to run at that time. Despite the evidentiary problems inherent in proving the state of the debtor's finances at various times before an action is initiated, some courts have found that this view is better aligned with the parties' intent and the general rules of contract law. See Annotation, 14 A.L.R. 4th at 1385; see also Rees v. Heyser, 404 N.E.2d 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (where individual sought repayment of oral loan which did not contain a definite time of repayment, the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the promise until a reasonable time for performance had elapsed); Phillips & Jordan Invest. Corp. v. Ashblue Co., 86 N.C.App. 186, 357 S.E.2d 1 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Because this intermediate approach emphasizes Holdings: 0: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 1: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage 2: holding in an action on a verbal agreement which failed to specify time for repayment that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until reasonable time for repayment had passed 3: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan 4: holding that where oral loan was silent as to the time of repayment the statute of limitations began to run at the time the contract was made", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "dispute. 342 So.2d at 106. Sunshine Associates filed various defensive pleadings including an answer with affirmative defenses. Sunshine Associates also responded to discovery requests. Id. It was only after B & H Sales moved for summary judgment that Sunshine Associates revealed that the correct name of the defendant was The Fusco Corporation, which had been doing business as Sunshine Associates. Id. at 106-07. On those facts, we concluded that applying the statute of limitations to bar the amended complaint would be \u201cmanifestly unjust\u201d because the mistake in naming the defendant was merely a misnomer. Id. at 107. Thus, we held that the amended complaint related back to the original pleading. Id.; see also Schwartz v. Metro Limo, Inc., 683 So.2d 201, 203-04 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Galuppi v. Viele, 232 So.2d 408, 410-11 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 1: holding that where incorrectly named defendant filed a motion to dismiss and an answer with affirmative defenses and actively participated in discovery it led the plaintiff to believe that the correct defendant had been sued and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to amend its complaint to correct the misnomer 2: holding that plaintiff failed to state a securities fraud claim based on a duty to correct since an alleged duly to correct did not appear anywhere in the amended complaint and did not enter the case until wright mentioned it for the first time in her opposition memoranda to the motion to dismiss 3: holding that a misnomer does not render a summary judgment void provided the intention to sue the correct defendant is evident from the pleadings and process such that the defendant could not have been misled 4: holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "cancellation. But we reject this argument because it obviates the phrase \u201cbenefits accrued.\u201d Under Louisiana law, we should not assume that two different terms in a statute are synonymous. See Colwell v. State, 506 So.2d 941, 944 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 508 So.2d 89 (La.1987); Spragio v. Board of Trustees of the State Employees Group Benefits Program, 468 So.2d 1323, 1326 (La.Ct.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 472 So.2d 32 (La.1985). Mrs. Gahn, on the other hand, argues that she \u201cincurred\u201d the expense for the treatment of her liver cancer when she was diagnosed with the disease, and she relies on prior interpretations of coverage provisions in insurance policies to support that position. See, e.g., Valladares v. Monarch Ins. Co., 282 So.2d 569, 572-73 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), writs denied, 284 So.2d 603, 604 (La.1973); Holdings: 0: holding that cost of plastic surgery to repair scarring was an expense incurred within one year of the accident even though the physician waited more than a year after the accident to perform the operation 1: holding that the debtor gave his prior express consent even though he didnt give his number until one year after debt was incurred 2: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 3: holding that an insureds personal belief that he was not liable for an accident provided no basis for submitting the question of the reasonableness of his delay in notification to a jury when the insured knew the day after the accident that it had been claimed that the cable he had installed had caused the accident 4: recognizing that in the usual case no information or evidence comes to light more than one year after imposition of sentence", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "outcome of the plea process.\u201d Id. At the evidentiary hearing on his motion, Movant made no assertions that his trial counsel failed to adequately explain the charges against him or failed to object to the factual basis underlying his plea. In fact, in his testimony at the evi-dentiary hearing, Movant asserted his trial counsel wrongly advised him to plead guilty because she had failed to investigate three potential witnesses and she failed to explore certain issues relating to one of the victim\u2019s in his case. Accordingly, the issue raised in Movant\u2019s point relied on was not presented to the motion court in his Rule 24.035 motion and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Day v. State, 208 S.W.3d 294, 295 (Mo.App.2006); see Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Mo. banc 1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, plain error review is not available Holdings: 0: holding ineffectiveness cannot be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court  cannot be raised  for the first time on appeal 2: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to the expedited removal process, we are not persuaded. Shunaula introduced no evidence before the IJ, and makes no argument on appeal, regarding the general nature of the expedited removal system. He argues only that due process was violated in his particular expedited removal proceeding, a complaint that does not fall within \u00a7 1252(e)(3). Even if Shunaula\u2019s complaint could be viewed as systemic, however, such a challenge can be brought only in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See supra n. 4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(e)(3)(A)). This action did not originate there. In concluding that \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(A) bars our review of Shunaula\u2019s claim, we join every other circuit to have considered this matter. See Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329-30 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133, Holdings: 0: holding that  1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order 1: holding that court did not have jurisdiction under 8 usc  1252a2a to hear aliens collateral attack on his order of expedited removal where he alleged illegality in attorney generals particular decision to remove him and in specific way his removal was carried out 2: holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal 3: holding that  1252a2a presents jurisdictional bar to collateral attack on expedited removal order 4: holding that under  1252a2a court lacks jurisdiction to inquire whether the expedited removal procedure to which the khans were subjected was properly invoked", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Circuit Judge. In November 2006, Domick R. Nelson defaulted on a consumer debt of $751.87. On February 25, 2015, she filed a Chapter 13 petition in bankruptcy court. Midland Credit Management, Inc., as agent for the creditor, filed a proof of claim in bankruptcy court for the amount of the debt. According to the proof of claim, Nelson made no payment on the debt after November 2006. Nelson objected to the proof of claim, arguing it was time-barred. See \u00a7 516.120(1) RSMo 2000; Discovery Grp. LLC v. Chapel Dev., LLC, 574 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). The bankruptcy court agreed, disallowing Holdings: 0: holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law 1: holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine 2: holding that substantive aspects of claims under federal discrimination statutes and fcra are identical 3: holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim 4: recognizing that missouri statutes of limitations are procedural not substantive and merely suspend the remedy without extinguishing the right", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was discriminatory. Pl.\u2019s Mot. at 4, 7-8; Pl.\u2019s Opp\u2019n at 6-8. Where a plaintiff seeks an inference of discrimination based on \u201cdisparate treatment,\u201d he must show that \u201call of the relevant aspects of [his] employment situation were \u2018nearly identical\u2019 to those\u201d of the other employees who did not suffer similar adverse employment actions. See Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding that a female plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment where comparator was both male and \u201clower in seniority\u201d than the plaintiff); see also Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C.Cir.1999) (finding that two employees were not similarly situated where one was a GS-12 and the other a GS-13); Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261-62 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the other employees the plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding codefendants were not similarly situated because one had a less extensive criminal history 1: holding that potential class members are similarly situated to the named plaintiffs if they are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay provisions 2: holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated 3: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated 4: holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "officials); Doe v. State of La., 2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir.1993) (concurring opinion) (noting that while \u201cthe actions of which Doe complains are egregious\u201d, that fact alone \u201cdoes not mean that he has asserted the violation of a federally protected right, as required by 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983\u201d); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir.) (\u201c[T]he Constitution is not a criminal or civil code to be invoked invariably for the crimes or torts of state educators who act in contravention of the very laws designed to thwart [abuse by teachers].\u201d), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990). In fact, this Court has even held that a rape perpetrated by a state official was not an act under color of state law. City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-09, 65 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that a janitorial workers sexual assault of a student deviated from his duties and was clearly outside of the scope of his employment 1: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment 2: holding neither a phone call by the police requesting an arrestee to come to the station for questioning nor the questioning of an arrestee at the station was a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment 3: holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment 4: holding that transportation of arrestee to police station is service of police under the ada", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the injurious instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligence.\u201d Id. at 33, 574 P.2d at 826. \u00b6 13 However, we decline to view Jackson as a departure from the rule that a claimant must identify, to a degree of probability, which of multiple defendants controlled the instrumentality that injured him. Notably, the court in Jackson did not reject, but rather reiterated, the general rule that a claimant must bring \u201ccircumstantial evidence supporting the inference that the defendant(s) probably is responsible for the harm to the plaintiff.\u201d Id. at 32, 574 P.2d at 825. And, since Jackson, our appellate courts have repeatedly applied the exclusive-control rule without correction from the supreme court. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Otis Elevator, 146 Ariz. 98, 101, 703 P.2d 1247, 1250 (App.1985) (<HOLDING>); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 50, 588 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings 1: holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings 2: holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties 3: holding res ipsa applies to two defendants in joint control of instrumentality 4: holding authority to control limits duty to control", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trading costs for the Fund, \u201cas the vast majority of the fixed income spreads ended up benefitting a third-party broker \u2014 East West \u2014 that provided nothing of value to the pension fund,\u201d as Mayer put it, concluding from comparison with the actual performance of the portfolios Great Northern managed and with bond indices in the relevant period that the Fund would have earned about $300,000 on the commission dollars diverted to East West, not counting investigation costs. Berkowitz concluded that Great Northern obtained disadvantageous prices due to the criminal conspiracy involving Roach, Tringale, and Close. Great Northern challenges the admissibility of the Fund\u2019s experts\u2019 testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Evidence that is inadmissible because it is Holdings: 0: holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant 1: holding future dangerousness expert testimony to be admissible 2: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 3: holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible 4: holding that expert testimony may be admissible even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community provided that it qualifies in some other way as reliable under federal rule of evidence 702", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Article 9 provisions apply to any assignment of accounts has also been developed in case law in states whose commercial codes substantially parallel provisions of U.C.C. Article 9. See Major\u2019s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., Inc., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.1979) (stating that Article 9 governs all transactions in accounts, including both sales of accounts and secured interests in accounts, thus even an outright buyer of accounts by definition has a security interest in the accounts which it purchases); Valley Bank of Nevada v. City of Henderson, 528 F.Supp. 907 (D.C.Nev.1981) (noting that any transaction intended to create a security interest in accounts and any sale of accounts falls within the scope of Article 9); and In re Cripps, 31 B.R. 541 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1983) (<HOLDING>). The official comments to the U.C.C., Holdings: 0: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision 1: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 2: holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 3: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 4: holding that where an outright buyer of accounts receivable failed to perfect her interest in debtors account by filing a financing statement the buyer could not prevail over the bankruptcy trustee as lien creditor", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the following five requirements to be entitled to reimbursement from the Section 443 Fund: (1) a supersedeas must have been requested; (2) the request for supersedeas must have been denied; (3) the request must have been made under Section 413 of the Act; (4) payments were.continued because of the order' denying supersedeas; and (5) in the final outcome of the proceedings, it was determined that such compensation was not, in fact, payable. See, e.g., H.A. Harper Sons, Inc. v. WCAB (Sweigart), 84 A.3d 363, 366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). As will be discussed in further detail infra, there is 'no dispute among the parties that the fund established under S\u00e9ction 443 does not permit reimbursement of attorney\u2019s fees. See Universal AM-CAN, Ltd. v. WCAB (Minteer), 870 A.2d 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (<HOLDING>). 4 . As noted, the County's reimbursement Holdings: 0: holding that attorneys fees could notbe reimbursed from the section 443 fund 1: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 4: holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be  reasonable under the circumstances", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under section 1915(d) without prejudice. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315 (5th Cir.1993). 3 . Denton v. Hernandez, \u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). 4 . Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1734. 5 . Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1985). These options are, of course, unnecessary in cases where the facts alleged are \"fantastic or delusional scenarios\u201d or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is \"indisputably meritless.\" Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). 6 . Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); McCrae v. Hankins, 720 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1983); Mitchell v. Sheriff Dept., Lubbock County, Tex., 995 F.2d 60 (5th Cir.1993). 7 . See, e.g., Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 1: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 2: holding that during a postriot lockdown refusal of access to main law library is constitutional as long as access to basic law library for initial legal research is permitted 3: holding that prisoner did not have right to access law library because he had courtappointed counsel 4: recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the trial court re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18. In determining that the trial court reversibly erred in granting the Motion (and that the Insureds\u2019 motion for rehearing should be granted), the majority relies on its conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18. But, contrary to the majority\u2019s conclusion, in their Motion for Rehearing, the Insureds assert that the trial court did re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18; however, the Insureds claim that they did not receive notice that the Motion had been re-set until March 18. The Insureds state that \u201cgiving notice on March 18 \u2014 the day summary judg 14-04-00064-CV, 2004 WL 2933575, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>); Rios v. Texas Bank, 948 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 Holdings: 0: holding appellant waived her complaint that trial court gave her no notice of summaryjudgment hearing by not raising the objection in the trial court 1: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 2: holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection 3: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard 4: holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "been violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. \u00a7 704; Realmuto v. Department of Transportation, 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 613, 637 A.2d 769 (1994); Swoyer v. Department of Transportation, 156 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 626 A.2d 1247 (1991), appeal dismissed, 533 Pa. 318, 623 A.2d 321 (1993). 4 . Unless the context \"clearly indicates otherwise,\u201d the term driver refers to any \"person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.\u201d Section 102 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 102. 5 . Moreover, the purpose behind the acknowl-edgement requirement of section 1541 is not furthered by its application to Smith. The requirement of submitting an Acknowledgement Form is to ensure that the driver has notice of the suspension. See Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Here, Smith does not argue that he did not Holdings: 0: holding that police chiefs suspension letter omitting statutorily required information about process for appeal of suspension did not deprive hearing examiner of jurisdiction over suspended officers appeal and require reinstatement of officer 1: holding the state did not meet its burden of proving defendant operated a motor vehicle while suspended where the only evidence of actual notice of suspension was that dot mailed defendant the notice of suspension 2: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 3: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 4: holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "v. Chamberlin, 206 Neb. 808, 295 N.W.2d 391 (1980). While we have held that one may in good faith make an occupational change even though that change may reduce one\u2019s ability to meet financial obligations, we have never determined whether the termination of one\u2019s employment due to one\u2019s own bad acts or fault constitutes good cause justifying modification or termination of alimony payments. See Cooper, supra. Other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated, \u201cAlthough unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modific (employing good faith test to determine whether decrease in income should justify decrease in alimony); Antonelli v. Antonelli, 242 Va. 152, 409 S.E.2d 117 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Giesner v. Giesner, 319 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. Holdings: 0: holding that premium reduction was legal where the insured had given consideration for reduction 1: holding that husbands knowledge of his obligation of support and his subsequent election to enter employment that would substantially reduce his income and make it impossible to meet his obligations would not justify reduction in support 2: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith 3: holding that reduction in income resulting from voluntary employment decision does not require corresponding reduction in payor spouses support obligations even if decision was reasonable and made in good faith 4: holding that fathers criminal activity resulting in incarceration did not constitute material change in circumstances justifying reduction in or termination of his child support obligations", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and C (Nelson Dep. at 13;24-14:12). They also caused the duplicative second lawsuit to be filed. This Court and the Fifth Circuit rejected the individual Defendants\u2019 defense that they never read the LLC Purchase Agreement before signing it. # 52 at 5-6; # 55; # 170 at 2 (\u201cDallas Gas erred in not reading the addendum that effected the release, and Dallas Gas ratified the release by keeping the sums received under the contract.\u201d). Where a court has previously held that an unambiguous release and covenant not to sue bars the plaintiffs claims, the plaintiffs breach of the release and covenant not to sue may be deemed \u201cobvious\u201d as a matter of law, and the sued party is entitled to damages. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 957 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir.1992) (applying New York law) (<HOLDING>). See also McKissick v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int\u2019l, Holdings: 0: holding that where an action is brought in obvious breach of covenant not to sue court has wide discretion to impose liability for litigation expenses including attorneys fees 1: holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party 2: holding that trial court has wide discretion in determining sufficiency of foundation for opinion testimony 3: holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "WL 370461, at *4 (Minn.App. July 8, 1997) (stating that while section 197.46 specifically allows the veteran\u2019s right to appeal, \u201cboth parties have the same right to appeal\u201d), review denied (Minn. Sept. 3, 1997). These decisions cited Schrader as support. Stafne, 1998 WL 778931, at *3; Rollins, 1997 WL 370461, at *4. The district court relied on Schrader and Stafne as support for its dismissal order; Eldredge relies on Rollins in addition to Schrader and Stafne. But as unpublished cases, Stafne and Rollins are not binding authority. Minn.Stat. \u00a7 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2008) (stating that \u201c[u]npublished opinions of the [c]ourt of [ajppeals are not precedential\u201d). And although unpublished cases may have persuasive value, see Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.App. 1993) (<HOLDING>), because Stafne and Rollins did not involve Holdings: 0: holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect 1: holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential 2: holding onejustice opinion has no precedential value 3: recognizing that unpublished decisions issued after january 1 1996 are not controlling precedent but may be considered persuasive authority 4: recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "costs in the trial court on March 27, 2012. Analysis Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation when the inmate claims inability to pay costs. In its 2011 session, the Texas Legislature amended Chapter 14. Prior to the amendments, Chapter 14 \u201capplie[d] only to a suit brought by an inmate in a district, county, justice of the peace, or small claims court in which an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs [was] filed by the inmate.\u201d In its pre-amended state, it was clear that \u201cChapter 14 [did] not apply to appellate courts.\u201d Nabelek v. Garrett, 94 S.W.3d 648, 649 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. dism\u2019d w.o.j.); see Jackson v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). The amendments to Chapter 14 became effective Holdings: 0: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged to be cause for the procedural default of other claims is itself an independent claim subject to the procedural requirements of exhaustion 1: holding that court had no obligation to inform pro se litigant of procedural requirements due to clear evidence in record including inter alia defendants mention of requirements in summary judgment motion that litigant knew requirements 2: holding that remand was necessary when the alj failed to adhere to  4041527d2s procedural requirements and noting that a de minimis violation of those procedural requirements may qualify as harmless error 3: holding procedural requirements of section 14004 inapplicable to appellate filings 4: holding frady inapplicable", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "other acts providing there is a \u2018reasonable\u2019 basis ... to ... permit[] an inference that defendant had an aberrant sexual propensity that makes it more probable that he or she committed the sexual offense charged\u201d). \u00b6 15 Nor were the offenses so remote in time that evidence of each would not have been cross-admissible due to the danger of unfair prejudice. The attacks on Yolanda, Karen, and Melissa occurred within a three-month period. Although the attack on Alisa occurred two years and nine months before the attack on Yolanda, this time interval did not require the trial court to find that the probative value of the evidence of each attack was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Cf. State v. Arner; 195 Ariz. 394, 395 \u00b6 1, 988 P.2d 1120, 1121 (App. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Rule 404 cmt. to 1997 amendment (remoteness Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 1: holding that a bankruptcy court did not err in ordering repayment over five years 2: holding that before a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence of the victims character for violence there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was the first aggressor and that once the defendant testified that he was attacked and cut by the victim without provocation before using the victims utility tool to stab the victim the defendant was clearly entitled to question the victim about past acts of violence reflected in court documents from the state of oregon 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding trial court did not err by permitting evidence that defendant molested another child three years before the victim", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "those who live in such humble circumstances to dwell there. That they cannot afford to have their own kitchens and bathrooms, and hallway access thereto, does not render such areas \u201cpublic\u201d with respect to the constitutional prerequisites for permissible entry by the police .... We should vigilantly guard against permitting ... inroads upon the reasonable expectations of privacy of the lesser situated of our citizens who are forced by economic circumstances to reside in rooming houses. People v. Garriga, 189 A.D.2d 236, 596 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (citation omitted), leave to appeal denied, 82 N.Y.2d 718, 602 N.Y.S.2d 815, 622 N.E.2d 316 (1993). We are aware that other courts have reached a contrary result on this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1976)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Perkins, 286 F.Supp. 259, Holdings: 0: holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest 1: holding that the defendant committed assault under section 70813 where he came into the apartment for about two seconds with a gun in his right hand held the gun straight down at his side said wrong door then closed the door and started knocking on the other apartments door 2: holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house 3: holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful 4: holding that rooming house residents had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the front hallway of the house they shared which was not obviously a rooming house open to the general public", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Gualberto Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (\u201cBIA\u201d) summarily affirming an Immigration Judge\u2019s (\u201cIJ\u201d) denial of his motion to reopen deportation proceedings after he was ordered deported in absentia. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1105a(a). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890-91 (9th Cir.2002). We grant the petition. The IJ abused his discretion by denying Chavez\u2019s motion to reopen. See Jerezano v. INS, 169 F.3d 613, 615 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Chavez stated in his motion to reopen that Holdings: 0: holding that denying a petitioners motion to reopen when he arrived 15 to 20 minutes late was an abuse of discretion 1: holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it 2: holding that an order denying a petitioners motion to reopen proceedings so that he could apply for adjustment of status was not a judgment regarding the granting of relief and was thus reviewable 3: holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss under 11 usc  707a 4: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to adequately plead an offer to tender the Plan's shares back to Defendants. After briefing on Defendants\u2019 motion, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint which included an offer of tender. Thus, Defendants' argument on that point is moot. 25 . The applicable statute of limitations in this case is governed by \u00a7 13 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 77m. As discussed in detail infra, \u00a7 13 has both a 1-year and 3-year limitations period. Truly, the 3-year period is a statute of repose, not of limitations. P. Stolz Family Partnership L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 99-107 (2d Cir.2004); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 997 F.2d 39, 52 (5th Cir.1993) (judgment vacated on other grounds); Eureka Homestead Soc. v. Zirinsky, 1995 WL 542482, *2 (E.D.La.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because the parties have referred to \u00a7 13 in Holdings: 0: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose 1: recognizing that tilas statute of repose acts to limit the clouding of a propertys title 2: holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed 3: holding that statute of repose acts as an outer limit or ceiling within which all suits must be brought 4: holding that the 3year limit is a period of repose", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at 467 (describing the practical problems that would ensue if tolling were not permitted in opt-in class actions). It also would place on the court the burden of timing class certification and implementing opt-in procedures in such a way as to make sure that the limitations period was met. This would be virtually impossible in cases such as this, where suit was filed late in the period. See, Brief of Amici Curiae Larry J. Rhutasel et al. at 11-12 (unintentional procedural delays in ruling on class certification would terminate putative class members\u2019 claims if tolling did not permit putative members to opt in to a representative suit after the statute of limitations had run). Such a holding also would create an anomalous difference 8, 139-140, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we agree with the reasoning of the Holdings: 0: holding that congress intended to adopt a standard more stringent than the prepslra second circuit standard 1: recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies 2: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 3: holding that terry  parental unfitness  standard is more stringent than the dependency best interests standard 4: holding that the standard for assessing whether a justiciable controversy exists should not be more stringent in lawsuits seeking a declaration of patent invalidity or noninfringement than in nonpatent fields", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "anatomical areas.\u201d Id. at 1503-1504. When terms are defined, however, a vagueness argument generally fails. See e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, supra, 427 U.S. at 60-62, 96 S.Ct. at 2447-2448, 49 L.Ed.2d at 320-321; Berg v. Health & Hospital Corp., supra, 865 F.2d at 803. See also State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 166, 475 A.2d 31 (1984). Here, N.J.S.A 2C:33-12.2 clearly defines specified sexual activity. In addition, N.J.S.A 2C:33-12.2a(4) contains the verb \u201cfacilitate,\u201d which has uniformly been found not to offend the vagueness doctrine. See e.g., Matter of Kaster, 454 N.W.2d 876 (Iowa 1990) (reasoning that proscribed criminal activity was clearly defined and \u201cfacilitate\u201d in the context of a forfeiture statute was not vague); People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Colo.1987) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bush, 195 Mont. 475, 636 P.2d 849, Holdings: 0: recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim  1: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 2: holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes 3: recognizing broad definition of proscribed tools which facilitate burglary reflected legislatures understanding that a burglars choice of tool is limited only by his imagination and ingenuity 4: holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "damage to the tracks was done by the work of an independent contractor whom Chessie did not sue. The district court granted summary judgment on the trespass and negligent claims as a result, and Chessie does not ask us to review those decisions. Chessie\u2019s idiosyncratic problems with its state-law claims do not provide a sound basis for finding an implied right of action, which would use congressional silence to work broad changes in the relationship between federal and state law affecting railroads. Finally, to support its argument for an implied right of action, Chessie cites court cases and administrative decisions in which the ICC Termination Act has been held to preempt various state laws. See, e.g., Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Bickham, 602 F.Supp. 383, 384 (M.D. La. 1985) (<HOLDING>), aff\u2019d mem., 775 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1985); Holdings: 0: holding that under colorado law tjortious interference with a prospective business relation requires a showing of intentional and improper interference preventing formation of a contract 1: holding that railroads servitude could not be extinguished under state law and enjoining servient estate owners interference with railroad operation 2: holding that a claim for tortious interference with inheritance exists under texas law 3: holding federal court was not precluded by antiinjunction act from enjoining florida state court after state court entered a preliminary order 4: holding that to the extent compliance with the flsa interferes with the state budgetary process that interference is caused by state law not federal law", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "improper voir dire questions, a party must make a timely, specific objection at the earliest possible opportunity. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The State asked the jury panel members whether they would require more evidence than one witness if they found the witness to be credible and believed the State proved all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt through that witness. Appellant did not object until after the State had directed the question to two panel members, and one of those potential jurors had further dialogue with the State about the question. Accordingly, appellant did not object at the earliest possible opportunity and waived the issue for our review. See Thrift v. State, 134 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet. granted) (<HOLDING>). Appellant\u2019s first issue is overruled. Holdings: 0: holding error was not preserved where matter was explored with jury panel before defendant objected 1: holding that where the trial court is on notice of error in seating the panel before the jury is sworn and the error is not corrected automatic reversal is required 2: holding that error was preserved when defendant objected to question regarding defendant was under arrest immediately following question about postarrest event sufficient to put trial court on notice of appellants state constitutional grounds for objection 3: holding issues not raised before the district court are not preserved for appeal 4: holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "State\u2019s decision to characterize that failure as a finding drat K.S. was incompetent to testify. Yet the record demonstrates the State consistently and adamantly characterized Simpson\u2019s efforts to prevent the witness from testifying as a disqualification issue and repeatedly urged the district court to conduct a hearing on her competency as required by statute. The district court\u2019s failure to focus on the State\u2019s argument or to provide any clear basis for its ruling should not fall upon the State. Instead, I would hold that the district court clearly abused its discretion by failing to identify or isolate any legal basis for its harsh ruling despite the State\u2019s efforts to provide the court with a framework for doing, so. See State v. Hernandez, 294 Kan. 200, 207, 273 P.3d 774 (2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention 1: holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions 2: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion 3: holding trial court abused its discretion when it denied a motion for mistrial after erroneously concluding an issue could be dealt with at sentencing 4: holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "cited in City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 588. Accordingly, by 2003, germaneness had evolved to a standard of \u201cwhether the court can fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various subjects included in the statute under review.\u201d City of Phila., 838 A.2d at 587. Nevertheless, we cautioned that we should be careful not to render Section 3 \u201cimpotent to guard against the evils that it was designed to curtail\u201d by fashioning a theme that is all-encompassing in its broadness. Id. at 588 (citing, e.g., DeWeese v. Weaver, 824 A.2d 364 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (finding the theme \u201cbusiness of the courts\u201d too encompassing to uphold a law regulating DNA records and apportioning negligence liability); Pa. Ass\u2019n of Rental Dealers v. Com., 123 Pa.Cmwlth. 533, 554 A.2d 998 (1989) (<HOLDING>)). Thus, in City of Philadelphia, Holdings: 0: holding that the topic of economic wellbeing of the commonwealth would turn the germaneness requirement into a nullity 1: holding the appellant was guilty of transporting illegal substances into the commonwealth the moment he crossed the border into virginia which took place well before they were discovered 2: holding that the petitioner may not turn a clerical error into a windfall of rights it would not otherwise enjoy internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth 4: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "right to free speech and association under the First Amendment\u2019) with Compl. at 7 para. (1) (requesting an order \u201d[d]eclaring that Defendants are unlawfully depriving plaintiffs of their right to engage in organization and other expressive activity in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.\u201d). Defs.' Reply at 6 n. 6. 6 . The Court concludes that because Counts I and II of the plaintiffs' complaint are barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the Court need not address whether these counts state a claim for which relief may be granted. 7 . See Orange, 59 F.3d at 1273 (finding that the plaintiffs speech was a matter of public concern because it regarded \"potential fraud at a public university.\u201d); Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935-36 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Speech is not of public concern \"when it is Holdings: 0: holding that a public employees internal memoranda raising concerns about public corruption are protected first amendment speech because they addressed a matter of public concern 1: holding that issues of prison security public safety and official corruption are matters of public concern 2: holding police officer is a public official 3: recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern 4: holding that a public employees deposition testimony involves a matter of public concern if arguably a statement about misconduct or corruption in city government and regardless of whether testimony is given in employees official capacity", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "arises, of course, because many formulary orders are not meant to convey anything as to the reason for the decision. Attributing a reason is therefore both difficult and artificial. We think that the attribution necessary for federal habeas purposes can be facilitated, and sound results more often assured, by applying the following presumption: where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground. If an earlier opinion \u201cfairly appear[s] to rest primarily on federal law,\u201d Coleman, [\u2014 U.S. at-], 111 S.Ct. at 2559, we will presume that no procedural default has been invoked by a subsequent unexplained order that leaves the judgmen 2d 737, 738 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>); see also People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, Holdings: 0: holding batson challenge untimely because objection made after all jurors were sworn 1: holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection 2: holding that defendant waived any objection to a peremptory strike against a minority juror by affirmatively accepting jury immediately prior to its being sworn without reserving earliermade objection 3: holding objection to jury selection process waived where not raised until after entire panel had been sworn 4: holding that objection was timely even though objection was not made until after question was answered", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.1982), therefore, does not assist Sandoval-Vasquez. There, we ruled that officers\u2019 entry into a business they knew was closed violated the Fourth Amendment. In this case, however, the officers entered an open business. Sandoval-Vasquez also attempts to distinguish Tolar on the basis that the officers here entered the premises with their weapons drawn, yelling that they were police officers and ordering the occupants against a wall. The officers\u2019 entry in Tolar, in contrast, was peaceful. Sandoval-Vasquez thus maintains that in addition to entering the business shortly before it closed, the officers\u2019 manner of entry into his business rendered the entry unlawful. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that the Holdings: 0: holding that the common law knockandannounce principle forms a part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 1: holding that commonlaw knock and announce principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the fourth amendment 2: holding common law knockandannounce principle forms part of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry 3: holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure 4: holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "No. A-201, April 1997 Edition,\u201d an industry standard. And in Avatar Properties, Inc. v. Greetham, 27 So.3d 764, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), although a home warranty was not attached to a purchase and sale agreement, \u201cthe agreement state[d] that the warranty was available for examination at [the seller\u2019s] offices and, that upon request the warranty would be attached as an exhibit to the purchase and sale agreement.\u201d The buyers initialed that paragraph, signaling an intent that the warranty be incorporated into the main contract. Id. at 766-67. During the formation of the contract in this case, Tradewinds expressed no similar intent to incorporate the \u201cterms and conditions.\u201d See also Mgmt. Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627, 631-32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we affirm the order of the Holdings: 0: holding that purchase contract for computer software referred to license agreement indicated where it could be obtained and provided it with software sealed with the warning by opening this packet you indicate your acceptance of sellers license agreement 1: holding that the uniform commercial code specifically encompassed a software licensing agreement 2: holding that licensing agreement controlled the scope of the users rights in the software 3: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 4: holding the following express language binding upon receipt  of an accepted counterpart of this letter our agreement to purchase from you and your agreement to issue sell and deliver to us  the captioned securities shall become a binding agreement between us emphasis added", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "over KOH\u2019s claims arises independently under article XI, section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution in light of specific provisions therein protecting native Hawaiian rights. Second, Respondent/Appellee-Appellee Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) was required to hold a contested case hearing prior to the issuance of a conservation district use permit (CDUP or permit), as a matter of constitutional due process, because Respondent/ Ap-pellee-Appellee University of Hawaii (UH) had a \u201cproperty interest\u201d in the CDUP, and the issuance of the CDUP would adversely impact KOH\u2019s ability to engage in native Hawaiian traditional and customary practices as protected by art. XII, \u00a7 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawaii 64, 881 P.2d 1210 (1994) (<HOLDING>). Third, jurisdiction arises under the public Holdings: 0: holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause 1: holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest 2: holding that constitutional due process protections mandate a hearing where the issuance of a permit implicating an applicants property rights adversely affects the constitutionally protected rights of other interested persons who have followed the agencys rules governing participation in contested cases 3: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 4: holding that a rule which affects only the process of enforcing litigants rights and not the rights themselves does not exceed the constraints of the rules enabling act", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or in privity with a party in the first action.\u201d Id. at 802 (emphasis in original). The second requirement need not detain us. Fullerton pled guilty to a violation of Tex. Penal Code \u00a7 19.02. By entering this plea, he admitted that he intended to kill his victims or at least knew that his actions would cause their deaths. In other words, his convictions were valid because he admitted that the deaths were not accidents. The convictions are inconsistent both with the Buckners\u2019 suggestion that Fullerton\u2019s delusions made the shootings acts of self-defense and with their contention that he was legally insane during the incident. If the criminal proceedings decided anything, it was that the shootings were not \u201coccurrences.\u201d See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 352-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). The first and third requisites for issue Holdings: 0: holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime 1: holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime 2: holding that a brady violation is waived by guilty plea 3: holding that a judicial confession in a guilty plea is itself sufficient evidence to support the crime charged 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "condition, which the evidence primarily addressed and which United received for the first time on appeal. Thus, the physician suggested that United have Hall attend an IME if it intended to allow benefits based on Hall\u2019s current condition. United immediately contacted Hall and set the IME within the extension deadline. A few days later, United sent another letter to Hall explaining this exact argument. Thus, United concludes that its request for an IME was made in good faith. The Court agrees. Accordingly, the Court finds that United\u2019s plan allows it to require Hall to attend an IME during the appeal process and that Hall\u2019s refusal to attend the IME resulted in him not exhausting his administrative remedies. See Zalka v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 65 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1371 (S.D.Fla. 1998) (<HOLDING>); accord Hunter, 251 F.Supp.2d at 111-12 Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs refusal to submit to an ime and immediately filing suit precluded the defendant from completing its administrative reviewing of her claim 1: holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea 2: holding that the timely filing of an administrative charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to bringing suit 3: holding that the plaintiff was precluded from asserting her failure to promote claim as a continuing violation 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to raise a claim in an administrative complaint with osha precluded pursuing that claim in district court", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Am. v. SPM Flow Control, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 761, 785 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted, judgm\u2019t vacated w.r.m.). A claim need not demand an exact amount or list every element of damage. Id. \u201cThe abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court\u2019s factual findings as they relate to prejudgment interest; but the de novo standard applies to the trial court\u2019s application of the law to the facts.\u201d Figueroa v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). When settlement credits are at issue, the declining-principal formula should be used, under which settlements are credited w W.3d 819, 824-25 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that trial court abused its discretion in 2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Because the trial court must revisit Holdings: 0: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 1: holding that issues not fairly presented to the trial court are waived 2: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 3: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal 4: holding that arguments not presented to the district court in response to a motion for summary judgment are waived", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Johnston argues, as he did in the postconviction court, that he is exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because his severe mental illness places him in the same category as those whose executions are barred because they were under the age of eighteen at the time of the murder or are mentally retarded. The court below denied relief, finding Johnston\u2019s claim was procedurally barred for not having been raised on direct appeal or in prior posteonviction proceedings and because, under this Court\u2019s precedents, mental illness is not a per se bar to execution. We agree with both these conclusions. Relying on the reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court\u2019s rulings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (<HOLDING>) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 Holdings: 0: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime 1: holding the death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defendants 2: holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment 3: holding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed 4: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation\u201d indicates that once a claimant receives permanent partial disability benefits he or she is not eligible for any other benefits. The plaintiff responds that this court previously has concluded that a claimant can receive total incapacity benefits after having received permanent partial disability benefits and nothing in the present case requires a departure from this precedent. We agree with the plaintiff, and conclude that in interpreting the language and interrelationship of \u00a7\u00a7 31-307, 31-308 (b) and 31-315, we do not write on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of this language and the statutory scheme. See Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Over the course of the last 100 years, this Holdings: 0: holding that absent unusual circumstances this court must apply the plain meaning of a statute 1: recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term 2: holding that  12z does not require this court to overrule prior judicial interpretations of statutes even if not based on plain meaning rule 3: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 4: holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Vance, 231 F.3d at 261. Several Sixth Circuit cases also suggest that liability is appropriate where the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to known prior acts of harassment by the same perpetrator against victims other than the plaintiff, although these cases ultimately declined to find liability because the particular fact patterns did not support a finding that the defendant both had notice of these prior incidents and acted with deliberate indifference. See McCoy v. Board of Educ. of Columbus City Schs., 515 Fed.Appx. 387 (6th Cir.2013); Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Schs., 469 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.2006); Williams ex. rel. Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2005) ; see also Lopez v. Metro. Gov\u2019t, 646 F.Supp.2d 891 (M.D.Tenn.2009) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court finds that there Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants notice of prior harassment against victims other than the plaintiff can give rise to title ix liability so long as the defendant possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which the plaintiffs legal claim is based 1: holding that school districts are hable for peer sexual harassment in their schools under title ix only if they have actual knowledge of the harassment and act with deliberate indifference in response to it 2: holding that title vii does not address samesex harassment 3: holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola tive of title vii  although vinson was a sexual harassment case the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases 4: holding that the plaintiff must establish that a supervisors harassment was within the scope of his employment and that the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively when it learned of the harassment", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "strategy of \u201chumanizing\u201d or showing only the good characteristics of a defendant is not necessarily deficient where the strategy is \u201c \u2018dictated\u2019 by the defendant\u2019s insistence on his innocence.\u201d Sliney v. State, 944 So.2d 270, 285 (Fla.2006) (citing Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998)). However, in both Sliney and Rutherford, the trial attorney had a sound reason for believing the omitted mitigation would have been harmful in some respect to the defendant\u2019s case. In Sliney, the defendant was examined by a mental health expert prior to the penalty phase, and the report supplied to counsel contained substantial harmful information about the defendant and would have been inconsistent with other mitigation. Id. at 283; see also Sexton v. State, 997 So.2d 1073, 1084 (Fla.2008) (<HOLDING>); Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 348 Holdings: 0: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 1: holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence 2: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present mental mitigation that would have opened the door to testimony that the defendant was a sadistic sexual psychopath 3: holding that defendant cannot object to counsels attempt to rebut proposition once defendant has opened door to line of testimony 4: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "moved to dismiss at the March 8 hearing. It was therefore defendant\u2019s responsibility to present evidence of materiality at that time. See id. at 274. Defendant failed to do so. Thus the only record evidence concerning the issue of Argyle\u2019s materiality is the above-quoted exchange between the trial court and defense counsel, which took place at the December 10 hearing. We therefore address whether that evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding. The December 10 exchange between the trial court and defense counsel reveals that defense counsel was not able to make a plausible showing that Argyle\u2019s testimony would be favorable to the defense, but rather could only speculate as to how he thought Argyle might testify. Cf. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Utah 1984) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as delineated infra in our analysis Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to introduce evidence of witnesss pending indictment when witnesss testimony regarding defendants participation in murder was virtually identical to witnesss written statement which was sworn to on day of murder and prior to offense for which witness was indicted 1: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to parse witnesss testimony or to have it replayed in its entirety 2: holding that hospitalization of witnesss wife and his desire to be by her side was not a substantial basis for admitting witnesss testimony from first trial 3: holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility 4: holding that where no description of witnesss evidence offered and no suggestion made as to how testimony would affect defendants case trial court did not err in refusing to issue certificate ordering witnesss attendance", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "impose on Louisiana abortion providers. In the context of a challenge to the provisions of a regulatory scheme, such as that at issue here, hardship will often result first and foremost from the \u201cadverse effects of a strictly legal kind\u201d inherent in the provisions at issue. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665. The Supreme Court has explained that such legal harms inhere in laws or regulations that, for example, \u201ccommand [some]one to do ... or to refrain from doing [something; ... grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; ... subject [some]one to ... civil or criminal liability; [or] create ... legal rights or obligations.\u201d Id.; accord Nat\u2019l Park Hospitality Ass\u2019n v. Dep\u2019t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Texas, 497 F.3d at 499 (recognizing Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that a creditor may take a security interest in a licensees liquor license 1: recognizing that adverse effects of a strictly legal kind may amount to a showing of hardship where a regulation inter alia modifies a plaintiffs formal legal license or subjects a plaintiff to  civil  liability quoting ohio forestry 523 us at 733 118 sct 1665 2: holding that the statement failure to pay will leave our client with no choice but to consider legal action did not violate  1692e5 by threatening legal action because at most the language  threatened that the creditor will have to consider legal action and therefore no action of any kind is threatened by defendant collection agency 3: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 4: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Digital Technologies Corp., 306 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr.D.Del.2004) (\"In fact an overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that liability insurance policies fall within \u00a7 541(a)(l)\u2019s definition of estate property.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted) (citing In re Matter of Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1995)). 30 . In re Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at 509; see In re SN Liquidation, 388 B.R. at 584 (\"Who owns the proceeds of an insurance policy presents a more complicated issue and requires a more careful analysis.\u201d); In re CyberMedica, Inc., 280 B.R. 12, 16 (Bankr.D.Mass.2002) (observing that \"courts are in disagreement on whether or not insurance proceeds are property of the estate.\u201d) (emphasis in original); e.g., In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 298 B.R. 49 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>); In re First Central Financial Corp., 238 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate 1: holding the real estate sale proceeds 2: holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate 3: holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate 4: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "inconsistent with federal law and, therefore, preempted. Fla. Stat. Section 812.014(1) defines theft more broadly than the crime defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 661; the Florida statute makes punishable not only a taking but also knowing usage or attempts to use the property of another with intent to either, temporarily or permanently, deprive the other person of a right or benefit of the property or appropriate the property to his own use. Fla. Stat. \u00a7 812.014(1). Defendant would be subjected to additional punishments inconsistent with maritime law, including treble damages and payment of attorney\u2019s fees and costs if Fla. Stat. Sections 812.014(1) and 772.11 were applied. GE Seaco Servs., Ltd. v. Interline Connection, N.V., No. 09-23864-CIV, 2011 WL 98406, at *5 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 12, 2011) (<HOLDING>). Florida\u2019s civil theft statutory scheme does Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 1: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 2: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages 3: holding the attorneys fees and treble damages provisions of fla stat section 77211 are incompatible with maritime law 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "attaches an importance to prompt delivery, or simply because he desires to reduce shipping costs selectively. If selective cost savings were sufficient grounds to use a private courier to carry letters, the Private Express Statutes would be effectively nullified. 44 Fed.Reg. 40,076 (July 9, 1979) (emphasis added). Despite the soundness of this reasoning, the USPS proceeded in this case to ignore it, indeed to contravene it directly, by justifying an unqualified suspension solely on the selective cost and service benefits to businesses engaged in international commerce. This approach is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Cf. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1091-92 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 913, 108 S.Ct. 1088, 99 L.Ed.2d 247 (1988) (<HOLDING>). The Postal Service replies that it did Holdings: 0: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 1: recognizing the public interest exception 2: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 3: recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters 4: holding that agency administering a public interest standard did not engage in reasoned decisionmaking when it focused only on the economic impacts accruing to one segment of the power consuming public", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "submit that he would not have pled to \u00a7 924 had he known of the term. He bases his claim strictly on a procedural rule violation which he cannot do under \u00a7 2255. Even if the Court\u2019s error is a proper subject of collateral relief, the error did not affect Mr. Cooke\u2019s substantial rights. The Presentence Investigation Report noted the mandatory term of supervised release; in addition, the Court informed Mr. Cooke of the mandatory term at his sentencing hearing. Mr. Cooke failed to object to that information either in the report or at sentencing. Mr. Cooke\u2019s own conduct, or lack thereof, proves that his substantial rights were not affected by the Court\u2019s error. See United States v. Carey, 884 F.2d 547 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067, 110 S.Ct. 1786, 108 L.Ed.2d 787 (S.Ct.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since Mr. Cooke\u2019s substantial rights were not Holdings: 0: holding term of supervised release tolled while defendant was in state custody 1: holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release 2: holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release 3: holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands 4: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the duration of the proceedings, to cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses, and to call and subpoena witnesses on the defendant\u2019s own behalf. See generally Rule 5-302 NMRA. {17} Because grand jury proceedings are conducted by a prosecutor acting under the indirect supervision of the grand jury judge, we rely on the structural protections of the grand jury statutes and procedural rules to preserve the target\u2019s rights and the integrity of the grand jury process. If the target of a grand jury investigation establishes, pretrial, that the grand jury proceedings were conducted in violation of these structural protections, the target is entitled to dismissal of the indictment and is not required to demonstrate prejudice. See, e.g., De Leon v. Hartley, 2014-NMSC-005, \u00b6\u00b6 16-17, 316 P.3d 896 (<HOLDING>); Davis, 1977-NMSC-049, \u00b64 (holding \u201cthat the Holdings: 0: holding that the supervisory control of the district court may be exercised through its equitable jurisdiction 1: holding district court should have abstained pursuant to younger and thus remanding to district court to dismiss without prejudice 2: holding that the prosecuting attorneys failure to instruct grand jurors on the record of the elements of the relevant criminal offenses warranted dismissal of the indictment without a showing of prejudice 3: holding that there was no prejudice where had the district court allowed the moving party the proper opportunity to respond the evidence would have been properly in front of the district court 4: holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not limited to disputes between nonprofit entities. Conditions Precedent Teco asserts Valero has failed to comply with contractual conditions precedent to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Valero, on the other hand, maintains that whether it has satisfied any condition precedent is a question for the arbitrator, not the court. In support of this contention, Valero cites several federal cases construing the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 149 (5 th Cir.1987); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 838 F.Supp. 1156, 1158 (N.D.Tex.1993), aff'd, 47 F:3d 750 (5 th Cir.1995). We note that in construing the TGAA, there is a conflict among Texas courts of appeals on this issue. See, e.g., D. Wilson Constr. Co., 988 S.W.2d at 395 (<HOLDING>); City of Lubbock v. Hancock, 940 S.W.2d 123, Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court must determine whether an agreement to arbitrate was reached when several contracts the subject of a class action allegedly did not contain an arbitration provision 1: holding that court should consider issues relating to making and performance of agreement to arbitrate 2: holding that the trial court must determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate when the party contesting arbitration claimed she had never signed the contract or intended to be bound 3: holding that a condition was precedent to performance because the contract language did not explicitly state that it was precedent to formation 4: holding the trial court may determine issue of condition precedent to enforcement of agreement to arbitrate", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on defendant\u2019s long arrest record plus adjudicated criminal history without following \u00a7 4A1.3 in its \u201cholistic evaluation\u201d of \u00a7 3553(a) factors and affirming above-guidelines sentence); United States v. Perez-Molina, 627 F.3d 1049, 1049-51 (7th Cir.2010) (concluding that district court did not err in disregarding \u00a7 4A1.3 because it also relied on other \u00a7 3553(a) factors in imposing sentence that doubled high end of guidelines range). Nor was there any error in the court\u2019s consideration of the pending Wisconsin charges during the \u00a7 3553(a) analysis because a sentencing court may further consider facts already taken into account during the guidelines calculations. See United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 951(7th Cir.2010); United States v. Tockes, 530 F.3d 628, 633 (7th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We are even less persuaded by Adams\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence 1: recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award 2: recognizing appellate courts discretion to consider issues raised in the district court but not resolved there 3: holding that a trial courts consideration of a new pending charge at a sentencing hearing for the purpose of determining a pattern of conduct and defendants character was not improper absent a showing that the trial judge used the pending charge in determining defendants sentence 4: holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "circumstances of Strada\u2019s murder. Id. at 1312 (citations omitted). The robberies clarified the relationship between Mandacina, McGuire and Earlywine. The robberies brought both McGuire and Earlywine to Kansas City on numerous occasions to obtain firearms through the Mandarinas and to launder money. Most importantly, the robberies explained why McGuire would entrust Earlywine with knowledge of the Strada murder and why Mandacina would discuss a contract murder with McGuire, in Early-wine\u2019s presence, without fearing that he would be reported to the authorities immediately. In light of the above, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. The trial court need not issue a prior crimes limiting instruction sua sponte. See United States v. Williams, 994 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). We see no reason to treat the admission of Holdings: 0: holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error 1: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error 2: holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the district courts failure to give a limiting instruction addressing rule 404b evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise the issue on appeal 3: holding that the district court did not commit plain error in admitting physical evidence of the defendants prior drug arrest in addition to the fact of the arrest itself when the evidence was relevant under rule 404b and the district court gave a limiting instruction 4: holding that district courts incomplete 404b limiting instruction did not warrant reversal because district court told defense counsel what limiting instruction it would give and defense counsel did not object or request a more specific instruction", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of 9-mm ammunition. In response to Israel\u2019s objections to the presentence report, the probation officer noted that the search also resulted in the seizure of video-surveillance equipment and $1,047 in cash. The district court found that Israel possessed the firearms in connection with drug trafficking, noting that there had been a number of controlled buys from Israel, that he was in possession of cocaine when the search warrant was executed, that the firearms were hidden, that there was \u201ca lot\u201d of ammunition, and that scales and other indicia of drug trafficking were found. The district court expressed concern about Israel\u2019s possession of a firearm with a large capacity magazine: \u201cI really don\u2019t know why anybody would have one of those for any reason.\u201d See Taylor, 648 F.3d at 433 (<HOLDING>). Israel argues that the temporal remoteness of Holdings: 0: holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence 1: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense 2: holding that the type of firearm and whether it is loaded are also considerations 3: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 4: holding that a relevant factor to consider in determining the applicability of the fortress theory is whether the type of firearm found in that case an automatic assault rifle is one that is commonly used by drug dealers", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 913 (2d Cir.1985). In essence, the plan becomes a binding contract between the debtor and the creditors and controls their rights and obligations. See In re Kentucky Lumber Co., 860 F.2d 674 at 679 (6th Cir.1988). \u201cAbsent special language in the plan, two propositions seem clear as a result of the substitution of plan obligations for pre-confirmation obligations. First, creditors may engage in all lawful collection activities to enforce plan obligations; second, creditors may not take any steps to collect pre-confirmation obligations.\u201d Lander and Warfield; A Review And Analysis Of Selected Post-confirmation Activities In Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 62 Am.Bankr.L.J. 203, 217 (1988). See also Paul v. Monts (In re International Plastics, Inc.), 906 F.2d 1468, 1474-76 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION The Debtors\u2019 confirmed plan became Holdings: 0: holding that confirmation of a chapter 11 plan creates a binding contract which may be enforced in state courts 1: holding that the good faith analysis for evaluating a chapter 11 petition and that in evaluating a chapter 11 plan are distinct 2: holding that provision in chapter 13 plan discharging postpetition interest on a student loan is binding on creditor under theory of res judicata where objection was not raised prior to plan confirmation and confirmation order was not appealed 3: holding that boilerplate language in a confirmation plan is binding if confirmed 4: holding that a confirmed chapter 13 plan is binding on all parties under 11 usc  1327a however the plan may be modified pursuant to 11 usc  1329", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "price increase. 17 Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the regulation directly advanced the State\u2019s interest, it did not dispute the District Court\u2019s conclusion that the evidence suggested that, at most, a price advertising ban would have a marginal impact on overall alcohol consumption. Id., at 7-8; cf. Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Attorney General, 142 Mich. App., at 311, 370 N. W. 2d, at 336 (explaining that \u201cany additional impact on the level of consumption attributable to the absence of price advertisements would be negligible\u201d). 18 Outside the First Amendment context, we have refused to uphold alcohol advertising bans premised on similarly speculative assertions about their impact on consumption. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S., at 715-716 (<HOLDING>); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff 2: holding that easements using terms telephone telegraph and communications could properly be utilized for both internal communications and for thirdparty voice and data communications 3: recognizing state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal legislation 4: holding ban preempted by federal communications commission regulations", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as those presented by three other cases, Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930 (9th Cir.1999), Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.1998), and Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856 (9th Cir.1999), where plaintiffs endured multiple harassing incidents over two or more years. In reaching this conclusion, the district court appears to have impliedly adopted a legal standard that would require plaintiffs to suffer more than one incident of sexual harassment over a number of years in order to establish a hostile work environment. However, no such requirement exists or should be implied. Indeed, one incident of sexual harassment may suffice to establish a viable claim if it is sufficiently severe. See, e.g., Little v. Windermere, \u2014 F.3d -, -, 2002 WL 84237 at *5 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, Holdings: 0: recognizing this principle in the childpornography context 1: recognizing this principle as a settled rule 2: recognizing this principle in the failure to hire context 3: recognizing principle 4: recognizing principle but finding evidence at first trial sufficient", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "absence of probable cause to believe the detainee has a mental disorder. (2) Recognition of Mental Disorder Harvey asserts that Perez\u2019s deposition testimony supports a finding that Perez did not have any training as to \u00a7 5150 detentions beyond initial academy training. Harvey argues that had Perez been given additional training, Perez would have realized there was no probable cause to believe Harvey\u2019s behavior was the result of a mental disorder. Where a plaintiff bases a Monell claim on the theory that the training provided on a specific subject is insufficient, the plaintiff cannot prevail by offering, without more, evidence that the government entity miscalculated the amount of time necessary to adequately prepare its employees. See Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 814, 112 S.Ct. 65, 116 Holdings: 0: holding evidence police department trained officers for three to four hours in the use of tazer guns without more was insufficient to establish monell claim noting failure to provide a more lengthy training program suggests at most negligence on the part of the employer in miscalculating the amount of time necessary to adequately prepare its officers 1: holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter 2: holding that the plaintiff had offered insufficient evidence to establish deliberate indifference in a failuretotrain claim in part because the plaintiff did not present evidence that the training received was inadequate or evidence of any specific additional training that the employees should have received 3: holding that the pittsburgh police department did not illegally terminate an officers hla benefits and that the police department was entitled to a subrogation interest against the officers thirdparty settlement 4: holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "eviction), interpreted in Wagoner v. Bennett, 814 P.2d 476, 481 (Okla.1991); Okla.Stat. tit. 41, \u00a7 124 (providing a tenant -with an action when a landlord makes an unlawful entry). Therefore, any \u201cother invasion of the right of private occupancy\u201d is appropriately interpreted as also requiring an invasion of a real property right. The clear weight of authority in other courts defines this term precisely as we have suggested. See Red Ball Leasing, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 915 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1990) (applying the rule of ejusdem generis to the personal injury definition of \u201cother invasion of the right of private occupancy\u201d to determine that under Indiana law, it \u201cprecludes covera 766, 215 Cal.Rptr. 416, 421-22 (1985) (same); Harbor Ins. Co., 1989 WL 112532, at *1 (<HOLDING>). Instead of creating an ambiguity, the term Holdings: 0: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 1: holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication 2: holding that under california law policy language referring to wrongful entry eviction and invasions of the right of private occupancy pertains to torts against the real property of another 3: holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute 4: holding that a direct physical invasion of the property was not necessary under the 1876 constitution for a taking to occur", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as to the appropriate legal standard to be applied.\u201d DiBiasi, 988 So.2d at 459.\u2019 \u201cCatrett v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 996 So.2d 196, 199 (Ala.2008).\u201d Moon v. Pillion, 2 So.3d 842, 845 (Ala.2008). Legal Analysis The elements of a claim of malicious prosecution are: (1) institution of a prior judicial proceeding by the present defendant, (2) a lack of probable cause, (3) malice on the defendant\u2019s part, (4) termination of the prior proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff, and (5) damage. Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 831-33 (Ala.1999). The parties agree that there is no dispute that Burnett instituted a criminal proceeding against Ravenel; that the criminal proceeding was terminated in favor of Ravenel, see Chatman v. Pizitz, Inc., 429 So.2d 969 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>); and that Ravenel sustained damages. \u201cIn this Holdings: 0: holding that defendants successful completion of pretrial intervention program in one county and the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the relevant charges in that county barred subsequent prosecution in a separate county for charges arising out of the same conduct 1: holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused 2: holding that the entry of a nolle prosequi generally suffices as a termination of a criminal proceeding in favor of the plaintiff in a maliciousprosecution action 3: holding that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in termination cases is generally the same as in criminal proceedings 4: holding that appellant was not entitled to a preliminary hearing under code  192218 because following the entry of the nolle prosequi at the preliminary hearing the original charges were terminated and the situation was the same as if the commonwealth had chosen to make no charge  until the return of the direct indictment quoting watkins v commonwealth 27 vaapp 473 475 499 se2d 589 590 1998 en banc", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Council of Young Israel; Rabbinical Alliance of America; Rabbinical Council of America; Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America; and Torah Umesorah-National Society of Hebrew Day Schools. See Movants\u2019 Proposed Answer, dated May 31, 1996, at 2-4. The defendant, Rabbi Schulem Rubin, named in the amended complaint in his official capacity as the Director of the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, is represented by the New York Attorney-General (\u201cState\u201d or \u201cdefendant\u201d). Plaintiffs and the defendant object to intervention. By order dated July 11, 1996, the Honorable Denis R. Hurley referred this matter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), to the undersigned. See United States v. Certain Real Property, 751 F.Supp. 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Briefs were submitted by all parties, and Holdings: 0: holding that in class action the claim or defense of the representative party must be typical of the claim or defense of each member of the class 1: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive 2: holding that a party may not raise a new claim in its response to a dispositive motion 3: holding that a motion for rule 37 sanctions is dispositive 4: holding that a motion to intervene is not dispositive of a claim or defense of a party", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the alleged error on appeal. See Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 516 (640 SE2d 280) (2007). Appellant suggests that these evidentiary issues are subject to review on appeal for \u201cplain error.\u201d However, in criminal cases, plain error review currently is limited to appellate review of alleged errors in the sentencing phase of a trial resulting in the death penalty, see Sharp v. State, 286 Ga. 799, 801 (692 SE2d 325) (2010); to alleged violations of OCGA \u00a7 17-8-57, see State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633, 634 (690 SE2d 164) (2010); and, since July 1, 2007, to properly asserted errors in jury instructions, see OCGA \u00a7 17-8-58 (b); State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (718 SE2d 232) (2011). Thus, plain error review does not apply to the evidentiary issue raised in this case. See Brooks, 281 Ga. at 516 (<HOLDING>). We note that the new Georgia Evidence Code Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review was not available for alleged improperly admitted testimony 1: holding miranda error prejudicial in part because the defense presented testimony it otherwise would not have due to the improperly admitted statements 2: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 4: holding that omission was not plain error", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "he was in the immediate area of the transaction shortly after the transaction. Unbeknownst to the arresting officer, another offic xclusionary rule have already been satisfied by the exclusion of the evidence from Mr. Mejia's criminal trial. See Townes, 176 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.1999) (declining to extend exclusionary rule to \u00a7 1983 suit for, inter alia, false arrest and malicious prosecution). 28 . Mr. Mejia's account of the alleged phone call to his employee, Charlie Diego, in which an unidentified individual asked for the owner's name and asked whether the owner was Colombian, is inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered on this motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e) (providing that summary judgment must be opposed by \"such facts as would r.1991) (pre-Richardson ) (<HOLDING>); Calloway v. Boro of Glassboro Dep't of Holdings: 0: holding that private physician who conducted cavity search of drug suspect pursuant to facially valid search warrant was entitled to qualified immunity in suspects  1983 action where he did not act on his own initiative or out of selfinterest he was uniquely qualified to perform search procedure and where court found that extending qualified immunity to physicians under the circumstances of this case would benefitf society by effectuating acceptable means to execute body cavity searches pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause and benefit the party being searched by providing a safe means of conducting the search in a medically approved manner 1: holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician 2: holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search 3: holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant 4: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Powell\u2019s second trial was for a second crime, separate and distinct from the crime for which he was tried in his first trial. Finally, it is important to note a further state law ground on which this claim founders. The Supreme Court of Virginia correctly found that Powell invited any error that may have been committed by the trial court in this regard. See Powell, 590 S.E.2d at 559-60. It was Powell who chose to disclose to the potential jurors that he had been previously convicted of capital murder. Hence, under the doctrine of \u201cinvited error,\u201d Powell may not contend that potential jurors were tainted by their knowledge of his prior conviction when he is the one who disclosed the prior conviction to them. See Saunders v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Collins, 372 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that no exception to the invited error doctrine has ever been adopted by this circuit 1: holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal 2: holding that an appellant is not permitted to rely on invited error on appeal 3: holding that a court will not notice error which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal 4: holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the Federal Defendants challenge the Court\u2019s jurisdiction, the Court will address their arguments first. 1. Claims against the Federal Defendants. The FTCA is the exclusive remedy for obtaining damages based on tortious conduct committed by a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346(b); 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2679(b)(1); Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov\u2019t, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.1997). Here, Plaintiff has sued four federal employees for damages based on alleged torts that those employees committed while acting in the scope of their employment as officers of the USSS. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 8-9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs tort claims against the Federal Defendants are governed by the FTCA. See, e.g., Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d 464, 465 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The United States\u2019s waiver of sovereign Holdings: 0: holding that the public duty doctrine applied to claims against the town and fire chief for negligence in responding to a fire call although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show the special duty exception applied 1: holding that the ftca applied to negligence claims against secret service uniformed division officers 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations 3: holding that the assaultbattery exclusion applied to claims for negligence resulting in a shooting death 4: holding that the rule does not apply to bar tort claims against service providers", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Aaron Shelton pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g). On appeal, Shelton argues for the first time that his conviction is unconstitutional because Congress does not have power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the mere possession of a firearm, citing United States v. Lopez, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Although Shelton stipulated that the firearms Holdings: 0: holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act 1: holding that 42 usc  13981 exceeds congresss authority under the commerce clause 2: holding 18 usc  922o a valid exercise of congressional power under commerce clause 3: recognizing that there is an outer limit to congresss power under the commerce clause 4: holding unconstitutional 18 usc  922q as beyond congresss commerce clause power", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "responsibility for interpreting provisions of G.L.c. 138 rests with Court, not Commission). Although the Court acknowledges that the Commission\u2019s \u201cexperience, technical competence, specialized knowledge and discretionary authority\u201d are entitled to \u201cdue weight,\u201d this principle is \u201cone of deference, not abdication.\u201d Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 503 (quoting Leopoldstadt, Inc. v. Commissioner of Div. of Health Care Finance & Policy, 436 Mass. 80, 91 (2002). Accord Arnone v. Commissioner of Dep\u2019t of Social Services, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 33, 34 (1997) (\u201c[t]he approach is one of judicial deference and restraint, not abdication\u201d). In this regard, no deference is owed to analysis of the Commission falling outside the purview of its institutional expertise. Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 504 (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS Applying the foregoing standards to Holdings: 0: holding nondeferential review warranted because the commission drew no inferences from the unambiguous agreement other than its ultimate finding which no matter how couched is in fact a conclusion of law that an agency relationship existed 1: holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student 2: holding no liability existed under the circumstances 3: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact 4: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "mute swans, some of which may be those with which they have developed relationships, or have observed and plan to observe again in the future. Defendants have cited no authority suggesting that such an allegation of harm is insufficient based on failure to raise similar challenges in the past. Finally, although defendants appear to be correct in their assertion that the procedural harm arising from a NEPA violation is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute irreparable harm justifying issuance of a preliminary injunction, when combined with the irreparable aesthetic injuries alleged by plaintiffs, such procedural harm does bolster plaintiffs\u2019 case for a preliminary injunction. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F.Supp.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that movant must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction 1: holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages 2: holding that there could be no presumption of irreparable harm based on a statutory violation yet finding that ejnvironmental injury by its nature can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration ie irreparable if such injury is sufficiently likely  the balance of harms will usually favor issuance of the injunction to protect the environment 3: holding that where the uncontradicted evidence shows that a former employee is working for a direct competitor no finding of irreparable injury is necessary to support a permanent injunction to protect trade secrets because irreparable injury is established as a matter of law 4: holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that in the absence of an injunction irreparable injury is likely and not merely a possibility", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "shall constitute a waiver of notice of the meeting except where a person attends a meeting for the express purpose of objecting, at the beginning of the meeting, to the transaction of any business because the meeting was not lawfully called or convened\u201d). Therefore, since a shareholder may waive notice by attending a meeting and not objecting, one cannot say that the failure to provide a shareholder with notice of a meeting causes the actions taken at the meeting to be void ab initio. Third, both this Court and our Supreme Court have consistently held that the failure to provide a director with the required notice of a special board meeting renders the actions taken at the meeting voidable \u2014 mot void \u2014 and thus subject to ratification. See Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts 385 (Pa.1833) (<HOLDING>); Moller v. Keystone Fibre Co., 187 Pa. 553, 41 Holdings: 0: holding that the trustee did not have constructive knowledge of an improperly executed mortgage because ohio law provided that an improperly executed mortgage does not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser 1: holding that corporate president who called and participated in shareholders meeting to elect directors was estopped from questioning the legality of the meeting and election of directors who later removed him 2: holding that a corporation may ratify a mortgage executed by the directors at a special meeting convened without notice 3: holding that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors of a corporation  4: holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "job performance. There is no suggestion of unlawful conduct or other impropriety. The Board\u2019s decision is based on the lack of compatibility between Mr. McBride and the manner in which the Board desires the Authority to be operated. In Bristol Virginia School Board v. Quarles, the court held that public termination for \u201cineffective leadership\u201d and \u201clack of communication with personnel\u201d did not implicate protected liberty interests. 235 Va. 108, 366 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1988) (outlining the trend among federal courts to implicate liberty interests in eases involving \u201cspecific charges of moral turpitude, criminal activity, or serious character defects,\u201d but not in cases involving \u201cunelaborated charges relating to job performance\u201d). See Robertson v. Rogers, 679 F.2d 1090, 1092 (4th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090, Holdings: 0: holding that prospective adoptive parents do not have a fundamental liberty interest in adoption 1: holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest 2: holding that a superintendents comments to prospective employers that plaintiff was terminated for incompetence and outside activities did not infringe on a protected liberty interest 3: holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship 4: holding that a threeday suspension without pay did not infringe police officers liberty interest", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "names of participants, specific examples of double billings, estimations as to the number of times the alleged fraud was perpetrated, examples of non-compliance with Medicare regulations, etc. While it is true that the Complaint discusses mostly common practices rather than specific dates and times of the submission of false claims, the court does not find that this is dispositive of the issue in this particular context. Plaintiffs argue that the documentation which demonstrates the exact dates of all submissions of the alleged false claims to the Government is in possession of Defendants. The court does not expect two former employees, whose employment was terminated almost two years ago, to remember each date. The Ninth Circuit agrees. See United States ex rel. Lee, 245 F.3d at 1051 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have, however, provided Defendants Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant 1: holding plaintiffs fraud claim failed rule 9b particularity requirement which in turn meant deceptive trade practices claim failed the particularity requirement 2: holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity 3: holding that under merck a fact is not deemed discovered until a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have sufficient information about that fact to adequately plead it in a complaint ie until he can plead that fact with sufficient detail and particularity to survive a 12b6 motion to dismiss 4: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "515, 107 L.Ed.2d 516 (1989). Moreover, \u201cit is axiomatic that the proof required to show that a defendant knowingly associated with an existing conspiracy \u2018need not be overwhelming.\u2019 \u201d Viola, 35 F.3d at 44 (citation omitted). Indeed, participation in the conspiracy can be shown entirely through circumstantial evidence. Id. We find that the Complaint states a valid \u00a7 1962(d) claim against Ortoli. Specifically, although Ortoli was not an operator or manager of the RICO enterprise, we find that the facts alleged evidence his knowing association with the Madanes Brothers\u2019 conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff. The Court is satisfied that Ortoli\u2019s alleged actions \u2014 ranging from the restructuring of family assets, to drafting paperwork intend p, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 588, 601-02 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>). Baltimore is likewise liable under \u00a7 1962(d). Holdings: 0: holding that although plaintiffs failed to state  1962c claim against outside attorneys for directing principals in rico enterprise to sign various legal documents allegations that these same outside attorneys knowingly agreed with promoter of tax shelter to violate rico and personally agreed to commit racketeering acts stated valid cause of action for conspiracy under  1962d 1: holding that although plaintiffs failed to adequately allege  1962c claim against professional broker and its officer based on operating or managing enterprise they adequately alleged rico conspiracy to violate  1962a against same defendants 2: holding that to state a  1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise 3: holding that plaintiffs cannot claim that a conspiracy to violate rico existed if they do not adequately plead a substantive violation of rico 4: holding that the person charged with violating  1962c must be distinct from the rico enterprise", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in Keen, the process of weighing aggravating' and mitigating factors as was erroneously done in Mills\u2019 case, and by the trial judge in Keen, simply does not apply in cases where the jury recommends life. See id. We further explained: Moreover, so there is no doubt as to the proper focus of a life recommendation analysis, reversal under Tedder is in no way prevented even assuming the presence of several valid aggravators. Indeed, that has been the rule rather than the exception. See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, 474 n. 78 (11th Cir.1990) (listing 47 cases reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1990); Fuente, 549 So.2d at 658-59 (<HOLDING>). Keen, 775 So.2d at 287 n. 24. Clearly, the Holdings: 0: recognizing propriety of jury override reversal in brookings v state 495 so2d 135 143 fla1986 despite presence of four valid aggravators 1: holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence 2: holding jury trial waiver valid despite defendants argument that district court failed to clearly distinguish between jury trial bench trial and the use of stipulated facts 3: holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy 4: holding that reversal for a new trial was required where jury instruction relating to fraud was incorrect", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "essentially accidental injury to the person or property of another rather than coverage for disputes between parties to a contractual undertaking.\u201d Redevelopment Auth., 685 A.2d at 589; see also Keystone Filler, 179 F.Supp.2d at 439 (\u201cThe policy defines an \u2018occurrence\u2019 as \u2018an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.\u2019 \u201d); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2 (\u201cAn \u2018occurrence\u2019 is defined as \u2018bodily injury or property damage resulting from an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same general condition.\u2019 \u201d). The courts in these cases found that the insureds were not entitled to coverage because their underlying breaches of contract were not an \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident.\u201d Redevelopment Auth., 685 A.2d at 589 (<HOLDING>); Keystone Filler, 179 F.Supp.2d at 440 (\u201cThe Holdings: 0: holding insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured since the underlying suit arises out of a breach of contract which is not an accident or occurrence contemplated or covered by the provisions of a general liability insurance policy 1: recognizing in context of general liability policy if petition contains allegations which when fairly and reasonably construed state cause of action potentially covered by policy insurer has duty to defend insured in underlying suit 2: holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy 3: holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the  insurance policy 4: holding that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured because the allegations of the initial complaint did not allege facts which would bring the case within the coverage of the title insurance policy", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are admissible if they meet one of the exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. RULE EVID. 802. Thus, police investigative reports are admissible in certain circumstances under the business records exception. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6); see also, United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir.1976); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Chemical Svcs., Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1202, 1209 (M.D.La.1986). However, when police reports contain witness statements, and the witness statements are offered to prove their truth, the statements themselves generally are inadmissible. See Ariza v. City of New York, 139 F.3d 132, 133-34 (2d Cir.1998) (witness statements in police investigative report inadmissible as business record). United States v. Dotson, 821 F.2d 1034, 1035-36 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Halperin, 441 F.2d 612, Holdings: 0: holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible 1: holding that police report of witnesss statement was inadmissible because witness had not adopted report as accurate when matter was fresh in his memory 2: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 3: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 4: holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "more or less probable. Minn. R. Evid. 401. Although the first CHIPS petition was not pleaded as a basis for the termination petition, the district court took judicial notice of all court records relating to the first CHIPS petition, and appellant did not object. The neglect incident was relevant to whether appellant demonstrated a pattern of failing to comply with the duties of parenthood, including providing a safe and clean environment for the child. It was also relevant to projecting appellant\u2019s future ability to provide a safe environment and suitable level of care for the child. Appellant\u2019s hearsay argument is also unavailing. The reports were admissible under the public-records hearsay exception. Cf. Gardner v. Comm\u2019r of Pub. Safety, 423 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Minn.App.1988) (<HOLDING>); see generally Minn. R. Evid. 803(8) Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes 1: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence 2: holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence 3: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting police reports in civil case under publicrecords exception", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "stating that it was \u201cof the opinion that the suit was frivolous and without merit.\u201d While section 1988 provides that \u201cthe court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys\u2019 fee ...,\u201d the standard for awarding attorneys\u2019 fees differs if a defendant rather than a plaintiff prevails. In Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 417, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), the Supreme Court noted that under the attorneys\u2019 fees provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-5(k) (1976), attorneys\u2019 fees should be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff in all but special circumstances. The Court held, however, that a prevailing defendant should be awarded attorneys\u2019 fees 998 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Since we conclude that the record before us Holdings: 0: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 1: holding title vii claim against western electric not frivolous as a matter of law 2: holding delayed title vii suit not frivolous where there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew he had been given a right to sue letter 3: holding as subject to equitable tolling title vii statute authorizing suit brought within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice 4: holding defendant employer knew plaintiff had engaged in activity protected under title vii where plaintiff was identified as a potential witness by a coworker plaintiff in a deposition given in a prior title yii employment discrimination action brought by the coworker against the employer", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the plan would likely only perversely benefit ISN. Therefore, given these circumstances, the court acted within its discretion when it allowed the replacement fiduciary to formally terminate the plan. C. The issue of whether ISN\u2019s request for a stay is moot is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Green v. City Of Raleigh, 523 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir.2008). Similarly, whether the district court order requiring ISN to pay Saakvitne was one for injunctive or monetary relief is also subject to de novo review. Because ISN has already paid Saakvitne and ISN did not appeal the district court\u2019s denial of its request for a stay under Fed. R.App. P. 8(a)(2), ISN\u2019s appeal of the earlier December 2009 order is now moot. See, e.g., Koger v. United States, 755 F.2d 1094, 1096-98 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the posting of a supersedeas Holdings: 0: holding the rule against taxpayer standing applies both to federal taxpayers and state taxpayers challenging state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as state taxpayers 1: holding that an appeal by taxpayers in a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the government from collecting income tax deficiencies was mooted because the taxpayers had paid the deficiencies pending the appeal 2: holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge 3: holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity 4: holding that wages are subject to oregons personal income tax and that a taxpayers argument to the contrary was frivolous", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "colloquy. We have held: A competent election by the defendant to represent himself and to decline the assistance of counsel once made before the court carries forward through all further proceedings in that case unless appointment of counsel for subsequent proceedings is expressly requested by the defendant or there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to a particular stage of the proceedings. United States v. Springer, 51 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that the defendant\u2019s retrial was \u201cobviously\u201d a continuation of the criminal prosecution and previous waiver was intended to stand absent an attempt to withdraw it (quoting Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.1969)); see also White v. United States, 354 F.2d 22, 23 (9th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>). Our jurisprudence on this point is harmonious Holdings: 0: holding that constitution protected right to counsel at sentencing even where it was waived at trial 1: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 2: holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage 3: holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage 4: holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "after six years was constitutional. Lamb refrained from deciding however, \u201cwhether the legislature could constitutionally abolish all tort claims against builders and designers arising out of improvements they built or designed.\u201d Id. at 443-444, 302 S.E.2d 868. In that case, the court found this was not an issue as \u201c93% of all claims against architects are brought within six years of the substantial completion of the construction.\u201d Id. at 444 n. 7, 302 S.E.2d 868. Similarly, Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., Inc., found \u00a7 l-50(6)\u2019s statute of repose constitutional in part because \u201cover 97 percent of product-related accidents occur within six years of the time the product was purchased.\u201d 314 N.C. 44, 54, 332 S.E.2d 67 (1985). Here, the plaintiff is cla 0, 861 P.2d 625, 30 A.L.R.5th 729 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Holdings: 0: holding first that injuries sustained during contact sports were foreseeable then deciding that public policy insulated the defendant from liability for those injuries 1: holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries 2: holding that an action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the uniform commercial code is a product liability action within the meaning of the products liability act if as here the action is for injury to person or property resulting from a sale of a product 3: holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service 4: holding that statute barring products liability actions for injuries occurring more than 12 years after product is first sold violated state constitutional prohibition against abrogation of right of action to recover damages for injuries", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the information but that they were nonetheless unable to comply with the scheduling order deadline. Nothing in the district court\u2019s \u201cgood cause\u201d analysis would have changed given that the court identified four specific reasons for concluding that the Appellants had demonstrated an overarching and persistent lack of diligence throughout the case. While the dissent theorizes on the district court\u2019s \u201cgeneral frustration ... with various other delays\u201d in the case, post at 829 n. 2, the district court\u2019s reasoning is precisely the appropriate analysis to determine the existence of \u201cgood cause.\u201d That is, in considering whether \u201cgood cause\u201d excuses compliance with a scheduling order deadline, the district court must examine whether the movant had been dilig 1419 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). As noted, the Appellants alleged from the Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline 1: holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint 2: holding that good cause existed where the plaintiff did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to support new claims until after the deadline for amending his complaint and moved to amend immediately after the new evidence came to light 3: holding that good cause did not exist where movant was on notice of information that with some investigation would have led to timely discovery of the basis for the motion to amend 4: holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "system expressly state that \u201c[i]nmates may also pursue available remedies in State and Federal court.\u201d 37 Pa.Code \u00a7 93.9(b). Even assuming, arguendo, that Paluch\u2019s complaint includes federal claims, to which federal law would apply, Paluch\u2019s \u201ctolling while exhausting\u201d argument is belied by his own evidence, which supports the conclusion that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Under Section 1997e(a), an inmate must exhaust the administrative remedies available at the state prison. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir.2007). \u201c \u2018[P]roper exhaustion\u2019 [means] that the prisoner must comply with all the administrative requirements and not merely wait until there are no administrative remedies \u2018available.\u2019\u201d Id. (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>)). The \u201cadministrative remedies available at Holdings: 0: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 1: holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages 2: holding that the ftca bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies 3: holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court 4: holding that declaratory judgment was inappropriate where after exhausting administrative remedies a contractor would have to bring separate actions against the state and other parties in state court", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the appeal waiver, Garza has filed a notice of appeal. The government moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (en banc). For the reasons explained below, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. In Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325, we held that a waiver of appellate rights will be enforced if (1) \u201cthe disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) ... the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) ... enforcing the waiver would [not] result in a miscarriage of justice.\u201d Garza concedes that his appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights. We therefore need not address that factor. See United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We reject Garza\u2019s argument that his waiver Holdings: 0: holding that a district court does not have to state on the record that it considered every  3553a factor 1: holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor 2: holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence 3: recognizing that court need not address each hahn factor if defendant does not raise issue relating to that factor 4: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "misdemeanor theft, was referred on February 20, 1990, when Gilkey was 14. On August 27, 1990, a sentence of probation with restitution was imposed for each of these first two offenses. The probation for these first two adjudications, however, was revoked on July 29, 1992, and Gilkey was ordered into custody. On November 3, 1992, when Gilkey was 17, he was referred to the juvenile court for his third juvenile adjudication, for carrying a concealed weapon. A sentence of continued custody was imposed for this third adjudication. Gilkey remained in custody until April 8,1993. Gilkey concedes that his confinement constituted a \u201cjuvenile sentence to confinement\u201d for purposes of \u00a7 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). See Appellant Br. at 11; see also United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1095 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). He claims, however, that only two points Holdings: 0: holding that although police initially took juvenile into custody juvenile arrested on drug charge did not have standing to challenge constitutionality of pretrial detention statute in relation to his drug case where juvenile was never detained for drug offense 1: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 2: holding defendants placement into kansas juvenile custody qualified as confinement within meaning of ussg  4a12d2a 3: holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii 4: holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "them. The same .result applies in this case. Section 679.4061(1)\u215b provision governing discharge upon assignment establishes a rule of contract performance: it determines how a party to a contract may discharge an obligation to make payment on an account created by virtue of that contract\u2014i.e., how it can perform its contractual obligation to pay\u2014after the party has been notified the account has been assigned. Cf. Bldg. Materials Corp., 972 So.2d at 1092 (applying section 679.4061(1) in the context-of a claim for'breach of contract). The 'Department all but concedes that this rule would govern in a contract dispute between private parties. For the reasons we have explained, the rule governs here as well. See also Mooney v. Univ. Sys. of Md., 178 Md.App. 637, 943 A.2d 108, 110-12 (2008) (<HOLDING>), reversed on other grounds, 407 Md. 390, 966 Holdings: 0: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 1: holding that sovereign immunity did not protect state agency from liability based on failure to pay assignee of contractual account receivable 2: holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest 3: holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability 4: holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "governmental job, thus rendering HSS a state actor and Salon\u2019s conduct in assessing Fridman\u2019s employability state action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. The Court finds that, on the record before it, Fridman\u2019s argument is too tenuous to prevail. Traditionally, a defendant must have exercised power \u201cpossessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law for its conduct to constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\u201d See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Accordingly, a private entity\u2019s conduct may become so entwined with governmental policies, or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755-57 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The existence of a contractual relationship, Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under  1983 1: holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states 2: holding that a private plaintiff may not being an action under the family educational rights and privacy act of 1974 because that statute does not create personal rights to enforce under 42 usc  1983 3: holding that to the extent that private hospital acted in furtherance of a child welfare statute and not medical considerations it may be held liable under 42 usc  1983 4: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(c)(3). 3 . See also Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a First Amendment claim based on arrest fails if probable cause existed); Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2001) (\u201cThe \u2018constitutional tort[]\u2018 of false arrest ... require[s] a showing of no probable cause.\u201d). 4 . See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying doctrine where presentment to magistrate and grand jury occurred after arrest), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 949 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 5 . See Russell, 546 Fed.Appx. at 434, 436-37; see also Smith, 670 F.2d at 526 (\"The constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.\u201d). 6 .See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>); Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 124 n.4 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that a grand jury indictment insulated police officers from damages accruing after but notbefore the indictment 1: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 2: holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering  only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment 3: holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury 4: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "period prescribed in \u00a7 2953.21 or to the filing of an earlier petition, \u201cthe United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner\u2019s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based upon that right\u201d and, in addition to meeting one of the foregoing conditions, \u201cthe petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of which the petitioner was convicted.\u201d No matter how unlikely it seems that Godbolt\u2019s petition will fall within the narrow exception contained in the statute, it is for the state courts to interpret and enforce their laws on such issues. See Israfil v. Russell, 276 F.3d 768, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Godbolt did not explain to the Holdings: 0: recognizing that an appellate court must defer to district courts findings denying defendants motion to suppress even when videotape of defendants encounter with state trooper is available 1: holding it is proper to defer to the family court even if conflicting evidence is presented on appeal as long as ample evidence in the record supports the family courts findings and conclusions 2: holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record 3: holding that it was proper for the district court to defer to the state courts findings as to whether a petitioners postconviction motion had been submitted according to ohios timeliness requirements 4: holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "information about their search precludes a finding of good faith on their part. And it is enough for us to make clear that Thomas in no way protects evidence obtained on the basis of a warrant which, like this one, was gotten not only illegally but in clear bad faith. CONCLUSION Because the district court\u2019s findings, on the basis of which it correctly concluded that the search in this case constituted an illegal invasion of the defendant\u2019s curtilage, were not clearly erroneous, and because the good faith exception, valuable though it is, does not apply on these facts, we affirm the decision of the district court. 1 . The government argues that in United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 95 108 S.Ct. 128, 98 L.Ed.2d 85 (1987); United States v. Ceballos, 812 F.2d 42, 46-47 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with these cases, we hold that the Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of whether distress was so extreme that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it is a question of law 1: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 2: holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses 3: holding that question of whether a state law tort claim was preempted by the lmra focused on whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract 4: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argument, however, ignores two important limitations to the shield: (1) the shield is removed if the individual\u2019s personal interests motivate his actions, see Rice, 38 F.3d at 912; and (2) the shield generally does not apply when the individual\u2019s actions are discretionary. See Brujis v. Shaw, 876 F.Supp. 975, 978 (N.D.Ill.1995). As noted, the fiduciary shield denies personal jurisdiction if the individual\u2019s actions were \u201csolely on behalf of his employer.\u201d Rice, 38 F.3d at 912. If the individual \u201cwas acting also on his own behalf\u2014to serve his personal interests,\u201d the shield does not apply. Id. (emphasis added). The personal interests need not be pecuniary\u2014they may be dislike or malice towards the plaintiff. See id.; Roy v. Austin Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16254 at *6-7 (N.D.Ill.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, a defendant who dislikes or acts Holdings: 0: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests 1: holding on a motion to dismiss that plaintiffs allegation that defendants actions were without justification based on the legitimate business interests of the employer and were performed maliciously was sufficient to prove actions taken to serve personal interests 2: holding that the defendants had received sufficient notice where the original defendants and the newly added defendants shared an identity of interests and were represented by attorneys who were involved in the litigation from its inception 3: holding that both inmates and pretrial detainees can be visually strip searched in the interests of significant and legitimate security interests 4: holding that a determination of the reasonableness of the defendants actions based upon the economic crisis involving the retirement system was premature on a motion to dismiss", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "employer defaulted in that obligation. Cf. Bilotta v. Labor Pool of St. Paul, Inc., 321 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.1982). Having set forth the test for determining whether a special employer relationship exists, we must now analyze these factors as they apply to the facts of the instant ease to determine if Allied is Bowens\u2019s special employer. Whether an individual is a special employee for workers\u2019 compensation purposes is generally a question of fact. However, a court may find special employment status as a matter of law where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, together with affidavits establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact to the contrary. See Union Light & Power Co. v. District of Columbia Dep\u2019t of Employment Servs., 796 A.2d 665, 669 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., Holdings: 0: holding no triable issue of fact existed where employee had not asked for accommodation 1: holding that the right to recover a particular measure of damages in a workers compensation case is fixed as of the date of injury 2: recognizing the issue may be decided as a question of law if the facts are undisputed and support only one inference 3: holding that temporary employee status for workers compensation purposes is determinable as a matter of law where the particular undisputed critical facts compel that conclusion and present no triable issue of fact 4: holding that workers compensation is the exclusive remedy as a matter of substantive law and hence whenever it appears from the plaintiffs pleadings bill of particulars or the facts that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant the obligation of alleging and proving noncoverage or applicability of workers compensation benefits falls on the plaintiff the court continued stating that waiver may be accomplished by ignoring the issue to the point of final disposition", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that have a determinate sentencing scheme.\u201d Id. (quoting Foote, 808 P.2d at 735). Accordingly, we hold that a district court does not generally have the authority to order the Board of Pardons to credit an inmate\u2019s sentence with time served as a condition of probation. However, because the establishment of an original parole date is inherently a sentencing function and the Board of Pardons therefore serves as a sentencing entity in our system, id., \u201cthe Board [of Pardons], like the courts, is governed by constitutional requirements addressing accuracy and fairness in the decision-making process.\u201d Id. at 911. Thus, while the Board exercises unfettered discretion in determining the length of an inmate\u2019s sentence, its actions must not violate the inmate\u2019s constitutional rights. See id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we must examine whether the Holdings: 0: holding that any reliance by the parole board on inadmissible hearsay did not violate due process 1: recognizing in certain contexts  a postjudgment hearing may afford the requisite due process 2: holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate 3: holding that board of pardons must afford inmate due process in original parole hearing 4: holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of that statute, he must show \u201c(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful by the [Tennessee Consumer Protection Act] and (2) that the defendant\u2019s conduct caused an \u2018ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or \u201e thing of value wherever situated....\u2019\u201d Hanson v. J.C. Hobbs Co., Inc., No. W2001-02523-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5873582, at *9 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 21, 2012) (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. \u00a7 47-18-109(a)(l)). To prevail, therefore, the Tennessee attorney general need not show that S & P violated CRARA or any other federal provision. That is, the right that he seeks to vindicate \u201cis the right not to be lied to in a fashion that causes reliance and results in financial 195 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). By contrast, if S & P had never invoked Holdings: 0: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law 1: holding that dalessio did not justify removal where the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint was that defendants made materially false statements to them in a manner prohibited by new york law and in violation of duties created by new york law and no construction or interpretation of federal law was required 2: holding the same where the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract provision that incorporated federal law by reference and breach of a new york statute by failing to provide uniform rates allegedly required by federal law 3: holding under new york law in fact the failure to prove damages is  fatal to a plaintiffs breach of contract cause of action  4: holding that federal statutes and regulations can form the basis of a breach of contract claim if expressly incorporated into the contract", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.\u201d H o. 14, 15 (1918); Y.H. v. F.L.H., 784 So.2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)); 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (stat ing that \u201cintervention under [rule 1.230] assumes an interest in pending litigation which shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding\u201d) (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, a contingent interest in the proceedings, as opposed to a direct and immediate interest, will not justify a party\u2019s intervention. Harbor Specialty Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, 932 So.2d 383, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Grimes, 591 So. 2d at 1094 (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Infinity\u2019s interest Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to intervene where the intervenors would not stand to gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment in the action 1: holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion 2: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss 3: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 4: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "statement that he would \u201cjust as soon wait\u201d until he had an attorney before talking to the police [Statement 1], followed immediately by his statement that he was willing to discuss the \u201ccircumstances\u201d [Statement 2], was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel or a statement declaring an intention to remain silent. People v. McKinney, 794 N.W.2d at 614-15 (internal citation omitted). However, the crux of this case is whether Detective Hod-shire\u2019s comment \u201cWell that\u2019s fine, but like I said\u201d was interrogation. If Hodshire\u2019s statement was interrogation, then the Michigan Supreme Court improperly used McKinney\u2019s second statement in determining that he did not unequivocally request counsel. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan Supreme Court\u2019s decision did not Holdings: 0: holding that after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel the suspects responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request 1: holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel 2: holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation 3: holding suspect must unambiguously request counsel before applying rule established in edwards that police questioning must cease once suspect requests counsel during interview 4: holding that interrogation must cease if the suspect unambiguously asserts his right to counsel", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "permissible under the sufficient sureties clause of the Iowa Constitution so long as the accused is permitted access to a surety in some form \u201d Id. at 583. Thus, the Briggs court seemed to recognize that cash and surety are separate options. The court explained that the defendant had presented no evidence to show that she was absolutely precluded from accessing a surety of some form. Instead, her allegations appear to center on the denial of access to a commercial bail bond. . . . [T]here is no absolute right to such access. Briggs has made no claim that she could not otherwise find a sufficient surety. Under other circumstances, we would, perhaps, remand this issue to the district court to determine whether Briggs\u2019 access to a surety was completely precluded. Id 125, 835 N.E.2d 5, 18 (<HOLDING>); Brooks, 604 N.W.2d at 354 (holding that an Holdings: 0: holding an allcash bail violated ohios sufficient sureties clause 1: holding that retroactive application of ohios residency restriction statute violates the federal ex post facto clause 2: holding that stricti juris does not apply to compensated sureties but unambiguous contracts must not be extended by interpretation 3: holding allcash bail violates louisianas sufficient sureties clause 4: holding that an allcash bail violates vermonts sufficient sureties clause", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "[the father] to [the mother] in the sum of $2,730.00.\u201d The trial court further ordered the father to pay the attorney for the mother the sum of $2,789.08 within 180 days for the fees incurred in the action. The father filed a timely postjudgment motion, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. The father timely appealed to this court. The father first argues that the trial court erred in awarding the mother \u201cliving expense assistance.\u201d The father contends that Alabama law does not recognize such an award, except for periodic alimony, which, he says, the mother did not request and could not recover. The father further notes that the mother petitioned only for postminority support for their adult disabled daughter, see Ex parte Brewington, 445 So.2d 294, 297 (Ala.1983) (<HOLDING>), which, he says, can be awarded only in Holdings: 0: recognizing that third party may not recover contribution against parent where child has no cause of action against parent for negligent supervision 1: holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance 2: recognizing that a parent can petition for postminority support for a disabled child 3: holding that a superior court can adjudicate a child as a child in need of aid based on the acts of just one parent 4: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Michigan Court of Appeals decision that Petitioner consented to the mistrial was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. VI. Conclusion The Court concludes that Petitioner\u2019s right to be free from double jeopardy was not violated. Therefore, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 2 . The Double Jeopardy Clause is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 3 . Implied consent to a mistrial does not implicate the line of Supreme Court cases holding that fundamental Constitutional rights may not be deemed waived on a silent record. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)(<HOLDING>). In Dinitz, the Supreme Court rejected the Holdings: 0: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 1: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination 2: holding presumption of waiver from a silent record is impermissible 3: holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific 4: holding that waiver of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront ones accusers cannot be presumed from a silent record", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "trial appears to have been directed toward whether or not Palmer Johnson performed more than the services ordered and not whether there were certain services ordered which it failed to perform. Wisconsin law and not federal principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel governs the effect of the state court judgment on this action. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1738; Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Omernick v. LaRocque, 406 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.Wis.1976); Allen v. McCurry, __U.S. __at__, 101 S.Ct. 411 at 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Thus, this Court must give to the Door County Circuit Court judgment at least the preclusive effect which the courts of the State of Wisconsin would give it. Allen v. McCurry, supra; Williams v. Ocean Transport Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183, 1189 (3d Cir. 1970) (<HOLDING>). Casey argues that neither of the doctrines of Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law 1: holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court 2: holding that a federal court acting under its federal as opposed to diversity jurisdiction may also give greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts would give 3: holding that courts must look to the state that rendered the judgment to determine whether the courts of that state would afford the judgment preclusive effect 4: holding that state court judgment settling shareholders state and federal claims had preclusive effect in federal court even though shareholders could not have pressed their federal claims in state court", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "maximum for an indeterminate quantity of drugs, then the type and quantity of drugs is an element of the \u00a7 841 offense that must be charged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. submitted to the jury, it was error for the District Court to sentence the Friedmans to life terms on the ITAR counts. We assume, arguendo, that Gary Friedman\u2019s request to charge the jury with determining whether the plot involved a plan to commit a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d was sufficient to preserve the issue of the failure to charge the jury with determining whether the deaths of Kovach and Gould were caused by the \u201ccrime of violence,\u201d and, accordingly, review the claim for harmless error pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a). See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Guevara, 298 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge 1: holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis 2: holding that the harmlesserror rule of chapman v california  applies to the failure of a trial judge to submit an element of the offense to the jury 3: holding that the omission of an element from the jury charge is subject to harmlesserror review 4: holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "thus providing no incentive to supervisory employees like plaintiffs, who have authority to give raises and set work hours, to avoid violating the FLSA. (Resp. at 3.) However the decisions discussed above explicitly considered \u2014 and rejected- \u2014 -the very policy arguments stressed by Defendants here. See, e.g., LeCompte, 780 F.2d at 1264. None of the authorities cited by Defendants as supporting their position addressed the issue of indemnity or contribution for FLSA violations. In Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2001), the court observed that a supervisor who uses his authority over employees to violate their rights under the FLSA may be liable to those employees (although, in that case, the claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). There is no sugge (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).) In light of the consistent holdings by the Holdings: 0: holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity 1: holding that indemnification provision did not expressly state the party was seeking indemnity for its own negligence so as to satisfy express negligence test 2: holding that subcontractor was not obligated to indemnify general contractor for general contractors own negligence where indemnification clause did not expressly state that subcontractor would indemnify general contractor for such negligence 3: holding that illinois construction contract indemnification for negligence act invalidates indemnity provision in contract between general contractor and postal service 4: holding that the indemnification contract between an owner of train tracks and an owner and operator of a train clearly and unequivocally required indemnification for the track owners negligence given that the contract explicitly stated that the indemnification provisions shall apply regardless of considerations of fault or negligence", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rights \u201cshould be valued as an inherent part of his property interest\u201d). We are persuaded that the first line of cases correctly interprets the statute. This interpretation gives meaning to both sentences of \u00a7 506(a), and enables bankruptcy courts to exercise the flexibility Congress intended. By retaining collateral, a Chapter 11 debtor is ensuring that the very event Winthrop proposes to use to value the property \u2014 a foreclosure sale \u2014 will not take place. At the same time, the debtor should not be heard to argue that, in valuing the collateral, the court should disregard the very event that, according to the debtor\u2019s plan, will take place \u2014 namely, the debtor\u2019s use of the collateral to generate an income stream. In ordinary circumstances the present value of the income strea 993) (<HOLDING>); In re Green, 151 B.R. 501 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993) Holdings: 0: holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or 1: holding parties negotiated price of vehicle was evidence of market value as represented 2: holding that truck to be retained by chapter 13 debtor must be valued at replacement cost to debtor because foreclosure value fails to account for debtors proposed use of collateral 3: holding that motor vehicle to be retained by chapter 13 debtor should be valued at the price the debtor could get for it in a free and open market ie its fair market value 4: holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "IX, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides: Neither the state nor any county, school district or municipality, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge its credit or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or public or private corporation or in aid of any private enterprise for the construction of any railroad except as provided. N.M. Const. Art. IX, \u00a7 14. \u201cThe Anti-Donation Clause ... prohibits the use of state or local governmental funds to benefit private organizations.\u201d H. Stratton & P. Farley, Office of the Attorney General, State of New Mexico, History, Powers & Responsibilities, 1816-1990 at 125 (Univ. of N.M. Printing Servs.1990). In the context of New Mexico\u2019s 8, 314 P.2d 714, 720 (1957)(<HOLDING>); Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. 144, 99 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 1: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 2: holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry 3: holding that legislative diminishment of tax obligation constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to the liquor industry in violation of the antidonation clause 4: holding husbands early retirement subsidy was not marital property as a vested right but an option contingent upon his continued employment and eventual qualification for the subsidy in nine years based upon value of the pension frozen at the time of dissolution", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Property Mgmt. Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When a plaintiff moves for summary judgment against a defendant\u2019s counterclaim, the plaintiff must negate one or more of the essential elements of the defendant\u2019s counterclaim. Martin v. McDonnold, 247 S.W.3d 224, 229 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.). Because the trial court\u2019s order did not specify the ground(s) on which the summary judgment was granted, and because there were multiple grounds on which summary judgment may have been granted in the instant case, the State is required to negate all grounds on appeal. See Star-Telegram, Inc., v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex.1995); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 381 (Tex.1993); Lewis v. Adams, 979 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Evans v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Bellville, 946 Holdings: 0: holding that to establish grounds for reversal an appellant must challenge all grounds on which the trial court ruled against it 1: holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal 2: holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court 3: holding where movant asserts several grounds in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court does not specify the grounds on which judgment was granted the reviewing court can affirm the judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious 4: holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Ms. Ward\u2019s trust the plain language she used and replaces that language with words of the Court\u2019s own choosing. It is neither this Court\u2019s job nor its prerogative to rewrite the unambiguous language of trusts and wills, even if the terms of the trust or will might seem inequitable to one of the parties. Cf. In re Estate of Lucile B. Snyder, 2009 MT 291, 352 Mont. 264, 217 P.3d 1027. \u00b628 As Jack correctly argues, 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 524(a)(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of any attempt to recover or offset the debt he at one time owed to Joan. This means that judgment creditors-here, the trustee on behalf of Joan-are prohibited \u2018from taking any action against debtors to collect the discharged debts.\u201d In re Clowney, 19 B.R. 349, 353 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1982) (<HOLDING>). The granting of a discharge releases the Holdings: 0: holding that the code excepts from discharge debts resulting from agreements by the debtor to hold the debtors spouse harmless on joint debts to the extent those debts are in the nature of alimony maintenance or support 1: holding that plaintiffs amended complaint was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations where the amendment merely expanded on plaintiffs negligence theories and stating that in a tort action an amendment may vary the statement of the original complaint as to the manner in which the plaintiff was injured or as to the manner of the defendants breach of duty 2: holding that the plaintiffs liability to the defendant was absolved as a result of the bankruptcy order and the defendants were barred from collecting debts from property of the plaintiffs 3: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 4: holding that under the doctrine of direct estoppel a law firms failure to appeal the bankruptcy courts earlier order barred it from challenging the courts holding on its appeal from a subsequent order", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of that order. We consolidated the appeal and the petition for writ of certiorari for review. Fernwoods has now dismissed its appeals from the March 21 and March 29 orders; Octubre has also dismissed her cross-appeal from the March 10 order. This leaves pending for resolution only the Rodriguez\u2019 cross-appeal of the March 29 order permitting Octubre to intervene and staying collection and their certiorari petition challenging the propriety of that same order. As the following eases establish, the March 29 order must be reversed: Goolsby v. State, 914 So.2d 494, 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (concluding that \u201cany order entered simultaneously with an order of recusal ... [is] void and [has] no effect\u201d); Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. v. Tarr, 557 So.2d 595, 595-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>); Economic Dev. Corp. of Dade County, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding recusal not required 1: holding that the oral rendition of an order in open court does not constitute entry of that order 2: holding that an order granted simultaneously with a recusal order is void unless the trial judges written order  was but a reduction of an earlier adverse oral ruling made prior to the recusal 3: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 4: holding that the judges recusal order effectively deprived that judge of authority to preside over the contempt proceedings", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "amount of time. And, while Movants cite to their jury demand as a reason to withdraw the reference now, the Court may withdraw the reference if and when a trial is necessary, rather than at this early stage of deciding a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court directs that this adversary proceeding be now returned to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. SO ORDERED. 1 . The Bankruptcy Court determined that the Trustee\u2019s fraudulent conveyance claims were statutorily core, and that the unjust enrichment claims were non-core as pled, without prejudice to the Trustee to replead. See In re Refco Inc., Adv. Pro. No. 07-03060(RDD) (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2008); see also In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 184 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, since neither party contends the Holdings: 0: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 1: holding that unjust enrichment claim could prevail contrary to the ucc priority system 2: holding that trustees unjust enrichment claim against memphis holdings defendants was statutorily core 3: holding that unjust enrichment claim alleging fraudulent inducement was based on tort theory 4: holding that a claim for unjust enrichment should not be dismissed because the court may find that the express contract was no longer in force", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "support for exempting restitution orders from discharge\u201d without the aid of federalism concerns because \u00a7 523(a)(7) \u201cdoes not mention restitution, and it operates only if the penalty is \u2018for the benefit of a governmental unit\u2019 \u2014 a condition not easy to satis fy when the governmental body is collecting for private creditors.\u201d Towers, 162 F.3d at 954; see also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 n. 4, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990) (stating the goal of the VWPA is \u201ccompensating victims\u201d). The Court held that the context in which the word \u201c \u2018benefit\u2019 appears \u2014 \u2018payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit\u2019 \u2014 implies that the \u2018benefit\u2019 in question is the benefit of the money that is \u2018payable to\u2019 the governmental unit.\u201d Id. at 956. But see Vetter, 895 F.2d at 459 (<HOLDING>); Zajder v. Hills Dep\u2019t Store, 154 B.R. 885 Holdings: 0: holding without comment that kelly applies to restitution paid to a victim bank 1: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not 2: holding restitution paid to a local department store is not dischargeable pursuant to kelly 3: recognizing that the test adopted in kelly applies to rulings on evidence 4: holding that debtor not bank paid the propertytax redemption amount even though debtor paid this amount using proceeds of loan from the bank", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "aff d in part, rev\u2019d, vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 1334 (2000); McCreary v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 533, 536 n. 1, 547 (1996) (distinguishing between a patent infringement action between private parties and the \"so-called 'patent infringement\u2019 by the United States, which is an uncompensated taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment\u201d); Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 533, 573 (1993) (reasonable and entire compensation is based upon a theory of eminent domain); Messerschmidt v. United States, 29 Fed.Cl. 1, 44 (1993) (\"Therefore, for purposes of the instant claims of 'direct infringement,' or more properly for purposes of this compulsory, nonexclusive license analysis in eminent domain ....\"); Ha-las v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 354, 360 n. 10 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Judin v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 759, 773 Holdings: 0: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 1: recognizing theory of constructive possession 2: recognizing  1498 is based on principles related to the taking of property namely a patent license 3: recognizing that the theory behind united statess use of a patent is a taking 4: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Fox in North Carolina; and, Ms. Gibson engaged in sexual intercourse with Mr. Fox in North Carolina. This is competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that there is a direct link between Ms. Gibson\u2019s contacts with North Carolina and the injuries alleged in Ms. Fox\u2019s complaint. Replacements, Ltd., 133 N.C. App. at 140-41, 515 S.E.2d at 48. Since the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, ignoring finding of fact twelve, support its conclusion of law that \u201c[t]his action arises directly out of Defendant\u2019s activities within and to the state of North Carolina[,]\u201d we hold that section 1-75.4(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes confers personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. See Dillon, 291 N.C. at 675, 231 S.E.2d at 630; see also Cooper, 140 N.C. App. at 733, 537 S.E.2d at 857 (<HOLDING>). We must next examine whether the exercise of Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign subsidiary that is not registered to do business in north carolina has no place of business employees or bank accounts in north carolina does not design manufacture or advertise its products in north carolina and does not solicit business in north carolina cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction in north carolina even if some of the companys products do enter north carolina through the stream of commerce 1: holding that north carolina court lacked personal jurisdiction over illinois bank even though some of its customers resided in north carolina and loan proceeds were used in north carolina 2: holding that because north carolina has opted out of the exemptions provided under 11 usc  522d the exemptions available for bankruptcy debtors in north carolina depend upon the law of north carolina 3: holding that claims of alienation of affections and criminal conversation are claims within the purview of section 17543 of the north carolina general statutes 4: holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "States, 23 CIT -, - n. 6, 41 F.Supp.2d 319, 323 n. 6 (1999) (noting that \u201c[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon, however\u201d) (citation omitted). If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether Commerce\u2019s construction of the statute is permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce\u2019s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed.Cir.1996). Provided Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency\u2019s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965 Holdings: 0: holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable 1: holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence 2: holding that a court must defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another 3: holding that circuit court should defer to supreme courts interpretation of the act 4: holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer\u2019s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.\u201d Villiarimo v. Aloha Island, Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Apart from the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff can raise an inference of discrimination (i.e., create a prima facie case) with circumstantial or direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640. If the plaintiff attempts to do so and the employer provides evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs evidence must be such as to create a triable issue as to discriminatory intent. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 Holdings: 0: recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent 1: holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent 2: recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons 3: recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee 4: holding that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case the defendant employer must then articulate some legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action and the employee must then have a fair opportunity to show pretext that is that a discriminatory intent motivated the employers action", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "submitted a written curative instruction and asked the court to include it in the court\u2019s final jury instructions: The Cincinnati Insurance Company was mentioned by Mr. Gratzianna. The Cincinnati Insurance Company does not insure Mr. Whitaker or Milford Towing or the Plaintiff. There is no evidence before you that the defendants or plaintiff have or do not have insurance. Whether such insurance exists has no bearing upon any issue in this case. You must not discuss or consider it for any purpose. The district court characterized Gratzi-anna\u2019s comment as not \u201ceven a foul tip. It was just a loose comment that I think right now is better off left quiet without any further instruction to highlight ... the comment itself.\u201d The court agreed to address the iss 1565-66, 1568-69 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court held long ago that, when a trial Holdings: 0: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 1: holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice 2: holding that any misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction 3: holding mistrial unwarranted where contemporaneous objection was made to single mention of insurance and court gave cautionary instruction 4: holding no prejudice occurred where party made contemporaneous objection to brief remark about insurance during closing argument and court gave cautionary instruction", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the bearer bonds had not yet been detected at that date, the further concealment of the $18 million in profits was either direct actual loss from the con tinuing offense or relevant uncharged conduct committed during the original offense. Therefore, those profits were properly considered in establishing the total loss. B. Whether the $18 Million Profits Were Properly Found by the Court Brennan argues that even if it is proper to consider the profits made as part of the bankruptcy fraud, the District Court did not make its own factual findings with respect to the profits, but merely adopted the facts in the presentence investigation report, in violation of former Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1) (2001) (now Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B)). See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Cherry, 10 F.3d at 1013-14 (Fed. R.Crim.P. Holdings: 0: recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion 1: holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record 2: holding that the trial courts putting its findings on the record at the conclusion of the states case was sufficient to satisfy  152538 because that section does not specifically limit the time within which the court must state the findings 3: holding that the district court must make findings on the record as to the basis for its conclusion about the amount of actual loss 4: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "are not material to the court\u2019s disposition of the case. 4 . Because of the timing of this filing \u2014 prior to any decision in the case, plaintiff's request for reconsideration is not ripe for judicial review. Reconsideration of an opinion or other action by a court presupposes an underlying prior action which the court may then reconsider. See Rule 59(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) (stating the requirement that \"a motion for ... reconsideration of a judgment ... shall be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment\u201d and therefore contemplating that the court will have rendered a decision or taken some other action in the case before the court may entertain a motion for reconsideration) (emphasis added); see also RCFC 59 rules committee note (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the court, prior to this opinion, has Holdings: 0: recognizing that nonfinal orders may be revised at any time before a final judgment is entered 1: holding that motion for reconsideration renders deportation order nonfinal despite language of the 1990 amendments 2: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 3: recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration 4: holding that when reviewing a final judgment we generally also have jurisdiction to review all prior nonfinal orders and rulings which produced the judgment", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the court makes no determination that Waste Management \u2014 Washington has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 2, by attempting to monopolize or monopolizing solid waste collection and disposal services at Fairchild AFB, only that Waste Management \u2014 Washington may not claim immunity under the \u201cstate action\u201d doctrine in the event the court may need to reach that issue in related proceedings or if the Government does not comply with this final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(b)(1). In that regard, the court notes that the modus operandi employed by Waste Management \u2014 Washington in this case apparently has been tried by an affiliated company in another court without success. See, e.g., Waste Management of North America, Inc. v. Weinberger, 862 F.2d 1393, 1397-98 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). If Waste Management \u2014 Washington and its Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs breach of contract claim was properly a statutory claim under the personnel management act 1: holding that because colorados hazardous waste program was authorized by rcra it became effective pursuant to rcra and the citizen suit provision of section 6972a1a applies 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction under the bid protest provisions of section 1491 to enjoin a contracting agencys termination of a contract 3: holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public 4: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate waste management of north americas claim that the el toro marine corps air base was required to award waste management of north america with a waste collection award since it was the only permittee in orange county because the case was not properly initiated as a citizen suit under rcra in addition the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit held that waste management of north america did not have standing under 31 usc  35512 since it did not file a proper bid protest nor submit a bid", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was lawful. The referral to secondary did not exceed the boundaries of permissible detention for continuing investigation, and did not become a de facto arrest. Cf. State v. Flores, 122 N.M. 84, 89, 920 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Ct.App.1996) (\u201cWhen a detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigatory stop, it becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.\u201d). {39} Whether the agent subjectively intended to continue his routine investigation or only to immediately ask for consent in secondary is not material to the outcome of this case. \u201c[T]he Fourth Amendment\u2019s concern with \u2018reasonableness\u2019 allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the [officer\u2019s] subjective intent.\u201d Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). In the present case the Holdings: 0: holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to exit the car pending completion of the stop 1: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 2: holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop 3: holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver 4: holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prepublication investigation to ensure it was adequate and complete. But Compuware squandered this opportunity, providing only a short, virtually fact-free, one-paragraph response to Moody\u2019s inquiry. Compuware now attempts to use against Moody\u2019s this cursory response, arguing that Moody\u2019s should have investigated the issue further. But this sort of argument is not supported by precedent. The relevant legal inquiry focuses on the extent of the defendant\u2019s efforts to avoid the truth, not the extent of the defendant\u2019s investigation to discover the truth. See Perk, 931 F.2d at 411-12. Because Moody\u2019s actively sought to learn about the relationship and litigation between Compuware and IBM, any alleged investigatory deficiencies are insufficient to establish actual malice. See id. at 412 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Moody\u2019s investigatory efforts, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred 1: holding that there is no constitutional duty to do a better investigation and that a decision not to conduct a more thorough investigation does not invade an accuseds rights 2: holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff 3: holding investigation was not deficient in part because counsel hired an experienced death penalty investigator who conducted a thorough investigation into defendants history 4: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are present at the commission of the crime, it matters not by whose immediate agency the crime is committed, all are guilty. The hand of one is the. hand of all. (J.A. at 656.) In other words, the State had to prove only that Howard and Weldon, working together and with malice aforethought, were jointly responsible for Le\u2019s death. See S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 16-3-10 (Law Co-op.1985) (defining murder as \u201cthe killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied\u201d). Therefore, because South Carolina does not require that a defendant have specific intent to commit murder, nothing in Howard\u2019s original confessions was exculpatory for Fifth Amendment purposes and in no way diminished Howard\u2019s legal blameworthiness for the murder. See State v. Foust, 479 S.E.2d 50, 51 (S.C.1996) (<HOLDING>) (citing State v. Johnson, 291 S.C. 127, 352 Holdings: 0: holding that felony murder verdicts did not merge into a malice murder verdict but were instead vacated by operation of law 1: holding that possessing property of another for the purpose of security on a debt does not give rise to probable cause to arrest 2: holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder 3: holding that wrongful intent to injure another may give rise to finding of malice to support verdict of murder 4: holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "law claims against state officials, regardless of an otherwise-valid pendent jurisdiction claim. \u201c[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment .... this principle applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.\u201d Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121, 104 S.Ct. 900. Nor does their request for declaratory relief save plaintiffs\u2019 state law claims. \u201c[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.\u201d Id. at 106, 104 S.Ct. 900; see also Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Universities, 928 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) Counts Four and Five of the Complaint are Holdings: 0: holding that a declaratory judgment by a federal court based on state law would constitute an endrun around pennhurst that is equally forbidden by the eleventh amendment 1: holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court 2: holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when a plaintiffs suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judgment and an  issue in that federal suit is inextricably intertwined with an issue resolved by the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is taken 3: holding that there is an exception to eleventh amendment immunity for actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law 4: holding that state did not waive eleventh amendment immunity by removing case to federal court", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "make plan payments. The reverse can also occur: a debtor who has recently lost a high-paying job or who received unusual payments (such as severance or a year-end bonus) in the six-month period may show disposable income that is far beyond his or her actual ability to pay. Distortions can also occur with respect to the allowed deductions from current monthly income. For example, the means test envisions a hypothetical chapter 13 scenario in which secured debts are paid in fu 38 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2006) (projected disposable income for above-median income debtor would not include deduction for contractual payments on under-secured debt that debtors would not actually be required to pay because plan bifurcated claim or surrendered collateral); In re Minahan, 394 B.R. 116 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2008) (<HOLDING>); In re Watson, 366 B.R. 523 (Bankr.D.Md.2007) Holdings: 0: holding that for abovemedian income debtors projected disposable income calculated on form b22c is the starting point but not the ending point in determining debtors correct minimum obligation and both income and expenses must be determined as of date of confirmation 1: holding that projected disposable income for abovemedian income debt or is not fixed by means test calculation that includes expenses that would not actually be incurred under plan such as car payments for car to be surrendered 2: holding that the disposable income arrived at with form b22c is a beginning point for evaluating the debtors past and current financial status 3: holding that projected disposable income for abovemedian debtors is disposable income as defined by  1325b 4: holding that a debtors disposable income as calculated under 11 usc  1325b2 is not the same as a debtors projected disposable income but that it can be used as the presumptive projected disposable income", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "possession of a gun or ammunition is admissible so long as it is sufficiently tied to the crime charged. For example, in Herman v. State, 896 So.2d 222, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), we considered the trial court\u2019s decision to admit evidence that the defendant in a murder case \u2014 where the victim was killed with a shotgun \u2014 owned a shotgun. The defendant\u2019s shot r ammunition and the crime is too tenuous, such evidence is generally not relevant. In Cooper v. State, the Third District held that evidence of ammunition found on a murder defendant nine months after the murder which could not be definitively matched to the ammunition used in the murder was too tenuous to the crime to be admissible. 778 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See also Sosa v. State, 639 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (<HOLDING>). Here, there was an adequate nexus between the Holdings: 0: holding that when a defendant voluntarily approached the immigration officer at the airport it cannot be said that he was discovered in or found in the united states 1: holding that trial court erred in allowing police officer to testify to contents of telephone records that were not introduced into evidence 2: holding that court erred in allowing 380 caliber cartridges found in murder defendants vehicle into evidence when there was no evidence connecting them to the crime especially in light of the fact that the investigating officer testified the bullet holes he discovered were consistent with 22 caliber ammunition 3: holding that it was error to admit into evidence 880 cartridges found in defendants car where there was no link established between the cartridges and the crime charged 4: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(Tex.App.2000). As the court explained in Bohls v. Oakes, \u201c[p]laintiffs establish their standing as consumers by their relationship to the transaction, not by a contractual relationship with the defendant.\u201d Bohls v. Oakes, 75 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex.App.2002) (citing Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex.1985)). \u201cA third party beneficiary may qualify as a consumer of goods or services, as long as the transaction was specifically required by or intended to benefit the third party and the good or service was rendered to benefit the third party.\u201d Bohls, 75 S.W.3d at 479; see also Bynum v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 129 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Tex.App.2004) (acknowledging that third-party beneficiaries of a contract have standing to sue under the DTPA); Kennedy, 689 S.W.2d at 892-93 (<HOLDING>); Wellborn v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 970 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding claims for negligent procurement of insurance accrued on date the insured purchased the insurance policies 1: holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury 2: holding that employee was consumer of medical insurance purchased by employer for employees benefit 3: holding that a plaintiff who purchased a crane for business use is a consumer 4: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cir.2005)[\u201c[T]he District Court lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA to provide injunctive and declaratory relief\u2019]; see also 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346(b). Therefore, Plaintiffs claims under the FTCA are without merit, and should be dismissed. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendant Berry and Paul\u2019s motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs Bivens claim concerning his placement in the SHU on August 31, 2001 be denied. In all other respects, the Defendants\u2019 motions for summary judgment should be granted. September 7, 2006. 1 . To the extent any of Plaintiffs claims relate to his transfer to FCI-Florence, or conditions of confinement at Florence, they are not properly before this court. See Ajaj v. Smith, 108 Fed.Appx. 743 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The text of this order reads as follows: Holdings: 0: holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim 1: holding that ajaj did not have a protected liberty interest in remaining at fciedgefield and finding that this court was without jurisdiction over anyone with responsibility for  conditions at fciflorence in part because no one with responsibility over that facility was named in that action but noting that the decision was without prejudice to ajajs right to challenge the conditions of his fciflorence confinement in the district court in colorado 2: recognizing a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement 3: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court 4: holding over", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. However, \u2018[n]ot every order has the requisite element of finality that can trigger the operation of Rule 51(b).\u2019 Goldome Credit Corp. v. Player, 869 So.2d 1146, 1147 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (emphasis added). A claim is not eligible for Rule 54(b) certification unless it has been completely resolved by the judgment. \u201c.... \u2018[T]he trial court cannot confer appellate jurisdiction upon this [Cjourt through directing entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) if the judgment is not otherwise \u201cfinal.\u201d \u2019 Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So.2d 299, 302 (Ala.1978).\u201d Rather than appealing from the trial court\u2019s interlocutory order, Deakle should have filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Ex parte Fort James Operating Co., 905 So.2d 836 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). However, for the reasons explained in Part I Holdings: 0: holding that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate mechanism for challenging a trial courts grant of leave to amend a complaint 1: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 2: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 3: holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint  on the eve of trial when discovery was complete 4: holding that a trial judges denial of a recusal motion can be challenged on appeal or in a petition for a writ of mandamus", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "times, requiring them to change schools. Id. at 750. However, all of the moves resulted in their residence being in southeast Missouri. Id. In 1993, the mother informed the father that she intended to move, with the children, to Fulton, Missouri, because of her upcoming remarriage. Id. The father filed a motion to modify custody, which the trial court sustained, finding a substantial and continuing change of circumstances based, inter alia, on the mother\u2019s remarriage and move to Fulton. Id. at 752. The judgment was reversed on appeal, the appellate court finding that the mother\u2019s move from southeast Missouri to central Missouri was not a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody. Id. at 752-53. See also Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 812 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). The one change in the residence of the Holdings: 0: holding that evidence was sufficient to support trial courts best interest finding where mother allowed child to be in contact with individual who had physically abused her mother was not capable of caring for child on her own mother admitted at trial she had not found stable employment and child was doing well in her current placement 1: holding that no substantial and continuing change in circumstances had occurred where there was no evidence of an adverse effect on the child even though the mother has moved six times since her marriage was dissolved 2: holding that fundamental error occurred in the prosecution of a mother for aggravated manslaughter of her child when the prosecutor commented on the fact that the mother had contemplated having an abortion during the course of her pregnancy with the child 3: holding that a mother and her two children failed to establish a  1983 claim where there was no evidence that threats made to the mother were directly aimed at the relationship between parent and child 4: holding a mother on appeal must successfully challenge a trial courts finding that there was no substantial and continuing change of circumstances of the children or mother before she can succeed on her claim that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to modify custody", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "858 P.2d 380, 381 (1993)). In doing so, we are \u201cbound to accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true.\u201d Marcoz v. Summa Corporation, 106 Nev. 737, 739, 801 P.2d 1346, 1347 (1990) (citing Edgar v. Wagner, 101 Nev. 226, 227-28, 699 P.2d 110, 111-12 (1985)). Kaldi contends that his exclusive agency arrangement with Farmers created an employer-employee relationship between himself and the companies. The plain language of the Agreement does not support Kaldi\u2019s assertion. \u201cIt has long been the policy in Nevada that absent some countervailing reason, contracts will be construed from the written language and enforced as written.\u201d Ellison v. C.S.A.A., 106 Nev. 601, 603, 797 P.2d 975, 977 (1990) (citing Southern Trust v. K & B Door Co., 104 Nev. 564, 568, 763 P.2d 353, 355 (1988) (<HOLDING>)). Here, provision \u201cI\u201d of the agreement Holdings: 0: holding that if a document is facially clear it will be construed according to its language 1: holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms 2: holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words 3: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts 4: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "entitled to relief from the district court\u2019s judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) because the court\u2019s dismissal order violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. He appears to argue that the district court\u2019s pretrial dismissal of his complaint under the \u201cdogma\u201d of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), usurped the jury\u2019s fact-finding role. We cannot agree. Whether to grant a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is within the district court\u2019s sound discretion. Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam). Yeyille has shown no exceptional circumstance that warrants relief. A plaintiffs right to a jury trial is not violated merely because his ease is dismissed before trial. See Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 366 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). There is no requirement to conduct a jury Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal pursuant to federal rule of civil procedure 56 did not violate the seventh amendment 1: holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment 2: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 3: holding that seventh amendment right to jury trial not violated by courts dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 4: holding that the courts grant of summary judgment did not violate the plaintiffs seventh amendment right to a jury trial and describing the plaintiffs argument that it did as very misleading", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the legislative history behind \u00a7 544(a)). The Bankruptcy Code does not authorize the Trustee to collect property or money except that which is owed to the estate. 2. The Trustee alternatively contends that the conspiracy claim belongs to the bankruptcy estate because, unlike in Caplin, the claim here seeks to remedy an injury to all of Bradley\u2019s creditors and not merely a subset thereof. Even assuming that any or all of Bradley\u2019s creditors could properly assert the claim, we disagree that this fact alone confers standing on the Trustee. This court recently clarified that, when determining whether a claim is property of the bankruptcy estate such that the trustee has standing to assert it under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 541(a), the distinction between claims that 52-53 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). But Texas law does not suggest that Bradley Holdings: 0: holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law 1: holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud 2: recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person 3: recognizing that the alter ego doctrine is an equitable doctrine which should be used to prevent inequitable results 4: holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "information to the government in 2007, Koerber did not file his protective-order motion until February 2010, nearly nine months after the grand jury\u2019s indictment. In addition, Koerber did not file his motion to suppress statements from the February 2009 interviews until April 2012. Moreover, Koerber did not file a motion to dismiss for an STA violation until April 2014-nearly five years after the grand jury returned its initial indictment. At the same time, Koerber filed his motion before trial when it was clear that there was an STA violation in this case. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3162(a)(2) (\u201cFailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.\u201d); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1001 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). And Koerber did not simply acquiesce to Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant waived any argument on the issue by failing to oppose a motion to dismiss 1: holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence 2: holding that the defendant waived the right to dismissal under  3162a2 when he did not file a motion to dismiss before trial 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that party sought affirmative relief by filing motion to dismiss and violated dueorderofhearing requirement by having motion to dismiss and motion to reconsider dismissal heard before special appearance", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Circuits have held that footnote seven creates a general exception to Heck for \u00a7 1983 Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims. See, e.g., Beck, 195 F.3d at 559 n. 4 (noting that \u201cuse of illegally obtained evidence does not, for a variety of reasons, necessarily imply an unlawful conviction,\u201d with the caveat, however, that the case before it was not one of those \u201crare situation[s] ... where all evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal arrest\u201d); Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.1998) (interpreting Heck\u2019s footnote seven to \u201cmean that Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful searches or arrests do not necessarily imply a conviction is invalid, so in all cases these claims can go forward\u201d); Simmons v. O\u2019Brien, 77 F.3d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 253 n. 1 (11th Holdings: 0: recognizing that harmless error analysis is appropriate even if presumptively coerced confession is improperly introduced 1: holding the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis when the defendants guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  3: holding that beeause harmless error analysis is applicable to the admission at trial of coerced confessions judgment in favor of simmons on this  1983 action challenging his confession will not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction 4: holding admission of coerced confession to he a classic trial error similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence and thus reviewable for harmlessness", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is not a pollutant. See, e.g., McFadden, 595 N.E.2d at 764 (finding that an insured could reasonably understand the pollution exclusion to \u201cexclude coverage for injury caused by certain forms of industrial pollution, but not coverage for injury allegedly caused by the presence of leaded materials in a private residence.\u201d). Accordingly, it is at least plausible that the pollution exclusion was not meant to and does not apply to lead exposure claims. There are several lower state court cases, cited by both plaintiff and defendant that interpret the pollution exclusion, as applied to lead poisoning and other injuries, in seemingly incongruous ways. The relevant Appellate Division cases are: American Heritage Realty Partnership v. La Voy, 209 A.D.2d 749, 618 N.Y.S.2d 125 (3d Dep\u2019t 1994) (<HOLDING>); Miano v. Hehn, 206 A.D.2d 957, 614 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding lead paint poisoning covered by the pollution exclusion 1: holding that the discharge of paint chips into soil was covered by the pollution exclusion because it polluted the environment but that the presence of lead paint in a household would not be so covered 2: holding that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause 3: holding that removal of insulation that released asbestos  a thermal irritant  into an apartment was covered by the pollution exclusion 4: holding that pollution exclusion did not apply to claim arising from ingestion of lead paint because exclusion reasonably may be limited to environmental claims", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "File is a routine background investigative file like the Government suggests, the file was not located in one of the FBI main files designated for such investi gations, such as the files for administrative matters, for special inquiries for the White House, or for the security clearance investigation program. Id. As the in camera review reveals, all of those features of the DeLoach Memorandum are reflective of the \u201chighly unconventional\u201d nature of the investigation at issue. By pointing out those features, and by presenting the Court with substantial external evidence of similar improper conduct by DeLoach and the Hoover FBI, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the allegation of improper conduct by the FBI is \u201cmore than a bare suspicion.\u201d See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, despite the factual imbalance Holdings: 0: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  1: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 2: holding that when the public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their duties the requester must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure 3: holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion 4: holding that a claim for abuse of process requires a plaintiff to show that the defendants acted with intent to do harm without excuse or justification  in order to obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of the process", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "likewise conclude that Section 951.1, 25 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 2911.1, under which the Commonwealth Court ruled that Camejo cannot appear on the ballot as the candidate of a political body because of his membership in the (minor) Green Party, is inapplicable. I believe that the language of this provision, which includes \u201cthirty (30) days before the primary----\u201d as its reference point of disaffiliation, when read in context, clearly reveals that the General Assembly intended it to apply to major, not minor, political parties. This is so because in the Election Code, the legislature has determined that only major parties may gain ballot access through the primary process. See Heicklen v. Pennsylvania Board of Elections, 751 A.2d 260, 262 (Pa.Cmwlth.), aff'd per curiam, 561 Pa. 33, 747 A.2d 894 (2000)(<HOLDING>) Further, even if Camejo\u2019s affidavit were Holdings: 0: holding that 25 pacs  28722 is capable of only one meaning that minor political parties must nominate candidates by nomination papers and are not entitled to participate at party primaries 1: holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40  25 2: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 3: holding that it violated the first amendment to prohibit announcement of views on disputed legal and political issues by candidates for judicial election 4: holding that the achievements of minor political parties were accomplished without the help of public funds thus the limited participation or nonparticipation of nonmajor parties or candidates in public funding does not unconstitutionally disadvantage them", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to demonstrate a nexus because his fear of \u201cordinary crime\u201d or \u201cprivate violence\u201d by \u201cunknown persons\u201d did not amount to evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. We cannot say that the record compels a different conclusion. Garcia\u2019s. evidence established at most that crime, including kidnapping for ransom, is widespread in Mexico and that people within both the expatriate and local communities, and at all socioeconomic levels, may be targeted by gangs and drug-trafficking organizations for kidnapping. As a matter of law, such evidence of high levels of general criminal activity within a country alone is insufficient to \u201cconstitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground.\u201d See Ruiz v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1310-11 (explaining Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners who apply for withholding of removal must establish that a statutorily protected ground was a reason for their persecution 1: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence 2: holding that persecution based on being a current member of the military national police force or us embassy guard does not qualify as persecution on a protected ground 3: holding that while widespread violence against a protected group by private individuals and public officials may constitute persecution widespread discrimination that may include persecution of some individuals does not compel such a finding 4: holding that evidence that  is consistent with acts of private violence  or that merely shows that a person has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution based on a statutorily protected ground", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to indemnify a public employee for defense costs arising out of willful or wanton misconduct,\u201d regardless of the context in which those defense costs arise. We disagree. The statutes from which the city derives its broad public policy are part of the OTCA. By its terms, the OTCA establishes when the state and its subdivisions must expend public funds to address tort claims. Through the amendment of ORS 30.285 and ORS 30.287 in 1975, the legislature expanded the OTCA to require the state and its subdivisions to take financial responsibility for tort claims filed against their employees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that ORS 30.287 is directed to \u201ctorts, [and] not to other claims.\u201d City of Tualatin v. City-County Ins. Services Trust, 321 Or 164, 171, 894 P2d 1158 (1995) (<HOLDING>). That statute and ORS 30.285 were designed \u201cto Holdings: 0: holding that proof that an employer fired an employee three months after the employee filed a charge of discrimination sufficed to state a prima facie case of causation 1: holding that ors 30287 does not oblige a municipality to defend an employee against an ethics charge 2: holding that the other party must have adequate notice of the claim in order to defend against it 3: holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured 4: holding that rule 52040 prohibited the state from amending the indictment to include a different charge because defendant was prejudiced in that he had no ability to defend himself against the added charge", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Therefore, Conway has failed to put forward any evidence that National relied on counsel\u2019s advice so as to have reasonable cause for its failure to pay the pre-petition taxes. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record that National\u2019s failure to pay its post-petition taxes was due to reliance on the advice of counsel. Conway\u2019s reference to a few vague and conclusory statements of reliance in the record falls far short of pointing to specific substantive evidence that would support a conclusion that the taxes were not owed. While there is some evidence that counsel told management what debts to pay, no evidence suggests that counsel advised that preferring other creditors would not subject National\u2019s officers to personal liability for the excise taxes. See Newsome, 431 F.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). Nor is there evidence of any specific Holdings: 0: holding that an attorneys advice to execute a chattel mortgage in favor of the taxpayers bank did not provide reasonable cause where the attorney did not advise the taxpayer that he could prefer the bank over the united states without sub jecting himself to section 6672 liability 1: holding a bank officer who informed a third party that it would be safe to extend 8000 credit to bank customer although customer did not have an open account at the bank could be held liable for the material misrepresentation 2: holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank 3: holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank 4: holding that a copy of an agreement executed by an insolvent bank found in the draft documents of the banks attorney did not satisfy section 1823es requirements because it was not an official record of the failed bank", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed \u201cgreater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe.\u201d Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). The evaluation of whether section 4022.13 is vague as applied to Perez must be made with respect to Perez\u2019s actual conduct \u201cand not with respect to hypothetical situations at the periphery of the [regulation\u2019s] scope or with respect to the conduct of other parties who might not be forewarned by the broad language.\u201d diLeo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial 1: holding that statute that permitted termination of teachers for due and sufficient cause was not vague as applied 2: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 3: holding statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to mere possession of money on jail premises 4: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The EEOC interpretive guidance gives as an example of \"broad range of jobs in various classes\u201d: [A]n individual has an allergy to a substance found in most high rise office buildings, but seldom found elsewhere, that makes breathing extremely difficult. Since this individual would be substantially limited in the ability to perform the broad range of jobs in various classes that are conducted in high rise office buildings within the geographical area to which he or she has reasonable access, he or she would be substantially limited in working. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. \u00a7 1630.2(j). 12 . The Seventh Circuit has held that truck driving constitutes a class of jobs. Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.1997); see also DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial 1: holding that a nonnamed class member with opportunity to opt out constitutes a party bound by a settlement 2: recognizing that truck driving constitutes a class of jobs 3: recognizing that failure to develop claim on appeal constitutes waiver 4: holding that a request for search constitutes an interrogation", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "they are guaranteed the rights encompassed in the warnings. As far as we can tell, Davis had never been advised of his Miranda rights with respect to this case before talking to Judd. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to conclude that Davis\u2019s untaped confession to Judd should have been suppressed. Notwithstanding, the erroneous admission of this confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly after confessing in his holding cell, Davis gave a taped statement in which he voluntarily gave the same information contained in his prior statement to Judd. This statement was clearly admissible because Davis was fully informed of (and waived) his Miranda rights before the start of the taping session. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (<HOLDING>). As to the second taped confession, given on Holdings: 0: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 1: holding that where a suspect was given miranda warnings and then immediately spoke without police prompting that statement was voluntary and therefore admissible 2: holding inadmissible a statement made after incomplete miranda advisement but holding a subsequent statement admissible because the court found it was given after a full advisement 3: holding that a confession obtained in violation of miranda was admissible for impeachment 4: holding that miranda warnings do not have to be given in the exact form stated in the miranda opinion as long as an effective equivalent is given", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "could ever be established by the testimony of a party, which concept the law long abandoned. See Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 895 So.2d 225, 238 (Ala.2004) (citing Herbert E. Tucker, Colorado Dead Man\u2019s Statute: Time for Repeal or Reform?, 29 Colo. Law. 45, 45 (January 2000) (tracing the movement away from the common-law rule that rendered parties incompetent to testify in their own cases)). When the record contains no legitimate reason for questioning the credibility of a party\u2019s statements, a decision to disregard those statements based solely on the fact that they assist the party in proving his or her case is necessarily arbitrary and contrary to the law. See generally Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 11 S.Ct. 733, 35 L.Ed. 501 (1891) (<HOLDING>). The record lacks any basis on which the trial Holdings: 0: holding that industrial commission is ultimate fact finder 1: holding the question of necessity is one of mixed law and fact and accordingly one for the fact finder in the ordinary case 2: holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable 3: holding that a finder of fact may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence 4: holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Whitestown Court held that the trial court erred by finding that Whitestown had failed to carry its burden of proof. The Court also sought to \u201cremind trial courts of ... the deferential standard accorded to annexing municipalities[.]\u201d Id. at 927, 2015 WL 4557062 at *10. In the end, the Whitestown Court reversed the trial court and instructed that judgment be entered in favor of Whitestown on the remonstrators\u2019 petition. 2. Boonville Annexation [28] As for the case before us, we agree with Boonville that what a municipality needs and can use \u201cis first and foremost a legislative determination.\u201d Ap-pellees\u2019 Br. p. 33. A court, should not substitute its judgment for-what a municipality determines is needed to accomplish its purposes. State v. Collom, 720 N,E.2d 737, 741 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, we observe that necessity \u201cis Holdings: 0: holding that questions of government necessity and expediency are understood to be exclusively for the legislature 1: holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction 2: holding that questions of procedure are for the arbitrator not the courts 3: holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo 4: holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under the ADA are \u201cdefined in terms of 12 extensive categories,\u201d PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001), and includes places of education, see 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12181(7)(J). However, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12187 states: The provisions of the subchapter [III] shall not apply to private clubs or estab lishments exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.2000-a(e)) [42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2000a et seq.] or to religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places of worship. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a religious private school that is controlled by a religious F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 Holdings: 0: holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead 1: holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508 2: holding that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a separate, published opinion filed contemporaneously with this disposition. 2 . Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we do not restate them here except as necessary to explain our disposition. 3 . Cervantes is the only one of the petitioners who might benefit from the motion to reopen on the hardship determination, given that the applications of Alma, as discussed herein, and Serrano, as discussed in the separate, published opinion, fail on independent bases. 4 . The BIA properly determined that equitable tolling excused petitioners\u2019 untimely filing of their motion to reopen, in light of their prior counsel\u2019s statements that petitioners\u2019 only option was to appeal to our circuit. See SocopGonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184-1185 (9th Cir.2001) Holdings: 0: holding trial court abused its discretion when case had been on file for only three months the discovery sought was material to the plaintiffs claims and the plaintiff exercised due diligence in obtaining discovery 1: holding that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff was privy to facts which would provoke inquiry in the mind of a person of reasonable prudence and which if followed up would have led to the discovery of the fraud 2: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 3: holding that one need only show that reasonable diligence would not have led to the discovery of essential information bearing on the claim 4: holding that general allegations of a need for additional discovery will not suffice the person presenting such a claim must show what discovery has been obtained why it is inadequate and the what additional information he expects to obtain from additional discovery", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "information in the past\u201d is sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for a stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972). See also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (observing that \u201creasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause\u201d and noting that, in Adams, the Court had reasoned that \u201cthe unverified tip from the known informant might not have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop\u201d); State v. Morton, 363 N.C. 737, 738, 686 S.E.2d 510, 510, adopting per curiam, 198 N.C. App. 206, 217, 679 S.E.2d 437, 445 (2009) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (<HOLDING>); State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 794-95, Holdings: 0: holding that the detectives in this case had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant could be armed based solely on the confidential informants tip that defendant was involved in a recent driveby shooting and was wearing gang colors 1: holding that it was  reasonable for the defendant to foresee that in an encounter between armed robbers and armed guards protecting an armored car a shooting was likely to occur 2: holding an informants tip can establish reasonable suspicion without investigative confirmation if the tip is credible 3: holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made 4: holding corroboration is not a necessity where confidential informants reliability was well established and his tip was based on direct personal observation of criminal activity", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "whether they wish to proceed with' their own lawsuit, or to join a class, if one has been certified. Id. (quoting In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F.Supp.2d 431, 452 (S.D.N.Y.2003)). Plaintiffs argue vehemently that Wyser-Pratte is not binding on this Court because it constitutes an improper limitation of Supreme Court doctrine, represents the minority rule, and was wrongly decided. We recognize that Wyser-Pratte now represents the- minority rule. Compare Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir.1983) (approving in dicta of-forfeiture rule), with State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir.2008); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009 (9th Cir.2008); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 254-56 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). That several of our fellow Circuits chose not Holdings: 0: holding american pipe tolling continued when court of appeals reversed district courts class certification but remanded for further proceedings on certification as to subclass that included plaintiff 1: holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied 2: holding that american pipe  tolling applies to plaintiffs who file actions while class certificationis pending 3: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 4: recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). In Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir.1980), we held that \u00a7 1985(3) only covers conspiracies against: 1) classes who receive heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause; and 2) \u201cthose individuals who join together as a class for the purpose of asserting certain fundamental rights.\u201d Id. at 1150; see also Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.1994). Bartell\u2019s claim that Defendants discriminated against her on account of her mental disabilities therefore is not actionable. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has not conferred suspect or quasi-suspect status on statutory classifications covering the disabled, see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249; see also Haverstick, 32 F.3d at 994 (<HOLDING>). Further, Bartell has not alleged that Holdings: 0: recognizing that as with tax rates no one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty 1: holding party must support argument with legal authority 2: holding that the appellant failed to preserve a claim of error that was based on an argument that precedent was wrongly decided where in the trial court the appellant had conceded that the precedent was controlling 3: holding that no existing legal precedent supports the plaintiffs argument that  19853 covers discriminatory conspiracies against the handicapped 4: holding that improper argument about purging jurors community of drug conspiracies did not rise to level of plain error", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.\u201d Goosby, 409 U.S. at 518, 93 S.Ct. 854. In other instances, the Supreme Court has described insubstantial claims as \u201cso attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,\u201d \u201cwholly insubstantial,\u201d \u201cobviously frivolous,\u201d and \u201cno longer open to discussion.\u201d Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (collecting cases) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has suggested that this standard is rarely met. See Hagans, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372; Goosby, 409 U.S. 512, 93 S.Ct. 854. Our limited treatment of the \u201cinsubstantial\u201d standard makes use of similar language. See Loeber v. Spargo, 144 Fed.Appx. 168, 170 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished summary order) (<HOLDING>); Green, 380 F.2d at 448 (stating that a claim Holdings: 0: holding that the taxpayer filed a frivolous return because it had no basis in law or fact 1: holding defendant may receive only the portion of his fees under 42 usc  1988 that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim 2: holding that a claim is insubstantial only if prior decisions render the issue inescapably frivolous and leave no room for any inference of controversy 3: holding trial courts finding that claim was frivolous insufficient to meet statutory requirement that claim constitutes harassment is groundless and not made in good faith 4: holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of compensation is not controlling to our determination of whether it is a wage. Gurnik v. Lee, 587 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Rather, we will consider the substance of the compensation to determine whether it is subject to the Wage Payment Statute. Id. We have recognized that wages are \"something akin to the wages paid on a regular periodic basis for regular work done by the employee.\" Wank v. St. Francis College, 740 N.E.2d 908, 912 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (quotation and citation omitted), trams. denied. Deferred payment of compensation that accrued during an employee's tenure is a wage. Id. However, if the compensation is linked to the financial sue-cess of the employer, it is not a wage. See id.; see also Highhouse v. Midwest Orthopedic Inst., P.C., 807 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind.2004) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pyle v. Nat'l Wine & Spirits Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed 1: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 2: holding that compensation is a wage if it is compensation for time worked and is not linked to a contingency such as the financial success of the company 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that the words amount and compensation in the regulation referred to cash or salary rather than to all forms of compensation", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir.2005) (no need to enjoin allegedly improper fees, when any improper fees levied would be recoverable upon success on the merits); Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1995) (no need for injunction where failure to renew his employment contract for an additional term can be redressed by money damages upon success on the merits). 3 .Mr. Alvord accuses the appellees of filing the malpractice action separately as \"an end run around amending the complaint in the present action.\u201d We note that our holding would be no different if the malpractice action were in the same proceeding as the probate action, for the two claims are separate and distinct. See Astor Pictures Corp. v. Shull, 64 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.1949) (<HOLDING>). 4 . D.C.Code \u00a7 14-302(a) (2001) (\"In a civil Holdings: 0: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case 1: holding that the separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to establish jurisdiction 2: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 3: holding that if a single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and separate legal wrongs two causes of action would result 4: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a particular situation.\u201d Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Dunphy argues that the terms and conditions of his employment would have been materially altered by these transfers because they would have enabled him to work out of his home and thus avoid a long commute. While \u201cthe difference in location is certainly of tantamount importance to Plaintiff, it does not raise the denial of Plaintiffs transfer request to the level of an adverse employment action.\u201d Duncan v. Shalala, No. 97 Civ. 3607, 2000 WL 1772655, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Nonnenmann v. City of New York, 174 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a lateral transfer without a loss in benefits does not constitute an adverse employment action 1: holding that denial of a lateral transfer which would have allowed plaintiff to be near his wife was not an adverse employment action 2: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 3: holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home 4: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Qureshi and parents. 3 . The plaintiff also sued Principal Johnson for abuse of a teacher, but she conceded at the pretrial conference of this case that she will forgo this claim. 4 . These latter non-suspension-related allegations are substantive due process claims because the plaintiff argues that these actions were categorically unconstitutional, not that they were unconstitutional because they were taken before she received notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1352-53 (6th Cir.1990). 5 . The collective bargaining agreement between the JCTA and the Board (the \"CBA\u201d) does appear to grant the plaintiff a property interest in continued pay and benefits since it provides that a teacher may be suspended only for \"just cause.\u201d See Cleveland Bd 85)(<HOLDING>); with Gillard v. Norris, 857 F.2d 1095, 1098 Holdings: 0: holding that fiveday suspension was not de minimis deprivation where it was unreviewable under state law and included first amendment claims 1: holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible 3: holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard 4: holding that a suspension from employment and deprivation of duties and equipment constitute discrete acts", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "price reduction of $500,000. Ultimately, the general partners agreed to a settlement whereby the price to be paid by Horsham was reduced by $200,000, of which $100,000 would be deducted from the sum to be received by the partnership and $100,000 deducted from the commission to be received by Padmar. Padmar also agreed to guarantee Horsham $500,000 of future lease payments as they became due under the Leases. The sale then closed, and the cash proceeds of sale were distributed to and accepted by all of the limited partners. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The general partners contend this is a derivative action, cognizable in equity and thus this court may find facts in accordance with our view of the preponderance of the evidence. Pelfrey v. Bank of Greer, 270 S.C. 691, 244 S.E. (2d) 315 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the limited partners argue Holdings: 0: holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders 1: holding that shareholders had standing to bring derivative suit against the government but not direct suit due to lack of privity 2: recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action 3: holding a shareholders derivative action even where the only relief allowed is a recovery of damages is nevertheless a suit in equity and not an action at law 4: holding that in rendering judgment following the settlement of a derivative action that did not involve a class action trial court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment that would adjudicate rights and personal claims of individual shareholders who were not parties to derivative action that was being settled", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in federal court. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing between prudential and jurisdictional exhaustion requirements, and holding that the administrative-exhaustion requirement found in the Rehabilitation Act is prudential in nature). Turning now to the case before us, we note that HHC has raised a legitimate question as to whether Allen\u2019s and Slone\u2019s disparate-impact claims have been exhausted. Specifically, HHC plausibly contends that the plaintiffs did not adequately describe their discrimination claim such that an EEOC investigation into potential liability based on disparate impact could have \u201creasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.\u201d See Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991) (citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). Allen simply stated in her EEOC charge that Holdings: 0: recognizing this rule 1: holding that this court does not necessarily require the claim to be specifically raised in an eeoc charge provided that it satisfies this scopeofinvestigation test 2: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 3: holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal 4: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the incarceration that results from revocation is a consequence of the underlying crime of conviction. Indeed, New York law provides that time served as a result of revocation must be credited against the original sentence. See id. \u00a7 70.40(3) (providing that original sentenc (5th Cir.2011), and United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.1999), relied on by Bussey, warrant no different conclusion. In Garcia-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit ruled that supervision was not tolled during administrative detention pending deportation, see 640 F.3d at 133-34; in Morales-Alejo, the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion with re spect to pre-trial detention where the defendant later pleaded guilty, see 193 F.3d at 1105; but see United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The reason for these conclusions is that such Holdings: 0: holding that pretrial detention credited against ultimate sentence triggers tolling 1: holding that juvenile pretrial detention implicates due process rights 2: holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention 3: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act 4: holding that a pretrial motion triggers an automatic exclusion under  3161h1f even though no actual delay results", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "99 S.Ct. at 1757. Here, defendant\u2019s silence and his participation in the debriefing sessions did not constitute waiver. More than a failure to request counsel and subsequent conversations with the prosecutor pursuant to a cooperation agreement are required to find waiver in the debriefing context. For purposes of clarity, it is helpful to explain precisely what is required. Defendant and his counsel should be given reasonable notice of the time and place of the scheduled debriefing so that counsel might be present. A cooperating witness\u2019s failure to be accompanied by counsel at debriefing may later be construed as a waiver, providing defendant and counsel have had notice so that the consequences of counsel\u2019s failure to attend could be explained to defendant. Cf. Auen, 864 F.2d at 5 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 1: holding that an ijs failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel from a pro se petitioner is a due process violation 2: holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later 3: holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel 4: holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "HRS \u00a7 386-88 supersedes HRS \u00a7 91-14 and removes the circuit court from the appellate process with regard to the proceedings brought under HRS ch. 386\u201d. Id. In DeVictoria v. H & K Contractors, 56 Haw. 552, 545 P.2d 692 (1976), the supreme court confirmed HRS \u00a7 91-14(b) provides that \u201cproceedings for review shall be instituted in the circuit court ... except where a statute provides for a direct appeal to the supreme court.\" DeVictoria, 56 Haw. at 556 n. 3, 545 P.2d at 697, n. 3 (emphasis added). Therefore, under Ras and DeVictoria, HRS chapter 91 applies except with respect to the circuit court provision. Thus, HRS \u00a7 91-14 concerning the standard of review on appeal governs in the present case. See Ostrowski v. Wasa Elec. Servs., Inc., 87 Hawai'i 492, 495, 960 P.2d 162, 165 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Kleenco, 2 Haw.App. 219, 219, 629 Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute 1: holding that appellate review in a first amendment case of a lower courts finding concerning the motivation behind a decision to terminate a faculty member is governed by the clearly erroneous standard 2: holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit 3: holding that appellate review of the boards decision is governed by hrs  9114 4: holding that the standard of review for the denial of a motion for reconsideration is governed by the law of the regional circuit", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "categories .... \u201c \u2018[U]nless an employee at will identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may be discharged with or without cause.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). Accordingly, the courts interpreting New Mexico law have adhered to the rule that retaliatory discharge is a narrow exception to the rule of employment at will and have refused to expand its application. See Zaccardi v. Zale Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1475-76 (10th Cir.l988)(discharge for refusal to take polygraph examination did not violate public policy); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985) (discharge for use of employer\u2019s grievance procedure did not violate public policy); Jeffers v. Butler, 762 F.Supp. 308, 310 (D.N.M.1990)(<HOLDING>), aff'd without opinion, 931 F.2d 62 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that no public policy stated where employee and not public at large would benefit from employees whistleblowing actions 1: holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy 2: holding employees identified no clear public policy which their termination violated 3: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 4: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "income tax return for the appropriate year, the Commissioner constructed a fraction, using as the numerator the amount of prejudgment interest set by the trial court ($112,000) and as the denominator the total amount of the judgment ($287,000). He then multiplied the total settlement ($250,000) by this fraction and assessed a deficiency on the basis that the resulting product ($97,561) represented the (taxable) interest component of the settlement. See id. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner\u2019s determination, as did we. See id. at 23. Specifically, we approved the Commissioner\u2019s use of a ratio based on .the judgment in apportioning the undifferentiated settlement proceeds as between prejudgment interest and compensatory damages. See id. at 25-26; accord Robinson, 70 F.3d at 38 (<HOLDING>). Since the Commissioner used exactly the same Holdings: 0: holding that a motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict where sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict 1: holding that evidence regarding the existence of an oral contract and its subsequent modification supported the jurys verdict 2: holding that the appellants appeal of the jurys verdict was a material breach of the no appeals provision in the parties settlement agreement 3: holding explicitly that the jurys verdict furnishes the best indication of how to prorate an ensuing settlement 4: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) (document no. 7). Dwyer already amended her complaint once as of right. The United States objects. Standard of Review The United States\u2019 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2680(a). If the exception applies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See id.; Magee v. United States, 121 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997). Therefore, the court must resolve the 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first, before undertaking a summary judgment analysis on the merits of the plaintiffs claim. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304-05 (4th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. George Arpin & Sons, Inc., 949 Holdings: 0: holding that consideration of summary judgment motion should await determination of jurisdiction 1: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 2: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed 3: holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed 4: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Johnson and Wallace, saw two men flee the scene upon their approach. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (stating that \u201c[h]eadlong flight \u2014 -wherever it occurs \u2014 is the consummate act of evasion\u201d). Furthermore, as the court discussed above, the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed to support Johnson\u2019s seizure also includes all of Johnson\u2019s non-compliant conduct after being ordered to show his hands. See Valentine, 232 F.3d at 358. In the present case, as Silvers stepped out of the police car, Johnson had a \u201cvery surprised look\u201d on his case. Tr. at 49. Because Johnson\u2019s eyes got \u201creal wide,\u201d Silvers was led to believe that something was not right. Tr; at 49, 53, see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (<HOLDING>) As Silvers approached, Johnson pushed Senquiz Holdings: 0: holding nervous behavior and inconsistent story justified reasonable suspicion and subsequent search 1: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion 2: holding that nervous behavior and failure to make eye contact did not give rise to reasonable individualized suspicion 3: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 4: holding that nervous evasive behavior such as flight is a relevant factor in an examination of reasonable suspicion", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for Offer of Proof and Request for In Camera Inquiry and Combined Incorporated Memorandum of Law.\u201d 8 . On appeal, Smith assigns as error the district court's decision to deny an offer of proof. We do not reach that issue because we reverse and remand with instructions for other reasons. 9 . We note that our decision in Smitherman was not available to the district court when it ruled on the motion at issue in this appeal. 10 . In applying an earlier version of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, we recognized screens could be effective in mitigating imputed conflicts under certain circumstances. See Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 344, 348 (discussing the effective use of a \"Chinese wall\u201d by the public defender\u2019s office); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 650 N.W.2d 594, 597-98 (Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). It should be noted, however, that under the Holdings: 0: holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable 1: holding a motion is untimely if not filed after the party has knowledge to support disqualification and after the party suffers an adverse ruling 2: holding disqualification was appropriate but referencing several aba formal opinions where screening prevented the disqualification of an entire firm 3: holding that disqualification orders do not fall in the collateral order exception 4: holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "ch. 12, at 2196 (emphasis added). The subject at issue (amendment of RCW 9A.28-.020) is clearly expressed in the title of ESSB 6151. The bill has an overarching theme related to the management of sex offenders, and the title references the criminal attempt statute. The title notifies an interested reader that the amendments to the criminal attempt statute relate to the management of sex offenders. Because the title gives notice of the subjects contained within the legislation, Alexander\u2019s claim that the criminal attempt statute violates the subject-in-title rtain 1999 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?\u201d was a general title); Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 193, 217 Holdings: 0: holding that dyfs was not required to try the title 9 action to conclusion before filing a title 30 action for the termination of parental rights 1: holding title shall voter approval be required for any tax increase license tab fees be 30 per year for motor vehicles and existing vehicle taxes be repealed was a general title 2: holding that a renter who stole a motor home had void title not voidable title and could not convey good title 3: recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle 4: holding that in order for claim to be within scope of coverage of title insurance policy it must be specifically provided for", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that even assuming the ground invasion had reached the subsurface and become an \u201coffending concentration under some of the appellants\u2019 properties ... some type of physical damages or interference with use must have been demonstrated for appellants to recover for a trespass.\u201d Id. \u201cStigma damages\u201d were not enough, as they did not indicate actual damage or interference with use. Id. Plaintiff urges that this Court is bound to follow the standard in Chance, and hold that it must find only \u201csome\u201d interference with use or damage caused by the indirect air and water invasion in this case. Plaintiff argues that despite the clear holding in Chance, the Sixth Circuit in Baker incorrectly added a \u201csubstantial\u201d damage or interference standard to the holding in Chance. 533 Fed.Appx. at 522-23. (<HOLDING>). In so holding that \u201csubstantial\u201d damage or Holdings: 0: holding that damage to realty was not excluded from coverage if such damage resulted from subsidence caused by something other than soil condition despite homeowners experts description of the damage as settling 1: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 2: holding that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous and interpreting it as originating from or growing out of or flowing from 3: holding that a landowner who lost a strip of property to a highway widening project could not recover losses caused by concurrent placement of a median strip because when less than the entire property is taken compensation for damage to the remainder can be awarded only if such damage is caused by the taking and cjonstruction of the median not the taking caused the alleged damage 4: holding that plaintiffs could not show aerial vapors originating in subsurface plume caused substantial damage or interference with use", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that these education advocates are \u201cother like fiduciar[ies]\u201d under Rule 17(c). See Gardner ex rel. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.1989); Adelman ex rel. Adelman v. Graves, 747 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.1984); Life Ins. Co. v. Cashatt, 206 F.Supp. 410 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, while the Tenth Circuit cautions against appointing multiple individuals to represent a child, see Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1989) (reasoning that \u201c[allowing two parties, the court-appointed guardian ad litem and [a next friend], to represent the minor children interferes with the orderly development of the lawsuit\u201d), it does not support the defendant\u2019s proposition that the court does not have the power to replace a guardian ad litem with another guardian for a specific purpose, see Id. (<HOLDING>). Here, after appointing a guardian ad litem, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the person appointed as a guardian ad litem may not have interest adverse to those of the ward 1: holding that tolling statute applicable to incompetent plaintiffs continues in effect in spite of appointment of guardian ad litem 2: holding indigent mothers due process rights were not violated by trial courts failure to appoint attorney ad litem for her until six months after parental termination suit was filed against her where counsel was appointed giving mother a year to prepare for trial when department of protective and regulatory services made clear its intent to pursue dualtrack of both termination and reunification 3: recognizing that upon request a district court may remove the guardian ad litem andor  appoint another guardian ad litem to protect the childrens interests 4: holding that the recommendations of the childrens caseworker and guardian ad litem coupled with evidence of the mothers extensive drug history her incompletion of courtordered services and testimony that the children were happy and doing well in their foster homes were sufficient for the trial court to determine that termination of parental rights was in the childrens best interest", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "121 S.Ct. 365. The Court reached this holding on the bases that the property at issue had to be property that was valuable in the hands of the victim, not just valuable in the hands of the defendant, and that an unissued video poker bcense did not constitute property that was valuable in the hands of the State of Louisiana. Id. at 22-27, 121 S.Ct. 365. In contrast to the facts in Cleveland, because a government has a property right in tax revenues when they accrue, see Manning v. Seeley Tube & Box Co., 338 U.S. 561, 566, 70 S.Ct. 386, 9.4 L.Ed. 346 (1950), the tax revenues owed Canada and the Province of Ontario by reason of the Defendants\u2019 conduct in the present case constitute property for purposes of the wire fraud statute. United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 495 (4th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis' \u00e1dded). Indeed, the Court in Holdings: 0: holding that sales puffery cannot constitute mail fraud to support rico claim 1: recognizing that a mailing must be sufficiently related to the fraudulent scheme to support a charge of mail fraud 2: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 3: holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered 4: holding that plain language of the mail fraud statute condemns any scheme to defraud in which the mails are employed including the evasion of  sales and use taxes", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Co., 120 F.R.D. 82, 86-87 (N.D.Ind.1987)); Aiken v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 151 F.R.D. 621, 623 n. 2 (E.D.Tex.1993) (citing Shields v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.Cir.1980)). Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the burden of proving waiver of work-product protection falls on the party asserting waiver. See High Tech Communications, 1995 WL 83614, at *5. C. Joint Defense Privilege The \u201cjoint defense\u201d privilege, sometimes called the \u201ccommon interest\u201d or \u201ccommunity of interest\u201d rule is not an independent privilege, but merely an exception to the general rule that no privilege attaches to communications that are made in the presence of or disclosed to a third party. See In re Auclair, 961 F.2d at 69 (<HOLDING>); LTV, 89 F.R.D. at 604 (The joint defense Holdings: 0: holding that the joint defense privilege preserved the attorneyclient privilege against waiver in the context of a group with common interests seeking common representation 1: holding that an invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives the attorneyclient privilege 2: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 3: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 4: recognizing privilege", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the statute be read to mean that a mailing must occur at any time, but not later than three days after posting. See, e.g., Jensen v. Nelson, 19 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Iowa 1945) (ruling that where testator had willed a portion of his estate to the county to build a courthouse if the building was completed within ten years after the testator\u2019s death, the estate must furnish the money where the building was completed between the writing of the will and death of the testator); Tanzilli v. Casassa, 324 Mass. 113, 85 N.E.2d 220, 221 (1949) (permitting appeal of a zoning board decision prior to the rendering of that decision, where statute said the appeal must be made within fifteen days after the decision of the board); Reifke v. State, 31 A.D.2d 67, 296 N.Y.S.2d 667, 669-70 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Ingalls Packing Co., 30 Wash.2d 282, Holdings: 0: holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state 1: holding that in the absence of an adequate state remedy one whose constitutional rights are violated has a direct claim against the state under the state constitution 2: holding that while the fourteenth amendment is directed against state action and not private action the state action requirement is met in a civil action where state law is applied whether by statute or common law 3: holding that a property owner can make a claim against the state prior to the completion of the state action where statute says claim must be made within six months after completion of the action by the state 4: holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of its status as that of a mail carrier similar to the U.S. Postal Service would, in any event, not be availing in its bid for immunity. Cf. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408, 117 S.Ct. at 2106 (rejecting defendant's argument that \"[sjince private prison guards perform the same work as state prison guards, ..., they must require immunity to a similar degree\u201d); cf. also id. at 409, 117 S.Ct. at 2106 (stating that approach based on primary activity of private defendants \"bristles with difficulty, particularly since, in many areas, government and private industry may engage in fundamentally similar activities, ranging from electricity production, to waste disposal, to even mail delivery \u201d (emphasis added)). 32 . Cf. Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 965-67 (10th Cir.1995) (pre-Richardson) (<HOLDING>); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 Holdings: 0: holding that director of crisis center who was private individual and who acted under color of state law by conducting strip search of female detainees for contraband at request of police officer had qualified immunity from  1983 suit arising out of searches because she acted as agent of officer who also had qualified immunity 1: holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity 2: holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law 3: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 4: holding that officer had qualified immunity from  1983 action brought by arrestee because officer had probable cause to arrest based on statements of a witness store clerk who signed a criminal information and deposition detailing the theft and establishing each of the elements of the crime of larceny", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "step one allows, and perhaps requires, consideration of legislative history in determining \u201cwhether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue\u201d, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843; and \u2022 an analysis of the additional question we have to answer after Brand X, 545 U.S. at 984: Did the Supreme Court hold in Colony that its interpretation of the key phrase \u201comits from gross income an amount properly includible therein\u201d is \u201cthe only permissible reading\u201d of the statute? We agree with the majority that it is wise for us as a trial court to avoid the issue of what level of deference to give this regulation. See Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 96, 180-181 (2006) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (listing circuit conflicts), vacated and remanded 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). We are particularly cautious about the Holdings: 0: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority 1: holding ceq regulations entitled to substantial deference 2: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "conduct sales, merely that it can be viewed by potential customers. Moreover, Boschetto does not allege that any of the Defendants made any other eBay sales or posted listings either before or after the initiation of the lawsuit. While it might be jurisdictionally relevant if Hansing or the Boucher Defendants had used eBay to conduct a significant quantity of automobile sales to California residents or in other states, neither Boschetto\u2019s complaint nor his affidavit allege that any of the Defendants are engaged in such sales. The denial of Bos-chetto\u2019s request for discovery, which was based on little more than a hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts, was not an abuse of discretion. See Butcher\u2019s Union Local No. 198 v. SDC Inn, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion The sale of one automobile Holdings: 0: holding that while as a general matter discovery should be freely permitted  j jurisdictional discovery is justified only if the plaintiff reasonably demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through discovery 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period 2: holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion 3: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiffs state only that they believe discovery will enable them to demonstrate sufficient california business contacts to establish the courts personal jurisdiction 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "private agreement that lured his investment. D'Amico also testified that Freeman attended the meeting at which Sudeen explained the structure of the investment. D\u2019Amico's check was deposited in one of Sudeen\u2019s accounts for which Freeman was a signatory, the funds of which were traced to lulling payments that Freeman made to other investors. 8 . United. States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 766 (5th Cir.1994) (\"We have held that in some cases the likelihood of criminal wrongdoing is so high, and the circumstance surrounding a defendant\u2019s activities and cohorts are so suspicious, that a failure to conduct further inquiry or inspection can justify the inclusion of the deliberate ignorance instruction.\") (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding no deliberate indifference when a failure to take reasonable measures was due to defendants mistake 1: holding that the deliberate indifference instruction was appropriate where the defendant handled calls from irate loan applicants who received no money but made only made a trivial attempt to discern whether anything was wrong 2: holding that disgorgement was appropriate only as to the profits made prior to the time insider information was made public 3: holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs 4: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(3) the blameworthiness of the actor; (4) the nature and severity of the potential penalties for a violation of the law. Id. Applying this analytical framework, we must determine whether Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.165 is criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory. Recently, we addressed this exact issue in an unpublished opinion in State v. Bellanger, No. A06-1907, 2007 WL 4472287, at *l-*2 (Minn.App. Dec. 24, 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008), and concluded that Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.165 was criminal/prohibitory. Although not prece-dential, we find the reasoning in Bellanger to be persuasive, and we adopt it here. See Minn.Stat. \u00a7 480A.08, subd. 3 (2008) (\u201c[Ujnpublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential.\u201d); Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). In Bellanger, we held that Minn.Stat. \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that a duty to disclose did not arise under the special facts doctrine where while there may have been concealment of opinions there was no concealment of the facts upon which those opinions were based and de fendants were not bound to volunteer their opinions citation and internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding in an unpublished opinion that manifest disregard survives hall street as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur 2: holding that a taxpayer is required to present  substantial and persuasive evidence that the boards valuation is erroneous 3: holding that unpublished opinions may be persuasive 4: holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of both types of aggravated robbery, and Terry pled guilty to conspiracy to commit both. Hence, Terry was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery in contravention of section 18-4-302(a) and (b). Because aggravated robbery under section 18-4-302(b) is a per se crime of violence under the reasoning of this court\u2019s holding in Alonzo Terry, conspiracy to commit that crime \u201cis itself a crime of violence\u201d under section 18-2-201(4.5). Therefore, under our holding today, Terry must be sentenced according to the provisions of section 16-11-309(1)(a), resulting in a minimum lawful sentence of five years. We thus affirm the court of appeals\u2019 order vacating Terry\u2019s sentence, and we remand this ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Section 16-11-309 crimes of violence are Holdings: 0: holding different rule applicable for conviction of second degree murder 1: holding that fourthdegree aggravated assault is a violent felony 2: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates 3: holding that a high degree of foreseeability is required to impose a duty to hire security guards and that the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely if ever can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowners premises 4: holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "judicial or quasi-judicial function, as was the case in Lyons. Rather, Showers alleges that Musson negligently performed its excavation, construction, and drainage responsibilities under the contract. Specifically, Showers' complaint alleges that Musson is liable for \"improper drainage, . . . maintenance, excavation, construction procedures, and failure to take corrective measures.\" \u00b6 53. These assertions are fundamentally different from the assertion that a governmental entity negligently selected a design that a contractor imple mented for a government project. Design selection is a type of governmental entity decision that we have determined is within the legislative or quasi-legislative function immunized under Wis. Stat. \u00a7 893.80(4). See, e.g., Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100-01 (<HOLDING>); Lange v. Town of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 1: recognizing that the decision to undertake a project or how to design the project may be immunized as the exercise of a legislative or quasilegislative function 2: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission 3: holding that a zoning decision pertaining to a specific property is not a legislative act but is rather quasijudicial in nature 4: recognizing legislative or quasilegislative nature of design decision", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "12(e); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798; United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 692 (6th Cir.2009) (\u201cThus, because the record reveals that Deitz failed to file a Rule 14(a) motion prior to trial, he waived his objection.\u201d); see also United States v. Rox, 692 F.2d 453, 454 (6th Cir.1982) (determining that the defendant waived her objection to misjoinder when she failed to raise the issue until the third day of trial and could not challenge the allegedly improper joinder on appeal). A court may grant relief from the waiver \u201c[f]or good cause,\u201d Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e); Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798, where the defendant can \u201carticulare] some compelling reason for not filing the motion within the deadline,\u201d United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir.2010); see also Wallace, 597 F.3d at 798-99 (<HOLDING>). The defendant did not file a motion to sever Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must stand because defendant waived her right   has suffered no constitutional harm as a result of all charges being tried together in a single trial and failed to make  any substantive objections to the allegedly improper joinder quoting abboud 438 f3d at 567 1: holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal 2: holding that a communication between the judge and juror which is unrelated to the case being tried is not improper and prejudicial 3: holding that a defendant was entitled to a transcript of the trial of codefendants who were tried together and convicted where one of the convictions was reversed on the ground of reasonable doubt 4: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cA compromise verdict results when jurors resolve their inability to make a determination with any certainty or unanim of damages was not inadequate as a matter of law because the parties did not stipulate to a minimum amount of damages and the evidence at trial did not indisputably set a range of monetary recovery. But there need not be an agreed-upon damages range for an award to be inadequate. See Mekdeci 711 F.2d at 1514 (finding that the zero dollars in damages awarded by the jury to an injured child was inadequate because defendant never disputed the child\u2019s damages and the evidence was uncontroverted). The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. See Westminster, 12 So.3d at 842 (<HOLDING>); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating 1: holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate liability was hotly contested at trial the jury was deadlocked the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict 2: holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury 3: holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury 4: holding that jurys damagesrelated questions and verdict of liability with clearly inadequate damages of only medical expenses but no noneconomic damages in case where liability was hotly contested strongly suggested compromised verdict", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to defense counsel\u201d must be disclosed to the defendant when no request has been made, but it limited that holding to evidence \u201cobviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request.\u201d Id. at 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392. The courts of appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, have attached an additional gloss to the Brady rule. \u201c \u2018[T]here is no Brady violation if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in question, or if the information was available to him from another source.\u2019 \u201d Jones v. Bagley, 696 F.3d 475, 487 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000)); see also Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 460 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). To be entitled to a new trial under Brady, Holdings: 0: holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial 1: holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation 2: holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding that the brady rule encompasses evidence known only to police investigators but not the prosecutor 4: holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "P. 9(g). As a practical matter, the effect of a trial court\u2019s finding that a defendant is mentally retarded is that the State loses the option to pursue the death penalty. Once a defendant is tried and judgment is entered, the State has no appeal as of right under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tenn. R.App. P. 3(c) (providing for State\u2019s appeal as of right in limited circumstances, not including a trial court\u2019s finding that a defendant is mentally retarded). Furthermore, even if a defendant were to appeal on other grounds and successfully obtain a retrial, the State would arguably be barred by principles of double jeopardy from seeking the death penalty in subsequent sentencing proceedings. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, denying the State an Holdings: 0: holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty 1: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 2: holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death 3: holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error 4: holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not appointing him counsel for his sentencing hearing, citing to case law holding that where the sentencing error is due to judicial error the defendant is entitled to representation. See Nickerson v, State, 927 So.2d 114, 117 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The State concedes that a defendant is generally entitled to counsel at sentencing or re-sentencing. See Cross v. State, 18 So.3d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (stating that a defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at resentencing). However, the State argues that the defendant was not entitled to the appointment of counsel because the trial court\u2019s actions were ministerial. See generally Frost v. State, 769 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); Navarrete v. State, 707 So.2d 803, 804 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that a trial courts changing of the written sentence to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence is ministerial 1: holding that the failure of a written sentence to conform to the courts oral pronouncement cannot be raised in a rule 3800a motion 2: holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment 3: holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement 4: holding that in cases of direct conflict between a courts oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment the oral pronouncement controls", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "133 S.Ct. at 2082. We remand for resentencing so as not to pretermit the trial judge\u2019s role in exercising the full discretion the law provides. B. The three other Olano factors also support vacatur and remand for resentencing here: The ex post facto violation was plain, it affected Head\u2019s substantial rights, and it impaired the integrity of the sentencing proceeding. 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The district court\u2019s error was \u201cplain.\u201d Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. In this circuit, one circumstance in which an error may be plain is \u201cif, at the time it was made, a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit established its erroneous character.\u201d United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2012); see In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). In January 2012, when the district court Holdings: 0: holding that an error can be plain even in the absence of binding case law where it violates an absolutely clear legal norm 1: holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error 2: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 3: holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law 4: holding that an error cannot be plain unless it is clear under current law quotation omitted", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as natural persons. 12 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 24. \"While apparently never decided in Tennessee, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that the NBA preempts -state statutes requiring a national bank to register or obtain a certificate of authority before transacting business in a state. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City First Bank of D.C., N.A., 88 A.3d 142, 143-44 (D.C. 2014) (finding that the NBA preempted a statute that prevented a foreign entity from maintaining an action in the District of Columbia unless it registered to do business in the District because such a requirement infringed on national banks\u2019 ability to maintain suits \u201cas fully as natural persons\u201d in accordance with the NBA); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Baker, 204 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 502, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (<HOLDING>); 770 PPR, L.L.C. v. TJCV Land Trust, 30 So.3d Holdings: 0: holding a federal law permitting national banks to sell insurance in towns with less than 5000 residents preempted a state statute prohibiting banks from selling most types of insurance 1: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 2: holding that the nba preempted application of a texas statute that would infringe on a national banks federally granted right to sue in any court as fully as natural persons by requiring the bank to obtain a certificate of authority before it could maintain a suit in texas 3: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 4: holding that the nba preempted a kentucky statute that re quired a national bank as a foreign corporation transacting business in the state to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining suit in a kentucky court as it significantly impaired the banks exercise of authority under the nba", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "action under \u00a7 113(f). The Supreme Court stated that, for the purposes of the case before it, \u201cit suffices to demonstrate that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by way of \u00a7 107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement are recoverable only under \u00a7 113(f). Id. The Court noted, however, that it was not suggesting that \u00a7\u00a7 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) do not have any overlap at all. Id. at 2338 n. 6. The Court noted that a PRP may sustain expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under \u00a7 106 or \u00a7 107(a): \u201cIn such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another party.\u201d The Court did \u201cnot decide whether these compelled ., 565 F.Supp.2d 399, 402 (N.D.N.Y.2008) (<HOLDING>); New York v. Next Millennium Realty, LLC, No. Holdings: 0: holding that under the identical rule of professional conduct in alaska slinee the rule limits the clients authority to those decisions it follows that the lawyer has the ultimate authority to make other decisions governing trial tactiecsincluding whether to request lesser included offenses 1: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant 2: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions 3: holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law 4: holding that nothing in atlantic research provides authority to change the circuits previous decisions holding that a party that has incurred expenditures under a consent order with a government agency and has been found partially liable under  113f1 may not seek to recoup those expenditures under section 107a", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "for a sweep that requires information to justify it in the first place\u201d). {15} Our review of the testimony at the suppression hearing indicates an absence of any facts suggesting the presence of, much less any danger posed by, other persons on the scene. Burrell admitted he had no facts to suggest that anyone else was in the house, and he admitted that he neither saw nor heard any movement in the house. To the extent other agents conducted surveillance of the residence before Burrell arrived, they also failed to detect the presence of any other persons. We therefore conclude that the search was unwarranted because there was no evidence to support any specific safety concerns involving any other persons at the arrest scene. See United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 692 (11th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). {16} The State contends that other courts Holdings: 0: holding that the protective sweep of a van was lawful where officers stopped the van on reasonable suspicion that the driver had just committed an armed bank robbery and officers could not see inside the van to determine whether other occupants posed a danger to them 1: holding that the officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest on outstanding warrants because the officers had information that the defendant was suspected of running a methamphetamine operation on the premises other people were living there and assisting the defendant and at the time the sweep began the defendant had not yet been located 2: holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep of the suspects garage and backyard incident to his arrest for possession of marijuana in the back yard because the government pointed to no specific articulable facts suggesting that someone else was on the premises who posed a danger to the officers 3: holding that in the absence of specific and articulable facts showing that another individual who posed a danger to the officers or others was inside the warehouse the officers lack of information could not justify the warrantless sweep and dismissing the governments argument that someone must have been guarding the cocaine inside the warehouse as the kind of unparticularized suspicion or hunch that buie held was insufficient to justify a warrantless sweep internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: holding that the officers awareness that the defendant could be dangerous and that he had a previous weapons conviction was not enough to justify the sweep because once the defendant was in custody he no longer posed a threat to the police", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "enforcement agencies, who theoretically could have stopped the supervisor. Id. at 537. In those circumstances, the Cudney court could not say the actions the employee took were the \u2018only available adequate means\u2019 to protect the public from drunk driving. Id. at 536-38. \u00b616 Then, in Piel v. City of Federal Way, 177 Wn.2d 604, 609-17, 306 P.3d 879 (2013), our Supreme Court held the administrative remedies available through the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) under chapter 41.56 RCW were inadequate, on their own, to fully vindicate public policy when a public employer discharges a public employee for asserting collective bargaining rights. Unlike Korslund and Cudney, Piel involved a prior case holding PERC remedies failed to fully address th 474, 478-79, 276 P.3d 382 (2012) (<HOLDING>), remanded, 180 Wn.2d 1001. Division One of Holdings: 0: holding that the remedies available under massachusetts law to challenge tax assessments were sufficient to preclude federal declaratory action 1: holding the employee remedies available under the commercial motor vehicle safety act 49 usc  31105 adequately protected truck drivers who refuse to violate commercial motor vehicle safety laws even though a statute declared these remedies do not preclude others 2: holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available 3: holding that the remedies are exclusive 4: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the purchase price owed under the contract was not excused. Question 4 included no grounds for excusing Bartush\u2019s failure to comply with the agreement except the existence of a prior material breach by Cimco; other grounds for excusing Bartush\u2019s failure to comply were submitted in question 5, and the jury answered no to that question also. See, e.g., Tex. Standard Oil & Gas, L.P. v. Frankel Offshore Energy, Inc., 394 S.W.3d 753, 779 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (refusing to construe jury\u2019s answer to excuse question as finding that party\u2019s first-occurring breach was immaterial when excuse question combined prior-material-breach ground with other excuse grounds); Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Prof'l Corp., 142 S.W.3d 325, 341 (Tex. App.\u2014Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, although the court\u2019s charge Holdings: 0: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach 1: holding unchallenged jury finding that defendants subsequentlyoccurring breach was not excused by plaintiffs prior material breach required defendant to pay plaintiff per the terms of the agreement 2: holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract 3: holding plaintiff not required to perform its residual contract obligations after defendants material breach 4: holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "any defect in the aircraft or component part \u2014 ceases to be material or admissible in any civil action[.] H.Rep. No. 103-525(11), at 6, reprinted in 1994, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1994, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 1648 (emphasis added). 16 . Here, it appears to be undisputed that the replacement parts alleged to have caused the accident were not manufactured by Appellants or supplied by them within the eighteen-year period. See Plaintiffs' Mem orandum of Law In Support of Their Response In Opposition To Defendant Textron Lycoming's Motion for Summary Judgment at 5 (acknowledging that Appellants did not manufacture the carburetor installed on the accident aircraft at the time of the crash); id. at 21 (same, with respect to the other allegedly defective parts); id. at 15 & Exhibits T, U (<HOLDING>). It should be noted that Appellants now Holdings: 0: recognizing that reviewing court considers effect of charge on jury rather than component parts 1: recognizing that the overhaul in which relevant replacement parts were installed was not undertaken by appellants but rather was accomplished by mattituck airbase inc 2: holding that a defendants right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions 3: holding that 1 even if some conduct is not actionable as securities fraud that conduct cannot support a civil rico claim if it was also undertaken in connection with the purchase of a security and 2 conduct in maintaining ponzi scheme was conduct undertaken in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 4: recognizing that delancie implied that secret monitoring of conversations between detainees and visitors undertaken for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings rather than to maintain the security of the jail was unlawful", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "evidence of extraneous offenses of delivery of narcotics and possession of weapons to be admitted with no objection). Here, Garcia\u2019s counsel repeatedly elicited or opened the door to evidence that set his client up for impeachment by the State and damaged Garcia\u2019s credibility with the jury. Given the inherently prejudicial nature of extraneous offense evidence, the fact that the evidence would not have been otherwise admissible by the State during guilt/innocence, and the fact that Garcia\u2019s defense rested almost entirely on his credibility, there could have been no reasonable trial strategy for Garcia\u2019s counsel to elicit and open the door to the similar extraneous offense and the numerous instances of \u201cbad acts.\u201d See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 484-86 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, Holdings: 0: holding that where defense turned on defendants credibility there could be no strategic basis for allowing jury to hear defendant had prior conviction for same offense for which he was being tried and concluding counsel rendered ineffective assistance 1: holding that where defense depended on defendants credibility there was no possible reasonable strategy and defense counsel rendered deficient performance by intentionally eliciting and opening the door to otherwise inadmissible and clearly prejudicial evidence of defen dants current incarceration on two prior convictions one of which involved similar conduct to the charged offense during the guiltinnocence phase 2: holding trial record affirmatively showed defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by purposefully eliciting testimony as to defendants remote prior conviction for a different offense where there could be no possible reasonable strategy because defendants credibility was crucial to his alibi defense 3: holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy 4: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the merits.\u201d Ibid, Settled law holds that these relaxed evidentiary standards permit a district court to consider hearsay at the preliminary injunction stage. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n. 8 (7th Cir.1991) (\u201c[Hjearsay can be considered in entering a, preliminary injunction.\u201d); Mullins v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2nd Cir.2010) (\u201chearsay evidence may be considered by a district court in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction\u201d); Levi Strauss & Co, v. Sunrise Int\u2019l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995) (\u201cAt the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction.\u201d); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the First Circuit explained: \u201cAffidavits Holdings: 0: holding that a court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence including hearsay evidence at the preliminary injunction stage 1: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 2: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction 3: holding otherwise inadmissible evidence supporting employers good faith in a wrongful discharge claim was not hearsay 4: holding that court can consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a motion for preliminary injunction", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "ADEA claims. We reject PwC\u2019s construction of the worksharing agreement for another reason: it would effectively rewrite the ADEA\u2019s administrative prerequisites, making them traps for the unwary, poised to spring into action and deny those who may have suffered employment discrimination their right to seek redress in federal court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has announced \u201ca guiding principle for construing the provisions of Title VII,\u201d Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982), which applies with equal force to the ADEA: a technical reading of the statute\u2019s filing requirements is \u201cparticularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.\u201d Love, 404 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. 616 (<HOLDING>); see also Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755, 99 Holdings: 0: holding that unreviewed state administrative proceedings do not have preclusive effect on title vii claim 1: holding that a title vii claimant need not refile a charge after termination of state proceedings 2: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 3: holding that the antiretaliation provision of title vii reaches to employees who involuntarily participate in such proceedings and employees who do not seek to assist title vii claimant 4: holding that arbitration agreement that did not provide for award of attorney fees to successful title vii claimant was unenforceable because the right to attorneys fees  is central to the ability of persons to seek redress from violations of title vii", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for refund with the IRS for the amount of tax at issue. See 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 7422(a) (stating that \u201c[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, ..., until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary ... \u201d). Third, a plaintiff is required to provide the amount, date, and place of each payment to be refunded, as well as a copy of the refund claim, when filing a refund suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims. See RCFC 9(h)(6). Failure to plead that a timely refund claim has been filed, even in pro se actions, deprives the United States Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction. See Wozniak v. United States, 618 F.2d 119 (Ct.Cl.1979) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff has not satisfied the prerequisites Holdings: 0: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them 1: holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full 2: holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim 3: holding that refund suit for tax imposed in violation of export clause filed beyond applicable period of limitations was barred where claimant had failed to first present timely administrative claim to internal revenue service even though there was little  if any  reason to believe that claim would have been granted 4: holding that even in a pro se tax suit a timely claim for refund must be filed to invoke the courts jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the bill she sent had a tendency to expose Lieberman to \u201chatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy,\u201d or injury in her occupation. Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 839, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 (1996). Lieberman failed to demonstrate any such defamatory meaning, and the allegedly inaccurate statement as to the amount of the bill thus cannot sustain a slander claim. Lieberman\u2019s other two examples of \u201cexplicit\u201d factual assertions made by Fieger are equally unavailing because they constitute protected opinion. Fieger\u2019s statement that the criminal court \u201claughed at her and gave her zero\u201d merely offers a hyperbolic and colorful description of the actual outcome: the court denied the request for expert witness fees. See Ferlauto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 (1999) (<HOLDING>). In Lieberman\u2019s ease, as in Ferlauto, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties 1: holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified 2: holding that statements that the judge laughed at their motion and thought their motion was a joke merely provided colorful descriptions of the incontestable fact that the court indeed denied the motion 3: holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied 4: holding that a district court judge to whom a case had been reassigned could grant the defendants motion for summary judgment after the previous judge had denied the motion", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a government actor under the facts of this case under a \u201cfunctional\u201d or \u201cfederal action\u201d analysis. Hall correctly points out that the Red Cross has been considered a government instrumentality in tax immunity cases. Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 359-60, 87 S.Ct. 464, 467-68, 17 L.Ed.2d 414 (1966); United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.1990). However, this fact is not dispositive of the issues presented here. The question of whether a corporation is performing sufficient secondary or derivative government functions to be shielded from state taxation under M\u2019Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) is a far different question from whether it is subject to a constitutional restriction against burdening 127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). As with many other government-chartered Holdings: 0: recognizing statutory credit 1: holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits 2: recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority 3: holding a federal credit union not to be a government actor for constitutional purposes 4: holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and the court granted a running 404(b) objection to the extraneous evidence regarding Cantu\u2019s previous drug use. D. Analysis Cantu\u2019s defense included informing the jury that Jackie had, during past arguments, taken a gun and placed it to her head. The State attempted to rebut that defensive theory by showing that the previous fights were over Cantu\u2019s drug use and this incident was different because the drug test taken after Jackie\u2019s death showed Cantu was not on drugs. The State\u2019s evidence of Cantu\u2019s previous drug use generally would be inadmissible under Rule 404(b), but because the State used it to rebut Cantu\u2019s defensive theory, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence admissible. See Tex.R. Evid. 404(a), (b); Moses, 105 S.W.3d at 626 (<HOLDING>); Albrecht, 486 S.W.2d at 100 (\u201cProbably the Holdings: 0: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in its admitting extraneous evidence to rebut a defensive theory 1: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 2: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting highly probative and relevant evidence of other crimes 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy 4: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Id. First, the communication must be \u201cpredecisional;\u201d in other words, it must be \u201cantecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.\u201d Jordan, 591 F.2d at 774; Access Reports v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C.Cir.1991). In determining whether a document is predecisional, an agency does not necessarily have to point specifically to a final decision, but need only establish \u201cwhat deliberative-process is involved, and the role played by the documents in issue in the course of that process.\u201d Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868. In other words, as long as a document is generated as part of such a continuing process of agency decision-making, the deliberative-process protections of Exemption 5 may be applicable. Id.; Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 39 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, the communication must be Holdings: 0: holding that a document is predecisional if it was prepared to assist an agency in arriving at a decision rather than supporting a decision already made 1: holding that a guidance document is not binding where it provided only a list of factors the agency would consider rather than a clear statement of policy 2: recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision 3: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review 4: holding that guidelines although advisory and only one factor among others to be considered in arriving at a reasonable sentence are entitled to substantial weight in the sentencing decision", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "woman ingests a controlled substance that continues to affect the child postpartum; specifically, the child tests positive for a controlled substance following birth. The offense of endangerment of a child under N.D.C.C. \u00a7 19-03.1-22.2(2) states: \u201ca person who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or vulnerable adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia ... is guilty of a class C felony.\u201d The State conceded in oral argument that none of the Defendants committed any act exposing her child postpartum, but rather argued the prenatal act of each defendant continued to affect her child postpartum. The State argues that a child is still \u201cexposed\u201d to the controlled substanc 0 (1992) (<HOLDING>); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 Holdings: 0: recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined 1: holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy 2: holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy 3: holding a criminal charge of endangerment of a child does not apply to a pregnant woman who ingests an illegal substance that results in the transmission of drugs to her child through the umbilical cord 4: holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "predicate acts to consider, the jury was legally obligated to acquit on Counts One and Two. See id. at 3-4 (\u201c[A]cquittal was compelled as a matter of law once the jury reported its inability to find any unanimously proven predicate acts.\u201d). There is a serious problem with Gotti\u2019s interpretation of PJI 2.78. Acts as to which the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict must be disregarded in deciding two things \u2014 whether defendant is or is not guilty of racketeering. The drafters of PJI 2.78 were therefore not foreclosing a hung jury when they used the word \u201cdisregard.\u201d Rather, the word choice is intended to ensure jury compliance with the unanimity rule required by Richardson that has since been engrafted onto substantive RICO violations. See Richardson, 526 U.S. at 824, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Gotti\u2019s interpretation flies in Holdings: 0: holding that the jury in a continuing criminal enterprise case must unanimously agree not only that defendant committed some continuing series of violations but also must agree as to which violations make up that continuing series 1: holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense 2: holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred 3: holding that the doctrine may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct 4: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "pre-trial motion to suppress. We reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial without addressing the merits of Robuck\u2019s complaints. In its brief, the State notes that a division in authority exists among the courts of appeal regarding whether nonjurisdictional defects, such as the denial of a motion to suppress, are waived by application of the Helms rule in misdemeanor cases where the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without a plea bargain. Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.\u2014 Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107, 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.\u2014Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), ivith Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(<HOLDING>), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 Holdings: 0: holding that similar agreement allowed the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress 1: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo 2: holding that when a court has given a party a full and fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress and then  has decided the motion on the merits the party may be estopped from bringing the same motion in subsequent litigation 3: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 4: holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40b1", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a third party. As noted, there is no identifiable third party in this case. The transfers are thus properly viewed as either benefiting the Fund or benefiting Bear Stearns. In either case, reliance by Bear Stearns on the mere conduit concept is unavailing. More importantly, once the funds were deposited, and as long as short positions were open, Bear Stearns did not have to respond to directions from the Fund. Indeed, so long as there were open short positions, Bear Stearns was not required to return the money to the Fund and was also able to initiate affirmative measures with respect to the funds. Thus, Bear Stearns\u2019s position is simply not parallel to the traditional bank cases. See Malloy v. Citizens Bank of Sapulpa (In re First Security Mortgage Co.), 33 F.3d 42, 43 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Chase & Sanborn, 848 F.2d at Holdings: 0: holding a party to be an initial transferee because she was given legal title to the funds 1: holding that theft by taking conviction was supported by evidence of unlawful taking rather than unlawful appropriation of funds where defendant who was given an electronic banking card encoded with the account number of another customer withdrew funds from bank account knowing that she was obtaining funds which did not belong to her and which she had no right to receive 2: holding that bank was not an initial transferee where transferor exercised complete discretion regarding deposits to and disbursements from the account and he was entitled to possession of all account funds upon demand 3: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account 4: holding that where bank account titled in the names of two married persons a presumption arises that both hold the funds in the account as a tenancy by the entirety", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "property of the estate and whether they are exempt, the Court will not be able to determine whether any plan filed by Judy Jack is feasible and capable of confirmation. Additionally, Violet Jack\u2019s involvement in this case is based upon her asserted child support lien which she asserts is superior to any interest that Judy Jack\u2019s estate may have in the remaining payments; therefore, this is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(b)(2)(E). Finally, venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1409(a). B. Samuel Jack\u2019s Capacity to Contract A person does not possess the mental capacity to enter into a contract if he lacks sufficient mind and memory to understand the nature and consequences of the act and the business being transacted. Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 5.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex.1969) (<HOLDING>) (citing Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Brazil, 72 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err in failing to address the defendant personally to determine whether she understood the rights she was waiving by admitting that she violated the conditions of her probation 1: holding that a party has mental capacity if she appreciated the effect of what she was doing and understood the nature and consequences of her acts and the business she was transacting 2: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 3: holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent 4: holding appellant produced no evidence that when she made her complaints to management she ever mentioned that she felt she was being treated unfairly due to her race or sex", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law,\u201d or includes factual contentions that do not have evidentiary support. Pursuant to Fed.R.CivP. 11, \u201cthe court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney\u2019s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.\u201d Both the Federal Rule and Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 11 state that sanctions may include a monetary amount to cover the \u201cexpenses\u201d that have been \u201cincurred\u201d by the opposing party, including \u201creasonable ... attorney\u2019s fees\u201d or \u201ca reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.\u201d Based on the language of Fed.R.C regarding similar provisions allowing for sanctions. See Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J.Super. 510, 983 A.2d 604, 623-26 (App.Div.2009) (<HOLDING>); Musaelian v. Adams, 45 Cal.4th 512, 87 Holdings: 0: holding attorneys fees not available to pro se attorney litigant in a federal freedom of information act action 1: holding that under rule 13 of the texas rules of civil procedure which precludes bringing a groundless suit for purposes of harassment a pro se attorney litigant is not entitled to attorneys fees because an attorneyclient relationship was the predicate for that particular sanction 2: holding that new jersey rule patterned on fed r civ p 11 precludes a pro se attorney litigant from receiving attorneys fees because such fees are not actually incurred 3: holding that a pro se litigant who is an attorney is not entitled to fees under  1988 4: holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of PILT. We conclude a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to an explicit warranty of future performance. The existence of such a warranty, however, would not automatically make Marvin\u2019s claim timely. Assuming that a future warranty is present, Marvin\u2019s breach of warranty claim accrued when Marvin learned or should have learned of the breach, see Minn.Stat. \u00a7 336.2-725(2), and expires four years thence, see id. \u00a7 336.2-725(1). \u201c[T]he statute of limitations begins to run \u2018when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the defendant\u2019s refusal or inability to maintain the goods as warranted\u2019 \u201d WatPro, 491 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Smith v. Union Supply Co., 675 P.2d 333, 335 (Colo.Ct.App.1983)); accord Anderson v. Crestliner, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). There is evidence in the record that Marvin Holdings: 0: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 1: holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation 2: holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller 3: holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without sellers knowledge and consent 4: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that in custody disputes, \u201cthe fundamental issue is the best interest of the child.\u201d In a custody contest between two biological parents, \u201cthe burden of proof is shared equally by the contestants.... \u201d Yet, where the custody dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, the burden of proof is not evenly balanced. In such instances, \u201cthe parents have a \u2018prima facie right to custody,\u2019 which will be forfeited only if \u2018convincing reasons\u2019 appear that the child\u2019s best interest will be served by an award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the eviden-tiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the [biological] parents\u2019 side.\u201d Id. at 339, 744 A.2d at 1258 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted); see also T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873 (Pa.Super.2000) (<HOLDING>) aff'd, 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913 (2001). \u00b6 8 Holdings: 0: recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language 1: holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review 2: holding that although husband and wife were both fit and proper persons to have custody of the child custody in a dissolution action should have been awarded to wife the biological parent in light of blood test showing that husband was not the childs biological father 3: holding district court did not abuse discretion in ruling moving party failed to make prima facie case to modify custody 4: holding that biological parents have a prima facie right to custody over third persons", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982, supports this understanding. The . Report contemplates that [t]he intent to use unlawfully is the intent to use (i.e., present, display, certify, or otherwise give currency to) the identification document in any manner so that it would be accepted as identification in- a manner that violates a federal, state or local - law, or is part of the . making of a misrepresentation that violates a law. H.R.Rep. No. 97-802, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3519, 3529. . In this way, any intentional unlawful use or transfer of multiple identification documents whose purpose is to identify individuals to government authorities would inherently be intended to deceive the government in some way. See Serrato-Soto, 570 F.3d at 690 (<HOLDING>). The BIA\u2019s analysis in Matter of Serna further Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants use of a persons name and social security number without permission constituted the use of a means of identification without lawful authority 1: recognizing willful failure to appear as an essential element of the bailjumping offense 2: holding that where a statute requires knowing or willful use of an altered or counterfeit social security number the offense in the ordinary case involves dishonesty as an essential element 3: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient 4: holding a social security number is not private", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it, for example, by informing the jury that as a matter of law, he was not responsible for CWs death. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 102 A.3d 270, 279 (D.C.2014) (\u201c \u2018[I]m-proper prosecutorial comments are looked upon with special disfavor when they appear in the rebuttal because at that point defense counsel has no opportunity to contest or ciar ify what the prosecutor has said.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 284 (D.C.2007))). The lack of a limiting instruction also compounded the effect of the prosecutor\u2019s comment. Specifically, the court failed to instruct the jurors that CW\u2019s death should not be considered as evidence of Nofoa\u2019s guilt in the terroristic threatening and kidnapping ease. Cf. State v. Murray, 116 Hawai'i 3, 19, 169 P.3d 955, 971 (2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 416, 56 Holdings: 0: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error 1: holding that a trial court errs when it fails to give a limiting instruction properly requested by a party 2: holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error 3: holding the potential for undue prejudice is so great that failure to give a limiting instruction with regard to prior convictions results in error even if the defendant has not requested one citing evans v cowan 506 f2d 1248 1249 6th cir1974 4: recognizing that a limiting instruction has the potential to cure any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Billboard Act then in effect directed that \u201cthe erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary highway systems [shall] be regulated in accordance with sections 226.500 to 226.600 and rules and regulations promulgated by the state highways and transportation commission.\u201d Whiteco\u2019s applications were for four new billboards in locations that were subject to the Missouri Billboard Act. The City could not have relied on ordinance number 13191 in 1994 to lawfully deny Whiteco\u2019s applications. Existing precedent established that municipal ordinances banning all outdoor advertising signs were preempted by the Missouri Billboard Act. See Nat\u2019l Advert. Co. v. Missouri State Highway & Transp. Comm\u2019n, 862 S.W.2d 953, 955-56 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (<HOLDING>). National Advertising did not expressly Holdings: 0: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 1: holding that a complete prohibition on outdoor advertising signs imposed by a municipal ordinance is preempted by the missouri billboard act 2: holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance  the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid 3: holding that municipal ordinance was preempted by frsa and void under supremacy clause 4: holding that a courts order invalidating part of a city billboard ordinance did not moot a claim for damages arising from that invalidated portion of the ordinance", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "her individual capacity. In Miller v. Maxwell\u2019s Intern. Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no individual liability under the ADEA. The court explained that the statutory scheme of the ADEA itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees. The ADEA limits liability to employers with 20 or more employees, 29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 630(b), in part because Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating discrimination suits. Surely Congress would not wish to impose the same civil liability on individual employees that it decided to remove from small entities with limited resources. Id. at 587. See also Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corporation, 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This conclusion is supported by the law of Holdings: 0: holding that there is no individual liability under law 44 1: holding that individual employees are not proper defendants in adea lawsuits 2: holding no individual liability under the adea 3: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 4: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "services. Dr. Ostrer, on the other hand, maintains that he could have proceeded with his BRCA-related clinical activities without taking a license from Myriad. This assertion is based on his belief that the patents Myriad claims cover such activities are invalid because genes are patent-ineligible products of nature. Acting on his belief, Ostrer seeks in this lawsuit a declaration of his right to undertake NfiCA-related clinical activities without a license. Accordingly, Myriad and Dr. Ostrer have taken adverse legal positions regarding whether or not Ostrer can engage in BRCA genetic testing without infringing any valid claim to \u201cisolated\u201d BRCA DNAs or methods of \u201canalyzing\u201d or \u201ccomparing\u201d BRCA sequences, as recited in Myriad\u2019s patents. See Aetna Life, 300 U.S. at 242, 57 S.Ct. 461 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Ostrer has also alleged a controversy of Holdings: 0: holding an endorsement to an existing insurance policy which added a new vehicle did not create a new contract of insurance but was merged with and became a part of the original policy 1: holding that failure to pay obligations under a contract is a material breach as a matter of law when parties explicitly state in the contract that failure to pay warrants termination 2: holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract 3: holding declaratory judgment jurisdiction existed when the parties had taken adverse positions with respect to their existing obligations on an insurance contract 4: holding the same with respect to an apartment", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "two of the three physicians or (b) Local 68\u2019s standing to sue the physicians. The argument regarding personal jurisdiction fails immediately. Assuming arguendo that the New Jersey state court had no personal jurisdiction over two of the physi dans, AstraZeneca does not dispute that one of the non-consenting physicians, Antoun, is a resident of and has offices located in New Jersey. (Conapl. \u00b6 94.) Moreover, \u201cpersonal jurisdiction is an individual liberty right and is therefore waivable,\u201d and neither of the other two physician defendants, Berkman and Hopkins, have moved to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction. McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 127 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also Seguros Comercial Am. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 934 F.Supp. 243, 245 (S.D.Tex.1996) (<HOLDING>). AstraZeneca\u2019s argument regarding standing Holdings: 0: holding that removal proceedings are in the nature of process and defects in the removal procedures are waivable 1: holding that removal based on fraudulent joinder was not timely where it occurred more than thirty days after the removing defendants learned of facts showing that a nondiverse codefendant was fraudulently joined 2: holding that removal was untimely where the removing defendant could have ascertained from the face of a complaint that certain nondiverse codefendants were fraudulently joined but did not seek removal based on fraudulent joinder until after the state court granted a motion to strike the plaintiffs allegations against the diversitydefeating codefendants 3: holding that defects in service of process must be raised in preliminary objections 4: holding that removing defendant could not establish fraudulent joinder based on waivable defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or defects in service of process available only to joined defendants", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and not contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never be a finding of clear error.\u201d United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir.1997). As a result, the District Court did not clearly err when it found that the window was tint-free. Nor did the District Court err in concluding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop Davis. The officers observed odd behavior through the front window\u2014an exchange, shocked expressions, and tossing motions. Davis and Blackshear rapidly left the car and began walking away, the latter failing to close the car door. And the activity took place in a high-crime area. The officers thus had a reasonable suspicion that a crime might be afoot. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion 1: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 2: holding nervous behavior and inconsistent story justified reasonable suspicion and subsequent search 3: holding that nervous evasive behavior such as flight is a relevant factor in an examination of reasonable suspicion 4: holding that in a high crime area unprovoked headlong flight from police can form the basis for reasonable suspicion under terry", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "by our procedural rules. In the forty years since those decisions, Texas courts have consistently recognized and reaffirmed the existence of the fundamental-error doctrine. Because there is no statute defining the principle, we tend to agree with the commentator who noted that \u201c[tjhere is no single satisfactory definition of the phrase, nor can one easily analyze the cases for prognostic purposes.\u201d Kronzer, supra, \u00a7 9.2, at 205. In reviewing our caselaw, however, we are able to distill two types of error that our courts have consistently recognized are subject to fundamental-error review. First, and most commonly, we apply fundamental-error review when a jurisdictional defect exists in the case. See, e.g., Texas Ass\u2019n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex.1993) (<HOLDING>); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, Holdings: 0: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered 1: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 2: holding that court will not consider issue raised for first time on appeal 3: holding that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by this court 4: holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "discretion by failing to give adequate consideration to the Defendant\u2019s financial circumstances, the uncertainty of the degree and duration of her support network, and the realities of her earnings versus her expenses.\u201d The State countered that \u201cRule 3(b) ... does not permit direct appeal of a trial court\u2019s disposition of a motion to modify the terms of probation.\u201d The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State that Rule 3(b) does not specifically provide that a defendant may appeal a trial court\u2019s decision regarding modification of probation conditions. We agree as well. Unlike civil litigants, who have an appeal as of right from any final judgment, parties in criminal cases do not always have an appeal as of right under the Rules o 4 WL 50788, *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan.12, 2004) (<HOLDING>). In Adler, this Court examined whether parties Holdings: 0: holding that denial of the petitioners motion for credit for time at liberty was not appealable under rule 3 or through a commonlaw writ of certiorari 1: recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review 2: holding review of district court order imposing sanctions is by application for issuance of a writ of certiorari 3: holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired 4: holding that the defendant did not have an appeal as of right or grounds for a commonlaw writ of certiorari to review a trial courts denial of sentencing credits", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "opportunity to do so, the court deprived Taylor a meaningful opportunity to prove bias. The majority distinguishes Herndon on the basis that here \u201cthe district court asked all of the jurors about the extent to which they were aware of the reported remark.\u201d Maj. Op. 350. This characterization of the facts omits the critical fact that the court did not question Juror One (and only Juror One) whether she could contin trict court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove [juror bias]\u201d); United States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423, 431 (6th Cir.1993) (\u201cBy denying the reasonable request to inquire into the jurors\u2019 states of mind, the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to meet their burden of proving actual juror bias----\u201d); see also Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450 (<HOLDING>). The majority correctly obseryes that Taylor Holdings: 0: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession 1: holding that although this court affords broad discretion to the district court in determining the type of investigation necessary to determine juror bias the district court must provide the defendant a meaningful opportunity to prove the same 2: holding that because parties elected to bring the case to the appellate court in the first instance the appeal could not then be dismissed just to confer jurisdiction upon the district court to determine the issues 3: holding that it was permissible to ask whether a juror would consider death sentence if juror determined aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances 4: holding that the district court should determine the circumstances the impact thereof upon the juror and whether or not it was prejudicial in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.... Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. 652. The Court held that publication notice could not satisfy due process where the names and addresses of the beneficiaries were known. Id. at 320, 70 S.Ct. 652. Nevertheless, this due process right does not require actual notice to each party intended to be bound by the adjudication of a representative action. See id. at 313-14, 70 S.Ct. 652 (\u201cA construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impracticable obstacles in the way could not be justified.\u201d); accord In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2001) (\u201cIntegra I \u201d) (<HOLDING>). For due process purposes, rather than looking Holdings: 0: holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment 1: holding rule 23 and due process requisites satisfied where the record indicated that only seventyseven percent of class members actually received notice of the settlement 2: recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard 3: holding that under present rule settlement class must meet all rule 23 requirements and expressing concern about dangers of overrewarding attorneys and undereompensating class members 4: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a notice \u201cspecifically stating the taxpayer\u2019s liability and the basis for the liability;\u201d a FPAA is \u201csufficient notice\u201d of tax liability to allow the interest to start accruing again. Pl. Reply at 12-13 (citing I.R.C. \u00a7 5404(g)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. \u00a7 301.6404-4(a)(7)(ii)). In addition, either the issuance of the FPAA or the Government\u2019s Answer commenced the \u201cqualified offer period.\u201d Pl. Reply at 13-15. Treasury Regulation \u00a7 301.7430-3(c)(3) treats a FPAA as a \u201cnotice of deficiency\u201d that serves to start the \u201cqualified offer period.\u201d See Treas. Reg. \u00a7 301.7430-3(c)(3). For this reason, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a FPAA is the \u201cfunctional equivalent of a notice of deficiency,\u201d Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Comm\u2019r, 46 F.3d 382, 385-85 (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Alternatively, the Government\u2019s August 10, Holdings: 0: holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination 1: holding that a fpaa is the functional equivalent of a notice of deficiency because it serves to afford affected taxpayers that the commissioner has made a final administrative determination of their liability for particular tax years 2: holding that a prefiling notification letter from the internal revenue service was not a notice of deficiency and therefore the tax court had no jurisdiction over the taxpayers petition 3: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice 4: holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff first received notice of an alleged deficiency from the irs not when he received a final determination of tax liability", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "organization. A two-level upward adjustment for Ortiz\u2019s role in the offense, therefore, is not warranted. 2. \u201cSafety Valve\u201d Adjustment Ortiz argues that because he is not a manager or supervisor, he qualifies for a two-level decrease in his offense level. In order to receive this downward adjustment, a defendant must have a pre-adjustment offense level of at least 26 and meet the \u201csafety valve\u201d criteria set forth in U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5C1.2. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2Dl.l(b)(6). However, section 5C1.2 only applies to certain enumerated drug offenses: it does not apply to one of the offenses to which Ortiz pled guilty, distribution of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 860. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5C1.2; cf. United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Ortiz cannot receive a two-level Holdings: 0: holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc  841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc  80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state 1: holding that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 usc  3553e and ussg  5k11 or the defendant falls within the safetyvalve of 18 usc  3553f 2: holding that relief under 18 usc  3553f the statutory safety valve provision is not available to defendants convicted of a violation of 21 usc  860 because that offense is excluded from the list of offenses to which the statutory safety valve applies 3: holding that it was error to subject the defendant to a twolevel enhancement under ussg  2d12 which addresses inter alia drug trafficking near a protected location when the defendant was neither convicted of nor stipulated to a violation of 21 usc  860 which penalizes drug offenses committed near schools 4: holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "have been submitted by the Board. We do not deem it unreasonable or contrary to Legislative intent for PERC to have concluded that the withholding was not based on an evaluation of the Principal\u2019s performance. We agree with PERC\u2019s observation that an arbitrator can determine whether the Principal\u2019s inability to work warranted withholding his increment. Cf. N.J.S.A. 18A:30-2.1(a) & (b) (leave taken pursuant to work related injury constitutes satisfactory service for purposes of increment adjustment). In any event, in the present circumstances, the arbitrator should not be bound by PERC\u2019s conclusion that the action was for disciplinary purposes in the ordinary sense of imposing discipline on the Principal. Cf. Scotch Plains-Fanwood Bd. of Educ., supra, 139 N.J. at 158, 651 A.2d 1018 (<HOLDING>). The arbitrator\u2019s inquiry should focus on the Holdings: 0: holding that arbitrator was bound by perc determination that board acted for disciplinary reasons where board failed to appeal that determination 1: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board 2: holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested 3: holding that the board did not abuse its discretion by dismissing an untimely appeal where the appellant failed to respond to a board order to show cause 4: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Collectively, Drs. Dionee and Zacharia\u2019s conclusions, the \u201cfunctional capacity evaluation,\u201d and Hartford\u2019s \u201cemployability analysis report\u201d supported the decision that Maninger was no longer totally disabled. This evidence provided a reasonable basis for Hartford\u2019s decision. AFFIRMED. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 . See Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 356 F.3d 1008, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2004) (citing standard of review); Alford v. DCH Group Long-Term Disability Plan, 311 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir.2002). 2 . See Nord, 356 F.3d at 1009-10. 3 . Id. at 1010. 4 . Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions although administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit them 1: holding that courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimants physician 2: holding that the decision of whether to accord greater weight to contemporaneous medical records or later given testimony is uniquely within the purview of the special master 3: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions 4: holding that reviewing court should accord deference to special masters decision and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the special master", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C.Cir. 1980)); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 LEd.2d 154 (1976). [7] 7. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir.1984) (relying on Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Time, Inc., 424 U.S. at 454-55, 96 S.Ct. 958; Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 LEd.2d 411 (1979)). 8 . 47 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR.) 73.1202 (2004) provides that All written comments and suggestions received from the public by licensees of commercial AM, FM, TV and Class A TV broadcast stations regarding operation of their station shall be maintained in the local public 187 F.Supp.2d 605, 609, 612 (S.D.W.Va.2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 339, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act 1: holding that evidence that the petitioner had a political opinion that he expressed it to his persecutors and that they threatened him only after he expressed his opinion compelled the conclusion that the threats were connected to his political opinion and not only to his failure to provide money in response to demands from the persecutors that predated his expression of his political opinion 2: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 3: holding that campaign volunteer who had expressed support for one of candidates political positions in television advertisement and who also posed for photographs with candidate did not become limitedpurpose public figure because his actions were not sufficiently significant and because he did not assume a position that  propelled him to the forefront of the campaign 4: holding that firefighter who was expelled from volunteer fire company could not bring declaratory action seeking declaratory judgment that provision under which he was expelled was overbroad because he had not alleged with sufficiently credible facts that the challenged provision would be applied against him in the future", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not permit a defendant to bring counterclaims that would not independently qualify for summary process. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. \u00a7 3213:17; Friends Lumber Inc. v. Cornell Dev. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 886, 888, 663 N.Y.S.2d 327, 330 (3d Dep\u2019t 1997). According to the district court, Wireless\u2019s allegations did not so qualify. The court therefore concluded that Wireless could not have asserted its counterclaims in a state proceeding governed by \u00a7 3213. But \u00a7 3213 is a procedural rule, and when this case was removed to federal court, the regime of the Federal Rules replaced that of \u00a7 3213. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(e) (\u201cThese rules apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal.\u201d); TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 133 (3d Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Sage Realty v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., Holdings: 0: holding  after summary process was sought under  3213 and the ease was removed to federal court  that the bringing of counterclaims was governed by the federal rules not cplr  3213 1: holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence 2: holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court 3: holding that a federal court with diversity jurisdiction must apply the choiceoflaw rules of the state in which the federal court sits 4: recognizing privilege under federal rules", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1. The MTCA argues that intervention at this stage is untimely and would prejudice them because the case is in an advanced stage. The mere passage of time, however, does not render an application untimely. Bank of America Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass\u2019n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates, 844 F.2d 1050, 1056 (3d Cir.1988); Wright & Miller, supra, \u00a7 1916 at 425-26. While four years had elapsed before the Seipels filed their motion to intervene, the critical inquiry is: what proceedings of substance on the merits have occurred? See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 695 F.2d at 500 (\u201ca motion to intervene after an entry of a decree should be denied except in extraordinary circumstances.\u201d) (emphasis added). Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2292, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) (<HOLDING>). This is because the stage of the proceeding Holdings: 0: recognizing that the longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings generally requires federal courts to abstain from involvement in state criminal proceedings 1: holding that where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court the principles of younger v harris should apply in full force 2: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 3: holding that declaratory relief is improper when a prosecution involving the challenged state statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated and the same principles that govern the propriety of federal injunctions of state criminal proceedings govern the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings 4: holding that where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffsafter the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place  the principles of younger v harris 401 us 37 91 sct 746 27 led2d 669 1971  apply in full force", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "standing argument is that (1) under the current financial standards certain suppliers would be ruled ineligible for the DME Bidding Process, but (2) proper notice-and-comment rulemaking would have altered the standards used by the Secretary, and (3) under the new financial standards those suppliers would be found eligible. Similarly, the argument concerning harm to beneficiaries is that (1) under the current financial standards the Medicare beneficiary would obtain a rate and quality of care that (2) would be altered by new financial standards (whatever they might be) and (3) would lead to higher costs or lower-quality services. These highly attenuated scenarios are insufficient to confer Article I II standing. See Jacobrown v. United States, 764 F.Supp.2d 221, 227 (D.D.C.2011) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133, Holdings: 0: holding that the threat of injury was not speculative because the plaintiffs had been previously charged under the challenged statute 1: holding that district court did not have jurisdiction over any claims that could not exist independently of a contract 2: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 3: holding that in order to establish standing the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling must not be too speculative 4: holding that standing does not exist where the court would have to accept a number of very speculative inferences and assumptions in any endeavor to connect the alleged injury with the challenged conduct ", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "303 by the transfer of an illiquid promissory security that gave the creditor no more than it already had-its proportionate share of an interest in the debtor\u2019s assets. The Alleged Debtor also observes that the Eden Rock Petitioners brought a lawsuit in New York State court, individually and derivatively, against Stillwater, Gerova and certain of their principals, and that judgment has never been entered for the Eden Rock Petitioners against Stillwa-ter. The fact that litigation is ongoing related \u201cto a petitioning creditor\u2019s claim is insufficient to rebut its prima facie validity.\u201d See In re VitaminSpice, 472 B.R. 282, 293 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2012), citing In re Red Rock Rig 101, Ltd., 397 B.R. 545 (10th Cir. BAP 2008); see also In re AMC Investors, LLC, 406 B.R. 478, 486 (Bankr.D.Del.2009) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Eden Rock lawsuit asserted Holdings: 0: recognizing that if a creditors claim is subject to a bona fide dispute that creditor lacks standing to file an involuntary petition 1: holding that there is no requirement that a petitioning creditor obtain a statecourt judgment in order to have standing to file an involuntary petition under  303 of the bankruptcy code 2: holding that creditor lacked appellate standing to appeal order of bankruptcy court absent permission of bankruptcy court 3: holding that tjhere is no requirement in the bankruptcy code that a debtor must prove that a plan is confirmable in order to file a petition 4: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "argument that an explanation based on a juror\u2019s perceived \u201csnippiness\u201d toward or perceived inappropriate looks at the prosecutor, or on a juror\u2019s perceived better rapport with opposing counsel, is not legally cognizable as a race-neutral explanation in the context of a Batson challenge. As we observed in Smith, \u201cconcern about a juror\u2019s rapport with opposing counsel can be a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a peremptory strike.\u201d 966 A.2d at 384 n. 27 (citing Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112, 117, 131 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 178 Fed.Appx. 152, 156 (3d Cir.2006) (reasoning that prosecutor\u2019s explanations about his perception of jurors\u2019 lack of eye contact were sufficient at Batson step two); United States v. Cordova, 186 Fed.Appx. 742, 744 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). It bears reiterating that \u201cexplanations based Holdings: 0: holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias 1: holding trial court did not err by permitting evidence that defendant molested another child three years before the victim 2: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 3: holding that trial court did not plainly err by permitting prosecutors strike for proffered reason of jurors negative body language and eye contact 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "... [and (2) ] immediately recognizes the object[ ] discovered as evidence of wrongdoing.\u2019\u201d \u201d State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950, 953 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (quoting Smith v. State, 472 So.2d 677, 682-83 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), quoting in turn Herrin v. State, 349 So.2d 103 (Ala.Crim.App.1977)). See also Otwell, 733 So.2d at 953 (recognizing that there is no requirement under the plain-view doctrine that the officer come upon the evidence inadvertently). Here, there is no dispute that Cpl. Wells lawfully stopped Moore for running a stop sign. See Perry, 66 So.3d at 294 (explaining the law-enforcement officers may lawfully stop the driver of a vehicle for a traffic violation). Once Moore was lawfully stopped, Cpl. Wells properly ordered him to get out of the vehicle. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 (<HOLDING>); Perry, 66 So.3d at 294 (same). After Moore Holdings: 0: holding that a police officer may as a matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit his vehicle 1: holding that once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped an officer may order the driver out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendment 2: holding that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the fourth amendments proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures 3: holding that when lawenforcement officers have legally stopped the driver of a vehicle they may consistent with the fourth amendment order a driver out of the ear for any reason or for no reason 4: holding that the fourth amendment does not require lawenforcement officers to have a reason for ordering a driver who has been lawfully stopped to get out of the vehicle", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u00b647 The principles set forth in section 344 of the Restatement are consistent with Washington precedent. Washington courts have long recognized that the special relationship between a business owner and its invitees triggers a duty on the part of the owner to protect invitees from harm arising from the foreseeable conduct of third parties. See Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 44 (quoting Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assocs., 116 Wn.2d 217, 228, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991) (citing Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 383 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984))); Hutchins, 116 Wn.2d at 223-24 (noting that \u201cthe usual case where a duty may be found to protect others from third party criminal assault involves a business and its invitee\u201d); Passovoy v. Nordstrom, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 166, 172-73, 758 P.2d 524 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Staton, 58 Wn.2d 879, 883, 365 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 1: holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm 2: holding a business owner must protect invitees against injury caused by third persons 3: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons 4: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "this case, however, Pigs Gun Club was not a class action. That distinction is significant because interpreting the notice of claim provision to require identification of every potential plaintiff in a class action lawsuit would nullify our class action rule, which provides that \u201c[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all.\u201d Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). Nothing in the Immunity Act suggests that the State declined to waive immunity from class action lawsuits. Accordingly, we hold that a claim providing notice of a possible class action lawsuit satisfies the requirements of the Immunity Act if it is filed by a class representative on behalf of potential class members. Cf. Moreno v. Bd. of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>). The notice of claim in this ease met that Holdings: 0: holding that an adversary defendant was not a person aggrieved even though creditor committee acting on behalf of the estate had already filed claims against him 1: holding ftca jurisdictional requirements satisfied in wrongful death action by substituting husband in his individual capacity who had filed timely administrative claim for husband in his capacity as personal representative of decedents estate who had not filed claim and could not bring wrongful death action under state law 2: holding that a wrongful death claim related back to a personal injury claim in an automobile accident case where the wrongful death claim  arose from the same transaction or occurrence as the original complaint and the defendant was advised of the essential facts necessary to prepare his defense even with the added claim 3: holding that the notice of claim filed by a guardian in a wrongful death action even though erroneously filed on the guardians own behalf was sufficient to preserve the parents claim because the guardian was legally authorized to file a claim on behalf of the parent 4: holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "explained, this ease has never been framed to solidify a foundation to support such necessary, broad-scale assessment. We do observe that there is a weakness in PHS and its amici\u2019s particular emphasis on the DOC\u2019s responsibility to provide a safe work environment, since it seems apparent that the Department may rely upon the prison medical companies with which its contracts as an integral component of the agency\u2019s institutional safety planning. The argument for imposition of a duty carries more force relative to the contractual obligations of the prison healthcare company itself, rather than the independent obligations of its individual staff members arising out of physician-patient relationships. Cf. Guy, 501 Pa. at 58-63, 459 A.2d at 750-53 (opinion of the Court, in relevant part) (<HOLDING>). See generally Brief for Amicus Pa. Med. Soc\u2019y Holdings: 0: holding that the attorneyclient privilege protects a clients identity only in limited circumstances where disclosure would convey the substance of a confidential professional communication 1: holding that there is no right to a meaningful attorneyclient relationship 2: holding that plaintiff was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys fees even where the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement because there was insufficient judicial sanctioning of the alteration of the parties legal relationship 3: recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care 4: recognizing limited thirdparty rights in the context of an attorneyclient professional relationship where the plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of the prevailing standard of care", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Homes, Inc., 202 B.R. 260, 261 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1996) (observing that the final decree does not adjudicate any rights between the parties and is more of an administrative step to allow the clerk\u2019s office to dispose of the fully administered case file). On the other hand, a confirmation order incorporates the terms of a chapter 11 plan, orders the performance of the critical promises the debtor made vis a vis its financial reorganization, fixes the rights and obligations of the debtor to each class of creditors, and articulates the essential agreements governing the relationship between the parties in interest and the reorganized debtor. It is generally regarded as the final court determination in a chapter 11 case. See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1141; In re Layo, 460 F.3d 289, 293-94 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re American Preferred Prescription, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that a bankruptcy courts sale order is a final order for res judicata purposes 1: holding that a bankruptcy courts order confirming a plan of reorganization constitutes a final judgment with res judicata effect binding the parties by its terms 2: holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes 3: holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment 4: holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of fact. However, aside from there being no questions of fact concerning this issue, the 5th Circuit has established that when a trial court\u2019s power to hear a case is questioned with regard to subject matter jurisdiction, it is proper for the trial court to weigh the evidence to determine its power to hear the case. MDPhysicians, 957 F.2d at 180. III. Conclusion ERISA does not govern this case. A self-employed physician, licensed to practice in Texas, is not an employee of the TMA or any of the insurance agencies. The TMA is not Dr. Path\u2019s employer, but rather a \u201cprofessional association which was established by and for the benefit .of physicians who are licensed to practice\u201d in the state of Texas. See McCaslin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 779 F.Supp. 1312, 1316-1317 (N.D.Ala.1991) (<HOLDING>). ERISA only regulates those plans established Holdings: 0: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 1: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 2: holding erisa did not apply when doctor was not employee of the medical association of the state of alabama 3: holding that the tolling provision of  91141 did not apply when the plaintiff knew that medical negligence may have contributed to her husbands death but asserted that she did not know the identity of the doctor who treated him 4: holding that a question of fact existed regarding whether the hospital held the doctor out as its agent if the hospital provided the doctor without explicitly informing the patient that the doctor was not its employee", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and third methods of proof under Russell lead to the same conclusion as the first method of proof: that the employee is unable to work in any capacity. The first method establishes that the employee is medically incapable of working, while the second and third methods focus on the vocational component of disability. Under those two methods, an employee is deemed totally disabled because even though the employee may be medically capable of performing work, employers nonetheless will not hire the employee. See White, 167 N.C. App. at 673, 606 S.E.2d at 399-400 (affirming award of total disability for closed period based on the Commission\u2019s finding that the plaintiff, during that period, made unsuccessful efforts to find suitable work); Bridwell, 149 N.C. App. at 343-44, 561 S.E.2d at 302 (<HOLDING>). I can find no basis upon which to distinguish Holdings: 0: holding that even though the medical evidence did not support the commissions findings that the plaintiff was restricted from any and all employment the award of total disability should be affirmed based on findings that the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought suitable employment 1: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 2: holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings 3: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 4: holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to issue Sole-Source Solicitation No. F45613-03-Q-A068 and Contract No. FA4620-04-D-A003 to Waste Management \u2014 Washington. Based on this record, there is no question that Blue Dot was prejudiced by the Air Force\u2019s decision and that it has standing to bring this action. See Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1334. C. Relevant Standards Of Review. 1. In Bid Protest Cases. Bid protest actions are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 701 et seq. (\u201cAPA\u201d), which provides that: The reviewing court shall \u2014 ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be \u2014 ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.] 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2)(A); see also NVT Techs., Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, Holdings: 0: holding that an agencys decision is to be set aside only if it is arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law  1: recognizing that a court may reverse the pelrbs actions where those actions are arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion    not supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole or otherwise not in accordance with law 2: holding that cis rejection of visa renewal application was not arbitrary capricious an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law 3: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 4: recognizing a nonstatutory basis for setting aside an arbitration award if it is arbitrary and capricious", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "territory\u201d during the policy period; and (2) Arising out of the conduct of your business, excluding advertising, publishing, broadcasting or telecasting done by or for you. c. This insurance applies to \u201cadvertising injury\u201d only if caused by an offense committed: (1) In the \"coverage territory\u201d during the policy period; and (2) In the course of advertising your goods, products or services. 2. Exclusions This insurance does not apply to: a. \"Personal injury\u201d or \"advertising injury:\u201d (2) Arising out of oral or written publication of material wh after notice of a claim would, however, constitute a waiver of the provision insofar as post-notification attorneys' fees are concerned. Cf. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 Md. 40, La.Ct.App. 1989) (<HOLDING>). The Peavey and Rovira courts agree that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control 1: holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay 2: holding that the insurer was not estopped from asserting a policy defense not contained in its reservation of rights letter where the delay was not unreasonable and the insured was not prejudiced 3: holding that an insurer can deny benefits based on late notice by the insured only when the insurer is prejudiced by the delay 4: holding that insurer must pay for defense after it declined to provide a defense and coverage was found to exist", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The court examined the history of amendments to the DUI statute and concluded that the Legislature\u2019s addition of \u00a7 1201(e) at the same time it amended \u00a7 1201(a) to include subsections (a)(l)-(3), see 1973, No. 79, \u00a7 1, reflected a legislative concern with preventing multiple convictions based on the different ways the State could prove the operator was impaired. On this basis, the court concluded that \u00a7 3323(e) does not bar conviction of two counts of BWI/Fatal. \u00b6 55. We need not resolve whether the court\u2019s interpretation of the Legislature\u2019s intent in enacting \u00a7 3323(e) is correct because multiple convictions are prohibited for a violation of \u00a7 3323(a), even without reliance on \u00a7 3323(e), in accordance with our holding in State v. LaBounty, 2005 VT 124, \u00b6 10, 179 Vt. 199, 892 A.2d 203 (<HOLDING>). As we explained in interpreting a similar Holdings: 0: holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless 1: holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured 2: recognizing that cjlearly buie requires more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present in a residence 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence even if there was more than one victim", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "between the two markets was due in part to different levels of trade. Commerce found the data insufficient to provide a basis for the claimed adjustments because B\u00f6we did not submit data for its own sales to distributors in the home market. To require B\u00f6we to submit data for sales to distributors in the home market, however, is to preclude B\u00f6we from ever obtaining a level of trade adjustment because it does not sell to any distributors in the home market. Consequently, such a requirement renders B\u00f6we powerless to produce evidence to satisfy the burden of proof that Commerce has laid down for these adjustments in this case. This requirement is not in the regulation; nor does Commerce provide a reasoned basis for it. See NEC Home Elecs. v. United States, 54 F.3d 736, 745 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 12 Holdings: 0: holding that burden imposed to prove a level of trade adjustment was unreasonable because party could under no practical circumstances meet the burden 1: holding that the party challenging a tax deed has the burden to prove its invalidity 2: recognizing burden 3: holding that the government could not meet its burden under harmless error analysis because the record indicated that district court would have imposed shorter sentencing under advisory guidelines scheme 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "teams and therefore proeompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics\u201d and suggested that rules establishing eligibility requirements of student-athletes were such controls, while rules limiting television broadcasts were not. See id. at 117, 104 S.Ct. at 2969. While the parties have not cited any opinion addressing the particular bylaw at issue here, and we have found none, other courts have held that the NCAA\u2019s \u201cno-draft\u201d and \u201cno-agent\u201d rules, which disqualify a-student-athlete from further intercollegiate competition if the student-athlete enters a professional draft or contacts an agent, are reasonable because they are procompetitive. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass\u2019n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087-94 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 746; Jones, 392 Holdings: 0: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 1: holding that ncaas nodraft and noagent rules do not have an anticompetitive impact on a discernable market 2: recognizing that rates awarded in other cases do not set the prevailing market rateonly the market can do that 3: recognizing implied duty to market 4: holding elements of attempted monopolization claim under  2 of sherman act are intent anticompetitive conduct and dangerous probability of success in a relevant market", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Alleged Negligence Regarding Chock Straps and Lighting Plaintiff also contends that his workplace was unsafe because (a) the Nissan vehicle that allegedly injured him was \u201cover-restrained,\u201d such that it inched forward when plaintiff removed the chock straps securing it, Appellant\u2019s Br. at 28, and (b) it was too dark for him to see the license plate holder. The district court noted that these claims \u201cneed not be considered\u201d because plaintiff raised them for the first time in opposition to summary judgment. Hr\u2019g Tr. at 16. We agree with the district court. See Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 361 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to reach merits of argument raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment); Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.1956) (<HOLDING>); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Holdings: 0: holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 1: holding that an argument raised for the first time in response to defendants motion to dismiss instead of in an amended complaint was not properly raised before the district court and would not be considered on appeal 2: holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court 3: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived 4: holding that district court was justified in brushfing aside further argument not alleged in complaint but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "368 (1997). Here, Policyholders have not shown that Westchester made any material representation regarding the coverage of the policy. In the absence of an express request for a certain type of coverage, the mere issuance of an insurance policy does not constitute a representation that the policy covers everything the insured expects. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized that an insurer may make a tacit representation regarding the scope of coverage when it sells a policy that lacks any value whatsoever, see Glazewski, 91 Ill.Dec. 628, 483 N.E.2d at 1266, it has refused to extend this rule to cases where the policy does in fact have some value. See Charles Hester Enterprises, Inc. v. Ill. Founders Ins. Co., 114 Ill.2d 278, 102 Ill.Dec. 306, 499 N.E.2d 1319, 1325 (1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Friesz ex rel. Friesz v. Farm & City Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding misrepresentation must at least be partial cause of plaintiffs injury 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for tacit misrepresentation where the policy had some value 4: holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the proposed amended judgment offered by Valley Oak, the'trial court stated, \u201cBaratta is correct that this order still doesn\u2019t comply with what I think the second district is looking for or any appellate court, and that is some findings of fact.\u201d Nevertheless, the trial court signed the proposed amended judgment as presented and attached certain portions of the transcript of the prior evidentiary hearing. Baratta now seeks review of this amended judgment for attorney\u2019s fees and costs. In Rowe, the supreme court adopted the federal lodestar .approach for determining a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee under a prevailing party attorney\u2019s fee statute or contractual provision. Rowe, 472 So.2d at 1146; Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Biltmore Constr. Co., 510 So.2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). In doing so, the court recognized that while Holdings: 0: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 1: holding that the prevailing market rate can be established with reference to information concerning recent fee awards by courts in comparable cases 2: holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action 3: holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal 4: holding that rowe applied to both statutory and contractual prevailing party fee awards", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "make reasonable inferences from the facts he knew. Those parts of the demonstration for which Detective Reynolds lacked personal knowledge were admissible as lay opinion because they were reasonable inferences from those facts he did know by personal knowledge. TEX. R. EVID. 701. Under Rule 701, a witness, even a lay witness, may make reasonable inferences from the evidence. Detective Reynolds, as a lay witness, was entitled reasonably to infer how the crime occurred based on those facts he knew. See Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating that a witness\u2019s testimony can include opinions, beliefs, or inferences as long as they are drawn from his or her own experiences or observations); Ventroy v. State, 917 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1996, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>); Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320, 325 Holdings: 0: holding officers testimony about the common use of vise grips to assist in stealing cars was admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness 1: holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion 2: holding that witnesss opinion of a persons reaction to hearing a statement was admissible lay testimony based on personal observation 3: holding officers testimony about point of impact automobiles direction of travel and other opinions about crime scene was admissible as both lay opinion and expert testimony in trial for attempted murder of victim struck by automobile when based on personal knowledge and experience 4: holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "be narrowly confined to its specifically enumerated areas of review. Commonwealth v. Judge, 591 Pa. 126, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (2007). Such narrow construction would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to channel post-conviction claims into the PCRA\u2019s framework, id., and would instead create a bifurcated system of post-conviction review where some post-conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA while others are not. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 (1999). Instead, this Court has broadly interpreted the PCRA eligibility requirements as including within its ambit claims such as this one, regardless of the \u201ctruth-determining process\u201d language that Appellee invokes from Section 9543(a) (2) (i). See Commonwealth v. Liebel, 573 Pa. 375, 825 A.2d 630 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, Holdings: 0: holding claim is cognizable 1: holding that while batson claim was waived derivative claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the batson claim is cognizable under the pcra 2: holding that claim alleging counsels ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining process is cognizable under the pcra 3: holding that claim challenging counsels effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is cognizable under pcra 4: holding claim is not cognizable", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "authorized.\u201d As quoted, this language implies that because Vincent\u2019s and Mackey\u2019s decision was \u201cdeliberate, considered, or planned,\u201d an inquiry into whether the practice was authorized is irrelevant. This proposition, however, is unsound. First, Piatt\u2019s holding is the far narrower proposition that alleging challenged conduct to be a \u201cmatter of consistent policy\u201d is sufficient to withstand attack on Parratt grounds. 773 F.2d at 1034. As alleged, the conduct in Piatt was authorized by state policy, 773 F.2d at 1034; therefore, Parratt does not apply to the conduct, whether deliberate or not. The language quoted by the majority is thus clearly dicta. Even more importantly, the dicta in Piatt is directly contrary to the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. at 3203 (<HOLDING>). We should follow the Supreme Court. 2. The Holdings: 0: holding parratt does not apply where an officer acts pursuant to established procedures 1: holding that 1 even if some conduct is not actionable as securities fraud that conduct cannot support a civil rico claim if it was also undertaken in connection with the purchase of a security and 2 conduct in maintaining ponzi scheme was conduct undertaken in connection with the purchase or sale of securities 2: holding that parratt does apply to intentional conduct if the conduct is unauthorized 3: holding that uncharged conduct may be considered at sentencing when that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the ada amendments act does not apply to preamendment conduct", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under the Jencks Act for a copy of the FBI 302 Report. The government refused on the ground that the report was not a \u201cstatement\u201d within the meaning of the Act. Without conducting an in camera review of the document, the district court declined to require its production, finding, \u201c[A]ll I can do is go by the law, and I just don\u2019t think this is a Jencks Act statement.\u201d We review the district court\u2019s finding for clear error. See United States v. Boyd, 53 F.3d 631, 634 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 322, 133 L.Ed.2d 223 (1995); United States v. Smith, 31 F.3d 1294, 1301 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1170, 130 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1995). In response to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1957) (<HOLDING>), Congress enacted the Jencks Act, which Holdings: 0: holding a failure to object to a witnesses testimony while the witness was on the stand justified overruling a motion for a mistrial made several witnesses later 1: holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted 2: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 3: holding that despite district courts restriction on crossexamination of government witness concerning the sentencing benefits he would earn through testifying for the government it did not violate defendants confrontation rights because of defense counsels effective impeachment of the government witnesses credibility and sentence reduction 4: holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "value * * * of one-half the share of said farm,\u201d court held that the term \u201cin fee simple\u201d clearly and conclusively imported the testator\u2019s intent to grant a fee simple estate in the grandson.) See, also, Widows\u2019 Home v. Lippardt (1904), 70 Ohio St. 261, 71 N.E. 770, paragraph two of the syllabus, (where will provided \u201cI give and bequeath to my beloved wife all my estate, * * * in fee simple * * *; that after the death of my wife, if there is anything remaining of my personal or real estate it shall be distributed in the following manner * * court held that the wife had the power to sell the real estate and \u201ca deed making such a conveyance, good as against the widow, is good against the second devisees\u201d); Koval v. Koval (C.P.1966), 8 Ohio Misc. 206, 208, 37 O.O.2d 265, 221 N.E.2d 490 (<HOLDING>). But, see, Panzero v. Panzero (Feb. 3, 1989), Holdings: 0: holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit 1: holding that it is difficult to imagine any language more forceful than the words absolutely and in fee simple to bestow complete ownership upon zella koval and where a fee simple in real property or the equivalent in personal property is given an attempted gift over of any property remaining after the designated persons death is of no effect 2: holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property 3: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 4: holding that a company which knew when it issued a policy that the insureds interest in the insured property was less than fee simple could not rely upon a provision rendering the policy void if the insureds interest was less than fee simple", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in increasing premiums for minority stockholders in merger freeze-outs, compared to tender offer freezeouts effected without special committees); James F. Cotter, Anil Shivdasani, & Marc Zenner, Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. of Fin. Econ. 195 (1997) (finding that, in the context of a tender offer, the presence of an independent board increases the tender offer bid premium and overall stockholder gains). 45 .Such an approach might also provide incentives for a controlling stockholder to proceed by means of a tender offer to the minority stockholders, and thus potentially avoid the need to actively negotiate with a special committee. See generally In re Siliconix Inc. S\u2019holders Litig., 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (<HOLDING>); but see In re Cox Commc\u2019ns, Inc. S\u2019holders Holdings: 0: holding that the use of fund assets to fend off a hostile tender offer since made without sufficient inquiry into the facts constitutes a violation of the fiduciary standards under erisa 1: holding under its reading of solomon v pathe commcns corp 672 a2d 35 del1996 and other similar cases that a goingprivate tender transaction made by way of a tender offer is not subject to entire fairness review 2: recognizing further that the offer of proof allows the aggrieved party to present a proper record for review on appeal and in the absence of such an offer error may not be preserved 3: holding that rule 14e3 by its terms does not require that the offender know or have reason to know that the information relates to a tender offer 4: holding that rule of proportionality applies only under a1 and what is now a2d", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "granted and are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). III. SUMMARY For the preceding reasons, the Court: 1) DISMISSES Plaintiffs\u2019 RICO claims because they fail to state claims for which relief may be granted, and because the WDCA reverse-preempts those claims under the McCarran-FergusonAct; and 2) DISMISSES Plaintiffs\u2019 state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants for failure to state claims for which relief may be granted. SO ORDERED. 1 . While Cass urt deferred to the state administrative agency\u2019s primary jurisdiction only on the ground that the E\u00f1e doctrine would compel such deferral. See 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure \u00a7 72; Virginia Imports, Inc. v. Kirin Brewery of Am., LLC, 296 F.Supp.2d 691, 698, 698 n. 1 (E.D.Va.2003) (<HOLDING>). 3 . While Cassens contends that the Holdings: 0: holding that the state police is a state agency 1: holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law 2: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case 3: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law 4: holding that in a diversityjurisdiction case involving only state claims the primaryjurisdiction doctrine does not apply in favor of a state agency as compared to a federal agency and holding that even if the doctrine were to apply a federal district court sitting in diversity would defer to a state agencys primary jurisdiction only if state courts would so defer", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "does not argue that the Court should determine an award of compensatory education. Instead, Ms. Lopez requests only \u201cthat this Court remand this case to the Office of Dispute Resolution so that the hearing officer may award compensatory education.\u201d Pl.\u2019s Mem. at 5. The District \u201cdoes not object to a remand.\u201d Def.\u2019s Mem. at 3; see id. at 9; see also Pl.\u2019s Reply at 1 (noting the \u201cDistrict\u2019s acquiescence to Ms. Lopez\u2019s proposed remand\u201d). The parties thus agree that remand is appropriate in this case. The D.C. Circuit has held that a district court may remand for the purposes of considering an award of compensatory education following a finding that a child was denied a FAPE. See Reid, 401 F.3d at 526; see also Branham ex rel. Branham v. Gov\u2019t of D.C., 427 F.3d 7, 13 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). District courts in this circuit fre quently Holdings: 0: holding that reid permits the district court either to take supplemental evidence or to return the case to the hearing officer 1: recognizing that a lower court cannot change the law of the case as decided by the highest court hearing a case 2: holding a district courts application of supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion not of plaintiffs right 3: holding that the doctrine of incorporation by reference permits the court to consider documents on a motion to dismiss that are crucial or essential to the plaintiffs claims 4: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "issue presented in this case: that the allowance of a rule 30A (k) deposition does not necessarily require the quashing of a subpoena to the deposed witness as being unreasonable or oppressive. We think the drafters of the rule would not have imposed such a drastic limitation on the important right of parties to call witnesses of their own choosing without explicit language or comment. Certainly in adopting the rule this court did not so intend. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the judge\u2019s order restricted the defendants\u2019 right of cross-examination, a right which has long been recognized in both civil and criminal cases. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-692 (1931); The Ottawa, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 268, 271 (1865). See also Fuller v. Rice, 4 Gray 343, 344 (1855) (<HOLDING>); McCormick, Evidence \u00a7 19 (3d ed. 1984). Holdings: 0: recognizing a right to contribution 1: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 2: holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings 3: holding right to be fundamental 4: recognizing right to crossexamine a deponent fully otherwise deposition should not be admitted", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that although the rule \u201cdoes not require the producing party to engage in a post-production review to determine whether any protected communication or information has been produced by mistake,\u201d the \u201crule does require the producing party to follow up on any obvious indications that a protected communication or information has been produced inadvertently.\u201d For example, when a privileged document is used at a deposition, and the privilege holder fails to object immediately, courts have found the privilege to be waived. Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir.1999); Brandon v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 07-CV-1256, 2008 WL 2096883, at *3 (S.D.Cal. May 16, 2008) (listing cases); cf. Clarke v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 08-CV-02400, 2009 WL 970940, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Of course, the burden of proving that Holdings: 0: holding that failure to timely assert attorneyclient privilege constitutes waiver 1: holding that a one month delay is acceptable 2: holding that a six month delay was unreasonable 3: holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial because it is settled that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs 4: holding twomonth delay in asserting privilege including failure to assert privilege at a deposition weighed in favor of finding waiver and describing cases in which waiver was found after delay ranging from six days to one month", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective-bargaining agreement.\u201d 482 U.S. at 396, 107 S.Ct. at 2431. An employer may then allege that plaintiffs state law claims are preempted, but must do so in state court. Id. at 397, 107 S.Ct. at 2432. Even if the employer proves that plaintiffs claims are preempted, this \u201cdoes not establish that they are removable to federal court.\u201d Id. at 398, 107 S.Ct. at 2432 (state law claims for breach of individual employment contracts made while plaintiffs were not members of bargaining unit did not arise under federal law and were not removable). Accord, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1885 n. 12, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (<HOLDING>). This distinction between jurisdictional Holdings: 0: holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement 1: holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim was not completely preempted and noting that state court on remand would have to apply federal law to remaining issues requiring interpretation of collective bargaining agreement 2: holding that the present controversy concerns the plaintiffs rights under state and federal statutes which exist independently of the collective bargaining agreement and do not require interpretation of that agreement 3: holding that plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim under michigan law was not preempted because the statelaw tort of retaliatory discharge creates rights independent of those established by the collective bargaining agreement further holding that discrimination claim was not preempted even though the employer was likely to rely on provisions of the cba in its defense 4: holding state law claim preempted by  301 of labor management relations act only if application of state law requires interpretation of collective bargaining agreement", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "exclusion. Absent such an indication, this court will not intervene to rewrite the contract. Despite the opinion of the Washington Supreme Court in Kent, this court is satisfied that diesel fuel, regardless of the way it is \u201cdischarged,\u201d \u201cdispersed,\u201d or \u201creleased,\u201d is within the definition of pollutants in the insurance policy at issue. As to defendants\u2019 argument that the policy provision \u201cis intended to protect against outside pollutants and waste cleanup, not the effects of a pest control cleanup,\u201d this court is satisfied that the unambiguous language of the policy excludes all pollutants and does not exclude pollutants based on their source or location. See Damar Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 856 F.Supp. 679, 682-83 (N.D.Ga.1993), aff'd, 21 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir.1994), (<HOLDING>) Even though the court is disturbed by the Holdings: 0: holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of  a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured 1: holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony 2: holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended 3: holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution 4: holding claim for injuries arising out of use of truck and not from negligent supervision excluded from coverage by auto exclusion in commercial general liability policy no claim that language in policy was ambiguous or unclear", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the elevator maintenance, repair, and inspection exercised the appropriate care in keeping the elevators in safe operating condition. A. Liability for Delegation of a Non-delegable Duty The United States exercised its discretion to carry out its responsibilities for maintaining the elevators at the VA Medical Center by contracting with Otis and Bayline. \u201c[T]he law is clear that the government may delegate its safety responsibilities to independent contractors in the absence of federal laws or policies restricting it from doing so.\u201d Andrews v. United States, 121 F.3d 1430, 1440-41 (11th Cir.1997) (citations omitted); Moore, 2014 WL 949985, at *5 (citing Cochran v. United States, 38 F.Supp.2d, 986, 992-93 (N.D.Fla.1998)); see also Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Dingler v. United States, No. 1:06-cv-181, Holdings: 0: holding that causes of action for employers misrepresentation and breach of contract to replacement workers are not preempted 1: holding that an agencys determination on a workers compensation claim was entitled to deference 2: holding the government was entitled to delegate responsibility for safety of rail yard workers to their private employers 3: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act 4: holding that an agency may not delegate its public duties to private entities", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the law (and we need not pass upon that issue), it was the duty of the town clerk \u2014 not Attorney Brule \u2014 to record and index the notice of intent in accordance with the General Laws. See Gerardi, 414 A.2d at 476 (noting that the town clerk is \"bound to comply with the applicable [recording] statutes\u201d). 7 .Mr. Beauregard argues that the motion justice erred when he ruled that there was \u201cno dispute concerning the lack of [Attorney Brule's] malice.\u201d Because we are affirming the grant of summary judgment based on the fact that Mr. Beauregard failed to show that the attorney defendants made a false statement about Mr. Beauregard\u2019s ownership of the property which he wished to develop, we need not address the malice issue. See Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I.2007) Holdings: 0: holding we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even those not relied upon by the district court 1: recognizing that this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than those relied upon by the motion justice 2: holding that this court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground appearing in the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied on it 3: holding that the supreme court can affirm a trial justices decision on grounds other than those stated by the trial justice 4: recognizing that appellate court may affirm result on reasons different from those on which lower court relied", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "District of Columbia embodies \u201ca preference for the testimony of treating physicians over doctors retained for litigation purposes,\u201d the hearing examiner nonetheless \u201cmay choose to credit the testimony of a non-treating physician over a treating physician.\u201d Short v. District of Columbia Dep\u2019t of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 851 (D.C.1998). Particularly is that so if \u201cthe contradicting medical evidence from the employer was from a doctor who examined\u201d the claimant, King v. W.C.A.B. (Wendell H. Stone Co.), 132 Pa. Cmwlth. 292, 572 A.2d 845, 846 (1990) (cited in Stewart v. District of Columbia Dep\u2019t of Employment Sens., 606 A.2d 1350, 1353 (D.C.1992)), and, in any case, the hearing examiner must explain his decision to credit the one opinion over the other. See Short, supra, at 851 (<HOLDING>). Although an agency as finder of fact Holdings: 0: recognizing examiners right to discredit treating physicians opinion but remanding for explanation where examiner did not mention opinions of those physicians 1: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 2: holding that challenge to vietnam war did not necessarily raise political question and remanding 3: holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error 4: recognizing substantial body of authority from other states and the federal courts holding that fatiguerelated injuries can be compensable in some circumstances but remanding case for explanation why contrary precedent within jurisdiction was not followed", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Unfortunately, the Appellants\u2019 attempt to establish that their decision to terminate Wright did not violate a clearly established right wholly misunderstands the limited nature of our interlocutory review. The Appellants contend that their decision to terminate Wright was based on HUD\u2019s audit report, which suggested, at best, that he was a poor manager, and, at worst, that he was guilty of potentially criminal conflicts of interest. They further contend that their reliance on the report, whether or not mistaken, was not unreasonable under the circumstances. They conclude, therefore, that because Wright \u201ccannot demonstrate that the individual Defendants were \u2018p L.Ed.2d 348 (1981); Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Whether the Appellants\u2019 decision to terminate Holdings: 0: holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination 1: holding that plaintiff is entitled to assert claim of retaliatory transfer under  1981 2: holding that six cited cases were sufficient to inform a reasonable government official in 1988 that racially based retaliatory actions may violate the employees rights as enumerated in  1981 3: holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy 4: holding that retaliatory discharge demotion or other adverse employment claims state a cause of action under  1981", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "days: Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(b). 4 . The indictments, though, need not allege identical facts. As Perez demonstrates, minor variations in the facts alleged in the indictments will not prevent an initial indictment from tolling the STA clock. Perez, 217 F.3d at 328; see also United States v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). We express no opinion on the permissible Holdings: 0: holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review 1: holding that a subsequent indictment does not restart the thirtyday speedy trial clock but rather tolled it when the original indictment was dismissed the thirtyday period again continued to run it did not begin anew the second indictment was then filed before the thirtyday period expired therefore the filing of the second indictment even though filed after thirty days following defendants arrest did not violate his rights under the speedy trial act 2: holding that when initial indictment was filed within the thirtyday period a superseding indictment filed outside the thirtyday window which did not change the original charges did not violate the speedy trial act 3: holding that additional facts in superseding indictment filed more than thirty days after arrest did not violate sta 4: holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Judgment A summary judgment motion must be granted if there is \u201cno genuine issue as to any material fact,\u201d Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), not, as Appellant states, \u201cif there are any genuine issues of fact.\u201d \u201cOnly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.\u201d Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering the motion for summary judgment, the district court properly relied on the state trial transcript and not solely on Walker\u2019s Rule 56 pleadings. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a grant of Holdings: 0: holding district court not required to uncover disputed facts when considering summary judgment motion 1: holding that the entire record may be examined when considering a summary judgment motion 2: holding that by considering matters outside of the pleadings the trial court converted a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion 3: holding district court did not err by considering a contract central to the dispute without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment 4: holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sold, handled, distributed or disposed of by you....\u201d Section V, 15.a. The court was unable to locate any Indiana or Seventh Circuit case law dealing with the definition of \u201cproduct\u201d as that term is used in CGL insurance policies, and, in fact, neither party in this case cites any case that specifically defines the term. The Ninth Circuit offers some assistance in the case of Hydro Systems, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.1991), wherein the court wrote: Several courts have examined the meaning of the term \u201cproduct\u201d as it relates to product hazard exceptions. The majority of courts \u201cdefine \u2018products\u2019 as goods or services which the insured deals in as his stock or trade.\u201d CPS Chem. Co. Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J.Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1984) (<HOLDING>); see also Paxton-Mitchell Co. v. Royal Indemn. Holdings: 0: holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to enjoin some products but not others 1: holding that industrial wastes were not products under a products hazard exception because they were not intended for consumption sale or use by others  2: holding that i4i was not required to prove that its specific customers stopped using i4is products because they switched to the infringing word products 3: recognizing that substantial change is a defense to a products liability claim 4: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was affected. We disagree. Evidence in the record must support a finding that Anagnos's failure to use a turn signal affected other traffic. See City of Milwaukee v. Johnston, 21 Wis. 2d 411, 413, 124 N.W.2d 690 (1963). Given that the deputy was in the far right-hand turn lane, we cannot see how he was affected by Anagnos's failure to use a turn signal in the left lane. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that there were any other vehicles on the highway that could have been affected by Anagnos's left turn. We affirm the circuit court's decision that Anagnos did not violate \u00a7 346.34(l)(b), and therefore hold that the deputy did not have probable cause to stop Anagnos for a traffic violation. See State v. Longcore, 226 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 594 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1999) (<HOLDING>), affd by an equally divided court, 2000 WI 23, Holdings: 0: holding that there is no probable cause when an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of law 1: holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law 2: holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion 3: holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause 4: holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "criminal sense. The district court agreed and granted the motion, reasoning that \u201cthe website was obviously directed at a younger audience and contained loose, figurative, slang language such that a reasonable person would not believe ESPN was actually accusing Plaintiffs of being involved in criminal activity.\u201d The Knievels moved to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), but the motion was denied. The Knievels then noticed this appeal. They contend that the Montana Constitu tion guarantees them a jury trial on their defamation claim, and that the district court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed the action. II. We review the district court\u2019s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187 (9t 38 P.2d 580, 586 (1943) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. Holdings: 0: holding that court may not use extrinsic evidence unless contract language is ambiguous 1: holding that notwithstanding the ambiguous language of the montana constitution it is for the court and not the jury to pass upon demurrers to the complaint 2: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 3: holding that rules of contract construction are to be applied where the language used is ambiguous 4: recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "charged with this offense only after he expressed his desire, during plea negotiations, to go to trial on the conspiracy charge. Ogman offers no authority, however, and we are aware of none, that would permit a district court in these circumstances to not consider all offenses to which a defendant pleads guilty when calculating a sentence. Ogman voluntarily pled guilty to both crimes with which he was legitimately charged. Thus, the district court reasonably considered both convictions in calculating his sentence. See United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582 (2d Cir.1991) (\u201c[T]he fact that a charge was used in plea bargaining does not mean that the penalty mandated by statute does not apply.\u201d); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, Ogman argues that the district court Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not be liable for malicious prosecution where the plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that defendants conspired with influenced or even participated in the prosecutors decision to bring charges against him 1: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 2: holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state 3: holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges 4: holding that a prosecutors threat to bring more serious charges to induce a plea bargain no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Officer at Brunswick. 3 .Affidavit of Ray Shurling, Operations Officer at Brunswick. 4 . In addition, as noted previously, pedestal fans are located in each of the housing units. Smoking is prohibited in the library, dining hall, gymnasium and medical department. Furthermore, inmates in the general population are afforded recreational opportunities and are confined to their housing units only during count or after knockdown in the evening. 5 . While the record in this case indicates that officials at the Brunswick facility are adequately accommodating both smokers and nonsmokers, the physical plants of other prisons may not permit such an accommodation. In such circumstances, a total ban on smoking may be appropriate. See Doughty v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 731 F.Supp. 423 (D.Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>); Elliott v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 796 P.2d 71 Holdings: 0: holding that negligent inaction by a jail officer does not violate due process 1: holding references to a defendants lack of remorse violate the fifth eighth and fourteenth amendments 2: holding that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not violate fifth or fourteenth amendments 3: holding that complete ban on smoking in county jail does not violate eighth or fourteenth amendments 4: holding that execution of juveniles violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not appear to have any connection to a willing buyer\u2019s estimate of the price he would -pay for the property. The contribution by these costs to the property\u2019s value is speculative. To the extent the inclusion of such costs in the valuation is an attempt , to collect - reimbursement for Defendant\u2019s prior investment in the property, the costs are impermissible, as the Fifth Amendment does not guarantee the landowner \u25a0 a -return on his investment. [United States ex rel. & for Use of TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 285, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943)]. United States v. 15,478 Square Feet of Land, more or less, situate in the City of Norfolk, VA, 2011 WL 2471586, at *6 (E.D.Va. June 20, 2011); see also Crosby v. Pickaway Cnty. Gen. Health Dist., 303 Fed.Appx. 251, 262-63 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Further, none of the experts, including Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 1: holding that general authorization to service real estate loans included claims regarding fees for prepayment of mortgage loans 2: holding that landowners could not recover consequential damages due to delay or for the interest on incurred construction loans utilities insurance and real estate taxes for the period after county agency allegedly effected a regulatory taking by revoking permits previously granted to install sewage system on property 3: holding petitioner could not deduct real estate taxes imposed on property he did not own because these taxes were not imposed on him 4: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the time of filing. See Quality Fabrication, 2003 Ct. Int\u2019l Trade LEXIS 27, at *2. Miller did so because she was affirmatively instructed by government officials that the DOL website was the appropriate source of information. See id. at *13. Miller subsequently emailed her regional Labor office to inquire about her petition. See id. at *2. Two days later, Miller received an email response from Labor stating \u201c \u2018these things take time.\u2019 \u201d Id. Miller, however, pursued this action pro-actively in that she contacted: (1) two local Representatives from Congress; (2) the State of Pennsylvania Department of Labor Trade Adjustment Representative; (3) a state legislator; and (4) Labor\u2019s NAFTA-TAA office located in Washington, D.C. See id. at *2-*4. In addition to these extens LEXIS 27 at *2 \u2014 *5 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs, acting in a reasonably prudent Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs extensive efforts to inquire as to the status of the relevant naftataa petition were sufficient to satisfy the due diligence standard 1: holding that an applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard of proof for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal 2: holding that foresight not retrospect is the standard of diligence 3: holding that defendant dentists were not entitled to summary judgment in malpractice actions commenced more than two years after the relevant dental procedures where factual questions remained as to the plaintiffs diligence 4: holding that affidavit submitted to the court after the plaintiffs motion to remand was sufficient to cure the defect in the removal petition", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "counsel for indigent defendants at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and during their first appeal as of right, Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. 814, but refusing to extend that right to discretionary appeals. Wainwright v. Toma, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). No reasonable jurist, even in light of the dicta in Evitts, could have interpreted these cases as requiring the kind of relief that Pursell now seeks. Granted, there are cases imposing general requirements on states when they venture into areas where they are not constitutionally required to tread. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (<HOLDING>). These cases were adequately summarized in Holdings: 0: holding that a state tort claim is a species of property protected by the due process clause 1: holding that the eighth amendment applies only after the state has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with the due process of law 2: holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process 3: recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution 4: holding that although state is not required to operate welfare program it must do so in accordance with the due process clause", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as to the rights of the parties thereto and their privies.\u201d Stewart v. SunTrust Mtg., 331 Ga. App. 635, 638 (3) (770 SE2d 892) (2015) (punctuation omitted). Further, \u201c[a] lender owes a borrower a duty to exercise a power of sale in a security deed fairly, which includes complying with statutory and contractual notice requirements.\u201d Thompson-El v. Bank of America, 327 Ga. App. 309, 310-311 (2) (759 SE2d 49) (2014). In her complaint, James asserts that BANA breached the terms of the security deed by failing to provide proper notice of default and her right to cure as mandated by Paragraph 22 of that deed. These allegations are sufficient to support a breach of contract claim, and the trial court erred in dismissing it. See Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, 324 Ga. App. at 755 (2) (b) (<HOLDING>); see also Stewart v. SunTrust Mtg., 331 Ga. Holdings: 0: holding that breach of contract claim related back to misrepresentation claim because operative facts upon which the breach of contract claim was based were contained in the misrepresentation counts of the original complaint 1: holding that complaint alleging that creditors failed to comply with the notice provisions contained in the security deed stated a claim for breach of contract 2: holding that party must comply with notice and cure provisions before seeking remedy for default under contract 3: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 4: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "supplemental jurisdictio y action premised on alleged bad faith termination from IAI \u201ccannot be maintained against parties with whom no employment relationship existed \u2014 i.e., the named defendants other than IAI.\u201d Rothmeier contends that respondents breached fiduciary duties owed to him by terminating him from the partnerships in bad faith. However, the partners here acted pursuant to (1) the IAI Venture I partnership agreement, which provided for automatic termination of Rothmeier\u2019s partnership interest upon his termination from IAI and (2) the IAI Venture II partnership agreement, which provided for termination of a partner\u2019s interest at the sole discretion of the other partners. Neither agreement abrogates the fiduciary character of the partnerships. See Appletree, 494 N.W.2d at 893 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under Delaware law, a partner Holdings: 0: holding that a statutorilyimposed fiduciary obligation created an express trust fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 1: holding that partners have a fiduciary relationship and are held to high standards of integrity in their dealings with each other 2: holding that partners may not agree to eliminate the fiduciary character of their relationship 3: holding that general partners must notify limited partners of partnership opportunity to purchase adjacent property but not addressing whether  9404 requires affirmative consent of partners after such notice 4: holding that the relationship of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity in their dealings", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 633 (Tex. App.\u2014Dallas 1995, writ denied). Rule 263 requires that the parties submit the agreed statement to the clerk and that the court certify it. However, even when the parties fail to conform to the technical requirements of the rule, an appellate court may treat the case as one involving an agreed statement of facts under rule 263 if the record indicates that the trial court heard the case on stipulated facts. See Kessler, 932 S.W.2d at 736 (finding no statement of facts necessary for review where order stated that the court considered only the motion before it, the attached exhibits, the brief in response, and the arguments of counsel); Lambda Const. Co. v. Chamberlin Waterproofing and Roofing Sys., 784 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1990, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the trial court\u2019s final Holdings: 0: holding fact issue existed regarding foreseeability of murder at restaurant where police records indicated history of crime in the area 1: holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs 2: holding that no issue of material fact existed as to the reasonableness of an employers response where the offending employee was promptly suspended and fired 3: holding case tried on stipulated facts where order indicated that the parties agreed during telephone hearing with the court that no material issue of fact existed 4: holding order nonfinal where parties agreed to reserva tion on issue ripe for adjudication and tried by parties", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appellant) must include at least one of three statements in his notice of appeal. The three statements are: 1) that the appeal involves a jurisdictional defect, 2) that the substance of the appeal was raised below by written motion and ruled upon by the court, or 3) that the trial court granted permission to appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(b)(3). Moreover, it is the inclusion of these statements which vests us with jurisdiction over the appeal. Should they be omitted, we are restricted to considering only those points averring jurisdictional defects or impugning the voluntariness of the initial plea. Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (involving the predecessor to the current rule of appellate procedure); see Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711, 714-15 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). As previously mentioned, appellant pled Holdings: 0: recognizing that an appellants obligation to timely perfect her appeal from the general sessions court is mandatory  and if it is not complied with the circuit court has no jurisdiction 1: recognizing that exception to requirement of timely filing of notice of appeal exists in cases where defendant either was not told of right to appeal or was not furnished attorney to exercise those rights or was furnished attorney for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete appeal 2: holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal 3: holding that the rule also applies to those attempting to perfect an appeal after their community supervision is revoked and they are adjudicated guilty 4: holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and one count of conspiring to structure, they faced a combined maximum fine of $1,000,000. Because the amount the Strelskis were required to forfeit \u2014 a total of $140,630 \u2014 is well below the $1,000,000 statutory maximum, there is a strong presumption that the forfeiture is constitutional. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d at 1309. The maximum fine authorized for the Strelskis under the sentencing guidelines is $50,000 each, resulting in a combined total fine of $100,000. Although the forfeiture amount exceeds the maximum fine under the guidelines, it is still \u201cnear the permissible range of fines under the sentencing guidelines,\u201d which means that it is almost certainly not excessive. See United States v. 127 & j.29 Hall St., 74 F.3d 1165,1172-73 (11th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The Strelskis contend that the fine is Holdings: 0: holding that forfeiture of property valued at 65000 was not excessive where the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 40000 1: holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal 2: holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant  according to the states sentencing guidelines 3: holding that forfeiture of property valued at 150000 was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 20000 4: holding that forfeiture of 357144 in currency was excessive where the maximum statutory fine was 250000 and the maximum fine under the sentencing guidelines was 5000", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of a complaint involving an indispensable party). As a result, the Court dismisses without prejudice plaintiffs\u2019 claims under the TCA related to Verizon\u2019s alleged wrongdoing. See generally Direct Energy Marketing Ltd. v. Duke/Louis Dreyfus LLC, 50 Fed.Appx. 469, 473 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that the proper procedure is to dismiss the claims without prejudice to allow plaintiff to renew its claims in another tribunal). (vi) Extensive Delay, Shifting Rules and Negligence In their final mash of TCA claims, plaintiffs paint a tale of egregious delay, deliberately shifting regulatory sands and gross administrative negligence. These factors, plaintiffs argue, created the types of barriers to entry that the TCA was intended to prevent. The City protests that the d 1160, 1176 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs allege both a six to eight Holdings: 0: holding no retroactive application 1: holding retroactive application 2: recognizing district court application of the same rule 3: holding that the combination of lengthy application process burdensome application and unfettered discretion violates the tca 4: holding that there is no rational reason for the retroactive application of 80173 and the prospective application of 833", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "into Samuels' record would have informed Wright of the prior plea agreement. The facts of this case suggest otherwise. The prosecutor announced that Samuels would be a surprise rebuttal witness without prior notice to Wright. This was an insufficient amount of time for counsel to adequately prepare in time for trial. And in this time frame, it would have been unfair to require Wright to learn about the existence of all documentary evidence related to Samuels. See Gershman, supra, at 696. 70 . Cf. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.2001) (finding a Brady violation where the government's disclosure prevented any \"opportunity for a responsible lawyer to use the information with some degree of calculation and forethought\u201d). 71 . See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763 (<HOLDING>); People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d 1, 603 N.Y.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding evidence not to be material within the meaning of brady when the evidence did not eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator 1: holding that the prosecutors nondisclosure of material evidence affecting a witnesss credibility which goes uncorrected falls within the requirements of brady 2: holding that a prosecutors comment that a witnesss cooperation had convicted 23 other people impermissibly bolstered witnesss credibility through evidence outside the record 3: holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule 4: holding that nondisclosure of evidence undermining eyewitness identifications of the defendant by what the state identified as its two best witnesses was material under brady", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903; accord Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127, 110 S.Ct. at 984; Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). The Court has also applied the Mathews balancing test to the adequacy of notice. See Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 & n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1563 & n. 15, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that its flexible approach to due process taking account of private interests the potential for reducing erroneous deprivations and the costs of procedures needed to reduce errors applies to evaluations of notice as well as the procedures at a hearing 1: holding that procedures adopted by the state to guide its parole release determinations are not themselves liberty interests entitled to constitutional due process protection 2: holding that a court should consider the private interests of the parties including their convenience and the convenience of potential witnesses as well as other publicinterest concerns such as systemic integrity and fairness which come under the rubric of interests of justice  3: holding that procedures that were available to the employees after the implementation of the rif guideline provided such protection of their rights that the absence of a pretermination hearing alone was not violative of due process 4: holding california postdeprivation recovery procedures satisfy due process despite lack of notice to claimant of recovery procedures", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "United States, 480 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.1973). In fact, it is impossible for the \u201cthe validity of the underlying conviction, and, indeed, of the sentence itself\u2019 to be at issue in a Rule 35(b) proceeding. Id.; see also United States v. White, 251 Fed.Appx. 658, 659 (11th Cir.2007) (\u201cContrary to White\u2019s assertion, Rule 35(b), by its own terms, provides for a reduction of a sentence, not the vacating of a sentence and a resentencing.\u201d). If the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence cannot be at issue in a Rule 35(b) proceeding, it makes no sense to say that a Rule 35(b) reduction constitutes a genuine \u201cresentencing\u201d that gives rise to a new \u201cjudgment\u201d that imprisons the \u00a7 2255 movant. See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-14, 58 S.Ct. 164, 166, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937) (<HOLDING>). Instead, a defendant imprisoned by a sentence Holdings: 0: holding that once a sentence is imposed it is a valid final judgment until it is reversed or vacated 1: holding that a sentence is not imposed until judgment enters for purposes of rule 35c 2: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 3: recognizing that a criminal prosecution is not complete until a sentence has been imposed 4: holding that it is not", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the IML are not within the control of the state. Under the IML, appropriations are made to the Department\u2019s instructional material fund, created by the state treasurer. Section 22-P5-5(A). Disbursements from the instructional material fund are made \u201cby warrant of the department of finance and administration upon vouchers issued by\u201d the Department. Section 22-15-6. The Department makes payment to an in-state depository for instructional material distributed to private schools as agents for their students. Sections22-15-7(B), -9(E). No funds are appropriated, to any private school. The mere indirect or incidental benefit to the private schools does not violate Article IV, Section 31. Cf. State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm\u2019n v. Reynolds, 1963-NMSC-023, \u00b6 17, 71 N.M. 389, 378 P.2d 622 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs rely on Harrington v. Atteberry, Holdings: 0: holding that imposition of government fees did not violate exempt status of religious organization 1: holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government 2: holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury 3: holding that the death penalty does not violate the prohibition against cruel punishments set forth in article 1 section 13 of the pennsylvania constitution 4: holding that incidental benefits to a nonprofit organization from appropriations made to the state engineer with absolute control of the expenditure does not violate article iv section 31", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the case so that the court can make the necessary factual findings. United States v. Rowland, 906 F.2d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1990). Here, the court reviewed and adopted the PSI, but then found that employment opportunities in prison and after release would enable McCorvey to pay a fine in the amount of $800. McCorvey has offered nothing to show his inability to pay this small amount. As the court noted, McCorvey is only 48 years old, has a college education, and has no medical conditions that would prevent him from being able to work while incarcerated and after release. Thus, it appears that the court sufficiently considered the necessary factors before imposing a fine. McCorvey has offered nothing other than the PSI\u2019s findings of his outstanding debt as evidence of his Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Rule 403 provides, \"[a]lthough relevant, Holdings: 0: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense 1: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 2: holding that the application of the enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense is proper only if there is a clear connection between the firearm that was used in the other offense and the one that was used in the offense of conviction 3: holding that in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon defendants assault with the firearm the evening before the charged offense was necessary to complete the story and prove that brown possessed the gun 4: holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a  924c sentence for the same firearm", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "N.W.2d 406, 407 (1969) (\u201c[A] conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness.\u201d). Although Had-gu contends that Owens\u2019 reliability is questionable, that credibility was attacked on cross-examination, and it is the \u201cexclusive function of the jury\u201d to judge the credibility of witnesses. Dale v. State, 535 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn.1995). The jury convicted Hadgu despite attacks on Owens\u2019 credibility, and this court must assume the jury believed Owens. Moore, 438 N.W.2d at 108. Hadgu also contends the police failed to use available means to verify and corroborate Owens\u2019 testimony. But there is no requirement that the state corroborate Owens\u2019 testimony because he was not an accomplice to Hadgu. See State v. Swyningan, 304 Minn. 552, 556, 229 N.W.2d 29, 32 (1975) (<HOLDING>). There is merit in Hadgu\u2019s contention that Holdings: 0: holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation 1: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 2: holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller 3: holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without sellers knowledge and consent 4: holding that purchaser could rescind contract where seller failed to disclose a fact  the flooding of the subject real estate  that seller knew purchaser would regard as material", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "examine and challenge all factual information upon which the court based his sentence.\" Id. \u00b6 9 It is proper for the trial court to impose restitution at sentencing unless defendant objects to its imposition and requests a full hearing on the amount at that time. See Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 76-3-201(4)(e) (1999); State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611, 612 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). In this regard, Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 76-8-201(4)(e) (1999) states: \"If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.\" Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute is clear-any request for a full restitution hearing must be made at or before sentencing. Cf. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Holdings: 0: holding defendant entitled to full restitution hearing where he requested it at sentencing 1: holding trial court without jurisdiction to impose additional restitution because more than 60 days had passed between the sentencing hearing and the second restitution hearing 2: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing 3: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 4: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with the said [victim\u2019s] personal liberty____\u201d We have implied that kidnapping is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.2(1)(ii) because it involves a \u201cserious potential risk of physical injury to the ... kidnapped person.\u201d United States v. Lonczak, 993 F.2d 180, 182-83 (9th Cir.1993). In an analogous context, we explicitly held that \u201ckidnapping entails a \u2018serious potential risk of physical injury\u2019 to the victim, making the offense a \u2018violent felony1.... \u201d United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir.1988). That holding has been followed by other circuits which have determined that kidnapping is a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d because it, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk of physical violence. See United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 324-25 (6th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Salemi 26 F.3d 1084, 1086 Holdings: 0: holding that the potential for violence against the victim is an inherent aspect of the crime of kidnapping under 18 usc  924 1: holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which involves a serious potential risk of injury under 18 usc  924 2: holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc  2113a is a crime of violence 3: holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc  16 4: holding that kidnapping is a crime of violence which necessarily involves the threatened use of physical force under 18 usc  924", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "brief, Northlake argues that the trial court in the First Petition lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Northlake had not exhausted its administrative remedies. Our supreme court has held that \u201cthe exhaustion of administrative remedies under [the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act] is a procedural error and does not implicate the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind.2014), amended on reh\u2019g, 27 N.E.3d 768 (Ind.2015). Moreover, Northlake argued in the First Petition that it was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies because it would suffer irreparable harm while the administrative appeal was finalized. See, e.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm\u2019rs v. Ispat Inland, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 477, 483 (Ind.2003) (<HOLDING>). Northlake cannot now argue that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face 1: holding that statute of limitations is tolled by pursuit of internal union remedies even where those remedies are ultimately determined to be futile 2: holding that a plaintiff may not avoid exhausting the administrative remedies by requesting money damages 3: holding that irreparable harm is presumed where discharged employee has exhausted her administrative remedies and proceeds under a civil rights statute 4: holding that a procedural default in exhausting administrative remedies bars relief in federal court", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the trial court should have treated his petition as a motion filed under Rule 3.800. We agree in part. The first issue raised in the petition alleged trial court error in the jury instruction. Because this issue could have been raised on appeal, the claim was not cognizable in a postconviction motion. See Waterfield v. State, 1 So.3d 235, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The second issue, however, alleged a discrepancy between the written sentence and the sentence that was orally imposed. In particular, Barrett alleged that the court never orally imposed a habitual felony offender (HFO) designation. Because this type of discrepancy can be challenged in a Rule 3.800(a) motion, we i\u2019everse and remand with direction to treat the claim as such. See State v. Akins, 69 So.3d 261, 268 (Fla.2011) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Holdings: 0: holding that modification of judgment and sentence to reflect an hfo designation that was not orally pronounced at sentencing violated double jeopardy and constituted an illegal sentence 1: holding that if the record does not reflect that the sentence was pronounced in the defendants presence there is no sentence and the court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal 2: holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable 3: holding that a court is free to change an orally pronounced sentence until a written judgment is filed 4: holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216, 77 S.Ct. 793, 1 L.Ed.2d 776 (1957) (internal quotations and citation omitted). It is well established that a pay-when-paid clause in the circumstances at bar does not foreclose a subcontractor\u2019s right to bring suit for payment under the Miller Act against a general contractor and its surety. See United States ex rel. Walton Tech., Inc. v. Weststar Eng\u2019g, Inc., 290 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir.2002) (\u201cA subcontractor that has performed as agreed need not await the Government\u2019s payment of the contractor before initiating an action under the Miller Act against the contractor or the surety.\u201d); see also United States ex rel. T.M.S. Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Tex., 942 F.2d 946, 949 n. 6 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. McKenney\u2019s, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute 1: holding that a mandatory arbitration clause does not preclude litigating a federal statutory claim 2: holding that the absence of a formal injunction does not preclude the plaintiff from recovering costs and attorney fees under mcl 152714 3: holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractor from recovering under the miller act 4: holding that exemption under the ada does not preclude liability under the rehabilitation act", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "course did not materially alter the terms and conditions of plaintiffs employment and therefore plaintiff could not recover under Title VII for such conduct). \u201cTo hold otherwise would be to expand the definition of \u2018adverse employment action\u2019 to include events such as disciplinary filings, supervisor\u2019s reprimands, and even poor performance by the employee \u2014 anything which might jeopardize employment in the future. Such expansion is unwarranted.\u201d Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708 (emphasis in original). Similarly, Reno\u2019s other asserted incidents of retaliation are equally lacking in consequence. Humiliation experienced by Reno as a result of Moorer\u2019s derogatory comments does not constitute an ultimate employment decision. See Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883, 886 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Neither does Moorer\u2019s unfulfilled threats to Holdings: 0: holding that in the first amendment employment context harassing speech must constitute constructive adverse employment action to be actionable 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that cancellation of benefit to honor plaintiff in retaliation for filing an age discrimination complaint constitutes adverse employment action because of public humiliation involved 3: holding that conduct causing public humiliation was not an actionable adverse employment action because public perceptions were not a term or condition of employment of the plaintiffs employment 4: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result. Restatement (Second) of Pres. Comm\u2019n, 652 N.W.2d 742, 749 (S.D.2002)); see also Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Ass\u2019n, 514 N.W.2d 693, 697 (S.D.1994) (\u201cA release is not fairly made and is invalid if the nature of the instrument was misrepresented or there was other fraudulent or overreaching conduct.\u201d); Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1382 (Del.Ch.1992) (\u201cIt is generally held that the unconseionability test involves the question of whether the provision amounts to a taking of an unfair advantage by one party over the other.\u201d (quoting Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540, 552 (Del.Sup.1977))); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 912 (Del.1989) (<HOLDING>). There was no reasonable manner for Holdings: 0: holding that a court will not notice error which has been invited by the party seeking to take advantage thereof on appeal 1: holding that a contracting party cannot be allowed to use his own breach to gain an advantage by impairing the rights that the contract confers on the other party 2: recognizing that before ordering disqualification the trial court should determine whether one party has obtained an unfair advantage over the other which can only be alleviated by removal of the attorney citations omitted 3: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 4: holding that to support a finding of unconscionability a court must find that the party with superior bargaining power used it to take unfair advantage of his weaker counterpart", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "could not have meant what it unmistakably said.\u201d Id. (quoting Sutherland Statutory Construction \u00a7 45:12, at 105-07). In Sherwinr-Williams, we declined to apply the absurd results doctrine, even though the outcome under the plain language of the statute \u2014 allowing a retailer to claim a manufacturer\u2019s tax credit \u2014 appeared counterintuitive. Id. at 427-28. We emphasized \u201cwe will not ignore clear legislative l 8, 331 (2011) (noting defendants convicted of a felony receive sentencing credit for time subjected to electronic and home monitoring pretrial). Most courts have held electronic monitoring and home supervision does not satisfy the \u201ccustodial\u201d or related requirements of their state sentencing credit statutes. See, e.g., Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469, 473 (Alaska Ct.App.2007) (<HOLDING>); Bush v. Arkansas, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761, Holdings: 0: holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail 1: holding confinement to home and work through electronic supervision does not equate to custody 2: holding that home confinement may not be credited toward official detention 3: holding that electronic home monitoring constitutes confinement under the sra 4: holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "we consider five factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of the statement; (2) whether defense counsel invited it; (3) whether the district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard it; (4) whether defense counsel had the opportunity to respond to the improper statement; and (5) whether the weight of the evidence was against the defendant. See Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d 1295, 1304 (7th Cir.1995). First, we consider the prosecution\u2019s comment on the weight of the evidence to be less damaging than other forms of impermissible argument. Typically, in vouching situations, the prosecution has attempted to bolster a witness\u2019s credibility by introducing facts that were not in evidence. See Cheska, 202 F.3d at 950-52 (<HOLDING>); Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d at 1304 (finding Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecutions failure to disclose information regarding a witnesss past cooperation with law enforcement did not constitute a brady violation in light of other impeachment evidence in the record including testimony regarding the witnesss extensive drug use and past cooperation with the dea 1: holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility 2: holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility 3: holding that a prosecutors comment that a witnesss cooperation had convicted 23 other people impermissibly bolstered witnesss credibility through evidence outside the record 4: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Brian Zahn appeals pro se from the district court\u2019s judgment for defendant following a bench tri 1080, 1093 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Coons v. Sec\u2019y of U.S. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 383 Holdings: 0: holding title vii analysis applies in ada case 1: holding consortium claim unavailable under title vii and ada 2: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 3: recognizing that the ada is interpreted in a manner similar to title vii 4: recognizing the same analysis applies under the wlad and title vii", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cause for a valid arrest), and, as discussed above, nothing \u2014 including Judge Nelson\u2019s order \u2014 affected this belief. The BCDC Ap-pellees\u2019 knowledge of Judge Nelson\u2019s order cannot, as Mr. Reed would have it, be equated with a knowledge of an unlawful detention. 2. One-Hour Delay in Release Mr. Reed also suggests he has claims pursuant to \u00a7 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act because, after Judge Murdoch ordered his release, a BCDC employee detained him one hour longer than the other prisoners for being a \u201csniffler.\u201d As a preliminary matter, we note that none of the BCDC Appellees was involved in the delay. Consequently, Mr. Reed has no \u00a7 1983 claims against the BCDC Appellees, regardless of the lawfulness of the detention. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). As for claims of false imprisonment, neither Holdings: 0: holding that section 1983 action requires a showing of defendants personal participation in alleged constitutional violation 1: holding that denial of a grievance by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff does not establish personal participation under  1983 2: holding that individual liability under  1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation 3: holding that liability in a  1983 action must be predicated on personal involvement not on the basis of respondeat superior 4: holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under  1983", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "without mentioning sentencing \u2014 stated that there are \u201cadditional allegations in the indictment, which will be addressed, if necessary, in the verdict .... These are allegations that the defendant committed the offense while brandishing a dangerous weapon; that the defendant physically restrained a person to facilitate his escape; and that the defendant took property valued at more than ten thousand dollars.\u201d Before and after reading the indictment, the district court admonished the prospective jurors that the indictment itself was not evidence and could not be used to infer guilt. After a two-day trial, the district court instructed the jury as to the robbery charge, and submitted a special verdict form for each of the sentencing allegations. The court cautioned that (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 200 (4th Holdings: 0: holding denial of involvement in crime is not assertion of right to remain silent 1: holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously 2: holding that evidence of a defendants invocation of the right to remain silent ordinarily is not admissible at the defendants criminal trial 3: holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent 4: recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "need not accommodate a disability by foregoing an \u2018esse 1995) (under Rehabilitation Act, employee with excessive absences related to claimed disability was not qualified individual). \u201cGross attendance problems can prevent a disabled person from being qualified for a position even when the attendance problem is related in whole or in part to the disability.\u201d 1 H.H. PerRitt, Jr., Amerioans With Disabilities Act Handbook, \u00a7 3.06[E] at 124 (4th ed.2003). In fact, \u201c[n]umerous federal courts have held that disabled employees cannot establish that they can sufficiently perform the essential functions of a job without showing they can maintain a regular and reliable level of attendance at that job.\u201d Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., No. CV 94-5344 SVW(GHKX), 1994 WL 740765 (C.D.Cal. December 6, 1994) (<HOLDING>). It is undisputed that P & G\u2019s Medical Account Holdings: 0: holding that inability to maintain regular and reliable level of attendance defeated plaintiffs qualification for the job 1: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 2: holding ones satisfactory performance of duties leading to a promotion does establish a plaintiffs qualification for a job 3: holding that attendance is a minimum function of any job 4: holding that the plaintiffs argument that the defendant caused plaintiffs inability to return to work cannot hold water because the socalled causation was insufficient to rise to the level of actionable harassment", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1252. Whether a conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude (\u201cCIMT\u201d) is a question of law we review de novo. Espino-Castillo v. Holder, 770 F.3d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the petition for review. The BIA did not err in determining that Paz-Valadez\u2019s conviction for knowingly possessing a false identification document with intent to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1028(a)(4) is categorically a CIMT because \u201cintent ... to defraud\u201d is an element of the crime. See Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 2008) (\u201cA crime involves fraudulent conduct, and thus is a [CIMT], if intent to defraud is either explicit in the statutory definition of the crime or implicit in the nature of the crime.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Espino-Castillo, 770 F.3d at 864 (<HOLDING>). Paz-Valadez\u2019s argument that his conviction is Holdings: 0: recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude 1: holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach 2: recognizing that a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that we need not remand to the bia so that it may apply the categorical approach 4: holding that an intentional battery that involves the use of a deadly weapon constitutes a crime of moral turpitude", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "claim. Mr. Stevens appealed to this court. Discussion Our review of Veterans Court decisions is limited by statute. Under 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7292(a), we may review \u201cthe validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the Court in making the decision.\u201d Unless the appeal presents a constitutional issue, we \u201cmay not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law ed record can be considered \u201can accurate account\u201d of his service in the military. The question of whether the record is accurate is also a factual matter, outside the jurisdiction of this court. See Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Third, Mr. Stevens \u201crequests]\u201d that this Holdings: 0: holding that a challenge to the proper weight of the evidence is a question of fact outside this courts jurisdiction 1: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 2: holding that records of personal phone calls made by staff employees of the house of representatives fall outside the current definition of public records and were properly redacted 3: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 4: holding that a claim that medical records were falsified was a factual question outside of the courts jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1. The majority\u2019s proposition that the Commission does not exercise a function that \u201cappertains to\u201d the judicial branch is simply wrong. As this Court stated in Young: The Judicial Conduct Commission plays a highly important, albeit not a determinative, role in the administration of judicial discipline by investigating and conducting confidential hearings regarding complaints against justices and judges. Consequently, the Commission exercises a type of judicial authority and operates within the judicial branch. Original op. \u00b6 84. We also pointed out in Young that other jurisdictions \u201chave also held judicial conduct commissions with similar authority to be within the judicial branch.\u201d Id. \u00b6 85 (citing Whitehead v. Nevada Comm\u2019n on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994) (<HOLDING>)). \u00b647 The majority denigrates the important Holdings: 0: holding executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against judge before commission violated separation of powers clause in nevada constitution 1: holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause 2: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 3: holding that where the conviction was final the disciplinary commission was not authorized to assume the roles of both an accusatory tribunal and the ultimate determiner of guilt and that the separation of responsibility between the disciplinary board and the disciplinary commission provides constitutional due process 4: holding that the presidential privilege is inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the government. By calling the Prince a thief, so the argument goes, Zoar-ab expressed a political opinion that identified him as a threat to the government for which he was and fears will be persecuted. The IJ rejected the argument, characterizing the matter as a personal business dispute, not a political matter. The IJ\u2019s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. Zoarab was clearly acting as an angry investor, not a political dissident, when he and his cousin-in-law sought to confront the Prince. Asylum is not available to an alien who fears retribution solely over personal matters. Matter of Y-G, 20 I & N Dec. 794, 799 (BIA 1994) (explaining that a love quarrel with a Haitian soldier was a \u201cpurely personal matter\u201d); see also Matter of Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461, 463 (BIA 1971) (<HOLDING>). Courts have routinely rejected asylum Holdings: 0: recognizing that purely personal retribution is of course not persecution on account of political opinion but holding that when the alleged government cor ruption is inextricably intertwined with governmental operation the exposure and prosecution of such an abuse of public trust is necessarily political 1: holding that mayor is a high public official 2: holding that a fear of retribution from a husband a high political official was a strictly personal matter 3: recognizing that purely personal retribution is of course not persecution on account of political opinion but holding that when the alleged government corruption is inextricably intertwined with governmental operation the exposure and prosecution of such an abuse of public trust is necessarily political 4: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a more favorable sentence under the advisory sentencing guidelines regime mandated by Booker.\"), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 266, 163 L.Ed.2d 239 (2005); United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.2005)(en banc) (\u201d[R]emand to the district court is appropriate for the purpose of ascertaining whether the sentence imposed would have been materially different had the district court known that the sentencing guidelines were advisory.\u201d); United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir.2005)(en banc) (\"[T]he District Court\u2019s mandatory application of the Guidelines was not 'particularly egregious\u2019 or a 'miscarriage of justice.\u2019 \u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 495, 163 L.Ed.2d 375 (2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1306 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied, 406 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.2005), Holdings: 0: holding that an appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal 1: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 2: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial 3: holding that the defendant necessarily bears the burden of satisfying the third prong of the plain error test 4: holding the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate the error satisfies each prong of the plain error test", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "996 F.2d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir.1993). In Castaldo v. Denver Public Schools, 276 Fed.Appx. 839 (10th Cir.2008), the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it chose not to apply equitable tolling to the plaintiffs EEOC charge when the plaintiff alleged: (i) that his employer did not post notices regarding the filing of EEOC charges; (ii) that he was too incapacitated by his shoulder injuries to file an EEOC charge; and (iii) that he was proceeding pro se. See 276 FedAppx. at 841. The Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court\u2019s conclusion that the failure to post EEOC notices was not a sufficient justification for equitable tolling. See 276 Fed.Appx. at 841. See also Wilkerson v. Siegfried Ins. Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir.1982)(<HOLDING>). The district court noted that the plaintiff Holdings: 0: holding that a person must file a claim under the civil rights act within three years of the date his or her cause of action accrues 1: holding that if good cause does not exist the court has the discretion to either dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time 2: holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver 3: holding that the simple failure to post  notices without intent to actively mislead the plaintiff respecting the cause of action does not extend the time within which a claimant must file his or her discrimination charge 4: recognizing the cause of action", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appellant testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone and that he brought the gun with him in the hope that he could scare the group surrounding the car and get them away from Gonzalez. He also testified that he brought the gun with him to confront the group because he \u201cthought it was the only way [he] could get [the group] away from Ryan.\u201d He stated that when he brought the gun, he hoped to \u201c[s]care [the group] to leave.... \u201d We conclude that the record contains some evidence that appellant\u2019s purpose in threatening to use deadly force was \u201climited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary.\u201d See id. Thus, because some evidence supports this defensive issue, we hold that appellant was entitled to a section 9.04 instruction. See Brown, 955 S.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>); see also Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 658 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 1: holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence 2: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source 3: holding that it is a partys duty to request a jury instruction submitting its defensive theory to the jury 4: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with the choice of relying on consent by a third party or securing a warrant, should secure a warrant and must therefore accept the risk of error should they instead choose to rely on consent. II Our prior cases discussing searches based on third-party consent have never suggested that such searches are \u201creasonable.\u201d In United States v. Matlock, this Court upheld a warrantless search conducted pursuant to the consent of a third party who was living with the defendant. The Court rejected the defendant\u2019s challenge to the search, stating that a person who permits others to have \u201cjoint access or control for most purposes . . . assume[s] the risk that [such persons] might permit the common area to be searched.\u201d 415 U. S., at 171, n. 7; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 740 (1969) (<HOLDING>). As the Court\u2019s assumption-of-risk analysis Holdings: 0: holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone 1: holding that defendant who left a duffel bag at anothers house and allowed joint use of the bag assumed the risk that the person would allow someone else to look inside 2: holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole 3: holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents 4: holding that where a defendant left his duffel bag at his cousins house and authorized the cousin to use the bag the cousin clearly had authority to consent to its search", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 (\u201cBIA\u201d) order summarily affirming an immigration judge\u2019s (\u201cIJ\u201d) order denying his motion to reopen proceedings in which he was removed in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review for abuse of discretion, Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (2005), and we deny the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part. The IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Lopez\u2019s motion to reopen because the record indicates that Lopez\u2019s hearing notice was mailed to his address of record and he did not provide a sworn affidavit containing information to rebut the presumption of delivery created by regular mail. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229(a)(1); Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Lopez\u2019s contention that the BIA erred by Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption of effective service by regular mail 1: holding that the bia had imposed a new standardof proof by requiring the alien to provide substantial evidence to overcome a presumption of effective mail delivery 2: holding that notice to an alien at the most recent address provided by the alien is legally sufficient 3: holding that a sworn affidavit that neither the alien nor another responsible party residing at his address received the notice will generally rebut the presumption of delivery created by regular mail 4: holding that the admission in evidence of a certifying document from the secretary of state that its history records indicated that notice of suspension was sent by regular mail to the defendant did not violate the confrontation clause", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the influence of alcohol. Alternatively, if chemical testing was performed in accordance with the statute, the crime may be proved by forensic evidence that the defendant\u2019s alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory percentage. Idaho v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 800 P.2d 107, 109 (1990). Here, neither Loader nor Ojeda were subjected to any chemical testing to determine their blood alcohol content at the time of the accident. As a result, Wood must prove Loader was intoxicated for purposes of the Idaho statute by \u201cevidence showing consumption of alcohol and some discernible impairment related to the motorist\u2019s ability to drive.\u201d State v. Bronnenberg, 124 Idaho 67, 856 P.2d 104, 107 (Idaho App.1993); Andrus, 800 P.2d at 110-11 (<HOLDING>). Only Loader and Browning testified in person Holdings: 0: holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary 1: holding that reliance must be proven by some evidence 2: holding that uncharged conduct may be considered at sentencing when that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that impairment must be noticeable or perceptible proven by observations of some type of ascertainable conduct or effect and relate to the ability to drive 4: holding all exceptions to discharge under  523a must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "McDonough has failed to produce evidence to show that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Walking is considered a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1630.2(i) (2011). However, it is undisputed that McDonough could walk continuously for one hour a day and intermittently for four hours a day. Moreover, McDonough spent two hours a day delivering mail, walking fifteen to twenty minutes non-stop. She also walked up and down the stairs in her home. For exercise, she would walk to a nearby lake and she even went to the gym a couple of times each week to take part in a water walking therapy class. As a matter of law, this evidence does not support McDonough\u2019s disability claim. See, e.g., Neal v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 379 Fed.Appx. 632, 634 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed 1: holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours 2: holding that evidence that plaintiff could walk only four hours a day was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled 3: holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled 4: holding that notice provided by plaintiff that alleged she  was injured  as result of fall was insufficient as matter of law and precluded invocation of savings clause", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "modification to the statute in the thirty years since funeral expenses were made available. C As a rule, a claim for punitive damages may lie only where there is a valid underlying cause of action. Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 45, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984). In a negligence action, the maintenance of a valid claim requires the plaintiff to show a breach of duty and resulting damage. Ibid, (citing Stanley Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 16 N.J. 295, 315, 108 A.2d 616 (1954) (other citations omitted)). In this case, Coastal stipulated negligence and causation, leaving only the issue of damages for the jury\u2019s determination. Coastal argues that because pain and suffering comprise the sole compensable inju Starkenburg v. Montana, 282 Mont. 1, 934 P.2d 1018, 1031 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Tirrell v. Navistar Int\u2019l, Inc., 248 Holdings: 0: holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law 1: recognizing cause of action 2: recognizing that substantive issue of liability may be litigated in the same action for wrongful death and survival actions 3: holding the plaintiffs action was one for wrongful death and not survival where damages listed in complaint were identical to damages listed in the wrongful death act 4: holding that plaintiff in survival action bears burden of proving that death was not instantaneous although a few seconds survival constitutes sufficient amount of time to vest accrual of cause of action", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and the cases that court relied on. Chenoweth offered a string cite of cases it relied on in supporting its proposition that the judgment was void or irregular. Further into the opinion, the court states in obvious reference to its string cite that \u201cthe final judgment rendered against the garnishee was void or irregular (depending upon which opinion is followed) _\u201d Chenoweth, 342 S.W.2d at 502. Upon reviewing these cases and subsequent ones, we find that Missouri courts have become accustomed to using the terms \u201cvoid\u201d and \u201cirregular\u201d seemingly interchangeably (Shanks and Butler), or at the very least have failed to draw a meaningful distinction between the two terms in situations similar to the facts of the present case. See, e.g., Roberts v. Meek, 45 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Mo.App.1931) (<HOLDING>); Gilbert v. Malan, 231 Mo.App. 469, 100 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular 1: holding void judgment must be vacated 2: holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment 3: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 4: holding that a premature notice of appeal from an interlocutory summary judgment was deemed effective when the trial court granted a severance and rendered the summary judgment final", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "full hearing as to the underlying felony conviction itself). Because the prior conviction was established in a proceeding cloaked with due process, the rights to adequate notice and a fair adjudication have already been satisfied. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 453-54, 120 S. Ct. at 2362; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 329-30, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (1999). Moreover, where the previous conviction is acknowledged, it represents an objective fact that is not subject to dispute, and concerns about the need for additional due process protections in a subsequent proceeding are mitigated. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 453-54, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-62; People v. Watson, 322 Ill. App. 3d 164, 167-68, 749 N.E.2d 1078 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, the triggering Holdings: 0: holding that undisputed matters of public record are proper subjects for judicial notice 1: holding that courts may take judicial notice of sec filings that are matters of public record 2: recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice 3: recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record 4: holding that the existence of prior convictions are typically matters of public record of which the trial court can take judicial notice without violating the defendants right to due process", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that increase in prejudice to the defendant as they diminish in v biting all expert testimony \u2014 including all \"consistent with\u201d testimony \u2014 except for purposes of rehabilitation on rebuttal by requiring the testimony to be narrowly tailored to an identifiable symptom from which the complainant suffers. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 444 (1990) (\"At this time, we choose to limit the admissibility of such testimony to rebuttal after the victim\u2019s credibility has first been attacked.\u201d); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891 (1988) (requiring that the testimony is \u201ctargeted to a specific \u2018myth\u2019 or 'misconception' suggested by the evidence\u201d); People v. Beckley, 434 Mich. 691, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (1990) (<HOLDING>). CADY, Chief Justice (dissenting). I Holdings: 0: holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim 1: holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim 2: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 3: holding that proper foundation existed for qualified experts testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome where expert had extensive training and experience with sexually abused children expert testified regarding the characteristics of the syndrome and its recognition by specific agencies and defense counsel rigorously crossexamined witness concerning the basis of her knowledge of the victims conduct 4: holding that only those aspects of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome which specifically relate to the particular behaviors which become an issue in the case are admissible", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "millions of dollars in revenue each year. Throughout its arguments on nonobviousness, Western Union places significant emphasis on the fact that both parties evaluated the Orlandi Valuta system that existed at the time of the invention and decided to develop their own new and improved systems. We agree with MoneyGram that the district court erred in its analysis of secondary considerations of obviousness and in its heavy reliance on them in denying MoneyGram\u2019s JMOL of obviousness. We find the evidence of secondary considerations irrelevant in supporting the jury verdict of nonobviousness. Our case law clearly requires that the patentee must establish a nexus between the evidence of commercial success and the patented invention. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the computer readable code claimed in claim 6 the product claim was a part or component of that invention 1: holding a determination that an invention was onsale within the meaning of the statute requires that a sale be operable the complete invention claimed be embodied in or obvious from the device offered for sale and the sale or offer be primarily for profit rather than for experimental purposes 2: holding that the one challenging the patent must in part show that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered it obvious by its addition to the prior art 3: holding that the proponent must offer proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention  4: recognizing that courts must be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references to reach the claimed invention without any explanation as to how or why the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "violations of the FDCPA. D. Attorneys\u2019Fees and Costs Since Plaintiff successfully demonstrated that Absolute violated the FDCPA, she is entitled to \u201ccosts of the action, together with a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1692k(a)(3). As a result, the undersigned turns to Plaintiffs request for attorney\u2019s fees and costs. 1. Attorneys\u2019 Fees \u201cThe starting point in fashioning an award of attorney\u2019s fees is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.\u201d Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994); Hepsen v. J.C. Christensen and Assocs., Inc., No. 10-12231, 2010 WL 3329836 (11th Cir. Aug.25, 2010) (calculating attorneys\u2019 fees under FDCPA using lodestar); Moton v. Nathan & Nathan, P. C., 297 Fed.Appx. 930, 931-32 (11th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The product of the reasonable hourly rate and Holdings: 0: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 1: recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea 2: holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa 3: holding that lodestar analysis must be used to calculate attorneys fees under the fdcpa 4: holding that unsegregated attorneys fees must be remanded", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(further quotation omitted). Mr. Camp argues that the ALJ improperly determined that his mental impairments were not severe, despite evidence to the contrary. Our review of the administrative record raised one concern: Mr. Camp\u2019s Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 50. A GAF score of 41-50 indicates \u201c[sjerious symptoms ... OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning.\u201d American Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed.2000). But the mental health evaluator did not indicate that Mr. Camp\u2019s GAF score impaired his ability to work. The score, without evidence that it impaired Mr. Camp\u2019s ability to work, does not establish an impairment. Cf Howard v. Comm\u2019r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Camp also asserts that the ALJ Holdings: 0: holding that this court could not affirm the aljs finding of gross misconduct because the alj failed to make findings on every material contested issue of fact 1: holding that perjured testimony standing alone does not constitute fraud upon the court 2: holding that a complaints reference to a guilty plea does not make the transcript of the plea proffer integral to the complaint 3: holding aljs failure to reference the gaf score in the rfc standing alone does not make the rfc inaccurate 4: holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Conversely, if the lender increases the interest rate in a manner not previously disclosed, the rate increase would constitute a new transaction subjecting it to new disclosure requirements. In Key Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Dean, 695 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), we held that \u201cincreases in interest rates are not considered \u2018new transactions\u2019 when a creditor gives prior disclosure that rates are subject to change, the conditions of the changes, and the limits of any possible change.\u201d We further stated that \u201cIf [the lender] properly disclosed the variable-rate information, then each rate change would be just a subsequent occurrence.\u201d Id. at 810; accord Hubbard v. Fidelity Federal Bank, 824 F.Supp. 909, 918 (C.D.Cal.1993), ajfd in part and rev\u2019d in part, 91 F.3d 75 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). It is not merely the initial \u201cmis-disclosure\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate 1: holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine 2: holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate 3: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract 4: holding under 12 cfr part 226 supp i  20a1984  a lender is obligated to provide new disclosures if the variable rate feature was not properly disclosed in accordance with regulation z and the lender 1 increases the rate based on a variable rate feature that was not previously disclosed or 2 adds a variablerate feature to the obligationemphasis added", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "blood alcohol content); Toler v. State, 623 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (refusing to instruct on intoxication even though the defendant had \u201cway too much to drink\u201d and \u201ccould not remember some things that occurred\u201d). Petitioner was indeed drunk on the night the crimes were committed, but \u201c[generally, voluntary drunkenness is no defense to a criminal charge.... [T]he degree of intoxication which must be demonstrated to exonerate a defendant is great.\u201d State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606-07, 298 A.2d 378, 381 (1973). Petitioner simply cannot point to evidence sufficient to satisfy that standard, leaving us with no basis to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the instruction. See Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 199, 203-04, 946 A.2d 444, 451, 454 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 242, 686 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a trial judge is obliged to give a correct jury instruction notwithstanding that request for instruction was technically erroneous if the evidence generates the subject matter of the jury instruction 1: holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it 2: holding that the requested instruction did not state the applicable law and the trial court was not required to grant it citing rule 4  325c 3: holding that issue of inadequate jury instruction was waived because the instruction given was the one expressly requested by defense counsel 4: holding that the requested instruction was not required under rule 4325c because even assuming that the requested instruction was a correct statement of law the trial judge exercised his discretion properly", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to continue a defendant\u2019s supervised release after a violation rather than revoke the release term). It immediately invited defense counsel to speak about whether there should be a revocation, and there is no error in the court deciding that LeBoeuf s violations and conduct as testified by Hernandez warranted revocation and imprisonment as opposed to a continuance on release. Furthermore, the district court\u2019s other remarks during the hearing show that its various references to \u201cpunishment\u201d did not invoke \u00a7 3553(a)(2)(A). The court explained that the 24-month sentence it imposed \u201cadequately addresses the factors the Court should consider,\u201d and also that those factors were not reflected in the advisory guideline range. The court\u2019s references to the factors that \u201c 00 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, any error by the district court Holdings: 0: holding that district court may consider  3553a2a and noting circuit split on the issue 1: recognizing split among district courts 2: recognizing circuit split 3: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 4: recognizing split", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "non-diverse agents, holding that where \u201c[the principal\u2019s] liability, like that of the two employees, was, in effect, predicated upon the alleged [misconduct] of the latter, the showing manifestly went to the merits of the action as an entirety, and not to the joinder.\u201d 232 U.S. at 153, 34 S.Ct. 278. Likewise, in Hauck this Court refused to find fraudulent joinder on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of a diverse principal and its non-diverse agent, given that \u201cany resolution of [the agent\u2019s] liability necessarily operates to discharge the liability of [the principal] as well because ... the liability of [the principal] in this case is, at least in part, derivative of that of its agent.\u201d 2006 WL 1 . 4:03CV0034-P-B, 2004 WL 555250, at *2 (N.D.Miss. Mar.15, 2004) (<HOLDING>); Polk v. Lifescan, Inc., No. Civ A. Holdings: 0: holding that the liability of a principal or master to a third person based upon respondeat superior is purely derivative and thus a judgment on the merits for or against the agent or servant is res judicata visavis the principal or master though he was not a party to the action 1: holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted 2: holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal 3: holding that the common claims or defenses test applies to a claim of fraudulent joinder asserted by a diverse principal as to a nondiverse agent because a finding of fraudulent joinder as to the agent necessarily involves a decision on the merits as to the principal given the doctrine of respondeat superior 4: holding that an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "amphetamine, the government had to show that Mendoza distributed amphetamine to a third party, that he did so knowingly and intentionally, and that he knew he was distributing a controlled substance.\u201d); United States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 779 (7th Cir.2004) (noting that the Government had to prove that the defen dant distributed methamphetamine knowingly or intentionally, knowing that substance was a controlled substance). 2 . See United States v. Mallett, 496 F.3d 798, 801-02 (7th Cir.2007) (concluding that evidence of a drug sale eight months before the charged conduct was properly admitted to show intent and knowledge in a prosecution for maintaining a crack distribution place and for possession with intent to distribute); United States v. Hurn, 496 F.3d 784, 787-88 (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Blount, 502 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute 1: holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute 2: holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609 3: holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine 4: holding that evidence that defendants had participated in several prior drug transactions was properly admitted to establish defendants intent to distribute narcotics", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "does impose various duties upon those operating motor vehicles in this state, not every violation of article 6701d constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Caughman v. Glaze, 412 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Tex.Civ.App. \u2014 San Antonio 1967, writ refd n.r.e.). On a number of occasions, Texas courts have held that violations of particular sections found in article 6701d did not constitute negligence per se. These courts have held that, because a breach of these particular sections was conditioned upon proof that the defendant failed to act \u201csafely,\u201d \u201cwith safety,\u201d or \u201cprudently,\u201d these sections imposed upon the complainant the burden of proving that his opponent acted reasonably. See Cudworth v. South Texas Paisano Constr. Co., 705 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex.App. \u2014 San Antonio 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); Renfroe v. Ramsey, 477 S.W.2d 648, 650 Holdings: 0: holding that the issue is not whether officer subjectively feared suspect but whether a reasonably prudent person would justifiably believe that his safety or that of others was in danger 1: holding that whether a driver operated his vehicle on an improved shoulder in safety as per section 54a depends upon whether he acted reasonably under the common law 2: holding that the inquiry into whether an employee was acting within the scope of his employment depends on the respondeat superior law of the state in which the tort occurred 3: holding that whether a driver safely entered an intersection as per section 71c depends upon whether he acted prudently 4: holding that whether a driver yielded the right of way as per section 74 depends upon whether he acted negligently or unreasonably", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Appeals held, \"Viewing the evidence'-in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that L_M_was compelled to participate in incestuous intercourse with appellant through the use of force, threats and undue influence. Thus, L_M_is -not an accomplice Id. Under previous cases interpreting the standard adopted in Mercer and followed in Botin, it is doubtful that evidence of threats alone would have been sufficient to overcome the Bolin presumption that the victim, in Brown was an accomplice. See Trejo v. State, 135 Tex.Crim. 39, 117 S.W.2d 115, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938]) (Court of Criminal Appeals held \"[w]e are unable to reach the conclusion that the witness was not an accomplice\u201d despite testimony by complaining witness that her father \u201chad sexual int 2d 1038, 1039 (1934) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, by ruling that the defendant's Holdings: 0: holding that indirect use of force constituted robbery when defendant tried to push a jewelry case lid open while the victim tried to hold it shut 1: holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given 2: holding that complaining witness was an accomplice as a matter of law despite her testimony that i didnt consent to it  when i had intercourse with my father i tried to get away but i couldnt do it i tried to get loose from him  i tried to get up and hit him but that didnt do no good he was so much stouter than i was was insufficient to establish that she was not an accomplice 3: holding that complaining witnesss passive submission to her fathers act of carnal intercourse with her without her consent and that she failed to outcry or resist because she was frightened were insufficient to show she was not an accomplice 4: holding evidence insufficient when record contained expert testimony but no real evidence that proposed patient ever tried to hurt herself or others or that her condition was deteriorating to point where she might do so", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.\u201d) (internal quotation marks and cithtions omitted)/ The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to avoid our court\u2019s premature interference with' the agency\u2019s processes. See Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1995). We have made an exception to the exhaustion requirement for constitutional challenges,to statutes and to the administrative rules of procedure. See Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that because the BIA has no jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues, the general rule requiring exhaustion does not preclude petitioners from raising constitutional challenges to the Immigration and Naturalization Act or to the INS\u2019s procedures); see also Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, Holdings: 0: holding that pro se petitioners need not raise issues in ins terms but may raise them as they may have understood them 1: holding that once the court of appeals recognized that the claims of the absent parties were not frivolous as part of the rule 19b inquiry it was error for the court of appeals to address them on their merits when the required entities had been granted sovereign immunity and explaining that the courts consideration of the merits was itself an infringement on foreign sovereign immunity 2: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 3: holding that where petitioners did not simply challenge the validity of their orders of removal but had questioned whether the statute grants the ins authority to remove them to a country that cannot accept them the court of appeals retains jurisdiction 4: recognizing that jurors have the right to reject that part of the evidence believed by them to be untrue and to accept that found by them to be true", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by ERISA (MTD at 24-25); again, for the reasons given in the preceding section, the Court rejects that contention. The elements of a DTPA claim are (1) the plaintiff is a consumer; (2) the defendant committed a false, misleading, or deceptive act; and (3) the act caused the consumer\u2019s damages. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 17.45(4), 17.50(a); see also Brown & Brown of Tex., Inc. v. Omni Metals, Inc., 317 S.W.3d 361, 387 (Tex.App.2010) (\u201cUnder the DTPA, a consumer may bring an action when he has relied to his detriment on a false or misleading representation, and the reliance is a producing cause of damages.\u201d). The question of consumer status under the DTPA is question of law for the court to decide. Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven Pools, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 394, 40 , (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Because Plaintiff was an intended third-party Holdings: 0: holding where condemnation of a temporary easement in an airport parking garage was primarily designed for economic benefit to gain control of the garage at a discounted price the taking was not for public use and therefore was an unconstitutional taking 1: holding that defendants adult son who was living on defendants property had equal control over use of premises and had authority to consent to a search 2: holding that son of woman who bought garage door opener was a consumer because primary purpose of the purchase and installation into home was to benefit son 3: holding that an attached garage is part of the home for payton purposes even when the garage door is open 4: holding that son had no homestead interest in property even though he resided upon it with his fathers consent because son had neither title nor a present right to possess land nor right to demand partition from father who was his cotenant", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "see also Note, 58 BayloR L.Rev. at 259. That is, the existence of the basic fact of a contractual jury trial waiver gives rise to a presumed fact that the waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made until the presumed fact is rebutted. Accord Hunter, 988 S.W.2d at 473. Because we begin with this presumption, the burden is on the party seeking to enforce the prelitigation contractual jury waiver to rebut this presumption with evidence that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made with full awareness of the legal consequences. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132-33 (enforcing contractual jury waiver when \u201cundisputed\u201d facts established waiver was knowing and voluntary as a matter of law); accord In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding) (<HOLDING>). But see L & R Realty, 715 A.2d at 754-55 Holdings: 0: recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary 1: recognizing that contractual jury waiver provision that was conspicuous  because it was in bolded font and in all capital letters  met burden of party seeking to enforce provision to make prima facie showing that waiver was knowing and voluntary 2: recognizing initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made is on party seeking to enforce provision 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver 4: holding contractual jury waiver provision that was in all capital letters and was bolded was conspicuous", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for which evidence has been presented that satisfies this key element of a Title VII case. Plaintiff provides the Court with the agency\u2019s response to his appeal of the reduction in force before the District of Columbia Office of Employee Appeals. Moreover, the portions of plaintiffs deposition that defendant submits contain plaintiffs testimony about the termination of his employment. Ex. 1 to Def.\u2019s Mot. at 192, 194-96. Termination of employment clearly constitutes a materially adverse action. See Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2003). 7. After receiving notice of the RIF and before his employment was terminated, plaintiff was escorted from his place of employment and put on administrative leave. PL\u2019s Opp. at 26-27. Once again, plaintiff does not supply suffici D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Boykin v. England, No. 02-950, 2003 Holdings: 0: holding sevenday suspension was not materially adverse because although it was disciplinary in nature plaintiff was able to remain on the job and in pay status 1: recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority 2: holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void 3: holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination 4: holding that the ada plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of job when the plaintiffs psychotherapist had told the employer that the plaintiff was unable to work in any position when the plaintiff did not disagree with that point and when the plaintiff in response to a request for admission conceded that she was no longer able to work", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "requesting only reconsideration of an order awarding attorney fees tolls the effectiveness of a notice of appeal because the Millers\u2019 Rule 60(b) motions not only challenged the attorney fee award but also sought to vacate the district court's announced judgment of dismissal. See Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 223 F.3d 130, 137-138 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that a Rule 60(b) motion seeking attorney fees is covered by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) when the motion also addresses the merits of the judgment). 3 . Vacating the district court\u2019s order does not inappropriately reverse this Court\u2019s prior motion panel decision to dismiss, based on lack of jurisdiction, the Millers' appeal of the district court's Rule 60(b) order. See United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Also before the Court are Appellants' Holdings: 0: holding that under the law of the case doctrine an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not be reexamined by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal 1: recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling 3: holding that the law of the case doctrine does not bar a panel reviewing the merits of an appeal from reconsidering a motions panels jurisdictional ruling 4: holding that an unappealed ruling is the law of the case", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "benefits calculated under the Minimum Benefit Formulas, the amendment actually decreases the dollar amount of the participant\u2019s net annuity- 16 . Plaintiffs have brought their \u00a7 1024(b)(4) claim pursuant to both 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1132(a)(3) (which provides for injunctive relief) and 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1132(c) (which gives the court discretion to impose civil penalties on a plan administrator in certain circumstances). In their Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that the court may not as a matter of law impose civil penalties under 29 U.S.C. 1132(c) on the plan administrator for a \u00a7 1024(b)(4) violation. Plaintiffs have not had a chance to respond to this argument, and the Court will not consider it at this time. See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 17 . Unlike prior SPDs, the 2000 Honeywell Holdings: 0: holding that issues which are not specifically and distinctly argued and raised a partys opening brief are waived 1: holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived 2: holding that a court need not review arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in a partys opening brief 3: holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: holding that issues not specifically raised and argued in a partys opening brief are waived", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "actions do not fall under section 5-60-101\u2019s lawful exceptions, which include autopsies, embalming, or us ing the body for medical and scientific purposes. Therefore, in viewing the light most favorable to the State, we should give deference to this jury verdict and hold that substantial evidence supported Ham-monds\u2019s conviction of abuse of a corpse. C. Jury instruction I would affirm the circuit court\u2019s refusal to give Hammonds\u2019s proffered jury instruction. Nonmodel jury instructions are to be given only when the trial court finds that the model instructions do not accurately state the law or do not contain the necessary instruction on the subject at hand. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004); see also Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Any party that | ^wishes to challenge the Holdings: 0: holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law 1: holding that the requested instruction was not required under rule 4325c because even assuming that the requested instruction was a correct statement of law the trial judge exercised his discretion properly 2: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 3: holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence 4: holding that even though the reasonable doubt instruction given in the case was not the preferred instruction it was not a misstatement of the law and therefore was legally appropriate", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Karras argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hoy\u2019s motion to determine his attorney\u2019s lien. Karras contends that Hoy could only recover fees due through a separate action in quantum meruit. We disagree. First, quantum meruit is not the only remedy available to Hoy. Quantum meruit is \u201can equitable doctrine, based on the concept that no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should be unjustly enriched thereby; under those circumstances, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable amount for the labor and materials furnished, even absent a specific contract therefor.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1243 (6th ed.1990). However, South Dakota law explicitly allows an attorney to recover fees by operation of an attorney\u2019s lien , 619 P.2d 620, 623 (Okla.1980) (<HOLDING>). We specifically adopt the reasoning of the Holdings: 0: holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 1: holding that a lawyers claim for impression of his statutory charging lien upon the recovery secured in an action may be prosecuted as an ancillary proceeding to the main litigation 2: holding that the attorneys charging lien may be asserted and enforced in the civil action which gave rise to the lien claim or in an independent action 3: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond 4: holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are proper....\u201d Pope, 94 So. at 869; see also Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1959). A trial court\u2019s limitation on voir dire is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Pope, 94 So. at 865. Defense counsel attempted to question potential jurors as to whether \u201ca girl could come to court and lie?\u201d and whether \u201ca girl can come to court and lie about being raped?\u201d and about a \u201crape charge.\u201d The court prohibited references to \u201ca girl\u201d and \u201crape charge\u201d because they seem to refer to the facts of the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing these reasonable limitations on voir dire. Counsel\u2019s ability to determine the fairness of jurors was not restricted by this limitation. Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Blevins v. State, 766 So.2d 401 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Holdings: 0: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 1: holding that reversal for a new trial was required where jury instruction relating to fraud was incorrect 2: holding that the trial courts actions in sustaining the defendants objections were sufficient to remedy any possible harm resulting from the mere asking of the three questions by the prosecutor 3: holding that once counsel was appointed defendant spoke to the court through counsel and thus the court was not required to respond to defendants request for a speedy trial 4: holding that reversal was not required where the trial court prevented defense counsel from asking hypothetical questions to illustrate the difficulty of proving a defendants innocence", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "J. Jacqueline Moore appeals the summary denial of her motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which raised eleven claims. Because the rationale for denial, along with record attachments, supports the trial court\u2019s ruling with respect to ten of the claims, we affirm as to those issues without further discussion. However, we reverse the summary denial of Moore\u2019s first claim, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on that claim only. Moore was convicted of attempted first degree murder with a firearm following a jury trial on that charge. Her conviction was affirmed on appeal. Moore v. State, 942 So.2d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 20 ) (<HOLDING>); Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA Holdings: 0: holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the gun where although defendant denied ownership of the gun it was found near a knife of which defendant claimed ownership and where defendant was aware of the presence of the gun 1: holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept 2: holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with 3: holding that it was error to admit into evidence a gun purchased by the defendant which was not connected with the charged crimes 4: holding that it was error to admit into evidence 880 cartridges found in defendants car where there was no link established between the cartridges and the crime charged", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court to certify. This presents serious questions on.two separate fronts: our jurisdiction over this appeal under section 1292(b), and our general policy of declining to.consider arguments not made to the district court in the motion leading to the order.under appeal. Unlike the court, I cannot brush these concerns aside. Regarding our jurisdiction under section 1292(b), the Supreme Court has made clear that an appellate court can review \u201cany issue fairly included within the certified order\u201d because \u201c[a]s the text of \u00a7 1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.\u201d Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (<HOLDING>). But the \u201ccourt of appeals may not reach Holdings: 0: holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction 1: holding that where the district court decided two issues in the certified order but identified only the damages issue as the controlling question of law the court of appeals could nonetheless address the other issue 2: holding that where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendants first appeal the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand 3: holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court 4: holding that law of the case acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually considered and decided by the first court", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "figure and it is not relevant to this appeal. 2 . Downey also brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 et seq and Lo 2:04CV75-P-A, 2005 WL 1229695, at *5 (N.D.Miss. May 24, 2005) (concluding, in a case where the plaintiff \"received every benefit to which she was entitled under the FMLA,\u201d that Ragsdale implicitly invalidated 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 825.208(a)); Farina v. Compu-ware Corp., 256 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1056-57 (D.Ariz.2003) (noting that under Ragsdale, a plaintiff \"must show that she detrimentally relied on and was prejudiced by Defendant's improper notice\u201d and that \"[pllaintiff provides no evidence that she was prejudiced\u201d); Felder v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-1438, 2003 WL 22966364, at *5 (E.D.La. Dec. 16, 2003) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Blue Dot Servs. Co., 283 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act 1: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 2: holding in a case where it was not clear whether the plaintiff suffered prejudice from the lack of notice that a plaintiff could not obtain reinstatement based on lack of notice 3: holding that the case must be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction where notice of appeal was untimely 4: holding that lack of notice regarding the classification of the disability did not prejudice the respondent", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Watson testified that he arrested Wall because Wall stopped walking towards his car. Wall testified that he never stopped. He was walking away as directed and merely asked Watson to investigate a possible assault. Moreover, Wall never intimidated or obstructed employees or customers in Watson\u2019s presence. California law prohibits a peace officer from arresting someone suspected of committing a misdemeanor unless the officer \u201chas probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense in the officer\u2019s presence.\u201d Cal.Penal Code \u00a7 836(a)(1). Additionally, the arrest was accomplished by violence, again in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (<HOLDING>). If Wall\u2019s account is true, the balance of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest 1: holding that the severity of the plaintiff s injuries for which he sought medical attention and received treatment supports the reasonable inference that the amount of force used by the defendant was excessive 2: recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat 3: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 4: holding that a fourth amendment excessive force analysis requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case including the severity of the crime at issue whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the district court, holding that a competitive injury must be shown in order to state a claim under \u00a7 192(a) and (b). Because I believe that no such showing is required, I dissent. II Proper statutory analysis begins with the plain text of the statute. See Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 127 S.Ct. 2352, 2356, 168 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007) (\u201cWe begin, as always, with the text of the statute.\u201d) (citation omitted); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981) (\u201cThe starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.\u201d) (quotation omitted); see also In re Rogers, 513 F.3d 212, 225 (5th Cir.2008). \u201cIt is well established that when a statut 9, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The remaining parts of \u00a7 192 further support Holdings: 0: recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning 1: holding that ordinarily courts are not obligated to review evidence presented for the first time on appeal 2: holding that ordinarily a statute must be construed in a manner which protects its constitutionality 3: holding that courts ordinarily should resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face 4: holding that courts must avoid adding conditions to the applicability of a statute that do not appear in the provisions text", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "vacate the TTD award. Employer argues that because \u201cClaimant opted not to continue employment with the City, Claimant is not entitled to [TTD] benefits from the City and the City was under no obligation to offer light duty work to Claimant.\u201d We are not persuaded by Employer\u2019s argument. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding, affirmed by the panel, that Claimant\u2019s termination from employment was not voluntary. Employer\u2019s characterization of the events following Claimant\u2019s receipt of the \u201cFinal Lay-off Notice\u201d as a voluntary resignation lacks record support. \u00b6 14 First, we note that \u201ccontinued employment is not a statutory requirement for eligibility for workers\u2019 compensation benefits.\u201d Patterson v. Sue Estell Trucking Co. Inc., 2004 OK 66, 8, 95 P.3d 1087 (<HOLDING>). An employer is not relieved from its Holdings: 0: holding that an injured dump truck driver who was at fault in a workrelated automobile accident and cited for driving with a suspended license could not be denied ttd benefits even though employer fired him after his injury 1: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law 2: holding motorist entitled to hearing before taking his license under statute that required loss of license if uninsured driver involved in an accident 3: holding that an evidentiary basis for the search was  lacking  because gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of his car 4: holding that a truck driver who was on call was not compensated for an injury in a motel room provided by his employer", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the prosecutor explained in closing arguments, Farris testified that she saw the money just after 5:18 p.m., which means he had not yet purchased any drugs. Instead, as the prosecutor asserted, the more likely scenario is that Gipson called Harper at 5:15 p.m. to tell Harper that Ricks would making the delivery. 11 . In his appeal brief Gipson relies on the Ohio Court of Appeals decision in Ricks\u2019s trial, which found that Ricks arrived between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., see State v. Ricks, 196 Ohio App.3d 798, 965 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (2011), rev\u2019d 136 Ohio St.3d 356, 995 N.E.2d 1181 (2013). But this evidence was not before the Ohio Court of Appeals in this case, and therefore may not be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of its decision. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 180-82, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (<HOLDING>). 12 . This further included several meetings Holdings: 0: holding that aedpa only applies where the state court adjudicated the constitutional issue on the merits 1: holding that aedpa limits a federal habeas court to the record before the state court where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by the state court 2: holding that review under  2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing 3: holding that a state courts rejection of petitioners habeas claim was unreasonable under  2254d2 where the court made credibility determinations on the basis of a paper record without an evidentiary hearing 4: holding that the federal habeas corpus court could reach the merits of a due process claim even though there was no contemporaneous objection in state court trial where the state habeas corpus court reached the merits rather than rely on the procedural default defense", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "his performance evaluation in September 2010, and by subjecting him to unwarranted disciplinary action. The October 2009 denial of promotion occurred more than six months after Nicholson engaged in protected activity, and the changes to Nicholson\u2019s performance evaluation in September 2010 occurred 18 months after the protected activity. A time period greater than six months, without more, is not a sufficiently short period of time to satisfy the causal connection element of a retaliation claim. See Cooper, 795 F.2d at 1272; see also Clay v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 718 (6th Cir.2007) (finding no causal connection where gap between protected activity and adverse employment action was six months); Cecil v. Louisville Water Co., 301 Fed.Appx. 490, 502 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). The approximately two-month gap between Holdings: 0: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than three months after protected activity 1: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than three months after the protected activity 2: holding that adverse employment activity that occurred 10 months and 17 months after protected activity was insufficient on its own to create a reasonable inference of causation 3: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than two months after protected activity 4: holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "medical reporting. 13 See NRS 616B.324 (explaining that a self-insured employer\u2019s administrator is the employer\u2019s agent). 14 See Schmidt v. Beeson Plumbing and Heating, 869 P.2d 1170, 1175, 1175 n.7 (Alaska 1994); Barrington v. Employment Sec. Com\u2019n, 286 S.E.2d 576, 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (\u201cIt is well established that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied in workers\u2019 compensation cases.\u201d); Appleby v. Workers\u2019 Safety & Comp. Div., 47 P.3d 613, 619 (Wyo. 2002) (explaining that substantive legal issues like equitable estoppel may be determined by an administrative agency as part of a contested workers\u2019 compensation case and has been applied to prevent strict application of statutory limitations periods); see generally Lentz v. McMahon, 777 P.2d 83, 88-91 (Cal. 1989) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Harrison Living Trust, 121 Nev. Holdings: 0: recognizing that administrative agencies routinely apply equitable estoppel in administrative hearings and that permitting them to do so is consistent with administrative remedy exhaustion requirements and separation of powers 1: recognizing that administrative agencies lack to power to consider or determine constitutional issues 2: holding that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate where doing so can protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial efficiency 3: recognizing the transition of the administrative hearing process from the division of motor vehicles to the office of administrative hearings 4: recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in Trombetta and Youngblood is not relevant to the instant appeal. B. The law recognizes three general circumstances that give rise to a claim that the State violated a criminal defendant\u2019s right to due process by failing to \u201cprovide evidence to the defense which is within, or potentially within, [the State\u2019s] purview.\u201d State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 612 (N.D.1993). The first circumstance arises when the State violates the defendant\u2019s due process rights by collecting and preserving evidence from the crime scene only to withhold the evidence \u201cwhen the defendant requests it, or when it otherwise becomes material to the defense.\u201d Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963 ate v. Wells, 103 Idaho 137, 645 P.2d 371, 373 (Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); State v. Stepter, 794 S.W.2d 649, 655 Holdings: 0: holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant 1: recognizing that state agents may suppress evidence by failing to collect and preserve the evidence when performing routine procedures 2: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 3: holding that government did not suppress evidence when defendant knew about the existence of the evidence and could obtain it through the exercise of reasonable diligence 4: holding that similar agreement allowed the defendant to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "other things, that he has a \u201csignificantly protectable\u201d interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the suit. See Wilderness Soc\u2019y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). Klaas daims that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3771, which provides crime victims with certain rights, gives him a \u201csignificantly protectable\u201d interest. We agree with the district court that it does not. Section 3771 gives crime victims rights in certain cases involving individual criminal defendants and prisoners and prescribes certain remedies. This case does not involve an individual defendant or prisoner, and intervention is not among the remedies listed in the statute. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3771(b), (d); cf. Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 136 (4th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Klaas\u2019s claim to an interest in Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to intervene to assert the publics first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is proper 1: holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings 2: holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief 3: holding that a deathsentenced state prisoner has a right to a competency determination in federal habeas proceedings 4: holding that  3771 does not give crime victims the right to intervene in federal habeas proceedings", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "contractors. Such decisions are not, of course, wholly immune from review. The Secretary\u2019s discretion, like that of a prosecutor, remains \u201csubject to constitutional constraints,\u201d including those \u201cimposed by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.\u201d Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480. Moreover, the Commission retains authority to adjudicate \u2014 subject to the appropriate standard of review \u2014 whether safety violations have in fact occurred. See 30 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 815(d), 823(d). In this case, however, Twentymile has stipulated that the conditions cited by the Secretary constitute violations of safety standards. See ALJ Decision, 25 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 353. We therefore grant the Secretary\u2019s petition for review. The decision , 459-60 (D.C.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 216 Holdings: 0: recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct 1: holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable 2: holding icc decision not to investigate nonreviewable 3: holding that the faas decision not to renew an aircraft examiners authority is nonreviewable 4: holding that an agencys decision to reach a settlement is nonreviewable", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at issue, or its specific application, is one with which an average juror might not be sufficiently familiar, or if the trial court determines that the expert testimony would \u201cassist the jury in comprehending the evidence and determining issues of fact.\u201d Odom, supra, 116 N.J. at 70, 560 A.2d 1198. The proposed expert witness must be adequately qualified and possess sufficient knowledge and experience to express an opinion and explain its basis to the jury. Id. at 71, 560 A.2d 1198; Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 208, 478 A.2d 364. Ordinar 7 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990); United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616-18 (2d Cir.) (sustaining admission of expert-witness testimony concerning characteristics of narcotics \u201cstash pad\u201d and providing interpretation of financial records seized a 46-48 (1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569, 353 A.2d 776, Holdings: 0: holding that a prior conviction for using a communications device to facilitate the distribution of cocaine was admissible under rule 404b to prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to distribute cocaine 1: holding that purity of 3644 did not disqualify a drug as crack in light of the chemists testimony that he had previously tested crack of lowerthantypical purity 2: holding admissible police officers expert testimony that seized cocaine of eightythree percent purity would be cut with lactose to achieve lesser purity prior to streetlevel distribution 3: holding future dangerousness expert testimony to be admissible 4: holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "both an expert and fact witness); Cheek, 740 F.3d at 447 (recognizing \u201cinherent dangers\u201d with using one witness as both an expert and lay witness). Although the prosecution was careful to preface every question with \u201cbased upon your training and experience,\u201d it seems that \u201cexperience\u201d sometimes meant experience with this particular ease, not general experience as a task force agent. For example, when asked on cross-examination (during his expert testimony) how he came to the conclusion that \u201cone\u201d meant \u201cone ounce of cocaine,\u201d Clark attributed this interpretation to his experience \u201cfrom what [he] gathered through the investigation\u201d as lead case agent. App. Dkt. 70-3, 127. It was error to allow this transitioning back and forth between expert and fact testimony. See York, 572 F.3d at 426 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Moreland, 70S F.3d 976, 983 Holdings: 0: holding no confrontation right violation where the district court limited crossexamination to basic information about the witnesss convictions and prohibited inter alia descriptions of the witnesss conduct during the incidents leading to his convictions emphasis added 1: holding district court erred in admitting a witnesss responses to the governments questions about six fiftyfive and five dollar where the appeals court could not tell whether the witnesss interpretations were based on his exper tise or a conversation with the informant 2: holding that hospitalization of witnesss wife and his desire to be by her side was not a substantial basis for admitting witnesss testimony from first trial 3: holding that a participant in a conversation may testify as to his understanding of the conversation to satisfy rule 701as requirement that the testimony be rationally based on the witnesss perceptions 4: holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sold, that no one was already buried in the spot, or that no other circumstance would preclude the sale of the spot. 4 . Gaspard died sometime between the moving of Mr. Guerra's coffin and the Guerra\u2019s complaint to the funeral commission. The Guer-ras contend Gaspard's death was a suicide but the record is unclear as to the cause of his death. 5 . Appellants contend, in part, by their third issue that the evidence was insufficient to establish that SCI, the corporate parent of SCI Texas, was liable for the Guerras' injuries. Appellants contend that SCI is a separate legal entity from SCI Texas and that the relationship between the companies does not make SCI automatically liable for the actions of SCI Texas. See generally Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tex.1984) (<HOLDING>). However, the Guerras never alleged that SCI Holdings: 0: holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract 1: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary 2: holding that parent corporation could not be held liable for any acts of whollyowned subsidiary although boards of directors of the two corporations overlapped in all other respects corporation had not disregarded subsidiarys corporate separateness had not involved itself directly in management of subsidiary and had not otherwise dominated or controlled subsidiary 3: holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham 4: holding that a court will generally not disregard the corporate fiction and hold a corporation liable for the obligations of its subsidiary", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in In re Marrama, 430 F.3d 474 (1st Cir.2005), cert. granted \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 126 S.Ct. 2859, 165 L.Ed.2d 894 (June 12, 2006), to decide \u201cwhether the right to convert a chapter 7 bankruptcy case to another chapter can be denied notwithstanding the plain language of the statute and the legislative history.\u201d 2006 WL 295220 (petition for certiorari filed Jan. 30, 2006). The First Circuit in Marrama found that \u201cat any time\u201d meant \u201csimply [] that the debtor may seek to convert at any time during the pendency of the bankruptcy case \u201d and that the statute does not prevent a court from refusing to convert based on the debtor\u2019s own \u201cwillful misconduct, such as an intentional abuse of the bankruptcy process.\u201d 430 F.3d at 479 (emphasis added). See also In re Finney, 992 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, a bankruptcy appellate panel for Holdings: 0: holding in a case considering whether the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing sua sponte that an appellate court may only consider those facts which were before the court when the trial commenced 1: holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith 2: holding that a state appellate courts decision to raise and answer a constitutional question sua sponte permits subsequent federal habeas review 3: holding that bad faith in a  706a conversion permits the court to consider sua sponte whether the petitioner engaged in abuse of process under 11 usc  105a 4: holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "correctly recognizes that sub-ACLs are not a mandatory measure, and that an FMP must simply establish an overall suite of accountability measures sufficient to prevent overfishing. See Pl.\u2019s Mot. Summ. J. 22, ECF No. 36 (citing Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d 95, 117 (D.D.C.2011)). Indeed, the MSA makes no mention of sub-ACLs. Cf. 16 U.S.C. \u00a7 1853(a)(15) (2012) (requiring that the Secretary \u201cestablish a mechanism for specifying [overall] annual catch limits\u201d). The issue is thus whether NMFS, by not implementing Oceana\u2019s sub-ACL proposal, acted arbitrarily and capriciously by ignoring bycatch of target stocks in non-directed fisheries. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass\u2019n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Both the Guidelines and the administrative Holdings: 0: holding allegation that the agency failed to fully evaluate an aspect of petitioners claim to be another way of saying that the agency got the facts wrong 1: holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency 2: holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise 3: holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it reverses its position in the face of a precedent it has not persuasively distinguished 4: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 844, 851 (5th Cir.1991). 134 . Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d at 811, citing Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir.1983). 135 . See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 824-28, 97 S.Ct. at 1496-98; Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 768-69 (5th Cir.1996); Pembroke v. Wood County, Texas, 981 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973, 113 S.Ct. 2965, 125 L.Ed.2d 665 (1993); Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d at 811-12; and Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 772-73 (5th Cir.1986). 136 . See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,-, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). 137 . See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at---, 116 S.Ct. at 2179-82; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1329 (5th Cir.1996); and Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d at 821. 138 . See Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir.1988), (<HOLDING>); and Eisenhardt v. Britton, 478 F.2d 855 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must show an actual injury 1: holding that the total denial of all access to the law library for seven months violated the plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts 2: holding that denial of access to carbon paper and reproduction equipment and denial of facetoface access to other inmates did not deprive an inmate of his right of access to the courts 3: holding that although prison inmates have a first amendment right to access to the courts prison officials may regulate law library access including reasonable time place and manner of access taking into account the administrative needs of the institution 4: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "AND JUDGMENT ROBERT E. BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. Mr. Miguel Angel Gutierrez-Carranza was convicted on federal charges and faced unrelated charges in Mexico. After the federal conviction, he requested extradition to Mexico and the district court denied the request based on a \u201clack of jurisdiction.\u201d R. vol, I, at 7. We affirm. The defendant had no power to initiate his own extradition. The court\u2019s power to order extradition derives from 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3184. Under \u00a7 3184, a district court can initiate extradition proceedings only after the federal government files a sworn complaint for extradition based on a request from a foreign jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3184; see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 186, 23 S.Ct. 98, 47 L.Ed. 130 (1902) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, extradition could take place only Holdings: 0: recognizing with respect to a virtually identical predecessor to  3184 that a complaint must be made under oath charging the crime for which extradition is sought 1: holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted 2: recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations 3: holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction 4: holding the same with respect to an apartment", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Hamilton v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass\u2019n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (6th Cir.1976) (privilege of participation in interscholastie sports is outside due process protections); Albach v. Odle 531 F.2d 983, 984 (10th Cir.1976) (interscholastic athletic participation not a constitutionally protected right); Zehner v. Central Berkshire Reg\u2019l Sch. Dist., 921 F.Supp. 850, 862 (D.Mass.1995) (taking part in interscholastic athletics was not constitutionally protected claim of entitlement); Simkins, 434 N.W.2d at 368 (interscholastie participation is mere expectancy); Bruce v. S.C. High Sch. League, 258 S.C. 546, 189 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1972) (participation in high school extracurricular activities is a privilege); Menke v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass\u2019n, 2 Ohio App.3d 244, 441 N.E.2d 620, 623 (1981) (<HOLDING>); Whipple, 629 P.2d at 386 (\u201cWhile we think Holdings: 0: holding high school which allowed student secular noncurricular activities to meet on school property was required to provide equal access to a christian student group 1: holding drug testing high school student athletes was constitutional 2: holding right to be fundamental 3: holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student 4: holding that student has no fundamental right to participate in high school athletics", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "prejudice as a result of the jury selection procedure. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(c) (1999); State v. Miller, 339 N.C. 663, 681, 455 S.E.2d 137, 147, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 893, 133 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1995); State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 312, 500 S.E.2d 668, 680 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1180, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1999). Defendant further argues that the improper jury selection procedure violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. However, defendant did not raise this constitutional issue at trial; consequently, the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider or rule on this issue. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve this assignment of error for appellate review. See State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 122, 512 S.E.2d 720, 730 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal 1: holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue 2: recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review 3: holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions 4: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 13). The plaintiff fails to meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, which requires that he show that AMHA treated him differently than employees outside the protected class for the same or similar conduct. Under Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit held that sharing the same supervisor and being subject to the same standards are not sufficient to establish that a non-minority employee is similarly situated. See generally, Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992). Singfield must show that the non-minority employees \u201chave engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer\u2019s treatment of them for it.\u201d Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>) Singfield cannot show that AMHA treated him Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim 1: holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff 2: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated 3: holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment 4: holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "properly bring a disciplinary action against a prisoner for filing a grievance that is determined by those officials to be without merit anymore than they can properly bring a disciplinary action against a prisoner for filing a lawsuit that is judicially determined to be without merit. That the Constitution does not obligate the state to establish a grievance 'procedure is, we believe, of no consequence here.... Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit recognizes that (1) an inmate possesses a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for filing a grievance, id., while simultaneously recognizing that (2) an inmate does not have a due process \u201cliberty interest in access to [a grievance] procedure,\u201d Flick, 9 th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Like our sister circuits, we see no Holdings: 0: recognizing retaliation involving promotion as adverse employment actions under the first amendment 1: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 2: recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances 3: recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance 4: recognizing first amendment retaliation right", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(and other cell phones in the area) to identify the phone to the network for authentication. That process would be repeated at different locations until the target cell-phone number was identified\u2014 here, that included the identification of several prepaid cell phones subscribed to in fictitious names using a post office box address in California. Defendants assert that the identification information was obtained \u201cillegally\u201d \u2014 and therefore evidence derived from that infor mation should be suppressed \u2014 because the use of a cell-site simulator to capture \u201cautonomously\u201d transmitted information could not be authorized under the pen-registe e itself provide for the suppression of evidence as a remedy for its violation. See United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the district court that use of Holdings: 0: holding suppression is not a remedy for violation of vienna convention under federal law 1: holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation 2: holding that the fourth amendment remedy sought is suppression 3: holding suppression not available remedy for violation of 18 usc  1321 et seq 4: holding that suppression of the evidence or dismissal of an indictment are not required to remedy a violation of  6103", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "329 Ga. App. at 518 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord In the Interest of L. T, 325 Ga. App. at 592. 14 Holcomb, 329 Ga. App. at 518 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423, 424 (1) (736 SE2d 397) (2013); see also Deal, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a) (\u201c[I]f the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.\u201d (punctuation omitted)). 15 Horton v. Dennis, 325 Ga. App. 212, 216 (750 SE2d 493) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Joyner v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 268 Ga. App. 835, 838 (2) (602 SE2d 871) (2004). 16 Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 299 (3) (637 SE2d 716) (2006). 17 See, e.g., Lockwood v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 330 Ga.App. 513, 515-16(1) (767 SE2d 829) (2014) (<HOLDING>); Nelson v. Nelson, 176 Ga.App. 107, 109 (2) Holdings: 0: holding that a court has power to award attorney fees when authorized by contract statute or recognized ground of equity 1: holding that an award of attorney fees was authorized by ocga  13111 a 3 when the requirements of that statute were satisfied 2: holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice 3: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 4: holding that the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable because it precluded the award of attorney fees which were authorized in the relevant ohio consumer protection statute", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of whether to impose negligence per se should not be made merely by counting how many factors lean each way. Id. at 305-06. Rather, the factors should act as guidelines to assist courts in determining the ultimate question of whether imposing tort liability for violations of a statute is fair, workable, and wise. Id. Because the parties briefed this case prior to the supreme court\u2019s decision in Perry, their arguments did not address all of the factors listed by the court. However, McCurdy\u2019s primary argument on appeal is that the standard of conduct defined in section 61(a) is conditional in nature, and, therefore, the statute does not provide an absolute duty sufficient to support the application of negligence per se. This argument closely parallels one v.App. \u2014 Austin 1971, no writ) (<HOLDING>). These courts have reasoned that, if a Holdings: 0: holding that whether a driver yielded the right of way as per section 74 depends upon whether he acted negligently or unreasonably 1: holding that whether a driver safely entered an intersection as per section 71c depends upon whether he acted prudently 2: holding that whether a driver operated his vehicle on an improved shoulder in safety as per section 54a depends upon whether he acted reasonably under the common law 3: recognizing that whether a consumer survey should be admitted depends among other things on whether the questions are leading or suggestive  4: holding whether these explanations are reasonable or not depends upon matters that the jury must decide including witness eredibility", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1567, 1573 (11th Cir.1992) (explaining that a facial challenge is proper because the regulation \u201caffects the enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees and subjects the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to licensing requirements\u201d) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Frandsen and Morris challenge the permit regulation, which is a prior restraint on speech, on grounds that it fails to provide constitutionally required procedural safeguards, the general rule set forth in Adler does not apply to their facial challenge. A prior restraint on expression exists when the government can deny access to a forum for expression before the expression occurs. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2756 n. 5, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The regulation presently at issue clearly Holdings: 0: holding that a state may not exercise a prior restraint on publishing a newspaper 1: holding that strict scrutiny applies to a prior restraint enforcing a contentbased restriction on speech in a traditional public forum 2: holding that a regulation was not a prior restraint because it did not authorize suppression of speech in advance of its expression 3: holding that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the permit process where it could not show that it would ever be genuinely threatened by an unconstitutional prior restraint in this case 4: holding that prior restraint analysis applies to commercial speech but that the general health claim regulation 21 cfr  10114 was sufficiently welldefined to survive prior restraint analysis", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it unnecessary to address these arguments because of our resolution of a necessary threshold question: Does Section 553 apply to the transactions at issue here? The Turners argue that the administrative offsets were not setoffs within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 553 at all, but rather were voidable preferences falling under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 547. We agree. Setoff is an equitable right of a creditor to deduct a debt it owes to the debtor from a claim it has against the debtor arising out of a separate transaction; it \u201callows parties that owe mutual debts to state the accounts between them, subtract one from the other and pay only the balance.\u201d Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp., 896 F.2d 54, 57 (3d Cir.1990); see also Jones v. England, 782 P.2d 119, 122 (Okla.1989) (<HOLDING>). The United States has an inherent right of Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: recognizing common law privileges 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: holding that federal government agencies have a common law right to interagency setoff 4: recognizing existence of common law right of setoff in oklahoma", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and alleging that as a result of Hoffenberg\u2019s pre-existing use, One Harbor acquired an easement by implied reservation and that as a result of continued use by One Harbor and its predecessors in interest, One Harbor acquired an easement by prescription. The trial court specifically found that Hoffenberg took title to each parcel \u201cindividually and as trustee,\u201d that no trust or beneficiary was identified in any conveyance of either parcel, and that there was no evidence that a trust relating to either parcel was ever recorded. The trial court applied the provisions of section 687.07, Florida Statutes (1959), and concluded, inter alia, that Hoffenberg was the fee simple \u201cindividual\u201d owner of each parcel at the time that the Agreement was executed. The trial court also found that ) (<HOLDING>). An easement, by definition, is the right to Holdings: 0: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 1: recognizing that as long as the lots belonged to the same owner there could be no easement in favor of one lot or servitude upon the other 2: holding that where there is common ownership of two parcels there could be noeasement in favor of one lot operating as a burden to the other 3: recognizing that the dominant easement owner not the servient estate owner bears responsibility for maintaining an easement 4: holding same as to an easement by implication", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 478. Central to the Court\u2019s conclusion in Ingersoll-Rand was the fact that the state law in question was not \"a generally app at Ingersoll-Rand does not require preemption of state-law malpractice claim against insurers). 5 . MVP makes the claim that \u201c[ajlmost all Courts of Appeals that have considered the question agree that state causes of action asserted against non-fiduciaries are preempted by ERISA.\u201d MVP Br. at 26. The three circuit court cases which MVP cites, however, .involve suits brought by employees to recover plan benefits. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 418 (4th Cir.1993) (finding that an employee\u2019s suit against administrator and underwriter for denied medical benefits was preempted); Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Howard v. Parisian, Inc. 807 F.2d 1560, 1565 Holdings: 0: holding that an employees suit against agent for denied disability benefits was preempted 1: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 2: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits 3: holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted 4: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Rules \u201chave the force of law\u201d throughout the state Id. at 166. The Court expressly reaffirmed Holt, however, explaining that the Rule 16(a)(2) \u201cexception to disclosure and inspection does not apply to investigative files in possession of state agents or law enforcement officers, where the files have been closed and are not relevant to any pending or contemplated criminal action.\u201d Id. Four years later, in 1991, the General Assembly amended the Public Records Act by replacing the phrase \u201cstate statute\u201d with the phrase \u201cstate law.\u201d This Court has since held that the phrase \u201cstate law,\u201d added by the 1991 amendment, encompasses the Rules of Civil Procedure such that documents shielded by the Rules need not be disclosed pursuant to the Public Records Act. See Ballard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (<HOLDING>); see also Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, Holdings: 0: holding that by vesting jurisdiction of gtla actions in circuit court where the tennessee rules of civil procedure applied the legislature intended to allow the tennessee rules of civil procedure to apply to gtla actions 1: holding that tennessee rule of civil procedure 24 is not applicable to proceedings in juvenile court 2: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of documents sealed by a protective order entered pursuant to the tennessee rules of civil procedure 3: holding that a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of pretrial discovery does not offend the first amendment 4: holding that the public records act does not mandate disclosure of records protected by tennessee rule of criminal procedure 16", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "finds that good cause sufficient to require admission exists. The burden of establishing good cause is upon the party offering the evidence and good cause must be shown in the record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.5. This rale is mandatory, and the only remedy \u2014 exclusion of the witness \u2014 is automatic unless the offering party presents good cause on the record to excuse its imposition. See Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914. The purpose of this rale is to require complete discovery so the responsible assessment of settlement is promoted and trial by ambush is prevented. See id. The case law is fairly liberal in providing good cause when the location information provided was sufficient to allow the requesting party to find the witness. See Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 91 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Varner v. Howe, 860 S.W.2d 458, 464 Holdings: 0: holding a motion is untimely if not filed after the party has knowledge to support disqualification and after the party suffers an adverse ruling 1: holding failure to designate party as witness not fatal because interrogatory answers showed party had knowledge of relevant facts 2: holding that implied consent is not established merely one party introduced evidence relevant to an unpleaded issue and the opposing party failed to object 3: holding that a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue 4: holding that a nonhearsay response to an interrogatory that is based on personal knowledge may be considered as evidence on summary judgment", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "514 U.S. at 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671; Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325, 117 S.Ct. 832; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146. 37 . Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130, 113 S.Ct. 580. 38 . See ERISA \u00a7 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1056(d)(1); cf. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (concluding that a general state garnishment statute\u2019s application to employee welfare benefits was not preempted by ERISA because ERISA was silent about enforcement mechanisms for money judgments whereas ERISA explicitly prohibited assignment of pension benefits). 39 . See Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 & n. 13 (5th Cir.1988). 40 . See LeTourneau Lifelike Orthotics & Prosthetics, Inc., 298 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); see also Physicians Multispecialty Group v. Holdings: 0: holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis 1: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 2: holding that antiassignment provisions are not per se invalid as applied to health care providers 3: holding such agreements to be per se illegal 4: holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "award of prejudgment interest is normally left in the discretion of the trial judge. We find that the trial court did not err in assessing interest at 8%.... \u201d (citation omitted)). Defendants do not suggest an alternative rate of prejudgment interest, and the Court concludes that 8% is an appropriate rate under Mississippi law. Cf. Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 75-17-1 (setting 8% per annum rate for claims on \u201cnotes, accounts and contracts\u201d). Prejudgment interest will begin with the date the first suit was filed. See id. \u00a7 75-17-7 (establishing that prejudgment interest begins on \u201cdate determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint\u201d); see also Sw. Recreational Indus., Inc. v. FieldTurf Inc., No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 32783971, at *9 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Court may take judicial notice Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred by failing to determine and deduct the actual value of securities received by fraud victims 1: holding that district court erred by failing to follow prejudgmentinterest accrual date in state statute 2: holding that the district court erred in failing to properly charge the jury on defendants affirmative defenses 3: holding that district court erred in failing to consider evidence of secondary considerations 4: holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in state court and the Attorney General issues a scope certification, then the Act requires that the case be removed to federal court and the United States be substituted as the party defendant. Id. at 2679(d)(2). However, section 2679(d)(2) goes further than section 2679(d)(1) by stating, \u201cThis certification of the Attorney General shall conclusively establish scope of office or employment for purposes of removal.\u201d Whether a federal employee is ultimately immune from suit, therefore, depends entirely upon whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the events which underlie the lawsuit occurred. Previously in the Fourth Circuit this determination was left solely in the hands of the Attorney General. See Johnson v. Carter, 983 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 57, 126 Holdings: 0: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 1: holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute 2: holding that plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive 3: holding that the attorney generals scope certification is to be given conclusive effect 4: holding to the same effect", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972 (1st Cir.1995) (\u201cIn general, the law ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep upon perceptible rights.\u201d). Thus, the government argues that the defense\u2019s failure immediately to object when Kevin was asked about convictions in addition to his unlawful sexual contact convictions constrains this court from considering the matter on appeal absent plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Examination of the transcript, however, reveals that Meserve\u2019s attorney objected as soon as it became obvious that the government\u2019s line of questioning was in violation of Rule 609, i.e., when the government indicated that the conviction about which it was asking was a twenty-year-old disorderly conduct conviction. To 17 (D.C.Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Benavente Gomez, 921 Holdings: 0: holding that objection by defense counsel that he did not see the relevance of the evidence was not a proper relevancy objection 1: holding that defendants objection to personal jurisdiction was forfeited where defendant did not object before he entered his plea 2: holding that defense counsels failure to object until after he learned the nature of the document being used to refresh the defendants recollection did not render objection nugatory 3: holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony 4: holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Claimant had pursued that position in good faith. (R.R. 83-5a.) The duties of the position were \u201c[c]ontacting organizations by phone to recruit fund raising campaigns.\u201d (R.R. 109a.) She again indicated that the duties were within Dr. Durning\u2019s sedentary work guidelines. After reviewing the six job referral notices, we disagree that they were insufficient to put Claimant on notice of the general duties and the exertional classification of the positions. Four-Way Construction. Certainly, the notices were sufficient to put Claimant on notice of the basic job duties and of the fact that they were within the sedentary guidelines set forth by Dr. Durning. Compare School District of Philadelphia v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Stutts), 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 413, 603 A.2d 682 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We note, however, that at least three of the Holdings: 0: holding that where the employer discontinues a specially created job the employer must offer another suitable job to the claimant or continue total disability payments 1: holding that job referral notices without information advising a claimant that the job was within a category for which he received medical clearance were insufficient under kachinski 2: recognizing that employer is not obligated to produce evidence of change in physical condition as required by kachinski when modification request is based solely on job availability and allowing employee the benefit of same rule 3: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 4: holding that an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he could be injured or could injure others and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "It maintains first that the Supreme Court\u2019s SUWA case, 542 U.S. 55, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137, which concerns limitations on APA suits for an agency\u2019s failure to act, bars review; second, that the Court\u2019s analysis in Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460, likewise prevents us from addressing the EIS\u2019s failings; and third that the BLM is owed deference as to the methodology it adopts to comply with its NEPA obligations, including the failure to consider wilderness characteristics at all. None of these arguments is persuasive. a. SUWA SUWA held, inter alia, that an APA suit under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(1) to \u201ccompel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed\u201d \u201ccan proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to ta 99, 1503 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 Holdings: 0: holding a rod to be final agency action 1: holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action 2: holding that it appears wellestablished that a final eis or the rod issued thereon constitute the final agency action for purposes of the apa and collecting cases 3: holding that the designation of the rod as final agency action under the apa is generally recognized 4: holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "116, line 1] she states, \u2018[Baker] may be the sole owner but it is still my house.\u2019 \u201d Doc. 31 at 18. There are at two obvious problems with this contention. First, the cited page 116 of Griffin\u2019s May 3, 2012 Examination Under Oath contains no such statement, and there are no similar statements in any of the bordering pages. The eourt confesses that it did not read the entire 294 pages of the examination to ascertain whether it could perhaps find the quoted language or any passage remotely similar to it because \u201cjudges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs\u201d or, in this case, in a voluminous evidentiary record. Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Adkinson, 135 F.3d 1363, 1378-1380 (11th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>); Dickson v. Amoco Performance Prod., Inc., 845 Holdings: 0: holding that it is unfair to the district court to other litigants and to the movant to impose a duty on the district court to search and sift the factual record for the benefit of the defaulting party 1: holding that it is not the courts duty to sift through the record for evidence that supports a partys contentions 2: holding that the appeals court may affirm the ruling of the district court on any basis which the record supports 3: holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument 4: holding it is proper to defer to the family court even if conflicting evidence is presented on appeal as long as ample evidence in the record supports the family courts findings and conclusions", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Supreme Court determined in its discretion that the time had come to return the FJD to local control; the Justices then debated alternatives, voted, and issued a directive reorganizing the FJD. This procedure was no different from that which a legislature would follow in like circumstances. In sum, the issuance of the March 26 order was both substantively and procedurally legislative, and accordingly the dis trict court did not err in applying legislative immunity to Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Nigro with respect to claims arising from Gallas\u2019 termination as Executive Administrator. Having reached this conclusion, we must afford quasi-legislative immunity to Sobolevitch, whose role in the reorganization derived from the Supreme Court\u2019s order. See Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 99-100 (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Gallas\u2019 counsel conceded before the Holdings: 0: holding that city council is entitled to absolute legislative immunity from claim under the age discrimination in employment act 1: holding that individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level are entitled to absolute immunity 2: holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity 3: holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee 4: holding that borough attorney who was acting in direct assistance of legislative activity was entitled to absolute immunity", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Transamerica Financial Services (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.1984) (per curiam). The Matthews purchased a piano and a stereo with money borrowed from Transamerica Financial Services (Transamerica). The collateral listed as securing the loan included the piano, the stereo, and other household goods and other personal property of the Matthews. Subsequently, Transamerica refinanced the loan for a longer term at a lower monthly payment and issued a new loan. The Matthews used the new loan to pay off the old and, additionally, received $63.14 in cash and paid insurance charges of $279.23. The Matthews filed a petition for bankruptcy in November 1980. When Transamerica filed for relief from the Automatic Stay to repossess the collateral, the Debtors 84 B.R. 6 (D.R.I.1988) (<HOLDING>); (citing In re Matthews, supra, and In re Holdings: 0: holding buyer liable for balance of contract price of accepted goods 1: holding that a note which was a consolidation of the debtors previous notes did not give rise to a pmsi 2: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods 3: holding that under north dakota law consolidation of a note secured by a pmsi in farm machinery with other goods resulted in a novation destroying the creditors pmsi 4: holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to present her reasons to the court as to why she should be granted a continuance. The scheduling order Ray relies on did not satisfy the requirements under the rule. Other than containing the date the petition was filed, there was no indication in the scheduling order alerting the judge that the case was subject to imminent dismissal. Simply agreeing on a trial date without including \u201cgrounds for continuance\u201d circumvents the requirements under rule 215.1. Ray had the burden of keeping her case alive and avoiding an automatic dismissal under rule 215.1. See Greif v. K-Mart Corp., 404 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1987). Accordingly, the stipulation as to a trial date does not save her case from automatic dismissal under rule 215.1. Compare Butner v. Beyer, 593 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>). We find, therefore, this case was correctly Holdings: 0: holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because it was filed without proper authority 1: holding that trial counsel did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance where appellant failed to specify the evidence which might have been revealed if the continuance had been granted and counsel had been afforded the opportunity to investigate further 2: holding district court was without authority to dismiss the case on rule 2151 grounds when an application had been filed and a continuance ordered 3: holding that district court had no authority to reopen appeal period when motion was filed beyond 180day limit 4: recognizing district court application of the same rule", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was a convicted felon, and allow the State to parade the defendant\u2019s prior felony history before the jury, over objection by the defendant, was an abuse of discretion and deprived defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial. (A96) (emphasis added). Reviewing this sentence in the context of the arguments made in Petitioner\u2019s Opening Brief, the Court likewise concludes that it is insufficient to put the state supreme court on notice that Petitioner was raising a federal constitutional claim. As the Court noted, Petitioner did not analyze his claim in constitutional terms and his reference to Old Chief as not binding on the state courts undermines Petitioner\u2019s argument that he raised a federal constitutional claim. See e.g. Bright v. Snyder, 218 F.Supp.2d 573, 578-579 (D.Del.2002) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the Court finds further support Holdings: 0: holding that because defense counsel failed to alert the trial court that he was requesting relief based on a violation of defendants constitutional rights due process argument was not preserved for appellate review 1: holding that petitioner did not exhaust his due process claim that he was denied a full and fair hearing by arguing that due process was violated on the ground that the ij admitted uncertified evidence 2: holding that the petitioners due process claim that he was denied a full and fair hearing because the immigration judge was biased was the kind of procedural error that required exhaustion 3: holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law 4: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that it claims will cause individualized inquiries to overwhelm the common issues. These claimed defenses are that (1) ECMC\u2019s warning on a previous call can establish a customer\u2019s awareness of and implied consent to future recordings of subsequent calls, and (2) a caller\u2019s hold time for each individual call can serve as a proxy for notice and consent. (See id. 11:16-12:2, 12:13-27.) i. ECMC\u2019s Prior Awareness Defense The Court will first consider the effect of ECMC\u2019s proposed \u201cprior awareness\u201d defense. As ECMC correctly notes, the existence of prior awareness of its recording practice or consent thereto could raise the possibility of individual differences among class members. See, e.g., Right v. CashCall, Inc. (\u201cCashCall II\"), 231 Cal.App.4th 112, 132, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 439 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, ECMC offers evidence only that Holdings: 0: holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages 1: holding that because the defendant has the right to litigate the issue of each class members consent the trial court did not improperly exercise its discretion in finding that these issues would predominate over common questions 2: holding that individualized factual determinations precluded finding that common issues predominate reversing the class certification order 3: holding that individualized questions concerning the defendants responsibility for diminished sales prices of class members bonds predominated over any common questions rendering class certification inappropriate 4: holding that common issues of fact did not predominate because it was necessary to make an individualized inquiry into equitable circumstances", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Estate].\u201d It is undisputed that at the time they signed the Release, the Mahans had knowledge of Claim 7 and knew that it would be assigned to them. Debtor conceded that prior to the closing of the loan with United Southern Bank, the Mahans decided that rather than simply pay off the Loan with Mercantile Bank, they would acquire the Mercantile Bank Loan documents, including Claim 7, by way of assignment. Debtor testified that when the Mahans signed the Release, they were aware of the escrow of the assignment of Claim 7 and of the note and other Loan documents. Debtor also testified that at the time the Mahans signed the Release, they knew that once Southeastern\u2019s debt to Mercantile Bank was paid, Mercantile Bank would assign Claim 7 to the Mahans 208, 210 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct. App.2002) (<HOLDING>); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla.3d Holdings: 0: holding that despite release language discharging defendant from claims upon or by reason of any matter cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents release did not bar any claims accruing after the date of execution 1: holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of these presents included claims which the releasor had or could have had against the releasee up to the date of its execution 2: holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution 3: holding that all inclusive language  from the beginning of the world to the days present barred all claims arising prior to releases execution 4: holding that release which barred all claims from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents included all claims which had matured at the time of its execution", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "abused its discretion.\u201d Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir.2008). The district court \u201chas discretion to deny leave to amend ... when the moving party offers no adequate explanation for a lengthy delay.\u201d In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1119 (11th Cir.2014). Witt\u2019s motion was submitted a year after the action was initially filed and lacked any supporting explanation for why leave should have been granted. Her thread bare request failed to state why justice required the opportunity to submit a fourth version of her complaint. As we see it, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend. Moreover, Witt\u2019s proposed amendment was futile. See Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 716 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>) \u201cBecause justice does not require district Holdings: 0: recognizing that this court may affirm on any ground supported by the record even if it differs from the reasoning of the district court 1: holding that we may affirm a district court if its holding was right for any reason 2: holding this court may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the district courts grounds 3: recognizing this court may affirm for any reason supported by the record 4: recognizing ability to affirm for any reason that finds support in record", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "when a union member brings a meritorious grievance, the union\u2019s decision to ignore that grievance or to process it in a perfunctory manner is considered a ministerial action that breaches the union\u2019s duty if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, or performed in bad faith. Nevertheless, a court reviewing a union\u2019s conduct will not find that the union has exercised its duties perfunctorily unless it has treated the union member\u2019s claim so lightly as to suggest an \u201cegregious disregard\u201d of her rights. Kirbyson, 795 F.Supp.2d at 940 (citations omitted). B. Defendants Have Not Demonstrated that the Six-Month Statute of Limitations Bars Vegas\u2019s Claims. The applicable statute of limitations for hybrid \u00a7 301/fair representation claims is six months. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164-65, 103 S.Ct. 2281 (<HOLDING>). The limitations period begins to run when the Holdings: 0: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 1: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 2: holding that  301 of the labor management relations act of 1947 29 usc  185 does not preempt claims brought under washingtons minimum wage act chapter 4946 rcw 3: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act 4: holding that section 10b of the national labor relations act 29 usc  160b sets the applicable statute of limitations for hybrid  301fair representation claims at six months", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "arid mandatory right originating outside of the CBA. see e.g., Rabe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir.2011) (\u201cA state law claim is preempted only when it asserts rights or obligations arising under a collective bargaining agreement or when its resolution is substantially dependent on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Detabali v. St. Luke\u2019s Hospital, 482 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir.2007) (\u201c[T]he need to interpret the [collective bargaining agreement] must inhere in the nature of the plaintiffs claim.. If the claim is plainly based on state law, \u00a7 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the [collective bargaining agreement] in mounting a defense.\u201d); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int\u2019l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 209 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. Ramos, et al., 197 F.3d 777, 781 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 1: holding that an employees retaliation claim was not preempted by section 301 because he was exercising his rights under the states antidiscrimination laws and the terms of the cba were at most relevant background for the employees termination 2: holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa 3: holding that plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by section 301 because employers duty to provide a safe workplace was expressly created by the cba 4: holding that both plaintiffs discrimination and retaliation claims were beyond the preemptive scope of section 301 because they involved purely factual questions and asserted rights independent of the cba", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "been brought out on voir dire. At trial, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial and a motion to voir dire Julian. After a detailed hearing conducted August 8, 1994, at which Julian was thoroughly examined, the court denied the motion for new trial. As the postconviction court stated, \u201cThe underlying substance of this claim is clearly Mr. Julian\u2019s potential bias, an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal because it was thoroughly addressed at the conclusion of the trial.\u201d On this basis, the court rejected the claim as procedurally barred, finding that it could have been raised on direct appeal. To the extent Kimbrough seeks review of the substantive issue underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we agree. See Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Sireci v. State, 469 So.2d 119, 120 Holdings: 0: holding that claims alleging prosecutorial misconduct which were based on facts in the record could have and should have been raised on direct appeal and were thus not cognizable in postconviction proceedings 1: holding that any claim that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal is barred from review on post conviction under the doctrine of res judicata 2: holding that claims not properly raised on direct appeal will not be considered as a basis for collateral relief 3: holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing 4: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the statute, different terms may be used to show criminal intent. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 264, 72 S.Ct. 240 (\u201cCongress ... has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as \u2018intentional,\u2019 \u2018wilful,\u2019 \u2018knowing,\u2019 \u2018fraudulent,\u2019 or \u2018malicious,\u2019 will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act....\u201d) Here, section (a)(3) requires a higher mens rea than general criminal intent; a defendant must \u201cknowingly\u201d falsify header information and \u201cintentionally\u201d. transmit it. Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement. See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who deliberately avoids reading the form he is signing cannot avoid criminal sanctions for any false statements contained therein 1: holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback 2: holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government did not constitute a trap for the unwary 3: holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments 4: holding that the defendant contractor violated 18 usc  286  a companion statute to the criminal fca  because his claims were false when submitted even though the false claims were ultimately irrelevant to the total amount paid by the government to the contractor", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and injustice warrant the setting aside of an arbitration award.\u201d Id. When a non-prevailing party seeks to vacate an arbitration award, it bears the burden in the trial court of bringing forth a complete record that establishes its basis for vacating the award. Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266; GJR Mgmt. Holdings, L.P., 126 S.W.3d at 263-64 (citing Kline v. O\u2019Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 790 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (op. on reh\u2019g)). When there is no transcript of the arbitration hearing, the appellate court will presume the evidence was adequate to support the award. Jamison & Harris v. Nat\u2019l Loan Investors, 939 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); House Grain v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Many Texas courts have held that without a Holdings: 0: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 1: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees 2: holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments 3: holding the appellate court must presume adequate evidence to support the award when appellant sought to vacate the award based on gross mistake with no transcript of the arbitration proceedings 4: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "permanent place of incarceration. Our Court of Criminal Appeals has followed this view. See Lock, 839 S.W.2d at 444. In Lock, a prisoner who was serving a sentence in a Kentucky jail filed a request for final disposition of an indictment pending against him in Sumner County, Tennessee. Id. at 438. After the passage of 180 days, the prisoner filed a motion to dismiss the Sumner County charges, asserting that he had not been tried within the time period required by the IAD. Id. at 439. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the State\u2019s argument that the IAD was not applicable because it found that the prisoner was in a county jail, not a state prison. The court held that \u201c[i]f a prisoner is under custodial authority by virtue of serving a term of imprisonment, the 0-21 (D.Colo.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Evans, No. 1:08CR00024-006, Holdings: 0: holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state 1: holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds 2: holding it an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny equitable relief by relying on its own findings that were inconsistent with the jurys findings 3: holding that a temporary order with no fixed time period had lasted so long as to make judicial review timely 4: holding that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the iad to deny its protections to a sentenced prisoner who serves time no matter how lengthy in a temporary facility", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\u201c[W]e conclude that \u00a7 1404(a) is the proper avenue of relief where a party seeks the transfer of a case to enforce a forum-selection clause, while Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper avenue for a party\u2019s request for dismissal based on a forum-selection clause.\u201d); Hillis v. Heineman, 626 F.3d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that a party\u2019s defense for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3) based on a forum-selection clause was valid and was not waived by the filing of a counterclaim); Muzumdar v. Wellness Int\u2019l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 760-62 (7th Cir.2006) (\u201cA challenge to venue based upon a forum selection clause can appropriately be brought as a motion to dismiss the complaint under [Rule] 12(b)(3).\u201d); Sucampo Pharm., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma, Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 548-50 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Holdings: 0: recognizing circuit agreement that a motion to dismiss based on an arbitration clause is proper under rule 12b3 1: holding prejudgment denial of motion to dismiss on basis of forumselection clause not to be immediately appealable under  1291 2: holding that since the fifth circuit has accepted rule 12b3 as a proper method for seeking dismissal for improper venue based on a forum selection clause the court need not decide whether a rule 12b1 motion  is appropriate 3: holding that motions to dismiss based on forumselection clause should be analyzed under rule 12b3 4: holding that a forumselection clause may be enforced under rule 12b3 as a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to appropriate its business opportunities. See Cal. Corp. Code \u00a7 16404(b); Leff, 33 Cal.3d at 514, 189 Cal.Rptr. 377, 658 P.2d 740. Second Measure\u2019s request to dismiss Counterclaims 2 and 4 is therefore DENIED. 3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Counterclaim 5) a. Relevant Substantive Law To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show \u201c(1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.\u201d People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo, 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 950, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 443 (2013) (quotation omitted). Section 16404 of the California Corporations Code provides a nonexclusive list of the fiduciary duties that one partner owes to another. See Enea v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1565, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Because fiduciary duties are imposed by Holdings: 0: holding that an error cannot be plain unless it is clear under current law quotation omitted 1: holding that the list is comprehensive but not exhaustive quotation and emphasis omitted 2: recognizing that a strong causal connection is required quotation omitted 3: holding that fela is comprehensive and also exclusive in respect of a railroads liability for injuries suffered by its employees while engaging in interstate commence quotation omitted 4: holding that competency is appropriately defined as the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "at 1273-1274. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir.1993). Consequently, the Court refuses to conclude that one incident is, as a matter of law, insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. That conclusion, coupled with the evidence that the incident at issue was especially severe, leads this Court to conclude that Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the hostile work environment claim. Courts have pointed out that the racial epithet of \u201cnigger\u201d is particularly offensive. See Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 675. In Rodgers, the Seventh Circuit stated that the word \u201cnigger\u201d is unambiguously racist and held that its use on even a few occasions affects the terms and conditions 878, 885 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court concludes that the Holdings: 0: holding that referring to a female colleague as dancing girl or call girl ignoring her except to comment on her appearance and another female employees quitting because of the same person was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment because the offensive utterances do not rise to the level required by the supreme courts definition of a hostile work environment 1: holding that evidence of a single battery and two offensive remarks over six months did not establish a hostile environment 2: holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment 3: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 4: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to set aside the conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the conviction and require the repayment of the money collected as fines.\"); United States v. Beckner, 16 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (M.D.La.1998) (\"[This court has jurisdiction to carry out its obligation to completely vacate all aspects of the erroneous judgement [sic] issued by it.... In this criminal case the final judgment is that Beckner owed restitution to no one.... The government must reimburse Beck-ner....\"); United States v. Venneri, 782 F.Supp. 1091, 1092-95. (describing previous order requiring government to refund a defendant's fine paid for violating an unconstitutional statute and ordering third-party restitution recipient to repay defendant); Cooper v. Gordon, 389 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (<HOLDING>); : Commonwealth v. McKee, 38 A.3d 879, 881 Holdings: 0: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 1: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it 2: holding lower court had inherent power to restore defendant to status quo ante for wrongly paid fine restitution and probation costs 3: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 4: holding that courts have inherent power to hire and require salaries be paid to secretaries clerks probation officers and assistants", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by reference the Condominium Documents, and indicates that these Documents would be provided to Venezia at some indeterminate point after execution of the Purchase Agreement. (See Purchase Agreement at 1 (\u201cDEVELOPER WILL FURNISH [Condominium Documents] TO BUYER.\u201d (emphasis in original).) In other words, the terms of the Purchase Agreement provided either the same period or a longer period of time within which Venezia had the opportunity and ability to cancel the Agreement without cause, which again obviates his cause of action based on the failure of the Purchase Agreement to include language that precisely mirrored the language set forth in the statute. Cf. Werdmuller Von Elgg v. Carlyle Developers, Inc., No. 09-cv-132-Orl-31 KRS, 2009 WL 961144, at *2 (M.D.Fla. April 7, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Venezia\u2019s response does not even address Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of 15 usc  1703b where their purchase contract gave notice that they had a right to cancel the agreement by giving notice to the seller until midnight of the fifteenth day following the signing of the contract 1: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 2: holding that contract for purchase of real property terminated by its own terms upon buyers giving of a certain notice and that therefore the contract was no longer valid and enforceable 3: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 4: holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "remedies must be exhausted.\u201d Id at 810, 554 P.2d at 1307. This Court, in Carter v. State, Dept, of Health & Welfare, 103 Idaho 701, 652 P.2d 649 (1982), reaffirmed this holding by stating: In V-1 Oil Company v. County of Bannock, we held that the proper method of contesting an agency or judicial decision is by appeal, and that an order or judgment may not later be collaterally attacked by means of a declaratory judgment action. The appellants\u2019 collateral attack upon their orders of commitment by means of a declaratory judgment action is thus clearly impermissible. Id at 702, 652 P.2d at 650 (citation omitted); see also Conley v. Looney, 117 Idaho 627, 630, 790 P.2d 920, 923 (Ct.App.1990) (citing Bills v. State Dept, of Revenue and Taxation, 110 Idaho 113, 714 P.2d 82 (Ct.App. 1986)) (<HOLDING>). Count I of Ag Air\u2019s amended complaint seeks Holdings: 0: holding that appellant hjaving failed to exercise administrative appeal  cannot now collaterally attack the tax deficiency determination in an independent action 1: holding that a party could not collaterally attack a default judgment obtained against him in a foreclosure action 2: holding that a defendant cannot collaterally attack his sentence under 18 usc  3582c2 3: holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination 4: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "we grant the Levy defendants\u2019 Rule 50 motion in part, on other grounds, we need not reach the issue of whether in any circumstance, duress may toll the copyright statute of limitations. However, we note that Judge Broderick, in his April 15 Order, held \"that under the facts of this case, the recognition of a toll for duress would be consistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act and the duress toll which should be utilized is that provided under the law of this court's forum state, New York.\u201d April 15 Order at 11; Cf. Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F.Supp. 1423, 1442 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (acknowledging that duress toll may have a role, albeit a narrow one, in antitrust actions.) But cf. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 808 F.Supp. 213, 225 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (<HOLDING>). In any event, it is doubtful that'we could Holdings: 0: holding petition for writ of mandate seeking return of property does not toll the statute of limitations 1: holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations 2: holding there is no authority to toll statute of limitations based on mental incompetence 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that a new trial is not warranted. United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir.1977). III. CONCLUSION We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury on Appellant\u2019s theory of temporary innocent possession of a firearm. Further, the district judge\u2019s conduct in this case does not warrant a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm Palma\u2019s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . Almonte testified at trial that she stood away from Palma and German during the transaction and rejoined them when they left the store. 2 . German paid for the grips, upon Palma\u2019s request. 3 . In the past, we have declined to entertain the theory of a \"mere inspection\u201d defense. See United States v. Beverly, 194 Fed.Appx. 624, 628 (11th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). And while we have indicated that a Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 1: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a mere inspection instruction in a firearm possession case 2: holding that court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give effect to defendants answer when filed almost one year after default entered against them 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order production of government files under rule 16a1c 4: holding that trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instruction on fleeting possession theory", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "only if that effect can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.\u201d United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Even assuming \u2014 without in any way deciding \u2014 that the law disproportionately impacts Native Americans, Parshall provides no meaningful evidence that Congress intended to discriminate against Native Americans when it passed 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241(c). He argues that Congress should have been aware of the law\u2019s likely disproportionate impact on Native Americans, which suggests, according to Parshall, \u201cat least a possibility\u201d of discriminatory intent. Such assertions fall short of establishing the Congressional intent necessary to show a violation of the Fifth Amendment. See id.; United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 1000 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). C. Eighth Amendment Parshall argues that his Holdings: 0: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection 1: holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law 2: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 3: holding that a 30year sentence imposed under 18 usc  2241c did not violate a defendantnative americans equal protection rights 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "suit. Fourth, the patent explicitly disclaims any relation between Figure 4b and the aspects of the invention dealing with the discharge of the primary switch\u2019s parasitic capacitance. See col. 5, 11. 44-51 (\u201cneglecting ... parasitic effects including the ones associated with ... the capacitance of non-ideal hardware realizations of the primary switch 10 ..., the operation of the magnetizing current mirror as a reset mechanism is illustrated by an example in 4b.\u201d). It is therefore less plausible that the inventor would rely on this figure to define the invention\u2019s switch-timing properties. Finally, Unitrode presses an argument based on claim differentiation for adopting a voltage-based definition for ON period. See Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987 (Fed.Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>).* The doctrine of claim differentiation is a Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of the scope of a particular claim can be found on review of other claims 1: holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action 2: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 3: holding that declaratory judgments fall outside the scope of the court of claims jurisdiction 4: holding the scope of a particular claim can often be determined on inspection of other claims", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "before magistrate or justice of peace \u201cwithout any reference to the act for trial of small causes in this colony\u201d). As the preceding statutes indicate, in colonial New Jersey, as in England, certain forfeiture and penalty proceedings to enforce police statutes and to punish minor criminal offenses, such as violations of the fish and game acts, proceeded before justices of the peace without juries. See Greely v. City of Passaic, 42 N.J.L. 429, 431 (E. & A. 1880) (noting that \u201c[Pjarliament conferred upon the [justice of the peace] certain judicial functions, as a means of enforcing the game acts\u201d by \u201ca summary proceeding, technical in character, of a quasi-criminal nature, and totally unlike an action at law\u201d); State v. Lakewood Mkt. Co., 84 N.J.L. 512, 523, 88 A. 194 (Sup.Ct.1913) (<HOLDING>); Carter Bros. v. Camden Dist. Court, 49 N.J.L. Holdings: 0: holding denial of jury trial was harmless because evidence was insufficient to create issue of fact for submission to jury and insurer would have been entitled to directed verdict 1: holding that penalty action instituted pursuant to fish and game procedure act of 1897 did not include jury trial because it has been repeatedly held in this state that in a summary procedure for the collection of a penalty for violation of a police regulation neither party is entitled to a trial by jury 2: holding no right to jury trial in action to recover penalty for violation of 1882 act to prevent the adulteration and to regulate the sale of milk 3: holding that jury trial not required before imposition of penalty for selling intoxicating liquors contrary to city ordinance reasoning that prior to 1776 the legality of convictions before magistrates for petty offenses and for violations of police regulations without trial by jury was unquestioned 4: holding that the penalty is applicable", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of defense). It should be noted that even inadequate provocation coupled with an objectively unreasonable reaction may be relevant to a case, like this one, because the jury may find that it creates a reasonable doubt about the existence of the \u201cmalice\u201d (under our new Code, the mental state of knowledge or purpose) required for murder, id. at 314-15, thus warranting a possible verdict on a lesser-included offense of murder. Murder eases will almost always turn on the mental state of the accused. Deciding that question is the jury\u2019s function. 2 Wharton\u2019s Criminal Law \u00a7 164, at 259 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979) (where there is dispute, jury should decide questions of adequate provocation); see also American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries \u00a7 210.3, at 57-61 (perm. ed. 1980) (<HOLDING>). Even \u201cwords alone,\u201d when they are racial Holdings: 0: recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure 1: recognizing limited value of categorical rules on mitiga tion developed by common law 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence 4: recognizing common law privileges", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "notice of its elements to those who may potentially be charged under that statute: \u201cThe underlying principle is that no person shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which one could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.\u201d Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 613 (1990). I agree with the magistrate judge that the statutory definitions of \u201csexual contact\u201d and \u201csexual intercourse\u201d are clear. That they are similar does not make them ambiguous. The definitions in Wis. Stat. \u00a7 948.01(5) explicitly describe, in graphic detail, the conduct required for each act. Furthermore, as I said above,- each act requires different elements. I believe that an ordinary person is able to understand the meanings of, and the differences between,' these definitions. See Server, 902 F.2d at 613-14 (<HOLDING>). The petitioner\u2019s last claim is that the same Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that the illinois statutory definitions of sexual penetration and sexual conduct cover clearly distinct conduct and that therefore the statute was not unconstitutionally vague 2: recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years 3: holding that the clergy sexual conduct statute requires general intent and does not impose strict liability because the act of sexual penetration must be intentional 4: holding that a jury instruction listing additional modes of sexual penetration than those listed in the information did not impermissibly amend the charge of sexual assault becausein part the added modes of sexual penetration did not change the applicable statute sentence or level of offense", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "McDonough intercepted the package at the mail facility located at the Dayton Airport, sometime during the morning of September 5, 2001. The label for the package indicated that delivery had been promised by noon on September 5th. In other words, the Defendant did not have a right to possess it until noon. Judge Merz issued that warrant at 9:54 a.m., on that date. There is no indication that the package could not have been delivered from the Dayton Airport to Mail Boxes, Etc., in Centerville, in two hours, if Judge Merz had refused to grant the requested search warrant or if no contraband had been discovered therein. Consequently, one could question whether the detention of the package was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. England, 971 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). However, since the Government has failed to Holdings: 0: holding inspector had reasonable suspicion when the return sender was fictitious the package was shipped special delivery the label was handwritten the package had been mailed from california and the package had been taped up at all the seams 1: holding package was not seized when it was detained since it could have been delivered in timely fashion if cocaine had not been discovered inside 2: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 3: holding that it was not fatal when the notice of appeal did not state that the transcript had been ordered when in actuality it had been ordered 4: holding that state had waived argument because it could have been raised in an earlier appeal but was not and because it fell outside the scope of remand", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Government action challenged as violating the Establishment Clause must satisfy the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971): To pass muster under Lemon, the challenged practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Preliminarily, to prevail on its Establishment Clause claim, plaintiff must prove two key facts: (1) anthroposophy constitutes a \u201creligion\u201d for Establishment Clause purposes; and (2) if anthroposophy is a religion, that there is an anthroposophieal curriculum at the subject public Waldorf-method schools. See Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1227 (<HOLDING>). As set forth above, the parties agreed that Holdings: 0: holding that the establishment clause forbids studentinitiated religious meetings on public secondary school property 1: holding that there is no statute of limitations for establishment clause challenges to stillexisting religious displays 2: holding no violation of federal establishment clause 3: holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause 4: recognizing that the court had to first consider whether the object in question can be defined as religious for establishment clause purposes", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Brief, 1. Klayman\u2019s response is twofold. He admits to making the income alleged by the Government but points out his annual income over that period fluctuated greatly from as low as $61,000 to $328,000. Plaintiffs Response to Gov\u2019t\u2019s Facts \u00b6 26. Secondly, he points out that for the years 2001 through 2003 the majority of the reported income constituted \u201cphantom,\u201d or passive, non-cash income passed through from Herkly, his Subchapter S corporation. See Response to Gov\u2019t\u2019s Facts \u00b6 24; Klayman Dep. 47-49 attached to Plaintiffs Response; see also Government Ex. 118-120, Form 1040 for 2001-2003, Schedule E. Neither of these reasons, however, explains why no payment at all was made toward his tax debt for the previous years. See In re Scarpiello, 240 B.R. 203, 209 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1999) (<HOLDING>); In re Lacheen, 2005 WL 1155257 *4 Holdings: 0: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety 1: holding this court generally lacks jurisdiction over the sec 6651a2 addition to tax for failure to pay tax 2: holding that failure to make any tax payment despite having resources sufficient to pay all or a substantial portion of tax liability constitutes evasion 3: holding that state and city tax evasion considered relevant conduct under conviction for federal tax evasion 4: holding that franchisees tax evasion scheme provided cause for termination", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and the court, after a noticed hearing that Michelle failed to even attend, then ordered restitution in early 2007. \u00b6 19 Unlike Alton D., this is not a case in which the juvenile court set a reasonable deadline, or for that matter any time limit, within which a restitution claim had to be submitted. See Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 19, 994 P.2d at 403, 406-07. And, unlike the situation in Kevin A., in this ease the juvenile court never indicated that \u201c \u2018restitution [would] be closed\u2019 \u201d at a certain point in time. Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, \u00b6 3, 32 P.3d at 1089; see also In re Richard B., 216 Ariz. 127, \u00b6 17, 163 P.3d 1077, 1081 (App.2007). Nor did the victim fail to comply with any deadline or other order concerning restitution. Compare Alton D., 196 Ariz. 195, \u00b6 19, 994 P.2d at 407 (<HOLDING>), and Kevin A., 201 Ariz. 161, \u00b6\u00b6 4, 8, 32 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses  1: holding that when in light of the circumstances of a particular case the court sets a reasonable deadline by which victims must present their restitution claims and supporting evidence any victim who fails to comply is barred from recovery 2: holding that a district court cannot order restitution in amounts that will result in the payment to the victim of an amount greater than the victims loss 3: holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted 4: holding that even though the victim has settled a civil claim and signed a release the state is not barred from seeking or the court from imposing reasonable restitution", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "two fundamental reasons. First, appellant\u2019s reliance on the fact that she was convicted of murder under a theory of accomplice liability is misplaced in this context. As we implicitly held in Ramsey, in determining whether Wharton\u2019s Rule applies to a substantive offense the conviction of which is based on accomplice liability, the focus must be on the underlying criminal act of the particular substantive offense rather than on the accomplice aspect of the offense. 2 Va.App. at 272, 343 S.E.2d at 470. The accompliceship itself is not the completed criminal act upon which the conviction is based but simply the means by which criminal responsibility for the completed criminal act is incurred under Code \u00a7 18.2-18. See Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1017, 121 S.E.2d 452, 458 (1961) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the accomplice aspect of the Holdings: 0: holding that a statute imposing a one dollar court cost for law enforcement on every person convicted of a crime was not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because it is reasonable that one convicted of a crime should be made to share in the improvement of agencies that society has had to employ in defense against the very acts for which he has been convicted 1: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 2: holding that code  18218 directs that an accessory before the fact is accountable in all respects as the principal who carries out the intended crime as well as any of its natural probable and incidental crimes 3: holding that before the accessory to a crime can be convicted as such it must be shown that the crime has been committed by the principal 4: holding punishment must be proportional to the crime convicted", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 20.2b, at 906 n. 21 (5th ed.2005). And, finally, the petitioner argues that the district court was required to grant her request for an evidentiary hearing under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). As a matter of statutory law, we reject the Commonwealth\u2019s importunings. Here, the petitioner adduced extensive evidence in the state court. The exact manner in which she elected to make the point is less important than the fact that she did make the point; her proffer went directly to the merits of the claims that she later sought to pursue in the federal court proceedings. We conclude, therefore, that the district court was not statutorily prohibited from taking evidence on those claims. See Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Matheney v. Anderson, 253 F.3d 1025, 1039 Holdings: 0: holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint 1: holding that  2254e2 does not apply where the petitioner diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his habeas petition but a state court prevented him from doing so 2: holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice 3: holding federal evidentiary hearing not statutorily barred when petitioner had sought to develop factual basis for claim in state court 4: holding that when a petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim but the state court denies such a hearing entitlement to a federal court hearing is analyzed pursuant to preaedpa law rather than the standards set out in  2254e2", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was the pipe cut incident, we refrain from deciding whether that incident, standing alone, would qualify as a \u201csudden and accidental\u201d release. Although we may disagree with the district court\u2019s legal analysis of the issue, because we affirm on other grounds, a further discussion by this court is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. C. The Administrative Proceedings FAG\u2019s insurance policy declares that Liberty has a duty to defend \u201cany suit against the insured seeking damages.\u201d Liberty asserts that it does not, and never did, owe an obligation to FAG to defend against agency action in administrative proceedings because those proceedings are not \u201csuits.\u201d FAG disputes this assertion, claiming that the relevant Eighth Circuit opinion, Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d at 713-14 (<HOLDING>), is no longer viable because it relies on a Holdings: 0: holding that agency litigating positions are not entitled to judicial deference when they are merely posthoc rationalizations for agency action and are advanced for the first time on appeal 1: holding that agency demand letters are not suits 2: holding that section 1823e applies only to assets and does not apply to claims regarding letters of credit because letters of credit are liabilities rather than assets 3: holding that an agency could invoke an exemption that was not previously asserted in its letters with the foiaprivacy act requester 4: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.1995). \u201c \u2018[Objections disputing] the correctness of the magistrate\u2019s recommendation but failing] to specify the findings ... believed [to be] in error\u2019 are too general.\u201d Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380). The defendant did not object to the magistrate judge\u2019s conclusion that the plaintiff established the first two elements of his prima facie case. \u201c[T]he failure to file specific objections to a magistrate\u2019s report constitutes a waiver of those objections.\u201d Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir.2004). Since the defendant did not challenge those conclusions, the Court need not address those items, since those arguments are waived, see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. Detroit Fed\u2019n of Teachers Local 231, Holdings: 0: holding that under current eleventh circuit rule the failure to object limits the scope of our appellate review to plain error review of the magistrate judges factual findings  however failure to object to the magistrate judges legal conclusions does not preclude the party from challenging those conclusions on appeal 1: holding that the failure to object to the magistrate judges report releases the court from its duty to independently review the motion 2: holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal 3: holding that failure to object in a timely fashion to a magistrate judges report and recommendation generally constitutes a waiver of the defaulting partys right to appeal provided that the parties received clear notice of the consequences of their failure to object 4: holding failure to timely object to magistrate judges recommendation waives appellate review of factual and legal questions", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "C.R.S. (2006). 2 . 25 U.S.C. \u00a7 1911(b) (2000) states: In any State court proceeding [concerning] ... an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child\u2019s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe.... 3 . Article VI, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution establishes the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver. Denver is the only county to have separate probate and juvenile courts. Other counties in Colorado handle probate and juvenile matters in their district courts. 4 . See, e.g., L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d 1271, 1274, 1277 (Colo.2000) (<HOLDING>). While L.L. was a case of guardianship in the Holdings: 0: holding foster parents not liable for willful act of their foster child 1: recognizing childrens need for stability and permanency and thus upholding placement of children in permanent guardianship of foster parents 2: holding that a superior court properly considered the childrens need for permanency a crucial need for young children in evaluating the best interests of the child in a termination proceeding 3: recognizing that prolonged pattern of failed treatment threatens childrens future stability 4: recognizing need for custodial stability and permanency planning for children adjudged dependent or neglected and removed from physical custody of their parents without terminating the parentchild relationship", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "although specifically invited to do so, the State has presented no evidence from the record that Raphael\u2019s attorney knew of the nature of the ex parte hearing and yet deliberately chose not to object. To the contrary, the record shows that the trial court did not fully inform Raphael\u2019s attorney of the nature or content of the hearing. Based on the trial court\u2019s abridged account to Raphael\u2019s attorney of its contact with I.W., along with the lack of support for the theory that Gould knew the full extent of the constitutional errors and deliberately chose not to object, we cannot say that Raphael\u2019s failure to object to the ex parte hearing and to I.W.\u2019s testimony was tactical. Because the trial court committed plain error, we recognize Raphael\u2019s constitutional claims on (E.D.Mich.19.72) (<HOLDING>); cf. J & L Diversified Enters. v. Municipality Holdings: 0: holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial 1: holding prosecutions failure to disclose promise of leniency to witness provided in exchange for that witnesss testimony violated due process 2: holding that the polices torturing of a witness until he provided incourt testimony incriminating the defendant violated the defendants right to due process 3: holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly allowed a government witness to commit perjury 4: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "901-950 [1957], for injuries sustained when he fell asleep while driving home after being required to work twenty-six hours without sleep because hazard of journey arose out of and in course of \u201cextraordinary demands of employment\u201d). See Hed v. Brockway Glass Co., 309 Minn. 73, 76 (1976) (affirming compensation award to worker who fell asleep while driving home after being required to work longer hours as bricklayer than generally required); Snowbarger v. Tri-County Elec. Coop., 793 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Mo. 1990) (affirming award of compensation to worker who fell asleep while driving home after being required to work \u201cunusually long overtime hours\u201d of manual labor, eighty-six hours in one hundred hour period). See also Deland v. Hutchings Psychiatric Ctr., 203 A.D. 2d 776, 778 (N.Y. 1994) (<HOLDING>). In all such cases, however, the employer had Holdings: 0: holding that state courts failure to discuss or even to be aware of federal precedent does not in itself render the decision contrary to federal law 1: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 2: recognizing substantial body of authority from other states and the federal courts holding that fatiguerelated injuries can be compensable in some circumstances but remanding case for explanation why contrary precedent within jurisdiction was not followed 3: holding that it is axiomatic that remanding a case to state court terminates the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy or district court over that case 4: recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has held on more than one occasion, not inconsistent with Magnolia, that the language in section 85.321\u2019s predecessor (section 13 of article 6049c) does, in fact, create a private cause of action. Turnbow v. Lamb, 95 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir.1938) (\u201cArticle 6049c, section 13, Vernon\u2019s Civil Stat. Texas, expressly recognizes and preserves to an injured party his cause of action for damages \u2018or other relief against a violator of the oil production laws.\u201d); see Sun Oil Co. v. Martin, 330 F.2d 5, 5 (5th Cir.1964) (adopting the lower court\u2019s reasoning in Sun Oil Co. v. Martin, 218 F.Supp. 618, 621-22 (S.D.Tex.1963) (explaining that a violation under section 13 of article 6049c \u201cmay give rise to an action for damages\u201d)); see also Ivey v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 36 F.Supp. 811, 816 (S.D.Tex.1941) (<HOLDING>). Although section 85.321 and section 13 of Holdings: 0: holding in accord with fifth circuit law that a plaintiff does not have standing to sue pursuant to section 13 of article 6049c if no railroad commission regulation or state law violation occurred 1: recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements 2: holding that employers have standing to sue 3: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 4: holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in the sexual battery statute, we must hold it was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment of defendant\u2019s guilt of, that offense. An arrest of judgment is proper when the indictment \u201cwholly fails to charge some offense cognizable at law or fails to state some essential and necessary element of the offense of which the defendant is found guilty.\u201d State v. Gregory, 223 N.C. 415, 418, 27 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1943). Further, \u201c[w]hen an indictment has failed to allege the essential elements of the crime charged, it has failed to give the trial court subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, and the reviewing court must arrest judgment.\u201d State v. Bullock, 154 N.C. App. 234, 244, 574 S.E.2d 17, 23 (2 t. App. 1995) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court reached a contrary result Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could be convicted of sexual battery a lesser crime not included in the offense for which he was indicted where the defendant requested that sexual battery be submitted to the jury 1: holding that when an appellant affirmatively declines a bill of particulars he can not on appeal claim that he was misled when convicted of a lesser included offense 2: holding that the defendant who was indicted for first degree rape and convicted of sexual battery had no remedy on appeal when he requested that the erroneous lesser nonincluded charge be submitted to the jury 3: holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same 4: holding there are no grounds to appeal when defendant receives the remedy he requested from the trial court", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that if the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed on July 12, 1979, the July 12, 1984 indictment was filed one day too late. Id. at 1531. Finding the Guerro decision persuasive, the Eleventh Circuit held that in conspiracy cases \u2014 whether an overt or covert act is alleged \u2014 the day following the event is when the statute of limitation begins to run. Id. at 1532-33. In a case where the conspiracy continued until July 12, 1979, the following day was the first day of the limitation period, and the indictment filed on July 12, 1984 was timely. Id. at 1533. This Circuit has long held that the day of the offense is excluded when determining the trigger date for the statute of limitation. See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 64 F.2d 950, 950-51 (9th Cir.1933) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Tawab, 984 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that an indictment returned on march 7 1930 was not barred by a threeyear limitation statute where the offense occurred on march 71927 2: holding that subsections 7751515  16 did not apply where threeyear statute of limitations expired on january 25 2006 and thus prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations 3: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 4: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities\u201d may a court assert general jurisdiction over a defendant. Id. at 318, 66 S.Ct. at 159. For example, in Helic\u00f3pteros Nacionales, the Supreme Court held that a defendant corporation\u2019s contacts with the forum state, which included the temporary physical presence of a corporate officer for contract negotiations, regular purchases of equipment and training services from a business in the forum, and personnel training in the forum, were not sufficiently continuous and systematic so that the attempted exercise of general jurisdiction would satisfy the requirements of due process. 466 U.S. at 418-19, 104 S.Ct. at 1874; cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 447-48, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418, 419, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (<HOLDING>). While the record shows that Flex-sys sold its Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks 1: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 2: holding that the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was reasonable and just when the corporations president maintained an office in the forum where he conducted activities on behalf of the company such as keeping company files holding directors meetings carrying on business correspondence and distributing salary checks drawn on forum bank accounts 3: holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation 4: holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "28-29 (homemade key designed to burglarize coin-operated machines). The Legislature cannot foresee what these objects might be. The Legislature may have intended section 16.01 to cover possession of these objects, which would otherwise go unpunished. Third, we are not convinced that the Legislature intended section 16.01 to be construed more broadly, in all respects, than the statute it replaced. Under the plain language of the former statute, it applied to objects \u201ccommonly used\u201d to commit burglary or safecracking. But under section 16.01, objects must be \u201cspecially designed, made, or adapted for use in the commission of an offense.\u201d \u201cCommonly used\u201d allows for broader application than \u201cspecially designed, made, or adapted.\u201d See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). We also note that the practice commentary Holdings: 0: holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent 1: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 2: holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used 3: recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect 4: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "evidence on you. Even if what you told us is true, a jury will still convict you of first degree murder. You\u2019ve got 12 people sitting back there and they\u2019ve read about all this stuff in the papers and, man, these people will just string you by the nape of your neck right now if they get their hands on you. Hell, we know you done it. You know you done it. We can prove it in court. Admit it. Say you\u2019re sorry. Try and get off light. That\u2019s your only recourse. Brewer, 386 So.2d at 234-35 (emphasis supplied). To advise a suspect of potential penalties and consequences does not amount to a threat. See Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d at 1475. In a similar manner, encouraging a suspect to cooperate with law enforcement is not coercive conduct. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 512 (Fla.2005) (<HOLDING>). It is recognized that advising a suspect that Holdings: 0: holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission 1: holding that parole officers advisement to defendant to cooperate did not vitiate the voluntariness of his statements 2: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendants tendered instruction regarding the voluntariness of his confession 3: holding that the defendant had no legitimate basis to justify his refusal to cooperate with his appointed attorney and therefore did not demonstrate good cause for the court to appoint substitute counsel 4: holding that habeas petition challenging the state boards decision to defer his scheduled parole release date was rendered moot by prisoners release from custody on parole and subsequent incarceration for violating his parole", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of twelve counts of mail fraud and three counts of copyright infringement, and specifically found Susel was in the business of receiving and selling stolen property. Before sentencing, Susel objected to the jury\u2019s finding, which subjected him to an increase in his base offense level under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2B1.1(b)(4), and asserted he should receive a three-level reduction for only partially completing his offense under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2X1.1(b). The district court applied the \u00a7 2B1.1(b)(4) increase, denied the \u00a7 2X1.1(b) decrease, and sentenced Susel under the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines to fifty-one months in prison and three years of supervised release. A few days after sentencing, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756-57, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The district court held a resentencing Holdings: 0: holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 1: holding guidelines to be only advisory 2: holding that the pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are purely advisory in nature 3: holding that even though the guidelines are advisory a district court must accurately calculate and consult the defendants guidelines range 4: recognizing only that the guidelines must be advisory not that judges may find no facts", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the jury\u2019s joint enterprise finding. Subsection (a)\u2019s vicarious liability language therefore cannot apply to Hospital based on a joint enterprise theory of vicarious liability. Second, also as set forth above, the instructions and definitions given to the jury in connection with the negligence question, question 2, submitted to the jury only the issue of LMS\u2019s and Hospital\u2019s direct liability. The jury did not make any other fact finding that would support the imposition of vicarious liability on LMS for Hospital\u2019s breach of its direct duties to Chesser. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 537-38 (discussing various theories of vicarious liability); accord Obstetrical & Gynecological Assocs., P.A. v. McCoy, 283 S.W.3d 96, 105 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, absent some fact finding that would Holdings: 0: holding that investigative report regarding potential premises liability claim was protected work product 1: holding that expert report failed to implicate defendant in context of plaintiffs direct liability theory and thus trial court had no discretion to grant extension but only to dismiss 2: holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation 3: recognizing that purely vicarious liability claim against entity as opposed to direct liability claim did not require expert report in addition to report filed regarding doctor employed by entity 4: holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Furthermore, Wiggins\u2019s contention violates the purpose of the notice provision to \u201cimmediately\u201d give notice of legal process: \u201cto afford [State Farm] an opportunity to control litigation.\u201d See Reeves, 539 So.2d at 256 (citation omitted). Thus, written notice to State Farm of the Incident and of Wiggins\u2019s suit was delayed by more than three years and one year, respectively. Sanders has not offered an excuse for the delay. In fact, the correspondences to State Farm by Sanders and his parents show that they did not want State Farm to be involved in the matter relating to the Incident. Although Wiggins contends that she gave written rt\u2019s declaratory judgment that a one-year delay with insufficient reasons for the delay was too late to require indemnification); Pharr, 429 So.2d at 1019\u2014 20 (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 334 So.2d at 885 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that a five month delay was unreasonable 1: holding that an eightmonth delay without excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law 2: holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law 3: holding threeyear delay without mitigating circumstances was unreasonable 4: holding inability to locate attorney who would prosecute infringement suit inadequate as matter of law to excuse delay", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "other elements required for a viable defamation claim under Louisiana state law. See Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997) (\u201cFour elements are necessary to establish a defamation cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d); see also Lee v. Pennington, 830 So.2d 1037, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding report of the plaintiffs arrest was neither false nor defamatory). Indeed, we have already concluded that there was probable cause for Thorn\u2019s arrest, and under these circumstances, Louisiana law affords police officers a qualified privilege against defamation actions. See Trentecosta, 703 So.2d at 562-64 (<HOLDING>); see also Roche v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 303 Holdings: 0: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 1: holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person 2: holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person 3: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 4: holding that police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for reporting the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being held", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.\u201d Id. However, if the allegations taken as true do not establish a violation, \u201cthere is no- necessity for further inquiries.\u201d Id. The United States Supreme Court has noted that \u201c[t]he qualified immunity standard \u2018gives ample room for mistaken judgments\u2019 by protecting \u2018all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.\u2019\u201d Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Peng alleges that Gage violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free of an unlawful seizure because Gage arrested him without probable cause. Gage arrested Peng for robbery. In California, where the arrest occurred, \u201crobbery\u201d is defined as (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Second, Peng asserts that there is a material Holdings: 0: holding that possessing property of another for the purpose of security on a debt does not give rise to probable cause to arrest 1: holding that the first amendment does not by itself give rise to a cause of action for damages 2: holding that failure to record an assignment does not give rise to a cause of action 3: holding that a dispute regarding payment of a restaurant bill does not give rise to probable cause to arrest 4: holding that arrest made with probable cause and without excessive force does not give rise to iied claim", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "since it was not brought within the statutory \u201creasonable time.\u201d W.S. 14-2-104(a)(ii). In addition, we hold that the petition is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and judicial es-toppel. In 1977, Wyoming adopted a slightly modified version of the Uniform Parentage Act, W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120. See generally, Uniform Parentage Act, 9B U.L.A. 287, 287-345 (1987 & 1991 Cum. Supp.). The Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in response to several United States Supreme Court decisions premised on the discriminatory treatment of illegitimate children and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, Holdings: 0: holding that the word tort is not technically construed and hence a fathers breach of the statutory duty to pay child support for his illegitimate child constitutes a tortious act within the meaning of the statute 1: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child 2: holding that an illegitimate child is guaranteed a right of support from his father 3: holding illegitimate child acknowledged by putative father stands on same footing as legitimate child under workers compensation statute 4: holding biological father responsible under uniform parentage act for back child support notwithstanding stepparents support of child", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a provision of CSRS that requires five years of civilian service for disability retirement eligibility. See 757 F.2d at 264-65. We rejected the argument that military service creditable under \u00a7 8332 for the purpose of calculating the proper annuity should also count as civilian service to meet the eligibility requirements of \u00a7 8337(a). Id. at 265. We explained that the five-year civilian service require ment is a \u201cthreshold standard of eligibility\u201d and only if this threshold standard is met could military service be counted to determine the appropriate annuity. Id. \u201cCongress obviously wanted only those individuals with a minimum of federal civilian service to be entitled to a federal civil service annuity.\u201d Id.; see also Tizo v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 325 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>) (citing Pub.L. No. 80-426, \u00a7 5, 62 Stat. 48, Holdings: 0: holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service 1: holding that under the 1948 version of csrs civil servants were required to meet the fiveyear service requirement exclusive of military service  2: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 3: holding military service disability payments are community property 4: holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Defendant asserts that the 1991 Amendments to Title VII do not apply to \u00a7 1981 claims, and therefore that a successful mixed-motive defense is still a complete bar to liability under \u00a7 1981. The Second Circuit has not directly addressed this question. However, that court has concluded that \u00a7 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to retaliation claims under Title VII, see Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2000), nor to claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), see DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.1993). Other circuits that have directly addressed this question have concluded that the 1991 Amendments do not apply to \u00a7 1981. See Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No. 1996, 176 F.3d 1357, 1357 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 Fed.Appx. Holdings: 0: holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively 1: holding that the  1981 amendments contained in  101 of the civil rights act of 1991 do not apply retroactively 2: holding that 1991 amendments to other aspects of  3910114lai clarified intent of 1988 amendments to statute 3: holding that a plaintiff could not assert a  1981 claim based on gender discrimination 4: holding that the 1991 mixedmotive amendments do not apply to  1981 based on an independent analysis of the amendments and  1981", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "causation in the context of a claim based on the principles of informed consent doctrine. That concession, therefore, does not extend to the determination of plaintiffs\u2019 wrongful birth claim. Plaintiffs contend that the PDR, which contained specific warnings that Provera could cause bilateral limb reduction, the retention of a defective ovum, and general genetic anomalies, constituted evidence of the standard of care governing the doctors\u2019 duty of disclosure. In determining what constitutes a medically accepted risk when defining a doctor\u2019s duty to warn, we have recognized that the PDR, standing alone, is not and should not be the touchstone of what risks a physician must reveal to his or her patient. See Morlino v. Medical Ctr. of Ocean County, 152 N.J. 563, 580, 706 A.2d 721 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that the PDR contained Holdings: 0: holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care 1: holding that because pdr warnings are written for many reasons including compliance with fda requirements advertisement the provision of useful information to physicians and an attempt to limit the manufacturers liability pdr warning alone does not establish physicians duty of care 2: holding physicianpatient privilege does not apply to nurses or other medical staff working under physicians supervision or acting as physicians agent 3: holding that nontreating physicians opinions are entitled to little weight when contradictory to treating physicians opinions and will not constitute substantial evidence standing alone 4: holding that emtala does not provide a private cause of action against individual physicians or against physicians medical corporations", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "would result in direct and immediate hardship and would entail more than possible financial loss. \" Winter, 900 F.2d at 1325. The district court found DSC\u2019s risk of additional seizures and injunction actions \u201ctoo speculative to warrant judicial intervention.\u201d DSC claims the district court erred in failing to distinguish between the potential risks of tentative FDA policy statements and the very real liabilities imposed by a final, announced enforcement position and actual seizures. Again, DSC\u2019s position assumes that the FDA has made a final determination as to the general status of CoQlO. In light of our rejection of DSC\u2019s finality argument, we hold the district court correctly found that DSC failed to show sufficient hardship to require bypassing final agency 86 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The cases are also distinguishable on the Holdings: 0: holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action 1: holding a rod to be final agency action 2: holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action 3: holding a general prediction set forth in order does not constitute final agency action 4: holding that epa regions policy statement does not constitute final agency action because it does not compel action", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rather than among investors.\u201d (citing Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1978)), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir.1990) (per curiam); Waterman v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 643 F.Supp. 797, 803 n. 6 (E.D.N.C.1986) (\u201cA common enterprise exists where the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts of and success of the party seeking the investment or of a third party.\u201d (citing SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.1974)), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir.1987) (table). Other courts, although not directly addressing the issue whether vertical commonality alone is sufficient, have indicated which approach to vertical commonality they follow. See In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F.Supp. 1192, 1248 (E.D.Va.1988) (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part and rev\u2019d in part on other Holdings: 0: holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller 1: holding that there was no common venture where the fortunes of the purchasers were not tied to the fortunes of the seller 2: holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation 3: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 4: holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in that year for EARN centers had worked out financially. PWDC\u2019s President\u2019s statement that many of the EARN centers \u201cearned above the contract amount in certain performance benchmarks\u201d and that those payments \u201c \u2018busted\u2019 the budget\u201d could have given the jury a basis for accepting KRA\u2019s interpretation of the contract. (App. at 2586.) If performance payments had \u201cbusted\u201d the budget, then the jury could have concluded that PWDC had not eabined profit to 10% and had instead allowed contractors to keep all of their profits. But even if the District Court should have allowed the e-mail into evidence, the error was harmless. It is highly likely that the admission of the e-mail would not have altered the jury verdict. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985) (<HOLDING>). While the e-mail could have supported KRA\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that bia error is harmless when it is highly probable that error did not affect cases outcome 1: holding that noneonstitutional errors in civil suits are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case 2: holding that it is an abuse of discretion to make errors of law or clear errors of factual determination 3: holding that instructional errors that are trial errors are subject to harmless error analysis 4: holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "common area premises where the marijuana was actually found were accurately described in the search warrant. Trial counsel does not provide ineffective assistance by failing to make a meritless objection. Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Mo. banc 2009). \u201c[Before an individual can challenge a search and seizure, he or she must establish that he or she had a \u2018legitimate expectation\u2019 of privacy in the area searched or the items seized.\u201d State v. Martin, 892 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Mo.App. W.D.1995) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). \u201c[TJenants of multifamily dwellings have no legitimate expectation of privacy in common or shared areas.\u201d U.S. v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir.2002); U.S. v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Movant lived in an apartment complex where he Holdings: 0: holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party 1: holding that in a multifamily dwelling where other residents had access to a basement storage locker there was no legitimate expectation of privacy 2: holding common areas of a storage facility not entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy because any tenant could invite anyone in 3: holding that even though student had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker school officials properly conducted a warrantless search of the students locker because the officials had probable cause to believe that the locker contained marijuana 4: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "2112, 2189 (\"[traditionally, the interest of truth in the administration of justice has been subordinated in the law to the interest of preserving privileged communications where [certain] relationships have been involved: ... husband-wife_ [18 U.S.C. \u00a72517(4)] is intended to vary the existing law only to the extent that an otherwise privileged communication does not lose its privileged character because it is intercepted by a stranger\"). See also 18 Pa. C.S.A. \u00a7 5711 (\"[n]o otherwise privileged communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.\u201d); U.S. v. Geller, 560 F.Supp. 1309, 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd, 3rd Cir., 745 F.2d 49 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109, 105 S.Ct. 786, 83 L.Ed.2d 780 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 28 . 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d Holdings: 0: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 1: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 2: holding 18 pacsa  7508 effectuates the legislative purpose of reducing drug crimes 3: holding that 18 pacsa  5711 and its federal counterpart 18 usc  25174 prevent the government from introducing recordings of communications between spouses resulting from tap on third partys telephone 4: holding that the relating to parenthetical in 18 usc  1961 was merely to aid identification of 18 usc  2314 rather than to limit its application", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "distanced Issa from the egregious crimes that occurred inside the victims\u2019 home and best explained why Issa\u2019s blood was found outside on the fence but was not conclusively matched with any of the blood found inside the home. And this is exactly the kind of 8 SE2d 840) (2014) (same). 43 Alvelo, 290 Ga. at 615 (5) (punctuation omitted); accord Wheeler, 327 Ga. App. at 318 (3). 44 See OCGA \u00a7 17-8-58 (b); see also State v. Alvarez, 299 Ga. 213, 214 (1) (790 SE2d 66) (2016) (noting that when trial counsel fails to object to a jury cha Jefferson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 842, 852 (6) (720 SE2d 184) (2011); see Whitaker v. State, 283 Ga. 521, 524 (3) (661 SE2d 557) (2008) (noting that the fact that a defen itted); see Parks, 281 Ga. App. at 681 (2) (same). 53 See Whitaker, 283 Ga. at 524-25 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jefferson, 312 Ga. App. at 853 (6) (same). 54 Holdings: 0: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial and instead giving a curative instruction when an improper comment on a defendants silence was not directed to any particular statement or defense offered by the defendant was made during the witnesss explanation of the course of events and did not have the effect of being probative on the issue of guilt or innocence 2: holding court did not abuse discretion in deciding to deal with the jurors note solely by giving a curative instruction when there was no evidence of misconduct or prejudice 3: holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail 4: holding that comment on defendants silence was not reversible error because inter alia it did not have the effect of being probative on guilt or innocence", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "theory of the case, any weakness or implausibility in that theory is a matter for the jury, not for the court. See Folger v. State, 648 P.2d at 113. Admittedly, there are some exceptions to this doctrine where the defense of necessity is concerned. There are several Alaska eases which conclude that trial judges did not abuse their discretion in refusing to give necessity defenses. However, we believe that a close reading of those cases establishes that the defendants in those cases had clear legal alternatives to violating the law. See Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 980 (Alaska 1979) (finding that defendant had several lawful alternatives and that \u201c[t]he seriousness of the offenses committed by Nelson were disproportionate to the situation he faced.\u201d); Schnabel, 663 P.2d at 966 (<HOLDING>); Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1081 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 1: holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available 2: holding that defendant had adequate alternatives in judicial and administrative remedies to the course he took 3: holding that requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is appropriate where doing so can protect administrative agency authority and promote judicial efficiency 4: holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relevant law of the two states is similar. Robinson bases its argument that the Committee lacks standing on the holding in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1991), that when \u201ca bankrupt corporation has joined with a third party in defrauding its creditors, the trustee cannot recover against the third party for the damage to the creditors.\u201d Moreover, when the alleged malfeasor is the corporation\u2019s sole shareholder and decision-maker, the Wagoner rule bars the trustee from suing even if the trustee claims that the debtor was harmed because, in that situat kruptcy trustee had no standing to sue a professional for aiding and abetting the unlawful investment activity of the president and sole shareholder of the bankrupt company); Mediators, 105 F.3d at 822 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the Committee, citing Reider v. Holdings: 0: holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel 1: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 2: holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank 3: holding that the creditors committee could not sue third party aidersandabettors because the participation of the sole shareholder and decisionmaker of the debtor rendered the debtor a participant 4: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "holds, that the placement of traffic control devices is a discretionary duty. Because the placement of traffic control devices, i.e., the road construction signs, is a discretionary duty, \u00a7 11 \u2014 46\u20149(1)(d) applies, and Hinds cannot be liable \u201cwhether or not the discretion be abused.\u201d Even if an abuse of discretion standard were to apply to the placement of the road construction signs, the Court would find that Hinds did not abuse its discretion. The Court is aware that such a finding would require the Court to engage in fact finding. However, the Court finds that even if an abuse of discretion standard applied, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Hinds is liable for the placement of the road construction signs. See Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir.2004)(<HOLDING>). The Court reaches this conclusion after Holdings: 0: holding that a nonmovant could not oppose a summary judgment motion with an unauthenticated letter 1: holding that on appeal a nonmovant need not have answered or responded to the motion for summary judgment to contend that the movants summaiy judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment 2: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 3: holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant 4: holding courts review motion for summary judgment in light most favorable to nonmovant", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "recordings made by a participant to the conversation who was \u201cacting under color of law.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(2)(c). Second, \u00a7 2511(2)(d) allows the use of recordings made by participants in a conversation unless that party had a \u201ccriminal or tortious\u201d purpose in making the recording. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2511(2)(d). Because we find that Whitacre acted under color of law, we do not need to reach the second possibility. The government asserts that Whitacre was acting as a cooperating witness, and therefore under color of law, from November 1992 through the end of the conspiracy. See Obron Atlantic Corp. v. Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 864 (6th Cir.1993) (allowing use of tape recordings made by corporate executive in price-fixing investigation); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1582 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d 319, 322 Holdings: 0: holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording 1: holding that cooperating witness under direction of fbi was acting under color of law 2: holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca 3: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 4: holding intentional gender discrimination in public employment by persons acting under color of state law violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and is actionable under section 1983", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). First, banks like Regions are not subject to LUTPA, which provides that: The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or any licensee of the Office of Financial Institutions, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility regulatory body, the commissioner of financial institutions, the insurance commissioner, the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal banking regulators who possess authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. La. R.S. 51:1406; see Bank One, N.A. v. Colley, 294 F.Supp.2d 864, 868 (M.D.La.2003) (<HOLDING>); State Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana, Holdings: 0: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under missouri law 1: holding that a national banking association chartered by or under the authority of the united states was exempt from the lutpa as a matter of law 2: recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys 3: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law 4: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Restitution Order In issue three, appellant argues that the trial court had no authority to compel appellant, as a condition of probation, to make restitution to anyone other than DBS, the named complainant. A trial court may not order restitution to be paid to a person who was not a victim of the charged offense. Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 677-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). In order to preserve error concerning a probation order, however, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918, 921 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (stating if defendant wishes to complain about appropriateness of trial court\u2019s restitution order, he must do so in trial court); see also Lemos v. State, 27 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence in the record to reflect Holdings: 0: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial 1: holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal 2: holding that party waived complaint regarding instruction where it did not raise specific objection 3: holding that a complaint is waived by the failure to object during the witness unsworn testimony 4: holding defendant waived complaint", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "agencies have some procedural limitations on their discretion, it does not follow that substantively they have no discretion. Such a conclusion is overly formalistic and ignores the on-the-ground reality that DSHS was the party that had control over the formula for authorized service hours. \u00b626 As described above, when a party has discretion over a future contract term, it has an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in setting and performing that contractual term. Here, the contract provided that service providers wo the duty of good faith did not apply to a landlord\u2019s refusal to consent to a lease agreement when the contract gave the landlord the unconditional right to do so); Seattle-First Nat\u2019l Bank v. Westwood Lumber, Inc., 65 Wn. App. 811, 820, 822-23, 829 P.2d 1152 (1992) (<HOLDING>). DSHS relies heavily on Monotype Corp. v. Holdings: 0: holding that course of dealing may render uncertain terms sufficiently definite 1: recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties bargain in fact but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties 2: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 3: holding that the trial court erred by imposing a duty of good faith on seattlefirst in relation to a course of dealing when that course of dealing conflicted with the express terms of the contract 4: holding that duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend to thirdparty claimant", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Giordano, 41 Fed.Appx. 522, 522-28 (2d Cir.2002) (reviewing application of rebuttable presumption for plain error (if at all) where defendant failed to object to it at detention hearing); United States v. Guebara, 15 Fed.Appx. 584, 589 (10th Cir.2001) (reviewing issue that was not raised at bond revocation proceedings for plain error). Under plain-error review, in the light of the lack of authority in this, or any other, circuit regarding whether the rebuttable presumption is limited only to cases whose facts involve actual minor victims (again, Emmons\u2019 conduct involved undercover agents), the district court could not have plainly erred in applying the rebuttable presumption in favor of detention pursuant to \u00a7 3142(e). See United States v. Hull, 160 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). As discussed, Emmons\u2019 alternative contention Holdings: 0: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 1: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 2: holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error 3: holding that omission was not plain error 4: holding that an error whose identification requires the extension of precedent is not plain", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued Plaintiff failed to show a vegan diet is central or indispensable to the practice of Buddhism. (Defendants\u2019 .Brief in Support at 4-6.) The Magistrate Judge concluded \u201c[wjhile a reasonable juror could perhaps conclude that such is the case, the evidence of record more than supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs religious beliefs are sincerely (and intensely) held.\u201d (R & R at 894.) Defendants object, arguing whether a belief is sincerely held is a distinct issue from whether the belief is central to the practice of a religious faith. Defendants reassert that Plaintiff has not established that his request for a vegan diet is central to the practice of his religious faith. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review 1: holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case in a religious discrimination suit because among other reasons employer hired someone else with identical religious practices 2: holding the plaintiffs failed to establish the centrality or indispensability to their religious observances of the location at issue 3: holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status 4: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by insured; insured not directed by government to remediate site; action against insured by those remediating the property pursuant to government cleanup directive; held: suit for \"damages\"). Under Hills, there is insurance coverage in connection with this second category of sites. \u00b6 7. The third category presents a situation where the insured is responsible for at least part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, and has been directed by a government to remediate the site, but has not done so. The insured is sued by the government to recover money it spent to clean up the site. There is no insurance coverage in connection with the scenarios encompassed by category three. Regent Ins. Co. v. City of Manitowoc, 205 Wis. 2d 450, 463, 556 N.W.2d 405 (Ct. App. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Johnson Controls argues that the supreme Holdings: 0: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a  106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution 1: holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a  113f contribution action 2: holding that the plaintiffs suit for workrelated costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree was a contribution action under  113f 3: holding plans suit against law firm for constructive trust was a suit for appropriate equitable relief 4: holding that where the government sues an insured to recover incurred cleanup costs under  107a4a of the cercla  or to impose a plan for remediation that action is not a suit for damages but is rather a suit for equitable monetary relief", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at the car wash, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (finding relevant characteristics of the location may be considered in assessing reasonable suspicion); (4) both men were wearing heavy cotton, dark-colored hoodies with their hoods pulled over their heads on a very warm night, see Lee v. Hefner, 136 Fed.Appx. 807, 809-10 (6th Cir.2005) (affirming the district court\u2019s finding of reasonable suspicion where one of the factors cited by the officer was that the suspect was \u201cwearing dark clothing\u201d); (5) Royal and Kelley were visibly nervous, sweating profusely, and had given evasive answers to the officers\u2019 questions, see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (\u201c[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.\u201d); Waldon, 206 F.3d at 604 (<HOLDING>); and (6) the officers observed what appeared Holdings: 0: recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion 1: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 2: holding that nervous evasive behavior such as flight is a relevant factor in an examination of reasonable suspicion 3: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion 4: recognizing a defendants giving of evasive answers when asked what he was doing in the area as a factor establishing reasonable suspicion", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "six or seven months, they purchased approximately one-half of a kilogram of cocaine to split; (2) Bolware and Chisolm also purchased cocaine powder from an individual named \u201cB\u201d on 20 to 40 different occasions, and Bolware estimated that they received over 50 kilograms of cocaine from \u201cB\u201d; and (3) McCloud testified that on approximately 20 occasions from January through June 2006, he would buy 4 or 5 crack cocaine \u201ccookies,\u201d which were approximately 21 to 23 grams each, from Chisolm and Bolware. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chisolm conspired to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base between April 17, 2006, and June 3, 2008. See Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1333; Thompson, 422 F.3d at 1292 (<HOLDING>). Because the evidence was sufficient for a Holdings: 0: holding that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a cocaine conspiracy conviction 1: holding that simple possession of cocaine is not lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute 2: holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 3: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 4: holding that sufficient evidence supported conspiracy because the government established the existence of a continuing relationship between mr stratton and ms thompson in which mr stratton would supply ms thompson cocaine the bulk of which she would distribute to customers", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. The State presented insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for possession of alcohol by a minor under section 562.111, Florida Statutes. See State v. Williams, 742 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Even considering the relatively low burden of Holdings: 0: recognizing that evidence regarding the high price the defendant had paid for the substance in question was relevant to show the substance was cocaine 1: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 2: holding that quantity of the controlled substance does not have to be measurable to support a conviction for possession of such controlled substance particularly when the immeasurable amount of the substance is found on an implement used to consume the substance 3: holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance 4: holding to prove possession the state must show that a defendant possessed a certain substance the substance was illegal and he had knowledge of the presence of the substance", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "reasoning is nonetheless apropos in cases of addiction. Where the State seeks to introduce drug addiction without first establishing a defendant\u2019s identity as the culprit, his drug addiction has no relevance or probative value as to the motive of an otherwise unknown culprit. In other words, without a sufficient identification of the defendant as the intruder, the necessary chain of reasoning breaks and we need not reach the relationship between drug addiction and motive. In the absence of some identification of the defendant as the intruder, his heroin addiction, though introduced to show motive, would necessarily fill in the missing logical gaps that Rule 404(b) requires a prosecutor to fill. See Gould v. State, 579 P.2d 535, 539 (Alaska 1978) (introduction of heroin (Kan. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Adkins v. Com., 96 S.W.3d 779, 783-85, 793 Holdings: 0: holding evidence of defendants prior drug use and heroin addiction admissible to establish defendants motive to commit robbery 1: holding that the defendants prior distribution of crack was admissible to prove that he had intent and knowledge regarding crack found in a gym bag 2: holding crack cocaine addiction admissible to prove motive to kill and rob when accomplice identified defendant and defendants cell mates testified she had admitted her actions 3: holding evidence of defendants gambling losses and extramarital affair admissible to show motive to kill when he admitted to police that he drugged and robbed murder victims but claimed he did not kill them 4: holding rap recordings about dealing cocaine were relevant to show knowledge and motive when the defendant testified he had never purchased or sold cocaine", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argue that they cannot be exempt even though salaried because AEP requires them to account for at least 40 hours of work each week and to make up for partial-day absence either by working extra hours or by taking vacation time or paid time off. An employer may require exempt salaried employees to make up for time missed from work due to personal business. It is only when an employer actually deducts from an employee\u2019s paycheck that the employee is ineligible for the exemption. See, e.g., Cowart v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 213 F.3d 261, 265-66 (5th Cir.2000) (finding that employees who were required to make up personal time off and suffered no salary deductions for the lost time were paid on a salary basis); Haywood v. North Amer. Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because the planners concede that AEP has not Holdings: 0: holding that provisions protecting classified service employees from administrative demotion or discipline did not preclude reclassification of employees and warning against misinterpretation of scope of protections afforded to employees where protections apply only to administrative actions such as the promotion or discipline of employees they do not limit or preclude the city councils legislative authority to make necessary policy and budget decisions they do not somehow override the express authority for the city councils actions  and thus they do not create a constitutionallyprotected property interest that prohibits the city council from passing the ordinance at issue in this case 1: holding that the first amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employees expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities 2: holding that the regulations prohibit only monetary discipline of exempt employees 3: recognizing right of this court to regulate and discipline members of the bar 4: holding that threatening to discipline employees for not reporting union solicitation violated  8a1", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "whether to order the prisoner\u2019s removal in this category of cases, \u2018it follows that such a case may proceed without attendance by the prisoner-parent.\u2019 \u201d (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 599.) Counsel could have rightly perceived that the court was not under a mandatory obligation to order father\u2019s removal, and thus any objection to proceeding without him would have been futile. 2. Findmg of Intent to Abandon Under Section 7822 Father also contends the trial court erred because it could not terminate his parental rights without a finding of intent to abandon under section 7822. Father argues that, without this finding, there was no showing of parental unfitness as required by Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216] (Kelsey S.) (<HOLDING>). As we explain in part 1. of the Discussion, Holdings: 0: holding that due process allows parental rights to be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of unfitness 1: holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 2: holding that a father who impregnated his childs mother in the usual and customary manner after signing a preconception agreement to forego parental responsibilities was not merely a sperm donor and thus was not statutorily bound to give away his parental rights 3: holding that petitioner could maintain his action seeking parental rights and responsibilities under rsa chapter 461a notwithstanding his lack of biological relationship to the child so long as he alleges sufficient facts to establish his status as a parent by other means 4: holding that if an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities  emotional financial and otherwise  his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.3d at 217 \u2014 18 (classifying the \u201cradio dispatch tape made during defendant\u2019s arrest\u201d as potentially useful evidence). Generett has given us no reason why the LeSabre or its contents plainly would exculpate him and indeed he has not even cited Brady v. Maryland in his brief to this court. Generett fares no better under the \u201cpotentially exculpatory evidence\u201d test. Most importantly, he has given us no reason to believe that the government officials acted in bad faith by auctioning off the LeSabre in this case. The record reveals no evidence of a \u201ccalculated effort to circumvent [Brady\u2019s] disclosure requirements\u201d or \u201cofficial animus\u201d or a \u201cconscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.\u201d Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488,104 S.Ct. 2528; Young-blood, 488 U.S. at 58; Jobson, 102 F.3d at 218 (<HOLDING>); cf. Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that instruction was not supported by the evidence and was properly refused where the defendant never seriously argued that the police exercised bad faith in failing to preserve evidence and the police gave a reasonable explanation 1: recognizing that even where the plaintiff presents evidence of selective treatment failure to demonstrate malice or bad faith requires dismissal of the claim 2: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 3: holding that officers were not justified in conducting a protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest despite the defendants alleged involvement with narcotics and possession of weapons because the defendant did not resist and there was no noise or other evidence suggesting anyone else was present in the house 4: holding that despite the governments dilatory response to defendants discovery requests the government did not act in bad faith because there is no evidence that anyone  suspected that the tape was exculpatory and the tape was erased not as a result of malice but routine police department policy", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "conspiracy of which he was a part. In affirming the trial court\u2019s conviction, we held that the defendant\u2019s actual participation [in the conspiracy] (answering telephone, taking drug orders and referring buyers to the independent contractors, delivering and selling drugs, as well as occasionally picking up drug shipments and preparing packages for sale) in [the] drug trafficking conspiracy went well beyond that of a simple buyer-seller relationship. The full activities of the drug conspiracy were not only reasonably foreseeable to [the defendant], but were also performed in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and advanced an objective within the scope of the conspiracy that he joined. Id. at 1327. See also United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1206 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In the ease under consideration, Gray-Bey\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding defendant responsible for conspiracys entire drug quantity where defendant played managerial role in the conspiracy coordinated drug distribution and shared in conspiracys profits 1: holding defendant responsible for conspiracys entire drug quantity where defendant played managerial role in conspiracy coordinated drug distribution and shared in conspiracys profits 2: holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy 3: holding that defendant is liable for entire quantity of drugs attributable to conspiracy in circumstances where defendant is one of conspiracys central figures 4: holding that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three graduated penalty subsections of 21 usc  841b applies to defendants convicted of a  846 drug conspiracy the jury must be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a veteran-friendly procedure that would enable accrued-benefits beneficiaries to more readily substitute, and that a more restrictive procedure for requesting substitution may thwart Congress\u2019s objectives in enacting section 5121 A. Nevertheless, although the Secretary notified Mrs. Reliford that she could waive the right to submit additional evidence, he did not notify her that she could waive substitution, in contravention of his policy. Thus, the Court holds that the Board erred by failing to follow the Secretary\u2019s own established procedures. See Morton, supra. The Court is cognizant of its statutory duty to take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7261(b)(2) (requiring the Court to \u201ctake due account of the rule of prejudicial error\u201d); Shinseki v. 06 (2005) (<HOLDING>). These matters are to be provided expeditious Holdings: 0: recognizing that the necessary inquiry  is not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one but whether there was probable cause for the arrest 1: holding that the existence of our jurisdiction turns on whether the claim was reasonably raised to the board and remanding for determination of whether the claim was reasonably raised when there was an evidentiary factual basis therefor 2: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability 4: holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the board either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "federal officials. Under Alabama forfeiture law, cash is considered fungible and may be replaced by a monetary instrument such as a cashier\u2019s check. Section 15-5-63, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Comprehensive Criminal Proceeds Forfeiture Act, \u00a7 15-5-60 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, provides, in part: \u201c(5)a. In cases where the property to be forfeited is cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, or other like fungible property, it shall not be necessary for the state to identify the specific property, other than as U.S. currency, cash, monetary instruments in bearer form, or as funds deposited in an account in a financial institution, involved in the of urrency and $20.00 in Canadian Currency, 103 F.3d 902, 905 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Although \u201c[i]t behooves authorities to Holdings: 0: holding that the cashiers check was an appropriate fungible surrogate for the seized currency 1: holding that drawer of check is liable only for the amount originally stated by drawer on check even though the drawers negligence facilitated the wrongful alteration of the amount on the check and the payment of a larger amount to the payee 2: holding that investigation was insufficient prior to prosecution for forgery of check 3: holding that a payment made by certified check rather than the customary regular check was outside the ordinary course of dealings between the parties 4: holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Graves \u201chad many chances.\u201d R.N., T.N.\u2019s father, testified that Graves\u2019s behavior with Billy was \u201cvery peculiar,\u201d such as \u201criding around the countryside when he should be in school. Putting him up in an apartment. And telling other people that that\u2019s his son.\u201d R.N. further testified that he was \u201cnot alleging\u201d that Graves used Billy for \u201csexual reasons.\u201d None of these statements constitutes evidence of an extraneous offense. Rather, each of the witnesses denied knowledge of any improper conduct with other boys. Accordingly, with respect to Graves\u2019s relationships with other boys, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that the State must prove extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Prior Convictions During punishment, the Holdings: 0: holding that under the bail reform act for a defendant to have been convicted of two or more offenses constituting crimes of violence offenses must have been committed on different occasions 1: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 2: holding that trial courts instruction implying that the jury had to be unanimous in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment violated defendants constitutional rights because this instruction could have been clearerand should have been 3: holding that such an instruction is a useless act if no unadjudicated offenses have been introduced 4: holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "any cases addressing the issue of whether section 574.037 is a provision pertinent to an article 46.03, section 4(d)(5) proceeding, and therefore applies to such a proceeding. Based on the unambiguous language of the Texas Mental Health Code and article 46.03, we conclude that section 574.037 is a provision of the Texas Mental Health Code pertinent and applicable to a proceeding under article 46.03, section 4(d)(5). Section 574.037 is contained in a sub-chapter entitled, \u201cPROCEEDINGS FOR COURT-ORDERED . MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES.\u201d See Tex. Health & Safety Code \u00a7\u00a7 574.031-.037. Courts of appeals have determined that five of the seven sections in this subchapter apply to proceedings under article 46.03 regarding court-ordered mental health services. See id; Campbell, 118 S.W.3d at 801-03 (<HOLDING>); Campbell, 68 S.W.3d at 757 n. 3 (stating that Holdings: 0: holding that a single ballot question encompassing amendments to both article i section 9 and article v section 10c violated the separatevote requirement 1: recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations 2: holding that article 4603 section 4d5 hearing was required to be conducted pursuant to the texas mental health code 3: holding  574032 574035 and 574036 applied to one of campbells prior hearings under article 4603 section 4d5 4: holding that a party could not pursue an employment discrimination claim under one article of a labor agreement when the complaint was framed exclusively in terms of another article of the same agreement", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "protections that Miranda affords. A. The holding in Edwards v. Arizona makes clear the unreasonableness of the state court decision. As required by that case, Sessoms \u201cexpressed his desire\u201d for the assistance of counsel, and was therefore \u201cnot subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel [had] been made available to him.\u201d Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. \u201cInvocation of the Miranda right to counsel \u2018requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.\u2019 \u201d Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (<HOLDING>). These decisions, which constitute clearly Holdings: 0: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 1: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires 2: recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim 3: holding that if a suspect indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning 4: holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and is guaranteed by the constitution.\u201d We further held: The provision of the constitution must be construed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to the records, and that access can be denied only when a law, specifically and unequivocally, provides otherwise. Whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public\u2019s right to see. To allow otherwise would be an improper and arbitrary restriction on the public\u2019s constitutional rights. Id. Since Title Research Corp., we have reaffirmed that \u201cthe public has a constitutional right of access to court records.\u201d Copeland I, supra, 930 So.2d at 941 (citing Title Research Corp., supra); In re John Doe, 96-2222 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 900, 901(<HOLDING>) However, the fact that a document is filed in Holdings: 0: holding that factual pleadings on this issue are weak but sufficient 1: recognizing this as the general rule 2: recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court 3: holding that draft pleadings are not subject to public records disclosure 4: holding that as a general rule pleadings filed in this court are public records and are not subject to being sealed", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that order. 2. GM II Having resolved the question of whether this court had jurisdiction to issue the original writ of mandamus, we turn to the relatively more straightforward question of whether we have jurisdiction to issue the writ for which petitioners now pray. We conclude that we do. Our jurisdiction is premised, as it was in GM I, on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651(a). Under that act, the courts of appeals have the authority to, inter alia, issue writs of mandamus to district courts to ensure compliance with earlier mandates. U.S. v. Cannon (In re U.S.), 807 F.2d 1528, 1529 (11th Cir.1987); Oswald v. McGarr, (In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation), 620 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (7th Cir.1980). Cf. In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 192-93 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). GM premises its current request for a writ of Holdings: 0: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 1: recognizing authority but declining to issue writ 2: recognizing that laches is a proper ground for refusing to issue a writ of mandamus 3: recognizing a split of authority on this issue 4: recognizing the two lines of child custody cases but declining to resolve conflict", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and upheld the Commission\u2019s regulations. Id. at 1143. We observe that before 1989, courts that reviewed programs designed to test police officers for drug use differed about whether the officers fell within the highly regulated industry exception. Compare Policemen\u2019s Benevolent Ass\u2019n of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d. 133, 136-41 (3d Cir.1988) (\u201cPBA Local 318\u201d) (finding that police are members of highly-regulated industry and upholding suspicionless drug testing of police officers), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L. Ed.2d 153 (1989) with Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.Supp. 1507, 1518-19 (D.N.J.1986) (finding that fire fighters are not members of pervasively regulated industry), and FOP, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 469, 524 A.2d 430. (<HOLDING>). This divergence in views depended on the Holdings: 0: recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court 1: holding that police officers are not members of highly regulated industry 2: holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity 3: holding that extensively regulated public utilities are not state actors 4: holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an agreement, it is not contained within the record. Instead, the bystander\u2019s report simply indicates that the parties agreed that the trial court \u201cwould hear all three cases together.\u201d Therefore, based upon my review of the record, it is apparent that the trial court conducted a single trial of all three cases. See People v. Lopez, 367 Ill. App. 3d 817, 819 (2006) (noting that appellant has burden of providing sufficiently complete record to support claims of error and that any doubts that may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against appellant). By agreeing to a single trial on all of the cases, defendant cannot now complain that the trial court heard evidence of defendant\u2019s conduct in the other cases. See People v. Gresham, 104 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Finally, I disagree with the majority\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal 1: holding that defendants failure to file a motion to sever waives objection to single trial on multiple charges 2: holding failure to assert an objection based upon the confrontation clause at trial waives the issue for appeal 3: holding that failure to file a postjudgment motion on alleged error of law relating to ruling on exception to the statute of frauds that was committed for first time in the judgment waives any objection to that ruling and that in the absence of any other formal objection the issue is not preserved for appellate review 4: holding that defendants general objection to states specific questions regarding defendants failure to appear before grand jury was sufficient to put trial court on notice of objection based on defendants constitutional right to remain silent", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "they expressly state or overwhelmingly imply that KSU waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. To resolve this dispute, we must evaluate whether a state may waive immunity by its affirmative conduct in the context of a federal. program or whether Edelman mandates that a state can waive only by express statements or overwhelming implication in its statutory or constitutional text. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238. n. 1 & 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Several Supreme Court decisions. provide that neither receipt of federal funds, participation in a federal program, nor an agreement to recognize and abide by federal laws, regulations, and guidelines is alone sufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47, 105 S.Ct. 3142 (<HOLDING>); Florida Dep\u2019t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Holdings: 0: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds 1: holding the requisite connection was met with proof that the city received federal funds for housing and urban development programs and the corrupt payments at issue concerned real estate transactions also without specifying which federal grant provided the jurisdictional basis 2: holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court 3: holding that participation in federal programs and receipt of federal funds under such programs fall far short of manifesting a clear intent  to waive immunity 4: holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Althen, 418 F.3d at 1278 (requiring that a petitioner show \u201ca medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury\u201d); see also Pafford v. Health & Human Servs., 451 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2006) (asking, under the first Althen element, \u201ccan [the] vaccine(s) at issue cause the type of injury alleged?\u201d (internal quotation omitted)). Even if Dr. Shoenfeld\u2019s testimony satisfied the first prong of Althen, under the very deferential standard of review afforded the decision of the special master, it was not arbitrary and capricious for him to find Dr. Maclaren\u2019s testimony more credible than that of Dr. Shoenfeld, and thereby give substantial weight to Dr. Maelaren\u2019s rejection of a causal link between the MMR vaccine and Petitioner\u2019s Type 1 diabetes. See Lampe, 219 F.3d at 1360 (<HOLDING>); see also Crutchfield, 2014 WL 1665227, at *10 Holdings: 0: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the united states court of federal claims may not reweigh the factual evidence quoting munn 970 f2d at 871 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud 3: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 4: holding that plaintiffs negligence claims sounded in tort and thus could not be transferred to the united states court of federal claims", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Property (Mortgage ) \u00a7 5.1(a), an \u201cassumption of liability\u201d means \u201ca promise by the transferee of mortgaged real estate, whether made to the transferor or to the mortgagee, to perform the obligation secured-by the mortgage.\u201d (emphasis added); see also Burlington State Bank v. Tucker, 76 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1934, writ refused) (\u201cHer father\u2019s obligation would not under said statute become her personal obligation; but she could, for the protection of her inheritance, validly assume it ....\u201d). Wells Fargo cites several cases stating that every party to a contract must agree to modify that contract. See, e.g., Powell v. Thompson, 130 Tex. 577, 112 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex.1938); Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 22 1, 193 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1938, writ dism\u2019d) (<HOLDING>). Struble was not a necessary party to the Holdings: 0: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 1: holding that note marked in rem gave maker no liability at all beyond property itself and that creditor was unable to maintain any action against maker to reach any of makers other assets 2: holding that a bank is required to notify the maker of a promissory note by some affirmative act upon exercise of its option to accelerate the maturity date of the note 3: holding failure to pay a debt due under a promissory note is a breach of contract claim under florida law 4: holding that even after a debt has been assumed a creditor can look to the maker for the collection of its note and the enforcement of its lien upon the assuming partys failure to pay", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "submitted in support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Federal Defendants and Nebraska argue that this extra-record evidence is impermissible under the APA\u2019s limitation on \u201cthe scope of judicial review.. .to the administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time that he or she made the decisions.\u201d Fed. Defs.\u2019 Mot. at 5 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Costie, 657 F.2d 275, 285 (D.C.Cir.1981). While it is true that \u201c[a]s a general rule, plaintiffs may not supplant or supplement the administrative record,\u201d Fed. Defs.\u2019 Mot. at 6 (citing Peterson Farms I v. Madigan, 1992 WL 118370 (D.D.C.1992)), this Circuit has recognized that courts may consider extra-record evidence in its review of agency actions under certain circumstances. See Costle, 657 F.2d at 286. (<HOLDING>). The D.C. Circuit has also recognized that Holdings: 0: holding that the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case 1: holding that a party seeking to seal a judicial record  bears the burden of overcoming  the compelling reasons standard 2: holding appeal of termination is limited to information that is part of the record 3: holding that in determining whether the defendant has a prior conviction for burglary under the armed career criminal act the federal court may look only to the terms of the charging document the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant or to some comparable judicial record of this information 4: recognizing a judicial venture outside the record for background information or to determine the presence of the requisite fullness of the reasons given", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lesser included offense. State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345 (Fla.1996). However, in State v. Von Deck, 607 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1992), our Supreme Court held that an instruction cannot be given on a permissive lesser included offense unless both the accusatory pleading and the evidence at trial support the commission of that lesser included offense. Here, the information filed against Donovan alleged the charge of kidnapping as follows: COUNT 1: In the County of BRE-VARD, State of Florida, on July 11, 1999, Michael Curtis Donovan, did forcibly, secretly or by threat, confine abduct or imprison another person [K.B.] ag conviction because it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury on that permissive lesser included offense. See Torrence v. State, 440 So.2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)(<HOLDING>). Donovan also argues that he was entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that where evidence was sufficient for attempted murder it was necessarily sufficient for aggravated assault which is a lesser included offense 1: holding that aggravated assault was not a lesser included offense in prosecution for armed burglary attempted robbery and use of a firearm in the com mission of a felony because the allegation in the information that the accused carried a firearm was insufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault 2: holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible 3: holding that the 1020life sentence was improperly imposed stating the absence of any allegation in the information that appellant discharged a firearm during the aggravated assault deprived him of notice that he was subject to a mandatory minimum of twenty years the jurys finding that he discharged a firearm during the course of the aggravated assault did not cure the defect in the information 4: holding reclassification impermissible where underlying felony of attempted thirddegree murder with a firearm was aggravated assault and aggravated assault includes the use of a deadly weapon as a necessary element", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Michael Ray Rogers, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court\u2019s judgment dismissing, under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A, his civil rights action alleging that the United States Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by requiring prison staff to assess and collect prisoners\u2019 district court filing fees in installments pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (\u201cPLRA\u201d). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. We review de novo, Cooper v. Pickett, 187 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm. Because the PLRA\u2019s filing fee requirement is a procedural rule that does not infringe on the authority of the courts, the district court did not err by dismissing Rogers\u2019 action. Cf. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Rogers\u2019 contention that this court erred by Holdings: 0: holding that the plras three strikes rule is a procedural rule that does not violate the separation of powers doctrine 1: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 2: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 3: recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine 4: holding that adam walsh act does not violate procedural due process require excessive bail or violate separation of powers", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not assert that she imported Pike is inconsistent with her interpretation of Shallal. No cases support Talhelm\u2019s attempt to read the public-body requirement out of the statute. The relevant precedents are strictly to the contrary. See, e.g., Richards v. Metron Integrated Health Sys., No. 242502, 2004 WL 443991, at *2 (Mich. Ct.App. Mar.11, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (nursing home employee did not meet the \u201cpublic body\u201d element when he threatened to report patient abuse to higher-ups at the company); Roulston, 608 N.W.2d at 530-31 (denying employer\u2019s motion for summary judgment against employee who had reported suspected resident abuse at a nursing home to state investigators); see also Allen v. Charter County of Wayne, 192 Fed.Appx. 347, 350-51 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished opinion) (<HOLDING>). The Michigan Supreme Court has recently Holdings: 0: holding woman who alleged she was terminated for having an abortion stated a prima facie case for discrimination 1: holding that a juror who initially equivocated as to her impartiality could be found impartial after she affirmatively said she thought she could be fair 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 3: holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent 4: holding that employee who admitted that she had no intention of affirmatively seeking out the state auditors or giving them any information  unless she was specifically asked could not establish a prima facie case", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his claims during \u201cboth the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.\u201d). In fact, although Zheng stated that he did not learn of the ineffective assistance of his former counsel until he hired an attorney to file his motion to reopen in 2010, he failed to assert that he took any action in his proceedings during the more than seven years between his order of removal and the filing of his motion to reopen. See id. Finally, Zheng does not challenge the BIA\u2019s determination that he failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief based on his practice of Falun Gong in the United States. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Holdings: 0: recognizing that bia may deny motion to reopen where movant has not established prima facie eligibility for relief sought 1: recognizing that failure to offer new previously unavailable evidence establishing a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought is a proper ground on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 2: holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought 3: recognizing that there are at least three independent grounds on which the bia may deny a motion to reopen 1 failure to establish a prima facie case 2 failure to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable and 3 a determination that despite the aliens statutory eligibility for relief he or she is not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion 4: holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "claim that the State negligently placed the barrels. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original). The court explained that the maintenance crew was merely carrying out the policy of the State because the barrel and sign warning system chosen by the crew complied with the department of transportation\u2019s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Id. Thus, the court held that the decision to warn rather than repair was discretionary, and the decision to use barrels and signs, as opposed to another warning device, was discretionary. Id. In contrast, when a governmental unit fails to maintain public works, such as a storm drainage system, or street and storm sewers, those activities are not discretionary functions. See City of Fort Worth v. Gay, 977 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex.App.\u2014Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the State contends that the Holdings: 0: holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability 1: holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning 2: holding city not immune from liability where claims were based on the citys failure to maintain clean and inspect an area of the street 3: recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability 4: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cservice effected on a registered agent within the scope of its agency is imputed to the litigant\u201d). On that date, CT Corp. had the duty to receive or accept and forward the process or lawsuit to WCT. See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Aun. \u00a7 5.206(a)(1) (West 2012). WCT argues that CT Corp. had no obligation to forward the process to WCT because CT Corp. was the registered agent for a second entity that used the same common name. The dilemma faced by CT Corp. does not, however, alter the applicable law. By contracting to act as the registered agent of WCT, CT Corp. became WCT\u2019s agent on whom Arnold was entitled to serve the lawsuit she filed against WCT in its assumed name. See Cummings v. HCA Health Servs, of Tex., Inc., 799 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Chilkewitz, 22 S.W.3d at 830 Holdings: 0: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 1: holding service on hospital corporation of america dba tidelands general hospital was service on the assumed name and constituted service on hca health services inc dba tidelands general hospital because ct corporation system was the registered agent for both 2: holding that claim against hospital regarding patients fall caused by defective footboard on hospital bed constituted health care liability claim 3: holding that because the contract between the hospital and the health insurance company had a hold harmless provision which stated the hospital would not bill or hold insurance subscribers liable for any hospital expenses covered by the subscribers insurance contract and all expenses from the patients treatment for the automobile accident were covered in such contract there was no debt upon which the hospital could assert a lien pursuant to the states hospital lien statute 4: holding service on registered agent jack h brown was service on jack h brown  company dba signgraphics even though jack h brown was also the registered agent for signgraphics inc", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ann. \u00a7 21-3-201 to -203, -205 (Michie 1996), which prohibits age discrimination in public employment but does not manifest consent to be sued for such discrimination in federal court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (\u201cA state will be deemed to have waived its immunity only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm. 1 . The Honorable Holdings: 0: holding that tribes did not waive their immunity by intervening in  administrative proceedings because any waiver must be unequivocal and may not be implied 1: holding that the tribal defendants removal of the case amounted to a clear and unequivocal waiver of immunity in federal court 2: holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal 3: holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity 4: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "722, 724 (3d Cir.2009) (\"If it is necessary to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence, the court may conduct a hearing.\" (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted in Rainey) (quoting Durant v. Husband, 28 F.3d 12, 15 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2)))). 9 .\"Delay in realizing satisfaction on a claim rarely serves to establish the degree of prejudice sufficient to prevent the opening [of] a default judgment\u201d in favor of a defendant who has appeared, Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., Ltd., 691 F.2d 653, 656-57 (3d Cir.1982) (emphasis added), but the standard must apply differently when the district court is evaluating whether to grant default judgment against an absent defendant. Cf. Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164 (<HOLDING>). See also infra note 11. 10 . See Chamberlain, Holdings: 0: holding that default judgment was not warranted where the defendant answered late but answered 1: holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact 2: holding 1 that where a defendant who previously answered does not appear for trial a plaintiffs only remedy is to make a motion with the court to continue with that trial 2 that entry of default is not authorized and 3 that the hearing held under such circumstances is uncontested as distinguished from a default hearing 1 quoting warden v lamb 98 calapp 738 277 p 867 868 1929 3: holding that on appeal a nonmovant need not have answered or responded to the motion for summary judgment to contend that the movants summaiy judgment proof is insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment 4: holding that a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment precluded default judgment", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(Morgan), 156 Pa.Cmwlth.304, 627 A.2d 250 (1993), aff'd, 545 Pa. 70, 680 A.2d 823 (1994). It is clear that an employer must pay medical expenses after indemnity benefits have been suspended until the employer\u2019s petition to review medicals is granted. Consolidated Freightways v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Jester), 145 Pa.Cmwlth.369, 603 A.2d 291 (1992). See also Deremer v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board, 61 Pa. Cmwlth. 415, 433 A.2d 926 (1981). However, an employer\u2019s liability does not extend beyond the time when compensation benefits are terminated. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (Randall), 545 Pa. 22, 679 A.2d 765 (1996); Consolidated Freightways. See also Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 526 Pa. 25, 32, 584 A.2d 301, 304 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Article III (Liability and Compensation), Holdings: 0: holding that default termination is government claim 1: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits 2: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer 3: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 4: holding that termination is an adverse employment action", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in tribal court. Mr. Valenzuela argues that the district court was incorrect. He asserts that he exhausted all tribal court remedies and that \u201c[a]ny further attempts to exhaust tribal remedies would be futile and result in irreparable damage.\u201d Aplt. Br. at 18. First, Mr. Valenzuela argues that he waived his right to appeal in his written plea agreement and therefore had no tribal court remedies to exhaust. We agree with the district court that Mr. Valenzuela\u2019s appeal waiver does not excuse his failure to pursue habeas corpus relief in the tribal court. The appeal waiver did not expressly waive Mr. Valenzuela\u2019s right to collaterally attack his conviction in tribal court. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181-83 (10th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). That step was necessary to exhaust Mr. Holdings: 0: holding that under oregon law an agreement must be supported by consideration to be legally enforceable 1: holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government 2: holding that waivers of  2255 collateral attack rights must be expressly stated to be enforceable 3: holding federal regulations have the force of law and may create enforceable rights 4: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "class, so it appears that they seek to include all fifty states. (See Compl. at \u00b6\u00b6 94-97.) Again, like the consumer protection issue, courts faced with the question of whether variations in the state law of unjust enrichment bar class certification have reached different outcomes. Compare, e.g., Overka v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 265 F.R.D, 14, 19-21 (D. Mass. 2010) (stating that \u201cunjust enrichment claims in different states are substantially similar\u201d and certifying a 34-state class) and In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 220 F.R.D. 672, 697 n.40 (S.D, Fla. 2004) (stating that the \u201cstandards for evaluating various states classes\u2019 unjust enrichment claims are virtually identical\u201d) with Casa Orlando Apartments, Ltd. v. Fed. Nat\u2019l Mortg. Ass\u2019n, 624 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Rapp v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 302 F.R.D. Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed 1: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 2: holding that unjust enrichment is brought about by unlawful or improper conduct as defined by law 3: holding that plaintiffs survey here fails to show that burden of proof standards do not vary or that differences in state unjust enrichment laws are insignificant 4: holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "came too late.\u201d). The district court acted within its discretion in dismissing Adams\u2019s duplicative complaint with prejudice and preventing her from \u201cfragment[ing] a single cause of action and [ ] litigating] piecemeal the issues which could have been resolved in one action.\u201d Flynn v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam\u2019rs, 418 F.2d 668, 668 (9th Cir.1969) (per curiam). AFFIRMED. 1 . We note that we are affirming the district court\u2019s dismissal on the basis that the second action was duplicative of the first, and not on the basis that the district court had the discretion to dismiss the second action as a sanction for failing to comply with the Rule 16 scheduling order issued in the first action. Cf. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1073-74 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the plaintiff in Atchison, Adams was Holdings: 0: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 1: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion by summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a  2255 motion where only certain claims were vague and conclusory 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 4: holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing a secondfiled action with prejudice where plaintiffs claims against a thirdparty defendant were permissive not mandatory under federal rule of civil procedure 14", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "be designed specifically to accommodate creditors like LVNV, who claim to be unable to produce documents. Given these provisions, it is difficult to understand how providing a summary of documents supporting a claim, or at least providing an explanation for why the proof of claim has nothing attached to it, unduly burdens creditors. The only explanation could be that certain creditors wish to continue their routine of executing and filing proofs of claim without objection and without any evidence \u2014 essentially, without having to do any work. This practice violates the Bankruptcy Rules and undermines the bedrock notion of the legal system that claimants bear the burden of proving their claims. See Raleigh v. Ill. Dep\u2019t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 21, 120 S.Ct. 1951, 147 L.Ed.2d 13 (2000) (<HOLDING>). For the reasons stated above, LVNVs original Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: recognizing burden 2: recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it 3: holding burden of proof is on one asserting an affirmative defense 4: recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the movant \u201c \u2018presents claims subject to the requirements for successive applications as well as claims cognizable under Rule 60(b),\u2019 \u201d such a motion is a mixed Rule 60(b)/\u00a7 2255 motion. Id. at 400 (quoting United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2003)). In his Rule 60(b) motion, Strom sought a remedy for a perceived flaw in his \u00a7 2255 proceeding \u2014 namely, the district court\u2019s failure, in ruling on the \u00a7 2255 motion, to address Strom\u2019s claims of actual innocence and that plea counsel induced Strom\u2019s guilty plea by assuring Strom that he would receive a 10-year sentence \u2014 and raised a direct attack on his conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the motion was a mixed Rule 60(b)/\u00a7 2255 motion. McRae, 793 F.3d at 397, 400; see Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 n.4, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (<HOLDING>); Winestock, 340 F.3d at 207 (stating that \u201ca Holdings: 0: recognizing the trial courts responsibility to inquire where matters are raised which might entitle the movant to relief under rule 60b  1: holding that appellate courts can review the denial of a rule 60b motion by appeal even if the appellant mistakenly files a petition for a writ of mandamus 2: holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc  3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp 3: holding that district court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider rule 60b motion after appellate decision because movant cited no material change of circumstances or new evidence 4: holding that a movant files a true rule 60b motion when he  asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in error", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the contempt. (d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts alleged to constitute the contempt have been: (1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and (2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers of the court or other responsible person. (emphasis added). The initial motion for contempt filed by Co-Alliance was not verified as required by Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-5(d)(2). However, we have held that \u201cnot every technical requirement of the indirect contempt statute must be followed, so long as the contempt defendant\u2019s due process rights are respected.\u201d In re Contempt of Wabash Valley Hosp., Inc., 827 N.E.2d 50, 63 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); cf. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). Benson does not mention in his appellant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a state application for relief had not been properly filed because it was not accompanied by an oath as required by state law 1: holding that pleading captioned petition for rule to show cause implies that proceedings will be civil because a criminal defendant can never be compelled to show cause 2: holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction 3: holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause 4: holding that because the petition lacked verification by oath it faded to meet the statutory requirements and could not serve as a basis for a rule to show cause", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to raise it in a subsequent application. See Silvesan v. State, 1999 ND 62, \u00b6 12, 591 N.W.2d 131. He may not raise this issue now. See id. C [\u00b6 14] Finally, Murchison contends he was denied a fast .and speedy trial. [\u00b6 15] Section 29-32.1-12(1), N.D.C.C., allows a court to deny a post-conviction application on the grounds of res judicata if the same claims have been fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding. See Hughes, 2002 ND 28, \u00b6 8, 639 N.W.2d 696. [\u00b6 16] Murchison raised the speedy trial argument in his first Application for Post-Conviction Hearing. When that application was denied by the trial court, Murchison did not appeal. Murchison has had this issue fully and finally determined in a previous proceeding. See Murchison, 1998 ND 96, \u00b6 11, 578 N.W.2d 514 (<HOLDING>). The doctrine of res judicata cannot be Holdings: 0: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 1: holding that when no appeal was taken from an initial application for postconviction relief the claims were fully and finally determined in that previous proceeding 2: holding that issues were not waived on subsequent appeal when initial appeal was dismissed 3: holding that postconviction relief claims which either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal were properly denied without an evidentiary hearing 4: holding that postconviction proceeding is a civil suit", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "immunity. See Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act, 28 A.L.R. Fed.2d 563 at \u00a7 27 (citing cases); but see id. at \u00a7 28 (citing cases holding that sue-and-be sued clause does not constitute express waiver). Here, however, CNI\u2019s charter does not contain a broad sue-and-be-sued clause; instead, the ability to take legal action is limited to action approved by the board of directors. Thus, even if we were to conclude that a broad sue-and-be-sued clause waives tribal-sovereign immunity, this clause is insufficient to do the job. Cf. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201c[T]he enactment of such an ordinance ... does not waive a tribe\u2019s sovereign immunity.... [The o uper. 357, 747 A.2d 837, 841-42, 844 (1999) (<HOLDING>); but see Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Holdings: 0: holding that an act of legislature may be required to waive sovereign immunity 1: holding that a senior vice presidents signature to an agreement with an express waiver of sovereign immunity provision did not waive sovereign immunity because that right was reserved exclusively to the tribal council 2: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 3: holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity 4: holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which, among other things, imposes federal criminal penalties on sex offenders who knowingly fail to register or update their registrations. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2250; 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16913. Congress enacted SORNA in 2006 but delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine whether and when SORNA should apply retroactively to sex offenders convicted before SORNA\u2019s effective date. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16913(d); Reynolds v. United States, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012). The Attorney General has exercised this authority and made SORNA retroactive, but the circuits have split over which action by the Attorney General was successful in making the statute retroactive. Compare United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that sorna is only unconstitutional when applied to those previouslyconvicted persons who traveled before the attorney generals rule 1: holding that the act is not retroactive 2: holding that the act is retroactive 3: holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term 4: holding that sorna was made retroactive by the attorney generals february 28 2007 interim rule", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on this aspect of his appeal. Similarly, Culver merely asserted, without more, that Deborah Culver\u2019s physical possession of the property on the date she filed for bankruptcy is a sufficient interest in property under section 541 to trigger the automatic stay. (Mem. of Law in Supp. of Stay Pending Appeal at 6). Whether the debtor has an interest in property is determined by non-bankruptcy law. William L. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 51:5 (2d ed.2002) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979)). Culver has not identified any body of Maryland law recognizing that a mere possessory interest in property is sufficient to invoke the automatic stay. Cf. In re Ford, 3 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr.Md.1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Culver has not met his burden of Holdings: 0: holding that property seized by a creditor prior to debtors bankruptcy was property of the estate even though creditor  the irs  held a secured interest  a tax lien  in the property 1: holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property 2: holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate 3: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 4: holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "[the victim] was dying, did she c tention that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by invoking the victim\u2019s memory and referring to spiritual authority. As noted, the prosecutor stated in closing remarks, \u201c[i]t is fitting and proper that I do this for [the victim\u2019s] memory,\u201d and \u201cthis closing speech [has] become, for me, sort of a benediction for all the evil that we have been confronted with in this case.\u201d N.T., Oct. 28, 1994 at 3. The prosecutor further concluded his remarks by stating, \u201cGod bless you.\u201d Id. at 18. The trial court held that such references did not amount to the type of religious inferences that warrant the grant of a new trial. PCRA Court Opinion, Oct. 13, 2010, at 24 (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (<HOLDING>)). The PCRA court reiterated the trial court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a new trial was warranted where there is reasonable probability that the false testimony introduced by the government influenced the outcome of the trial 1: holding that a new trial was warranted where the prosecutor stated as the bible says and the murderer shall be put to death 2: holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defendants timely motion for the substitution of the participating prosecutor in order to permit the defense to call the prosecutor as a witness 3: holding that a seven week suspension of the speedy trial clock was warranted under the ends of justice provision where the chief prosecutor was ill and new assistant prosecutors required time to prepare for trial 4: holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir.2010) (\u201cBecause we hold that an indictment need not set forth vicarious coconspirator liability, it was not error for the district court to instruct the jury on this theory.\u201d). As members of the conspiracy, all of the defendants, including Phun, were legally responsible for the possession of firearms, which was a reasonably foreseeable act by their cocon-spirators in furtherance of that conspiracy. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180. 10 . The defendants do not contest, and we find, that Snyder\u2019s testimony met Rule 701\u2019s second requirement, as it was undoubtedly helpful to the jury's ability to understand the conversations. 11 . Even if we were to follow the Ninth Circuit's approach in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), there is no indication that Snyder gave any Holdings: 0: holding that an experts testimony that a victims symptoms were consistent with administration of a date rape drug were admissible 1: holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible 2: holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment 3: holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible 4: holding inadmissible an agents testimony that certain activities were consistent with those of an experienced drug trafficker", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "video disks (DVDs). According to the officers, Officer Molinaro discovered a gun in Williams\u2019s waistband during a search of his person after the arrest. It was later determined that Williams had several prior felony convictions, and Williams was indicted under \u00a7 922(g)(1) in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Williams elected to go to trial. Prior to trial, he stipulated that he was a convicted felon so that the name and nature of his recent prior convictions \u2014 a 1991 conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin, a 1995 conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, and a 1995 handgun conviction\u2014 would not be introduced to the jury. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The prosecution called Officers Molinaro and Holdings: 0: holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction 1: holding that a defendants denial of a conviction may be contradicted by introducing public records which prove such a conviction 2: holding that fedrevid 403 prohibits the government from introducing the name or nature of a prior felony conviction in a  922g1 case when such information would tend to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning regarding a defendant who had stipulated to his felon status 3: holding that prior indiana felony was conviction for purposes of defendants  922g1 prosecution and noting that although state law determines whether there is a predicate statelaw conviction once the conviction is established federal law dictates that the convicted felon may not possess any firearm 4: holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the MERS system supplies the thinnest possible veneer of formality and legality to the wholesale marketing of home mortgages to large institutional investors. But what of it? MERS\u2019s certifying officers \u201cpurport[ ] to hold the position of ... vice president, ... secretary, ... [or] assistant to ... such office or position.\u201d Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, \u00a7 54B. That they hold themselves out as officers of MERS, the \u201centity holding [the] mortgage,\u201d is all that the statute requires with respect to a signer\u2019s authority. Id. The corporate resolution, however auto-generated, does give them actual authority to act on MERS behalf. Indeed, this is immaterial. Even without it, their assignments would be \u201cbinding upon [MERS] ... [and] entitled to be recorded.\u201d Id.; see Kiah, 2011 WL 841282, at *7 (<HOLDING>); In re Marr\u00f3n, 2011 WL 3800040, at *3 (\u201cThough Holdings: 0: holding assignment of a mortgage was not subject to article 9 1: holding that even if the individual who signed the mortgage assignment lacked the authority to do so the assignment would still be binding on mers because he purported to be authorized 2: holding that the putative noteholder lacked standing to foreclose because mers lacked authority to assign the note though it arguably had authority to assign the mortgage 3: holding plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the validity of an assignment from mers to bac because she was not a party to the assignment and the assignment did not affect her underlying obligation to make timely payments 4: holding article 9 inapplicable to an assignment of a mortgage on real estate", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "limited arbitration provision are legal in nature,\u201d we review the district court\u2019s judgment de novo. Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Kirschhofer, 226 F.3d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir.2000). \u201cThe FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.\u201d Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 376 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employers and employees may contractually agree to submit federal claims, including claims under the ADA, to arbitration. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 149-51 (1st Cir.1998); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Holdings: 0: holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration 1: holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 2: holding age discrimination claim barred 3: holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 4: holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of the Department. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the transfer of a lawsuit from a county of proper venue to another county of proper venue is not reversible error. II. The Department contends that the transfer of a civil lawsuit from a county that qualifies as a proper venue to another county that might originally have been considered a proper venue is not reversible error as a matter of law. We disagree. Venue selection presupposes that the parties to the lawsuit have choices and preferences about where their ease will be tried. See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 15.001-15.040 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.1994); Maranatha Temple, Inc. v. Enterprise Prod. Co., 833 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). Venue may be proper in many counties under Holdings: 0: recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue 1: holding that the state has the right to elect in which county the offense may be prosecuted where the jurisdiction is concurrent under the statutes and until the final judgment which operates as a bar to further prosecution in either county the states right of selection of the forum continues 2: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county 3: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  4: recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "but deemed unsalable. Perfetti moved for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction against Defendants after learning that Defendants had diverted the candy to retail stores for sale rather than recycling it. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants Perfet-ti\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. I. Facts This Court draws the facts from the Verified Complaint, the affidavits and sworn declarations filed by Perfetti, and the testimony and exhibits from the hearing on May 28, 2015. See Doe v. S. Iron R-l Sch. Dist., 498 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir.2007) (affirming a preliminary injunction based on a verified complaint and additional documents); Movie Sys., Inc. v. MAD Minneapolis Audio Distribs., 717 F.2d 427, 431-32 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Perfetti is a global manufacturer of candy Holdings: 0: holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible 1: holding that courts may rely solely on affidavits in granting preliminary injunctions 2: holding that a court may rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence including hearsay evidence at the preliminary injunction stage 3: holding that a school may assert the rights of its students parents and gathering cases granting injunctions to businesses on behalf of customers 4: holding that statements in affidavits based solely on hearsay are inadmissible as summary judgment evidence", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "need for the expert\u2019s testimony that it cannot obtain without \u201cundue hardship, which is necessary to overcome a motion to quash by an unretained expert.\u201d See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee\u2019s note (An expert can \u201cwithhold their expertise\u201d unless the subpoenaing party can \u201cshow[ ] a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship; and ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably compensated\u201d); see also Chavez ex rel. v. Board of Educ. of Tularosa Mun. School, No. CIV-05-380JB/RLP, 2007 WL 1306734, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 16, 2007). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there are no other comparable witnesses that are unwilling to testify on its behalf regarding the subject patents-in-suit. Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I find it unnecessary to Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 1: holding defendants could not be guilty as parties when the state failed to show they knew the criminality of the conduct they assisted 2: holding that the expert failed to explain how the defendants device operated in an equivalent manner to one of the patent claims 3: recognizing that it is the proponents burden to demonstrate the admissibility of expert scientific testimony 4: holding the subpoenaing parties failed to demonstrate they could not obtain substantial equivalent testimony to that of the unretained expert", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "remains in full force and effect as to such other acts.\u201d Id. (citing Sanchez v. Dickinson, 551 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ)). When the parties have agreed to rights and obligations that are \u201ccollateral to and independent of the conveyance, such as completion of construction or escrow agreements pending construction,\u201d those rights \u201csurvive[ ] a deed that is silent in respect to the construction or escrow agreement.\u201d Id. We thus held in Harris that the parties\u2019 execution of an escrow agreement \u201ccontemporaneously with\u201d their - execution of a deed that \u201cpertained only to the conveyance\u201d itself \u201cplainly shows\u201d that the parties \u201cdid not intend to merge the conditions of the agreement into the deed.\u201d Id. S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1962, writ refused n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). , Because Ms. Cosgrove\u2019s promise to correct Holdings: 0: holding that deed was valid when the deed was conveyed to grantee corporation which formally incorporated after the conveyance 1: holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed 2: holding that sellers agreement to furnish title policy was a separate agreement not superseded by the deed and properly not included in the deed 3: holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed 4: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rights are never property rights or that the Government may always take them for their own benefit without compensation. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223-24, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (internal conditional grant of funds to California did not subject the federal government to liability for California\u2019s actions. Second, California\u2019s legislature cannot be considered to have acted under federal ore, cannot be construed as a grant of authority for California to pass legislation on behalf of the federal government. This is not even a case in which Congress first regulated a particular field and then delegated its authority to regulate that field to another sovereign entity. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975) (<HOLDING>). California had, at all times, the inherent Holdings: 0: holding indian tribes subject to gamblingrelated taxes from which states are exempt 1: holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist 2: holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes 3: holding that congress which regulated the introduction of alcoholic beverages in indian country could validly delegate to indian tribes its authority to regulate that subject matter because indian tribes themselves possessed independent authority over the subject matter 4: holding the constitution vests the federal government with exclusive authority over relations with indian tribes", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Fee Statements covering May of 2010 contain two expense charges: $14.25 in FedEx delivery services and $2.44 in total postage costs. [Adv. Doc. No. 87-3, p. 16]. The Court concludes that both of these expenses\u2014totaling $16.69\u2014 are reasonable and, therefore, recoverable as a portion of McKool Smith\u2019s sanction award. In sum, the Court concludes that McKool Smith is entitled to $73,522.85 in fees and $655.15 in expenses, for a total amount of $74,178.00. This award represents both the amount of fees and expenses this Court determines were reasonably expended by McKool Smith in prosecuting the Original Motion for Sanctions, in addition to the amount this Court believes is appropriate to deter repetition of the Plaintiffs\u2019 bad faith conduct. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (<HOLDING>); Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct 1: holding that the court should limit the amount of sanctions to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated 2: holding that government breached agreement to not recommend incarceration by arguing to the court that the defendant lacked remorse and the court should use the case to deter others from committing tax evasion 3: holding article 1802 claims only survive where the conduct alleged of is based on tortious or negligent conduct different from the conduct covered by other specific labor laws involved 4: recognizing that the legislature may effectively limit the scope of the victims bill of rights by decriminalizing certain conduct or redefining the type of conduct that qualifies as a criminal offense", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the jury found that Moncivais did not commit the murder under the immediate influence of sudden passion and assessed punishment at 50 years\u2019 confinement. Moncivais timely appealed. Sufficiency of the Evidence Moncivais contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury\u2019s finding that he did not kill Erik under the immediate influence of sudden passion. A. Sudden Passion Proof of sudden passion can reduce an offense from a first degree felony to a second degree felony and the defendant must prove sudden passion by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 19.02(d) (West 2003); see McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); see also Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 206, 211-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). \u201c\u2018Sudden passion\u2019 means passion directly Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must prove an affirmative defense at sentencing stage by a preponderance of evidence 1: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that appellant bears burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that defendant bears burden at punishment phase to prove issue of sudden passion by preponderance of evidence 4: holding that defendant bears burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that factors other than the condemned discrimination caused the decision of which claimant complains", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "6 . A plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Ramsey v. City & County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (10th Cir.1990). Proof of \"an existing policy which itself constitutes discrimination\u201d would constitute direct evidence. Id. at 1008. But contrary to Mr. Jones\u2019s argument, the record does not contain direct evidence of a discriminatory policy. In order to be \"direct,\u201d evidence must prove \u201cthe existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.\u201d Hall v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted). For example, an employer's express adoption of a discriminatory policy constitutes direct evidence. See Trans World. Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (<HOLDING>). To prove the existence of a discriminatory Holdings: 0: holding that an employers policy requiring female employees to make larger pension fund contributions than male employees was discriminatory on its face in violation of title vii 1: holding that a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 2: recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent 3: holding section 61137 unconstitutional on its face 4: holding employers admitted policy discriminatory on its face", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "has been a \"legislative delegation\u201d of regulatory authority to an administrative agency, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, courts must defer to that agency\u2019s interpretation of that statute, so long as that interpretation is \"based on a permissible construction of the statute,\u201d id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The NLRB\u2019s interpretation of the Act receives this \"Chevron deference\u201d unless its interpretation is unreasonable. See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713, 121 S.Ct. 1861, 149 L.Ed.2d 939 (2001). 4 . The holding of N.L.R.B. v. C. & C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 87 S.Ct. 559, 17 L.Ed.2d 486 (1967), is not to the contrary. That case dealt with the jurisdiction of the Board to adjudicate matters turning on contractual interpretation. Id. at 428, 87 S.Ct. 559 (<HOLDING>); see also Bath Marine Draftsmen\u2019s Ass\u2019n v. Holdings: 0: holding that terms of 29 usc  156 authorizing the nlrb to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the act grant the nlrb broad rulemaking authority 1: holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered 2: holding with respect to a certified claim that congress has determined that submission of a  claim to the contracting officer in the first instance is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a suit in the claims court 3: holding that appellate court erred by reaching question of changed country conditions where neither bia nor ij had been given a chance to address it in the first instance 4: holding that the nlrb has the authority to interpret cbas in the first instance where its interpretation is for the purpose of enforcing a statutory right which congress considered necessary to allow labor and management to get on with the process of reaching fair terms and conditions of employment", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "vexation of conflicting claims. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 406-08, 59 S.Ct. 563, 567-69, 83 L.Ed. 817 (1939); John, supra, 141 F.R.D. at 33; see generally 7 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1704 at 501 (2d ed. 1986). As interpleader provides a method to compel adverse claimants to litigate their claims to property in a single proceeding, the burden is on the party seeking interpleader to demonstrate its entitlement to the remedy. Id. \u00a7 1714 at 583. The plaintiff demonstrably has failed to carry its burden in this case. In general, an existing and a prospective claim from separate parties are sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of multiple liability. See Bell v. Nutmeg Airways Corp., 66 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.Conn.1975) (<HOLDING>); 3A Moore & Lucas, supra, \u00b6 22.-08[2]. The Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not appeal a jury instruction where he did not object to the challenged instruction but in fact requested it and stated he was satisfied with it 1: holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment 2: holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under  922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm 3: holding in the alternative that plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that but for plaintiffs age he would not have been constructively discharged where plaintiff was asked on more than one occasion when he was going to retire emphasis in original 4: holding that adversity existed between plaintiff and defendantclaimants despite fact that plaintiff al leged he was nothing more than stakeholder as he requested court to enjoin future claims", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "requirement applies to \u201cfor cause\u201d drug testing as well as random drug testing. DOC chose not to apply these procedures in White\u2019s case. DOC has never shown that its refusal to apply the established procedure in this case was anything other than arbitrary. The agency\u2019s arbitrary abandonment of its published procedure encroached upon petitioner\u2019s due process rights. See Wareham v. Singletary, 700 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (\u201cIn Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court held that inmates facing disciplinary charges must be afforded certain minimal safeguards.\u201d). By denying relief, the circuit court condoned the denial of due process. Certiorari is therefore appropriate. See Plymel v. Moore, 770 So.2d 242, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we grant the petition for Holdings: 0: holding that a denial of due process warrants mandamus relief 1: holding that the denial of counsel to a father at a shelter hearing constituted a denial of due process renewable by certiorari 2: holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis 3: holding that to declare a denial of due process we must find a denial of fundamental fairness 4: holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "began running on October 16, 2003. Our resolution of this dispute depends upon our construction of the legal disability statute. Initially, we reiterate that [o]ur approach to statutory construction begins with the statute\u2019s language, and if it can end there \u2014 with our finding of a clear meaning of the Legislature\u2019s intent \u2014 then we must stop. \u201cOur search for a statute\u2019s purpose begins with the words of the statute itself. If the statute is unambiguous, we need only to enforce the statute as writtenf,]\u201d with no recourse to the broader statutory scheme, legislative history, historical background, or other external sources of the Legislature\u2019s purpose. Galaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 516 (Tenn.2005) (quoting In re Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn.Ct.Ap 14 (1975) (<HOLDING>); O\u2019Brien v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 405 Mass. Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for an attorney malpractice suit did not begin to run until the client had suffered some actual damage 1: holding the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the owning spouse reaches a pay status 2: holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury 3: holding that statute of limitations did not begin to run against a non compos mentis individual in spite of interested parties being available to bring suit 4: holding that the statute of limitations for attorney malpractice may begin to run before the plaintiff knows the full extent of his damages", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "would have been permissible. In other words, our decision appears to have agreed with the premise that the government may use classified information without disclosure, if that information truly implicates national security. Here, the classified information implicates national security. 10 . We recognize that the utility of the methods described in text may be limited. For example, the information conveyed by an unclassified summary will be decidedly less helpful to the entity than the classified information itself. But limited utility is very different from no utility. An unclassified summary is analogous to privilege logs in the context of discovery disputes, yet their use is routine. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5); see also MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Compare EO 13,224, \u00a7 1(a), (b) (blocking Holdings: 0: holding party seeking disqualification waives attorneyclient privilege as to the court so the court may assess the contents of allegedly confidential information and the party may present the information either in a hearing out of the presence of the party against whom confidentiality is to be protected or in camera inspection 1: holding that on a motion for attorney fees the requesting party must disclose its time sheets to the other party redacted as necessary where protected by the attorneyclient privilege 2: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 3: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 4: holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is that drawing any inferences from a party\u2019s failure to call a witness equally available to both sides is impermissible.\u201d). Andrews contends that the prosecutor \u201ceffectively shifted the burden of proof in this prosecution to the defendant.\u201d Assuming arguendo that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were improper, Andrews\u2019 argument that the burden of proof was shifted is not supported by the record, because the district court gave the following instructions to the jury: \u201c[T]he defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence at all. The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.\u201d See Iredia, 866 F.2d at 117-18 (<HOLDING>). Plain error is not shown. D Andrews contends Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 2: holding that prosecutors comment  if there was  evidence available to defense lawyers dont you think they would put it on  did not require reversal because district courts instruction  that burden was on the government  should have sufficiently erased any doubts as to which party had the burden of proof 3: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "clearly erroneous findings of fact, carefully and correctly set out the law governing the issues raised, and clearly articulate the reasons underlying the decisions, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the opinions of the magistrate judge and the district court, we AFFIRM. We add only that, although we agree with the magistrate judge\u2019s conclusion that because the trustee in Sharp\u2019s bankruptcy abandoned any interest in this cause of action, Sharp has standing to bring this action and to represent the class, we would find that Sharp has standing principally on the ground that Sharp\u2019s interest in this action was never the property of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Young, 66 F.3d 376, 378-79 (1st Cir.1995) Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code 1: holding that the texas proceeds rule is only applicable in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case and would not apply where the debtor sells homestead property postpetition in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case 2: holding that facts as they existed on the date of the original bankruptcy petition not on the date of conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 bankruptcy applied 3: holding that the 1994 amendment to  348 of the bankruptcy code should control in preamendment ongoing cases and that the debtors tort causes of action that accrued while the case was proceeding under chapter 13 did not become property of the estate or subject to the bankruptcy proceedings upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 proceedings 4: holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "silent about a medical problem or tell a patient he has a clean bill of health when he does not. Pickup was justified on the same basis. SOCE therapy is analogous to prescribing a harmful drug. Liability could attach for providing SOCE therapy because the therapy had the chance to harm minors psychologically. As Pickup and Lowe recognized, however, even if quack medicine (or what the State deems to be quack medicine) can be prohibited without scrutiny, doctors cannot be prohibited from talking to their patients about quack medicine. See 472 U.S. at 231, 105 S.Ct. at 2584 (White, J\u201e concurring) (\u201cI do not think [the State] could make it a crime ... privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); 740 F.3d at 1228 (<HOLDING>). I believe, apparently unlike the Majority, Holdings: 0: holding only that a doctor may not counsel a patient to rely on quack medicine but recognizing that a doctor may talk to patients about quack medicine such as soce emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak but they  do not prevent anyone from speaking citation and internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that provisions in a contract established only the tribes willingness to face suit in tribal court and not an explicit waiver of tribal immunily like that in c  l enterprises emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that competency is appropriately defined as the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed upon the convict emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted 4: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on evolving circumstances, they were not merely attempts to revive waived issues. For this reason, \u201capplication of the firm waiver rule here would be pointless,\u201d and we will consider Hill\u2019s arguments. Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 695 n. 5 (10th Cir.2004). We review a district court\u2019s refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent prisoner in a civil case for an abuse of discretion. See Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.1995). \u201cThe burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel.\u201d McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1985). \u201cOnly in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness will the district court\u2019s decision be overturned.\u201d Id. at 839 (<HOLDING>). We have previously directed district courts Holdings: 0: recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel 1: holding that the natural father who was incarcerated failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with his daughter and noting that he called his daughter once and that he did not attempt mail communication with her despite his awareness that the adoptive parents were represented by counsel and therefore he could have initiated contact through their counsel or the court to communicate with her 2: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 3: holding a prisoner with multiple sclerosis attending court in a wheelchair who had diminished eyesight hearing and ability to communicate and needed to present complex medical issues requiring expert opinion should have been appointed counsel 4: holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980) is most instructive. In Anderson, the Supreme Court expressly held that Doyle does not apply in situations where \u201ca defendant ... voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings [because he] has not been induced to remain silent.\u201d Id. at 408. Here, as in Anderson, before the Defendant made his statement regarding who owned the drugs in Apartment 22, the Defendant had already answered a number of prior questions; thus, his affirmative statement (that \u201che did know [who the owner of the drugs was]; however, he would not inform [Agent Hayes] of that person\u2019s name\u201d) was not silence, but rather an admission that he knew the identity of the drug owner but refused to reveal the party\u2019s name to Agent Hayes. See also Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Crowder, 719 F.2d 166, 168, Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 1: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 2: holding that the defendants statement in an application for citizenship that he had only been married once was false even if the second marriage had been a nullity because it was bigamous 3: holding that an agents testimony regarding defendants compound statement that he had been out fishing all night but he didnt wish to say any more was not a doyle violation 4: holding that fishing was not incidental to navigation", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "plain meaning of a clear statutory text. We therefore hold that the clear text of \u00a7 2713 creates a mandatory condition precedent barring all OPA claims unless and until a claimant has presented her claims in compliance with \u00a7 2713(a) and either: (1) all responsible parties deny all liability; or (2) the claim is not settled by payment within 90 days after (A) the claim was presented, or (B) advertising was begun under section 2714(b) of the Act, whichever is later. 33 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2713(c). C. Consequence of Dismissal All parties agree that the district court\u2019s dismissal should not be treated as a dismissal with prejudice. Appellants remain free to refile this action, if and when they comply with OPA\u2019s claims presentation procedure. See also Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 31-33, 110 S.Ct. at 312 (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Daniel Good Real Holdings: 0: holding that rcras notice provision is a condition precedent to all claims 1: holding agreed abatement to allow compliance with 60day notice requirement of section 74051a did not extend 120day deadline or constitute an agreement of the parties to extend 2: holding that after dismissal plaintiffs may refile suit after compliance with rcras 60day notice requirement 3: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient 4: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Ark. v. Hill, 122 B.R. 539, 541 (ED.Ark.1990).\u201d In re Merrick, 175 B.R. at 336-337. To determine whether a \u201cproceeding\u201d is subject to the automatic stay under section 362(a)(1), many courts have followed the analysis employed in the Third Circuit which is the following: \u201cWhether a specific judicial proceeding falls within the scope of the automatic stay must be determined by looking at the proceeding \u201cat its inception.\u201d \u201cThat determination should not change depending on the particular stage of the litigation at which the filing of the petition in bankruptcy occurs.\u201d Thus, the dispositive question is whether a proceeding was \u201coriginally brought against the debtor.\u201d Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204-1205 (3d Cir.1992) (citations o , 491 n. 2 (8th Cir,1993) (<HOLDING>); Gecy v. Bank of Ozarks (In re Gecy), 510 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 1: holding that although the automatic stay only applies to proceedings against the debtor  counterclaims seeking affirmative relief against a debtor implicate the automatic stay 2: holding that the protections of the automatic stay apply only to actions against the debtor 3: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay 4: holding that a thirdparty action instigated by two debtors against a third party was not subject to the automatic stay", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not a statute of limitations in the traditional sense, but a part of the state's insurance laws dictating what terms must be included in group health policies. As such, we question whether it could impact claims existing at the time of its passage (rather than merely claims brought under policies issued in 1985 or thereafter which included the terms required by the statute), and whether the Missouri legislature would have had reason to include any saving language in the statute. This dilemma raises the more general concern about whether provisions in state insurance codes, such as \u00a7 376.426(14), should even be considered \"analogous\u201d statutes of limitation for ERISA purposes. See Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 647-48 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). As stated above, however, we decline to Holdings: 0: holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 1: holding that statutes of limitation for bivens and  1983 actions are the same 2: holding that criminal statutes of limitation should be construed in favor of the accused 3: holding that statutes of limitations are considered substantive matters for purposes of the erie doctrine 4: holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that was neither deep enough or long enough to require stitches, and a scraped elbow did not require prompt medical attention under the Eighth Amendment. See Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971, 972-73 (7th Cir.1991). In sum, Pinkston\u2019s split lip and swollen cheek do not qualify as injuries that are \u201cso obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor\u2019s attention.\u201d Wynn, 251 F.3d at 593. Furthermore, even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument only, that Pinkston has indeed somehow established an objectively serious medical need, he has certainly failed to demonstrate that Madry and Grisselle were deliberately indifferent to that hypothetical need. See Board, 394 F.3d at 478; see also Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1420 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Woods, 233 F.3d 482, 484 Holdings: 0: holding that when findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses rule 52 demands even greater deference to the trial courts findings for only the trial judge is in a position to be aware of the variations in demeanor including but not limited to the actions mannerisms and facial expressions that bear so heavily on the listeners understanding of and belief in what is said 1: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 2: holding that a courts determination to discount the testimony of the defendants expert witnesses was a proper exercise of his discretion in weighing the demeanor credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence when ruling on a motion for a new trial 3: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 4: holding total deference is given to the trial courts determination of historical facts supported by the record especially when the trial courts findings turn on evaluating a witnesss credibility and demeanor", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "error that had a \u201c \u2018substantial and injurious [effect or influence\u2019 \u201d on the outcome of the proceedings. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The state court\u2019s factual findings are entitled to deference, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254, and the district court\u2019s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. McKenna, 65 F.3d at 1490. Also important to our analysis is the posture of this case, which comes to us on collateral review of Lopez\u2019s conviction in state court, not on direct review of a conviction in federal district court. In this context, our inquiry is limited to whether Lopez was sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Quoting from Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, Holdings: 0: holding that a federally issued writ of habeas corpus  reaches only convictions obtained in violation of some provision of the united states constitution 1: holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 2: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   3: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 4: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence ", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "when she applied for a supervisor\u2019s position, Johnson was required to be fingerprinted. The fingerprints were submitted to a law enforcement agency for review and Johnson\u2019s previous conviction for affray was disclosed. When asked to clarify or explain the criminal charge, Johnson admitted that in 1980 she had been charged with aggravated assault and affray. She stated the aggravated assault charge was dismissed and she entered a plea of nolo contendere to the affray charge and was fined. One could agree with Johnson that she might have been confused if the Board\u2019s question was, \u201cHave you ever been convicted of a crime?\u201d because the term conviction is confusing to both the legal and lay communities. See Proffitt v. Unemployment Appeals Comm\u2019n, 658 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>). However, the Board asked not only whether Holdings: 0: holding that where a witness had been convicted seventeen years earlier but had been given probation and had not been confined the date of the conviction controlled 1: holding that because the term conviction is ambiguous to lawyers judges and laymen the claimant did not commit misconduct when she wrote she had not been convicted of felony where adjudication had been withheld 2: holding that where juror did not disclose that she had an interest in the conviction of the defendant probable prejudice is shown and the conviction must be reversed 3: holding that where possible juror misconduct is brought to the trial judges attention he or she has a duty to investigate and to determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment 4: holding that substantial evidence did not support agencys finding fear speculative when petitioner had offered evidence that she had already had two children that she planned to have more that she had gone to great lengths to avoid being sterilized in china and that she had removed her iud after escaping to the united states", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "previously, plaintiffs interests can and should be adequately protected in the state proceeding given the substantial similarity of the state proceeding to the federal one. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of abstention. g. Vexatious and reactive nature of the federal claim The Supreme Court recognized that the \u201cvexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation may influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation under Colorado River. \u201d Cone, 460 U.S. at 17, 103 S.Ct. 927. Where courts find bad faith on the part of plaintiff, a stay or dismissal may be warranted \u201cas a means to deter vexatious use of the courts.\u201d Holland, 840 F.Supp. at 1101; see also Baseline Sports, Inc. v. Third Base Sports, 341 F.Supp.2d 605, 611-612 (E.D.Va.2004) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, Livingston and Winn Holdings: 0: holding that a developers claim for breach of fiduciary duty was actually a contract action properly brought in the court of claims 1: holding that district court has no jurisdiction when an action is brought before the first final denial occurs 2: holding that plaintiff brought its claim to district court for a vexatious purpose when the claim was a mirror image of the state court action 3: holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the purported state law claim for violation of the automatic stay and that any such claim could be brought only in bankruptcy court only 4: holding state immune from suit brought in state court", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "districts in which they serve. Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189. Texas law places control of probation departments in the hands of district judges, who are elected state officials. See PYCA Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d at 1417 n. 3. In Shore, the court explained that because the district judges are empowered to employ and dismiss individuals in the probation department, any actions by the director \u201cwould be as an agent for the Judges.\u201d 414 F.Supp. at 385; see Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189. The Shore court further explained that \u201cany equitable relief granted must therefore be directed against the \u2018Judges ....\u201d\u2019 414 F.Supp. at 385; see Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d at 189 (citing Clark v. Tarrant County, 608 F.Supp. 209, 211 (N.D.Tex.1985), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 798 F.2d at 739 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>)). Because ultimate control over JCCSCD staff Holdings: 0: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 1: holding that county and district attorneys are officers within the judicial department 2: holding that a county had no duty to bargain with a union of its employees 3: holding that the commissioner of the department of pensions and security had statutory authority to reassign state employees to the county level 4: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "sentence\u201d may not \u201cthen appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement.\u201d United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1993). The plea agreement stipulated that Blackwell \u201ccommitted the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony-conviction for a crime of violence.\u201d App\u2019x at 10, That stipulation resulted in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months under the terms of the plea agreement. Id. at 11. At sentencing, the district court decided to follow the plea agreement and sentenced Blackwell to 36 months imprisonment. Because Blackwell\u2019s sentence conformed to his plea agreement, he received the benefit of that agreement and he has waived any challenge to his sentence on the basis of Johnson. See United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, and finding no Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal 1: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable 2: holding that the inability to foresee that subsequently decided cases would create new appeal issues does not supply a basis for failing to enforce an appeal waiver on the contrary the possibility of a favorable change in the law after a plea is simply one of the risks that accompanies pleas and plea agreements 3: holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver 4: holding that since the statute does not provide for appeal of issues related to a motion to dismiss after entry of a guilty plea the defendant who raised only that issue had no right to appeal", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015) (\u201cTo state an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must allege (and ultimately prove) \u2018intentional discrimination.\u2019\u201d (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976))). Additionally, because Lee does not allege that she is a member of a \u201csuspect\u201d or \u201cquasi-suspect\u201d class, her claim would be subject to rational basis review. See id. at 298-99. Lee would not plausibly be entitled to relief under this standard because, as the District Court observed, the Palimony Law is \u201cextremely rationally related to the end goal\u201d (Oral Arg. Tr. at 23), of \u201cproviding greater clarity in the enforcement of palimony agreements\u201d (App. 400). See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Lee\u2019s Amended Complaint fails to Holdings: 0: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 1: holding rational basis as standard for commerce clause inquiries 2: holding that the law challenged in that cases classification is invalid because it is wholly without any rational basis 3: holding that a law survives rational basis review so long as there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification 4: recognizing heightened rational basis scrutiny", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "from enforcing its billboard ordinance, save wind load and electrical requirements, should Whiteco or its successors apply to rebuild in the same location, or to relocate in a new location, any of the forty-two billboards identified in the Agreement. Applying the settled principles above, the Agreement had \u201cthe effect of interfering [with the proper exercise of City\u2019s police power], [and] must necessarily give way to an appropriate exercise of [City\u2019s] police power.\u201d State ex rel. Kansas City, 524 S.W.2d at 859. Because City had no authority to contract away future enforcement of its zoning ordinance against rebuilt or relocated billboards, the Agreement exceeded the scope of City\u2019s powers in violation of section 432.070, and is void. North Kansas City Sch. Dist., 369 S.W.2d at 165 (<HOLDING>); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., 3 Rathkopfs The Law Holdings: 0: holding it is critical to the trial courts power of control over its own docket and its ability to serve effectively all litigants that it maintain control over progress of cases before it including requests for extensions of time 1: holding that where a court possesses jurisdiction over a disputed matter it may exercise its equitable powers to ensure that substance will not give way to form and that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done 2: holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract 3: holding that any attempt by way of contract to deprive a city of  control over exercise of it police powers is void 4: holding over", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to support denial, is nevertheless relevant.\u201d) The single most important factor is whether prejudice would result to the nonmovant as a consequence of the amendment. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir.1981). In the Ninth Circuit, if a complaint does not include the necessary factual allegations to state a claim, it is not sufficient to allege such claims in a motion for summary judgment. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1080 (9th Cir.2008); see also Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir.2006) (\u201c \u2018Simply put, summary judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.\u2019 \u201d); Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). The first amended complaint alleges a general Holdings: 0: holding that the complaint did not satisfy the notice pleading requirements of federal rule of civil procedure 8a because the complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment 1: holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation 2: holding that the plaintiffs complaint was valid because despite general allegations it provided notice 3: holding that a complaint does not meet the requirements of rule 9 when the complaint did not give notice to the defendant of false claims submitted by others for federal reimbursement of offlabel uses only of illegal practices in promotion of the drug 4: holding that the district court did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of new allegations where the plaintiffs complaint gave the defendants no notice of the specific factual allegations presented for the first time in the plaintiffs opposition to summary judgment", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "whether [it] ha[d] some job that [Burns] might [have been] able to fill.\u201d Dalton, 141 F.3d at 677 (noting that \u201creassignment is particularly important when the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his or her current job, either with or without accommodation\u201d); see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304 (stating that \u201c[njumerous courts have assumed that the reassignment obligation means something more than treating a disabled employee like any other job applicant\u201d). Because prior decisions of this court hold that an employee has the burden of identifying particular positions to which he could be reassigned based on his qualifications, we affirm 'the district court\u2019s order granting summary judgment for KCC. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Dalton, 141 F.3d at 679 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination 1: holding that employees threats of violence against a coworker were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination 2: holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job 3: holding that reassignment is not required where the disabled plaintiff sought to escape the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory policy requiring all employees seeking transfers from parttime to fulltime positions to take a written exam 4: recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the F.D. Rich decision, courts deciding the issue had held almost without exception that the provision was a venue requirement. United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 924, 87 S.Ct. 239, 17 L.Ed.2d 148 (1966). It is well settled that venue provisions are subject to contractual waiver. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315, 84 S.Ct. 411, 414, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964). Three circuits have addressed forum selection clauses that conflict with the Miller Act\u2019s venue provisions. All three have held that as a mere venue requirement, \u00a7 270b(b) is subject to contractual waiver by a valid forum selection clause. See FGS Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); G & C Enterprises, 62 F.3d at 36; In re Holdings: 0: holding that a partys repeated representations that venue was proper in one forum waived its right to bring a subsequent motion under 28 usc  1406a challenging venue 1: holding the miller acts venue requirement could be waived by defendants 2: holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived 3: holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue 4: holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "innocence by giving jurors an instruction that minimized the significance of their anonymity. Before jurors filled lowed its anonymity discussion by instructing jurors that the defendants enjoyed a presumption of innocence, and repeated that instruction both at the beginning and conclusion of the trial. See Preliminary Instruction at 3, reprinted in J.A. I 260; Trial Tr. (Sept. 18, 1989) at 46, reprinted in J.A. VIII; id. (Dec. 1, 1989) at 74, reprinted in J.A. XVII. This step further mitigated any prejudice from the anonymous jury procedure. See Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1133; see also Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216 (finding repeated instructions on presumption of innocence to protect defendant from possibility of prejudice resulting from impan-elment of anonymous jury); Vario, 943 F.2d at 241 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, appellants find fault in the Holdings: 0: holding that trial court took adequate steps to safeguard defendants presumption of innocence where judge failed to instruct jurors as to reason for their anonymity but fully instructed them on presumption of innocence 1: holding that no amount of boiler plate instructions to the jury  not to draw any inferences as to the judges feelings about the facts from his asking questions or that they are free to disregard factual comment by the judge or as to the presumption of innocence  could be expected to erase from a jurys mind the part taken in this trial by the district judge 2: holding trial courts failure to recite a presumption of innocence instruction seriously jeopardized the defendants federal constitutional right to due process and a fair trial 3: holding that it was fundamental error for a sentencing court to consider a criminal defendants protestations of innocence because due process guarantees an individual the right to maintain innocence even when faced with evidence of overwhelming guilt 4: holding that a district court order denying anonymity to the parties is a collateral order", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "dismiss Counts III-V pending adjudication of Count I. With regard to Count II, the court held that the power to revoke an objection is implied by the power to interpose one, and that the sixty-day period was intended only to limit the Attorney General\u2019s authority to interpose objections. Id. at 211. Appellees urged that the claims set forth in the remaining counts were not subject to judicial review, because section 5 of the Voting Rights Act precludes judicial review of actions taken by the Attorney General under its provisions, and commits the decision to interpose objections wholly to agency discretion. However, the District Court deferred consideration of the review-ability of Counts III through V, and ruled on the basis of Harper v. Levi, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 520 F.2d 53 (1975) (<HOLDING>), that the \u201cprocedural\u201d issue raised by Count I Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error 1: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  2: holding that where defendant failed to object to facts in psi relating to prior conviction the failure to object constituted an admission 3: holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver 4: holding reviewable the attorney generals alleged failure to exercise his independent judgment before deciding not to object to a proposed voting change", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "failed to establish that Kennedy\u2019s stock sales were \u201cunusual.\u201d As discussed above, Kennedy disclosed all his holdings in the November announcement. The additional 30,000 shares that Kennedy sold in January represented less than 11% of his holdings; after the sale, Kennedy owned approximately 259,000 shares and/or options of IMCERA stock. Further, the complaint failed to allege that any other defendant sold any shares of IMCERA stock during this period. The fact that the other defendants did not sell their shares during the relevant class period undermines plaintiffs\u2019 claim that defendants delayed notifying the public \u201cso that they could sell their stock at a huge profit.\u201d In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) \u00b6 97,060, at 94,-697, 1992 WL 394927 (N.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, it appears that the 30,000 shares Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs claims that defendants artificially inflated the companys share price so that they could sell their stock at a huge profit was undermined by the fact that one of the four defendants did not sell his stock during the class period 1: holding that plaintiffs allegations of loss causation complied with dura because they asserted that defendants misrepresentations had caused the value of the shares of stock to become inflated after which the disclosure of the true state of affairs caused the plaintiffs to lose millions of dollars 2: holding that complaint stated a claim under erisa for breach of fiduciary duty of among other things prudence where defendants continued to offer a company stock fund as a pension plan alternative when they knew that the stock price was unlawfully and artificially inflated 3: holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter 4: holding that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation where their only allegation was the payment of artificially inflated prices for defendants securities and their complaint failed to provide defendants with notice of what plaintiffs relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the alleged misrepresentation at issue ", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in understanding the case and in reaching a correct verdict.\u201d State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 136, 184 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1971). It is recognized by this Court that \u201cthe preferred method of jury instruction is the use of the approved guidelines of the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions.\u201d In re Will of Leonard, 71 N.C. App. 714, 717, 323 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1984). \u201cIn a criminal trial the judge has the duty to instruct the jury on the law arising from all the evidence presented.\u201d State v. Moore, 75 N.C. App. 543, 546, 331 S.E.2d 251, 253, disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 188, 337 S.E.2d 862 (1985). This places a duty upon the presiding judge to instruct the jury as to the burden of proof upon each issue arising upon the pleadings. See State v. Redman, 217 N.C. 483, 8 S.E.2d 623 (1940) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe rule as to the burden of proof is Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 1: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 2: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial 3: holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element 4: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "109 Utah 213, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (1946)). This requires a system of coordination between the holder of the easement and the owner of the land through which it passes. The Court thus concluded that the BLM needed to make an \u201cinitial determination\u201d regarding the reasonableness and necessity of any proposed improvements beyond mere maintenance of the previous condition of the road. Id. at 1084-85. This approach was elaborated and applied in district court cases after Hodel. In United States v. Garfield County, 122 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Utah 2000), the court held, with reference to the same road at issue in Hodel, that any road construction within the National Park, beyond \u201cmaintenance,\u201d would require advance notification of the Park Service and mutual accommodation between the P Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Jenks, 22 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that proposed improvements to an rs 2477 route in a national preserve is subject to regulation by the national park service 1: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation 2: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 3: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 4: holding that a lessors interest can only be subject to liens arising from improvements performed on the leased property if the lease required the improvements or if under judicial interpretation the improvements were the pith of the lease", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1 . See Tex. Lab.Code \u00a7 417.002. Goudeau raised no objection to USF & G's intervention in his pleadings or summary judgment response. 2 . 243 S.W.3d 1, 10. The portion of the court of appeals\u2019 judgment affirming summary judgment against Goudeau's former wife Tasha, see id. at 5-6, has not been appealed. 3 . Fies Hawai\u2019i 117, 883 P.2d 38, 53 (1994) (finding coverage as occupancy if insured vehicle \"started the chain of events\u201d that resulted in injury). 13 . See Torres v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 793 A.2d 592, 593 (2002) (\"[I]n order to obtain UM coverage where occupancy is in issue, a plaintiff is required to establish a substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and the injury sustained.\u201d). 14 . See Genthner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 681 A.2d 479, 482 (Me.1996) (<HOLDING>); Sayers v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 192 Mont. Holdings: 0: holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle 1: holding that the physical contact needed to support a direct claim against an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to nc gen stat  2027921 existed where the physical contact arose between the hitandrun vehicle and plaintiffs vehicle through intermediate vehicles involved in an unbroken chain collision which involved the hitandrun vehicle 2: holding attempt to apprehend hitandrun driver was directly and reasonably related to the operation and use of the insured vehicle 3: holding that the term strike as used in a contractual definition of hitandrun coverage required physical contact between the hitandrun vehicle and the insured vehicle 4: holding that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense in situations where the arresting officer has not observed the operation of the vehicle such facts and circumstances would necessarily have to include a relationship between the time there was evidence to show the influence of intoxicants and the time of operation of the vehicle internal citations omitted", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 711 (5th cir.1985) ], its intended purpose should be upheld so long as it otherwise offends no substantive rights. See In re Adams [734 F.2d 1094 (5th cir.1984) ]. We see no such result here. On the contrary, if bankruptcy court jurisdiction is not permitted over a class action of debtors, Rule 7023 is virtually read out of the rules. Id. at 754 (internal footnotes omitted). ... There is also disagreement about whether the bankruptcy court may exercise jurisdiction over a nationwide class of debtors or is limited to exercising jurisdiction over debtors whose petitions are filed within the same judicial district. Compare, e.g., In re Noletto, 244 B.R. 845, 849 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.2000) (permitting nationwide class) with Barrett v. Avco Fin. Servs. Mgmt. Co., 292 B.R. 1, 8 (D.Mass.2003) (<HOLDING>). The class at issue in this case was limited Holdings: 0: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members 1: holding court lacks jurisdiction over putative class members whose bankruptcies were discharged outside of judicial district 2: holding that it is not necessary that all putative class members share identical claims 3: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 4: holding court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over the governments prosecutorial discretion decisions", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "award was not an abuse of discretion. The district court based its award on a variety of factors: it cited the need for deterrence, and recognized that \u201cthe willful and pervasive nature of [Chertok]\u2019s misrepresentations, and the time and effort they added to this litigation,\u201d called for a \u201cconsiderable sanction.\u201d Joint Appx 290-91. It balanced those considerations against the fact that we vacated two out of the three Rule 11 violations it originally relied on, and the fact that StreetEasy devoted less than one third of its submissions to the affirmed Rule 11 violation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the district court\u2019s decision to award one-third of the original amount was not within the range of permissible decisions. See Eastway Constr. Corp., 821 F.2d at 128 (<HOLDING>); see also Caisse Nationale de Credit Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive 1: recognizing wide reach of jurisdiction under title 11 2: holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions 3: recognizing that appellate courts that have applied rule 16 have afforded wide discretion to district courts applications of that rule 4: recognizing district courts wide range of discretion in setting amount of rule 11 sanctions", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the \u201cfast-steering\u201d language of the claim preamble is not a limitation of any of the claims. See STX LLC v. Brine Inc., 54 USPQ2d 1347, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2000) (\u201cThe fact that the first squeezes that formed the basis of the commercial offer to sell might not have exhibited the desired degree of \u2018improved playing and handling\u2019 characteristics ... is irrelevant, not least because the preamble to claim 1 is not a limitation.\u201d). Nor should the court consider things like the alleged \u201coperator friendly\u201d characteristics of the \u2019220 trowel that do not appear in the claims. Finally, the court should appreciate that experimentation and modification of non-claimed features of the Red Rider will not necessarily preclude the finding of an on-sale bar. See Theis, 610 F.2d at 793, 204 USPQ at 194 (<HOLDING>). 4. Marking Bartell argues that the Holdings: 0: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 1: holding the same with respect to an apartment 2: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 3: holding that experimental use  does not apply to experiments performed with respect to nonclaimed features of an invention 4: holding to that effect with respect to rule 64", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Ford Motor Cre creditor owes to the debtor must be incurred for the specific purpose of achieving setoff rights.\u201d In re Summit Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 B.R. 105, 120 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1999) (citing Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Mfr. & Traders Trust Co. (In re The Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.), 146 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.1998)). The debtor has the burden of proving that a creditor obtained a claim for the purpose of obtaining setoff rights. In re Energy Co-op., Inc., 100 B.R. 992, 995 (N.D.Ill.1989) (citing Record Club of Am. v. United Artists Records, 80 B.R. 271 (S.D.N.Y.1987)). \u201cThere must be facts to show an intent to manipulate the balance in order to create an issue of fact.\u201d Energy Co-op., 100 B.R. at 995. See In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). But see In re Bohlen Enter., Ltd., 859 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a creditor could not set off a debt owed on a loan that he took out a month before the bankruptcy against the value he paid for investment certificates from the debtorbank a year earlier in order to improve his position as a creditor based on the timing of the loan 1: holding that when a creditor on multiple debts applies an undesignated partial payment by the debtor to a debt on which the statute of limitations has not yet run the payment tolls the statute of limitations on that debt 2: holding that for purpose of the means test debtor can deduct mortgage payment even though debtor will abandon property 3: holding that creditor did not have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing where the debtor informed creditor of the possibility that a bankruptcy case would be filed 4: holding that a creditor did not incur debt for the purpose of set off where it stopped payment to the debtor", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is not dependent on the alleged merits of an appellant\u2019s underlying claim. Boone, 409 S.W.3d at 598. Rather, the relevant inquiry in determining whether to apply the escape: rule is deciding whether the defendant\u2019s escape adversely affected the criminal justice system. Id.; McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926. Here, Appellant twice failed to appear for sentencing. The trial court was forced to issue a capias warrant, and law enforcement had to locate, and apprehend Appellant out of state and transport him back to Missouri. The trial court had to, schedule three sentencing hearings, resulting in a delay of nearly six months. Appellant\u2019s actions in absconding from justice adversely impacted the criminal justice system, warranting application of the escape rule. See Wagner, 172 S.W.3d at 924 (<HOLDING>); McCartney, 297 S.W.3d at 926 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that willful failure to appear at sentencing supported obstruction of justice enhancement 1: holding a failure to appear for sentencing constitutes an escape under the rule 2: holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense 3: holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits 4: holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "must be a substantial one, a \u201cwell-founded, rule of domestic policy established to protect the morals, safety or welfare of our people.\u201d Bevins, 195 S.W. at 155 (emphasis supplied). Where no Kentucky resident has been affected, rarely will that standard be met. It is not met here where the competing public policies \u2014 supposing a Kentucky policy against this UIM exclusion \u2014 concern only the balance to be struck between required insurance coverage and insurance affordability, a balance different states have assessed differently. Since here no Kentucky resident is affected, nothing requires a Kentucky court to interfere with the balance Pennsylvania has chosen for its citizens. Cf. United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frye, 381 Ill.App.3d 960, 320 Ill.Dec. 639, 887 N.E.2d 783 (2008) (<HOLDING>); Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. v. Sanches, Holdings: 0: holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law 1: holding that illinois public policy did not require the application of illinois law to an illinois accident involving only indiana residents insured in indiana 2: holding that geographic limitation in illinois franchise law prevents its application to dispute with outofstate franchisor notwithstanding express illinois choiceoflaw clause 3: holding that a federal due process malicious prosecution claim against an indiana police officer could proceed because indiana law did not provide an adequate postdeprivation tort law remedy 4: holding that illinois wage law did not apply to nonresident employee who worked outside the state even though eim ployers primary place of business was in illinois", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "be a little over 17 grams. He continued his argument by drawing the same distinction between simple manufacturing and trafficking. He stated, I think the evidence that has been presented is, at this point ... not sufficient for at least trafficking ... [b]ut it\u2019s certainly the\u2014it\u2019s too speculative to present the trafficking. So, if we don\u2019t have\u2014if we have enough to present to the jury, I submit we have\u2014it would be for manufacturing as opposed to trafficking. In denying the motion, the trial court specifically referred back to the previous discussion about \u201ctheoretical yield,\u201d indicating the trial court understood the directed verdict motion to address the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence on the element of quantity. See State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 353, 737 S.E.2d 490, 497 (2013) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hendricks, 408 S.C. 525, 531, 759 Holdings: 0: holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed 1: holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a mental state requirement he had not preserved another constitutional objection 2: holding the issue was preserved when the trial court immediately appeared to understand the objection was a renewal of a previous argument 3: holding an issue was preserved in part because the trial court immediately understood the basis of the objection 4: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prosecutor\u2019s failure to strike venire-member 33 for the same reason as Robertson was the result of a mistake in his notes and not evidence of his disparate treatment of Robertson based on race. Here, in response to the challenge by appellant\u2019s trial counsel, the prosecutor represented to the trial court that he exercised a peremptory strike on all venire-members who he had marked in his notes as stating that they could not consider life imprisonment and that he did not strike veniremember 33 because she was not marked in his notes as having given this response. Appellant\u2019s counsel did not cross examine the prosecutor on this statement or request the production of the prosecutor\u2019s notes to assess the truth of the statement. See Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187, 193 Holdings: 0: holding that the jurors failure to remember particular facts inquired about on voir dire and the jurors misunderstanding of voir dire questions do not constitute probable prejudice 1: holding that appellant is entitled to prosecutors voir dire notes if they were actually used by prosecutor to refresh his memory 2: holding that an order requiring a prosecutor to disclose his notes from voir dire over a claim of workproduct privilege was immediately appealable under rule 313 3: holding that appellant failed to meet his burden of showing that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by sealing jury questionnaires used in open court during voir dire 4: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "it is mandatory and therefore the exclusive remedy for the Leonards\u2019 counterclaims. Failure to arbitrate, Shepler argues, barred suit on the Leonards\u2019 claims and was not subject to waiver by Shepler. \u00b615 Most contract terms will be viewed as mandatory in the sense that the parties agreed that they will be bound by them and expect that they will be enforced by the court. However, this does not mean that contract terms cannot be waived or modified. It is also well established that parties may contract for an exclusive remedy that limits their rights, duties, and obligations. Graoch Assocs. #5 Ltd. P\u2019ship v. Titan Constr. Corp., 126 Wn. App. 856, 865, 109 P.3d 830 (2005). But, the contract must clearly indicate the parties\u2019 intent to make the stipulated remedy exclusive. Id. at 865-66 (<HOLDING>); see also Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs were not foreclosed from pursuing ucc remedies outside of written warranty because warranty notice provision did not specify that the remedies provided were exclusive of any other remedy 1: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 2: holding the flsa does not provide the exclusive remedy for violations of its mandates 3: holding that warranty claim accrued at tender where 180 day warranty on computer not a warranty for future performance as it involved a remedy only 4: holding that one year warranty was not an exclusive remedy for defective construction where the contract did not so state", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to his own skill, which we interpret the law not to mean, as distinguished from the chance or unpredictability of the mechanism, which we construe the law to proscribe. Id. at 874-75. Additionally in State v. Broward Vending, Inc., 696 So.2d 851 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997), the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that where \u201cthe game is set to play-itself and to record a certain win/loss ratio[,] ... the element of chance is inherent in the game.\u201d Id. at 852. These prior Florida cases clearly put Plaintiffs on notice of the meaning of the phrase \u201coutcome is determined by factors unpredictable by the player or games in which the player may not control the outcome of the game through skill.\u201d See Fla. Stat. \u00a7 849.161(l)(a); see also Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). As, the Fourth Circuit stated in Martin v. Holdings: 0: holding that a noticeofrights form that plainly affects more than one person and encompasses more than an immediate set of facts and is applicable  to all inmates in a particular category is a rule 1: holding that prior south carolina cases interpreting whether a device is a game of chance demonstrate  a plainly legitimate sweep and more than a conceivable application which is all that is required to survive a facial challenge to a criminal statute where constitutional rights are not implicated 2: holding that exhaustion of arbitration procedure is not necessary before the district court could consider a facial constitutional challenge 3: holding that in deciding on a facial constitutional challenge it is improper to consider only limited hypothetical applications 4: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "regardless of whether or not the June 20th Order triggered the filing requirements of Rules 50 and 59, it is not necessary to decide if the June 20th Order triggered the 10-day filing requirement of these Rules. Specifically, if the June 20th Order did trigger the 10-day filing requirement, Schering\u2019s motion may be considered by this Court because they were timely filed. If, however, the June 20th Order is not a \u201cjudgment\u201d under Rule 50 and 59, Schering\u2019s motion may nonetheless be considered by this Court because the filing requirements embodied in those Rules are maximum filing requirements and do not prevent a party from filing such motions prior to the entry of \u201cjudgment.\u201d Although parties typically do' not file post-trial motions until entry of final judgment resolving al Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1711, Holdings: 0: holding trial court retains jurisdiction to consider motion for attorneys fees despite filing of notice of appeal of final judgment 1: holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees 2: holding that a motion to reconsider filed after the entry of final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error 3: holding that the rule 12b6 ruling was not a final judgment and did not bind the district court at summary judgment 4: holding that district court improperly denied rule 50b motion filed after entry of final judgment because previous judgment which did not resolve issue of attorneys fees did not trigger rule 50b filing requirements", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "The debtor is not directly obligated to her minor children for Mr. Sinton\u2019s charges, but this fact is not determinative of discharge. In the case of Silansky v. Brodsky, Greenblatt & Renehan (In re Silansky), 897 F.2d 743 (C.A.4 1990), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the District Court that attorney\u2019s fees ordered to be paid to attorneys for debtor\u2019s former spouse were within the coverage of \u00a7 523(a)(5) and not dischargeable, following the holdings of such cases as Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6 (C.A.2 1981), that classified fees allowed to a spouse\u2019s attorneys in divorce proceedings as nondisehargeable debts in the category of alimony, maintenance, and support. See Brodsky, Greenblatt & Renehan, Chartered v. Daumit (In re Daumit), 25 B.R. 371 (Bankr.Md.1982) (<HOLDING>); Burns v. Burns (In re Burns), 186 B.R. 637, Holdings: 0: holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree 1: holding that attorneys fees incurred in a custody action were nondischargeable under  523a5 2: holding that counsel fees awarded to debtors wife in a divorce action were nondisehargeable under  523a5 3: holding the family court properly awarded a wife attorneys fees incurred as the result of her husbands contempt 4: holding that the apparent denial of the husbands request for an order compelling the wife to deliver to him the personal property he had been awarded in their divorce judgment did not constitute a modification of the original divorce judgment", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 471, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989)). The Navy concedes that it is an agency with a mixed function. Therefore, it must demonstrate that it \u201chad a law enforcement purpose based upon properly delegated enforcement authority\u201d for compiling the ESQD arc maps. Church of Scientology, 611 F.2d at 748. The Navy does not meet this standard. Agencies with law enforcement powers have the ability to conduct investigations or adjudications to enforce laws or regulations. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Int\u2019l v. I.R.S., 995 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.1993) (finding that the Exempt Organization Division of the IRS performs a law enforcement function \u201cby enforcing the provisions of the federal tax code that relate to qualification for tax exempt status\u201d); Lewis v. I.R.S., 823 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Binion v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 695 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the irs has a law enforcement purpose in the context of a criminal tax investigation 1: holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law 2: holding that the irss full participation in the bankruptcy proceeding in relation to an income tax debt did not bar it from collecting a gift tax debt that had also been listed in the debtors schedules where the irs did not file a proof of claim and the debtor did not force the irs into the proceeding on the gift tax debt 3: holding that the debtors belated filing was not a reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the tax law relying significantly on the debtors delinquency in failing to file his tax returns until after the irs assessment thus defeating the main purpose of the selfreporting requirement of our tax system 4: holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "result: An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representation, if the actor (a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action by the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other, and (b) knows (i) that the statement is false, or (ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 310 (1965) (emphasis supplied). Though cited to in passing by the Court of Appeals in a small number of cases, \u00a7 310 has not been expressly adopted by Maryland courts. But see Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, at 791 n. 14, 955 A.2d 769 (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Virginia Dare Stores v. Schuman, 175 Holdings: 0: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position 1: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 2: holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish constructive notice because the plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the oil was on the floor for any length of time 3: holding that a constitutional violation by the individual defendants is required in order to sustain a claim against the municipality 4: recognizing that although the plaintiff attempted to make a claim under section 310 the plaintiff failed to establish the element of duty required to sustain that claim", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "judgment. It is inherently of such character that the voters, no matter how intelligent, cannot be expected to investigate and have access to all the information which we may assume the city council, with the aid of their attorney, acquire. Full information should be obtained and carefully considered before a conclusion is reached. Oakman v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 203 N.W. 514, 517 (1925). See also Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 293 Minn. 227, 198 N.W.2d 531, 536-37 (1972) (stating a proposed city charter amendment that would have allowed citizens to refer actions such as the settlement of lawsuits could create a \u201cchaotic situation\u201d in city government); Peterman v. Village of Pataskala, 122 Ohio App.3d 758, 702 N.E.2d 965, 967 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The dissent\u2019s self-generated contention to Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under  1983 through official policy or custom 2: holding that legislative immunity does not depend on motivation for legislative action even if the motive was to impinge on plaintiffs free speech rights 3: recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government  4: recognizing a settlement prevented a municipal referendum as it was not a legislative action", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Judge. Kiefer Filppula entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following crimes: (1) possession of a prescription drug without a prescription in violation of section 499.03, Florida Statutes (2009); (2) possession of cannabis with intent to sell in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2009); (3) possession of alprazolam in violation of section 893.13; and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 893.147. On appeal, Filppula argues that the court imposed illegal sentences on counts two and three. We agree and reverse. For count three, the possession of alprazolam, the court orally sentenced Filppula to five years\u2019 probation with two 1991) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the order of probation states that Holdings: 0: holding that the law is clear that when a defen dant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation  the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law 1: holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration 2: holding that probation is not a sentence 3: holding that work release qualified as incarceration 4: holding that a sentence structured with three years incarceration suspended and eight years of sex offender probation was a true split sentence", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "jobs at the GS-12 grade level. See Luper Suppl. Decl. Ex. G, ECF No. 34-12 (labeling both jobs as \"GS 12\u201d positions on Mr. Willis\u2019s resume). That Mr. Willis\u2019s previous specialized experience was not credited to him is therefore insignificant in assessing Ms. Thompson and Mr. Willis\u2019s comparative qualifications. 7 . Below, the Court addresses Ms. Thompson\u2019s allegations of impermissible bias shown through factors other than her own qualifications. See infra Part IV.B.2. 8 . Other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit, corroborate this legal principle. See Hendricks v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1008, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment when the plaintiff\u2019s evidence \"supports at most favoritism, not sex discrimination\u2019\u2019); Caldwell v. Washington, 278 Fed.Appx. 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Dalton, 71 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that when a plaintiff proves the defendants stated reasons for hiring someone else were pretext for offering the position to a personal friend and not a pretext for racial discrimination she does not establish triable issues of fact 1: holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination 2: holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee 4: holding that inconsistency in employers reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "I. & N. Dec. at 124 (reasoning that it would be \u201cinconsistent\u201d to interpret Section 1226(c) in a manner that \u201cpermits the release of some criminal aliens, yet mandates the detention of others convicted of the same crimes, based on whether there is a delay between their release from criminal custody and their apprehension by [DHS]\u201d). Finally,. the Court\u2019s interpretation of Section 1226(c) is further reinforced by Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has held that \u201ca provision that the Government \u2018shall\u2019 act within a specified time, without more, [is not] a jurisdictional limit precluding action later.\u201d Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158, 123 S.Ct. 748, 154 L.Ed.2d 653 (2003); see United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990) (<HOLDING>); see also Sylvain v. Attorney General of the Holdings: 0: recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal 1: holding that the government may detain criminal defendants leading up to trial even if they do not comply with the relevant statutes command that a judicial officer shall hold a bond hearing immediately upon the persons first appearance before the officer 2: holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 3: holding that period of up to fortyeight hours between arrest and initial appearance before judicial officer is presumptively reasonable 4: holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "That alone is enough to demonstrate the regulation provided defendants with the fair notice required by the Due Process Clause. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50, 96 S.Ct. 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975) (explaining that statutes which require interpretation using standard tools of legal analysis are not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 82-85 (1st Cir.2005) (rejecting a defendant\u2019s fair notice challenges after interpreting a criminal statute in light of its legislative history). Looking beyond the language of Part 273.2(f)(3) and the legislative purpose of e is particularly fair because the record establishes they, as required by their business model, kept abreast of developments in hazardous waste regulation and had act .3d 722, 727 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). The government\u2019s search of Executive\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors 1: holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable 2: holding that a guidance document is not binding where it provided only a list of factors the agency would consider rather than a clear statement of policy 3: holding that courts should look at the notice afforded by a document rather than a litigants motivation in filing to determine whether a document constitutes a notice of appeal 4: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the State satisfied its burden of proof. Therefore, counsel\u2019s failure to object was not deficient. We also find that the prosecutor\u2019s alleged improper vouching for Skalnik was a fair comment in response to defense counsel\u2019s attack on Skalnik\u2019s credibility during closing argument. Defense counsel referred to Skalnik as a \u201cprofessional thief\u2019 and a poor police officer. The State was entitled to rebut these comments. Accordingly, Dailey has failed to demonstrate that counsel\u2019s failure to object constitutes deficient performance. With regard to the prosecutor\u2019s alleged \u201cblatant misstatement of fact\u201d concerning Shaw\u2019s testimony, this claim was never raised in Dailey\u2019s postcon-viction motion. Therefore, it is not cognizable on appeal. See Gordon v. State, 863 So.2d 1215, 1219 (Fla.2003) (<HOLDING>). Dailey also argues that the cumulative effect Holdings: 0: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 1: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 2: holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion 3: holding that a claim is proeedurally barred where it was not raised in the defendants motion for postconviction relief 4: holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "664 A.2d 1370 (1995) (for purposes of appellate review, what is not of record does not exist). The uncontradicted evidence indicates that Forrest McDanel and his wife, Jacquelyn, are named as the sole owners of the truck. There is no evidence supporting appellant\u2019s allegation that the truck was titled in the name of McDanel Painting, or any other indication in the record that the truck was a commercial vehicle. Because there is no evidence in the official record that the truck was a commercial vehicle, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the status of the vehicle. Consequently, appellant\u2019s claim that the truck was a commercial vehicle, and, thus, she is entitled to the presumption that the operation of the truck was for the owner\u2019s purposes must fail. See Waters, supra (<HOLDING>). 4 . Although Forrest McDanel and his wife, Holdings: 0: holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes 1: holding that care of the grounds was part of the business of the hospital 2: holding that the operation of a plant cafeteria was part of the plant owners business 3: holding that there is no unitary business in part because there is no flow of international business 4: holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "she accordingly lacks the \u201cirreducible constitutional minimum of standing,\u201d which is \u201can injury in fact that is ... actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.\u201d Drutis, 499 F.3d at 611 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Majority correctly observes that \u201c[o]ur decision in Horvath did not revolve around whether the plaintiff suffered a financial loss.\u201d (Majority Op. at 416.) It did, however, turn on the question of whether the plaintiff had demonstrated an individual loss, i.e., an actual injury to that particular plaintiff. That showing is required when a plaintiff is seeking individual relief under ERISA. See In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 159 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Yet the Majority appears to conclude, as one Holdings: 0: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa 1: holding that equitable relief is not available to an individual under this section of the fdcpa 2: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 under a breach of fiduciary duty theory did not have a cause of action when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty was a failure to distribute benefits in accordance with the plan 3: holding that a civil rights plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fmla against individual individual is not employer subject to liability under the act 4: holding that a plaintiff seeking individual relief under erisa  502a3 in contrast to  502a2 which allows relief on behalf of a plan is required to prove an individual loss", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "890, 893 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Abuse of discretion occurs when a decision by the trial court is \u201cso clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.\u201d Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Public records and reports, in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report are not hearsay, even if the declarant is available as a witness. Tex.R. Evid. 803(8)(B). An exception controls criminal cases, however, in which records and reports concerning matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel are inadmissible hearsay. See id.; Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 804-07 & n. 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh\u2019g) (<HOLDING>); Bermen v. State, 798 S.W.2d 8, 12 Holdings: 0: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised 1: holding that fulltime forensic chemists employed by texas department of public safety were lawenforcement personnel whose reports were not admissible under either the publicrecord hearsay exception rule 8038b or the businessrecord hearsay exception rule 8036 2: holding that records referring to defendant as escaped prisoner and escape risk were not admissible because exception for public records rule 8038b specifically excluded them as records of law enforcement personnel further holding that specific exclusion controlled over businessrecord hearsay exception rule 8036 3: holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted 4: holding that evidence of customer inquiries is admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for federal protection, aid, and grants of land.\u201d Id. at 218, 79 S.Ct. at 269. Were the State to expressly disclaim jurisdiction and the federal courts to give up their protective jurisdiction over Indian lands, including water rights, the Indians would seem deprived of the benefit of the original bargain that they were driven to make. Of course, by general statute, Congress later expressed its willingness to have any state assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians if the state legislature or the people voted affirmatively to accept such responsibility. Id. at 222, 79 S.Ct. at 271. To date, Montana does, not appear to have accepted such responsibility. In passing, we note that McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm\u2019n., 411 U.S. 164, 179, 180, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1266, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1972) (<HOLDING>), has expressly limited the application of the Holdings: 0: holding that arizona could not impose an income tax on reservation indians 1: holding a state cannot impose an income tax on indians whose income is solely from reservation sources 2: holding state may not impose tax on nonindian trader operating on the reservation 3: holding that assumption of jurisdiction by the state court would infringe upon the right of reservation indians to make their own laws and be governed by them 4: holding that state cannot impose vendor taxes on indian sellers who operate on the reservation", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161, 1165-66 (10th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1180-83 (10th Cir.2006) (upholding a 41-month sentence for illegal reentry based in part on a 16-level enhancement for a prior conviction). Based on this precedent, the district court could reasonably rely on the 16-level enhancement to arrive at an appropriate sentence. Mr. Soto-Robledo relies not only on the alleged unfairness of the 16-level enhancement, but also on the alleged failure to adequately consider mitigating factors. According to Mr. Soto-Robledo, these factors deserved greater weight. But the district court has the discretion to balance mitigating factors, such as cultural assimilation. See United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 889-90 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d at 1167 Holdings: 0: holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence 1: holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range 2: holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness 3: holding that a 57month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable rejecting the defendants effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness based on evidence of cultural assimilation 4: recognizing a presumption of reasonableness", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "so disabled. The second certified question asks us to construe the legal disability statute, Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-106, to determine whether its provisions toll the statute of limitations for individuals of unsound mind when that person\u2019s legal representative accepts responsibility for the injured person\u2019s tort claims arising out of a single incident. As noted above, the statute of limitations for actions for injuries to the person is one year. TenmCode Ann. \u00a7 28-8 \u2014 104(a)(1) (2000). However, Tennessee\u2019s legal disability statute provides that: [i]f the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or such person\u2019s representatives and pri 590, 592 (Minn.Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>); Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that appointment of a conservator does not remove a mentally disabled persons legal disability so as to start the statute of limitations running 1: holding that the appointment of a conservator will not cease the tolling of the statute of limitations for those of unsound mind 2: holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations 3: holding that the appointment of a guardian for a mentally incompetent or nonage person does not have the effect of commencing the running of the period of limitations tolled by virtue of the disability 4: holding that appointment of guardian does not operate to start statute of limitations running in cases where title to cause of action is in person belonging to class of disabled persons encompassed within tolling provision", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "judge announces that she has denied a group of motions, and this group includes the Insureds\u2019 motion to strike as untimely the Reply Evidence. The trial judge further states that she had set the Motion for submission on March 18, 2005, and that counsel knew about this setting. No party challenges this statement, states that the court did not re-set the submission date, expresses surprise that the trial court had set the Motion for submission on that date, or objects to any alleged lack of notice that the submission date had been re-set. The trial court also announces that it is granting the Motion. The Insureds\u2019 counsel complains that the Reply Evidence had been on file for less than ten days before the submission date for the Motio S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, pet denied) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the timeliness of the Reply Evidence Holdings: 0: holding that trial courts resetting of hearing date for motion for summary judgment made timely summaryjudgment evidence that had been untimely based on hearing date in effect when the evidence was filed and served 1: holding that evidence filed less than 21 days before original summaryjudgment hearing was timely even though trial court never granted leave to file late evidence because the summaryjudgment hearing was reset to a date more than 21 days after the evidence was filed 2: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 3: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard 4: holding same when nonsuit filed after summaryjudgment hearing but before rendition of summary judgment", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "5708, can justify a contrary result. We decline to accept Cooper\u2019s invitation to place the burden on the defendant to request a nominal damages instruction. Cooper was the party seeking a finding of actual injury and, as such, bore the responsibility of requesting a nominal damages instruction if it wanted the jury to consider that option. Of course, Cooper may well have decided for tactical reasons that it did not want the jury to consider that option. But whether Cooper failed to request an instruction on nominal damages by choice or inadvertence, it should bear the consequences. Because Cooper did not request such an instruction, it cannot now contend that we should infer a finding of nominal damages. See Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 844-45 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 113 S.Ct. 1043, 122 Holdings: 0: holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict 1: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 2: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them 3: holding that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages in a breach of contract regarding a fire appraisal 4: holding that plaintiff waived the right to nominal damages in an excessive force case because nominal damages were not requested until after the verdict", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "statutory sodomy, and it does pot consist of an attempt to commit the latter offense. Thus, first-degree sexiial misconduct as defined by section 566.090 does not satisfy any of the subparts of section 566.046.1(2) and therefore is not a lesser included offense of first-degree statutory sodomy. Our holding is consistent with State v. Greenlee, 327 S.W.3d 602, 621 (Mo.App. E.D. 2010), in which this Court held that first-degree sexual misconduct, as defined by section 566.090 is not a.lesser included offense of first-degree statutory sodomy because the former requires proof of \u201clack of consent.\u201d Id. Ward\u2019s argument is based entirely on the principle that a person under the age of fourteen can never legally consent to any kind of sexual activity. State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2 Mo.banc 1965) (<HOLDING>); State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Mo. banc Holdings: 0: holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent 1: holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape 2: holding that intent and motive play but little if any part in statutory rape 3: holding that very little  evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employers motive any indication of discriminatory motive  may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder 4: holding 404b evidence admissible under intent exception but not motive exception where motive not contested", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "were offered or admitted in evidence. 3 . It is not clear from this record why the final hearing occurred two months after service on Ducatt. 4 . Jusseaume offered this testimony without objection. 5 . If one party\u2019s cross-examination of the other could result in harassment, intimidation, or threats, the court may exercise its discretion to constrain that cross-examination. See M.R. Evid. 611(a)(3) (\u201cThe court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence on direct and cross-examination so as to ... protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.\u201d). \"[Tjrial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, p 5 (1997) (<HOLDING>). There is no allegation here, however, that Holdings: 0: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation 1: holding that a court may take steps to minimize fear in a child witness if the court finds that the child would be substantially traumatized in a way that compels the limitation of confrontation rights 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child 3: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify 4: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in a case involving a yielding motorcyclist-rather than section 41-6a-904, which requires vehicles to yield to emergency vehicles and includes a subsection stating this does not eliminate the duty of emergency vehicle operators to others on the road-when considering an emergency vehicle operator's duty, further affirming this conclusion. Willden v. Duchesne Cnty., 2009 UT App 213, 193, 4, 6-15, 217 P.3d 1143. 16 . Urtag Cons \u00a7 41-6a-212(1)(b). 17 . See Richards, 2012 UT 14, \u00b6 23, 274 P.3d 911. 18 . See, eg., Estate of Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78, 81 n. 7 (Alaska 1995) (\"We do not interpret these sections as establishing a duty to protect fleeing offenders. Rather, these provisions focus on the safety of innocent third parties.\"); Bryant v. Beary, 766 So.2d 1157, 1160 (Fla.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); City of Winder v. McDougald, 276 Ga. 866, 583 Holdings: 0: holding that such a duty exists 1: holding that these statutes are not intended to create a duty where none exists but to preserve any that do exist 2: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts 3: holding these two statutes are not criminal offenses and only affect sentencing 4: holding that claims under  1983 1985 and 1986 are barred for the further reason that these statutes create rights solely against persons and a state is not considered a person under these statutes", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "injuries to children who may have fallen therein.... \u201d Neal v. Home Builders, 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280, 286 (1953) (quoting 38 AmJur. \u00a7 151), reh\u2019g denied. Thus, the risk of falling from a height to the ground or of falling into an excavation, pit, or ditch is considered obvious and, therefore, generally precludes the application of the doctrine. See 62 Am. JuR.2d \u00a7 352. However, certain exceptions have been made in cases where a dangerous condition was concealed, where the structure from which the child fell was defective, where there existed a distracting influence which made it likely that the child would not appreciate the danger, or where the child was too young to appreciate any risk. See id. at \u00a7 353; see also Greene v. Di Fazio, 148 Conn. 419, 424, 171 A.2d 411, 414 (1961) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the parties dispute the Holdings: 0: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation 1: holding in a securities fraud action that a court may only find the lack of materiality where a jury could not reasonably find materiality 2: holding that the jury could find that a nine year old boy did not realize the risk of falling fiom a plank over an open stairwell in a house under construction 3: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 4: holding that at the summary judgment stage there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could find for the plaintiff", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "would still be John\u2019s though \u2018apples and oranges\u2019 are listed before pears. The comma after \u2018apples and oranges\u2019 is not a period, it\u2019s a comma. They are still \u2018John\u2019s ... pears.\u2019 It is illogical to say otherwise. Also, the apples, oranges, kiwis, and pears are still John\u2019s though \u2018fruit\u2019 appears in the middle of the statement and is a term that overlaps the others. Appellants\u2019 Reply Brief at 7. To the extent that the Haires argue that \u201cthe entire list of categories is controlled by the possessive \u2018its,\u2019 \u201d we observe that the list includes \u201criders,\u201d \u201cmotorcycle owners,\u201d \u201cmechanics and pit crew, and owners and lessees of premises,\u201d Appellants\u2019 Appendix at 47, and the plain language of the Release does not reveal whether these entities are or are not owned by or separate from Haspin 1267 (<HOLDING>). The Haires also argue that Donald was not in Holdings: 0: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties 1: holding that if summary judgment is reversed and remanded parties are not limited to theories asserted in original summary judgment at later trial on merits 2: holding that contradictory references clouded the intent of the document parol evidence may be utilized to determine the parties true intentions respecting the documents application and that the entry of summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a factual determination 3: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 4: holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "549 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversing and remanding because trial court erroneously overruled motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence); see also Tex. R. App. P. 21.3 (setting out grounds for granting a new trial, many of which refer to newly discovered evidence). In addition, if trial counsel is aware of exculpatory evidence that is not effectively used at trial, the defendant can make an ineffective claim in his motion for new trial. Tex. R. App. P. 21.7 (the court \u201cmay receive evidence by affidavit or otherwise\u201d). Finally, counsel can be deficient when he fails to object to erroneous language in a jury charge. Willis v. State, No. 06-02-00108-CR, 2003 WL 21524704 (Tex. App.-Texarkana July 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); McDade v. State, No. 06-01-00134-CR, 2002 WL Holdings: 0: holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel 1: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 3: holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence 4: holding that the appropriate vehicle for claims alleging that defense counsel violated a defendants right to testify is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "As stated above, the Ninth Circuit generally takes a broader view, and often finds that expert testimony is appropriate regarding the objective substantial similarity of literary works. See Olson, 855 F.2d at 1449; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.1977). Nonetheless, several Ninth Circuit cases have recognized the limitations of expert testimony in this area. See Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the district court\u2019s decision to disregard the parties\u2019 expert reports where the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the alleged similarities in expressive elements of the works and \"neither expert opinion [was] very relevant to the conclusions drawn by the court\u201d); Olson, 855 F.2d at 1450-51 (<HOLDING>); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts decision to discount expert testimony was appropriate where the expert deemphasized dissimilarities between the works and compared scenes a faire 1: recognizing that the need for the expert was so great that the decision to preclude the expert effectively amounted to dismissal of case 2: holding the district courts decision not to allow an expert to rely on a note found in a hospital record was within the courts discretion because the court found that the note was too unreliable to be used as the basis for an expert opinion 3: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 4: holding expert testimony on probative similarities between works is unnecessary where the works are not highly technical and the jury is capable of recognizing and understanding the similarities between the works without the help of an expert", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "believe that an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a pretrial ruling in a criminal case that denies any relief sought on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We disagree. [A defendant] is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal to avoid whatever slight increment of strain, embarrassment, or expense might arise from having to defend against allegations made or evidence presented in connection with a court on which trial will in any event occur.\u201d); United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1984) (\u201cUnlike the defendant in Abney, Gulledge will undergo a second trial regardless of our ruling .... Consequently, full protection of his fifth amendment right does not depend on appellate review at this time.\u201d); United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, in this case, Pickering did Holdings: 0: holding no jurisdiction under abney when appeal even if successful could only lessen and not wholly remove the possibility of conviction upon being again tried 1: holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction 2: holding that extraneous information which is unrelated to the case being tried is not prejudicial 3: holding that an error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction 4: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "they ignored the obvious warning signs of the alleged mispricings by Smirloek of the funds portfolios.\u201d The examples of such \u201cobvious warning signs\u201d provided by Appaloosa and Tepper are: \u201csignificant inconsistencies in markets in which Smirloek invested for the funds; significant discrepancies in securities valuations from different dealers for the funds\u2019 portfolio securities; and the substitution of the prices of more valuable securities for those of less valuable securities in the funds\u2019 portfolio valuations.\u201d As further support for their allegation of conscious misbehavior or recklessness, Appaloosa and Tepper contend that the James River Defendants \u201cfailed to institute any meaningful systems of internal controls over Smirl 9 CIV. 8761, 2000 WL 977673, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (<HOLDING>). The Court finds that here, the facts alleged Holdings: 0: holding that scienter had not adequately been pled where the plaintiffs provided none of the required facts underlying the complaints allegations as to the information that was supposedly available to the individual defendants 1: holding scienter not adequately alleged where the complaint lacked sufficient specificity as to facts regarding how and when defendants received information which they allegedly recklessly ignored 2: holding that single paragraph asserting that plaintiffs based their information and belief on investigation of sec filings analysts reports press releases and discussions with consultants neither provided required facts underlying complaints allegations nor directed court to where facts could be found 3: holding that underlying complaints filed by several plaintiffs all contained express allegations of property damage and that because all complaints arose from the same set of circumstances the allegations in any single complaint can be inferred in the other complaints 4: holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter because in part the amended complaint affords no basis for inferring that the individual defendants would have heard about these whistleblower complaints during the class period", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "first year. DOT, meanwhile, continued to forward the balance of the commissions, minus a percentage for administrative costs, to the Commonwealth's Bureau of Blindness and Visual Services. (DOT\u2019s brief at 4.) 12 . As noted previously, DOT terminated each of the five contracts effective January 14, 1990. Accordingly, the contracts for Site 55, Site 56, Site 62 and Site F were in the second renewal period at the time of termination; only the contract for Site 61 was still in the first renewal period. 13 . See also Central Transportation, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals of Cambria County, 490 Pa. 486, 417 A.2d 144 (1980); Citizen Care, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 397, 545 A.2d 455 (1988). But see Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F.Supp. 352 (W.D.Pa.1973) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Although it is true, as DOT argues in Holdings: 0: holding that where a contract results from joint efforts of attorneys for both sides contract should not be construed against either party 1: holding that prevailing party to contract dispute may recover attorneys fees either pursuant to contract or pursuant to statute 2: holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions 3: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 4: holding an ambiguous contract will be construed against the party drafting the same", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "783 A.2d 543, 557 n. 54 (Del.2001); Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d at 568; Mattes v. Checkers Drive-In Rests., Inc., 2001 WL 337865, at *5 (Del.Ch.); Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., 2001 WL 1334182, at *3; Sahagen Satellite Tech. Group, LLC v. Ellipso, Inc., 791 A.2d 794, 796 (Del.Ch. 2000). 42 . The \"credible basis\u201d standard is also settled law in those states that look to Delaware law for guidance on matters of corporation law. See, e.g., Arctic Fin. Corp. v. OTR Express, Inc., 272 Kan. 1326, 38 P.3d 701, 703-04 (2002) (looking to Security First and Thomas & Betts for guidance regarding a books and records inspection under Kansas law); Towle v. Robinson Springs Corp., 168 Vt. 226, 719 A.2d 880, 882 (1998) ( , 2001 WL 1334182, at *4 (Del.Ch.) (<HOLDING>); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2001 WL 818173, Holdings: 0: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses 1: holding that trademark infringement must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the credible evidence 2: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions 3: holding that the plaintiffshareholders demonstrated a credible basis for its  220 claim tjhrough the testimony of their two trial witnesses and the documents introduced as evidence regarding the actions of the corporations board of directors through evidence of suspicious expense figures 4: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "disbursing the $65,000. Moreover, even if it were to be assumed that federal common law does not govern the perfection of MHFA\u2019s security interest, see supra note 11, the same result would obtain under Massachusetts law. In Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Boston Harbor Marina Co., 159 B.R. 616 (D.Mass.1993), the district court held that a Massachusetts mortgagee which recorded its assignment of rents in the registry of deeds as an adjunct to its mortgage, \u201cperfected\u201d its lien in the rents so as to constitute the rents \u201ccash collateral\u201d under Bankruptcy Code \u00a7 363(a), and that there was no need for the creditor to take possession of the real property (e.g., as by foreclosure) or the rents (e.g., as by appointment of a receiver) prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 620-22 (<HOLDING>); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Holdings: 0: holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor 1: recognizing distinction between perfection which governs secured creditors rights against third parties and enforcement of liens which controls creditors rights against its debtor rejecting theory that such inchoate or unenforced security interests are voidable under bankruptcy code  544a 2: holding that creditors rights are subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the bankruptcy code 3: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 4: holding an unsecured creditors postconfirmation suit against a secured creditor for fraudulent misrepresentation at a creditors meeting constituted a collateral attack on the confirmation order", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "District of California. Before turning to the relative merits of these venues, the court addresses two disputed legal issues between the parties: whether the venue provision of Title VII commands greater deference to a plaintiffs choice of forum and affects the section 1404(a) analysis, and whether the venue provision impl 3 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying section 1404(a) to a Title VII action); Harrison v. Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 807 F.Supp. 1513, 1516-17 (D.Or.1992) (same); Dean v. Handysoft Corp., 2005 WL titled to greater deference where a case arises under Title VII. Congress expanded the available fora to plaintiffs grieving civil rights violations, thereby expressing intent to broaden a Title VII plaintiffs choice of forum. See Passantino, 212 F.3d at 504 (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Where venue is governed Holdings: 0: holding that congress intended for idea to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions of statutes such as title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 1: recognizing right to petition for redress of grievances under established prison grievance system 2: holding that title viis broad venue provision was necessary to support the desire of congress to afford citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances 3: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim 4: recognizing that it is important that the judicial remedy be full and complete and stating because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel they are unable to present their cases to the courts", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "recreational facilities ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 3 \u2014 106.) Section 3 \u2014 106 applies to situations where a municipality fails to maintain property under its control intended for recreational use by allowing an unsafe condition to exist. Section 3 \u2014 106, unlike section 3\u2014 102, contemplates liability only if the governmental unit or employee acts in a willful and wanton manner. Pursuant to section 3\u2014 106, there is no municipal liability for negligence resulting in injuries occurring on public property intended for recreational purposes, unless the local public entity is guilty of willful and wanton conduct. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501. Accord Jarvis v. Herrin City Park District (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 285 N.E.2d 564 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff first argues that defendant has no Holdings: 0: holding that a right of action for personal injuries resulting from negligence cannot be assigned absent statutory law 1: holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries 2: holding that the plaintiff was not barred by hrs  3865 from seeking common law tort remedies against his insurer for injuries caused by the insurers  outrageous and intentional denial of medical benefits and disability payments  because such injuries were not  work injuries  within the scope of hrs chapter 386 3: holding that injuries covered by the act are not limited to external traumatic injuries 4: holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff provides no evidence \u2014 other than her own bare allegations of futility \u2014 that requesting a second claim review would have been \u201cclearly useless.\u201d Such bare allegations of futility are simply insufficient to defeat defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. See Rando, 1999 WL 317497, at *4 (granting summary judgment to an ERISA defendant when plaintiff responded to defendant\u2019s summary judgment motion with unsupported allegations of futility). Moreover, the record indicates that the second claim review would have been conducted by different individuals than the first claim review, and that fact is also sufficient to preclude the court from finding that any further review would have been futile. See Getting v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 108 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1203 (D.Kan.2000) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 2001 WL 201966. For these reasons, the Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that different individuals could have conducted the subsequent review of denial of benefits was itself sufficient to preclude a finding futility 1: holding that claims were preempted where the factual basis of the complaint was the denial of reimbursement of plan benefits 2: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself 3: holding that the consideration of the fact that claimant collected unemployment benefits while he was allegedly disabled was not a ground for reversal where there was other medical and vocational evidence supporting denial of benefits and claimants receipt of unemployment benefits was not decisive factor in denial of benefits 4: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "75 Fed.Reg. 8747-01 (Feb. 25, 2010). At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed in this case in December 2007, the relevant dollar amount was $136,875. 16 . \u201cDependent\u201d is defined in \u00a7 522 to include a spouse. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(a)(1). 17 . Id. \u00a7 522(p)(l)(D). 18 . H.R. Rep. 109-31, pt. 1, at 15-16 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 102, cited by In re Rogers, 513 F.3d at 227. 19 .11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(p)(2)(B). 20 . Id. \u00a7 541(a)(2). 21 . 461 U.S. 677, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983). 22 . Id. at 680, 687, 103 S.Ct. 2132. 23 . Id. at 697, 103 S.Ct. 2132 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, \u00a7 8, cl. 1; U.S. Const, amend. XVI) 24 . See generally 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 363. 25 . Id. \u00a7 363(g). 26 . Id. \u00a7 363(h). 27 . See Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex.1991) (<HOLDING>); Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 1: holding that the former husbands property from a noninterspousal gift may not be distributed under section 610751 although use of the former husbands separate property may be awarded to the former wife to satisfy the former husbands child support obligation 2: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 3: holding that former wifes interest in her homestead was held in cotenancy with a mortgagee who succeeded to her former husbands 2617 fee simple interest 4: holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Jerry Crawford.\u201d Complaint, \u00b6 VII. May further stated that \u201cbecause the sexual harassment caused Plaintiff to leave her employment and because the said harassment interfered with her advancement within the company, the sexual harassment claimed in the Plaintiffs complaint did, in fact, result in a tangible job detriment.\u201d Response Brief at 2. Here, the court agrees with Autozone that May has not suffered- any tangible employment action, as that term is defined above. When an employee quits, even when under stressful or undesirable conditions, it simply is not a company act. May was not fired, and has presented no evidence that she was passed over for a promotion, reassigned, or given any change in benefits. See Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc., 159 F.Supp.2d 921, 924 (N.D.Miss.2000) (<HOLDING>). The court is of the opihion, that with regard Holdings: 0: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 1: holding that a plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit did not suffer an adverse employment action where her employer withheld one days pay and it was not reinstated 2: holding that an initial denial of leave did not constitute materially adverse action because the plaintiff was ultimately allowed to take the leave without any other consequence to her 3: holding that because plaintiff chose to leave her employer she did not suffer any tangible employment action 4: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "trial. In Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute which gave health care arbitration panels original jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. The court based its decision on statistical evidence that the delays involved in processing claims under the statutory procedures oppressively burdened the right of a jury trial so as to \u201c \u2018make the right practically unavailable,\u2019 \u201d concluding that the actual operation of the arbitration procedure was not \u201c \u2018reasonably designed to effectuate the desired objective\u2019 of affording \u2018the plaintiff a swifter adjudication of his claim, at a minimal cost.\u2019 \u201d Id. 421 A.2d at 195 (quoting Parker v. Children\u2019s Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 939 (1978) (<HOLDING>)). In concluding, the court narrowed its Holdings: 0: holding that an infringement on the right to vote necessarily causes irreparable harm 1: holding that statute was too new to determine whether its actual operation resulted in unconstitutional infringement on jury trial right 2: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 3: holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only 4: holding that even though new jersey supreme court found that state antidiscrimination law did not entitle party to jury trial in state court jury trial was still provided as matter of right in federal court", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cpurposeful and deliberate attempt ... to suppress dissent within the union.\u201d Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir.1973); Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229 (2d Cir.1985). This is because \u201cthe rights of union members to belong to an open democratic labor organization are infringed\u201d when a \u201cdominant group \u2022strives to stifle dissent and efforts at reform\u201d through removal of a political opponent from office. Adams-Lundy v. Association of Professional Flight Attendants, 731 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.1984). To fall within this exception, a plaintiff must present \u201cclear and convincing proof\u2019 that her dismissal was \u201cpart of a series of oppressive acts by the union leadership that directly threaten the freedom of members to speak out.\u201d Cotter, 753 F.2d at 229; see also Schonfeld, 477 F.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). In the past, we have allowed such claims to Holdings: 0: holding that before pretrial detention may be ordered in a life felony case state must show that proof is evident or the presumption great 1: holding that ratification by a union of disciplinary acts of the local leadership against members would occur if the union affirmed the discipline with full knowledge that it was part of an overall scheme to suppress dissent in violation of the lmrda 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: holding that to state a cause of action the alleged scheme to suppress dissent must be evident either in the established history or articulated policy of the union 4: recognizing cause of action", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "security if [it] is a security issued by an investment company that is registered, or that has filed a registration statement, under the Investment.Company Act of 1940.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 77r(b)(2). The Second Circuit recently stated that a variable insurance product is a \u201ccovered security\u201d under SLUSA when: (1) it is a \u201csecurity\u201d; and (2) the separate accounts used for marketing the product are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (\u201cSEC\u201d) under the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Lander, 251 F.3d at 109. First, the plaintiffs variable universal life insurance policy is a \u201csecurity\u201d because it invests in mutual funds which are regulated by the SEC. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 70-72, 79 S.Ct. 618, 621-22, 3 L.Ed.2d 640 (1959) (<HOLDING>); Lander, 251 F.3d at 109 (same). See also Holdings: 0: holding a summary calendar does not violate due process as long as defendant is able to properly present issues on appeal 1: holding that claims not properly raised on direct appeal will not be considered as a basis for collateral relief 2: holding that a variable annuity is properly classified as a security 3: holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed 4: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is critical in discerning the source of a victim\u2019s injuries by excluding other possible causes of injury. Further, this Court is satisfied a victim\u2019s motive in making a statement excluding a possible source of her injuries is consistent with promoting her treatment for those injuries. Thus, Appellant\u2019s claim that the answer did not meet KRE 803(4) is simply incorrect. Of greater concern is Appellant\u2019s claim that the statement improperly identified him as the victim\u2019s assailant. Under KRE 803(4), \u201cthe general rule is that the identity of the perpetrator is not relevant to treatment or diagnosis.\u201d Colvard, 309 S.W.3d at 244. This Court has a long history of finding this type of hearsay extremely prejudicial when repeated by a professional on the stand. See Colvard, 309 S.W.3d at 247 (<HOLDING>); Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 545 Holdings: 0: holding that it was error to admit a videotaped interview of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse because the defendant was deprived of the right to crossexamine the child 1: holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice 2: holding that the doctrine of harmless error applies when a due process violation is alleged and affirming a conviction when defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice 3: holding evidence of past uncharged sexual encounters admissible in child sexual abuse case to show relationship between defendant and alleged victim 4: recognizing extreme prejudice and reversible error due to physicians testimony repeating hearsay of alleged victim of sexual abuse identifying defendant as alleged perpetrator", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "view of the unsettled state of the law on this issue, IBM\u2019s adoption of the position that it viewed as favorable to itself, and its decision to raise the issue as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, was not unreasonable (imprudent, perhaps, but not unreasonable). Therefore, TM\u2019s motion in limine to prevent IBM from asserting a defense under \u00a7 1498 is denied and the amendment is allowed. 5. TM\u2019s motion for sanctions as per Fed.R.Civ. , 57 F.Supp.2d 961 (C.D.Cal.1999) (surveying the caselaw and holding that \u00a7 1498 is jurisdictional as to governmental defendants and, in the case of private defendants, establishes an affirmative defense that must be timely asserted). 2 . See Croll-Reynolds Co. v. Perini-Leavell-Jones-Vinell, 399 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1050, 89 S.Ct. 688, 21 Holdings: 0: holding that given the version of  1498 then in place the governments authorization and consent to allegedly infringing manufacture formed a basis for a transfer of jurisdiction from the district court to the court of claims now the court of federal claims 1: holding that the accused item was used by the government under an older version of  1498 and that therefore the only remedy was a suit against the united states in the court of claims now the court of federal claims 2: holding that to exhaust a claim the claims raised at the administrative appeal must be so similar that the district court can ascertain that the agency was on notice of and had an opportunity to consider and decide the same claims now raised in federal court 3: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994); Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 418. The \u201cminimum contacts\u201d aspect of due process can be satisfied by either finding specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction. See Wilson, 20 F.3d at 647. If the conduct of a defendant that supports personal jurisdiction is related to a stated cause of action, personal jurisdiction is known as \u201cspecific jurisdiction.\u201d See Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 418-19. The minimum contacts prong for specific jurisdiction can be satisfied by a single act if the nonresident defendant \u201cpurposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws.\u201d Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold 1: holding that the defendant must have created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state 2: holding that sufficient minimum contacts exist when nonresident defendant purposefully directed action toward texas 3: holding that a defendant establishes minimum contacts by purposely engaging in conduct directed toward the forum state such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there 4: holding that minimum contacts exist if the defendant has purposely directed his activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The second question we must address is whether the plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action is time-barred. The district court addressed both the general five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims found at Ark.Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-111(b), and the general three-year statute of limitations for constructive fraud claims found at Ark.Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105(3), and concluded that the plaintiffs\u2019 claims were not barred under either statute. We agree with the district court\u2019s conclusion, but not with its reasoning. Hav ing determined that NEI may be subject to liability for the original developer\u2019s obligations pursuant to the Arkansas TimeShare Act, we conclude that Time-Share Act\u2019s statute of limitations governs this action. See Shelton v. Fiser, 340 Ark. 89, 8 S.W.3d 557, 560 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The Time-Share Act actually contains two Holdings: 0: holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict 1: holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter 2: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 3: holding that under arkansas law a specific statute of limitations involving the particular subject matter governs over more general statutes 4: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "after a juror indicated that the verdict did not represent her individual verdict, and Muller asserted that the evide 6, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (concluding that the police violated the Fourth Amendment when, without probable cause, they seized the defendant from a neighbor\u2019s home and transported him to the police station for interrogation without telling him he was free to go); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724-28, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (ruling that an unreasonable seizure occurred when police brought the defendant to the police station without probable cause, a warrant, or his consent for fingerprinting and brief questioning before he was released); see also Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631-33, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d Cir. Holdings: 0: holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station 1: holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning 2: holding that the line separating a terry stop and an arrest is crossed when police forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes 3: holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was transported without probable cause from his home to the police station for fingerprinting and that the line is crossed when the police without probable cause or a warrant forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station where he is detained although briefly for investigative purposes 4: holding that merely because questioning was designed to produce incriminating responses took place at the police station and occurred only after the defendant was identified as a suspect did not trigger miranda", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla.1978), to define statutes of repose and distinguish them from statutes of limitations). Consistent with their function, statutes of repose are understood to set \u201can outer limit beyond which [claims] may not be instituted.\u201d Hess, 175 So.3d at 695. As such, they are generally regarded as establishing an absolute bar to the filing of any claim after the expiration of the repose period and as being immune to the efforts of claimants to avoid-it. See, e.g., May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143, 1156 (Fla.2000) (describing nonclaim statute in the probate code as' a statute of repose and as creating \u201ca self-executing, absolute immunity to claims\u201d); Sabal Chase Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. Walt Disney World Co., 726 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). On its face, section 726.110 is a repose Holdings: 0: recognizing risks in construing statutes of limitations in favor of repose 1: holding that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose 2: holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed 3: holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose 4: holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of paternity as if it were any other regulatory issue entrusted to that administrative body, judicial review of a decision of great importance affecting matters beyond the scope of the agency\u2019s purview will have been significantly curtailed. Our common understanding of the essential nature of the parent-child relationship is such that we do not easily countenance the possibility that a person could be considered a child in one context, but not in another. However, if the question of paternity is decided by an administrative body \u2014 particularly one that is uneasy or ill-equipped to make the decision \u2014 there is the unwelcome possibility of different determinations of parentage in different fora. See Oubre v. District of Columbia Dep\u2019t of Employment Servs., 680 A.2d 699, 703 (D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, unless the governing statute has a Holdings: 0: holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes 1: holding that collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to quasijudicial agency decisions 2: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award 3: recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record 4: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "primary arguments why the district court\u2019s sentence should be vacated. First, Hernandez contends that because the sentencing guidelines are advisory after Booker, a district court has discretion as to how and when it determines \u00a7 3553(f) eligibility. Second, Hernandez argues that because \u00a7 3553(f) contains mandatory language, it is invalid after Booker, Hernandez\u2019s Hoofcer-based challenges are foreclosed by recent Ninth Circuit opinions in United States v. Hernandez-Castro, 473 F.3d 1004, 1005-06 (9th Cir.2007), where we held that \u00a7 3553(f)(1) was not \u201crendered advisory by Booker,\u201d and United States v. Cardenas-Juarez, 469 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 (9th Cir.2006), where we held that despite its mandatory language, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(f) survives Booker, and if triggered 336-37 (8th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Echeverri-Jaramillo, 777 Holdings: 0: holding that possession of the equivalent of 279 pounds of marijuana valued at 279000 dollars justified the district courts refusal to provide a lesser included instruction 1: holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested 2: holding that possession of more than thirtyfive pounds of cocaine valued at between 5 and 7 million ruled out a simple possession jury instruction 3: holding that jurys failure to find the defendant guilty of possession of marijuana could not be reconciled with a verdict of guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to purchase 4: holding that possession of more than seven tons of marijuana justified the district courts refusal to provide a simple possession instruction", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201crequire\u201d tracked section 7B1.3(f)\u2019s provision that a revocation sentence \u201cshall be ordered to be served consecutively\u201d to the sentence for the new criminal offense. See USSG \u00a7 7B1.3 (1990); see also USSG \u00a7 7B1.3 (2011) (same). As noted above, the Guidelines in effect when Head committed the underlying offense included no requirement or presumption of consecutive prison terms upon revocation of supervised release. See USSG ch. 7 (1988). Unconstrained by section 7B1.3(f), the district court had discretion under the 1988 Guidelines and the general guidance offered by 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3553(a), 3583(e), and 3584 to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence. See United States v. Ayers, 795 F.3d 168, 172 (D.C.Cir.2015); see also United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 852 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Reliance on section 7B1.3(f) here created at Holdings: 0: holding that  3145c authorizes district courts to grant release pending sentencing 1: holding in assault and involun tary manslaughter case that district court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences based on finding of whether multiple counts involved the same harm 2: holding that supervised release sentences are normally reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding in agreement with fourth fifth seventh eighth ninth and eleventh circuits that courts general sentencing discretion under 18 usc  3584 authorizes district courts revoking supervised release to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences 4: holding that  5g12 did not limit the district courts authority to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release since the policy statements in chapter 7 governed revocation sentences", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "829 S.W.2d at 271-72. 23 . Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Texas v. Texoma Directional Drilling Co., 622 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex.App.\u2014Fort Worth 1981, no writ). 24 . Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex.1982). 25 . See Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 387 S.W.2d at 24 (disagreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals who held that a court must look beyond the pleadings and policy); Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1367-68 (5th Cir.1987) (applying Texas law to hold that the proper question in determining duty is not what could have been pled, but what was pled). 26 . Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 633 S.W.2d at 788. 27 . Houston Petroleum Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 830 1464 (N.D.Cal.1992) (<HOLDING>); Qualman v. Bruckmoser, 163 Wis.2d 361, 471 Holdings: 0: holding that pecuniary damages are not property damages under insureds policy 1: holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages 2: holding that claims alleging negligent misrepresentation and failure to disclose seek economic damages not property damages within insureds policy 3: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 4: holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "estoppel claim dismissed because Cornell fails to identify any promise any of the Individual Defendants made. I agree with the Individual Defendants. As I noted above, the only basis that exists for Cornell\u2019s promissory estop pel claim is the sewage facility agreement and the surrounding promises. See supra Part IV.E. In the complaint, Cornell only alleges that the Borough made the promises regarding the dedication of the facility and the reimbursement of Cornell\u2019s expenses. See Third Am. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 27, 31, 33-34, 148. Cornell does not claim that any of the Individual Defendants made any of these or other promises. Accordingly, I will dismiss the promissory estoppel claim against the Individual Defendants. See Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 745 A.2d 606, 610 (2000) (<HOLDING>). E. Immunity Defenses The Individual Holdings: 0: holding that objection must reasonably be expected to alert the trial court to the ground subsequently raised on appeal 1: holding that the first element of a promissory estoppel claim is the promisor made a promise that he should have reasonably expected to induce action emphasis added 2: recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a  1983 claim 3: holding that the trial court erred when it did not consider what the husband could have been reasonably expected to have earned  based upon the recent work history and other pertinent circumstances 4: holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "articulate its intent. Moreover, we can imagine an altogether rational reason the legislature might decide to write a statute with a strict Hability punishment provision. As Judge Staton wrote for the Court of Appeals, \"A dealer's lack of knowledge of his proximity to the schools does not make the illegal drug any less harmful to the youth in whose hands it may eventually come to rest.\" Williford v. State, 571 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Accordingly, we hold that the conviction was not deficient for failure to prove that Walker knew he was within 1,000 feet of a school when he committed the crime. Walker also argues that the evidence of dealing was insufficient because he did not have the $20 bill given to him by Witten in his possession at the time of his arrest. In ligh 988) (<HOLDING>) (collecting cases); Mullins v. State, 486 Holdings: 0: holding that proof of scienter is required to succeed on a claim under  1991a1 but not under  1991a2 or  1991a3 1: holding obscenity statute required proof of scienter 2: holding trial court should have required segregation because tort claims entailed proof of facts unnecessary for proof of the contract claim 3: holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter 4: holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Article 78.\u201d (citing N.Y. Pub. Off. Law \u00a7 89)). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim that defendant Pickering violated FOIL will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 1983. 7. First Amendment Mail Interference The First Amendment protects an inmate\u2019s right to send and receive both legal and nonlegal mail, although prison officials may regulate that right if the restrictions they employ are \u201c \u2018reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.\u2019 \u201d Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)); see also Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Legal mail is entitled to Holdings: 0: holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells 1: holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights 2: holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases 3: recognizing a first amendment right to receive mail subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security 4: holding that prisoners do have a right  albeit a limited one  to send and receive mail", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "physician. The physician that treated Street testified as to the adequacy of Street\u2019s care. Street offers only his own conclusory statements to the contrary. \"[Ijnadequate prison medical care violate[s] the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [only when it amounts to] 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners'\u201d. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1978 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). Street's medical needs were met. While there is evidence that Street had requested more medical care (i.e., pain medication prior to his hospital visit), \"there is no evidence that [the defendants] either w[ere] aware of or had any responsibility for this lack of medical attention.\u201d Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 14 . In Farmer, the Court noted, \"At what Holdings: 0: holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial 1: holding failure to check medical records of inmate that eventually died to be mere negligence 2: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 3: recognizing negligence cause of action for failure to maintain medical records preservation of which was required by statute 4: holding that to the extent medical records may be properly categorized as business records such records are properly categorized as nontestimonial", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 718 F.2d at 1276 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). The reasonable doubt instruction in this case, viewed in the context of the charge as a whole, diluted this burden by creating a standard that \u201ccould mislead [the members of the court-martial] into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there was some.\u201d Holland, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 138. The strongest language in the charge that might serve to correct this impression, that stating that \u201c[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof to a moral certainty,\u201d see United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 1934, 40 Holdings: 0: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning 1: holding that the court did not abuse its discretion by tracking the statutory language in the instruction 2: holding that instructions are sufficient which substantially follow the language of the statute or use equivalent language 3: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical 4: holding that moral certainty language compensated for willing to act language in an otherwise proper reasonable doubt instruction", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the plain language of the public disclosure bar to hold that \"[i]t does not deny jurisdiction over actions based on disclosures other than those specified\u201d); United States ex rel. O\u2019Keeffe v. Sverdup Corp., 131 F.Supp.2d 87, 91 (D.Mass.2001). 71 .LeBlanc I, 913 F.2d at 20. 72 . See Mathews, 166 F.3d at 863-64; United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (4th Cir.1994); O'Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92; United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 874 F.Supp. 35, 40 (D.Mass.1995) (\"LeBlanc II\"). 73 . O\u2019Keeffe, 131 F.Supp.2d at 92 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir.1992)) (emphasis in original); see also United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 386-88 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Holdings: 0: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 1: holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known 2: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 3: holding that a qui tam action is based upon a qualifying disclosure if the disclosure sets out either the allegations advanced in the qui tam action or all of the essential elements of the qui tam actions claims 4: holding that a valid final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7 Sexuality Res. & Soc. Pol\u2019y 176, 186, 188 (2010) (noting that in a national survey, 95 percent of gay men and 84 percent of lesbian women reported that they \u201chad little or no choice about their sexual orientation.\u201d). Finally, Plaintiffs note that homosexual citizens constitute a minority group that lacks sufficient political power to protect themselves against discriminatory laws. In fact, the history of same-sex marriage bans across the nation illustrates the historical lack of political power possessed by gays and lesbians. Plaintiffs point out that not only do homosexuals fit all factors to be considered a suspect classification, but in fact, several courts have already admitted as much. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480-84 (9th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); see also Pedersen, 881 F.Supp.2d at 294 Holdings: 0: holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race 1: holding use of peremptory strike against gay juror failed heightened scrutiny 2: holding that it was not iac to decline to use peremptory strike on a potential juror whose statements hinted at possible bias against defendant where counsel strategically used peremptory strikes against jurors who might have been more likely to convict 3: holding that trial courts erroneous refusal to strike juror for cause impaired defendants statutory right to his allotted number of peremptory challenges 4: holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiffs choice of venue. Nintendo informed the district court that the majority of NOA\u2019s relevant documents are located within the transferee venue. The record also shows that all of Nintendo\u2019s research and development documents are located in Kyoto, Japan. Notwithstanding this evidence, the district court assumed that Nintendo\u2019s relevant documents were equally spread between its headquarters in Japan and Washington, and minor satellite offices in California and New York. By including these minor offices in the equation, the trial court hypothesized that the Eastern District of Texas could serve as a centralized location. This court has already questioned this type of reasoning in another case involving the Eastern District of Texas. See id. at 1344 (<HOLDING>). Because most evidence resides in Washington Holdings: 0: holding that venue in the district identified in  9 was mandatory 1: holding that the district court is free to consider the full record in the case when selecting the appropriate sanction 2: holding that the district court in setting fees appropriately relied upon prevailing market rates in the eastern district of new york where the case was commenced and litigated 3: holding that it is improper to consider the centralized location of the eastern district of texas when no identified witness resides in the district 4: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "true or false. Certainly, different members of the general public might provide different specific definitions of this term or might emphasize different factors in assessing whether housing is \u201cdecent, safe, and sanitary.\u201d However, the fact that each individual's exact definition of the meaning of this phrase might differ does not undermine the proposition that the general meaning of the concept is commonly understood. As we have noted in another, quite different context, despite the fact that certain words or phrases might \u201cstrike distinct chords in individual jurors,\u201d they can nevertheless have a \u201cplain meaning of sufficient content that the discretion left to the jury\u201d is \u201cno more than that inherent in the jury system itself.\u201d Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1096 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); see also James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116, Holdings: 0: holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared 1: holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular 2: holding presumptive sentencing standards applied retroactively where defendant objected at sentencing hearing on the basis that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to his case 3: holding that the texas capital sentencing scheme is permissibly applied when the sentencing jury evaluates the terms deliberately probability criminal acts of violence and continuing threat to society without any specific definitions 4: holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "process that would reflect a lower cost than others \u201d (emphasis added)). The harm BBSSI will suffer outweighs the harm to defendant and to CMR. 4. Whether Injunctive Relief Is in the Public Interest BBSSI asserts that \u201cSafeguarding the integrity of the procurement process is a matter of high public interest that is best served by enjoining arbitrary and capricious agency action, or action generally inconsistent with procurement law and regulations.\u201d Pl.\u2019s Mot. 31. Defendant describes the \u201cdetrimental impact\u201d upon the military as \u201csevere\u201d if injunctive relief is awarded, noting that there exists a strong public interest in not interfering with an agency\u2019s procurement process. Def.\u2019s Mot. 31. CMR argues that the public interest is not served \u201cby issuing contrac Fed.Cl. 431, 434 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The public interest was compromised by the Holdings: 0: recognizing the publics interest in receiving the best value in public services 1: recognizing the publics interest in ensuring that the ultimate awardee offers the best value to the government pursuant to the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement regulations 2: recognizing the public interest exception 3: holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard 4: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "need not be treated as an \u2022element required to be found by the jury suggests that the same fact need not be treated as an element that is required to be alleged in the charging instrument. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (stating that factor increasing a defendant\u2019s minimum sentence \u201cneed not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d). The symmetry between charging and fact finding suggested by Apprendi has not been universally embraced. Some courts have concluded that the notice guarantee of the Sixth Amendment may be satisfied with respect to a fact that is an element under Apprendi by means other than an allegation in the charging instrument. See, e.g., State v. Nichols, 201 Ariz. 234, 33 P.3d 1172, 1176 (Ariz.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>). But other courts have followed the line of Holdings: 0: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 1: holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied 2: holding that facts related to commission of offense necessary to establish eligibility for enhanced penalty of life imprisonment need not be alleged in the charging document provided that the notice of them given to the defendant comports with arizonas traditional notice requirements for alleging sentence enhancements 3: holding that the notice afforded by a document determines its sufficiency as a notice of appeal 4: holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search. She also assigned error to certain of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. Although the Court of Appeals held that Ellen consented to the search, it did not address her challenge to the trial court\u2019s findings. She did F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding the validity of a warrantless search where the defendant was present and did not consent, but his wife did consent, because the rule developed in Mat-lock did not depend on the defendant\u2019s absence); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Colo. 1995) (\u201cThe valid consent of a person with \u2018common authority\u2019 will justify a warrantless search of a residence despite the physical presence of a nonconsenting co-occupant.\u201d); State v. Frame, 45 Or. App. 723, 609 P.2d 830, 833 (1980) (<HOLDING>); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent 1: holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion 2: holding that the consent to search given by the defendants wife and cohabitant was an effective consent because it was consistent with the rationale set forth in united states v matlock 3: holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given 4: holding that the defendants consent to allow the officer to search her purse by way of holding it open for the officer was for consent to a limited view of the purses interior not to surrender possession  for an unrestricted search and thus the officer exceeded the scope of the defendants consent", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has also held that nervousness alone does not constitute reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and grounds for detention. See Laime v. State, supra. Despite the fact that Lilley was shaking, he did not exhibit any additional signs of nervousness, such as an inability to maintain eye contact with Officer Bowman or evasiveness, prior to the conclusion of the traffic stop. Accordingly, his nervousness, without any other questionable circumstances, would not constitute reasonable suspicion. Nor does there appear to be anything inherently suspicious about using a rental car rented by a third party even when combined with the nervousness of the suspect. Certainly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with that conclusion. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). In the case at hand, Lilley explained to the Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs 1: holding that the totality of the circumstances failed to generate reasonable suspicion to warrant becks renewed detention where 1 beck was driving a rental car rented by an absent third party 2 the car was licensed in california 3 there was fastfood trash on the passengerside floorboard 4 there was no visible luggage in the passenger compartment of the car 5 beck had a nervous demeanor 6 becks trip was from a drugsource state to a drugdemand state and 7 the officer disbelieved becks explanation for the trip 2: holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause 3: holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had knowledge of firearm in close proximity to him when he was driving the car for the cars owner who was a passenger 4: holding that a car passenger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed brown paper bag found on the floorboard of his companions car", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the part of the officers. Having concluded that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any constitutional violation, it becomes unnecessary for us to consider whether the rights at issue were clearly established such that \u201cit would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.\u201d Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 608, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). The district court correctly ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Because the police officers did not violate Caricofe\u2019s constitutional rights, the other defendants may not be held liable for failing to train or supervise those officers. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for an official policy or custom if it has been determined that the individual defendants did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights 1: holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom 2: holding that a municipality may not assert the defense of qualified immunity but may be held liable under  1983 only for a constitutional deprivation inflicted by the execution of a governments policy or custom whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy  3: holding that a municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 under a theory of respondeat superi or but may be liable for policies or customs that violate an employees constitutional rights 4: holding that a defendant can only be sued in his official capacity under  1983 if he acted pursuant to an official policy or custom in causing the constitutional injury", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "letter. On March 22, 2001, Perch filed suit against the City of Quincy for sex and disability discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, and for sex discrimination under the Equal Protection clause, on the basis of both CFS-related and cancer-related conduct. On November 30, 2001, the City of Quincy moved to dismiss Perch\u2019s cancer-related discrimination claims. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court is to accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favora t from filing claims in court which allege different types of discrimination, or are based on materially different facts, from the administrative charge. See, e.g., Lattimore, 99 F.3d at 465 (<HOLDING>); Silva v. Hit or Miss, 73 F.Supp.2d 39, 41 Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union 1: holding that settlement with one defendant could not be setoff from verdict against second defendant where the claims were separate and distinct ie involving different elements of damages 2: holding that a plaintiff could not add civil claim based upon different facts that are separate and distinct both qualitatively and temporally  and relate to the conduct of different individuals from facts in administrative charge 3: holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based 4: holding that plaintiff who filed administrative charge for racial harassment and discrimination could add claim for retaliation because some of the same facts supported both types of claims", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and denied the rest. On March 1, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint in this Court alleging ERISA violations. After an extension of time, Defendants moved to dismiss on May 10, 2004. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on June 22, 2004. On October 14, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, which does not modify Plaintiffs\u2019 original claims, but merely adds a new Count V. Defendants have also moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Dismiss Standard For the purposes of the Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes that the facts alleged in Plaintiffs\u2019 Complaint are true, unless such allegations are contradicted by documents referenced in the Complaint. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will be Holdings: 0: holding that the court need not accept as true  unwarranted factual inferences 1: holding that courts are to accept allegations in the complaint as being true including monell policies and writing that a federal court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint has a limited task 2: holding that if a district court dismisses a  2255 claim without holding an evidentiary hearing we take as true the sworn allegations of fact set forth in the petition unless those allegations are merely conclusory contradicted by the record or inherently incredible 3: holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint 4: holding that a court need not accept a plaintiffs allegation if it contradicts documents properly considered with the complaint", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that a defendant is \u201cable to provide.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. The statute in Keller is also part of a recoupment scheme whereby a state seeks to recover costs from providing court-appointed counsel to indigent defendants. not support her argument. The fact that Fuller and its progeny require a finding of ability to pay does not mean that one is required here because those cases concern whether schemes to exact payment for the costs of appointed counsel from criminal defendants unconstitutionally impinge upon the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Here, no constitutional right to counsel is implicated; the trial court instead ordered defendant to pay the costs of caring for her animals during the litigation. See State v. Diamondstone, 132 Vt. 303, 305, 318 A.2d 654, 656 (1974) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 14. Defendant also cites State v. Haught, Holdings: 0: holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it 1: holding that under fuller sixth amendment requires trial court to make finding that defendant has or will have ability to pay reimbursement amount within statutory time period before imposing payment obligation 2: holding that the statute in effect at that time ie section 7750832b florida statutes 2003 required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendants ability to pay the fine before imposing it 3: holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine 4: recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the law restricting third party beneficiary status remained unchanged by our decision in Montana. Accord Roedler v. Dept. of Energy, 255 F.3d 1347 (Fed.Cir.2001). Accordingly, because the shareholders did not stand to directly benefit under the contract, they are at most incidental beneficiaries of the contract with no rights to enforce the contract against the United States. We reverse the Court of Federal Claims summary judgment of liability in favor of the shareholders and remand the case so that the court may consider any remaining claims asserted by the shareholders. II. FDIC\u2019s Breach of Contract Claims We review the Court of Federal Claims\u2019 legal conclusion that the FDIC has asserted a justiciable claim de novo. See Alger v. United States, 741 F.2d 391, 393 (Fed.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Article III, section 2 of the United States Holdings: 0: holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo 1: holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo 2: holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo 3: holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo 4: holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Company was forced kicking and screaming to settle.\u201d); id. (\"They are intent now on buying your vote.\u201d). Compare Riley, 529 A.2d at 252. 22 . See, e.g\u201e id. at 1 (\"They are so afraid of you finding out what they are up to.\u201d); id. at 2 (\"They haven\u2019t disclosed any of this because they want you to think that they are doing this all on their own.\u201d). 23 . Doe v. Cahill, 884 A,2d at 465 (noting the known unreliability of internet blogs and chat rooms). See also Riley, 529 A,2d at 252 (same for newspaper editorials); SunEnergy 1, LLC v. Brown, 2015 WL 7776625, at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2015) (same for online reviews). 24 . Austin, 418 U.S, at 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770 (calling plaintiff a \"traitor\" in the course of a labor dispute was nonactionable opinion); Bresler, 398 U.S, at 14, 90 S.Ct. 1537 (<HOLDING>) 25 . Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183-84 Holdings: 0: holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured 1: holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact 2: holding governments position unreasonable where government advanced no legal authority for its position and applicable principle of law was long settled 3: holding in the chevron context that deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agencys convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate 4: holding a characterization of a real estate developers position as blackmail to be nonactionable opinion because in context even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole a vigorous epithet used by those who considered breslers negotiating position extremely unreasonable", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "renewed his policy that was in effect on the date of the accident, March 24, 2006. From 2002 until the date of the accident, Murray never alleged that he attempted or recommended to place liquor liability coverage for Ennie. Considering these facts, Murray created an \u201cunreasonable risk of harm\u201d to Ennie at the earliest in the fall of 2002 and at the latest during the last policy renewal in December 2005. Any meeting between Poeng and Murray that occurred in 2006 regarding insurance coverage was a continuation of Murray\u2019s wrongful act of failing to provide the proper coverage. As such, Murray\u2019s wrongful acts did not occur \u201cwholly after\u201d the retroactive date of January 1, 2006. Therefore, we hold that Murray is not covered under the AAIC policy, and that the Dist 5, 627-28 (8th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Here, AAIC named Easter and Ennie in its Holdings: 0: holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured 1: holding that an insurer who brought a declaratory judgment action and out of an abundance of caution named the injured party as an additional defendant 1 must have thought the injured party had some potential interest in the insurance policy and 2 had tacitly conceded the injured partys standing to appeal by not contesting the appeal on the ground of lack of standing 2: holding that an injured party in an underlying tort action was not a necessary party in an action by an insurer for declaratory judgment of nonliability where the injured person had not obtained judgment against the insured 3: holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer 4: holding that an injured person having a possible claim against an insurer who has been made a party defendant to an action for declaratory judg ment possesses the requisite interest to be heard on appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 704 F.Supp. 441, 447-448 (same); White v. Fed. Res. Bank (1995) 103 Ohio App.3d 534, 538-539 [660 N.E.2d 493, 496] (same); Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home Loan Bank of New York (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 95, 97-98 (dealing with section 12 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, as amended, as codified at section 1432(a) of title 12 of the United States Code, its common designation, which, in line with the model of section 24, Fifth, grants a federal home loan bank the power to \u201cdismiss\u201d any of its officers, among others, \u201cat pleasure\u201d by its board of directors: holding to the effect that section 1432(a) has been impliedly amended by Title VII). But compare Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (9th Cir. 1981) 650 F.2d 1093, 1100 (<HOLDING>). 5 In stating that section 24, Fifth, as Holdings: 0: holding that even when applied retroactively the reexamination statute does not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment the jury trial guarantee of the seventh amendment or article iii of the constitution 1: holding in the context of section 341 fifth that the mere existence of federal agediscrimination laws apparently including the adea does not create a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution in the form of job entitlements for government employees over a certain age 2: holding outside of the context of title vii or the adea to the effect that section 341 fifth preempts conflicting state law 3: holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government 4: holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (\u201cFacial neutrality is not determinative .... The [Free Exercise] Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In reaching this conclusion we do not suggest that \u201cevery religious sect or group within a prison\u2014 however few in number \u2014 must have identical facilities or personnel.\u201d Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). But under Turner, neutrality must be ensured, or its absence sufficiently explained in light of a legitimate penologoical interest, for summary judgment to be appropriate. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-16, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Hammer v. Ashcroft, 512 F.3d 961, Holdings: 0: recognizing that it serves no discernible public purpose to draw distinctions between clinical social work and other mental health professions with regard to the need for confidentiality 1: holding that prison regulations impinging on prisoners constitutional rights are only valid where reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 2: holding that turners neutrality requirement allows a prison policy to draw distinctions so long as those distinctions flow from the governments legitimate penological interest 3: holding that prison administration may infringe upon prisoners first amendment rights as long as the infringement is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest 4: holding a publisheronly rule was constitutional because prison administrators are accorded deference and rule was reasonably related to the penological interest of maintaining internal prison security", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "indispensable party. Id. This aspect of the opinion must not be overstated, as the court ultimately held that the patent owner did not transfer all of the substantial rights in the patent to the plaintiff; rather, it transferred only the right to license the patent to one specific (sub)lieensee. Id. at 1379-80. While the case was decided in the context of a Rule 19 dispute, the decision rested on the fact that none of the named plaintiffs had rights of ownership that created standing to sue. Alternatively, in one case requiring Rule 19 joinder of the holder of a reversionary right, the reversionary right was triggered upon the expiration of an agreement transferring all of the substantial rights of the patent. Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 60 F.Supp.2d 104 (W.D.N.Y.1999) (<HOLDING>). In Moore, any extension of the agreement Holdings: 0: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 1: holding that the assignor of a patent retained substantial rights in the patent and must be added as an indispensable party 2: holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims 3: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 4: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "clearly established law. See Levine v. City of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201cUnder the defense of qualified immunity, a government official is immune from civil damages unless his conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known\u201d); see also Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (clarifying that sincerity of prisoner\u2019s religious beliefs, not objective doctrinal centrality of beliefs, determines whether Free Exercise Clause applies). The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on Campbell\u2019s Equal Protection claim because Campbell did not present evidence indicating that he was similarly situated to inmates who were permitted to possess religious oil. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Campbell\u2019s remaining contentions are Holdings: 0: holding that to assert a viable equal protection claim plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were differently treated from others who were similarly situated to them 1: holding that equal protection claim by prisoner lacked merit where prisoner not similarly situated to others who were permitted to engage in relevant conduct 2: holding equal protection under the federal constitution applies to similarly situated persons 3: holding members of two distinct pension plans were not similarly situated for equal protection analysis 4: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court in order to be preserved for appellate review). As to the merits, we are troubled by the lack of evidence in the record regarding the authority of M.P.H. Holdings to initiate the supplemental proceedings. A plain reading of section 33-15-102(a) requires a foreign corporation to have a certificate of authority prior to initiating any action in this state. See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201cWhere the statute\u2019s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.\u201d); see also Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 307 S.C. 33, 37, 413 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Although the master referred to section Holdings: 0: holding that the funds in the privatelyheld corporations account belonged to the corporation not to the individuals who owned the corporation and expressly stating that directors officers and shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to claim an ownership interest in corporate property in their individual capacities they must state a claim in the corporate name 1: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 2: holding the failure of a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to bringing an action to recover monies owed on an account affected the corporations capacity to sue but did not affect the courts subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that plaintiff an officer and shareholder of a corporation with signatory authority over the corporations checking account was not a customer of the bank and could not file suit for wrongful dishonor of the corporations checks 4: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012). Parker did not advance the procedural error argument before the district court, and we therefore review it for plain error. Miller, 557 F.3d at 916. Having reviewed the sentencing transcript, we find no plain error in the district court\u2019s consideration of the statutory factors or explanation of its sentence. The district court announced that it had considered the factors, and the colloquy with defense counsel indicated the district court was thinking about Parker\u2019s specific history and characteristics. The court had detailed information regarding Parker\u2019s history of supervision, criminal history, original offense of conviction, and the numerous violations of supervised release conditions. See United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Nor is Parker\u2019s within-Guidelines-range Holdings: 0: holding that appellate review is precluded when the error is invited 1: holding that an appellate court may review the entire record to determine whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable 2: holding that there is no due process right to appellate review 3: holding that the context for appellate review is the entire sentencing rec ord 4: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 541 (1991). Here, Licensee first argues that the trial court erred in determining that he had, in fact, refused the blood test, maintaining that, although he refused to sign the hospital consent form, he agreed to submit to the actual blood test. Although acknowledging that our holding in Smith would defeat this argument, Licensee urges that we reconsider that opinion, contending that, in Smith, this court exceeded its authority and usurped legislative authority by superimposing upon section 1547 the requirement that a licensee execute a hospital consent form. In Smith, we relied on the underlying principles expressed in Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Miller, 155 Pa.Cmwlth. 564, 625 A.2d 755 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993) (<HOLDING>), Lewis v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 326, Holdings: 0: holding that a request to the licensee to sign a consent form is not an impermissible precondition to testing 1: holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 2: holding that because consent is not a statement and a request for consent is not an interrogation giving consent to search is a neutral fact which has no tendency to show that the suspect is guilty of any crime 3: holding consent not voluntary where police threatened to arrest defendants girlfriend if he refused to sign consent form 4: holding consent invalid where defendant threatened by officer that everyone in the house would go to jail if he did not sign consent form", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.\u201d Id. A plaintiff must provide \u201cmore than labels and conclusions\u201d or \u201ca formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action\u201d to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955; accord, e.g., Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir.2007) (the court is not \u201ccompelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.\u201d) (quotations and citations omitted); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir.2005). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, \u2014 U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: recognizing that rule 8 pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations but it demands more than an unadorned thedefendantunlawfullyharmedme accusation 1: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983 2: recognizing rule 3: holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim 4: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, at this stage of these proceedings, the Court must decide whether the Sykes are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims, not whether they will ultimately prevail. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In doing so, the Court may consider \u201cofficial public records\u201d that are relevant to the Sykes\u2019 claims without converting Bayer\u2019s motion to one for summary judgment. See Gasner v. County of Dinwiddle, 162 F.R.D. 280, 282 (E.D.Va.1995); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2509, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (<HOLDING>). III. First, the Sykes claim that Bayer is Holdings: 0: holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 1: holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 2: holding that 1 the complaint is deemed to include any documents incorporated in it by reference and any document upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint and that the court may consider such documents on a motion to dismiss pursuant to fedrcivp 12b6 3: holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award mental-anguish damages to the homeowners. Id. The Bowerses argue that, in a negligence case, the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is not in a zone of danger, should be allowed to recover damages for mental anguish resulting from an incident that causes damage to property if the damage to the property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See Reinhardt Motors, Inc. v. Boston, 516 So.2d 509, 511 (Ala.1986). We disagree. Under Alabama law, it is well established that damages for mental anguish are not recoverable in tort where the tort results in mere injury to property unless the damage to property is committed under circumstances of insult or contumely. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Bush, 608 So.2d 361, 364 (Ala.1992) (<HOLDING>); Smith & Gaston Funeral Directors v. Wilson, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages in connection with the birth of healthy children 1: holding that a plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages because he had failed to rebut the defendants prima facie showing that the alleged trespass was not attended by words or acts of insult or contumely 2: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach 3: holding plaintiff could not pursue ejectment or damages for alleged continuing trespass by power company 4: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "liability is not cut down by the subsequent 'additional condition\u2019 making defendant liable for actual cost of repairs or replacement.\u201d). 16 . In at least some of these cases, however, courts found the policy language ambiguous and therefore applied the rules of construction requiring the court to construe the terms of the insurance policy against the insurer. See, e.g., Delledonne, 621 A.2d at 354; Campbell, 109 S.E.2d at 577. In others, courts applied rules of construction contrary to those followed in Texas and strictly construed the policy language against the insurer without first finding that the language was ambiguous. See, e.g., Gibbs, 127 S.E.2d at 461; Corbett, 134 S.E. at 338. 17 . See, e.g., Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 754 P.2d 330, 331 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Ray v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 200 Cal.App.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a claim against an insurer for vexatious refusal to pay cannot be maintained where the court finds that the insurer has no duty to defend under the policy 1: holding that if despite repairs there remains a loss in actual market value estimated as of the collision date such deficiency is to be added to the cost of repairs 2: holding that an insurer has no obligation to pay diminished value in addition to repairs 3: holding that if the insurer cannot return the vehicle to substantially the same condition then the actual cash value is the appropriate measure where insured sued for damages caused by insurers inappropriate election to repair and the value after repairs was almost sixty percent less than its preloss value 4: holding insurer was not obligated to repair the damaged automobile to both its preaccident condition and market value concluding that permitting coverage of diminished value would render meaningless the insurers clear policy right to repair rather than pay actual cash value", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with the \u201cexecutive\u201d privilege. Such importation is potentially misleading because the executive privilege is inspired, at least in part, by a policy consideration that plays little or no role in cases against police officers. At the root of the executive privilege is concern about preserving a constitutionally appropriate balance and separation of the largely disparate powers of the three great branches of the federal government. In the seminal cases about executive privilege the courts have been concerned primarily about finding an appropriate accommodation between the constitutionally independent status and needs of the presidency of the United States and the needs of our system of justice. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (<HOLDING>). These high level, politically most sensitive Holdings: 0: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 1: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 2: recognizing that standing doctrine is fundamentally rooted in respect for the separation of powers of the independent branches of government 3: holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution 4: holding that the presidential privilege is inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "3 .It is the content of this section that compels the temporary sealing of this memorandum opinion. See United States v. Lentz, 1:01cr150 (E.D.Va.) (sealing orders). 4 . In a memorandum opinion dated August 22, 2005, defendant's motion to suppress the recordings of these telephone calls and to preclude their disclosure to the government\u2019s trial team under either the attorney-client privilege or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied. See United States v. Lentz, v. Blakney, 581 F.2d 1389, 1390 (10th Cir.1978) (stating that \"if the exemplars would provide probative and relevant evidence in the case there would seem no merit in the claim of prejudice when questions were asked which brought out the refusal to provide them\u201d); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 36 (6th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 9 . Only one circuit has Holdings: 0: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 1: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible 2: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 3: recognizing that evidence that defendant refused to comply with the court order to provide a voice exemplar is admissible 4: holding that evidence that a polygraph test was offered to or refused by a defendant was not admissible", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to address whether this letter could lead an objectively reasonable, but unsophisticated recipient, to believe the discharged debt was still payable. Merely focusing on the statutory notice contained in the letter, see 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1692g(a), as the court did, neither constitutes such a finding nor fulfills our mandate because such an inclusion in a collection letter does not, by itself, exempt a party from liability under \u00a7 1692e. During the course of the bench trial, evidence, testimonial or otherwise, was received, but without findings of fact on this evidence from the trier of fact, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of the magistrate judge\u2019s judgment, and therefore must again remand. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 422, 63 S.Ct. 1141, 87 L.Ed. 1485 (1943) (<HOLDING>). Based on the record before us, therefore, we Holdings: 0: holding that even though the medical evidence did not support the commissions findings that the plaintiff was restricted from any and all employment the award of total disability should be affirmed based on findings that the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought suitable employment 1: holding that errors of law in a magistrates findings and recommendations pursuant to section 636b1b can be challenged on appeal even in the absence of the filing of objections in the district court 2: holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo 3: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 4: holding that a proper determination of the questions of law  cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "deserve deference. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699-700, 116 S.Ct. 1657. However, although we review the district court\u2019s findings of fact only for clear error, our review of the district court\u2019s probable cause determination is de novo. Id. at 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657. Mr. Brown\u2019s primary argument is that the officers lacked probable cause because they confronted him, not on the basis of \u201creasonably trustworthy\u201d information, but on the basis of information obtained from an \u201cinformant,\u201d Dill, whose credibility was previously unknown to the police. Mr. Brown rests this argument on cases holding that information from anonymous sources might not be sufficiently reliable to constitute probable cause for arrest. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 80 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk 1: holding stop invalid where anonymous tip provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informants knowledge and credibility 2: holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description 3: holding that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability that an individual is carrying a gun is not enough to justify a terry stop 4: holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 216-17, 104 S.Ct. at 1762-63 (citations omitted). Thus, Consiglio did not continue to detain Appellee by merely asking him a question about whether he was transporting contraband. When a traffic stop ceases to be a detention and the driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning, no further seizure occurs. See United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, Holdings: 0: holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another 1: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 2: holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation 3: holding that detention ended when police officer returned drivers license and registration and driver voluntarily consented to additional questioning 4: holding that traffic stop ceases to become a detention and becomes a consensual encounter when police officer returns license and registration unless driver has objectively reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to do so may result in a reprimand, a suspension of their license, or a permanent revocation of their license. See Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 377 (Iowa 1987) (stating that \u201cthe code of professional responsibility sets the standard for an attorney\u2019s conduct in any transaction in which his professional judgment may be exercised\u201d); Iowa Sup.Ct. R. 118.10 (discussing discipline by supreme court). It is also significant that the underlying goal of the licensing and supervision of attorneys is to protect the public from the consequences of unqualified legal advisors. See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Lawler, 342 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1984). These facts unquestionably demonstrate that the attorney licensing requirement has a regulatory purpose. Cf. Mincks, 611 N.W.2d at 277 (<HOLDING>). We now determine whether \u201cthe interest in the Holdings: 0: holding that grain dealer licensing statute has a regulatory purpose where the department of agriculture and land stewardship has general supervision over grain dealers and the purpose behind the statutory licensing requirement is protection of the public 1: recognizing that the primary purpose of tr  162051 is protection of the public 2: holding that the prohibitions under the statute do not prevent a manufacturer from terminating a contract with a dealer where the dealer has over a long period of time violated a valid and material clause of the contract and has failed to comply with the continuing insistence of the manufacturer upon performance 3: recognizing frustration of purpose where an unexpected regulatory change substantially frustrated the principal purpose of the agreement to the unfair advantage of one party 4: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014); Clark v. New York State Office of State Comptroller, 09-CV-716 (GLS/CFH), 2014 WL 823289 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014); Davis v. Vermont, Dep\u2019t of Corr., 868 F.Supp.2d 313, 322 (D.Vt.2012); Perciballi v. New York, 09-CV-6933 (WHP), 2010 WL 3958731 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010); Padilla v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Labor, 09-CV-5291 (CM)(RLE), 2010 WL 3835182 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2010) (\u201c[E]very district court in this Circuit to consider the issue has concluded that sovereign immunity bars Title V claims.\u201d); Emmons v. City Univ. of New York, 715 F.Supp.2d 394, 408 (E.D.N.Y.2010); Mosh-enko v. State Univ. of New York at Buffalo, 07-CV-0116 (RJA)(JJM), 2009 WL 5873236 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2009); Chiesa v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, Holdings: 0: holding state immune from suit involving a federal question 1: holding state immune from suit brought in state court 2: holding that the state is immune from punitive awards 3: holding that if a state is immune from underlying discrimination then it follows that the state must be immune from claims alleging retaliation for protesting against discrimination 4: holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims alleging conspiracy to present false testimony but witnesses including police officerwitnesses are not absolutely immune from such claims", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to discharge its liabilities to all creditors who extended credit or whose claims arose before such return. N.Y. Partnership Law \u00a7 106(4) (McKinney 1988). 9 . The court cited Barbro Realty Co. v. Newburger, 53 A.D.2d 34, 385 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dept.1976) for this proposition. Barbro held that a partner who joins a partnership during the term of a preexisting lease is personally liable for the partnership's rent payments while he or she is a partner. Id., 53 A.D.2d at 36, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (\"The lease agreement may have been executed prior to the entry of the defendants into the partnership, but the defendants, who were partners at the time of the default, may be held personally liable therefor.\u201d (citing Glassman v. Hyder, 23 N.Y.2d 354, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785, 244 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1968) (<HOLDING>) and In re Ryan's Estate, 294 N.Y. 85, 60 Holdings: 0: holding that future rent is not attachable under statute providing that a debt is not attachable unless it is certain to become due 1: holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa 2: holding that unearned rent is not a debt  and instead constitutes a contingent liability because rent does not accrue to the lessor as a debt unless the lessee has enjoyed the use of the land 3: holding that it is not 4: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Rules provide pleading requirements for fraud claims in federal court, and are therefore the governing authority on this issue. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most causes of action need contain only \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). \u201cSpecial matters,\u201d such as fraud claims, however, must be \u201cstated with particularity.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (\u201cRule 9(b)\u201d). The elements of a fraud claim requiring particularity include \u201c \u2018the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the representations and what he obtained thereby.\u2019 \u201d Harrison, 176 F.3d at 783-84. Also, reasonable detrimental reliance on a misrep ah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 921-22 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In the complaint in the instant case, the Holdings: 0: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 1: holding that confidential sources need not be named provided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information alleged 2: holding that fraud claims were wrongfully dismissed for insufficient particularity as they provided sufficient notice of the facts of the alleged misconduct 3: holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her 4: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 463-64, 937 A.2d 161, 170 (2007), quoting Guida, 391 Md. at 53, 891 A.2d at 1097. Regardless of if an attorney deposits unearned fees into a personal or operating account, he or she must have the consent of the client. Shakir, 427 Md. at 206, 46 A.3d at 1167 (attorney violated Rule 1.15(c) when he failed to deposit unearned fees into attorney trust account without client consent although the record did not indicate whether it was a personal or operations account). Here, Respondent deposited Ms. Nelson\u2019s fee in an account other than an attorney trust account without the written informed consent of Ms. Nelson and failed to keep any sort of record of the transaction, and therefore violated Rules 1.15(a) and ( d. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, Holdings: 0: holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge 1: holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 81b when he failed to respond to two letters from the attorney grievance commission 2: holding that because attorney violated several rules of professional conduct the attorney also violated rule 84a 3: holding an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients money in trust 4: holding that an attorney violated rule 84c when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Royal Colony of New Jersey: 1760-1769 52-53 (providing for fines as well as forfeiture and destruction of heavy steel and iron traps before \u201cany one Magistrate or Justice of Peace\u201d); \u201cAn Act for the more effectual Preservation of Deer in this Colony,\u201d (passed Dec. 6, 1769), id. at 582-85 (providing for forfeiture and destruction of steel and iron traps weighing over five pounds in proceeding before magistrate or justice of peace); \u201cAn Act for the Preservation of Deer and other Game, and to prevent trespassing with Guns,\u201d (passed Dec. 21, 1771), Paterson, supra, at 19-22 (providing that anyone who sets a trap larger than that commonly set for foxes and muskrats, shall suffer \u00a35 fine, three month imprisonment, and forfeiture and destruction of trap in pro 00, 602, 10 A. 108 (Sup.Ct.1887) (<HOLDING>); Shivers v. Newton, 45 N.J.L. 469, 476 Holdings: 0: holding no right to jury trial in action to recover penalty for violation of 1882 act to prevent the adulteration and to regulate the sale of milk 1: holding that right to trial by jury did not attach in suit to recover penalty for violation of 1886 act to prevent deception in the sale of oleomargarine butterine or any imitation of dairy products since violation was petty offense 2: holding that penalty action instituted pursuant to fish and game procedure act of 1897 did not include jury trial because it has been repeatedly held in this state that in a summary procedure for the collection of a penalty for violation of a police regulation neither party is entitled to a trial by jury 3: holding a violation of the travel act 4: holding that a charge of first offense dui is constitutionally petty and no right to jury trial attaches", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "abrasions and his November 2010 C & P examination that mentioned the presence of a scar on his buttocks. The Secretary argues that the Board (1) addressed the evidence of record concerning whether Mr. Johnson\u2019s service-connected skin condition resulted in scarring, and (2) provided an adequate statement of reasons and bases for concluding that it did not. The Secretary notes that the Board found that Mr. Johnson\u2019s disability involved hyperpigmentation, pruitis, and dryness, but not scarring. The Secretary also notes that, although mild abrasions were observed on Mr. Johnson\u2019s November 2013 C & P examination report, the examiner did not find scarring. Moreover, the Secretary contends that the scar noted on Mr. Johnson\u2019s buttocks in his November 20 .3d 1560, 1564 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Meeks v. West, 12 Vet.App. 352, 354 (1999) Holdings: 0: holding that all parts of a statute must be construed together without according undue importance to a single or isolated portion 1: holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute 2: holding that if a document is facially clear it will be construed according to its language 3: holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole    and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted 4: holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980)). In this case, the officers discovered 110 pounds of marijuana during a search pursuant to a warrant, the validity of which is not contested. The record is clear that the officers decided to procure this search warrant before the initial entry into the house. Moreover, the record reflects that the probable cause relied upon to obtain the warrant was based on information gathered by the officers before the initial entry into the house. Therefore, the officers\u2019 initial entry into the house did not contribute in any way to the discovery of the marijuana appellant was charged with possessing. Cf. Guo, 64 S.W.3d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Aguirre, 5 S.W.3d 911, 914-15 Holdings: 0: holding that where information obtained from illegal warrantless search of a briefcase was used to establish probable cause for the warrant to search briefcase evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was properly suppressed 1: holding that the evidence obtained as part of an illegal stop should have been suppressed even where the defendants consented to the search 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that evidence obtained from a search made subsequent to an illegal stop was admissible when before the search the police officer discovered that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant and the defendant was thereupon arrested pursuant to that warrant 4: holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process. Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Mo. Community Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.1998) (internal citations omitted). Moreover, plaintiffs have not established that Hood had any role in the decisionmaking process at issue in this case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that \u201c \u2018some causal relationship is necessary to demonstrate the significance of non-contemporaneous statements, or statements made by persons other than the relevant decision-maker, to the resolution of the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.\u2019 \u201d Kohrt, 364 F.3d at 898 (quoting Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.1995)); see Richards v. Farner-Bocken Co., 145 F.Supp.2d 978, 995-96 (N.D.Iowa 2001) (<HOLDING>). In this instance, there is no evidence that Holdings: 0: recognizing that the seventh circuit consistently has held that isolated comments that are no more than stray remarks in the work place are insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus 1: holding that comments which were considered by personnel board in normal course of considering employment action were relevant to establish discriminatory intent and were not just stray remarks 2: holding that ageist comments by coworkers were merely  stray remarks that while indicating an agediscriminatory animus on the part of those employees under the circumstances of the case were of no probative value as to the employers decisionmaking process 3: holding that stray remarks made almost two years prior to employment action was outdated and lacking in apparent probative value 4: holding that stray comments without more cannot establish a case of employment discrimination but if other indicia of discrimination are properly presented the remarks can no longer be deemed stray and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or internally inconsistent; (3) whether the interpretation conflicts with the substantive or procedural requirements of the ERISA statute; (4) whether the Plan Administrator interpreted the words at issue consistently; and (5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan. Finley, 957 F.2d at 621. The Plan Administrator does not render any language in the Plan meaningless or inconsistent. In fact, the interpretation is consistent with the Plan\u2019s goals of excluding coverage for certain injuries arising out of particular circumstances, such as criminal activity. There is no evidence that the words at issue were ever interpreted inconsistently with regard to other claimants. Further, the interpretation is not contrary to the 1998 WL 385897, *2-3 (6th Cir.1998)(<HOLDING>). \u201cWhen a plan administrator offers a Holdings: 0: holding plan administrators denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious because the administrator in effect applied a per se rule treating all drunk driving deaths as nonaccidental 1: holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan 2: holding that the plan administrators decision to deny benefits to wifes claim for accidental benefits was not arbitrary and capricious because a clause in the husbands policy specifically excluded from accidental death coverage any purposeful selfinflicted injuries and any injuries caused by drug use and husband had died as a result of drunk drivingxper curiam 3: holding that under erisa a plan administrators decision to deny an employee longterm disability benefits is arbitrary and capricious if the administrator ignores favorable evidence  and selectively reviews the evidence it does consider 4: holding that in the absence of any definite anatomic explanations of plaintiffs symptoms we cannot find that the administrators decision to deny benefits was not arbitrary and capricious", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to compel sterilization. According to the 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, one parent in families with two children may be \u201cencouraged\u201d to undergo sterilization, but sterilization is not required. The reports depict the Chinese government as generally pursuing its family planning goals through economic incentives, delayed family licenses, the imposition of fines, and the imposition of mandatory birth control such as intrauterine devices or implants. Since the reports do not show that Zheng would be in danger of this procedure upon return to China, we find no substantial evidence that would warrant reversing the holding of the BIA. B. Zheng claims that he was denied his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Zheng alleges that the IJ denied his petition Holdings: 0: holding that confrontation clause protections do not extend to sentencing hearings 1: holding that various fifth and sixth amendment protections apply to juvenile proceedings 2: holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings 3: holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel 4: holding that aliens in deportation hearings enjoy due process protections under the fifth amendment", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "manifest itself or progress to sickness or disease during the policy period\u201d). The undisputed medical evidence in this case establishes that exposure to and inhalation of asbestos fibers begins a cumulative process in which the body suffers virtually continuous injuries. The insurance policies in this case obligate the insurers to \u201cpay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury ... to which this insurance applies.\u201d In light of the medical evidence of the pathogenesis of asbestos-related diseases and the policy language, coverage under the policies, obligating the insurers to afford a defense to and potential indemnification of l Ins. Co., 10 Cal.4th 645, 689, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 913 P.2d 878 (Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 138 Holdings: 0: holding that continuous trigger will be applicable when environmental contamination claimant is able to show that damage like asbestosis occurred on continuing basis 1: holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury 2: holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended 3: holding that there must be a causal connection between an insureds advertising and an alleged injury to trigger coverage for an advertising injury 4: holding that the continuous injury trigger of coverage should be applied to third party claims of continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily injury or property damage", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and health insurance and death benefits could not survive even minimum scrutiny under Alaska\u2019s Equal Protection Clause and were invalid). 3 . Similarly, Procito argues that extending Nimitz and Kurtz to same-sex families would violate the Due Process Clauses of Article I, Sections 1 and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. She argues that adopting a construction of Section 402(b) of the Law that categorically excludes same-sex couples from being able to establish the \u201cnecessitous and compelling\u201d nature of their reasons for leaving employment would create an \"irrebuttable presumption,\u201d which would deprive them of the \"meaningful opportunity to be heard\u201d guaranteed by Due Process. See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 4 . In a reply brief Procito asserts that Holdings: 0: recognizing irrebuttable presumption as synonymous with conclusive presumption which is a presumption that cannot be overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted as irrefutable proof that establishes a fact beyond dispute 1: holding due process was violated by the automatic rejection of an unwed fathers custodial relationship without granting the father opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 2: holding that oneyear license suspension based on single epileptic seizure without opportunity to present evidence of fitness created irrebuttable presumption in violation of due process rights 3: holding that an illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit person to have custody of his children violated the due process clause and that due process required the father to be given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent 4: holding twoyear delay created rebuttable presumption of due process violation and citing cases in which delays of seventeento eighteenmonths either gave rise to or warranted inquiry into possible due process violation", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Amendment 1984-1 was a valid part of the Plan and that the Reference B Report was not a reliable source of data, and had used the SPD\u2019s actuarial factors despite a conflict with other Plan documents. (Def. Opp. 18-19; Def. R. 56.1 Statement \u00b6 57.) Thus, plaintiffs assert that PBGC was obligated to affirmatively inform participants that, if these determinations were incorrect, they could potentially be entitled to greater benefits. While a fiduciary may not mislead participants about its decisionmaking processes, it does not have to affirmatively advise participants of every step in its internal deliberations, unless the fiduciary itself has created confusion as to the action being considered. Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir.1994); see also Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278 (<HOLDING>). Any fiduciary making benefits determinations Holdings: 0: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 1: holding that employer had no obligation to voluntarily disclose deliberations regarding a plan amendment before it had actually been adopted and noting burden on fiduciary and likelihood of confusion arising from overly stringent voluntary disclosure requirements 2: holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion 3: holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion 4: holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of  349 claim premised on likelihood of confusion between marks", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the court\u2019s decision to strike defendants\u2019 pleadings and enter default was just, related to the claims at issue in the violated discovery order, and supported by a careful written analysis of the pertinent factors. Additionally, we conclude that appellants\u2019 continued discovery abuses and failure to comply with the district court\u2019s first sanction order evidences their willful and recalcitrant disregard of the judicial process, which presumably prejudiced Dingwall, Yang, and Chai. See Hamlett v. Reynolds, 114 Nev. 863, 865, 963 P.2d 457, 458 (1998) (upholding the district court\u2019s strike order where the defaulting party\u2019s \u201cconstant failure to follow [the court\u2019s] orders was unexplained and unwarranted\u201d); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products, 460 F.3d 1217, 1236 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). In light of appellants\u2019 repeated and Holdings: 0: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 1: holding that absent extraordinary circumstances a failure to comply with the statute requires a dismissal with prejudice 2: holding default was the appropriate remedy for failure to comply with numerous court orders and discovery requests 3: holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits 4: holding that with respect to discovery abuses prejudice from unreasonable delay is presumed  and failure to comply with court orders mandating discovery is sufficient prejudice", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police forbid. We believe that the Borough\u2019s selective, discretionary application of Ordinance 691 against the leehis violates the neutrality principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police because it \u201cdevalues\u201d Orthodox Jewish reasons for posting items on utility poles by \u201cjudging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons,\u201d and thus \u201csingle[s] out\u201d the plaintiffs\u2019 religiously motivated conduct for discriminatory treatment. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 2217; Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-65. Just as the exemptions for secularly motivated killings in Lukumi indicated that the city was discriminating against Santer\u00eda animal sacrifice, and just as the medical exemption in Fr f Va., 515 U.S. at 831-35, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (<HOLDING>). In contrast, the principle of Northwest Holdings: 0: recognizing that property interest based on contractual relationship may arise  when a student enrolls in a college or university pays his or her tuition and fees and attends such school  1: holding that university violated first amendment by expelling student for printing indecent newspaper despite student code prohibiting indecent conduct or speech 2: holding that free speech clause precludes state university that pays student publications printing costs from denying funding based on publications religious viewpoint 3: holding unconstitutional a rule excluding all religious speech as viewpoint discrimination 4: holding that where university has opened its forum to other similar student groups its denial of recognition to homosexual student group was the sort of viewpoint based discrimination forbidden by perry and was invalid under the first amendment unless the university could support this discrimination by providing a compelling reason for its actions", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "counselor who treated her. During the administrative hearing, Dr. Vargas testified that the plaintiff has a generalized anxiety disorder with a panic disorder. Opponent\u2019s Evidence Submitted in Response to Exhibit D of the Court\u2019s Order, Exhibit 2, at 150. Dr. Vargas also testified that the plaintiff had been prescribed anti-depressant medication in the past, id. at 134, 138-39, and that she had been suicidal, id. at 136. The plaintiff infers that \u201c[t]he testimony of [her] psychotherapist, Dr. Vargas, was strong enough that Judge Volkman stopped the hearing immediately after hearing Dr. Vargas\u2019 testimony.\u201d Opponent\u2019s Amended Responsive Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court\u2019s Order, at 5. Again, the plaintiffs inference is not reasonable. See Brown, 848 F.2d at 1540 n. 12 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff commits the common fallacy of Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference 1: recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference 2: holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference 3: recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference 4: holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "embracing the commission of a. series of crimes so related to each other that proof of one or more tends to prove the crime charged and to connect the accused with its commission.\u201d McClain, 240 N.C. at 176, 81 S.E.2d at 367. As a result, evidence that Defendant was involved in a long-standing plan to possess and sell or deliver prescription medications as evidenced by proof of the commission of prior bad acts is, under this State\u2019s decisional law, admissible for the purpose of proving that Defendant possessed prescription drugs with the intent to sell and deliver on 22-23 August 2006 in furtherance of that same common plan or scheme. State v. Houston, 169 N.C. App. 367, 372-73, 610 S.E.2d 777, 781-82 (2005), disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 639, 617 S.E.2d 281 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Evidence that Defendant possessed a number of Holdings: 0: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  1: holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed cocaine when although other people were present and had access to the yard the surveilling officers testified that in the period immediately prior to the search the defendant was the only person to retrieve items from the bucket where the cocaine was found which the defendant did repeatedly as police watched 2: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony 3: holding evidence of uncharged prior cocaine sales with numerous similarities to those for which the defendant was on trial admissible for among other purposes showing the existence of a common plan involving the prior sales and the transactions which were the subject of the charges pending against the defendant 4: holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cCAT\u201d), based on an adverse credibility finding. Mejia-Lopez argues that: (1) the IJ did not act as a fair and impartial arbiter because he was predisposed to make an adverse credibility determination; and (2) the adverse credibility provision of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(c)(4)(C), is unconstitutional on due process grounds. After thorough review, we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. We review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction. Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir.2007). We lack jurisdiction to review a claim unless the petitioner has exhausted her administrative remedies for that claim. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We review only the BIA\u2019s decision, except to Holdings: 0: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the bia 1: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider a claim not raised before the bia even when the bia sua sponte considers the claim 2: holding that we lack jurisdiction to consider claims not raised below by the alien even when the bia reviews the claim sua sponte 3: holding that we generally may not consider issues not raised before the bia 4: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Trust Company, 212 S.W.3d 893, 911 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). In Bell, a landowner filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking title to property upon which the State had built a highway. The State claimed title to the property by a lost deed and adverse possession. Id. This Court held that Bell\u2019s suit was, in effect, a trespass to try title action against the state. Id. at 294. The landowner in Bell, however, did not seek compensation for an inverse condemnation, but instead sought title to the land. Id. Thus, our court\u2019s holding in that case is distinguishable. In Texas Southern, a bank sued the university for inverse condemnation after the university refused to pay for equipment provided to it under a lease/purchase agreement. 212 S.W.3d at 898-99. Our court (<HOLDING>). Finally, the defendants respond that the Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation 1: holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action 2: recognizing that plaintiff must have vested legal right of access and not merely historical permissive use to have actionable inverse condemnation claim 3: recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property 4: holding that inverse condemnation claim survived jurisdictional plea where foundation alleged that state mineral leases encroached on foundations property", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a party should not be held to the terms of the contract. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870 F.2d 1148, 1149 (7th Cir.1989) (noting that the federal \u201creceiver of a failed bank ... [is] entitled to enforce [a] writing without regard to understandings or defenses applicable to the original parties\u201d); McCullough v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 870, 872 (1st Cir.1993) (reading Langley to mean that \u201ca contractually bound party\u2019s attempt to avoid a contractual obligation and/or to seek damages through a claim of misrepresentation is nothing more than a challenge to the truthfulness of a warranty ... and a concomitant claim that the truthfulness of that warranty was a condition of the first party\u2019s performance\u201d); FDIC v. Bell, 892 F.2d 64, 65-66 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, when a party alleges, on the basis of Holdings: 0: holding that failure to disclose that the defendant was involved on both the sellers and buyers side of transactions constitutes a concealment of a material fact sufficient to support a charge of fraud 1: holding claim based on failure to disclose information to the epa preempted 2: holding that whether attorney complied with fiduciary duty to disclose all material information was question of fact 3: holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense 4: holding that langley barred a defense based on banks failure to disclose a material fact regarding financial condition of company whose obligations were guaranteed by defendant", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Utah violated a mandate issued by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit by assigning certain criminal cases to himself. Because there is no such mandate in the instant case, and because the Chief Judge did not assign any cases to himself, Ritter is readily distinguishable from the instant case. 2. Sanctions The Court has inherent powers that enable it to enforce standards of conduct and to perform its case-management function. These inherent powers apply in both civil and criminal cases, Kouri-Perez, 187 F.3d at 9, and \u201cinclude the judicial authority to sanction counsel for litigation abuses which threaten to impugn the district court\u2019s integrity or disrupt its efficient management of the proceedings.\u201d Id. at 7. See also United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The choice of an appropriate sanction is Holdings: 0: holding that courts may invoke their supervisory powers to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights to preserve judicial integrity or to deter illegal conduct 1: holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district courts supervisory control over the commissioners court 2: holding that states may exercise their supervisory power to take custody of bank savings deposits 3: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 4: holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "it considered the proposed density urban. 35 The principal cases cited by the parties are Patzkowsky v. Klamath Cty, 8 Or LUBA 64, 71 (1983) (requiring county to discuss whether subdivision into one-acre lots in area 14 miles from UGB and two miles from nearest unincorporated community would comply with Goal 14); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas County, 3 Or LUBA 316, 327, 330 (1981) (to designate one-, two- and five-acre residential zones without addressing their impact on UGBs violates Goal 14); Medford v. Jackson Cty, supra, n 19, 2 Or LUBA at 389-91 (describing as \u201cquasi-urban\u201d a 2,600-acre area between Medford and Eagle Point containing 4,300 residents and the largest concentration of industry in the county); Metropolitan Serv. Dist. v. Clackamas Cty, 2 Or LUBA 300, 307 (1981) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of Linn County\u2019s Comprehensive Holdings: 0: holding that even when a defendant moves under rule 50 at the close of plaintiffs evidence  and autocentro did not even do that  if a defendant wishes to renew a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the posttrial stage with a view to having denial of that motion considered by the court of appeals the defendant is required to have moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence 1: holding that indigents have a right to a transcript on appeal as announced in griffin v illinois 351 us 12 76 sct 585 100 led 891 to be retroactive 2: holding that a foreclosure advertisements property description that included two unavailable subdivision lots was not defective as a matter of law 3: holding that although 13 lots on 31 acres 1 12 miles from ugb and 12 lots on 28 acres 12 mile from ugb are not necessarily  urban as a matter of law close proximity to ugb requires county to consider whether ugb would be affected by the approval of these subdivisions 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion in giving virtually no consideration to the mothers historical role as primary caregiver in a custodyrelocation order regarding a twelve 12 yearold child", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992)). 14 . Grand Crossing, L.P. v. United States Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 5429, 2008 WL 4525400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (quoting S.E.C. v. Ashbury Capital Partners, No. 00 Civ. 7898, 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001)). Accord Commerce Funding Corp. v. Comprehensive Habilitation Servs., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 355, 361 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (\"[A] movant may not raise on a motion for reconsideration any matter that it did not raise previously to the court on the underlying motion sought to be reconsidered.\u201d). 15 . United States v. Treacy, No. 08 Cr. 0366, 2009 WL 47496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (quotation omitted). Accord Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Makas v. Orlando, No. 06 Civ. 14305, Holdings: 0: holding that the bia may deny a motion to reopen on the ground that the movant has not established prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought 1: holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds 2: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 3: holding that a party may not use a rule 60b motion as an occasion to relitigate its case 4: holding that a court will deny the motion when the movant seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "procedure.\u201d Id. (Emphasis added). Similarly, the court in Wittenberg v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education, No. 1:05 CV 818, 2006 WL 2568937, at *5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63812, at *17 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006), held that the prior version of the stay-put provision \u201cshould be read to mandate an agreement after a decision of a hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the SEA only if there is no further appeal to a state review official.\u201d (Emphasis added). The Wittenberg court premised its holding on its finding that \u201cthe statute on which the regulation is based does not contemplate a situation in which a hearing conducted by the state will be appealed to a state review official.\u201d Id.; see also CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, the court in Benjamin v. Greater Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 1: holding that the district court did not err when it found that the stayput provision did not apply to a firsttier due process hearing conducted by a local school district 2: holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted 3: holding that the district court did not err in determining that inadvertent disclosure did not result in waiver 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "adequacy of the summons in light of Rule 4.15(F), we bear in mind the constitutional due process protections which a defective summons must nevertheless satisfy.\u201d In re J.H., 898 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. \"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality, is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec tions.\u201d Munster, 829 N.E.2d at 58. However, Trial Rule 4.15(F) cures only technical defects in service of process, not a total failure to serve process. LaPalme, 621 N.E.2d at 1106; see also Idlewine v. Madison Cty. Bank & Trust Co., 439 N.E.2d 1198, 1201-03 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Kelly v. Bennett, 732 N.E.2d 859, 862 Holdings: 0: holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation 1: holding that trial rule 415f will not cure defective service of process where no person authorized by the rules was actually served 2: holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f 3: holding service of process defective when the receipt card was signed by someone who was not the registered agent 4: holding service of process defective when the return receipt is not signed by the addressee", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to\u201d an employee benefit plan and, consequently, be preempted, even though the state law\u2019s effect on benefit plans is only incidental. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139, 111 S.Ct. 478. These cases, where the state law\u2019s effect on ERISA-encompassed employee welfare benefit plans, are the more difficult types of cases to ascertain the proper outcome. Further adding to the confusion is the fact that despite Congress\u2019s intention that ERISA cut a wide swath of preemption through state laws, the Supreme Court has recognized certain limitations: \u201cSome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law \u2018relates to\u2019 the plan.\u201d Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890; see also Mackey, 486 U.S. at 841, 108 S.Ct. 2182 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court\u2019s decisions do not provide a Holdings: 0: holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans 1: holding that a specific provision of georgias garnishment statute was preempted by its express reference to erisa plans but at the same time refusing to extend erisa preemption to georgias entire garnishment procedure 2: holding that a georgia garnishment statute that solely applied to erisa employee benefit plans was preempted 3: holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 4: holding that erisa did not preempt a states general garnishment statute even when applied to collect judgments against plan participants", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "found defendant incompetent to stand trial). Second, the rules of construction indicate a strong preference for harmonizing the rule and the statute. See State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 115 N.M. 573, 575, 855 P.2d 562, 564 (1993) (instructing courts to presume that \u201cthe legislature did not intend to enact a law inconsistent with existing law\u201d and to disfavor \u201cjudicial repeal of legislation by implication\u201d). Third, Child\u2019s interpretation is logical and avoids absurd results. See State v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 452, 774 P.2d 440, 446 (1989) (\u201cWhere the rule is unambiguous, we interpret it literally and give effect to the plain meaning of the rule ... unless to do so leads to an absurd or unjust result.\u201d). See also State v. Ware, 115 N.M. 339, 342, 850 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). {13} In contrast, we are not persuaded by the Holdings: 0: holding that courts should avoid interpretations of statutes which would produce absurd results 1: holding that virginia courts must avoid absurd results 2: holding that contracts should be interpreted to avoid absurd results 3: holding that the rules of criminal procedure should be common knowledge to lawenforcement and judicial officers who have the duty and responsibility to authorize searches 4: recognizing that to avoid absurd results the court has a duty to interpret the rules of criminal procedure with logic and common sense", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (setting forth the second prong of the \u201cdiscretionary function exception\u201d test, which requires the court to determine that \u201cthe judgment or choice in question [is] grounded in considerations of public policy or susceptible to policy analysis\u201d for the exception' to apply); Hardscrabble Ranch, L.L.C. v. United States, 840 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2016)(ex-plaining that \u201cthe discretionary action must be based on the purposes of the applicable regulatory regime\u201d)). According to C. Warren, where there is a risk of serious danger there cannot be a policy consideration that justifies the United States\u2019 \u201cinattentiveness or failure to intervene.\u201d Motion to Amend Reply at 13 (citing Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1991)(<HOLDING>)). Thus, C. Warren concludes the Motion to Holdings: 0: holding that the discretionary function exception was inapplicable to a center for disease control scientists failure to maintain safety procedures and to warn laboratory workers about a dangerous rabies sample to which he had exposed them 1: holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment 2: holding issuance of ldp to be a discretionary function and therefore recognizing no specific mandate by regulation or otherwise which renders the exception inapplicable 3: recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver 4: holding that decision to operate lighthouse is discretionary decision while failure to maintain lighthouse is not within discretionary function exception", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (1987); People v. Young, 334 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789 (2002). A trial court, upon determination of guilt, has no authority to assess a fine or impose a sentence other than that provided by statute. People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 38 (1986); People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga, 83 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1981); People ex rel. Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552, 556 (1973); People ex rel. Ward v. Salter, 28 Ill. 2d 612, 615 (1963). This court and our supreme court have held that a void sentence is considered to have never been imposed and that \u201c[a] void sentence is treated as a complete nullity, without legal effect, since inception.\u201d People v. O\u2019Neal, 281 Ill. App. 3d 602, 614 (1996), aff\u2019d in part & rev\u2019d in part by People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 73 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Although O\u2019Neal and Garcia deal with Holdings: 0: holding that remand for resentencing is appropriate when sentence for reversed conviction appears to have influenced trial courts sentence for the affirmed conviction 1: holding that on direct appeal appellate court may remand for resentencing of all counts 2: holding that in addition to a remand for clarification another option in these circumstances is to remand for resentencing 3: holding that consideration of original sentence on remand for resentencing was inapplicable when original sentences were void 4: holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "A lie does not become the truth simply because the person hearing it knows that it is a lie. The premise underlying this argument reveals the true nature of the matic because they are effectively invoking estoppel against the government. The Defendants contend that because the government\u2019s remission of payment represents that the government entity has evaluated all the relevant information and (presumably) determined that a claim is valid, the government should be estopped from arguing that the claim is invalid in a subsequent judicial proceeding. The premise underlying this argument is contrary to our longstanding presumption that estoppel against the government is impermissible. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 382, 386, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947) (<HOLDING>); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, Holdings: 0: holding that legal injury occurred for purposes of negligence action against insurance agent when insurance company rejected the claim 1: holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract 2: holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims 3: holding that an insurance agent who does not procure the insurance coverage requested breaches his or her duty suggesting a negligence claim 4: holding that a farmer who obtained federal insurance based on improper advice by an agent of the federal crop insurance corporation that his entire crop qualified for insurance could not recover for the loss of his crop because the government could not be estopped from denying the claim by the agents erroneous statements", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "226.32(a). A \u201chigh cost\u201d mortgage covered by HOEPA is a consumer credit transaction with a creditor: 3) that is secured by the consumer\u2019s principal dwelling 4) and is a second or subordinate residential mortgage, not a residential mortgage transaction, a reverse mortgage transaction, or a transaction under an open credit plan For such loans, a failure to satisfy the requirements of TILA/HOEPA can result in civil liability for the lender, which may be asserted as a matter of defense by recoupment. See 15 U.S.C.A. \u00a71640. The HOEPA, therefore, does not apply to credit transactions unless such transactions are secured by a property used or intended to be used as the mortgagor\u2019s principal dwelling. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1603; see also Antanuos v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 508 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Va. 2007) (<HOLDING>). 3. Is the subject mortgage a residential Holdings: 0: holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 1: holding tila applies only to credit transactions secured by real or personal property used or expected to be used as the principal dwelling of the debtor 2: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 3: holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner 4: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and time of the sale. That notice, had it been given, would have stated the time of the sale. See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. \u00a7 51.002. If appellants wanted to avoid the sale, they were required to pay the balance on or before that time. While it would have been preferable for the bankruptcy court\u2019s order itself to have given the parties a specific time on August 1, 2000 in which to make the $650,000.00 payment, we cannot agree that that flaw allows us to ignore the plain language of the order. Appellees\u2019 also direct us to other extrinsic evidence to show the bankruptcy court did not intend the sale to occur only on August 1, 2000. However, the bankruptcy court\u2019s order is not ambiguous. When an order is not ambiguous, we enforce it literally. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 441-42 (Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Bums Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding extrinsic evidence contradicting language in will inadmissible when will is unambiguous 1: holding that arbitration clauses as contractual agreements must be enforced to their terms 2: holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous 3: holding that unambiguous decree must be enforced literally without consideration of matters extrinsic to the decree 4: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "at 7. In the absence of that certification, the Court has little difficulty concluding that the complaint was not served, and that in consequence, Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirement of Rule 25(a)(3) to serve the motion to substitute \u201con nonparties as provided in Rule 4.\u201d Id. (emphasis added); see George v. United States, 208 F.R.D. at 31-32 (stating \u201cnon-party successors or representatives of the deceased party must be served the suggestion of death in the manner provided by Rule 4 for the service of a summons\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)). It is axiomatic that a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a would-be party that has not been \u201cserved with a copy of the complaint.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(1); see Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A, 99 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Macaluso v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Holdings: 0: holding that rule 45b does not require personal service 1: holding that personal jurisdiction is not conferred if service under rule 4 is not properly effected 2: holding rule 45b does not require personal service to the exclusion of other manners of service so long as the nonpersonal service was effected by means reasonably sure to complete delivery 3: holding that if good cause does not exist the court has the discretion to either dismiss the action without prejudice or direct that service be effected within a specified time 4: holding that delivery of subpoena via federal express was sufficient because effective service under rule 45 is not limited to personal service", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex.2013). Here, in both his answer and in discovery, Frazier admitted that the HVAC design was faulty, thus giving merit to plaintiffs claims. Frazier\u2019s, own admissions lend support to plaintiffs claims that negligence occurred in the construction of the HVAC system, and granting a motion to dismiss in this case would defeat the purpose of this statute. In light of this, we conclude that Frazier \u201csubstantially invoked the judicial process,\u201d Murphy, 374 S.W.3d at 631, and thus waived his right to a certificate of merit. The dissent focuses on Texas cases that, emphasize the quantity of activity in a case rather , than the substance of activity. See, e.g., Crosstex Energy Services, 430 S.W.3d at 394-95 (<HOLDING>). The dissent claims that \u201cthe majority Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily 1: holding that plaintiff may be entitled to prevailing party status where the mediation agreement entered into by the parties was read into the record before a hearing officer 2: holding that a stipulation properly entered into the record where there is a clear understanding of the finality of that agreement is an effective and enforceable settlement notwithstanding that it is subject to reduction to a written document 3: holding that as a matter of contract no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so 4: holding that no waiver existed where a party filed an answer exchanged 11000 pages of written discovery and entered into a rule 11 agreement among other actions", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or reasonable and prudent at the time.\u201d (citations omitted)). 22 . Thrift contends that the Second Note was a renewal of the First Note; the Hubbards do not agree with this characterization. 23 . At the time Thrift wrote the letter, he believed that the stock transfer had not satisfied the original debt. 24 . Peerless argues that allowing compounded interest would impermissibly add to the contract. Awards of prejudgment interest are damages, however, and need not be specified in the contract nor agreed to by the parties. 25 . See Enterprise-Laredo Assocs. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 839 (Tex.App.\u2014San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (''[Pjrejudgment interest may be awarded on a breach of contract claim.\u201d); O\u2019Reilly v. Grafham, 797 S.W.2d 399, 401-02 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 26 . Tex.Rev.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.05, \u00a7 1 Holdings: 0: holding teague applies to capital cases 1: holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation 2: holding that cavnar rule applies to nonpersonal injury economic damages cases 3: holding that eaja applies to court proceedings for review of social security cases 4: holding that rule 9b applies to fca", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "against Detectives Murphy, Kierse and O\u2019Connell, since, according to the facts set forth above and admitted by Mr. Hickombottom, they were not involved in the interrogation or processing after Hickombottom\u2019s arrest. McGuire and Tansey, however, are left with Hickombottom\u2019s remaining claims. The court will address each in turn. First, Mr. Hickombottom claims that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt hearing by delaying his appearance before a magistrate. The defendants did question Hickombottom for about eleven hours after his arrest, but had nothing to do with him after that time. Eleven hours is not an unreasonable period in which to delay an appearance before a magistrate. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Whatev er happened afterward is not, or at Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 1: holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable 2: holding that the defendants sentence was within the guidelines range and therefore presumptively reasonable 3: holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 4: holding that period of up to fortyeight hours between arrest and initial appearance before judicial officer is presumptively reasonable", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the Small Estate Affidavit, which includes an estimate of the Property\u2019s value. As evidence of Mrs. Brush's loan indebtedness, Wells Fargo relies on an affidavit attached as an exhibit to its summary judgment motion. This affidavit estimate falls outside the range of materials that a court may consider in a Rule 12(c) motion. Wells Fargo\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied as to its argument that the Brushes\u2019 have failed to show damages for Wells Fargo\u2019s breach of the loan modification contract. 6 . The Texas Supreme Court has yet to address whether foreclosure is \u201cdebt collection\u201d under the TDCA. Other courts applying Texas law have permitted foreclosure-related claims under the TDCA. See, e.g., Watson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 814 F.Supp.2d 726, 734-35 (E.D.Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Akintunji v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 2011 WL Holdings: 0: holding that debtors allegation that mortgage holder failed to provide him with the statutorily required notice of foreclosure was sufficient to state a claim for wrongful foreclosure 1: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 2: holding that foreclosure is debt collection under the tdca and allowing the plaintiffs claim that the mortgagors representations surrounding the foreclosure were fraudulent deceptive or misleading 3: holding that after a judgment entry grants a decree of foreclosure and order of sale the foreclosure action cannot be dismissed as the judgment is final 4: holding that 24 foreclosure was substantial under the facts of that case", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 254 F.Supp.2d 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). \u201cThe court must consider each mo tion independently of the other and, when evaluating each, the court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.\u201d Id. (citing Morales v. Quintel Entm\u2019t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs\u2019 N.Y. Labor Law \u00a7 196-d Tip-Sharing Claim New York Labor Law Section 196-d prohibits any \u201cemployer or his agent\u201d from \u201cdemanding] or accepting], directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities, received by an employee, or retaining] any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be a gratuity for an employee.\u201d N.Y. Lab. Law \u00a7 196-d (McKinney 2002); see Chung v. New Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The drafters of Section 196-d \u201csought to end Holdings: 0: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty upon a defendant who is insane 1: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 2: holding the mvra prohibits the court from examining the defendants ability to pay restitution 3: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane 4: holding that section 196 d clearly prohibits partowner employees who wield  broad managerial authority from retaining tips", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is a misreading of the decision for review. In addition to erroneously concluding that the action should proceed to a jury determination, the trial court further erred by instructing the jury as if Bombay was an ordinary negligence case. The trial court instructed the jury on the liability issue without using the word \u201cintentional.\u201d The trial court then gave an instruction on comparative negligence and submitted to the jury a verdict form that allowed for a finding of comparative negligence. Such instruction was directly contrary to section 768.81(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), which provided that comparative negligence was not applicable in an intentional tort action, a principle which had long been the common law of Florida. See Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 492 So.2d 1333 (Fla.1986); Holdings: 0: holding that liability insurer had duty to defend insured against complaint that alleged intentional tort and negligence in the alternative even when policy excluded coverage for intentional torts 1: holding that the obviousness of a danger is a factor for comparative negligence not a bar to recovery 2: holding comparative negligence not defense to intentional tort 3: holding that federal comparative negligence principles prevailed over state comparative negligence principles on the basis that admiralty is not merely a basis of jurisdiction but instead it is a body of substantive principles as well 4: recognizing tort of negligence by words", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to reopen deportation proceedings, arguing that she was not removable because her assault charge fell within the \u201cpetty offense\u201d exception of INA \u00a7 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), and could not therefore be construed as a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA denied that motion, and Membreno timely appealed. Discussion The Immigration and Nationality Act deprives a court of jurisdiction to review \u201cany final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2).\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(C). This section also deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions denying motions to reopen or reconsider such final orders. See Sarmadi v. INS, 121 F.3d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Section 1182(a)(2) renders \u201cany alien Holdings: 0: holding that withdrawal of judicial review over final orders of deportation also withdraws jurisdiction from motions to reconsider or reopen 1: holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders 2: holding that the criminal jurisdiction bar applies to the denials of motions to reopen 3: holding that bia denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion 4: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1999). Specifically, a RICO plaintiff must \u201c(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, at 1231, the court held that a complaint did not meet Rule 9(b)\u2019s heightened pleading standard because it did not include \u201cstatements setting forth the content, date, or place of any alleged misrepresentations, and the identity of the persons making them.\u201d Id. (brackets omitted). Instead, the complaint \u201ccontain[ed] sweeping and general allegations of mail and wire fraud directed at all the defendants rather than connecting the alleged fraud to the individual defendants.\u201d Id.; see also McGee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-392 FB CLP, 2009 WL 2132439, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2009) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, although a plaintiff may \u201callege Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant 1: holding that a plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity where he loosely alleged throughout his complaint that the defendants contacted each other by means of the mails andor the wires without specifying precise methods of communication or identifying any specific fraudulent statement 2: holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 3: holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity 4: holding that when there are multiple defendants rule 9b requires that a plaintiff allege facts specifying each defendants contribution to the fraud", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cinput\u201d from the respondent which was lacking in Go-dette. Ms. Lea testified at some length by telephone, but the hearing committee did not credit what she had to say. Since the committee\u2019s credibility findings were not clearly erroneous, the Board was bound to accept them. There is no room here for the Board to \u201cspeculate\u201d that Ms. Lea\u2019s evasion of service, like that of Mr. Godette, may have been motivated by \u201chopelessness and perhaps despair.\u201d In addition to the evidence of evasion of service, the Board also failed to consider other evidence of Ms. Lea\u2019s deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process. In particular, given that substantial evidence supported the committee\u2019s credibility findings, the Board erred in failing to accept those findings. See Temple, 629 A.2d at 1208-1209 (<HOLDING>). The committee found that Ms. Lea\u2019s testimony, Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record 1: holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts 2: holding that the court may not overturn the administrative law judges factual findings as long as they are supported by competent substantial evidence 3: holding that where adequately supported credibility findings are for the alj to make 4: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "findings or abused its discretion in denying petitioner\u2019s request for partition. We note that EPIC vests the probate court with the jurisdiction to hear an equitable claim for partition. MCL 700.1303(l)(b); see, also, Van Etten, supra at 287 (observing that MCL 700.22 extended equitable jurisdiction to the probate court in limited instances, including granting the relief of partitioning property). In an action for partition, the court determines \u201cwhether the premises can be partitioned without great prejudice to the parties,\u201d the property\u2019s value and use, and any other matters the court finds pertinent. MCR 3.401(A). Here, none of the parties suggested a viable method to partition the property into the four equal parcels required to comply with the trust\u2019s terms of distributio 1933) (<HOLDING>). The concerns discussed in these cases apply Holdings: 0: holding provision in oil and gas lease authorizing lessor to use gas for agricultural purposes contained no geographical limitations 1: holding assignment of oil and gas lease is subject to business and commerce code section 2601 2: recognizing oil gas and coal are minerals and holding if oil gas and minerals are reserved from the grant of the surface of several tracts of unseated land  they can be taxed as an estate in land 3: recognizing as impermissible the aggregation of claims seeking to recover royalties allegedly due under oil and gas leases 4: recognizing that a metes and bounds partition when land contains oil and gas results in a serious loss to a coowner who receives a lot without oil or gas under the surface with the loss due solely to the division of the land", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in denying supersedeas under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), even though those provisions were in effect at the time of the ruling.\u201d Cascos, 319 S.W.3d at 217. This analysis is clearly wrong, however, because, as noted above, the supreme court\u2019s opinion in Long expressly referenced the trial court\u2019s discretion under what is now TRAP rule 24.2(a)(3): Sweitzer [the judgment creditor] had possible mechanisms for seeking enforcement of the injunction.... Sweitzer could have sought denial of suspension of the injunction. See former Texas R.App. P. 47(f) (allowing trial court to decline to permit other judgments to be suspended) (currently Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(3)); City of Robstown v. Westergren, 774 S.W.2d 739, 740-41 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi, 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In re Long, 984 S.W.2d at 626. Thus, not only Holdings: 0: holding that district court has discretion under appropriate circumstances to rule on summary judgment motion before addressing pending class certification motion 1: holding that district court has discretionary authority under former rule 47f to deny a city suspension of an injunction pending appeal 2: recognizing that the district court has discretion to admit or deny motive evidence 3: holding that a district court of appeal opinion which cites as controlling authority a decision that is either pending review in or has been reversed by the court constitutes prima facie express conflict and allows the court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction 4: holding that when a state commission has the right under section 6001 of the texas civil practice and remedies code to supersede an order the trial court cannot deny suspension of a temporary injunction under former rule 43a currently texrapp p 291b pending an interlocutory appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "assignments. See id. at 304, 302. Appellants in this case did have notice that there was assigned parking at Le\u2019Lisa; however, they did not have notice as to how the system worked. Further, appellants had notice from Article XVI of the by-laws that the document could be amended by a 66% percent vote of the unit owners. Appellants also had notice that the by-laws could contain \u201crestriction^] on or requirement[s] respecting the use and maintenance of the units and the common elements.\u201d RP \u00a7 11-104(c). See Allers v. Tittsworth, 269 Md. 677, 686, 309 A.2d 476 (1973) (\"Every man is presumed to know the law\u201d). Therefore, appellants knew the by-laws could be amended by the insertion of use restrictions. Cf. Board of Directors of By the Sea Council v. Sondock, 644 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.Ct.App. 1982) (<HOLDING>). Appellants also attempt to distinguish Juno Holdings: 0: holding that condominium owners knew at time of purchase they bought subject to all provisions of declaration one of which was right to amend it 1: holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made 2: holding that defendant must assert right of confrontation and right to be present at time of alleged violation and cannot claim those rights for first time on appeal 3: holding that allegations that defendants designed and implemented improper accounting practices failed to state claim for securities fraud in absence of allegations of particular facts demonstrating how defendants knew of scheme at time they made their statements of compliance that they knew the financial statements overrepresented the companys true earnings or that they were aware of a gaap violation 4: recognizing that the right of redemption is one of the most important rights provided by the states to owners of real property", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "properly admitted as evidence of a common scheme or plan. We believe the trial court properly admitted the victim\u2019s testimony as evidence of a common scheme or plan. See Clasby, 385 S.C. at 155, 682 S.E.2d at 896 (\u201cWhere there is a close degree of similarity between the crime charged and the prior bad act, both this [c]ourt and the [c]ourt of [ajppeals have held prior bad acts are admissible to demonstrate a common scheme or plan.\u201d) (quoting State v. Gaines, 880 S.C. 23, 30, 667 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008)). The victim\u2019s testimony in this case established the incidents of abuse occurred in the same manner and in the same locations as the conduct that formed the basis of the charge of CSC with a minor brought against Berry. See State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 265, 89 S.E.2d 701, 711 (1955) (<HOLDING>); State v. McClellan, 283 S.C. 389, 392, 323 Holdings: 0: holding that the high level of similarity between the charged crime and prior bad acts necessary to prove common scheme or plan does not require evidence of common features to show a unique method of committing the crime 1: recognizing that the common scheme or plan exception is generally applied in cases involving sexual crimes where evidence of acts prior and subsequent to the act charged in the indictment is held admissible as tending to show continued illicit intercourse between the same parties 2: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 3: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment 4: holding that the striking similarity between the acts alleged in the indictment and the prior incidents rendered incidents that occurred fifteen years prior to the acts alleged in the indictment relevant and admissible under rule 404b", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "issued shares and options off the market. 3 . Flora asserts that he was somehow less sophisticated than Firepond's representatives and that the lock-up agreement was not the product of negotiation because it was offered on a take it or leave it basis, under the threat that if he refused to sign, the IPO might not go forward. The court finds neither argument persuasive. First, Flora was sophisticated enough to negotiate and perform multimillion dollar business agreements. Second, the court is not convinced that the lock-up agreement, in these circumstances, was a contract of adhesion. Even if it was a contract of adhesion, that fact alone does not create a special duty of care where none otherwise existed. See Vierkant by Johnson v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>); Safeco, 531 N.W.2d at 871 (not including Holdings: 0: holding that contingency fee contracts are voidable where attorneys fail to comply with disciplinary rules 1: holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable 2: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 3: recognizing the doctrine of unenforceability of unconscionable contracts 4: holding that contracts of adhesion are not voidable unless unconscionable", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his more particular two-fold argument that it was the testimony about the specific crime\u2014 possession of a stolen firearm \u2014 and the fact it was also firearm related that made Officer Brumfield\u2019s testimony more prejudicial than probative. As to this, we are mindful that Officer Brumfield only testified on direct that Grindle had been arrested and, when he was arrested, a .45-caliber pistol was recovered but did not match the murder weapon. And Grindle did not object to this testimony. It was Grindle\u2019s attorney, not the State, that brought up the underlying reason for his arrest \u2014 that he allegedly possessed a stolen pistol. Because Grindle\u2019s lawyer was the one who elicited the testimony, Grindle cannot argue now it was improperly introduced. See Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 755 (\u00b6\u00b6 52-53) (<HOLDING>). \u00b658. Despite Grindle\u2019s opening the door to Holdings: 0: holding that the district courts improper admission of an unauthenticated registration statement was harmless because the proponent of the registration statement later properly authenticated the statement in a motion to reconsider 1: holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement 2: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 3: holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial 4: holding that it was error for the court to rule that the statement of mortgage debt was incorrect prior to submission of the auditors statement of account", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "S.Ct. 2305, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986). Tribal sovereign immunity \u201cis subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress,\u201d Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), but the Court of Appeals has ruled that, as relevant to this suit, Congress did not impair the Nation\u2019s immunity. Vann II, 534 F.3d at 749. Of course, like all sovereigns, the Nation is free to assert or to waive its immunity as it sees fit, see Okla. Tax Comm\u2019n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), and \u201c[i]t is settled law that a waiver of sovereign immunity in one forum does not effect a waiver in other forums.\u201d West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 226, 119 , 137 Cal.App.4th 175, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 875, 883 (Cal.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Indian Agric. Holdings: 0: holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him 1: holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body 2: holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity 3: holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted    the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration 4: holding that as a matter of federal law an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is, CMS requires approval from off-site corporate doctors to obtain required medical treatment. Plaintiff asserts that this policy results in a denial of medical care deemed appropriate by the patient\u2019s treating physician. Finally, CMS has an orientation program that emphasizes cost and compliance over patient care. (ECF No. 224, pp. 13-14). Plaintiff asserts that he was denied care by at least two doctors, Dr. Nagaldinne and Dr. Hendricks, on the basis that the treatment would be too costly. The Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against CMS fail as a matter of law. The Court holds that CMS\u2019s policy requiring administration of narcotic medication in the infirmary does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Peterson, 2012 WL 4108908, at *14, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132848, at *46 (<HOLDING>); see also Steele v. Weber, 278 Fed.Appx. 699, Holdings: 0: holding that the gratuitous infliction of wanton and unnecessary pain is a violation of the eighth amendment 1: holding that plaintiff who alleged he was in pain and discomfort after a bilateral otoplasty sufficiently showed a serious medical need noting that pain though subjective and difficult to measure may well be serious 2: holding that plaintiffs allegation that he was denied prescribed pain medication because of a mdoc policy that narcotic pain medications must be given in the infirmary fails to establish an eighth amendment violation 3: holding that prisoner must show prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions to establish an eighth amendment violation 4: holding that untimely provision of medication to hivpositive in mate did not cause sufficiently serious injury to give rise to an eighth amendment violation", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the venire. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel\u2019s representation was objectively unreasonable and that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068-69 (1984); Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In the present case, given all the evidence against defendant, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel questioned, or asked the judge to question, the venire regarding the Zehr principles. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s contention of ineffective assistance is without merit. See also Foreman, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 143 (<HOLDING>). In his reply brief, defendant argues that Holdings: 0: holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 1: holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different 2: holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance claim a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different 3: holding that counsels failure to question the venire regarding the zehr principles did not constitute ineffective assistance where there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different 4: holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the information had been sought only for possible impeachment purposes. See id. at 630. The proper test to be applied by the trial court in such circumstances is whether the safety of the informant will be compromised by disclosure. See Garcia v. Florida, 379 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). If so, then the court must weigh the interests of the state against the defendant\u2019s right to develop his defense. See id. It is unclear whether the trial court in the instant case attempted to apply this balancing test in ruling on the motion to compel. We, therefore, quash the trial court\u2019s discovery order and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. WOLF, KAHN and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur. 1 . See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) Holdings: 0: holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment 1: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused  violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 2: holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 3: holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 4: holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "without merit. \u201cThe substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are \u2018fundamental,\u2019 that is, rights that are \u2018implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\u2019 \u201d McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citation omitted); see also Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.2003) (\u201cFundamental rights are those rights created by the Constitution.\u201d) (citation omitted). In this case, Behrens has failed to allege the deprivation of any fundamental right. We have previously held that \u201c[b]ecause there is no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted, it follows that there can be no fundamental right to apply for adoption.\u201d Lofton, 358 F.3d at 812; see also Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that prospective adoptive parents do not have a fundamental liberty interest in adoption 1: recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 2: holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 3: recognizing that noncustodial parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children 4: holding that there was no liberty interest where adoption placement agreement made it clear that adoption was not a foregone conclusion", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "officer was taking an interest in the plaintiff. Id. Here, no deputies under Sheriff Ball had ever engaged in sexually impermissible or suggestive conduct. And nothing in Fite\u2019s record suggested that he had a proclivity to engage in sexually prurient behavior. As in Andrews, where we found no patently obvious need to train an officer not to rape young women even in the face of actual knowledge of deviant behavior, we do not believe that there is a patently obvious need to train an officer not to sexually assault women, especially where there is no notice at all that such behavior is likely. An objectively reasonable officer would know that it is impermissible to touch a detainee\u2019s sexual organs by forcible compulsion. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Fite himself acknowledged in his Holdings: 0: holding that the court was not persuaded that a plainly obvious consequence of a deficient training program would be the sexual assault of inmates and that specific or extensive training hardly seems necessary for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior 1: holding that even in absence of copy of written decision inmates affidavit and notations on grievance form provided trial court with information necessary to determine whether inmates suit was filed within statutory time period 2: holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury 3: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates 4: holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as a deemed party under the doctrine. Under Texas law, Lapiner cannot satisfy any of the elements of the doctrine of virtual representation. Lapiner is not bound by the underlying judgment \u2014 Is-ramco is bound. The claims adjudicated in this shareholder derivative action are for injury to the corporation, as distinguished from injury to its shareholders. See Swank v. Cunningham, 258 S.W.3d 647, 661-62 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2008, pet. denied); see also Redmon v. Griffith, 202 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, pet. denied). Our analysis is not altered even though the shareholder derivative action judgment may \u201cbring about reduced earnings, salaries, or bonuses.\u201d See BJVSD Bird Family P\u2019ship, L.P. v. Star Elec., L.L.C., 413 S.W.3d 780, 785-86 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Finally, there is no identity of interest Holdings: 0: holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver 1: holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense 2: holding that the appellants interest as a stakeholder in an entity did not satisfy the privity element of the virtual representation doctrine 3: holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury 4: holding the connection is an element", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at Soldier Field because parking facilities increased the usefulness of the stadium property); Bubb, 167 Ill. 2d at 382-83, 657 N.E.2d at 893 (sidewalk deemed public recreational property within meaning of section 3\u2014106 where school painted four-square court on sidewalk and allowed children to play on it). This extension of the law does not justify further expanding the application of section 3\u2014106 to injuries occurring outside a public entity\u2019s property line. The District\u2019s interpretation of section 3\u2014106 is too expansive and would overcome the common law duty of due care codified by section 3\u2014102(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/3\u2014102(a) (West 2000) (a local public entity has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe conditio Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The plain wording of the Illinois statute Holdings: 0: holding that the public policy considerations supporting public officials immunity required that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actions as well as direct actions 1: holding that a road not open to the public at all times was not a highway 2: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 3: holding that legislative purpose for new jersey governmental tort immunity statute encouraging public agencies to open unimproved lands to public use was not thwarted when immunity was not applied to injuries caused by dead tree collapsing onto adjacent public road or private residential property 4: holding that california governmental tort immunity statute would apply if decayed eucalyptus tree limb fell on user of governmental property and would not apply to injuries caused to nonusers on adjacent property", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "allow the Restaurant to litigate the matter. Cf. Barr v. Resolution Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992) (\u201cRes judicata, or claims preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.\u201d). The Restaurant therefore attempted the other approach ad dressed in Mantas, that is, it filed a separate suit to resolve the settlement dispute and asked the appellate court to abate the appeal of the underlying cause pending that resolution. Our own precedent indicates that res judicata would not apply in these circumstances. See Wood v. Cosme, 447 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. Civ. App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In the unusual circumstances presented here, Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata does not bar litigation of a claim pleaded in an earlier case if the record of the case shows that the court refused to decide the issue 1: holding that res judicata does not bar those claims that arose after the original pleading is filed in the earlier proceeding 2: holding that res judicata barred a claim that had been voluntarily abandoned in a previous litigation 3: holding that when claims regarding the employment relationship arise after the plaintiffs first case is initiated the second case is not barred by res judicata 4: holding that res judicata is not applicable to a claim for relief that was unavailable in the earlier action", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1255, 1260 (8th Cir.1994) (Cabbell), this court reversed an obstruction of justice enhancement because \u201cthe district court did not evaluate [the defendant\u2019s] testimony in a light most favorable to him as required by section 3C1.1, application note 1.\u201d Howev er, we note that, effective November 1, 1997, \u201can amendment to [\u00a7 3C1.1] ... removed the \u2018 \u201cmost favorable\u201d language and advised courts simply to \u201cbe cognizant that inaccurate testimony or statement may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory, and thus not all testimony or statements necessarily reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice.\u201d \u2019 \u201d United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, \u2014, 2000 WL 33709971, at *22, (2d Cir.2002) (amending previous opinion); see also United States v. Behler, 100 F.3d 632, 638 (8th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 855, 118 S.Ct. 152, Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 1: recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel 3: recognizing amendment to  3c11 4: holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Esperanza Robles-Cruz and her husband Jorge Robles-Cruz, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition pro se for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (\u201cBIA\u201d) affirming the immigration judge\u2019s denial of their applications for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252. We review constitutional claims de novo, Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.2002), and we deny the petition. The Petitioners contend that it is a violation of equal protection to treat aliens with U.S. citizen relatives differently than aliens without U.S. citizen relatives. We are unpersuaded by this contention because the differential treatment is not wholly irrational. See Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding statutory classification of victim and a defendant involved in issuance of a protective order did not violate defendants equal protection rights 1: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 2: holding that petitioner must show that classification is wholly irrational in order to demonstrate equal protection violation 3: holding proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose required to show equal protection violation 4: holding that a petitioner must show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim that he or she was denied a full and fair hearing in violation of due process", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and his familial obligations did not warrant a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. See United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2006) (rejecting defendant\u2019s assertion the district court failed to consider adequately his personal history and troubled family life, holding sentence was reasonable as court considered each section 3553(a) factor and determined defendant\u2019s claims did not \u201cnecessitate[;] deviation from the suggested guidelines sentence\u201d); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 34 (2d Cir.2006) (concluding although the sentencing court had the power to reduce the sentence under section 3553(a) based on defendant\u2019s cooperation, \u201cthe court was not obliged to provide any such benefit\u201d); United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mares, 441 F.3d 1152, 1161 Holdings: 0: holding that plain error review is used for unpreserved challenges to the method by which the district court arrived at a sentence including arguments that the sentencing court failed to explain adequately the sentence imposed under the statutory factors in  3553a 1: holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors 2: holding that where the plea agreement required the government to inform the sentencing court of all defendants cooperation the issue  is not whether the prosecutor enthusiastically disclosed his cooperation but whether the prosecutor disclosed all cooperation 3: holding although different sentencing court may have given more weight to defendants cooperation disagreement with the courts assessment does not warrant reversal since our task is confined to determining whether the district court considered the appropriate range of factors and arrived at a reasonable sentence 4: holding that judgment calls on the weight to be given various relevant factors are for the sentencing court not for this court", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "As presented, the record supports a reasonable inference that SESH authored the \u201climited margin of error\u201d language, and that inference must be credited on summary judgment. In short, SESH cannot now prevail on the ground that the ambiguous Easement terms are to be construed against the drafter because the identity of the drafter is, itself, a disputed question of material fact. Where, as here, the contract language is ambiguous, the rules of contract construction do not resolve it, and fact questions persist, it is for the finder of fact to decide the contract\u2019s meaning. See McLemore, 7 So.3d at 327 (\u201cWhere factual issues arise, the resolution of the ambiguity becomes a task for the jury.\u201d) (citations omitted); Murray v. Holiday Isle, LLC, 620 F.Supp.2d 1302, 1322 (S.D.Ala.2009) (<HOLDING>). Defendant\u2019s Motion is therefore denied as to Holdings: 0: holding that the issue of witness credibility is within the knowledge of the average layperson and must be determined solely by the finder of fact 1: recognizing that courts must submit the ambiguity to the finder of fact if application of  canons of construction proves insufficient to resolve it 2: holding that the issue of proximate causation involves application of law to fact which should be left to the fact finder subject to limited review 3: holding that the courts in the absence of ambiguity should as a general rule confine themselves to a construction of a statute as written and not attempt under the guise of construction to supply omissions or remedy possible defects in the statute or to insert exceptions not made by the legislature 4: holding that where an ambiguity exists in fact or by construction it is proper to consider the history of the legislation", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Rule 9(G)(l)(b)(vi) creates what appears to be an exception to an exception. Again, that rule provides that \"[r]ecords of juvenile proceedings as declared confidential by Ind.Code \u00a7 31-39-1-2 [are excluded from public access], except those specifically open under statute.\u201d Read literally, that rule states that all court records are public, except those specifically confidential by statute, except those specifically open by statute. It is not clear if the records \"specifically open by statute\u201d are the same records that are \"accessible to the public\u201d in the first place. See Admin. R. 9. 8 . One may think that our earlier statement that the transcript here is presumptively confidential is obviously true, or at least that it should be obviously true. See In re T.B., 895 N.E.2d at 345-46 (<HOLDING>). But the commentary to Administrative Rule Holdings: 0: holding that section 5601c does not authorize appeals from juvenile courts transferring a child to district court for criminal proceedings under section 5402 of the family code 1: recognizing that incidents in which inmates have obtained drugs weapons and other contraband are welldocumented in case law and regularly receive the attention of the news media 2: holding that representatives of the news media have the standing to contest a court order restricting public access to legal proceedings 3: holding under indiana code section 313262 that the juvenile court erred in releasing the transcript of a confidential proceeding to news media 4: holding that access rights of the news media and of the general public are identical in scope", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on work-life expectancies compiled by the United States Department of Labor). In this regard, however, we must agree with the appellant. If sufficient, reliable evidence of Weil\u2019s actual expenses is available then the district court should give the appellant the latitude to introduce this evidence. Once again we note that the actual maintenance deduction is a jury question and if the evidence of Weil\u2019s actual maintenance expenditures will assist the jury in this determination then the evidence should be permitted. Weil\u2019s estate is free to argue to the jury as to why the statistics are more accurate than the evidence of actual maintenance expenses presented by the appellant. See, e.g., Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., 99 N.M. 335, 657 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Ct.App. 1982) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433 Holdings: 0: recognizing the limitations of estimates of worklife expectancy and personal maintenance deductions based on department of labor tables 1: holdingthat  301a confers jurisdiction on federal district courts over any agreement between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them 2: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 3: holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance 4: holding neutrality and nondiscrimination provisions of election agreement enforceable under  301 of the lmra as an agreement between an employer and a labor organization significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on or after June 30, 1994, to register as sex offenders. Id. at 373. In 2001, the Act was amended to require all offenders con-vieted of certain sex offenses to register as sex offenders regardless of conviction date. Id. The State determined that Wallace was required to register under the Act, but our supreme court held that the Act, as applied to Wallace, violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution \"because it impose[d] burdens that [had] the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his erime was committed.\" Id. at 384. We note that Herron has waived his ex post facto argument because he did not present the issue to the trial court. See Saunders v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trams. demied (<HOLDING>). Waiver notwithstanding, the Act is not an ex Holdings: 0: holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal 1: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 2: holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal 3: holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court 4: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by the Constitution\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974)); see also Roberson, 486 U.S. at 688-93, 108 S.Ct. at 2101-04 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). II Courts must be wary of exaggerating what are properly recognized as contemptible improprieties into grandiose visions of injustice. The temptation to entertain such visions is especially great in cases that pit lonely criminal defendants against the police and prosecutorial powers of their state governments. The danger in succumbing to such temptation is that rules designed to secure the integrity of the legal process can gradually take the form of escape valves whose only notable effect is to provide safe haven for indisputably guilty persons. Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding harmless the admission of a nontestifying codefendants confession in violation of the confrontation clause when there was extensive evidence of the defendants guilt including the defendants allegedly coerced confession and an eyewitness who testified that he was absolutely certain that the defendant committed the crime 1: holding the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to a harmless error analysis when the defendants guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that question of whether a confession was coerced was not to be resolved by considering the truth or falsity of the confession 3: holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that  the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendants guilt or innocence  4: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "appeared in Hinds County Justice Court and through them attorneys, pled not guilty. Similarly, on February 11, 2009, plaintiff Charles Shawn Lucrow was charged in Rankin County, Mississippi with driving under the influence. He initially appeared and pled not guilty in Rankin County Justice Court. On March 16, 2010, while the charges remained pending against them in the state justice courts, plaintiffs filed the present action in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983, alleging that defendants, as a mat ter of official policy, custom and practice, systematically deny justice court defendants access to favorable evidence relating to both guilt and punishment, in violation of their due process rights. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-96, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (<HOLDING>). More particularly, plaintiffs alleged that Holdings: 0: holding that suppression by prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment 1: holding that suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request by the defense violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment irre spective of the good faith of the prosecution 2: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material 3: holding that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution 4: holding that suppression by government of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material to guilt", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a ROPS for this particular tractor other than the information set forth in the owner\u2019s manual that Bren-Tex provided the Hensens with the tractor. 15 . Because it is not before us, we express no opinion on whether Bren-Tex may recover the attorney\u2019s fees or costs it incurred for the trial or appeal of its indemnity claim, as contrasted from its defense of the Hensens\u2019 lawsuit. KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice, concurring. This court correctly reverses the trial court\u2019s judgment because there was no evidence of independently actionable conduct by Bren-Tex that caused Michael Hensen\u2019s death. There was no evidence to support independent liability in this regard as to the alleged DTPA and implied-warranty claims. The majority opinion also correctly holds that there was no eviden 1-83 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>); Winn ex rel. Winn v. Pollard, 62 S.W.3d 611, Holdings: 0: recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known 1: holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution 2: holding manufacture had no duty to warn of the dangers of smoking because the dangers of cigarette smoking have long been known to the community 3: holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers 4: holding that seller of frontend loader had no duty to warn injured worker concerning the dangers of operating the loader without a rops because the dangers were obvious under an objective standard", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to which such conduct reasonably points.\u201d Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Henson asserts that there is no evidence that he touched.either Daniel or Patterson. And he maintains that the State did not prove the mens rea elements of each offense. In particular, he contends that .there is. no evidence that he had the specific intent to use the car as a deadly weapon. We address each contention in turn. . . Touching As our Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[w]hile battery requires [a] defen dant to have intended to touch another person, [he] need not personally touch another person since battery may be committed by the unlawful touching by [the] defendant or by any other substance put in motion by [the] defendant.\u201d Matthews v. State, 476 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. 1985) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Here, the State presented Holdings: 0: holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial 1: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 2: holding intent to touch satisfied where defendant fired bullets at officer 3: holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation 4: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (\u201cA discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute [Title VII] was passed.... [I]t is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.\u201d). Reno cannot, due to the circumstances surrounding Metro\u2019s refusal to promote her in 1991 and 1992, prevail on her claim that these incidents evince an overall pattern of continuing discriminatory conduct by Metro. Reno\u2019s promotion denials occurred over a three year period and each involved a different hiring manager, negating Reno\u2019s contention that such decisions were linked to or otherwise shared commonality with the 1993 promotion denial. See Scott v. Claytor, 469 F.Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C.1978) (<HOLDING>); Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a lender was barred from recovering repayment for loans made more than three years before filing suit where obligations without agreed repayment dates were deemed payable on demand and where the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts was three years 1: holding that new york statute of limitations for  1983 actions was three years 2: holding that three sexually suggestive comments over a three month period were not frequent enough nor severe enough to be unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs work environment 3: holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation 4: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "been shown that the defendant\u2019s insurer was doing anything other than investigating and processing an insurance claim, which is the nature of an insurer\u2019s business. That Aetna learned of attorney Majewski\u2019s involvement as early as October 26, 1987, is not dispositive, for the defendant has failed to prove that it switched to a litigation posture because of such knowledge. The mere awareness by an insurer that an injured person was seeking legal advice would not ordinarily cause one to anticipate litigation. Thus, any statements made by witnesses to the defendant, its agents, or its insurer (per the express language of Rule 26(b)(3)) soon after the incident are not protected by the work product doctrine. Accord, Schmidt v. California State Auto. Ass\u2019n., 127 F.R.D. 182, 184 (D.Nev.1989) (<HOLDING>) Some eight months later on June 8,1988, Aetna Holdings: 0: holding that court erred in admitting letter as business record where testimony was not adequate to establish that the letter was compiled as a matter of regular practice as opposed to one prepared in anticipation of litigation 1: holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business 2: holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5 3: holding that the workproduct doctrine was inapplicable where there was no indication a memorandum was prepared in anticipation of litigation 4: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at some later date. Id. Therefore, a reasonable basis for the different classification of unwed fathers and unwed mothers in section 78-30-4 is the fact that while identification of both parents of an illegitimate child is necessary, identification of a child\u2019s mother is automatic because of her role in the birth process, while identification of the father is not. A reasonable basis for the different classification of filing and nonfiling fathers is the state\u2019s need to distinguish those fathers who have accepted legal responsibility for the care of their children from those fathers who have not. Id. \u00b6 21 Based on this analysis and prior decisions, section 78-30-4.13 does not violate C.F.\u2019s right to equal protection. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62, 103 S.Ct. at 2993-94, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (<HOLDING>); Wells, 681 P.2d at 204; In re J.P., 648 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that statute that imposed different requirements to establish parental rights on father than on mother did not violate fathers right to equal protection under the law 2: holding that termination of fathers parental rights should be reversed since it was done to facilitate childs adoption and would prejudice rights of child and mother to receive support from father 3: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 4: holding that new york statutory scheme governing adoption did not violate unmarried fathers right to equal protection by according different legal rights as between birth mother and putative father", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\u201c[Wjhere the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties ... even though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying statute.... \u201d). But this does not make the invocation of the United States\u2019s name a mere formality. Indeed, in a recent case involving \u00a7 81, the Seventh Circuit rejected a standing challenge based on the non-Indian relators\u2019 having no connection whatsoever with the contracts, because the United States was the plaintiff, and it had standing. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1211-15 (7th Cir.1995); cf. United States ex rel. Mosay v. Buffalo Bros. Management, Inc., 20 F.3d 739 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Congress wished to protect tribes by aligning Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue 1: recognizing that a buyer may sue for specific performance of a realestate contract 2: holding that tribal members may sue as relators 3: holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights 4: holding that employers have standing to sue", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Taylor argues that: (1) his conviction was unconstitutional, under the Commerce Clause, because \u00a7 922(g)(1) does not regulate an activity with a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce; and (2) he was sentenced in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because the district court enhanced his sentence based upon facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him, pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme. We review the constitutionality of statutes de novo. United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir.2001). Taylor preserved his Booker error by objecting, based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), at sentencing. See United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, he is entitled to preserved Holdings: 0: holding that blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines 1: holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection 2: holding blakely not retroactive 3: holding neither booker nor blakely can be applied retroactively 4: holding that blakely did not apply to a case that was final but not on direct review when blakely was decided and in which the trial court later allowed a belated appeal", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "As we have often stated, the focus of inquiry at the summary judgment stage \u201calways remains on the ultimate question of law: whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of [the protected characteristic].\u201d Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir.1996). This approach \u201cis consistent with the Supreme Court\u2019s ... decision in St. Mary\u2019s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, [509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407] (1993), where the Supreme Court held that a plaintiffs proof of pretext is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination.\u201d Davenport, 30 F.3d at 945 n. 8; accord McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that at the pretext stage the plaintiff must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision 1: holding that when a plaintiff proves the defendants stated reasons for hiring someone else were pretext for offering the position to a personal friend and not a pretext for racial discrimination she does not establish triable issues of fact 2: holding that posthoc reasons for an adverse employment decision constitute evidence of pretext 3: holding that even if the plaintiff had produced evidence of pretext  the evidence did not tend to establish a discriminatory purpose 4: holding that there were genuine issues of material fact and reversing the district courts grant of summary judgment because in part the everchanging nature of the proffered reasons given for plaintiffs termination could be viewed as evidence tending to show pretext  ", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may ... certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 406(b)(1)(A). Although we have never addressed the precise issue of whether \u00a7 406(b)(1)(A) authorizes an award of attorney\u2019s fees where the district court\u2019s judgment remanding the case to the Commissioner does not explicitly mention attorney\u2019s fees, we have noted that the congressional intent behind \u00a7 406(b) is, in part, \u201cto encourage effective legal representation of claimants by insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary.\u201d Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir.1970) (<HOLDING>). We have also noted that one of \u00a7 406(b)\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may not authorize an attorney to charge fees for representation in court when the commissioner has already authorized that attorney to charge fees for representation in administrative proceedings and declining to reach the secretarys contention that  406b does not allow a court to authorize attorneys fees unless it renders a judgment on the merits favorable to the claimant 1: holding that direct payment of attorney fees for representation before the court is to be made on the basis of the claim or application for benefits underlying the issues successfully appealed to this court 2: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 3: holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal 4: holding that rule 11 does not authorize a district court to award appellate attorneys fees due to similar concerns", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). IPS Card Solutions, Inc. v. Boyd, No. 00 CIV.0776 (MBM), 2000 WL 620213, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,2000). 6 . Courts and text writers have characterized the attorney-client privilege as the oldest privilege for confidential communication known to the common law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); Federal Ins. Co. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 816 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tenn.1991); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges \u00a7 6.2.4, at 471 (2002); Edna S. Epstein, TheAttomey-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 2 (4th ed. 2001) (\"Epstein\u201d). 7 . Johnson v. Patterson, 81 Tenn. 626, 649 (1884) (<HOLDING>); McMannus v. State, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 213, Holdings: 0: holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege 1: holding that the codification of the attorneyclient privilege embodies the commonlaw rule 2: holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel waives attorneyclient privilege 3: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that an invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives the attorneyclient privilege", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and performance benefits. In any event, the tag-line is too vague and non-specific to conclude that it necessarily implies a direct comparison to Gatorade. 28. Moreover, the claim \u201cUpgrade your game\u201d is also puffery. The claim is exaggerated and boastful, and no reasonable consumer, having read the slogan, would be justified in believing that it would actually result in improved athletic abilities, such as playing a better game of basketball. See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc., 497 F.3d at 160 (an \u201c \u2018exaggerated, blustering, and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in relying\u2019 \u201d is puffery) (quoting Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John\u2019s Int\u2019l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir.2000)); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. The tagline is also puffery in that any Holdings: 0: holding that a wellfounded fear requires petitioner to show more than a generalized or random possibility of persecution 1: holding that an officer responding to a call that individuals were dealing drugs had more than a generalized suspicion 2: holding that statement less is more was generalized boasting upon which no reasonable buyer would rely 3: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death because a reasonable teller upon hearing the statement normally and reasonably would fear that his or her life is in danger 4: holding that a company which knew when it issued a policy that the insureds interest in the insured property was less than fee simple could not rely upon a provision rendering the policy void if the insureds interest was less than fee simple", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "conflicts with another provision of the restrictive covenants in this case and in Buckner. In the present case, the provision reads, [T]he owner or owners of any of the above land shall have the right to sue for and obtain an injunction, prohibitive or mandatory, to prevent the breach of or to enforce the observance of the restrictions, in addition to ordinary legal actions for damages, and failure to of the parties or owner or owners of any of the lot or lots ... to enforce any of the restrictions herein set forth at the time of its violation shall in no event, be deemed to be a waiver of a right to do so thereafter. [Emphasis added.] The covenants in Buckner contained substantially similar language. See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Stroud v. VBFSB Holding Corp., 917 S.W.2d 75, Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records 1: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 2: holding that lack of standing cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time by an appellate court on its own motion 3: holding that a trial court may take judicial cognizance of records on file in its own court punctuation omitted 4: holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "F.Supp.2d 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y.2007); Kreinik v. Showbran Photo, Inc., No. 02CV1172, 2003 WL 22339268, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18276, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2003) (\u201cTo state a claim under Section 215, [employee] must adequately plead that [employer\u2019s] counterclaims constituted an adverse employment action taken because of [employee\u2019s] complaints under the Labor Law.\u201d). In addition, New York\u2019s anti-retaliation provision requires a nexus between the employee\u2019s complaint and the employer\u2019s retaliatory action. Kreinik, 2003 WL 22339268, at *8, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18276, at *29 (finding that employee\u2019s allegations sufficiently plead that his labor law complaints were a motivating factor for employer\u2019s adverse action); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 162 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (<HOLDING>). The defendant asserts entitlement to summary Holdings: 0: holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony  regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone  be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim 1: holding that the close connection in time between the complaint and termination indicated that complaints could have been a motivating factor for employees termination 2: holding that although a reason was provided in the termination letter the without cause termination provision was applicable 3: holding that a 17 month time period between the employees protected speech and his termination could not support an inference of causation 4: holding that plaintiff must come forth with sufficient facts to permit a determination that his statements were a substantial motivating factor in his employment termination", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "district courts may expand the record in a case to include \u201cadditional materials relevant to the determination of the merits of the petition.\u201d Rule 7, 2254 Rules. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 7\u2019s purpose is to \u201celiminate some unnecessary hearings.\u201d In accordance with Rule 7, therefore, Twill expand the record in this case to include Pursell\u2019s mitigation evidence. This approach is consistent with Rule 7 and case law interpreting that provision. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Horn, 129 F.Supp.2d 390, 403 (M.D.Pa. 2001) (expanding the record on a claim for ineffective assistance based on trial counsel\u2019s failure to introduce mitigating evi dence during the sentencing hearing when the facts were not in dispute); see also Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Admittedly, questions arise when courts use Holdings: 0: holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources 1: holding that such statements were not even enough for an evidentiary hearing 2: holding that due process requires an evidentiary hearing when parties submissions in contempt proceedings raise disputed issue of material fact 3: holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law 4: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "constitutional due process claim and does not raise any additional arguments on appeal, the State is not entitled to relief. We express no opinion as to the merits of the State\u2019s arguments with respect to Superintendent Hawkins or the validity of the Secretary\u2019s decision-making process. III. CONCLUSION We dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. 1 . The Honorable Roberto A. Lange, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. 2 . Nearly six years elapsed between Superintendent Hawkins' final term as council chairman and his appointment with the BIA. See South Dakota v. U.S. Dep\u2019t. of Interior, 775 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1139 (D.S.D.2011). 3 . In 1975, the Supreme Court of the United States held an wentieth Jud. Cir., St. Clair Cnty., Ill., 986 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). The State has not argued on appeal or before Holdings: 0: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 1: recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments 3: holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause 4: holding school boards are persons within the meaning of the fifth amendment due process clause", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "678, 683 (N.D.Ga.1993) (for purposes of motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, court may consider document that is authenticated by and attached to affidavit, and affiant must be person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence), aff'd, 42 F.3d 645 (11th Cir.1994). Kuchersky also declares, under penalty of perjury, that he has attached \u201ctrue and correct copies of\u2019 business and governmental records relating to Navoi. Translations of the Kuchersky declarations and other attached documents were provided by Alexander Ahmedov, Counsel at the Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The exhibits and declarations submitted by Navoi are properly before the court and establish Navoi\u2019s prima facie case. Cf. Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Development B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 847-49 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979, 121 S.Ct. 426, Holdings: 0: holding that affidavits and exhibits submitted by defendant made prima facie showing that entity was organ of foreign state 1: holding that a plaintiffs prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts is reviewed de novo 2: holding that plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to make out prima facie case for mere department status of foreign corporation defendant 3: holding that the burden of establishing prima facie case of discriminatory treatment may be satisfied by minimal showing 4: holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Curiously, however, the Currys do not direct us to either video or photographic evidence in the record of Andrew and Grace\u2019s recordings of their comings and goings. In any event, it is undisputed le an uninvited invasion of the inside of plaintiffs home could constitute a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion, harassment of plaintiff in a restaurant or on the public street outside his home could not). The surveillance cameras did not intrude into the Currys\u2019 private physical space. As for the Currys\u2019 claim that a police officer came to their house to investigate Andrew and Grace\u2019s report of vandalism, they have neither alleged nor proven that the officer did not have a right to be there, especially since probable cause was found for Jeffery\u2019s arrest. See Cullison, 570 N.E.2d at 31 (<HOLDING>). Based on the undisputed facts, the trial Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that there was an intrusion upon his or her physical solitude or seclusion such as by conducting an illegal search 1: holding that the plaintiff further must demonstrate that the conspiracy was motivated by a class based animus such as race 2: holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change 3: holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel 4: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at oral argument, however, the Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Abbott v. United States forecloses that argument, and Smith\u2019s claim fails. * * * We AFFIRM. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(B)(iii). 2 . 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). 3 .18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(c)(1)(A). 4 . See Fifth Cir.Crim. Pattern Jury Instr. (2001) \u00a7 1.30. 5 . See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). 6 . See United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 487 (5th Cir.), cert denied,-U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 163, 178 L.Ed.2d 97 (2010); see also United States v. Mejia, 844 F.2d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). 7 . See United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless 1: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised 2: holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule 3: holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal 4: holding that hearsay objection does not preserve a confrontation clause challenge", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "review was ordered for February, 2000. At this review, the Board interviewed Appellant and informed him that he had failed to complete his mandatory therapeutic substance abuse program, failed to obtain a favorable recommendation from the Department of Corrections, and, moreover, the Board still did not have an updated INS report. Consequently, the Board denied parole the second time concluding that the fair administration of justice could not be achieved through Appellant\u2019s- release. The Board again reviewed Appellant\u2019s eligibility for parole in February of 2002, but refused to parole him for the same reasons it denied parole in February of 2001. Evidently believing his continued incarceration to be unlawful, Appellant filed a mandamus petition with the Com 2d 502 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (<HOLDING>). Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 4/9/2002. The court, Holdings: 0: holding that it is well settled that the pennsylvania board of probation and parole has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years 1: holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings 2: holding that parole is not a right in pennsylvania 3: holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission 4: holding that there was no legal right to court review of parole board decision because there is no legal right to release on parole", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "declaration, the individual Plaintiffs provide over 91 years of experience at CUC\u2019s main power plant. (Gary Camacho Deck, ECF No. 7-3 at 5.) Without their expertise, Camacho argues that there will continue, to be a \u201cdirect deterioration of service to the Utility\u2019s customers and the general public of the CNMI.\u201d (Id. at 6.) This includes an increase in overtime pay to cover the lack of manpower, delayed preventative scheduled maintenance on generators and other equipment, and delayed projects and other scheduled maintenance. (Id. at 7.) A plaintiff satisfies the irreparable harm requirement by demonstrating that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365; Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). \u201cThe possibility that adequate compensatory Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm 1: holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer 2: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 3: holding that a plaintiff meets the injuryinfact requirement for standing if he faces a credible threat of harm and that harm is both real and immediate not conjectural or hypothetical 4: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Veterans Claims (\u201cVeterans Court\u201d) affirming a March 30, 2010 Board of Veterans\u2019 Appeals (\u201cBoard\u201d) decision that found there was no clear and unmistakable error (\u201cCUE\u201d) in a September 6, 1973 rating decision (\u201cSeptember 1973 Rating Decision\u201d) that granted total disability resulting from individual unemployability (\u201cTDIU\u201d), effective June 27, 1973. Peterson v. Shinseki, No. 10-2433, 2012 WL 87578, at *1 (Vet.App. Jan. 12, 2012). In February 2006, Mr. Peterson sought to revise the September 1973 Rating Decision on the basis of CUE, and on March 30, 2010, the Board determined that the September 1973 Rating Decision was not the result of CUE. The Veterans Court agreed, reasoning that the alleged error was not outcome-determinative. See Willsey v. Peake, 535 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citing Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 310 Holdings: 0: holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision 1: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 2: holding that an error is harmless where it is highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of the case 3: holding that cue required a showing that the alleged error in the challenged decision would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made 4: recognizing that cue may be based on a showing that there was no evidence before the adjudicator that could have supported a denial of the claim on the merits that is that all of the evidence militated in support of the claim", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "261 S.W.3d at 368-69; Starrin, 2005 WL 3343875, at *1. We agree that if section 547.3215 had been relied upon by the officer and argued in the trial court, it would have made Officer Gilbert\u2019s traffic stop abundantly reasonable. But nothing at the suppression hearing\u2014not Officer Gilbert\u2019s testimony and not the argument of counsel\u2014presented that theory to the trial court. In this case, the State effectively relied strictly on subsections (a) and (c) of section 547.323 of the transportation code. Elsewhere in the State\u2019s brief, it conceded that its failure to rely on section 547.3215 at trial precludes it from relying on that provision here on appeal. Any reliance on section 547.3215 was not preserved. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>). Because the State did not rely on section Holdings: 0: holding that issues not argued in initial brief are deemed waived 1: holding that in cases in which the state is the party appealing the basic principle of appellate jurisprudence that contentions not argued at trial are deemed to be waived applies equally to the state and the defense 2: holding that issues not argued on appeal are deemed abandoned 3: holding that claims made but not argued in a brief are waived 4: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "causation standard under the enhanced penalty provision of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1347: Our decision is also guided by the principles of proximate cause. \u201cThe concept of proximate cause incorporates the notion that an accused may be charged with a criminal offense even though his acts were not the immediate cause of the victim\u2019s death or injury.\u201d Guillette, 547 F.2d at 749. \u201cIn many situations giving rise to criminal liability,\u201d the harm \u201cis not directly caused by the acts of the defendant but rather results from intervening forces or events.\u201d Id. \u201cWhere such intervening events are foreseeable and naturally result from [the defendant]^ criminal conduct,\u201d the defendant is \u201ccriminally responsible for the resulting harm.\u201d Id.) see also Hoopengamer v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, even if [the defendant] did not Holdings: 0: holding defendant culpable for the natural and probable consequence   of his conduct 1: holding that the bar against the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures comes into play only where negligence or other culpable conduct is alleged 2: holding that a trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense 3: holding destruction of trial transcript pursuant to court rule ten years after defendants escape disadvantaged defendant due to his own culpable misconduct 4: holding negligent conduct was not culpable meaning not devious deliberate or in bad faith", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "probate court approved the Master\u2019s conclusion that Adkins \u201cattacks the \u2018trust\u2019 as a sham, but does not present a showing that the [relinquishment] agreement was entered into mistakenly, fraudulently, or by coercion. The terms of the \u2018trust\u2019 are of no concern to Mr. Adkins if he has relinquished any interest in it.\u201d Although Adkins opposed the Master\u2019s recommendations, there was no subsequent action by the probate court. Adkins does not appeal this order. With regard to the fraud-related defenses, Adkins filed a \u201cPetition to Rescind and Void the \u2018Relinquishment Agreement\u2019 for the Causes of Fraud and Constructive Fraud,\u201d but later withdrew the motion. Where a party has withdrawn pleadings, he cannot later appeal based on such grounds. See Ogden v. State, 395 P.2d 371, 372 (Alaska 1964) (<HOLDING>). Adkins\u2019 fraud-related claims relating to the Holdings: 0: holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded 1: holding appeal improper where trial judge did not rule upon question 2: holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question 4: holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion lacked specificity", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Or 57, 61, 355 P2d 742 (1960) (\u201cThe purpose of an exclusion clause is the opposite of that of a coverage clause. * * * [T]he effect of an exclusion clause is to deny the protection of the policy to someone who, but for the denial, would be an insured.\u201d); Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 793 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining an \u201cexclusion clause\u201d as \u201ca clause in an insurance policy barring certain losses or risks from coverage\u201d). A condition of forfeiture exists where, initially, the policy provides coverage for the loss, but acts of the insured nullify the coverage. Day-Towne v. Progressive Halcyon Ins. Co., 214 Or App 372, 381, 164 P3d 1205 (2007), rev den, 346 Or 65 (2009); see, e.g., Kabban v. Mackin, 104 Or App 422, 429, 801 P2d 883 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Here, for a condition of forfeiture to exist, Holdings: 0: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 1: holding that the policy insured property but failure to occupy premises negated coverage 2: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 3: holding that the decoration contractor freeman was not subject to premises liability because it did not occupy own control or make special use of the premises at the javits center 4: holding that an ownedproperty exclusion did not apply with respect to property that the insured bought only after the policy periods for which the insured sought coverage", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "felt safe. Accordingly, we find that \u00a7 1040.18a promotes a compelling State interest as applied to Appellant. 133 As compelling as the State's interest of protecting minors is in the present case, the statutory provision must still be narrowly drawn to serve those interests if the provisions is to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126-27, 109 S.Ct. at 2886-37. The statute must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Id., 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2886-87. This standard necessarily disfavors a blanket ban or complete prohibition. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813-14, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1886-87, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000); Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2887-88 (<HOLDING>); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 Holdings: 0: holding that section 33021b was overbroad because it prohibited a wide array of constitutionally protected speech and was not drawn narrowly enough to achieve only the legitimate objective of protecting children from sexual abuse 1: holding total ban on indecent dialaporn telephone communications not narrowly drawn to serve the governments compelling interest in protecting children 2: holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents 3: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 4: holding the online solicitation statute was not narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and there were more narrow means of achieving the states interest in protecting minors", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "no reasonable person in Plaintiffs position would have believed that the activities listed in her Complaint constituted a violation under any law or regulation pertinent to SOX. Finally, even assuming Plaintiffs activities were protected under SOX, she cannot demonstrate that these activities were a contributing factor in her termination \u2014 the last prima facie element. Although Plaintiff alleges that her reports from March 2003 to January 3, 2008, caused her discharge on August 8, 2008, without additional evidence, the eight-month gap between Plaintiffs last complaint and her discharge \u201cis not sufficiently proximate to permit the inference that protected activity was a contributing factor to her termination.\u201d Pardy v. Gray, No. 07-6324, 2008 WL 2756331, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2008) (<HOLDING>); Sussberg v. K-Mart Holding Corp., 463 Holdings: 0: holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation 1: holding that a threeyear gap was insufficient to demonstrate staleness where the criminal activity was ongoing 2: holding that a sixmonth gap between the protected activity and the employees termination was insufficient to infer that the protected activity was a contributing factor 3: holding that twentyfour days between protected activity and termination is sufficient to infer existence of causal connection 4: holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "forced prosecutors to institute bargaining systems that allowed them to dispose of minor cases expeditiously. Id. at 32. In 1945, for example, eighty-five percent of the 36,114 cases brought in federal court were resolved by guilty pleas. See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, University of Albany, Table 5.22.2010, http://www.albany.edu/ sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (last visited August 10, 2015). By 1955, eighty percent of the 35,501 federal cases brought were settled by plea deals. Id. In 1965, post Gideon, ninety percent of the 28,757 federal cases opened were .resolved with plea agreements. Id. In 1970, the Supreme Court declared constitutional the practice of plea bargaining. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 Holdings: 0: holding guilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden and are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently 1: holding that such provisions are valid 2: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 3: holding that conditional guilty pleas are valid when entered into in accordance with certain standards 4: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or otherwise demonstrating that they received little or nothing of value under the contract. See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1097 (W.D.Mieh.2000) (\u201c[N]either the text nor the commentary to the Holder Rule limits the availability of affirmative consumer claims against assignee-creditors to those who assert a right of rescission under common law.\u201d); Simpson v. Anthony Auto Sales, Inc., 32 F.Supp.2d 405, 409 fn. 10 (W.D.La.1998) (\u201c[A] plaintiff should not be required to first prove that she has received little or nothing of value in order to recover from her creditor, as the FTC notice does not advise the creditor\u201d of such a requirement); Jaramillo v. Gonzales, 132 N.M. 459, 50 P.3d 554 (App.2002), cert. denied, 132 N.M. 288, 47 P.3d 447 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Alduridi v. Community Trust Bank, N.A., 1999 Holdings: 0: holding that ftc holder rule does not limit affirmative claims to those instances where rescission would be appropriate 1: holding that the holder of the note must act in a manner that effectively provides notice that the holder has exercised his option 2: holding that procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffectiveness claims 3: holding that equitable exception to one year limit applied where defendant had no reason to believe that plaintiff would increase the scope of claims after the filing of the original complaint 4: holding that the rights of a bona fide purchaser outweighed those of an under secured second mortgage holder", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "statute, a party may not secure a declaration of its statutory rights by seeking relief under the DJA. This general principle is implied by the Court\u2019s decision in In re Resolution of State Comm. of Investigation, supra, 108 N.J. at 46, 527 A.2d 851. The Court declined to render a declaratory judgment on the question whether the State Commission on Investigation (SCI) unlawfully disclosed information about the plaintiffs. The Court held that plaintiffs lacked a private right of action to secure injunctive relief against the SCI arising out of the alleged disclosures. Ibid. (\u201c[0]ur decision that the plaintiffs may not obtain the injunctive relief they sought undermines their need for a declaratory judgment.\u201d); see also In re A.N., 430 N.J.Super. 235, 244-45, 63 A.3d 764 (App.Div.2013) (<HOLDING>); Med. Soc. of N.J. v. AmeriHealth HMO, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending 1: holding that the chancery division lacked jurisdiction under njsa 2a1655 to determine medicaid eligibility where the authority to do so was vested in the division of medical assistance and health services 2: holding res judicata applied to improper property division before holding parties were bound by their division agreement 3: holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division 4: holding that a transfer was a demotion where there was testimony that few people transferred voluntarily from jobs in the plaintiffs prior division to jobs in the plaintiffs new division  everybody viewed a transfer from the plaintiffs new division to the prior division as a promotion and the two departments had different seniority systems", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may conduct a pat-down search (or \u201cfrisk\u201d) if he or she \u201charbors an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous.\u201d Davis, 94 F.3d at 1468; see also United States v. Duncan, 131 F.3d 894, 898 (10th Cir.1997) (concluding that officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in on-going criminal activity and therefore could order him to get out of car and conduct a pat-down search). Here, the evidence supporting the officers\u2019 reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs (i.e. his coming and going from the apartment named in the search warrant and the hand-to-hand contact observed outside the apartment) also indicated that he might be armed and dangerous. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention 1: holding that an officers diligent pursuit of an investigation during the detention is a factor in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop 2: holding that officer safety and other concerns authorize police officers to open car doors during an investigatory seizure 3: holding that personal injury settlement proceeds are disposable income to the extent that they are not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtors 4: holding that during an investigatory detention officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "scheme by filing a parallel proceeding before the NLRC complaining about his employment with IPS. The ap-pellees argue that the district court should not exercise jurisdiction because some conduct about which the appellants complain is actually required by Filipino laws and regulations. In their motion to dismiss, the appellees relied heavily upon Section 10 of the Migrant Workers Act to argue that the NLRC has exclusive jurisdiction and is a strong expression of the Philippines\u2019 interest in this case. While Section 10 is one fact that weighs in favor of dismissal insofar as it demonstrates that the Philippines regulates the complained-of activity, contrary to the appellees\u2019 argument, Section 10, alone, does not support dismissal of the appellants\u2019 ease. See Randall, 778 F.2d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). On balance, some evidence relevant to the Holdings: 0: holding that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction in  502e1 is exclusive 1: holding that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of saudi arabias labor law cannot deprive an american court of subject matter jurisdiction rejecting outright the notion that the law of a foreign country can unilaterally curtail the power of our  courts to hear a dispute unless some other agreement or treaty requires that result 2: holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petitioners collateral attack under  1331 3: holding that because the contract dispute between the parties in this case constitutes a justiciable matter that is cognizable in our trial courts our courts had subject matter jurisdiction 4: holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "judicial notice that Denton County had a population of over 25,000. 3 . Officer Stewart testified that he did not have Lyons sign the warnings as it was not required by Department policy. 4 . According to Jessee this letter was mailed a day or two after July 2nd. 5 . We have attempted to summarize this somewhat confusing portion of the charge, which portion takes up four double-spaced legal size sheets of paper. 6 . See Weaver, 700 S.W.2d at 777 (interpreting section 24 of TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6701/-1 to require that visual recordings be made of DWI suspects). 7 . We make no holding that the trial court was required to so instruct the jury; only that it had discretion to do so and to see that it was done properly. Compare Drewett v. State, 704 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could find constructive notice from evidence that the defendants knew of a recurring dangerous condition 1: holding that although it is proper to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case have been shown it is error to instruct the jury on the mcdonnell douglas burden shifting scheme 2: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial 3: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 4: holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "has held that SORA is rationally related to a \u201clegitimate state interest of protecting the public.\u201d See Golba, 273 Mich App at 620. Put another way, SORA in general is rationally related to the Legislature\u2019s stated purpose of protecting the people of Michigan from those who have committed offenses that \u201cpose[] a potential serious menace and danger to the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state.\u201d MCL 28.721a; see also Temelkoski, 307 Mich App at 270 (\u201cSORA . . . has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose . . . .\u201d); Fonville, 291 Mich App at 380. However, the issue of whether the requirement of registration for offenders who commit the crime of unlawful imprisonment of a minor without a sexual purpose survives r 27 (2010) (<HOLDING>); People v Cintron, 46 AD3d 353, 354; 848 NYS2d Holdings: 0: holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process 1: holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law 2: holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved 3: holding that sex offender registration and notification do not constitute punishment 4: holding evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction for violation of sex offender registration requirement", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the trial court to hold a hearing on the issue of a defendant's absence at trial in order to allow the defendant to rebut the initial presumption of waiver. In support of this position, he cites Willis, 525 N.E.2d 610. In Ellis, the defendant failed to appear for trial, and the trial court later questioned him, without his attorney present, about the reason for his absence. Another panel of this court ordered a new hearing regarding the defendant's absence at trial, finding that \"Ellis was entitled to a hearing affording him an opportunity to explain his absence,\" and that it was a critical stage of the proceedings at which he was entitled to representation. Id. at 612. In support of its conclusion, this Court cited Gilbert v. State, 182 Ind.App. 286, 290, 395 N.E.2d 429, 482 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Holtz argues that this Court's position in Holdings: 0: holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction 1: holding that reviewing court may consider trial evidence in reviewing denial of motion to suppress 2: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 3: holding that a reviewing court has an obligation to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction of the court below 4: holding that for reviewing court to look solely at the facts initially before the court regarding defendants absence would be patently unfair", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), \"was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds\u201d). The ICA unanimously decided the case in a two-page summary disposition order relying on settled law that the charge failed to allege an attendant circumstance of the offense. State v. Wheeler, 120 Hawai'i 256, 203 P.3d 676 (App. 2009) (summary disposition order) (citing HRS \u00a7 702-205 and Jendrusch in concluding that the ch ir.1996) (stating that a prior U.S. Supreme Court decision did not announce a new rule of constitutional law because it merely engaged in statutory interpretation); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278, 279 (9th Cir.1997) (accord); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1195-96 (4th Cir.1997) (accord); United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 34 . To the extent the concurrence\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive 1: holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision 2: holding that padilla does not announce a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure and listing in footnotes three eases finding that padilla announced a new rule of criminal procedure and seven cases finding that padilla is simply the application of an old rule 3: holding that a prior us supreme court decision did not present a new rule of criminal procedure but merely interpreted a statute 4: holding that the supreme courts decision in jones v united states 529 us 848 120 sct 1904 146 led2d 902 2000 did not effect a material change in the law but only clarified a prior supreme court decision and two ninth circuit opinions consistent with joness holding", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir.1998) (applying Section 388 under Iowa law); Erickson v. Monarch Indus., 216 Neb. 875, 347 N.W.2d 99, 108 (1984) (stating that \u201cwarning of a product\u2019s defects is unnecessary where the supplier of the product has reason to believe that those who will use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive the danger\u201d) (quotation omitted). U t] was under a duty to warn, its failure to do so could not have been the proximate cause of the accident because [the employer] and the plaintiffs decedent [a supervisory employee] were aware of the danger\u201d); Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 300 (8th Cir.1996) (same); Hammond v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 80, 86, 281 N.W.2d 520, 524 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, under Nebraska law, the \u201crule of Holdings: 0: holding that failure to warn of a gas leak could not have been a proximate cause of the accident if the gas company already knew of the leak 1: holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury 2: holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury 3: holding defendants act of disconnecting gas service for nonpayment was not proximate cause of plaintiffs carbon monoxide poisoning 4: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Appellant provides no evidence \u2014 and indeed does not even assert \u2014 that the court\u2019s order was ever given effect. Appellant is not entitled to relief merely on the basis of a trial court order that, although inconsistent with a current rule, led to no improper action or omission. Consistent with Rule 576, decisional law from this Court has clarified Commonwealth policy regarding hybrid representation. No defendant has a right to hybrid representation, either at trial or on appeal. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 534 Pa. 176, 626 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1993); Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (2010) (characterizing as a \u201clegal nullity\u201d a pro se Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement filed by an appellant who was represented by counsel); Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811, 822 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Here, Appellant was represented by Holdings: 0: holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right 1: holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal 2: holding that there is no constitutional right for a represented defendant to act as cocounsel 3: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction 4: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment. At the same time, this is not a case of debtors who ran up debt by consistently living beyond their means. Rather, it appears that they were the victims of a collapsing real estate market that caught them by surprise as they were attempting to move from one house to another that was more suited to their needs. In retrospect, they clearly extended themselves unwisely, but certainly they were not the only home buyers in the 2005 to 2007 time frame who did not foresee the precipitous drop in property values that took even experienced real estate professionals in Northern Virginia by surprise. In any event, poor financial decisions, standing alone, do not equate to abuse. In re Smith, 354 B.R. 787 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 2006) (<HOLDING>). The fall-off in real estate values left the Holdings: 0: holding that thrift savings plan monthly payroll deductions could be included as part of a hypothetical chapter 13 disposable income calculation in determining whether a chapter 7 case could be dismissed as a substantial abuse 1: holding that a debtors ability to make reduced payments under the icrp is relevant to the inquiry of whether the debtors reasonable future financial resources will cover payment of the debt while still allowing a minimal standard of living 2: holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute 3: holding that a chapter 7 debtors duty to file a section 521albv statement of monthly net income can only be fulfilled by filing form b22a 4: holding in prebapcpa case that chapter 7 filing was not a substantial abuse simply because debtors made unwise financial decisions that increased their monthly living expenses", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Due Process Clause because it failed to provide any protection for the parent\u2019s \u201cfundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughter.\u201d Id. at 70, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d at 59. The Court then cited with approval state statutes and court decisions that, unlike the Washington statute, protect that fundamental right. See, e.g., Cal. Fam.Code \u00a7 3104(e) (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation not in child\u2019s best interest if parents agree otherwise); Me.Rev.Stat. Ann., tit. 19A, \u00a7 1803(3) (West 1998) (authorizing visitation if in child\u2019s best interest and does not significantly interfere with parent-child relationship or \u201cparent\u2019s rightful authority over the child\u201d); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D.1999) (<HOLDING>). Summing up, the Court described the Holdings: 0: holding that for a compelling state interest to exist justifying an order of visitation over the objection of a childs parents a court must find an actual harm to the childs health or welfare without such visitation construing virginias statute as requiring such a finding 1: holding visitation statute unconstitutional because it disregards presumption favoring parental decisionmaking forcing parents to prove visitation not in childs best interest 2: holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights 3: holding troxel not controlling where states supreme court previously held rational basis review sufficient based on minimal intrusion of grandparent visitation and other parental protections afforded by visitation statute 4: holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation  award", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "they have elsewhere within the State or Territory: :(! \u2021 !{\u00ab S}! * ifc \u201c(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States . ' . . ; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein. \u201c(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an Indian tribe, 4, 18 L.Ed.2d 643 (1967) (<HOLDING>). See Board of Regents v. New Left Education Holdings: 0: holding local ordinances not state laws within the meaning of the railroad safety act of 1970 45 usc  434 1: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 2: holding that venue for litigation was proper based on 28 usc  1441 regardless of whether defendant was doing business in the district within the meaning of 28 usc  1391 3: holding local ordinances are not state statutes within the meaning of 28 usc  2281 requiring convening of a threejudge district court to enjoin a state statute 4: holding that because no clear implication could be derived from the language of the statute that the state should be bound by the local zoning ordinances the state was not bound", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "19(a), and; (2) if the absent party is necessary and cannot be joined, then the court must decide if \u201cin equity and good conscience\u201d the action should be dismissed because the nonparty is indispensable. Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.1990). (1) In order to determine if the absent party is necessary to the suit; (a) a court must determine if complete relief is possible among those already parties to the suit and; (b) whether the absent party has a legally protected interest in the suit. Id. at 558. This interest must be more than a-financial stake, and more than speculation about a future event. Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1986); See McLaughlin v. International Ass\u2019n of Machinists, 847 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Holdings: 0: holding that determination of the oklahoma and texas common boundary in a prior suit was conclusive in future litigation 1: holding that equitable relief is only appropriate where legal remedies are inadequate 2: holding that speculation about a future event is inadequate interest in a suit 3: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 4: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "hospitals\u2019 records undoubtedly assert that baby Joseph\u2019s condition at the time of discharge was that of \u201cno fever, alert, no distress\u201d, and \u201cgood, stable\u201d. However, plaintiffs\u2019 experts conclude through their opinions after scrutinizing the hospitals\u2019 records that the lack of sufficient documented objective vital signs at the time of discharge from HHM, and the mere reliance on the child\u2019s appearance accompanied by a normal chest x-Ray at the time of discharge from San Pablo is meager evidence of baby Joseph\u2019s stability at time of discharge. The Court must, therefore, leave the issue to be resolved by a jury\u2019s weighing of the hospitals\u2019 documented record against the opinion of plaintiffs\u2019 experts suggesting that the records were insufficient. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (<HOLDING>). Without entering into an opinion one way or Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 1: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 2: holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony 3: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses 4: holding that credibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions not those of a judge", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "no earlier than December 7, 2003. If their claims accrued before that date, then this court is without jurisdiction to hear them. A. Claim Accrual and Statute of Limitations in Overflight Takings Cases A claim against the government under the Tucker Act first accrues \u201cwhen all the events which fix the government\u2019s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.\u201d Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1988) (emphasis in original). In determining whether plaintiffs knew, or should have known, of the requisite factual predicates establishing the government\u2019s alleged liability in this case, the court must apply an objective standard. See Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Because plaintiffs bear the burden of Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue 2: holding that ratification requires full knowledge of all the facts upon which the unauthorized action was taken 3: holding illinois courts have frequently recognized  a cause of action for legal malpractice will rarely accrue prior to the entry of an adverse judgment settlement or dismissal of the underlying action in which plaintiff has become entangled due to the purportedly negligent advice of his attorney 4: recognizing the cause of action", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the entire state over the parochial interests of individual municipalities. 2 . In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Baer appears to translate the common-law maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas into a federal constitutional duty, on the part of local municipalities, to protect property owners from the use of neighboring properties in ways that are undesirable to them. See Concurring Opinion, at 729-31, 734-37, 83 A.3d at 1002-03, 1005-06. The decisions referenced in the concurrence, however, generally concern the boundaries of the police power to establish zoning regulations restricting the ability of landowners to do as they wish with their own properties. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 121, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (<HOLDING>); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 Holdings: 0: holding that a zoning ordinance impinging upon a landowners desired use of his property does not offend substantive due process norms so long as the regulation is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable having no substantial relation to the public health safety morals or general welfare 1: recognizing privilege for adjoining landowners defamatory statements about plaintiff to zoning board given landowners private interest in the protection of her property to advance 2: holding that allegations that the city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and stating in dicta that the decision would be the same even if the city had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith a badfaith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law 3: holding that discretion of zoning board was not sufficiently circumscribed to support substantive due process claim 4: holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "against each other, thereby avoiding \u2018the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Studley v. Boylston Nat\u2019l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528, 33 S.Ct. 806, 57 L.Ed. 1313 (1913) (emphasis added)). In this case, allowing Bechtel to set off its obligation to Shaw against Bechtel\u2019s claim against the Debtor would result in a different absurdity \u2014 essentially, A (Bechtel) would not have to pay B (Shaw) because C (Debtor) owes A. Shaw argues that the phrase \u201cother transactions\u201d in the Offset Provision means other transactions with \u201cSUBCONTRACTOR,\u201d which is now Shaw. Shaw concedes that to the extent there are any sums due by it to Bechtel under any of the Contracts assigned by the Debtor to it, Bechtel may offset those sums against t le\u2019s State Bank, 68 F.2d 110, 111 (4th Cir.1934) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Bechtel asserts that the parties Holdings: 0: holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff 1: holding that because a mortgage provides the security for the repayment of the note the person having standing to foreclose a note secured by a mortgage may be either the holder of the note or a nonholder in possession of the note who has the rights of a holder 2: holding that party that did not establish ownership in specific funds was a general creditor that only had a right to payment 3: holding that contract party could still offset funds placed on deposit by assignor to secure payment of assigned note 4: holding that the debtors deposit of funds was not in the ordinary course of business and was for the purpose of creating a setoff right for the bank", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "spent more time on Mar Oil matters after the New York action was dismissed than he had prior to and during the action is unsupported and seems so improbable that, on the basis of all the evidence, we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake was made. Since the court made no explicit finding of the number of hours Morrissey spent in service of Mar Oil after January 26, 1983, and its implicit finding was clearly erroneous, and since the record provides no clear quantification of those hours, we remand to the district court for a further finding on this question. Second, we have difficulty with the fee award because the court applied its $200/ hour rate to all of the time spent by Morrissey. Application of a judicially calculated reasonable rate .S.2d 285, 288 (1st Dep\u2019t) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1028, 517 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could recover money mistakenly paid in excess of contract price 1: holding defendant that did not present its own claim under chapter 38 could not recover attorneys fees 2: holding that attorneys could not recover fees in excess of amount billed 3: holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "are not under oath and not subject to cross-examination.\u201d United States v. Chong, supra, 104 F. Sup. 2d 1234 n.5. Moreover, it is important to remember that \u201c[t]he imposition of death by public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other penalties . . . .\u201d Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 605. In a capital sentencing proceeding, there is no verdict of \u201cnot guilty\u201d\u2014rather, a capital defendant who is not sentenced to death will receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Therefore, because the potential harm from an erroneous sentencing verdict is far greater for the defendant than it is for the state, the balance of equities requires that any inaccuracies in the capital sentencing process be resolved in favor of the defendant. See State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. 233-34 Holdings: 0: holding that recidivism may support the imposition of a severe penalty 1: holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape 2: holding that the penalty is applicable 3: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty 4: recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as denying to any party the right to trial by jury where there are substantial issues of fact to be determined. A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.\u201d). 21 See OCGA \u00a7 9-3-71 (a) (\u201c[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.\u201d). 22 See OCGA \u00a7 9-11-10 (b) (providing that \u201c[e]ach claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth\u201d). 23 Cf. Deen v. Pounds, 312 Ga. App. 207, 211 (1) (718 SE2d 68) (2011) (<HOLDING>); Goodman v. Satilla Health Servs., 290 Ga. Holdings: 0: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 1: holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence 2: holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action 3: holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does 4: holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe reglan and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence punctuation omitted", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "legal rights of the parties but also took steps toward decreeing a proper remedy. Thus in its January 20, 1998 order, the court resolved the merits of the Hospitals\u2019 claims, and with its April 30, 1998 order, directed the Secretary to calculate the amount of outlier payments due to the Hospitals and to make payment accordingly. This latter order has spawned some confusion about our jurisdiction because of the general rule applicable to civil actions that \u201cwhere assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved,\u201d a district court\u2019s judgment is not \u201c \u2018final\u2019 within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291.\u201d Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976); see also A & S Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234, 238 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). For it is clear that neither of the district Holdings: 0: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court 1: holding an order of default was not final where it resolved only the question of liability and the case was continued for proof on the issue of damages 2: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award 3: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 4: holding that an order establishing liability but referring the issue of damages to arbitration is not final", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it from either the United States, one of the fifty states, or the District of Columbia; all others are 'foreign' corporations\u201d). The United States Supreme Court has also suggested that whether a corporation is foreign or domestic is dependent on its \"charter.\u201d See, e.g., Can. Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537, 3 S.Ct. 363, 27 L.Ed. 1020 (1883) (\"A corporation 'must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty,\u2019 though it may do business in all places where its charter allows * * *. But wherever it goes for business it carries its charter, as that is the law of its existence * * *.\"). We have expressed a similar view on nationality. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohsman & Sons, Co. v. Starkweather, 214 Minn. 232, 237, 7 N.W.2d 747, 749 (1943) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Our conclusion is confirmed by Treas. Holdings: 0: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities 1: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations 2: holding that general laws affecting corporations form essential parts of the charters of the corporations as though copied into them 3: recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege 4: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "without inference or presumption.\u201d Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass\u2019n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). For example, we have held that a job interviewer\u2019s statement that the plaintiffs age caused him concern was not direct evidence of discrimination in the employer\u2019s decision not to hire the plaintiff. Haas v. ADVO Sys., Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir.1999). Although the interviewer\u2019s remarks were neither vague nor remote in time \u2014 and despite a reasonable inference that the interviewer had influenced the employer\u2019s hiring preferences \u2014 we nevertheless noted that an additional inference was required before we could conclude that the decisionmaker himself chose not to hire the plaintiff based on age discrimination. Id. at 734; cf. Fierros, 274 F.3d at 195 (<HOLDING>). In the context of TxDOT\u2019s motion for summary Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim 1: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 2: holding that a decisionmakers own statement  that the plaintiff would not receive a pay increase because she engaged in protected activity  is direct evidence of discrimination 3: holding that a plaintiffs retaliation claim is cognizable even in the absence of protected activity as long as his employer perceived him to be engaged in such activity 4: recognizing that plaintiff undoubtedly engaged in a protected activity when he contacted the eeoc alleging discrimination", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "definition that is applicable in all settings' Thus, 'the meaning of [cohabitation] depends upon the con text in which it is used.' '' Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, \u00b6 7, 107 P.3d 693 (second alteration in original) (quoting Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985)). The jury instructions employed the definition of eohabitant found in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, informing the jury that Watkins was a cohbabitant of Father if either he was \"related by blood or marriage to [Father]\" or he \"resides or has resided in the same residence as [Father].\" See Utah Code Aun. \u00a7 78B-7-102(2) (2008). However, that definition is limited to the provisions of the Cohabitant Abuse Act and is not necessarily applicable in other contexts. See Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868-69 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). \\ 13 The definition found in the Cohabitant Holdings: 0: holding that threat as used in the coercion definition as that definition is incorporated into section 3605s witnesstampering prohibition was not unconstitutionally vague because nature of threat was informed by the harms enumerated in the definition in that case hatred contempt and ridicule 1: holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract 2: holding that the cohabitant abuse acts definition of cohabitant did not abrogate the definition of cohabitant developed by case law in the context of alimony termination 3: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 4: holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "breadth of the consent decree as follows: [By THE COURT:] Well, I've reviewed the matter and the case started out as a residence case, and I know that the consent decree has some additional broad language in it. But it started out as a residence case. And now under the mantle, let us say, of a contempt proceeding, it has shifted ground, and it's becoming a testing and selection case. App. I at 5. Even if the case did initially center on the residency requirement, the proper focus must be on the language contained within the consent decree itself. A judicially approved consent decree, like a settlement agreement, is essentially a contract for purposes of construction. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3078, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (<HOLDING>); Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding in a challenge to a zoning deci sion that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to others who received different treatment for different reasons 1: holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union 2: holding that the plaintiffs had relied on illinois law because they could have filed in a different forum having a different statute of limitations 3: recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended 4: recognizing that consent decrees have a dual character that of contract and that of judicial decree subjecting them to different treatment for different purposes", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cprima facie, classifiable under two or more headings\u201d (ie., heading 9405 and heading 7013), the merchandise would nevertheless be properly classified under heading 9405, pursuant to GRI 3(a) \u2014 the rule of \u201crelative specificity.\u201d As outlined above, GRI 3(a) requires that\u2014 where merchandise is prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings \u2014 \u201c[t]he heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description.\u201d See GRI 3(a). As the Explanatory Notes emphasize, only if merchandise cannot be classified pursuant to GRI 3(a) does GRI 3(b) come into play. See Explanatory Note GRI 3(b)(VI) (stating that GRI 3(b) \u201capplies only if Rule 3(a) fails\u201d); Bauer Nike Hockey USA, Inc. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1246, 1252 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). It is clear beyond cavil that heading 9405, Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis it is the ability to process data that gives the essential character to articles under a tariff provision covering automatic data processing machines and units thereof 1: holding dismissal proper where complaint fails to allege an essential element of plaintiffs claim 2: holding that for purposes of gri 2a essential character analysis incomplete merchandise as imported does not have the essential character of the complete or finished article  the ability to strain salt from water and thus cannot be classified as straining cloth 3: holding that where the gri 3a rule of relative specificity adequately resolved proper classification of merchandise customs erred in reaching gri 3b essential character analysis 4: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "even if we were to accept Kovler's contention that he backed up his vehicle before taking the photographs, Kovler admitted that \"the rear of his vehicle [was] no more than a foot beyond the pole\u201d (marking the beginning of the stopping prohibited zone) as originally parked. (O.R. at 52.) 12 . Kovler also appears to argue that the trial court should not have considered this matter as an appeal. Rather, Kovler contends that the trial court should have required the City to file a civil complaint under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to allow the matter to be fully litigated. Kovler envisions a process involving discovery and a full civil trial; however, Kovler offers no legal support for such a contention. See Boniella v. Com., 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n. 8 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (<HOLDING>), appeal denied sub nom. In re Handgun, 600 Pa. Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court is not required to review an appellants point relied on which appears without citation of applicable or relevant authority 1: holding issue spotting without legal citation precludes appellate review 2: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 3: holding the appellants failure to raise a particular issue in its directed verdict motion precludes appellate review of that issue 4: holding that lack of objection at trial precludes appellate review of allegedly misused evidence", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the Model Act, especially when the General Assembly would have been fully aware of the Model Act\u2019s commentary when enacting our Business Corporation Act. This interpretation is also consistent with opinions of this Court in analogous situations. See Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 103 N.C. App. 479, 482, 405 S.E.2d 794, 796 (\u201cJeanne Lowder\u2019s claims arise from and depend on the role of her husband as officer of the corporation. To regard her claims otherwise would be to enable officers of a corporation to defraud their companies and avoid any accounting or detection by acting through their spouses and then allowing a spouse to assert claims.\u201d), disc. review denied, 330 N.C. 119, 409 S.E.2d 595 (1991); cf. City of Asheville v. Morris, 133 N.C. App. 90, 92, 514 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is no need, in this case, to Holdings: 0: holding that civil service board members had interests in the matter and should have recused themselves when one member had a husband and another a son who would be affected by the boards decision 1: holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school boards president constituted the decision of the board 2: holding that the boards finding that a matter was not before it because a substantive appeal had not been filed was error and determining that because a timely nod had been submitted and the ro never responded by issuing an soc as required by law and regulation the proper remedy was to vacate the board decision as to the matter and remand to the board for appropriate procedural compliance specifically the issuance of an soc 3: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings 4: holding that because pennsylvania law limited a state courts review of a zoning boards decision to the issue whether the boards determinations were supported by substantial evidence the rookerfeldman doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing a federal action claiming that the zoning board had engaged in disability discrimination following a state courts review of the boards determinations", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "MedtroMc first argues that res judi-cata requires KulinsM to plead all bases for jurisdiction in his original pleading. TMs argument is inconsistent with our precedent. In McCarney v. Ford Motor Co., 657 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.1981), we held that a dismissal based on subject matter jurisdiction: should preclude relitigation of the same [jurisdiction] issue but not a second smt on the same claim even if arising out of the identical set of facts_ [W]here the second suit presents new theories of relief, admittedly based upon the same operative facts as alleged m the first action, it is not precluded because the first decision was not on the merits of the substantive claim. Id. at 233-34 (citations omitted); cf. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411 (8th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Ku-linsM based his first action on federal Holdings: 0: holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action 1: holding that where no member of present plaintiff class had cause of action at time prior judgment was entered claim cannot be barred by res judicata 2: recognizing the express reservation of the plaintiffs right to maintain a second action as an exception to the doctrine of res judicata 3: holding that the plaintiffs due process claims were completely barred by res judicata because the underlying factual predicate for each of these claims  is substantially identical to the allegations presented in state court 4: holding that when claims regarding the employment relationship arise after the plaintiffs first case is initiated the second case is not barred by res judicata", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "denying their motions for a new trial and an evi-dentiary hearing on the basis of alleged juror misconduct and extrinsic influence on jurors. According to William and Chantal, since their motions demonstrate a color-able showing of extrinsic influence, the court erred by not conducting an eviden-tiary hearing on their motions. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. The only evidence offered by William and Chantal in support of their motions for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing consisted of the Porter and the Roberts Affidavits. With respect to the Porter Affidavit, all but two of the statements contained therein are excluded by Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) because they involve th\u00e9 jury\u2019s deliberative process and the mental impressions of juror Hart. The two statem (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion Holdings: 0: holding that allegations of influence by an unnamed person outside the jury required the holding of an evidentiary hearing to determine extrinsic influence 1: recognizing that trial court is obligated to conduct evidentiary hearing only when defendant makes a colorable showing of extrinsic influence  2: holding that it was not error for trial court to decline to conduct full evidentiary hearing before trial on outrageous government conduct claim 3: holding that the trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing when the dispute could be resolved as a matter of law 4: holding that where partys allegations raise a colorable entitlement to relief pursuant to rule 1540b3 a formal evidentiary hearing is required", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from hourly ongoing client matters relates to bankruptcy law in the following way. Under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 548, a bankruptcy trustee has the power to avoid any fraudulent transfer of an interest of the debtor in property within a specified period before the bankruptcy. A transfer will be fraudulent if it was done with intent to \u201chinder, delay, or defraud\u201d creditors, \u00a7 548(a)(1)(A), or if it meets certain criteria for a constructive fraudulent transfer, \u00a7 548(a)(1)(B). For purposes of bankruptcy law, debtors have an interest in any property that would have been part of the bankruptcy estate if not for the transfer. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58, 110 S.Ct. 2258, 110 L.Ed.2d 46 (1990). Certain subsequent transferees of the debtor\u2019s property can also be 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (<HOLDING>). The answers provided will help clarify the Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case 1: holding in the conflict of laws context that district courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the forum state 2: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 3: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law 4: holding that a federal court sitting in diversity is bound to follow the law of the forum state", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "policy on the basis of speculation that the l 66 (1999) (finding electronic monitoring does not place a defendant \u201cin custody\u201d within meaning of sentencing credit statute); State v. Climer, 127 Idaho 20, 896 P.2d 346, 350 (Idaho Ct.App.1995) (concluding \u201chouse arrest\u201d through electronic monitoring is not \u201cincarceration\u201d); State v. Muratella, 240 Neb. 567, 483 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (1992) (\u201cBeing confined to one\u2019s home, subject to electronic monitoring, with the freedom to engage in employment and probation-related activities, is far less onerous than being imprisoned.\u201d); State v. Faulkner, 102 Ohio App.3d 602, 657 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1995) (finding pretrial electronic home monitoring does not entitle defendant to sentencing credit); Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 874 A.2d 12, 20 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Tagorda v. State, 977 S.W.2d 632, 633-34 Holdings: 0: holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail 1: holding the legislatures approval of granting a defendant credit against his sentence in a statute governing postsentence 17electronic monitoring by the department of correction but omission of that approval in a separate statute relating to pretrial electronic monitoring is evidence that the legislature did not intend for credit to be given for electronic monitoring while a defendant is awaiting trial 2: holding that due process clause does not require a federal prisoner to receive credit for time spent on supervised release if release is revoked 3: holding as a matter of law pretrial electronic monitoring and home confinement merits sentencing credit under its statute 4: holding time spent on electronic monitoring while on bail release does not constitute custody within meaning of sentencing credit statute", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Constitution or federal law, it should \u201cafford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise ... its own plan.\u201d Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). This case presents an exceptional circumstance, however: the General Assembly enacted the 2016 Plan after another panel of this Court invalidated the 2011 Plan as a racial gerrymander. Harris, 159 F.Supp.3d at 627. When a court finds a remedial districting plan also violates the Constitution, courts generally do not afford a legislature a second \u201cbite-at-the-apple\u201d to enact a constitutionally compliant plan. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362 Holdings: 0: holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error 1: holding that if the defendant fails to file a motion in the trial court to withdraw his plea he cannot attack it for the first time on appeal 2: holding that if a state fails to enact a constitutionally acceptable remedial districting plan the responsibility falls on the district court 3: holding that plain error review applies when a party fails to raise a claim before the district court 4: holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "differs not at all from the speculation in Hughes Properties that a jackpot might never be paid by a casino. As we observed in Hughes Properties, the potential of nonpayment of a liability always exists, and it alone does not prevent accrual. The beneficiary of a liability always has the option of waiving payment, but a taxpayer is still unquestionably entitled to deduct the liability. An injured employee entitled absolutely to reimbursement for medical services under a workers\u2019 compensation statute, for example, may fail to utilize the medical services. The employer, however, has been held to be entitled to deduct the expected medical expenses because the workers\u2019 compensation law creates liability. See Wien Consolidated Airlines, Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F. 2d 735 (CA9 1976) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, any business liability could Holdings: 0: holding that accrual basis taxpayer may deduct expected workers compensation payments in year of injury even though injured workers may not utilize medical benefits 1: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 2: recognizing that a federal court may not review a challenge to a benefits determination of the office of workers compensation programs in the department of labor 3: holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments 4: holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that summary judgment in its favor meant that the School District was not negligent, it does not follow that Edison Learning was negligent. For example, both Edison Learning and the School District may have fully complied with their duties and the assault may have been the sole fault of Viruet\u2019s attacker. Indeed, if dismissing the School \u25a0 District was sufficient to establish Edison\u2019s negligence, Viruet himself could have asserted collateral estoppel against Edison at trial. Nor does the fact of settlement between Edison Learning and Viruet es tablish Edison Learning\u2019s negligence. Settlements are not final adjudications for the purposes of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Eighth N.-Val, Inc. v. William L. Parkinson, D.D.S., P.C., Pension Trust, 778 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001) (<HOLDING>); Lawlor v. Nat\u2019l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute 1: holding a compromise to settle the dispute meant there was therefore no actual litigation 2: holding that because there was no factual dispute between the parties the presumption of correctness is not relevant 3: holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required if there are no factual issues in dispute 4: holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "awards arising from LCAs than from reviews of CBA determinations. In Cooper Natural Resources, the arbitrator ignored the LCA, relying solely on the CBA. The court in that case was not faced with an issue like that in the present case, where the arbitrator interpreted a provision of the LCA and a party challenged the arbitrator\u2019s interpretation. Thus, Cooper Natural Resources does not support Continental\u2019s position that a more searching review of an arbitrator\u2019s interpretation of an LCA is mandated. Second, none of the authorities relied upon by the court in Cooper Natural Resources support a \u201cno deference\u201d standard of review for awards arising from LCAs. In Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc. v. Local Union No. 1, Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers\u2019 Int\u2019l Union, 832 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>), the court applied the same standard of review Holdings: 0: holding that a court reviewing an arbitrators award in an act 111 grievance arbitration involves questions regarding 1 the jurisdiction of the arbitrator 2 the regularity of the proceedings 3 an excess of the arbitrators powers and 4 deprivation of constitutional rights 1: holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated 2: recognizing that prevailing party has remedies available at common law to enforce arbitrators award 3: holding that arbitrators award will be vacated if    mistaken as to applicable law 4: holding that arbitrators award of temporary interim equitable relief can be confirmed", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(1941) (internal citations omitted). \u201cThe parties agree that the plaintiffs are citizens of North Carolina and defendants Whitehead and Aden are citizens of Virginia. The parties also agree that TRI was incorporated in Virginia and TRINC was incorporated in North Carolina.\u201d (Appellant\u2019s Br. at 11-12.) For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, \u201ca corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.\u201d 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1332(c)(1). The district court held that TRINC\u2019s North Carolina citizenship did not destroy complete diversity because TRINC was a \u201csham\u201d defendant under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921) (<HOLDING>). As Hugger and Settle \u201cacknowledge that there Holdings: 0: holding that the right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with the controversy 1: holding the connection is an element 2: holding that the basis for joinder of crimes must be alleged in the charging instrument by alleging the basis for joinder in the language of the joinder statute or by alleging facts sufficient to establish compliance with the joinder statute 3: holding that trespass requires only proof of interference with right of possession of real property 4: holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "X-Rite thus acted upon a questionable interpretation of Michigan law without first having ascertained whether representation by Vandeveer Garzia would involve a substantial likelihood of prejudice to its interests. X-Rite, 748 F.Supp. at 1228 (footnote omitted); see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d at 621-22. As in X-Rite, the defendants in this case proceeded under the same questionable interpretation of South Carolina law. The insurance companies, in contrast, adhered to settled principles under South Carolina law regarding their right and duty to defend by providing counsel (i.e., Robert McKenzie) to represent the defendants for all claims filed against them, despite the reservation of rights. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 259 S.C. 586, 193 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1972)(<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Best, 728 F.Supp. 1263, Holdings: 0: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 1: holding that insurance company operating under a reservation of rights had the right and the duty to control the defense until such time as it was determined that it had no liability insurance coverage 2: holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims 3: holding that insurance providers would be allocated defense costs according to the period of time they provided coverage and the insured would be allocated defense costs according to the period of time it had no insurance coverage 4: holding the insurance company discharged its fiduciary duty when it established the retained asset account in accordance with the insurance policy", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of constitutional violations in immigration proceedings, see Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001), and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. We lack jurisdiction to consider Vega Sanchez\u2019s challenge to the IJ\u2019s discretionary determination that he failed to demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.2002). Vega Sanchez contends the IJ violated his due process rights by using a boilerplate decision. The IJ\u2019s decision indicates she gave Vega Sanchez\u2019s application the required individual determination. Cf. Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1050-52 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The IJ set forth the facts as testified to by Holdings: 0: holding an ijs boilerplate demeanor findings failed to provide an adequate basis for this court to conduct its review 1: holding the trial court must make findings adequate to support a closure 2: holding that substantive review is adequate 3: holding that this court was unable to reach alleged errors where pro se appellant did not provide an adequate record 4: holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from that before the court in 1997. In essence, the argument is that a change in factual circumstances after the prior determination bars the application of collateral estoppel here. 2. Changed Circumstances Courts appear to waiver in considering whether \u201cchanged circumstances\u201d vitiates the application of the \u201cidentical issue\u201d element of collateral estoppel, or whether it presents an equitable exception to the application of collateral estoppel, even if the \u201cissue\u201d to be determined is the same. Compare Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Fed. Appx. 180, 184 (3d Cir.2010) (using \u201cidentity of issues\u201d terminology) and Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 477 (3d Cir.1997) (same) with Leventry v. Price, 319 F.Supp.2d 562, 568 (W.D.Pa.2004) (<HOLDING>) and Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia, Holdings: 0: holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims 1: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 2: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award 3: holding collateral estoppel elements met considering changed circumstances in the context of an exception to the general rule of collateral estoppel 4: holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "170 Colo. 465, 468 P.2d 305 (1969). Thus, even assuming Jenkins intended to include legally adopted children when he referred to his daughters\u2019 children in his 1944 will, he could not have intended to include equitably adopted children. The probate court found that Jenkins\u2019 use of the terms \u201cchildren, her lawful issue\u201d and \u201cchild or children\u201d in his will created latent ambiguity and the court thus resorted to extrinsic evidence to determine whether Jenkins intended to include adopted children as beneficiaries of his testamentary trust. Where evidence extrinsic to the will is considered, our standard of review is whether the probate court\u2019s decision was clearly erroneous or completely unsupported by the evidence. See, e.g., M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Colo.1994) (<HOLDING>); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Holdings: 0: holding that appellate court in affirming trial courts decision may rely in part on a ground not presented to trial court 1: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court 2: holding in a case considering whether the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing sua sponte that an appellate court may only consider those facts which were before the court when the trial commenced 3: holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records 4: holding that only when facts are presented to the trial court by uncontested documentary evidence may an appellate court draw its own conclusions", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Moreover, although the Burberry Check mark does not include an equestrian knight, it is undisputed that Burberry has obtained trademark protection for an equestrian knight mark, and that it often sells handbags and other goods displaying a combination of the two marks. It is also undisputed that Appellants used their mark on handbags \u2014 the same category of goods on which Burberry used its marks. The district court was therefore correct to afford the jury the opportunity to view the government\u2019s evidence and form an independent conclusion regarding whether Appellants\u2019 plaid design was substantially indistinguishable from the Burberry Check mark and whether the inclusion of the equestrian knight figure made any difference. See United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 629 n. 4 (5th Cir.2006)(<HOLDING>). And this evidence was sufficient to support Holdings: 0: holding that when determining prejudice under the objective test relevant considerations include 1 whether the extrinsic evidence was received by the jury and the manner in which it was received 2 whether it was available to the jury for a lengthy period of time 3 whether it was discussed and considered extensively by the jury 4 whether it was introduced before a jury verdict was reached and if so at what point during the deliberations and 5 whether it was reasonably likely to affect the verdict considering the strength of the governments case and whether the governments case outweighed any possible prejudice caused by the extrinsic evidence 1: holding that it was for the jury to determine whether a battery that used the signature duracell copper top and black body was a counterfeit even though the text on the counterfeit battery read dinacell 2: holding that the trial court must determine whether there was ever an agreement when the party resisting arbitration alleged that its signature was a forgery 3: holding that the jury must determine whether the partys conduct was reasonable under the cireumstances 4: holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "provide \u201cbare facts\u201d instead of demonstrating that an offender\u2019s guilty plea was based on that conduct. Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 888 (9th Cir.2003). It therefore appears that this Court cannot consider Plaintiffs admission in his Amended Complaint and deposition that he was married to Colette Fisher at the time of the 1997 incident under the modified categorical approach. Hayes indicates, however, that it is unnecessary to examine the elements of the predicate offense when analyzing whether that offense was \u201ccommitted by a person who has a specified domestic relationship with the victim.\u201d Rather, courts may look at the facts underlying the conviction to determine whether the \u201cdomestic relationship\u201d requirement is satisfied. See Hayes, 555 U.S. at 421, 129 S.Ct. 1079 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Under Hayes, the question of Holdings: 0: holding that a domestic relationship must exist as part of the facts giving rise to the predicate offense but it need not be an element of the prior offense 1: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 2: holding that it suffices that a prior conviction   was in fact for an offense  committed by the defendant against a spouse or other domestic victim 3: holding that argument regarding victim of prior offense was improper 4: holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "schemes. See State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 14 P.3d 997 (2000), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 386, 151 L.Ed.2d 294 (2001) (the Arizona Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Walton in denying a claim that the Arizona death penalty law was unconstitutional because it eliminated jury consideration in the sentencing process); People v. Anderson, 25 Cal.4th 543, 601, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, 386 (2001) (the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the California death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not require \u201c(3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d); Weeks v. State, 761 A.2d 804 (Del.2000) (<HOLDING>); Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 536-37 Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively 1: holding that apprendi does not apply to capital sentencing schemes 2: holding apprendi does not apply to consecutive sentencing 3: holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review 4: holding that apprendi does not apply to state capital sentencing schemes where judges are required to find certain aggravating circumstances before imposing a death sentence", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201cimmunity questions should be resolved as early as possible.\u201d The State, in its answer, concedes that, although \u00a7 13A-3-23 creates an immunity defense, Watters is unable to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief because, it says, the Code section includes no procedure requiring a pretrial hearing. Thus, according to the State, the trial court\u2019s order stating its intent to consider Watters\u2019s immunity defense \u201cin due course\u201d is sufficient and Watters\u2019s petition is due to be denied. We cannot agree. Both the State and Watters acknowledge in their pleadings to this Court that the Court of Criminal Appeals, subsequent to the issuance of its order in this case, has issued opinions relevant to the issue before us. See Malone v. State, 203 So.3d 126, 131 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (<HOLDING>); Harrison v. State, 203 So.3d 126, 131 (Ala. Holdings: 0: holding that where use of reasonable nondeadly force causes death defendant entitled to instruction on selfdefense 1: holding that the defendant was entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing on his claim of immunity based on selfdefense 2: holding an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of equitable estoppel 3: holding that petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section 2254e2 on whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a fitness hearing 4: holding that defendant may be entitled to selfdefense instruction even though he did not testify", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964); Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 102 S.Ct. 119, 70 L.Ed.2d 102 (1981); cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 910 F.2d 964, 966-68 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc) (emphasizing the extreme deference due agency remedial decisions). Even remedial decisions must, however, follow announced policies and procedures. United Food & Commercial Workers Int\u2019l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C.Cir.1988). The Local correctly points out that, in accordance with the American Rule, attorney\u2019s fees generally are not awarded in Board proceedings. Summit Valley Indus. Inc. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 456 U.S. 717, 721-23, 102 S.Ct. 2112, 2114-15, 72 L.Ed.2d 511 (1982) (<HOLDING>). It contends that attorney\u2019s fees would be Holdings: 0: holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board 1: holding that former employees state law claim of fraud brought against his former employer was preempted by labor management relations act 2: holding that labor management relations act  303 which authorizes recovery of damages for employers injured by an unfair labor practice does not provide authorization for awarding attorneys fees for board proceedings 3: holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act 4: holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the rules and regulations for determining fitness of locomotives. Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 612, 47 S.Ct. 207, 209, 71 L.Ed. 432, 438-39 (1926). This, therefore, excludes state regulation of safety appliances, parts and appurtenances of locomotives. Id. at 613, 47 S.Ct. 207. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that in passing FLIA, Congress intended the Act to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment. Id. at 611, 47 S.Ct. 207. \u00b6 74. While it is clear that FLIA preempts any state regulation of locomotive design, a majority of courts have also found that FLIA preempts common law actions against locomotive operators and locomotive manufacturers. See, e.g., In re W. Va. Asbestos Litigation, 215 W.Va. 39, 592 S.E.2d 818, 822 (2003) (<HOLDING>); General Motors Corp. v. Kilgore, 853 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted 1: holding that in a personal injury action against a railroad a report containing the conclusions of a hearing examiner of the public utilities commission regarding an alleged hazardous railroad crossing was obvious hearsay 2: holding breachofcontract claim was preempted 3: holding asbestos claim against railroad preempted by the flia 4: holding employees negligence claim against his employer was preempted by the lmra", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. California, addressed this issue directly and found that the compelled administration of a blood test falls within the reach and protections of the Fourth Amendment. 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Any forced extraction of blood, therefore, invades one\u2019s expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, and its reasonableness must be adjudged under a Fourth Amendment analysis. In addition, when blood is extracted and analyzed to reveal information derived from one\u2019s DNA, a second intrusion into one\u2019s expectation of privacy occurs. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In Skinner, the Supreme Court held that the Holdings: 0: holding that a warrant to obtain a blood sample was valid despite a reference to a urine sample in the addendum to the affidavit because the minor inconsistency did not seriously undermine the information underlying the probable cause determination 1: holding that a physician employed by the government who drew a blood sample from the defendant for medical not investigatory purposes did not conduct a search under the fourth amendment 2: holding that a test of a urine sample implicates the fourth amendment 3: recognizing problems with generalizing from an extremely limited sample when a broader sample  can be readily obtained and when no showing of the representativeness of the sample is made 4: holding blood sample does not constitute compelled testimony", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "fat from a fee application.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933; N.Y. Ass\u2019n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir.1983)); see also Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994) (\u201cWe do not require that .the court set forth item-by-item findings concerning what may be countless objections to individual billing items.\u201d). Barbu, 2015 WL 778325, at *5. In addition to eliminating unnecessary hours, courts may -reduce the number of hours when presented with time entries that are lack sufficient specificity to permit reasoned review. Id.; see also Annuity, Pension, Welfare & Training Funds of Int\u2019l Union of Operating Engineers Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. Integrated Structures Corp., 2013 WL 4095651, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013) (<HOLDING>). \u25a0 Counsel claims that it expended a total of Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases 1: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that courts must apply acrosstheboard reductions for vague entries 3: holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient 4: holding vague allegations of bias insufficient", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "concealment and notes the Court has said that fraudulent concealment in health care liability claims estops a health-care provider from relying on limitations to bar a plaintiffs claim. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex.2001); see also Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908-09 (Tex.1983). Thus, he notes, we have recognized exceptions to section 74.251\u2019s two-year statute of limitations in limited circumstances even though several of our decisions have characterized the two-year statute of limitations as \u201cabsolute.\u201d See Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.1997) (\u201cWe have repeatedly held that section 10.01 [74.251\u2019s predecessor] establishes an absolute two-year statute of limitation for health care liability claims....\u201d); Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also In re USAA, 307 S.W.3d 299, 310-11 Holdings: 0: holding that under such unique circumstances the five 5 year statute of limitations controls 1: holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute 2: holding that materiality necessary element of section 1001 3: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one 4: holding that when a statute and a guideline conflict the statute controls", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "were executed. The record therefore contains no evidence establishing what the original parties to the transaction anticipated at contract inception concerning QDS\u2019s \u201ccost of performing under the [L]ease [A]greement[s] if the option is not exercised.\u201d UCC \u00a7 1-201(37)(x) (West 2002). Without this evidence, the Court is unable to make the statutory calculation required under New \u00a7 l-201(37)\u2019s Option Price/Performance Cost Test. See APB Online, 259 B.R. at 819-20 (declining to consider affidavit testimony because affiant did not \u201cparticipate[] in the lease transactions or the computation of the option prices\u201d and holding that the \u201crecord is insufficient to permit [the court] to conclude ... that the ... option price was or was not nominal\u201d); Edison Bros. Stores, 207 B.R. at 811-12 (<HOLDING>); Zaleha, 159 B.R. at 585-86 (\u201cDebtor\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor in possession could utilize the strongarm powers of the trustee to avoid an unperfected security interest even though the debtor knew of the interest prior to bankruptcy because the two are distinct entities and the debtor in possessions responsibility is to preserve the estates assets for the benefit of the creditors 1: holding that motor vehicle to be retained by chapter 13 debtor should be valued at the price the debtor could get for it in a free and open market ie its fair market value 2: holding that debtor failed to meet its burden of proving lease should be recharacterized as a disguised security agreement because the record before the court provides no credible evidence as to the projected fair market of the leased equipment on the dates the debtor will be entitled to exercise the purchase options 3: holding that court cannot make a finding of nominality without some concrete information regarding the anticipated fair market value of the leased equipment at the time the purchase option is to be exercised emphasis added 4: holding that since motor vehicle contract between the debtor and fifth third bank was a lease and not a security agreement the debtor was required to treat fifth third banks claim in his chapter 13 plan as a lease and not as a secured debt which meant that the debtor could not obligate fifth third bank to finance the purchase of his vehicle", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to avoid punishment for running away \u2014 did amount to an \u201call or nothing\u201d defense. Accordingly, Pepe-Frazier has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. (c) Failure to object to the sentence for aggravated child molestation. Pepe-Frazier contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge his sentence for aggravated child molestation (652 SE2d 501) (2007) (finding a \u201crare case\u201d of gross disproportionality in holding that 10-year sentence for commission of consensual oral sex between 17-year-old defendant and 15-year-old victim constituted cruel and unusual punishment, given General Assembly\u2019s recent sweeping change in the punishment for consensual teenage oral sex). 42 See Jones, 290 Ga. at 676 (3) (<HOLDING>). 43 OCGA \u00a7 17-10-2 (a) (2). 44 See Blue v. Holdings: 0: holding that the failure of defense counsel to object to erroneous punishment charge authorizing an illegal sentence is ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved 2: holding that there was no ineffective assistance due to appellate counsels failure to challenge the trial courts denial of the motion to change venue because the defendant failed to show actual prejudice 3: holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law 4: holding that defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel by counsels failure to challenge sentence as equating to cruel and unusual punishment", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "sold two copies of the video to residents of Puerto Rico through the mail, and 2) Defendant sold 20 subscriptions to its magazine in Puerto Rico, in which they advertised the sale of the video. Defendant argues that LNE\u2019s sale of two videos in Puerto Rico \u2014 one of which was purchased by Plaintiff An\u00edbal Agos-to \u2014 cannot logically be considered the legal or \u201cproximate\u201d cause of Plaintiffs\u2019 alleged injuries since they were not a substantial factor in the sequence of events that led to the claimed injury. See Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir.2001) (defendant\u2019s actions will be considered the \u201cproximate cause\u201d of the alleged harm only if it was \u201ca substantial factor in bringing about the harm.\u201d); Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 371, 378 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). As alleged in the Complaint, the overwhelming Holdings: 0: holding that television station was not subject to personal jurisdiction in  new york under that states longarm statute since libel claim did not arise from defendants delivery of mail orders to new york 1: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 2: holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action 3: holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york 4: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the United States Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Winstar). For these reasons, the Government\u2019s November 17, 2003 Motion for Reconsideration concerning the authority of the FSLIC and FHLBB to enter contracts is denied. The second basis for reconsideration concerns the effect of Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, OTS, 967 F.2d 598, 620 (D.C.Cir.1992), a decision that the Government argues bars plaintiffs\u2019 contract claims in this case. See 11/17/03 Gov\u2019t Mot. to Reconsider at 1; see also id. at 6-10. As a threshold matter, the Government waived the defense of collateral estoppel by not asserting it in the September 22, 1999 Answer or raising this issue in any motion or brief prior to seeking reconsideration. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also RCFC 8(c), 12(b). In addition, since Holdings: 0: holding that an affirmative defense is ordinarily lost if not timely raised 1: holding that the exclusivity of workers compensation is an affirmative statutory defense which must be timely raised or it is waived 2: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 3: holding mmpa is an affirmative defense to be raised at trial 4: holding that the statute of limitations in a criminal case is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense that is waived if not raised in the trial court", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "equated to the making of a new contract. Rather, we give effect to the terms of the agreements themselves and conclude that they were executed once, in 1984, and that the original agreements continued to be in force until John Deere attempted to exercise its rights under the 120 notice provision in 2007. See 11 Williston on Cont of one party, John Deere, to terminate the contract without cause on 120 days notice. Applying the Act would effectively extend the dealer agreements indefinitely unless John Deere can meet the terms of the Act\u2019s good cause provision. We conclude that this would substantially impair the contractual relationship between John Deere and Reliable Tractor and would violate the Contracts Clause. See Morgan v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 754 F.2d 145, 147-48 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Garris v. Hanover Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 1001, Holdings: 0: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 1: holding retroactive application 2: holding that a retroactive application of a statute impairing an insurers contractual right to terminate an agent without cause violated the contract clause 3: recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary 4: holding no retroactive application", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "593-94, the mandatory nature of our current rule was clarified in January 2005 when preexisting versions in the Kentucky civil and criminal rules, versions leaving the sequestration of witnesses largely to the trial court\u2019s discretion, were rescinded, and KRE 615 was established as the controlling rule in our courts. Because, under the current rule, a court may decline a party\u2019s request to sequester a particular witness only if one of the rule\u2019s three express exemptions applies, the rule creates a strong presumption in favor of sequestration. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 60 F.3d 128, 135 (2nd Cir. 1995) (discussing the nearly identical federal rule). Moreover, the party opposing the presumption bears the burden of showing that one of the exemptions applies. Hatfield, 250 S.W.3d at 595 (<HOLDING>); Opus 3 Ltd., 91 F.3d at 628 (noting that \u201cthe Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court errs by exempting a witness from sequestration absent the requisite showing 1: holding that evidence of a threat to a witness by the defendant is relevant as showing an attempt to prevent a witness from testifying and avoid punishment for the crime 2: recognizing that  an ordinary witness may decline to answer only after making the requisite showing of the danger of selfincrimination  3: holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness 4: holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court earlier determined that \"Trooper Swets['s] contact with [Haar] was not the product of a traffic stop.\u201d Conclusions of Law \u00b6 3 (emphasis added). 2 . The circuit court also erred in reasoning that a number of cases have concluded that canine sniffs not incident to a traffic stop are subject to the same rules as sniffs conducted incident to a traffic stop. The circuit court\u2019s cited cases all involved canine sniffs that were either incident to a traffic stop or involved parked and unattended cars in public places where the defendant had no expectation of privacy. None of the court's cited cases involved what is alleged here: an investigatory detention of persons or property performed to conduct a canine sniff. See e.g. United States v. Engles, 481 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 551-52 Holdings: 0: holding no fourth amendment violation when police initiated a canine sniff of a trailer attached to a pickup truck that was parked and unattended on a public street 1: holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment 2: holding canine sniff of a vehicle validly stopped for a headlight violation was not unreasonable given that the driver was being issued a ticket at the time a second officer arrived on the scene and ran the drug dog around the vehicle 3: holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment 4: holding dog sniff of a vehicle parked on a public street did not violate the fourth amendment when canine sniff was conducted after the driver was validly stopped and arrested for driving on a suspended license", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and asked for a lawyer based on \u201cher practice\u201d and the notations on the jacket. (Tr. at 141.) This supposition, which does not account for the possibility of clerical mistakes in a busy prosecutor\u2019s office, is in contrast to the specific, uniform recollections of Officers Argila, McCarthy and Fogarty, who each testified in detail about Garcia\u2019s receipt and subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights, and the drafting and ratification of his statement. (Tr. at 33-39, 98-101, 128-29.) As this Court has no reason to doubt the credibility of the three officers in this case, their specific recollections trump ADA Coyne\u2019s bare assumption that the criminal file jacket accurately represents her conversation with Officer Fogarty. See United States v. Martinez, 634 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D.N.Y.1986)(<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Patterson, No. 02 Holdings: 0: holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible 1: recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial 2: holding that in the absence of police coercion a subsequent administration of miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement 3: holding that in absence of a jurat the fact that the statement was sworn to may be shown by other evidence 4: holding that police officers sworn affidavit that miranda warnings were given was held sufficient to deny suppression of defendants postarrest statement in the absence of properlysupported statement by defendant to the contrary", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "receive a downward departure for providing substantial assistance to the government. The sentencing court did just that. It did not consider McFarlane\u2019s extensive drug dealing history in setting his guideline range of 60 to 71 months, but did consider that history in determining whether to grant a downward departure and how much of a departure to grant. The court granted the government\u2019s motion for a downward departure, but limited the extent of the departure based in part on McFarlane\u2019s extensive drug dealing history. Thus, the terms of McFarlane\u2019s cooperation agreement, and correspondingly his constitutional rights, were not violated when he received at least a ten-month downward departure, based partly on testimony he gave at his code-fendants\u2019 trial. See Luloff, 15 F.3d at 766 (<HOLDING>); Nyhuis, 8 F.3d at 742 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit 1: holding trial court improperly granted dismissal on ground of immunity because the defendant had qualified statutory immunity rather than absolute immunity 2: holding that an immunity agreement limited to title 21 drug offenses was not violated when the defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a gun a nondrug offense based on testimony provided pursuant to the immunity agreement 3: holding that in the absence of explicit language to the contrary an informal immunity agreement confers the minimum immunity required by the constitution 4: holding that dismissal pursuant to a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity is with prejudice", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "event, it is apparent that the Debtor believed that there was some urgency to the delivery of the transcripts and her counsel communicated her concerns to Penn\u2019s counsel. 8 .While the parties have stipulated that such a written policy exists, the written policy itself wa S.D.Tex. Apr.27, 2005) (concluding that denial of transcript to chapter 13 debtor because of outstanding student loans was a violation of the automatic stay); Loyola Univ. v. McClarty, 234 B.R. 386 (E.D.La.1999) (university\u2019s act of withholding chapter 13 debtor\u2019s transcript violated automatic stay); In re Scroggins, 209 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1997) (act of parochial school withholding transcript of chapter 13 debtor's minor child violated the automatic stay); In re Carson, 150 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Gustafson, 111 B.R. 282, 288 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded 1: holding that state university violated 11 usc  362 and 525 by withholding debtors transcript where debt was dischargeable 2: holding that college violated stay by not delivering transcript to chapter 7 debtor when debt had not yet been determined dischargeable 3: holding that university violated the automatic stay by withholding chapter 7 debtors transcripts because the debts were not yet determined nondischargeable 4: holding  525 applies only where debt dischargeable", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, and we affirm. At sentencing, the district court applied a two-level increase of the offense level for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2Dl.l(b)(l). Lemar contends the two-level increase was not warranted because there was no evidence indicating he or any of his co-conspirators possessed a firearm during the commission of their offenses. We review for clear error the district court\u2019s finding that the defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a narcotics offense. See United States v. Willis, 899 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.1990). A criminal defendant can be held accountable for a firearm possessed by a co-conspirator, if the possession was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as part of the criminal activity. See id. at 875 (<HOLDING>). Lemar testified at sentencing that during Holdings: 0: holding that prior possession of a firearm is admissible to show knowledge in a prosecution for knowingly possessing a similar weapon 1: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute 2: holding that the enhancement applied where the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with possessing methamphetamine 3: holding that actual knowledge of a coconspirator possessing a firearm qualifies as foreseeability 4: holding plaintiff can prove foreseeability by showing the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the assailants violent nature", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "statement from the defendant that he would have accepted the plea if he were better advised); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir.1991) (requiring some substantiation of petitioner\u2019s claim outside of the petition itself before the claim acquires \u201csufficient credibility to warrant a further investment of judicial resources in determining the truth of the claim.\u201d); Ellzey v. United States, 210 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1051 (C.D.Ill.2002) (citing Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir.1991)) (self-serving affidavit, albeit made under penalty of perjury, is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing without additional objective evidence to support the alleged facts, especially when the government disputes those facts); Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240-41 Holdings: 0: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 1: holding that  1326b is a penalty provision and does not constitute a separate crime 2: holding that a petitioners declaration in support of his claim signed under penalty of perjury does not constitute objective evidence under toro 3: holding that the sentencing guideline governing perjury cases section 2j13 applies to perjury committed in civil as well as criminal proceedings 4: holding that a preprinted probablecause form sent to the magistrate judge which requires a signed statement by the declarant under penalty of perjury that the statements that follow are true satisfies the fourth amendment", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "second day of trial, after AUE had, the City contends, elected its damages remedy by moving for summary judgment on liability on a breach of contract theory. We review questions of law de novo, see L-3 Commc\u2019ns Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 607 F.3d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir.2010), and conclude that the City\u2019s arguments lack merit. First, although summary judgment is generally treated as the procedural equivalent of a trial, see S.J. Capelin Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 341, 357 N.Y.S.2d 478, 313 N.E.2d 776 (1974), AUE\u2019s motion for summary judgment addressed liability alone. Hence, to the extent the motion was the equivalent of a trial for these purposes, it did not address damages or rescission at all. Cf. Reilly v. Natwest Markets Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). AUE cannot be deemed to have elected its Holdings: 0: holding quantum meruit unavailable to remedy invalid contract 1: holding that where plaintiff did not seek to rescind a contract and only sought quantum meruit recovery after a jury had determined an enforceable contract existed plaintiff was limited to recovery under the contract 2: holding supreme court had jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of evidence in subcontractors action against project owner seeking recovery under equitable doctrine of quantum meruit rather than recovery based on contract 3: holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action 4: holding that a discharged firms recovery is limited to quantum meruit", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "reduction and determining his criminal history category of III, together with a total offense level of 25, resulted in a Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months. It also noted his seventy-month sentence, together with the consecutive firearm sentence of sixty months, resulted in a total sentence of 130 months. Two years later, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which reduced the statutory mandatory minimum sentencing penalties for crack cocaine by significantly reducing the prior crack/powder ratio but which did not apply retroactively to defendants previously sentenced under the prior existing mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. See Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Aug. 3, 2010). See also United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1790, 179 Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute 1: holding statutory reduction in mandatory minimum penalty based on new ratio is not retroactive 2: holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory 3: holding that the act is not retroactive 4: holding that the act is retroactive", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "consent to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion.\" Wood, 106 F.3d at 946; see United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir.1999). Haley's conduct in relue-tantly agreeing to a search of the luggage and refusing to consent to a search of the car is not a cireumstance supporting reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir.1998)(\"Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine. These legal principles would be considerably less effective if citizens' insistence that searches and seizures be conducted in conformity with constitutional norms could create the suspicion or cause that renders their consent unnecessary.\"); Karnes, 62 F.3d at 495 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion 1: holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion 2: holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home 3: holding the drivers refusal to consent to search of automobile did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that vehicle contained narcotics 4: holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "We certify direct conflict with Richardson v. Holdings: 0: holding that probation is not a sentence 1: holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed 2: holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken 3: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence 4: holding that probation is a sentence for habitualization purposes", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "896 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.1990). The Third Circuit has held that a defendant\u2019s offer of proof which contains only a conclusory statement alleging falsity does not satisfy the \u201coffer of proof\u2019 requirement of Franks. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1328 (3d Cir.1993). Further, the Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Kunze, 806 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.1986), similarly held that a Franks hearing is not mandated where the record is devoid of a sworn statement supporting the defendant\u2019s allegations of falsity. Id. at 599. The Tenth Circuit has stated that a defendant\u2019s allegations of falsity alone do not meet the preliminary burden placed on the defendant under Franks. United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1533 (10th Cir.1990). The Ninth Circuit has even held that the productio Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Zambrano, 841 F.2d 1320, Holdings: 0: holding that the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs deposition testimony was so contradictory of the statements contained in plaintiffs affidavit as to foreclose the affidavits use for summary judgment purposes 1: holding that the defendants offer of the affiants sworn testimony to establish falsity of the warrant affidavit did not amount to a substantial preliminary showing of falsity under franks 2: holding that the government cannot rely upon affidavits not attached to the warrant itself to satisfy the particularity requirement 3: holding that because the information omitted from the affidavit was immaterial to the investigation there was no error in denying defendants motion for a franks hearing 4: holding that the defendants allegations that the warrant affidavit contained falsified information did not satisfy franks even though the defendants offer of proof consisted of twentynine 29 affidavits", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "7 .We also note that the burden on the government was not insignificant. Kennedy was seeking $18,000 merely to enable Arthur Anderson to assess how much money it then would need to conduct the audit that Kennedy requested. R.O.A. Supp.Vol. 14 (order of 5/4/93 at 5). 8 . In this regard, we distinguish the cases in which the denial of an expert psychiatrist was deemed a due process violation. Those cases recognized that when the defendant's mental state is an important issue and is seriously in question, and when obtaining an accurate assessment of that mental state is uniquely dependant on psychological expertise, an expert psychiatrist indeed becomes a basic and integral tool to presenting an adequate defense. See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 74, 80-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1091-92, 1094-96 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sloan, 776 F.2d 926, 928-29 Holdings: 0: holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present insanity defense and crossexamine state psychiatrists because of the tremendous reliance jurors place on psychiatric testimony where there is often no single accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity 1: recognizing a settled insanity defense where use of intoxicants were deemed to produce insanity either permanent or intermittent at the time of the offense 2: holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense 3: holding that due process entitled indigent defendant to psychiatrist to present defense of lack of capacity to form specific intent and to crossexamine governments psychiatrist on this point 4: holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1880, 1888 (Fed.Cir.1998). III Turning first to the summary judgment that claims 1 and 3 of the '880 patent were not infringed, we commence our plenary review of that ruling by determining the proper scope of the claims at issue. TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1120, 60 USPQ2d 1017, 1024 (Fed. Cir.2001). Claims 1 and 3 of the '880 patent require a \u201cmeans for causing said at least one laser beam to strike the periphery of the energy zone for visibly outlining said entire energy zone.\u201d The parties agree that those claims at issue are in means-plus-function format and therefore invoke the provisions of 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112, \u00b6 6. See Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Section 112, paragraph 6, allows a paten-tee Holdings: 0: holding that if a document falls within the scope of the public records statute then the presumption favoring disclosure applies 1: holding that person as defined in njsa 112 does not include the state based on the fact that 1 the definition of person indicates that such term includes the state when it is used to designate the owner of property which may be the subject of an offense and 2 state and municipality are separately defined in njsa 112 2: holding that as to the scope of court review substantial evidence is a stringent limitation 3: holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art 4: holding that claim limitation using the term means for and not reciting any structure presumptively falls within the scope of  112  6", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "To establish that the Customer List is entitled to trade secret protection until the trial on the merits, TMC must show a probability of success in proving that the Customer List is entitled to trade secret protection. 28. TMC did not show a probability of success in proving that the Customer List is entitled to trade secret protection pending trial on the merits because of 1) the extent to which the Customer List was known by employees and others involved in the business, 2) the lack of measures taken by AICE to guard the secrecy of the Customer List, and 3) the ease or difficulty with which the Customer List could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. (Emphasis added.) TMC does not challenge specific findings of fact. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>); Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ogg, 122 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding that judgment on the pleadings will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 1: holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings 2: holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense 3: holding that motion to dismiss should not  be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law 4: holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding unless contrary is established as matter of law or there is no evidence to support finding", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "appeals did not present any analysis, it is clear that the court made a choice of law decision. This Court presumes that the court of appeals followed the directive of the Supreme Court despite the absence of any explicit discussion on the threshold choice of law issue. 41 . The Fifth Circuit does not cite authority to justify this part of its holding. Defendants attempt to distinguish Griffin because there are no funds on deposit withthis Court (or in any court) for any of the Plaintiffs. Other Texas cases establish, however, that the policy proceeds do not have to be located in Texas for the insurable interest doctrine to apply. The doctrine serves to protect the lives of Texas citizens irrespective of the vagaries of the location of the policy proceeds. See Cheeves, 28 S.W. at 275 (<HOLDING>); Tamez, 999 S.W.2d at 15 (\"[I]t is against Holdings: 0: recognizing the public interest exception 1: holding that the primary justification of insurable interest doctrine was that the public has an interest that no inducement shall be offered to one man to take the life of another 2: holding in 1894 that it is against the public policy of this state to allow any one who has no insurable interest to be the owner of a policy of insurance upon the life of a human being 3: holding that insurable interest doctrine does not entitle deceased insureds estate to a reformation of the insurance contract but a constructive trust on the policy proceeds 4: holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "conclude\u201d that the IJ and the BIA ruled erroneously. See INA \u00a7 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101(a)(42)(A). As Thap has not established that there was any past persecution, there is no presumption that he would be subject to persecution upon returning to Cambodia such that the burden of rebutting that presumption would shift to the government. Therefore, the court finds that Thap cannot establish a clear probability of persecution in Cambodia on the basis of any past persecution to which Thap or his family were subject. We next examine whether Thap can prove that there is a future threat of persecution based on a protected ground should he return to Cambodia. Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 750 (citations omitted); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.16(b). Again, Thap has not Holdings: 0: holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal 1: holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution 2: holding that a wellfounded fear requires petitioner to show more than a generalized or random possibility of persecution 3: holding that general crime conditions are not a stated ground for a wellfounded fear of future persecution 4: holding that such a report provided substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner failed to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of future persecution", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "When no definite term is set forth in a contract, the contract is terminable at will. Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 879, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982); Simons v. American Dry Ginger Ale Co., 335 Mass. at 524-25, 140 N.E.2d 649; Fall River Housing Joint Tenants Council, Inc. v. Fall River Housing Auth., 15 Mass.App.Ct. 992, 994, 448 N.E.2d 70 (1983) and cases cited. Mass Cash does not dispute the lack of dura-tional term in the contract, but it seeks to fit its contract into the category of cases which hold that where a contract contemplates the achievement of a definite end, but is silent as to its duration, a reasonable time is implied based on all relevant evidence. See, e.g., Thermo Electron Corp. v. Schiavone Construction Co., 958 F.2d 1158, 1164 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Bushkin Assoc., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 815 Holdings: 0: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient 1: holding that statutorilyrequired settlement of corporate net income taxes must be performed within the prescribed time limits 2: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 3: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 4: holding contract to sell a project which contained no time limits was to be performed within a reasonable time as determined by the court based on all the evidence", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure and functions of the workforce of such entity.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12111(10)(B). JC Penney challenges Bukta\u2019s proposed accommodation, arguing that a part time schedule imposes an undue hardship on its business by eliminating the essential job requirement of attendance. Essential function means the fundamental duties of the position. 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 1630.2(n)(l). Attendance can be an essential job function. See Brenneman v. MedCentral Health System, 366 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that attendance can be an essential function of a position and that excessive absenteeism rendered an employee unqualified for such a position 1: holding governments position unreasonable where government advanced no legal authority for its position and applicable principle of law was long settled 2: recognizing that an employers decision to eliminate a position is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a position or employee 3: holding that attendance is a minimum function of any job 4: holding attendance problem was a legitimate basis for an employers termination of an employee", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "541, 551, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (\u201cOur prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most 'loyal Democrats happen' to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.\u201d); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (\u201c[R]edistricting in most cases will implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete for recognition .... \u201d); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321 (\u201cPolitics and political considerations are inseparable from dis-tricting and apportionment.\u201d); see also Cooper v. Harris, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 137 S.Ct. 1455, 1488, 197 L.Ed.2d 837 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (<HOLDING>); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.Supp.3d 837, 934-35 Holdings: 0: holding that case was justiciable when at least some of the appellants have a sufficient personal stake  in its adjudication 1: holding that convictions under  111 require at least some form of assault 2: recognizing the constitutionality of at least some amount of political gerrymandering 3: holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political 4: holding illinois wage law only applied where at least some work was performed within the state", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "him, and likewise did not list himself as a party on appeal in his client\u2019s notice. Moreover, Jones's brief in this action was filed on January 11, 2006, which was over two months after the final judgment was entered and well after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal had expired. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal as to the entry of sanctions. 2 . Jones was terminated in May 2003, but did not file a claim with the EEOC until July 2004, which was well after expiration of the 180-day limitation period enumerated in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2005e-5(e)(l); 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12117(a). And he made no argument in favor of equitable tolling of the limitation period. Cf. Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1570 n. 17 (11th Cir.1996) Holdings: 0: holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the eeoc is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 1: holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 2: holding that the timely filing of a discrimination charge with the equal employment opportunity commission is a requirement like a statute of limitations that is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 3: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling 4: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the waiver of his constitutional rights, and signed the written admonishments only after reviewing the documents with his attorney. In addition, appellant waived his right to a jury trial and understood that once sentences were pronounced, he would not have the opportunity to plea \u201cnot guilty\u201d or contest the charges. Appellant\u2019s new counsel filed a motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty and pleas of true prior to the PSI hearing. Appellant stated he had felt pressured by his former attorney to enter the pleas. At the PSI hearing, the trial court allowed argument on this motion. The trial court, exercising its discretion, denied the motion. There is no evidence in the record to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See DeVary v. State, 615 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (<HOLDING>); Stancliff v. State, 852 S.W.2d 639, 640-41 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants request for severance because the district court nullified any prejudicial error when it repeatedly admonished the jury throughout the trial to consider the evidence only against the defendant to whom it related and at the end of trial gave the jury instructions that admonished the jury to consider separately each offense and evidence in support of each offense 1: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 2: holding that the trial judges failure to admonish the appellant regarding the range of punishment was harmless because the record was replete with statements by the parties concerning the punishment range and because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant was unaware of the range of punishment 3: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion although the defendant had been admonished incorrectly on the punishment range 4: recognizing the range of discretion of the trial judge", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "In that case, jurisdiction existed when the case was filed and the question was whether the amended complaint subsequently divested the court of jurisdiction; here, plaintiffs argue the inverse. Id. Similarly, several other cases relied on by plaintiffs relate to amended rather than supplemental complaints, and thus are not on point. 4 . Recent cases bring into question whether the statutory limitations implicated in these cases are truly jurisdictional or are \"nonjuris-dictional \u2018claim-processing rules.\u2019\u201d See Gonzalez v. Thaler, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (noting that in the past, the Court was less than meticulous in rendering statutory language jurisdictional); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, \u2014 U.S. -, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 1: holding that a 120day filing deadline for seeking review by the us court of appeals for veterans claims was a claimprocessing rule that lacked jurisdictional attributes 2: holding that the 120day filing deadline at issue was ajmong the types of rules that should not be described as jurisdictional but rather claim processing rules 3: holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory 4: holding that an agency filing deadline set forth in a regulation as a rule of administrative convenience is not jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is admissible). The designated evidence submitted in the present ease revealed that the personal injuries suffered by Rainwater in the accident caused severe pain and prevented him from working resulting in severe depression and an addiction to pain medication. Shortly before the suicide, Rainwater called 911, strangled and beat his former spouse, and tried to set the house on fire. After being arrested, Rainwater beat his head and hands on the door of his cell until police subdued him with foam. After that, Rainwater hanged himself in his cell. The resolution of the present case hinges upon determinations of proximate cause and decedent\u2019s state of mind, matters which ordinarily must be decided by the jury and not by way of summary judgment motion. See McKinney, 597 N.E.2d at 1005-06 (<HOLDING>); Nelson, 634 N.E.2d at 512 (holding that issue Holdings: 0: holding that courts should require very little evidence to survive summary judgment in a discrimination case because the ultimate question is one that can be resolved only through a searching inquiry  one that is most appropriately conducted by the factfinder upon a full record 1: holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage 2: holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment 3: holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment 4: holding that the issue of defendants actual knowledge should not be resolved on summary judgment but should be left to the trier of fact", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the issue of whether a grace period, i.e., a period between the recognition of the right to obtain a marriage license and a couples' obligation to do so, might otherwise be warranted. Additionally, because marriage was .available to same-sex couples at the time of Mr. Sapp\u2019s death, the Court does not address the parties\u2019 respective arguments regarding the earlier availability of domestic partnership. 7 . The terms \u201clawful\u201d and \"valid\u201d ar\u00e9 nearly synonymous in this context, and cases \"tend[ ] . to use the latter term in enunciating the doctrine.\u201d Vryonis, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 (citations omitted). \"Although ' in many situations there is little practical difference between lawful and valid,\" the use of the latter term \"may engender confusion\u201d in some contexts. Id (<HOLDING>). \"The putative marriage doctrine protects the Holdings: 0: holding that the belief in a valid religious marriage is insufficient to come within the doctrine 1: holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief 2: holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred 3: recognizing doctrine 4: recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "judicial review of merely discretionary decisions,\u201d and citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir.1997)). Because IIRI-RA expressly preclud .2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir.1986) (affirming district court\u2019s denial of preliminary injunction that would interfere with Attorney General\u2019s discretionary power to choose facility where deportable aliens were detained in absence of proof of actual deprivation of statutory right to counsel or denial of due process). Thus, the complaint does not allege that an actual or continuing constitutional violation had occurred that could be remedied by judicial action. We emphasize, however, that our holding in this case has no application to constitutional habeas claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241. See Jurado-Gutier-rez, 190 F.3d at 1145-47 (<HOLDING>). While the immigration statutes may not Holdings: 0: holding that iirira does not bar us from staying removal orders pending resolution of petitions for review 1: holding that review under  2241 still available notwithstanding express language in iirira barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review 2: holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law 3: holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a  2241 petition 4: holding that iirira  309c4g repealed this courts jurisdiction over petitions for review filed by aliens who are deportable for having committed enumerated criminal offenses but did not repeal 28 usc  2241", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Perry factors, namely, whether the statute puts the public on notice by clearly defining the required conduct. See Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 309. Of all the considerations set forth in Perry, we believe this factor is the most relevant to the statute at issue in this case because a statute which defines a violation in conditional terms is less likely to support the application of negligence per se than one which provides an absolute, and thus more definite, standard of care. Accordingly, we must determine whether the standard of conduct found in section 61(a) was defined with sufficient clarity to impose tort liability for a violation of that statute. See Perry, 973 S.W.2d at 309. Although article 6701d, entitled \u201cUniform Act Regulating Traff .App. \u2014 Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Hemphill v. Meyers, 469 S.W.2d 327, 328 Holdings: 0: holding that whether a driver safely entered an intersection as per section 71c depends upon whether he acted prudently 1: holding that whether a driver operated his vehicle on an improved shoulder in safety as per section 54a depends upon whether he acted reasonably under the common law 2: recognizing that whether a consumer survey should be admitted depends among other things on whether the questions are leading or suggestive  3: holding whether these explanations are reasonable or not depends upon matters that the jury must decide including witness eredibility 4: holding that whether a driver yielded the right of way as per section 74 depends upon whether he acted negligently or unreasonably", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "as follows: 980.07 Periodic examination; report. (1) If a person has been committed under s. 980.06 and has not been discharged under s. 980.09, the department shall conduct an examination of his or her mental condition within 6 months after an initial commitment under s. 980.06 and again thereafter at least once each 12 months for the purpose of determining whether the person has made sufficient progress for the court to consider whether the person should he placed on supervised release or discharged. At the time of a reexamination under this section, the person who has been committed may retain or seek to have the court appoint an examiner as provided under s. 980.03 (4). See State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, \u00b6 15, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (Sykes, J., lead opinion) (<HOLDING>). 12 Wisconsin Stat. \u00a7 980.07(2) provides as Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that wis stat  980071 allows a ch 980 committee to retain an independent examiner 1: holding that time limits in wis stat  980071 are mandatory 2: holding that the time limits in the equal access to justice act are jurisdictional 3: holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations 4: holding that a requesting party may immediately bring an enforcement action if an open records law request is denied and that such actions are exempt from the notice provisions of wis stat  893801", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "beyond that normally present in first-degree murder.\u201d Brown, 315 N.C. at 65, 337 S.E.2d at 827. State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 61-62, 436 S.E.2d 321, 356 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). In this case the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, reveals that this murder falls within the scope of each of the above categories. First, the evidence permits the inference that the killing was physically agonizing to the victim. After shooting the victim four times, defendant repeatedly kicked and pistol-whipped the helpless victim. The victim was conscious and in extreme pain for at least fifteen minutes after the shooting and assault, attempting to talk despite his broken jaw and wounded tongue. See Brown, 315 N.C. at 67, 337 S.E.2d at 828 (<HOLDING>). Further, the evidence permits the inference Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that the victim was conscious for fifteen minutes after being shot six times supports a finding that the victim suffered great physical pain prior to death 1: holding that where the dying victim remained conscious for fifteen minutes the evidence was sufficient to show that the victim knew that he was dying but was helpless to prevent it 2: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 3: holding that the witnesss prior statement that the victim was lying flat on his back when he was shot impermissibly contradicted the witnesss trial testimony that the victim was on top of another individual at that time 4: holding evidence of serious physical injury insufficient where victim was shot in right cheek but did not have to have surgery and victim denied having any longterm effects from the shooting", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Morales, 98 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). The answer to the question of whether prejudgment interest may be calculated on attorneys\u2019 fees that have been paid prior to judgment, as in this case, is less than clear, with our sister courts splitting on the issue, and the supreme court remaining silent. The Dallas Court of Appeals has expressly held that .under no circumstances may prejudgment interest be recovered on attorneys\u2019 fees. See Carbona v. CH Med., Inc., 266 S.W.3d 675, 688 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). However, other courts have taken a less rigid view and have allowed a trial court to award prejudgment interest on attorneys\u2019 fees paid prior to judgment. See Nova Cas. Co. v. Turner Const. Co., 335 S.W.3d 698, 706 (Tex.App.-Houston 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Colthurst, 253 S.W.3d 353, 362 Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent 1: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 2: holding in patent litigation that district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding simple rather than compound prejudgment interest 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest on attorneys fees paid prior to the entry of judgment 4: holding in adea action that district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding compound rather than simple prejudgment interest", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(refusing to challenge the agency\u2019s standards for determining which applicant is more qualified). Therefore, this argument also fails to rebut the defendant\u2019s legitimate non-retaliatory reason. Finally, the plaintiff attempts to rebut the defendant\u2019s non-retaliatory reason by arguing that it is insufficient on its face because the defendant caused her inability to work through the agency\u2019s discriminatory practices. Compl. \u00b6 13. The result of the plaintiffs hostile work environment is instructive on this point: if \u201cthe complained of conduct in this case does not rise to the level\u201d of a hostile work environment, the plaintiffs argument fails to adequately rebut the defendant\u2019s non-discriminatory reason. Peda v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 1007, 1020 (N.D.Iowa 2002) (<HOLDING>). Because the plaintiff could still succeed on Holdings: 0: holding that the allegations of plaintiffs coemployees of sexual harassment by manager were irrelevant to plaintiffs hostile work environment claim absent evidence that plaintiff was contemporaneously aware of the alleged harassment 1: holding that the plaintiffs argument that the defendant caused plaintiffs inability to return to work cannot hold water because the socalled causation was insufficient to rise to the level of actionable harassment 2: holding that a defendants notice of prior harassment against victims other than the plaintiff can give rise to title ix liability so long as the defendant possessed enough knowledge of the harassment that it could reasonably have responded with remedial measures to address the kind of harassment upon which the plaintiffs legal claim is based 3: holding that a hostile work environment was sufficient to constitute constructive discharge because the harassment was expressed by the plaintiffs supervisor and the offending language was not only used in the plaintiffs presence but was directed at him 4: holding that counsels failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "plain at the time of appellate review. See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 550. To satisfy the third Olano factor, Paz must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there exists \u201ca reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence with the Booker error eliminated by making the Guidelines advisory.\u201d Id. at 551. Paz cannot demonstrate that there exists. a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a more favorable sentence under an advisory guidelines system. First, the district court, in its discretion, chose to depart upward because Paz\u2019s criminal history category substantially under-represented the seriousness of his criminal history and the likelihood he would commit other crimes. See United States v. Sayre, 400 F.3d 599, 601 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Second, not only did the district court Holdings: 0: holding guidelines to be only advisory 1: holding that the cocaine guidelines  are advisory only 2: holding that the district court which had considered the guidelines but found an upward variant sentence necessary given the defendants previous violations did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 24month sentence instead of a guidelines range sentence of 3 to 9 months incarceration 3: holding that the district court did not violate the defendants right to due process when it departed upward to life imprisonment pursuant to  5k221 because his sentence was within the maximum set forth in the united states code for the offense of conviction 4: recognizing the futility of remanding a sentence for the application of advisory guidelines where the district court had previously departed upward", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "contract. Additionally, under SES\u2019s subcontract, SES declared that \u201cit ha[d] investigated all pertinent conditions relative to the performance of the work contained in this Agreement, knowing the character, quantities and sources of materials to be used in performing the work, [and] the labor conditions prevalent in the area in which the work is to be performed.\u201d SES does not seek the difference between the 00812 rate and the 00813 rate as damages. Cf. Morrison-Hardeman-Perini-Leavell v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 938, 392 F.2d 988, 997 (1968) (noting that contractor can recover against government, where government directed contractor to pay, both retroactively and in future, new higher minimum prevailin Servs., L.P., 317 S.W.3d 431, 456 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. filed) (<HOLDING>). We reject SES\u2019s reliance on these cases. Holdings: 0: recognizing a defense immunizing federal contractors from liability where the contractor has conformed its behavior to precise government specifications and if necessary has warned the government of risks posed by those specifications 1: holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made 2: holding that contractor was not precluded from recovering damages against owner for defective specifications stated in contract notwithstanding lumpsum and prebid investigation provisions in contract because owner made positive assurances concerning reliability of said specifications 3: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where the governments specifications were impossible to meet government changed the specifications but did not change the price to be paid original contractor refused to perform and new contractor was paid more to meet new specifications 4: holding original contractor not liable for additional cost of relet contract where significant changes were made to the construction specifications", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1, 40, 748 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 359 Md. 335, 753 A.2d 1032 (2000). Thus, even if the issue were preserved for review, we would discern no reversible error. Nor do we see reversible error in the prosecutor\u2019s reaction, in the jury\u2019s presence, to the objection when it came. At the bench conference that followed, counsel for appellant Varela objected to the prosecutor\u2019s \u201cgiving his theory of expert testimony in front of the jury.\u201d The court admonished the prosecutor to desist from making such statements in front of the jury. No further relief was requested by any appellant. In the absence of a request for relief, either in the form of a curative instruction or a mistrial, appellants have nothing about which to complain. See Lamb v. State, 141 Md.App. 610, 644-45, 786 A.2d 783 (2001) (<HOLDING>). In any event, we are hard pressed to find Holdings: 0: holding harmless an inadmissible comment as prejudicial effect was removed by district courts curative instruction 1: holding that where an objection is sustained and curative instruction given and no further relief such as a mistrial additional curative instruction or striking of the offending comment is requested there is nothing for the appellate court to review 2: holding that no issue is preserved for appellate review if the objecting party accepts the judges ruling and does not contemporaneously make an additional objection to sufficiency of the curative charge or move for a mistrial 3: holding that when an objection is overruled failing to request curative instructions or a mistrial does not result in waiver 4: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "add one point to an offender score if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant was under community custody when he committed the current offense. Former RCW 9.94A.525(19) (2007); State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231, 239 n.7, 241, 149 P.3d 636 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1354 (2007). Here, the State correctly concedes that no evidence supported this finding. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing. C. Same Criminal Conduct \u00b628 Jackson further argues that the sentencing court erred when it declined to hold that his DUI and reckless driving convictions were the same criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). He did not raise this issue at the sentencing court and has waived the right to appeal it. In re Pers. Restraint of Shale, 160 Wn.2d 489, 496, 158 P.3d 588 (2007) (<HOLDING>). D. Remedy \u00b629 The remaining concern is the Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus failed to preserve the issue for appellate review 1: holding the issue of standing is waived if not asserted at the district court level 2: holding that defendant failed to raise a constitutional issue at trial and thus waived appellate review of that issue 3: holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial 4: holding that issue waived when the defendant failed to ask the court to make a discretionary call of any factual dispute regarding the issue of same criminal conduct and he did not contest the issue at the trial level", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "discovering their wrongdoing. Davis was not a case where the plaintiff recognized a basis for a lawsuit but was persuaded to forego enforcing her right until after the statute of limitations expired. The policy underlying equitable estoppel would certainly justify its application to the fiduciary relationship allegedly abused in Davis. However, S.A.P. should not be read to let in thro d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (determining insurer equitably estopped from raising statute of limitations defense, when it agreed to appellant's demand to arbitrate, and had helped to pick arbitrators before five-year period for claim proceeding to arbitration ended); Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc. v. Carter, 658 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), abrogated by May v. Ill. Nat\u2019l Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>); Alachua County v. Cheshire, 603 So.2d 1334 Holdings: 0: holding estate of decedent estopped where widow affirmatively told hospital that estate had no assets and would not be probated where decadents estate in fact did have assets to pay unpaid medical bills 1: holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate 2: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate 3: holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan 4: holding that the debtors false statements about the location of assets of the estate were material to the proceedings", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "guest was precluded when insured\u2019s promise to maintain insurance on home insured was not currently occupying showed insured\u2019s intent that insurance was to benefit guest living in home), citing Alaska Ins. Co. v. RCA Alaska Commun., 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981) (commercial tenant was implied coinsured for limited purpose of defeating insurer\u2019s subrogation claim when lease provision required landlord to obtain and keep in effect insurance on premises). Although an insurance company has the right to recover against a wrongdoer whose conduct has subjected the insurance company to liability, no right of subrogation can arise in favor of an insurer against its own insured. Jindra v. Clayton, 247 Neb. 597, 529 N.W.2d 523 (1995). See, also, Fellmer v. Gruber, 261 N.W.2d 173 (Iowa 1978) (<HOLDING>); Housing Inv. Corp. v. Carris, 389 So. 2d 689 Holdings: 0: holding that contractual privity between the buyer and seller was not necessary for a cfa claim 1: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 2: holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation 3: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision 4: holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without sellers knowledge and consent", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because, whereas the latter is necessarily satisfied out of, and thus constitutes a property interest in, marital property, the former is not satisfied out of, and thus cannot constitute a property interest in, marital property \u2014 instead, the former will be satisfied out of property that either no longer constitutes, or never constituted, marital property. The Court notes that its holding regarding the dichotomy that exists between in kind relief and equalization relief vis-a-vis the classification of a pre-petition equitable distribution right is not all that novel since at least one other court has also found such a dichotomy to exist, see In re Emelity, 251 B.R. 151, 154-157 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.2000), although such court\u2019s analysis differs from this Court\u2019s in other regards, see Id. (<HOLDING>). Also, so as to compare this Court\u2019s decision Holdings: 0: holding that when a creditor files a proof of claim the bankruptcy court has core jurisdiction to determine that claim even if it was a prepetition contract claim arising under state law 1: holding that every prepetition debt is discharged subject to the provisions of  523 2: holding that creditors cannot allow postpetition funds to be automatically applied to a prepetition indebtedness absent some positive indication that debtors indeed intend to voluntarily assume their prepetition debts 3: holding that a prepetition equitable distribution right to equalization relief constitutes a discharged prepetition claim and distinguishing while agreeing with in re marriage of seligman 14 calapp4th 300 18 calrptr2d 209 214215 1993 wherein it was held that a prepetition equitable distribution right to in kind relief does not constitute a prepetition claim 4: holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "provision will include Buyer, Seller and Broker, will be awarded reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees costs and expenses. However, as Regency pointed out, it is not a party to the Contract. According to the language of the Contract, the \u201cprevailing party\u201d only pertains to the \u201cBuyer, Seller, or Broker.\u201d P.C.D.\u2019s reliance on authority enlarging the meaning of the word \u201cparty\u201d is misplaced because the courts in those cases are referring to parties to a lawsuit, not parties to a contract. See, e.g., Lage v. Blanco, 521 So.2d 299, 300 (3d DCA Fla. 1988). The fact that Regency may have had some rights arising from the Contract due to its status as first lienholder does not make Regency a formal party to the Contract. See, Gwen Fearing Real Estate, Inc. v. Wilson, 430 So.2d 589, 591 (4th DCA Fla.1983)(<HOLDING>). Likewise, seeking its own affirmative relief Holdings: 0: holding defendant liable for attorneys fees when the guaranty contract at issue provided for the payment of collection costs and expenses 1: holding that broker whose contract called for commission on sale of property was not entitled to commission on transfer of property to partnership in which owner had an interest and that because broker was not entitled to commission under terms of his contract he also could not recover against a third person on theory of tortious interference with that contract 2: holding defendant waived request for fees pursuant to contract provision by only generally referring to fees in the answer and not citing the contract 3: holding that when neither real estate brokers licensing statute nor its legislative history indicated that legislature intended unenforeeability of unlicensed brokers commission agreement broker was entitled to retain commission paid 4: holding broker not a party to a purchase contract and therefore not liable for attorneys fees even though provision providing for payment of the brokers commission was contained in the contract", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 732 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa.Super.1999). As such, JNOV is only proper where, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not disagree that the verdict was improper. Burton-Lister, 798 A.2d at 236. \u201cJNOV ... may not be employed to invade the province of the jury.... Thus, where the jury has been presented with conflicting evidence, a motion for JNOV should be denied.\u201d Rohm & Haas Co., 732 A.2d at 1248 (internal citations omitted). Initially, we observe that Tube City presents no argument in support of its claim that the trial court should have entered JNOV on the negligent misrepresentation count, and so we will not consider it. See Owens v. Mazzei, 847 A.2d 700, 705-06 (Pa.Super.2004) (<HOLDING>). With regard to fraud, Tube City argues that Holdings: 0: holding that the petitioners failure to address an issue in the argument portion of his opening brief waived the issue 1: holding that the superior court will not address an issue presented in the statement of questions involved where no corresponding analysis is included in the brief 2: holding that issues   not explicitly raised in the statement of questions involved are  waived 3: holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief 4: holding that issue not explicitly raised in appellants statement of the questions involved is waived", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Japan was not satisfied. 15 . In Byrd, the defense counsel \"did not reveal the name of the individual officer, nor turn over log books, as had been requested by plaintiff's counsel.\u201d See the case cited supra note 11. In fact, the defense counsel in Byrd did not comply with the plaintiff's repeated requests and disclose the name of the new defendant until after the limitations period ran. Id. 16 . The Court concluded that Enron failed to establish that relief was warranted under Cornwell. The Cornwell court held that when a plaintiff possessed information related to an added defendant's identity and its involvement in the alleged transactions, there is no mistake in identity and the failure to have named that new defendant is considered \u201ca matter of choice.\u201d Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 705 (<HOLDING>). In reaching its conclusion, the Cornwell Holdings: 0: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 1: holding that plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to add her husband as a defendant did not relate back because her failure to sue her husband was not due to misnomer or mistake involving the identity of the proper party but because the law at the time of the complaint did not allow one spouse to sue another in tort 2: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 3: holding that cornwell was not required to sue them and her failure to do so in the original complaint in light of her obvious knowledge and the detailed nature of that pleadings exhibit must be considered a matter of choice not mistake 4: holding in a case where a pro se plaintiff changed the date on which she allegedly received a right to sue letter between her complaint and her amended complaint that although her modification of the crucial detail of the receipt date was problematic to say the least the proper response was not to strike or dismiss an amended complaint based solely on contradictory statements or those inconsistent with prior pleadings", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "requires proof of both knowledge and intent by any person who makes a \u201cknowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission...\u201d N.J.S.A. 56:8-2; Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, supra., 148 N.J. at 607-608, 691 A.2d 350, Cox v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra., at 18, 647 A.2d 454, Varacallo v. Ma ndividual reliance, but does not require proof that such reliance was reasonable. Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, Inc., 121 Ariz. 517, 591 P.2d 1005 (1972). North Carolina requires proof of \u201cactual\u201d and \u201cdetrimental\u201d reliance upon defendant\u2019s misrepresentations, from which it may be inferred that such reliance need not necessarily be reasonable. Forbes v. Par Ten Group, Inc., 99 N.C.App. 587, 394 S.E.2d 643 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable 1: holding that billings by the cruise line for port charges that were misrepresented as passthrough expenses but kept as additional profits is a deceptive practice under the florida deceptive and unfair trade practices act 2: holding that both punitive and treble damages were recoverable under the texas deceptive trade practices act because each of the plaintiffs claims resulted from a distinct act however because the plaintiff suffered only one compensable injury she could only be awarded one recovery for actual compensatory damages 3: holding that statutory damages were appropriate for each discrete violation of that states deceptive trade practices act 4: holding that recovery under the north carolina unfair and deceptive trade practices act  is limited to those situations when a plaintiff can show that plaintiff detrimentally relied upon a statement or misrepresentation and he or she suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants deceptive statement or misrepresentation ", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as \"the Petitioners.\u201d 3 . The policy originally was with CNA Personal Insurance, the predecessor in interest of Encompass. 4 . The numerical figures were apparently added by the insurance agent, per an instruction on the form. 5 . The General Assembly subsequently increased the minimum coverage amounts to their current levels. Chapter 441, Laws of Maryland 2010 (raising minimum personal injury liability coverage to $30,000 per person up to $60,000 per accident); Chapter 681, Laws of Maryland 1999 (raising minimum property damage coverage to $15,000). 6 . Even if a waiver is executed by the \"first named insured,\u201d it is ineffective if the insurer\u2019s notice of the effect of the waiver is deficient. IN \u00a7 19-510(c); cf. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Powell, 292 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, Petitioners apparently Holdings: 0: holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement 1: holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver 2: holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage 3: holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee 4: holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "under the remainder aggregate rule, be deemed to have increased the sentence, the total time Weingarten will serve is the same under the new sentence as under the previous one. The district court\u2019s conclusion that its initial aggregate sentence was still appropriate is understandable, given its finding that the factual mosaic and the \u201ccentral factor[s]\u201d that \u201c[bore] on the imposition o[fj the appropriate sentence remained] the same.\u201d While we can imagine a record that would support a finding of vindictiveness where the district court imposed the same total sentence after the reversal of certain counts reduced the extent of the harm legally attributable to the defendant, this is not that case. Cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 253-54, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008) (<HOLDING>). As \u201cnothing in the record remotely suggests Holdings: 0: holding that states appeal of trial courts dismissal of first count in a four count indictment under cj  12302cl was not ripe until final judgment on the remaining counts pled in the guilty plea and noting that upon imposition of the sentences on the remaining counts the situation  was ripe for the state to appeal or to perfect its earlier attempt to appeal 1: recognizing with approval the practice following vacatur of some counts of conviction on appeal of increasing the defendants sentence on remaining counts to yield an aggregate sentence equal to the original aggregate imposed 2: holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction 3: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts 4: holding that to compare severity of sentences the proper procedure is first to disregard the sentence originally imposed on the dismissed count and then compare the total remaining sentence imposed on the remaining counts with the petitioners present position", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "claims, the subsection applicable to, the dismissal of his PCRA petition was Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(D)(1). (\u201cUpon the conclusion of the hearing the judge ' shall determine all material issues raised by the defendant\u2019s petition and the Commonwealth\u2019s answer, or by the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, if any-. (1) If the judge dismisses the petition, the judge promptly shall issue an order denying relief. The order shall be filed and served as provided in Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 114.\u201d). 8 . Appellant concedes that his substantive due process, right-to-counsel, and right-to-appeal claims fail if we reject his facial challenge to the statute\u2019s constitutionality. Appellant\u2019s Brief at 34. Accordingly, in light of our disposition, we need not address these claims. See Turner, 80 A.3d at 764 (<HOLDING>). 9 . The PCRA court also attributes some blame Holdings: 0: recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection 1: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 2: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 3: holding that because process is not an end in itself once a court has found that the petitioner does not have a valid liberty interest a challenge to both procedural and substantive due process must fail 4: holding convicted sex offender had not been deprived of liberty interest for purposes of procedural due process challenge to sorp", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "neither did Mr. Bowen. \u00b6 30. Bowen does not require an independent action seeking partition. Mr. Myers already had a request for a sale properly before the chancellor. A remand in order to obtain another is superfluous. \u00b6 31. Additionally, the majority suggests that to enforce a partition here would subvert longstanding public policy encouraging marriage. I do not find that the public policy arguments in favor of marriage impact on whether a spouse may seek the partition by sale of a financially burdensome marital home. Joint owners of property, even spouses not contemplating divorce, are entitled to seek partition of property. Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 11-21-8 (Supp.2002), Trigg v. Trigg, 498 So.2d 334, 335-36 (Miss.1986). See also Miller v. Miller, 838 So.2d 295, 298 (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). \u00b632. Trigg and Miller speak to the Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 1: holding that denial of divorce and corresponding equitable distribution does not preclude a partition action by res judicata 2: holding res judicata does not preclude consideration of constitutional questions in postconviction proceedings which by their nature depended upon facts not found in record 3: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 4: holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "545, 219 Ill.Dec. 823, 672 N.E.2d 331 (1996) (suppressing juvenile\u2019s confession where his mother\u2019s attempts to see her son \u201cwere clearly frustrated by the police so that they could create an intimidating atmosphere and obtain a confession\u201d); People v. Montanez, 273 Ill.App.3d 844, 210 Ill.Dec. 295, 652 N.E.2d 1271 (1995) (same); In re J.O., 231 Ill.App.3d 853, 173 Ill.Dec. 406, 596 N. (1986) (same). The second approac ing that juveniles are not permitted to waive privilege against self-incrimination unless friendly adult is present and gives guidance); In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937 (1982) (interpreting Vermont Constitution to require presence of interested adult during custodial interrogation of juvenile); State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 166 W.Va. 511, 276 S.E.2d 199 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Sevion v. State, 620 N.E.2d 736 Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights 1: holding that a federal criminal defendant may waive jury trial without advice of counsel 2: holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel 3: holding that juveniles may not waive counsel unless parent or guardian also waives that right 4: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The court then adjudicated his guilt, imposing a sentence of ten years confinement with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Di vision. Appellant subsequently filed a pr o be binding, stating, \u201cTexas Code of Criminal Procedure ... expressly denies a defendant the right to appeal from a trial court\u2019s determination to adjudicate.\u201d 28 S.W.3d 627, 633 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi, 2000, no pet.). Article 42.12 \u00a7 5(b) expressly allows, however, an appeal of all proceedings after the adjudication of guilt on the original charge. Examples of proceedings after adjudication that may be appealed include the assessment of punishment and the pronouncement of sentence. Perez, 28 S.W.3d at 633; See also Jones v. State, 39 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Appellant does not complain of any error Holdings: 0: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate 1: holding that the postconviction court erred in finding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim proeedurally barred because the courts opinion did not comment specifically on the ineffective counsel argument and the overall holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jurys verdict could not be viewed as an adjudication on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim 2: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 3: holding that a court of appeals has jurisdiction to review claim of ineffective assistance of counsel occurring after the adjudication of guilt 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "misrepresentation claim against him fails because they have failed to allege that he made a representation to any plaintiff. Plaintiffs respond that Morrison is alleged to have made a representation in his written opinion regarding the reverse merger in which he opined that all the requirements and SEC regulations had been complied with and that good and valuable consideration had been paid by all the alleged purchasers of the Literary Playpen, Inc. stock. The court concludes that the alleged misrepresentations in Morrison\u2019s opinion letter are sufficient for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Such allegations are sufficient since under Iowa law fraudulent misrepresentation claims may be based on statements made to third parties. See Clark v. McDaniel, 546 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1996) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, this portion of Morrison\u2019s motion Holdings: 0: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties 1: recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined 2: holding that no direct contractual relationship is required between the alleged tortfeasor and the person who justifiably relies to his or her detriment on the alleged tortfeasors representations because under restatement second of torts section 533 1977 hereinafter restatement persons who fraudulently misrepresent the truth can be held liable to third parties if they have a reason to expect their misrepresentation will be communicated to third parties 3: recognizing the adoption of the restatement second of torts  552 1977 in boykin v arthur andersen  co 639 so2d 504 ala1994 and holding that a real estate appraiser had a duty to third parties that the appraiser intended to influence and to third parties that the appraiser knew his client intended to influence by means of the appraisal 4: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "view of the sexual innocence inference theory. Thus, Oatts was required to show that the prior sexual act occurred and that the prior sexual act was sufficiently similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the knowledge to imagine the molestation charge. Here, Oatts failed to show that the prior acts closely resembled those in the present case. Oatts\u2019s attorney did not proffer any evidence that the prior molestation was similar to the current offense. Oatts\u2019s attorney stated that the \u201csimilarities of the allegations are very, very close\u201d and the current allegation \u201cis that Mr. Oatts touched [A.S.] while they were in bed together, and in fact Tony touched [A.S.] while she was in bed.\u201d Transcript at 120. However, Oatts did not offer sp c. 244, 683 N.E.2d 188, 192-193 (1997) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied, appeal denied. II. The next Holdings: 0: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 1: holding that the trial court did not err by excluding the victims earlier reports of sexual abuse because too many sexual details remain unaccounted for after consideration of what defendant hoped to prove with the prior sexual conduct 2: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 3: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse 4: holding that evidence of prior uncharged sexual conduct with the victim is admissible to corroborate the victims testimony", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "establishes sufficient facts from which a jury could reasonably infer Davis had a \u201creasonable opportunity to observe\u201d D.B. Davis met D.B. on the street. Davis then booked a room at the hotel and posted an ad to Backpage.com featuring a picture taken of D.B. in a room at the hotel \u2014 from this a jury could reasonably infer Davis spent time with D.B. that day taking her picture for the ad. And on the very next day, Davis brought D.B. to Rivera, introduced her to Rivera, and then drove the two to the hotel. Viewing this \u25a0 evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude any rational jury could have found Davis had a reasonable opportunity to observe D.B. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; see also United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 976-76 (11th Cir. 2017) (<HOLDING>). IV. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment Holdings: 0: holding the government proved the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the minor when among other things he spent twenty minutes taking pictures of her for her backpage ad 1: holding that in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under  1983 a plaintiff must establish among other things the absence of probable cause for the initiation of the proceedings against her 2: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment 3: holding individual defendant liable where he among other things made inquiries into the business obligations under the flsa 4: holding the evidence sufficient to establish the defendants knowing possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt when among other things the defendant admitted to a law enforcement officer that he had acquired the shotgun for his protection and that officers testimony went uncontradicted at trial", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "request that they leave. See People v. Medrano, 78 Cal.App.3d 198, 144 Cal.Rptr. 217 (Cal.App.1978), disapproved on other grounds, Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 29 Cal.3d 307, 172 Cal.Rptr. 720, 625 P.2d 263 (Cal.1981). a. Was Blair Field open to the public for purposes of section 602(n)? California Penal Code section 602(n) defines refusal to leave property occupied by another as a form of trespass. The statute \u201cenvisions an originally innocent entry, followed by an unlawful sojourn after refusal of requests to leave.\u201d Medrano, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 227-28. The location of Blair Field within a public park supports the plaintiffs\u2019 contention that the property was open to the public. See Denney v. Takaoka, 1993 WL 96602, *5, C-92-0818 FMS (N.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 1993) (<HOLDING>). The defendants contend, however, that Blair Holdings: 0: holding that a universityowned land used as a park was open to the public for purposes of section 602n 1: holding section 625 only requires a showing that the conduct was done in a place that is open to the public or where the public has a right to be 2: holding that a municipal corporation was forbidden to construct an auditorium in a park as such construction would practically destroy the lot as a park and convert its use into a public square 3: holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees 4: holding that so long as seattle city light opened up the diablo dam to the public for recreation immunity applied despite a contractual provision compelling it to open land for public recreational purposes", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "procedural default arguments are rejected and the Court finds the merits of the petition ripe for review. A status and scheduling conference will be scheduled to establish the further procedure of the case. An appropriate order follows. ORDER AND NOW, this 17th day of February 2009, it is hereby ORDERED that a telephone status and scheduling conference is SCHEDULED for Tuesday, March 24, 2009 at 10:30 a.m. Petitioner\u2019s counsel shall initiate the call to Chambers at 215-597-4073 when all parties are on the line. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In the imposition of the death penalty, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder victi osecutor\u2019s argument did not violate Caldwell, and reinstated the death sentence. Commonwealth v. Beasley, 524 Pa. 34, 568 A.2d 1235 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Petitioner filed a timely petition for Holdings: 0: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed 1: holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings 2: holding the prosecutions remarks did not lessen the jurys sense of responsibility as the ultimate arbiter of the sentence to be imposed 3: recognizing that the sentence imposed should be consistent with the protection of the public 4: holding that the defendants sentence did not violate apprendi where the actual sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum penalty corresponding to the quantity of drugs for which the defendant acknowledged responsibility nor was the sentence at the bottom end of a higher statutory range of penalties", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by courts as \u201coverbroad,\u201d Kapeluschnik, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22883, at *18, and \u201cfrivolous,\u201d Sturdevant v. Thomas E. Jolas, P.C., 942 F.Supp. 426, 430 (W.D.Wis.1996). At the same time, courts have noted that \u201cin cases where the likelihood of legal action is not clear from the language, the letter\u2019s source can be determinative, especially if it purports to be from an attorney.\u201d Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1120 (N.D.Ill.1998). \u201cBecause to most consumers, the relevant distinction between a collection agency and an attorney is the ability to sue,\u201d a letter signed by an attorney signals to the unsophistcated consumer that legal action is at hand. United States v. Nat\u2019l Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d 131, 136-37 (4th Cir.1996); see Russey v. Rankin, 911 F.Supp. 1449, 1454 (D.N.M. 1995) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the source of the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to notify attorney of receipt of right to sue letter and failure to confirm that the attorney had received the letter did not warrant the application of equitable tolling 1: holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone 2: holding that a letter clearly threatened litigation when it purported to be from an attorney and declared that we have the legal right to file a lawsuit 3: holding an arrestee has the right to contact an attorney but not a specific attorney who is unavailable when called 4: holding that district court could impose attorney fees where plaintiffs lawsuit patently had no legal merit", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "have obtained it by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the taint of the initial police illegality. When applying that doctrine, we always must keep in mind two distinct policy justifications that bear on the answer to that issue. The first is that the predicate for Oregon\u2019s exclusionary rule is the court\u2019s responsibility to vindicate the invasion by the police of a defendant\u2019s personal rights under Article I, section 9, in obtaining evidence. This court has held that an individual\u2019s personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under that provision also embraces a right to deny the state any ability to use evidence obtained in violation of that right to convict the individual of a crime. See State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 249, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Oregon\u2019s rights-based exclusionary rule Holdings: 0: recognizing principle but finding evidence at first trial sufficient 1: recognizing this principle in the childpornography context 2: recognizing this principle as a settled rule 3: recognizing principle 4: recognizing this principle in the failure to hire context", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "upheld a finding of liability against a chief operating officer and a chief executive officer where the officers had a \u201c \u2018significant ownership interest with operational control of significant aspects of the corporation\u2019s day-to-day functions; the power to hire and fire employees; [the power to] determin[e][] salaries;[and the responsibility to] maintain [ ] employment records.\u2019\u201d Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1001-02, 1012 (quoting the district court\u2019s jury instruction). \u201cThe evidence, moreover, strongly supports the jury\u2019s determination that both Ackerleys exercised economic and operational control over the employment relationship with the sales agents, and were accordingly employers within the meaning of the Act.\u201d Id. at 1012. See also Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States Dep\u2019t of Labor v. Cole Enters., Holdings: 0: holding president of corporation liable as employer where he inter alia maintained control over the corporations employment and pay practices and had the authority to make all major decisions regarding the corporations business affairs 1: holding that one who exercises daytoday control over the employee will be considered as the employer 2: holding that where daytoday operations were within sole control of the franchisee no agency relationship existed with franchisor 3: holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account 4: holding corporations president personally liable where he had ultimate control over businesss daytoday operations and was the corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment practices", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Marion Barry. Nevertheless, as the district court found, these desires do not constitute implied promises. Ahn acknowledges that a promise of secrecy was not expressed in the plea agreement. The agreement did, however, include an integration clause, which specifically stated that no other agreements or promises existed between the parties. Standing alone, such a clause would be strong evidence that no implied promises existed' \u2014 after all, integration clauses \u201cestablish that the written plea bargain was \u2018adopted by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Fentress, 792 F.2d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 210 (1981)); accord United States v. Hunt, 205 F.3d 931, 935 (6th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d 179, 185 Holdings: 0: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable 1: holding that where a criminal defendant has voluntarily and knowingly entered into a plea agreement in which he or she waives the right to appeal the defendant is not entitled to resentencing in light of booker  2: holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement 3: holding that promises made in a plea agreement could violate 18 usc  201c 4: holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not, we believe, a factor that ought to have been eliminated from any consideration. Conclusion Because the bankruptcy court did not take into account all of the factors that it ought to have weighed and because it did not place the ultimate burden of establishing the \u00a7 523(a)(15)(B) exception on the debtor, we must vacate the decision of the district court and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand it to the bankruptcy court for new factual findings made under the proper burden of proof. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the district court with directions that the case be remanded to the bankruptcy court for further consideration consistent with this opinion. Vacated And Remanded. 1 . Cf. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Congress supplemented the reach of this Holdings: 0: recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree 1: holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge   2: holding that  522f doesnot permit a debtor to avoid a lien granted to the debtors former spouse under a divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties had in the property and in no event secures more than the spouses former interest 3: holding that in the absence of a hold harmless agreement a former spouse has no claim against the debtor to pay a debt listed on the divorce agreement as belonging to the debtor because such a debt is not incurred in connection with the divorce but was incurred in connection with the debtors and former spouses original transaction with the creditor 4: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the 2013 Agreement\u2019s arbitration provision is unenforceable in its entirety because it is unconscionable under California law. The Court agrees. 1. Procedwral Unconscionability For largely the same reasons that this Court held the delegation clause in the 2013 Agreement was procedurally unconscionable, the entire 2013 arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable as well. Under any standard, the 2013 Agreement\u2019s opt-out provision was illusory because it was highly inconspicuous and incredibly onerous to comply with. Hence, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision in the 2013 Agreement was presented to drivers on a take-it-or-leave it basis, and was adhesive and oppressive. See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 113, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (<HOLDING>); see also Section III.C.1, supra. Similarly, Holdings: 0: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 1: holding that a standardized contract which is imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength and that relegates the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it is necessarily oppressive 2: holding contract not unconscionable where parties were of equal bargaining power plaintiff had opportunity to have an attorney review the contract the contract was clear and easily read the plaintiff had been a party to similar contracts in the past and was under no financial pressure to sign the con tract 3: holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff 4: holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "DANIELS, Chief Justice. {1} The plaintiff insureds (Plaintiffs) in these three consolidated cases were issued uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage in amounts less than the liability coverage provided by their automobile insurance policies. See Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 2010-NMSC-050, \u00b6 15, 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209 (2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals concluded that none of Holdings: 0: holding that a household exclusion in the policy was void insofar as it denied coverage in the amount required by  3031902 but it was valid as to any coverage exceeding that amount 1: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 2: holding section 3877160 clearly limits the amount of coverage which may be stacked from policies on vehicles not involved in the accident to an amount no greater than the coverage of the vehicle involved in that accident 3: holding that new mexicos uninsured motorist statute nmsa 1978 section 665301 1983 requires an insurer to offer um7 uim coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits of the policy and that the choice of the insured to purchase any lower amount functions as a rejection of that maximum amount of coverage statutorily possible 4: holding in a case involving a multiplevehicle policy that a new offer of uninsured motorist coverage was not required for the addition of a new vehicle which was comparable to the renewal or supplementation of an existing policy events that did not trigger the statutory requirement of a new offer the courts holding was based in part upon the principle that an insurance contract is personal to the insured because it insures the risk of loss to the insured and does not attach to specific vehicles", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "tending to show that Bree-land\u2019s weapon was manufactured as a shotgun and later altered, and he acknowledged at oral argument that the weapon had apparently been modified. The evidence at trial supporting this conclusion consisted of Officer Barnett\u2019s testimony that the stock appeared to have been sawed off and filed down, and the weapon itself, the stock of which has been visibly changed into a pistol-grip. Viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn f 7, 124 (5th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo warrant reversal of a conviction, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it casts serious doubts upon the correctness of the jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d). We similarly decline to reverse Bree-land\u2019s conviction based on the allegedly erroneous admission of a (5th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). Ill For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Holdings: 0: holding that any error that court may have made in admitting inadmissible evidence was harmless because government presented overwhelming evidence establishing defendants guilt 1: holding any error in admitting eye witness testimony was harmless because it was cumulative to other overwhelming evidence that established defendants guilt 2: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 3: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 4: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "while the opponents argue that, no matter under what guise an individual is deprived of his liberty, he should be afforded these rights. \u2018 \u2018Suffice it to say that the constitutionality of withholding from juveniles all the rights given criminals has been upheld by the courts in almost every instance where it has been questioned.\u201d Holman, supra, 39 Or L Rev at 316-17 (footnote omitted). See also Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision, Oregon Juvenile Code (1976). 11 See also State v. Gullings, supra, 244 Or at 176-77 (\u201cThe procedure is civil, not criminal, and equitable in that the remedies may be flexible and based upon \u2018conscience\u2019 and judgment, rather than upon more or less rigid rules of law.\u201d); Hills v. Pierce, supra, 113 Or at 390 (<HOLDING>); State v. Dunn, supra, 53 Or at 308-09 Holdings: 0: holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts 1: holding that the good faith requirement of the whistleblower statute was not met where the purpose of the employee at the time of the making of reports was not to protect the public but to protect the jobs of himself and his coworkers 2: holding that purpose of statute is to protect unwary consumers 3: holding that a statute is nonpenal if it imposes a disability not to punish but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose emphasis added 4: holdingthat purpose of juvenile court is not to convict or punish but to protect", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "To datfe, however, Pacleb has not actually received complete relief on those claims. Thos\u00e9 claims, therefore, are not now moot. In addition, because \u201ca would-be class representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair opportunit er of judgment, whereas Allstate purported to hold its Rule 68 offer open. Following the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Campbell-Ewald, however, Allstate has not continued to press that argument, and properly so. Under Campbell-Ewald, the key question is whether an offer has been accepted, regardless of whether it has lapsed or remains on the table. See Campbell-Ewald, 136 S.Ct. at 666 (\"We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force.\u201d (emphasis added)); id. at 672 (<HOLDING>). 3 . We grant Allstate\u2019s motion to supplement Holdings: 0: holding an unaccepted rule 68 offer does not moot a claim 1: holding that while rule 68 does not explicitly require that an offer of settlement under that rule be made in writing its requirement that the offer be served upon the adverse party implies as much 2: recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "order regular community supervision if the de fendant is adjudged guilty of aggravated sexual assault under section 22.021 of the Penal Code. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, \u00a7 3g(a)(l)(E). A trial judge also may not order shock community supervision if the defendant is ineligible for regular judge-ordered community supervision. See id. \u00a7 6(a)(1); State v. Posey, 330 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tex.Crim.App.2011); State v. Dunbar, 297 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex.Crim.App.2009). Because imprisonment was the only punishment option, we hold that the trial judge did not err in failing to order a section 9 presentence investigation. Id. \u00a7 9(g)(3); see also Skinner v. State, No. 06-00-00184-CR, 2001 WL 193882, at *2 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Feb. 27, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Jimenez further contends that the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that defendant whom trial court had adjudicated guilty of aggravated sexual assault after defendant had violated community supervision agreement was ineligible for judgeordered community supervision and thus fit within section 9g3 exception 1: holding that an information charging defendant with offense of burglary that alleged that the defendant had committed an assault was not defective for failing to further allege specific facts that constituted assault 2: holding that no apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range 3: holding that allegations of sexual assault by an employee of the church fell within coverage for sexual misconduct 4: holding criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint included offenses of aggravated crimi nal sexual assault and vacating convictions and sentences on former offenses", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "seat with his foot. Both defendants denied this. This testimony is not credible because a CB is not illegal, and there would have been no motivation to hide it under a seat. Instead, it was in front of the console on the floor where the documents were kept. Stark moved the CB when he went into the console to retrieve the papers. Finally, defendants gave a consistent story that they were traveling to Vermont to go mountain-biking and offered proof, including the mountain bikes. The government argues that th 1, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (expressing concern in the airport search context about a drug courier profile that would \u201cdescribe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers who would be subject to v ted States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1418-19 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who was a passenger in a car had joint constructive possession of drugs found next to the defendants luggage in truck of car even where she disclaimed ownership of the drugs 1: holding that because the government was unable to prove that a truck in which illegal drugs were discovered was stolen the driver and passenger had standing to challenge the search 2: holding a driver had standing to suppress the drugs found in the underwear of the drivers passenger during an unreasonably prolonged roadside stop of both driver and passenger 3: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 4: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on their face, were sufficient. Doc. Nos. 46 at 19-20 (\u201c[T]he judgment already provides for exceptions, exemptions and means to further avoid its application to any person, ... and no person at this time is so situated that the disposition may as a practical matter impair or impede that person\u2019s ability to protect that interest.\u201d); 47 at 43-45 (distinguishing Vasquez as a case that dealt with the enforcement of a gang injunction order, rather than the facial validity of the order itself, and noting the \u201cexpectation that Los Angeles authorities will implement the injunction only lawfully and fairly\u201d) (emphasis added). Here, however, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the City from enforcing the injunction against him by arguing th 91, (AFGE) v. Martin, 969 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Plaintiffs prior arguments Holdings: 0: holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights 1: holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that a us department of labor drug testing plan did not on its face violate the fourth amendment but emphasizing that the ruling did not preclude an as applied constitutional challenge 3: holding that a search of a students purse that was not based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 4: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "promotional and concealment money laundering require the government to prove that the defendant knowingly used the \"proceeds\u201d of an unlawful activity, Wilkes's analysis of Santos is applicable here. Cf. Dis, op. at 1100. 17 . The dissent\u2019s reliance on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 407 (4th Cir.2012) is also misplaced. In defining and applying \"essential expenses,\u201d Cloud relies on the Santos plurality\u2019s reasoning that the term \"proceeds\u201d excludes any payout to a co-conspirator. Id. at 403-09. We have not interpreted Santos so broadly, relying instead on Justice Stevens\u2019s case-by-case approach. See, e.g., Wilkes, 662 F.3d at 549. Other circuits have likewise refused to interpret Santos as broadly as the Fourth Circuit. See Kratt, 579 F.3d at 562 (<HOLDING>); Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 402 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that facts that increase the maximum sentence a defendant faces must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that a sixfold increase in sentence involved no enhancement of sentence because harrisonphilpot was charged and convicted of conspiracy the extent of the conspiracy caused the tremendous increase in her sentence 2: holding that in pleading scienter arguing that the motive for defrauding investors was to increase the companys profits or to increase officer compensation is not sufficient 3: holding in the ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel context that any increase in a defendants sentence is prejudicial 4: holding that proceeds means profits only when imposing a money laundering count leads to a radical increase in the statutory maximum sentence and only when nothing in the legislative history suggests that congress intended such an increase", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(rather than an erroneous application m.App.2002) (same); State v. Mercado, 972 S.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). It is thus not apparent how decisions such as Allen, holding that an appellate court may not affirm a trial court's granting of a motion to suppress ruling on a ground not raised in the . trial court, conforms with the holdings in Mercado, Martinez and Hailey. See State v. Allen, 53 S.W.3d 731, 733-34 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 4 .In addition to other considerations, such as that the suppression ruling in the DWI case was not a final judgment on the merits and that jeopardy had not attached in that case, that ruling did not reflect a finding of any particular fact. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)(<HOLDING>). In explaining its ruling in the present case, Holdings: 0: holding that collateral estoppel precludes future litigation between the same parties of ultimate facts that have been determined by valid and final judgments 1: holding that collateral estoppel applies to  1983 claims 2: holding that the debtor has the burden of showing that collateral estoppel applies 3: holding that collateral estoppel applies only where the antecedent judgment was a final judgment 4: holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Cir.2000). Examples of BMPs that have been accepted as substitutes for effluent limits include: nutrient management plans for concentrated animal feeding operations, see Waterkeeper All., 399 F.3d at 497, 502, filtration of stormwater runoff from ditches before it enters rivers and streams (by timber companies), and constructing roads with surfacing that minimizes sediment in runoff (by timber companies), see Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., \u2014 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1338, 185 L.Ed.2d 447 (2013). The narrative standard here is nowhere as specific as any of these examples. Indeed, it requires nothing more of a shipowner than to meet the TBELs. This interpretation is hardly consistent' with the regulations that require WQBELS to ensure compliance. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). Third, EPA claims that WQBEL standards will Holdings: 0: holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation citation and quotation marks excluded 2: holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 3: holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 4: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "direct financial benefit from the infringing activity and \u2018has the right and ability to supervise\u2019 the infringing activity.\u201d Id. (quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004)). Bridgeport argues that Universal is liable for both vicarious and contributory infringement of Change Gone Come. The vicarious liability, it argues, arose because Universal \u201chas the right to police the infringements\u201d of T-Funk. It, however, has not supported this assertion with evidence. While Universal entered into an exclusive publishing agreement with Hutton, the agreement merely provides Universal with the right to own and exploit his works, not to control his song writing activities. Cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (<HOLDING>). There is no vicarious liability because Holdings: 0: holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the copyright act since they were not qualitatively different from a copyright claim because they contained no extra element beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement 1: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply 2: recognizing that copyright offices interpretation of copyright act should ordinarily receive deference 3: holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation 4: holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "hearing \u201cif the substance of the affidavit purporting to contain newly discovered evidence, when taken at face value, is insufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested.\u201d Scherf v. State, 788 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Minn.2010). To prove a claim by clear and convincing evidence requires a party\u2019s evidence to be \u201cunequivocal, intrinsically probable and credible, and free from frailties.\u201d Gassier v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 583 (Minn.2010). The innocence prong in subdivision 4(b)(2) requires \u201cmore than an uncertainty\u201d about the petitioner\u2019s guilt. Riley, 819 N.W.2d at 170. Instead, estab lishing \u201cactual innocence\u201d requires the petitioner to prove it is \u201cmore likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict.\u201d Id; see also Miles v. State, 800 N.W.2d 778, 783 (Minn.2011) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Brown has failed to meet the Holdings: 0: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 1: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence 2: holding that a petitioner must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence on its face would prove the petitioners innocence by a clear and convincing standard 3: holding that a bad faith claim must be met through the clear and convincing evidence standard 4: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Norris, 96 F.3d 1085, 1088 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Brown, 921 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir.1990)). \u201cOur function as an appellate court is not to reweigh the evidence. To the contrary, we must accord \u2018great deference\u2019 where a state appellate court has found the evidence supporting the conviction constitutionally sufficient,\u201d as is the case here. Id. (citations omitted); see also Blair-Bey v. Nix, 44 F.3d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1995) (finding that, in evaluating claims that the evidence was insufficient to find guilt, courts must examine \u201cwhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d); Redding v. State, 881 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a reviewing court must determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged 4: holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the government and the recipient. In Jones, the Supreme Court emphasizes that the amount and nature of notice required by due process must take into account \u201cunique information about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case.\u201d Jones, 126 S.Ct. at 1716. A fiduciary relationship between the government and the intended recipient certainly constitutes such \u201cunique information\u201d \u2014 especially in light of other relationships that have been consistently held to increase the government\u2019s notice obligations. Where, for example, the notice recipient is a ward of the state (such as a prisoner), the government has been held to a higher standard of notice. See, e.g., Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 794-95 Holdings: 0: holding that burden is on government to show that error in failure to provide notice is harmless 1: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner 2: holding that at a bare minimum the district court was required to provide a pro se prisoner with fair notice of the summary judgment rule requirements 3: holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice 4: holding that where the recipient is a federal prisoner the government is required to provide him with actual notice of a deprivation", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Intelligence Agency, 591 F.Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C.1984), and judges \u201clack the expertise necessary to second-guess ... agency opinions,\u201d Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C.Cir.1980) (deferring to the agency\u2019s opinion and holding that certain CIA affidavits provided ample evidence to show potential harm under a limited de novo review). If the court finds that the agency\u2019s affidavits are insufficiently detailed, it should deny summary judgment. Campbell, 164 F.3d at 31 (remanding to the district court to allow the FBI to further \u201cjustify\u201d its Exemption 1 claim because its declaration failed to \u201cdraw any connection between the documents at issue and the general standards that govern the national security exemption\u201d), remanded to 193 F.Supp.2d 29, 38 (D.D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of the Army, 79 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that although the first amendment was implicated the regulation compelling disclosure of certain information in advertisements was constitutional as long as it was reasonably related to the states interest 1: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 2: holding that agency could not claim national security disclosure exemption where documents already released to the press 3: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 4: holding that a declaration was insufficient by merely concluding without further elaboration that disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his marriage to Ms. Short, and that the loan therefore constitutes a separate property debt incurred by him prior to his marriage to Ms. Short. In the post-nuptial agreement, however, Mr. Short promised to repay his loan to Ms. Short \u201cif the marriage lastfed] more than three years.\u201d More significantly, the decree of dissolution of June 3, 1993, provided that Mr. Short \u201cowed to [Ms. Short] $41,450\u201d at 8.469% interest and that Mr. Short would \u201cpay the sum of $600 per month to [Ms. Short] until such time as the loan [was] paid.\u201d Mr. Short\u2019s contention that his $50,000 loan from Ms. Short is not divorce-related, even though the terms of its repayment were expressly incorporated into the decree of dissolution, lacks merit. See, e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881-82 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Ill Mr. Short next argues that the bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 1: holding nondischargeable a husbands debt to his wife where the husband had agreed to assume the debt under the terms of the couples divorce agreement and stating that  523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements 2: holding that in the absence of a hold harmless agreement a former spouse has no claim against the debtor to pay a debt listed on the divorce agreement as belonging to the debtor because such a debt is not incurred in connection with the divorce but was incurred in connection with the debtors and former spouses original transaction with the creditor 3: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that  523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "set aside and the charge dismissed. We disagree. Wharton\u2019s Rule is a judicially created \u201cdoctrine of criminal law enunciating an exception to the general principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end are discrete crimes for which separate sanctions may be imposed.\u201d Iannelli, 420 U.S. at 771, 95 S.Ct. at 1287. See generally Boyd, 236 Va. at 351, 374 S.E.2d at 303 (articulating the current law in Virginia that convictions may be had in a single trial for \u201cboth the completed substantive offense and the underlying conspiracy\u201d). Under the rale, \u201c[w]hen to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logically necessary, conspiracy [to commit that offense] ... cannot be maintained.\u201d Stewart v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 473, 478, 303 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1983) (<HOLDING>) (quoting 2 F. Wharton, Criminal Law \u00a7 1604, at Holdings: 0: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 1: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder 2: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 3: holding that whartons rule applies to the crime of pandering 4: holding that exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2002). A court lacks habeas jurisdiction to evaluate claims \u201cgrounded solely in the INS\u2019s failure to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.\u201d Id. Pure issues of law may be raised in habeas petitions. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (noting historical use of writ to challenge detentions based on \u201cerrors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes\u201d); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (upholding use of habeas to challenge on constitutional grounds the \u201cstatutory framework\u201d permitting detention without bail); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 203 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir.1998)) (<HOLDING>). \u201c[I]f a statute makes an alien eligible to be Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts possess habeas jurisdiction over claims arising under implementing legislation and regulations of the convention against torture 1: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 2: holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident 3: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims 4: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "when he knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization, or by threat or deception, and knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the thing of value in such manner as to deprive the other person permanently of its use or benefit. With regard to both the Dunn and McCarthy funds, both parties initially authorized Rishel to obtain control over the funds for the express purpose of purchasing baseball season tickets. After Rishel failed to purchase the tickets, both Dunn and the McCar- thys attempted to reach Rishel to no avail, and thereafter withdrew their authorization. To constitute theft pursuant to \u00a7 18-4-401(1)(b), \"[clontrol of the property need not be unauthorized from the outset.\" People v. Treat, 193 Colo. 570, 568 P.2d 473, 476 (1977)(<HOLDING>). \"It is sufficient [for purposes of the Holdings: 0: holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse 1: holding that although authorization was initially given for property exercise of that control continued to be authorized only because the defendant deceived the rightful owner of the property into believing that a legitimate use was being made of the property 2: holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief 3: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property 4: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(1997) (\u201cAn inmate shall be released on parole by the written order of the parole board if the board determines . . . there is a reasonable probability that the inmate can be released without detriment to the community or to the inmate; and . . . the inmate is willing and capable of fulfilling the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.\u201d). 17 Without making a determinative decision, we note that the practical application of \u00a7 204b to plaintiff presents an instructive comparison to the case at bar. Unlike the current case, if \u00a7 204b\u2019s seventy-percent rule had been applied to plaintiff, the statute\u2019s plain terms would have retroactively increased the length of plaintiffs minimum sentence. This, presumably, would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 544, 133 S. Ct. at 2084 (<HOLDING>); see also Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671, Holdings: 0: holding that the application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing rather than at the time of defendants conduct does not violate the ex post facto clause even if the current guidelines suggest a harsher sentence because the guidelines are only advisory not binding 1: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range 2: holding that district court did not violate ex post facto clause in sentencing defendant above guidelines maximum where district court assumed guidelines to be advisory prebooker 3: holding that use of the guidelines in effect at time of sentencing does not violate ex post facto clause after booker 4: holding that parole guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "punitive damages against Defendants Ekstrom, Sockwell, and Walker. \u201cPunitive damages are available against individual [government officials] in a \u00a7 1983 claim only where the [officials\u2019] \u2018conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.\u2019\u201d Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983)). As discussed above, Ekstrom, Sockwell, and Walker are dismissed from this action in their individual capacities. Plaintiff is therefore precluded from seeking punitive damages against them. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even if Ekstrom, Sock-well, or Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 1: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity 2: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 3: holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under  1983 4: holding state of north carolina and state official sued in their official capacity are immune from  1983 and  1985 actions in federal court", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "tries to analogize its case to one considered by the Eighth Circuit in Frye v. Kansas City Missouri Police Department, 375 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.2004). In Frye, the plaintiffs demonstrated against abortion by standing on the side of a road holding signs, some of which contained pictures of mutilated fetuses. Id. at 788. Following complaints from drivers, the police gave the plaintiffs the choice of either relocating to a different portion of the road or taking down the graphic signs. Id. Several demonstrators were arrested under the loitering ordinance when they refused to obey. Id. The Eighth Circuit found no First Amendment violation. The court stated that the officers\u2019 actions were not motivated by the content of the signs, but rather out of a concern for public safety. Id. at 790 (<HOLDING>). The facts in the instant lawsuit are Holdings: 0: holding that alleged whistleblowing action that took place five years before the plaintiffs termination was not close enough in time  to support a claim of retaliation 1: holding anticipatory warrant was invalid for lack of probable cause because at time warrant was issued the contraband was not on a sure course to the place to be searched and there was no assurance defendant would take contraband to that place 2: holding that the plaintiffs message was not suppressed but only regulated as to time place and manner 3: holding for purposes of a retaliation claim restricting  disruptive behavior constitutes the type of time place and manner regulation that survives even the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum 4: holding that as to each predicate act the plaintiff must allege the time place and contents of the misrepresentations", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cincinnati, 622 F.3d at 534-35. After determining the type of forum, the Court addresses whether the limitations placed on Plaintiffs\u2019 speech satisfy the constitutional standard applicable to that forum. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469-70, 129 S.Ct. 1125. Because Plaintiffs seek access to the Atrium\u2019s Holiday Display, specifically the space next to the Nativity Scene, the Atrium is the space within which a determination of the relevant forum must be analyzed. United Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 1099 v. S.W. Ohio Reg\u2019l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir.1998) (where plaintiff sought access to advertising space located on exterior of public bus, the advertising space was the forum at issue); Air Line Pilots Ass\u2019n, Int\u2019l v. Dep\u2019t of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum 1: holding that phone and facsimile communications to the forum purchase orders and payments sent to the forum a choice of law clause within the contract regarding the forum state and delivery of the product within the forum state were not enough to satisfy minimum contacts 2: holding that where plaintiff sought access to display cases in ohare airport terminal the display case and not the terminal itself was the relevant forum 3: recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties 4: holding that inquiring about whether the defendant was carrying narcotics as he was leaving the terminal building of the portland international airport was not a stop within the meaning of ors 131605 et seq nor did it violate the defendants constitutional rights", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful removal or retention. 1988 WL 411501, at *7. ICARA, however, shifts the burden to a respondent to show why an award of fees, costs, and expenses would be \u201cclearly inappropriately.]\u201d [ (quoting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 11607(b)(3)).] The First Circuit has explained that under \u00a7 11607(b)(3), the district court \u201chas a duty ... to order the payment of necessary expenses and legal fees, subject to a broad caveat denoted by the words, \u2018clearly inappropriate.\u2019 \u201d Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir.2004). Such caveat provides the district court \u201cbroad discretion in its effort to comply with the Hague Convention consistently with our own laws and standards.\u201d Id.; see also Chafin [v. Chafin], [\u2014 U.S.-,] 133 S.Ct. [1017,] 1022[, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) ] (<HOLDING>). West v. Dobrev, 735 F.3d 921, 932 (10th Holdings: 0: recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs 1: holding that expenses refers to costs 2: holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan 3: recognizing that under  11607b3 a court ordering the return of a child generally must require respondent to pay the fees costs and expenses associated with the return 4: holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the loss at issue here. Having decided that each policy provides pro rata coverage, we must address the issue of the first $200,000 of liability, as Payless\u2019s policy with USF & G contains a self-insured retention of that amount applicable to this claim. The district court concluded that Payless was self-insured for that amount, and that the self-insurance was \u201cother insurance\u201d within the meaning of CU\u2019s \u201cother insurance\u201d clause, such that Payless\u2019s self-insurance was primary over CU\u2019s excess coverage for the first $200,000 for which USF & G is not liable. Although Minnesota courts have found certificates of self-insurance to constitute \u201cinsurance\u201d in the context of automobile insurance and compulsory liability insurance statutes, see McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Mmn.1991) (<HOLDING>), we do not believe that those cases dictate a Holdings: 0: holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable 1: holding that selfinsurance does not constitute other valid and collectible insurance 2: holding that the certificate of selfinsurance filed with the commissioner is the functional equivalent of an insurance policy for purposes of minnesotas nofault statutes minnstat  65b49 subd 31 2002 3: holding that because the policy by its terms afforded the injured party no coverage neither does minnstat  65b49 subd 3a5 4: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "circumstances of each case. Dominguez, 149 F.R.D. at 168; Goldwater, 136 F.R.D. at 340. 1. Witness\u2019 Area of Expertise, Education, and Training. Although it is uneontroverted that Dr. Golnick is a physician who specializes in neurology, the record is devoid of evidence that Dr. Golnick is a preeminent expert in his field or that he possesses knowledge or training unique from other neurologists. Even if the record did reflect that Dr. Golnick possessed unique expertise or training in the field of neurology, courts have been slow to award exorbitant fees based on an expert\u2019s special abilities. See Anthony, 106 F.R.D. at 464 (denying fee request of $420.00 per hour by physician who was \u201cone of only a handful of physicians\u201d with expertise to testify on subject); Dominguez, 149 F.R.D. at 168 (<HOLDING>); cf. Grendel\u2019s Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding physician employed by public medical school and removed as director of transplant program was not deprived of property interest when his salary was not decreased 1: holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits 2: holding that physician who specialized in taste and smell taught medical school classes and conducted research in his area of expertise was not entitled to earn premium fee 3: holding physician entitled to recover attorneys fees actually paid by malpractice insurer because physician was personally liable in the first instance 4: holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "attorney is considered a state official in Mississippi....\u201d). Finally, even if Appellees\u2019 failure to identify C.G. Smith and produce her statement was untimely, this conduct is not sanctionable, as the evidence is not germane to the merits of this case. As discussed above, because the evidence shows that C.G. Smith did not provide her statement to the District Attorney until after Ard\u2019s assault, the statement has no bearing on whether Rushing or Lincoln County acted with deliberate indifference. \u201cAn appellate court need be involved [in discovery rulings] only when a party\u2019s substantial rights have been prejudiced and the proceeding would have turned out differently had the evidence been disclosed.\u201d Bass v. City of Jackson, 540 F. App\u2019x 300, 302 (5th Cir.2013) (per curiam) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, Ard has failed to Holdings: 0: holding that there is no indication that the district court abused its discretion in denying the discoverysanction motion 1: holding that district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs motion to file fourth amended complaint 2: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 3: holding that district court abused its discretion in denying rule 60b1 motion without conducting equitable analysis 4: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "adjudicative administrative proceedings,\u201d we confirmed again that \u201cunder the general statutory authorizations for appeal, agencies are entitled to appeal from adverse circuit court judgments where the functions of the agencies \u2018are so identified with the execution of some definite public policy as the representative of the State, that their participation in litigation affecting their decisions is regarded by the Legislature as essential to the adequate protection of the State\u2019s interests.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 294, 643 A.2d at 416 (quoting Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., supra, 304 Md. at 743, 501 A.2d at 54). That approach was followed as well in Board of Liquor v. Hollywood, 344 Md. 2, 684 A.2d 837 (1996), where we overruled Liquor License Board v. Leone, 249 Md. 263, 239 A.2d 82 (1968) (<HOLDING>) and found standing to appeal. We could have Holdings: 0: holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision 1: holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school 2: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 3: recognizing that third class county assessment law establishes standing of board to appeal 4: holding that the county had no standing to sue the state to recover taxes illegally obtained from citizens unless the money belongs to the county", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "will not be considered by the Supreme Court. If the Court of Civil Appeals did not decide all properly preserved and briefed issues, the Supreme Court may, if it should vacate COCA's opinion, address undecided matters. Hough v. Leonard, 1993 OK 112, \u00b6 15-16, 867 P.2d 438, 445-46. 34 . Oklahoma statutes, 12 O.S.2001 \u00a7 551 et seq., provide a comprehensive scheme that governs trials. The terms of 12 O.S.2001 \u00a7 651 provide: \"A new trial is a reexamination in the same court, of an issue of fact or of law or both, after a verdict by a jury, the approval of the report of a referee, or [a claim of fundamental prejudicial error in the verdict form] is insufficient to warrant reversal of the verdict and judgment of the jury.\u201d LPCX Corp. v. Faulkner, 1991 OK 46, \u00b6 32, 818 P.2d 431, 440-41 (<HOLDING>); In Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co., Holdings: 0: holding that appellants failure to have trial proceedings transcribed precluded appellate review of whether trial court gave jury improper instruction 1: holding that licensee was not estopped from challenging the validity of a trademark 2: holding defendants were precluded from challenging the validity of jury verdict forms for failure to have complained at trial 3: recognizing that verdict must be affirmed by jury in open court to have force and validity 4: holding bars failure to present evidence on an issue to which the parties had stipulated precluded the attorney from challenging the accuracy of the finding", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and exit. The employee\u2019s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition is imputable to Hardee\u2019s. Hardee\u2019s also had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition because it knew that the par 14, 165 S.W.2d 390, 393-94 (1942) (whether condition was so obvious that plaintiff was bound to see it and whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not observing it were both questions of fact for the jury\u2019s consideration); Turcol v. Shoney\u2019s Enterprises, Inc., 640 S.W.2d at 507-08. However, the facts and circumstances in a particular case may be so one-sided that the trial court can say, as a matter of law, that a dangerous condition was so open and obvious that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the danger and assumed the risk. See, e.g., Harris v. Niehaus, 857 S.W.2d at 226-27 (<HOLDING>); Hokanson v. Joplin Rendering Co., 509 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an obvious joke told during an obvious comedy performance was not defamatory as a matter of law 1: holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger 2: holding danger was not so obvious to invitee as to relieve defendant of liability as a matter of law 3: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 4: holding as a matter of law that natural condition present was open and obvious to all who would encounter it", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "state\u2019s argument is very persuasive. The Second Circuit has already held that Connecticut has a sufficient economic interest in the regulations and FMPs promulgated as a result of the Secretary\u2019s actions under \u00a7 1854(f)(A) to challenge those regulations in its own right. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 204 F.3d at 415 n. 2. The Second Circuit declined to address the issue of Connecticut\u2019s standing as parens patriae. Id. This court finds that the economic interest that provided the basis for standing in Daley is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a state have a quasi-sovereign interest apart from any private citizens in order to maintain a parens patriae suit against the United States. See, Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)(<HOLDING>). Unlike in some cases where parens patriae Holdings: 0: holding that a state has a quasisovereign interest in the economic wellbeing of its citizens and in not being denied its rightful status within the federal system 1: holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest 2: holding that a state must articulate a quasisovereign interest in order to have parens patriae standing 3: recognizing as a quasisovereign interest that the state and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow fiom participation in the federal system 4: holding that the state would be the real party in interest with respect to its claim for restitution even under the claimbyclaim approach because it has a quasisovereign interest in seeking recovery on behalf of a wide range of consumers and aiming to deter future antitrust conduct by corporations in the state", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and In re Comer, 716 F.2d 168 (3d Cir.1983), the challenged order of the district court does not fully adjudicate a specific adversary proceeding between the parties. To the contrary, the district court\u2019s ruling that the bankruptcy court\u2019s September 30, 1993 disbursement order was a \u201cmoney judgment,\u201d and not a mandatory injunction, ensured continuation of the controversy, i.e., preserving the issue of whether the Government is entitled to set off the $8.36 million now in the registry account against the claims of the Government agencies. Even under the most relaxed concept of finality, the October 19, 1993 order of the district court granting the Government a Rule 62(d) stay pending appeal cannot be viewed as the equivalent of a final order. Compare In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1041 (<HOLDING>). An order granting a stay pending appeal is Holdings: 0: holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order  is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable 1: holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine 2: holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable 3: recognizing that an order denying a motion to modify a family court order where the motion is based on changed factual or legal circumstances is appealable as a special order after final judgment 4: holding that order denying representation to class of future claimants in bankruptcy proceeding is equivalent to denial of request to intervene and order denying right to intervene is appealable final order", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "User is the requisite element, and it may be by any who have occasion to travel over public lands, and if the use be by only one, still it suffices. (quoting Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 P.2d 652, 653 (1938)); accord, Barker v. County of La Plata, 49 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1214 (D.Colo.1999). See also Wallowa County v. Wade, 43 Or. 253, 72 P. 793, 794 (1903) (affirming R.S. 2477 claim\u2019 despite the servient landowner\u2019s showing that \u201cthe road over the land inclosed by him had never been worked or improved by the county authorities, or under their direction\u201d); Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe, 918 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Alaska 1996) (\u201c[n]or does the route need to be significantly developed to qualify as a \u2018highway\u2019 for RS 2477 purposes\u201d); Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal.App.2d 843, 158 P.2d 207, 209 (1945) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with our conclusion that Holdings: 0: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  1: recognizing rs 2477 right of way even though it was never improved or maintained by the county 2: holding that county commissioners court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to the will of those having to bear the bond burden 3: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 4: recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "original sentencing hearing was legally insufficient to support such a finding. In Butler v. State, 46 Md.App. 317, 416 A.2d 773 (1980), we vacated an enhanced sentence, imposed under section 643B(c), based on two prior convictions for crimes of violence, because one conviction was not final and the other conviction, for robbery in the District of Columbia, may have been for a crime of violence bu 309 (2003) (\u201cWhile we recognize that we have found New Hampshire\u2019s Double Jeopardy Clause to provide greater protection than its federal counterpart in certain circumstances ... we are not persuaded that we should interpret the State Constitution differently than the Federal Constitution in this context.\") (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 594 Pa. 106, 116 n.6, 934 A.2d 1191 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 6 , The defense maintained that the Holdings: 0: holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes 1: holding that double jeopardy protections did not prevent the state from presenting evidence of youthschool sentencing enhancement when the original sentence was overturned on appeal 2: holding possibility of more severe sentence on retrial after appeal or collateral attack does not violate double jeopardy or due process protections 3: holding that the government could appeal a criminal sentence without violating the double jeopardy clause when congress expressly authorized such an appeal 4: holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Cir. Ct.2005) (quoting Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 57 (Va. Cir. Ct.2003)). Plaintiff alleges that Voorthuis Optician\u2019s insistence that she report to work in the District of Columbia, where her medical malpractice coverage may not have applied, created an intolerable work condition that forced her to resign. Am. Compl. at \u00b6 36. Even assuming that plaintiffs resignation was occasioned by conduct \u201cso outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community,\u201d plaintiff failed to identify a specific statute which defendants violated by asking her to report to work in the District of Columbia. See Johnson v. Behsudi, 52 Va. Cir. 533, 538 (Va. Cir. Ct.1997) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, plaintiffs claim of Holdings: 0: holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute 1: holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine 2: holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action 3: holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy 4: holding that an employee has no right of action against an employer for wrongful discharge where no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201csubjects, or causes to be subjected,\u201d a person to deprivation of a right. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983; see, e.g., Board of County Com\u2019rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-03, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). As assistant coaches and an athletic trainer, Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice were not Defendant Dorrance\u2019s supervisors and had no authority over his behavior. In the absence of legal control over Defendant Dorrance, these Defendants\u2019 reporting omissions cannot be said to have affirmatively caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs\u2019 constitutional rights. Therefore, the \u00a7 1983, failure-to-report claims against Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice must be dismissed. See Reid v. Kayye, 885 F.2d 129, 131-32 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Holdings: 0: holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc  1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties 2: holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of  1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under  1983 3: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983 4: holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that he acted in conformity therewith * * * [s]o, it\u2019s not used to show the defendant committed this particular crime. He\u2019s presumed innocent. [E]vidence of any other unlawful activity is not used to show that someone has the capacity to commit a crime.\u201d Having withdrawn his objection to the admission of his prior-arson reference, defendant did not object to this instruction or request any supplementation or alteration to its wording. As a result, this instruction became the law of the case. See, e.g., State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I.1980). Hence we must not only presume that the jury followed this instruction, but also we will not allow defendant to complain about the adequacy of this charge on appeal when he failed to do so at the trial. See, e.g., Cardoza, 649 A.2d at 748 (<HOLDING>). However, notwithstanding this instruction, Holdings: 0: holding that in admitting evidence the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction sua sponte is not reversible error 1: holding that failure to give a limiting instruction for 404b evidence is not plain error 2: holding that when defendant argued on appeal that the trial justice should have given the jury a sua sponte limiting instruction regarding alleged rule 404b evidence defendants failure to object at trial constituted a waiver of that issue 3: holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver 4: holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the district courts failure to give a limiting instruction addressing rule 404b evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise the issue on appeal", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of [the contract containing the provision for arbitration].\u201d 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 2 (emphasis added). The complaint describes a controversy that did not arise out of the termite agreement. In their brief to this Court, the Orkin defendants argue that \u201cthe fact that the termite [agreement] [was] entered into after the \u2018termite letter\u2019 [was] prepared is of no legal significance.\u201d We disagree. The Orkin defendants cite no authority for such a broad interpretation of the \u201cthereafter arising\u201d language of \u00a7 2 of the FAA, and we know of no authority that could provide such a broad interpretation. It would be a strained reading of the FAA as well as circuitous log 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present action, the Lar-kins claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence 1: holding that that plaintiffs claims which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the pacific stock exchange were not arbitrable because the record contained little if any evidence to show that the plaintiff knew of the existing controversy when he became bound by the arbitration rules 2: recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence 3: holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract 4: holding that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate his claim which accrued before he became bound by the arbitration rules of the new york stock exchange because he was fully aware of the existing claim at the time he became a member of the exchange and became bound by its arbitration rules", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on to provide the court with authority to extend support beyond the child\u2019s eighteenth birthday if there are physical or mental disabilities of the child or upon a showing of other exceptional circumstances. In light of the above statute, it would appear at first blush that the now appealed from family court order erred in requiring Mother to pay the full amount of support as noted in the Original Support Order until Daughter was almost twenty years of age. However, where one of multiple children reaches majority, a parent\u2019s child support obligation will not be affected absent a family court order modifying the amount of support owed. Bull v. Smith, 299 S.C. 123, 126, 382 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1989). See also Stroman v. Williams, 291 S.C. 376, 380, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>). Where one of multiple children becomes Holdings: 0: holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy 1: holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees 2: holding that where a support order provides for payments for the benefit of two or more children the marriage or emancipation of one minor child does not automatically affect the liability of the father for the full sum prescribed in the order  3: holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father 4: holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court that his claims should survive because they involved continuing injuries that did not end until January 24, 2000. The district court construed this as an argument for the application of the continuing violation doctrine. The district court then rejected this argument because it concluded, based upon an unpublished decision of this court, that the continuing violation doctrine is not applicable to \u00a7 1983 cases. McCormick v. Farrar, No. 02-2037-GTV, 2003 WL 1697686, at *4 (D.Kan. Mar.20, 2003) (unpublished) (citing Rassam v. San Juan Coll. Bd., 113 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.1997)). This court has not, however, announced a precedential blanket rule that the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable to \u00a7 1983 suits. Cf. Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Rassam, the case relied on by the district Holdings: 0: holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith 1: holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing 2: holding continuing violation theory inapplicable to  1981 claims 3: holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud 4: holding frady inapplicable", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by double yellow lines on Salisbury Street. Although the two signs alerted motorists that there was a \u201cK-9 CHECK POINT AHEAD,\u201d in fact, there was no K-9 officer at the checkpoint. A K-9 officer was present and available to assist, however, in a vehicle parked near the narcotics officers who were observing the activities from Pelican Drive. The narcotics officers stationed on Pelican Drive observed a burgundy Pontiac Grand Am approach the checkpoint signs and then execute an illegal u-turn across the grass median after passing the first checkpoint sign but before reaching the checkpoint itself. Upon observing that conduct, the narcotics officers pursued the Grand Am and executed a stop. Three narcotics officers approached the stopped car. Narcotics officers Almeida and K Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Scott Brooks\u2019s commission of a Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 1: holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 2: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 3: holding that unless the law enforcement officers show of authority succeeds in restraining a person the person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 4: holding that a dog that was destroyed by the police department was obviously  seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as a purchaser. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130,119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)(noting that injury-in-fact is a constitutional minimum). Thus, to prove constitutional standing, a plaintiff must show that it has suffered a cognizable \u201cinjury-in-fact\u201d that has been caused by the defendant and is redressable by the court. See generally, Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 26-27 (1st Cir.2007); Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir.2006). BPI Global has satisfied that requirement here by showing that it took on investment risk as general partner for several of the very funds it managed. Whether less would be sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional minimum is a question I need n er, Peabody & Co., Inc., 604 F.Supp. 764, 767 (D.C.Mo.1985) (<HOLDING>). Although the First Circuit has not to date Holdings: 0: holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class 1: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 2: holding that a purchaser for the purposes of  12a2 includes a representative or an agent for a purchaser 3: recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim 4: holding that a party waived the right to allege contrary facts on appeal eg that defendant was not an agent or instrumentality of the mexican government for sovereign immunity purposes where the party alleged that the defendant was an agent or instrumentality in its complaint", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for subsistence and lodging constitutes an improper increase in their compensation.\u201d Id. at 225, 178 P.2d at 438. Noting that we had stated, in Olmsted & Gillelen v. Hesla, 24 Ariz. 546, 553, 211 P. 589, 591 (1922), that \u201c[i]n the Constitution compensation is employed to designate salary,\u201d we rejected the petitioners\u2019 argument that legislators could not recover the per diem payments. We concluded that \u201c[w]hen the State repays the legislators and their employees for personal expenses, this does not constitute additional compensation but is merely a reimbursement for actual cash outlays necessarily incurred for subsistence while away from home and in the performance of duty.\u201d Earhart at 226, 178 P.2d at 438; see also Geyso v. City of Cudahy, 34 Wis.2d 476, 149 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (1967) (<HOLDING>). B. \u00b6 9 Although petitioners seek to Holdings: 0: holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment 1: holding that the words amount and compensation in the regulation referred to cash or salary rather than to all forms of compensation 2: holding that an attorneys cause for services rendered over a period of time accrued when his services had been completely performed 3: holding that employees vacation benefits are form of compensation for services rendered and are not gratuity 4: holding that the words salary and expense are separate and distinct terms which connote entirely different concepts salary is a fixed periodical compensation paid for services rendered whereas an expense is a charge incurred in performing those services", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "waiver of appeal paragraph. This paragraph essentially indicates that the defendant acknowledges that he\u2019s been advised of his rights to appeal only in very limited circumstances and that he will not be allowed to challenge his conviction under Title 28, 2255; and Title 18, Section 3742; however, he is reserving the right to appeal any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum. THE COURT: And the statutory maximum in this case, Mr. McIntyre, at least with respect to Count 3, is 240 months. MR. WELDON: That is correct. THE COURT: You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. The record thus demonstrates that the district court made McIntyre fully aware of the waiver of his appellate rights regarding his sentence and thus complied with Rule ll(b)(l)(N). Cf. Almany, 598 F.3d at 240-41 (<HOLDING>). McIntyre\u2019s only argument in opposition to the Holdings: 0: holding that district comets inquiry do you have anything else for the record failed to satisfy requirement that the court clearly ask for objections to the sentence that have not been previously raised 1: holding that verbal threats such as we going to get you you better drop the suit do not rise to the level of adverse action 2: holding that the district courts question do you also understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have the right to appeal any sentence that i impose did not comply with rule llbln and failed to properly notify the defendant about the waiver of his appellate rights 3: holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute 4: holding that it is not extortion to threaten economic harm when you have a legal right to engage in the activity you threaten", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "recognize that the services rendered to the patient are necessary for the protection of the third person. DiMarco, supra at 424-25 (footnote omitted). The DiMarco rule, which was underscored by the Superior Court\u2019s subsequent holding in Troxel v. A.I. duPont Institute, 431 Pa.Super. 464, 636 A.2d 1179 (1994), is that a physician\u2019s duty of care is owed not only to his or her patient, but also to identifiable third parties who will suffer if a physician negligently errs in the handling of a case of infectious disease. See also Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 557 Pa. 340, 733 A.2d 623, 628 (1999) (recognizing that the role of physicians in protecting the public from communicable diseases was central to our decision in DiMarco); Matharu v. Muir, 29 A.3d 375 (Pa.Super.2011) {en banc) (<HOLDING>). The rule I derive from DiMarco and the Holdings: 0: holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law 1: recognizing that negligent conduct of police investigations does not give rise to a cause of action because the duty to protect citizens and enforce the law is one owed generally to the public 2: holding law enforcement owed duty similar to that owed by dshs under rcw 2644050 3: holding that physicians owed a duty to protect an infant against rhsensitization 4: holding that an international relief organization owed no duty to protect aid contractor from murder by thirdparty somalis", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "repealing act violated a prior constitutional provision virtually identical to Article 3, sec. 56 because it changed the city\u2019s charter, the Court observed: From a reading of the entire section it is clear that its object and meaning is to prohibit the granting of special favors by the legislature, and to require that all legislation upon the subjects therein enumerated should be equal and uniform. It certainly did not mean to take away from the legislature its inherent power of repealing any law theretofore passed by it, and we must hold that said repealing act is a )(stating that adoption of a constitutional provision against special legislation does not prevent the repeal of previously enacted special law); Luehrman v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 70 Tenn. 425, 2 Lea 425 (1879)(<HOLDING>). We conclude that Article 3, sec. 56 does not Holdings: 0: holding that the repeal of  921a30 did not affect the validity of the prior version of  2k21a4b which continued to reference the repealed  921a30 1: holding that a city charter is a law under the whistleblower act 2: holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them 3: holding that legislation which repealed the charter of the city of jacksonville did not violate constitutional provision prohibiting local or special laws which change the charter of a city 4: holding that constitutional provision which prohibited local and special laws did not limit legislatures inherent power to repeal the corporate privileges of a particular community and therefore act which repealed the charter of the city of memphis was not unconstitutional", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "basis review appears to be an issue of first impression in Michigan. Many other jurisdictions have faced similar challenges to the inclusion of false imprisonment crimes, even absent a sexual purpose, in their sex offender registration statutes. The majority have upheld the statutes under rational basis review. See, e.g., Moffitt v Commonwealth, 360 SW3d 247, 255-257 (Ky App, 2012) (concluding that although the defendant\u2019s conviction of child kidnapping included a sexual component, the purpose of Kentucky\u2019s registration statute was the protection of children and the requirement of registration for certain offenses against minors, regardless of a sexual component, did not offend substantive or procedural due process); State v Smith, 323 Wis 2d 377, 397-407; 780 NW2d 90 (Wis, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Rainer v State, 286 Ga 675, 676-679; 690 SE2d Holdings: 0: holding that the requirement of sex offender registration for the defendants conviction of false imprisonment of a minor was not cruel and unusual punishment and did not violate substantive or procedural due process 1: holding that even though the offense was not of a sexual nature requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender following his conviction for false imprisonment of a minor was rationally related to the government interest in protecting the public and did not violate the defendants right to due process or equal protection under the law 2: holding that the district court did not violate the defendants right to due process when it departed upward to life imprisonment pursuant to  5k221 because his sentence was within the maximum set forth in the united states code for the offense of conviction 3: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection as rule was uniformly applied not arbitrary and rationally related to legitimate government interest 4: holding that the admission of his juvenile conviction did not violate equal protection", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "who purport to hire, as contractors, minions to carry out the proprietor\u2019s own \u201cregular trade or business\u201d in an attempt to avoid workers\u2019 compensation liability for employees. King v. Snide, 144 Vt. 395, 400-01, 479 A.2d 752,754 (1984). The legislative intent in designating these individuals as \u201cstatutory employers\u201d was \u201cto impose liability only upon the owner or proprietor of a regular trade or business . . . where an uninsured independent contractor is carrying out some phase of the owner\u2019s or operator\u2019s business.\u201d Id. at 401, 479 A.2d at 754. \u00b6 9. Thus understood, the statutory defini that unofficial manager of a wood lot was not statutory employer of an independent logger\u2019s employee injured on the premises); Packett v. Moretown Creamery Co., 91 Vt. 97, 99-101, 99 A. 638 (1917) (<HOLDING>). In contrast, and like in In re Chatham Woods Holdings: 0: holding that a creamery was not statutory employer of a contractor hired to build a new structure 1: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate 2: holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work 3: holding that where owner and contractor frequently discussed progress of construction project and advancement of money by owner to contractor and contractor misappropriated some of the money debt was not excepted from discharge under bankruptcy code  523a2 because owner did not show that contractor had intent not to perform when the agreement was made 4: holding a premises owner is a general contractor for purposes of the statutory employer provision", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "against imposition of punitive damages on governmental entities.\u201d Vt. Agency of Nat. Res, v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 784, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (citation omitted). Consequently, the inquiry here is whether Plaintiffs argument that Defendant actually is not a municipality, and thus the punitive damages immunity is inapplicable, is valid. (See Br. in Opp\u2019n (Doc. 21) at 13.) \u201cThe board of education of each county in the State shall be a body corporate ....\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat., \u00a7 115C-40. Among other powers, duc., 315 F.Supp.2d 784, 810 (M.D.N.C.2004) (\u201cDefendant Guilford County Board of Education is a governmental entity and therefore is immune from punitive damages,\u201d (citation omitted)); Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 208, 293 S.E.2d 101, 115 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Ripellino v. N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass\u2019n, 158 Holdings: 0: holding that the state is immune from punitive awards 1: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that port authority is immune from punitive damages 3: holding that in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary municipal corporations are immune from punitive damages 4: recognizing that the municipal function test is used to determine both whether municipalities are immune from suit and immune from running of statutes of limitations", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "testify one way or another. Id. Thus, there was no indication that the impeachment evidence would be relevant, or even admissible. Id. In this case, disqualification would rest at present upon the chance that the prosecution might call the personnel manager to testify regarding Padilla's personnel file. We have no evidence in this record to support a determination that the possibility of that cireum-stance w 82 (1994) (stating that a defendant has no standing to invoke a third party's privilege in either a criminal or civil action}; State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo.1991) (stating that \"the physician-patient privilege is personal to the patient, and generally no person ... other than the patient may so object\"); Osborn v. Fabatz, 105 Mich.App. 450, 306 N.W.2d 319, 322 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Hence, it falls not to the defendant in this Holdings: 0: holding that where a third partys conduct is closely related to the contractual relationship or the contractual dispute and where the third party enjoys financial benefit from the contract the forum selection clause applies to the third party 1: holding that the defendant had no standing to invoke a third partys physicianpatient privilege in a paternity action 2: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 3: holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement 4: holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "compliment each other, but courts have found that in most cases they are so intertwined in the defendant\u2019s argument that they appear to raise the same question: are the plaintiffs claims so \u201ccompletely preempted\u201d that the only way to avoid removal due to federal question jurisdiction is through the \u201cartful pleading\u201d of the state-law claim? Thus, these courts have viewed \u201ccomplete preemption\u201d as a prerequisite to the application of the \u201cartful pleading doctrine\u201d. See, Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475, 118 S.Ct. 921 (\u201cThe artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiffs state-law claim\u201d); Braco v. MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., 138 F.Supp.2d. 1260, 1268, n. 10 (C.D.Cal.2001); Crump v. WorldCom, Inc., 128 F.Supp.2d. 549, 559-60 (W.D.Tenn.2001)(<HOLDING>); Minnesota by Hatch, at 373. The instant Holdings: 0: recognizing doctrine 1: holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate 2: recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine 3: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 4: holding that jurisdiction must be resolved before applying the act of state doctrine because that doctrine is a substantive rule of law", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by other Nashville-area employers, and not the operating costs of its other facilities. After weeks of fruitless negotiations, Peterbilt locked out the employees on June 23, 2008. The parties ceased negotiations in August, and the Madison plant closed for good in 2009. After the unions filed an unfair labor practice charge against Peterbilt, the Board\u2019s Regional Director filed a complaint alleging unlawful nondisclosure of relevant bargaining information and unlawful lockout under the Act. See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 158(a)(1), (a)(5), (d) (prohibiting employers from \u201cinterfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or eoerc[ing] employees in the exercise of\u2019 their collective-bargaining rights and requiring good-faith negotiations); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956) (<HOLDING>); Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, Holdings: 0: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 1: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  2: holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy 3: holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege 4: holding that the acts duty of good faith includes the disclosure of information relevant to the employers bargaining position", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "disclosure: \u201cA record of an agency relating to a noncriminal investigation, including: .., -[i]nvestigative materials, notes, correspondence and reports.\u201d Section 708(b)(17)(ii) of the RTKL (emphasis added). In the absence of definitions in the. RTKL for either \u201cnoncriminal\u201d or \u201cinvestigation,\u201d we have concluded .that \u201cnoncriminal\u201d applies to investigations- other than those which are criminal in nature and that \u201cinvestigation\u201d means \u201ca systematic or searching inquiry, a detailed examination, or an official probe.\u201d Dep\u2019t of Health v. Office of Open Records, 4 A.3d 803, 810-811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The inquiry, examination, or probe must be \u201cconducted as part , of the agency\u2019s official duties.\u201d Id. at 814. See also Dep\u2019t of Pub. Welfare v. Chawaga, 91 A.3d 257, 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the OOR determined that Holdings: 0: holding that an official probe must be conducted pursuant to an agencys legislatively granted factfinding and investigative powers 1: holding that an agencys reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute must be affirmed 2: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable 3: holding an action taken by an administrative agency in excess of its statutory powers is the well recognized exception to the general rule that an agencys final order  is immune from collateral attack 4: recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Defendants have not shown that a reasonable officer could have believed that entry with intent to arrest would not violate clearly established law. Thus summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity would be inappropriate if the intent was to arrest or if facts as to intent are in dispute. A genuine dispute exists as to whether or not defendants ordered the storming of the house primarily for the purpose of arresting Quade. The fact that this dispute turns on an essentially subjective element (the officers\u2019 purpose), while qualified immunity involves an inquiry into \u201cobjective reasonableness\u201d does not mean that qualified immunity is any more or less available in this context than it would otherwise be. See Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1385 (9th Cir.1991) (Branch I) (<HOLDING>); Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1468-69 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that under the fourth amendment the motive of the officer when stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic infraction whether subjective or objective is completely irrelevant 1: holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern 2: recognizing the tension between harlows emphasis on objective reasonableness and the subjective elements which are at times at issue in lawsuits against public officials including lawsuits based on alleged fourth amendment violations 3: recognizing private damage action for fourth amendment violations by federal officers 4: holding that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in making an arrest are properly analyzed under the fourth amendments objective reasonableness standard", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "whether her voice, and theatrical style, would have been identifiable if another song had been presented, and not \u201cher song\u201d, which unfortunately for her was owned by others and licensed to the defendants. Id. at 716. Similarly, Plaintiffs in this case assert that the \u201csound associated with Plaintiffs\u2019 \u2018What I Like About You\u2019 is part and parcel of who they are as entertainers.\u201d (Pis.\u2019 Mot. at 9.) Their claim is therefore that their \u201csound in connection with the music, lyrics and arrangement\u201d is distinctive. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that their sound is identifiable separate from the Song. The Court therefore reaches the same conclusion as the Sinatra court and holds that Plaintiffs\u2019 claim must fail. 2. First Amendment Defenda nc., 444 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1039 (C.D.Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>); Video Software Dealers Ass\u2019n v. Maleng, 325 Holdings: 0: holding that video game maker defendants have met both requirements of the rogers balancing test and are entitled as a matter of law to a first amendment defense to plaintiffs lanham act claims 1: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute 2: holding that the video games at issue are expressive and qualify as speech for purposes of the first amendment 3: holding that a video game clearly qualifies as an artistic work entitled to first amendment protection 4: holding that the first amendment protects communicative aspects of video games", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253(c)(1)(A) (stating no appeal may be taken from a \u201cfinal order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court\u201d until an applicant obtains a COA); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir.2000) (stating \u00a7 2253(c)(l)(A)\u2019s requirements apply when a state habeas applicant is proceeding under \u00a7 2241). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter. I.BACKGROUND Mr. Haff is a pretrial detainee at the Denver County Jail. He filed a \u00a7 2241 application for a writ of habeas corpus, urging the federal district court to stop the state criminal prosecution. See Walck v. Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The \u00a7 2241 application asserted five claims: Holdings: 0: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act 1: holding   2241 is the proper avenue by which to challenge pretrial detention 2: holding that  2241 was the proper statute for the petitioners pretrial double jeopardy challenge 3: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 4: recognizing that habeas corpus is a proper means to challenge the legality of pretrial detention under the jimmy ryce act", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Department of Labor\u2019s regulations were a permissible interpretation of \u00a7 196-d. See N.Y. Lab. Law \u00a7 199 (authorizing Department of Labor Commissioner to issue rules and regulations for enforcing state laws governing employers\u2019 payment of wages to employees); Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.3d at 79, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 88, 883 N.E.2d 990 (instructing that \u201cLabor Department\u2019s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference\u201d pursuant to general administrative law principle that \u201cconstruction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld\u201d). See generally Golf v. N.Y. State Dep\u2019t. of Soc. Servs., 91 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 674 N.Y.S.2d 600, 605, 697 N.E.2d 555 (1998) (<HOLDING>). But no court \u2014 state or federal \u2014 appears yet Holdings: 0: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 1: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 2: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 3: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation 4: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not been briefed and because the case can be resolved under sufh-ciency-of-the-evidence review, we assume without holding that a penis is not an \"object\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 2246(2)(C). 3 . Additionally, Rule 412 also would bar the admission of this evidence. When a party seeks to offer evidence that \u201csomeone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence,\u201d the party is required to file a motion describing the proposed evidence at least fourteen days before trial and to notify the victim of the proposed evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 412(c)(1). Here, Brown Thunder neglected to file a Rule 412 motion and failed to notify H.C. or her guardian or representative of the proposed Speker evidence. See United States v. Eagle, 137 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir.1998) Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence based upon the defendants noncompliance with the deadlines in rule 412c 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion 4: holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was justified at its inception and then (2) whether the action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances for the stop in the first place. Id. at 24, \u00b6 27, 170 P.3d at 273 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). \u00b6 46 The second detention started when Officer Craft grabbed Appellant\u2019s arm and informed him he was being detained. Men-denhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (A person is \u201cseized\u201d within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained.). Because Officer Craft and Appellant were engaged in a consensual encounter immediately prior to this point, Appellant was not seized and the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. United States v. Munoz, 590 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Flores, 474 F.3d 1100, 1103 Holdings: 0: holding officers request for passengers identification during stop constituted lawful consensual encounter 1: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 2: recognizing that once a completed traffic stop evolves into a consensual encounter there is no seizure and the fourth amendment is not implicated 3: holding that the officers mere use of her spotlight and flashlight did not transform the consensual encounter into an investigatory stop 4: holding that the return of a defendants drivers license after a traffic stop can convert what was a brief seizure into a consensual encounter even where the officer questions the defendant about criminal activity immediately thereafter", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "cannot alter the effect of the verdict. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 752. Submission of an immaterial issue is not harmful unless it confuses or misleads the jury, which we determine by considering its probable effect on the jury in light of the charge as a whole. Id. Here, reading the charge as a whole, we do not find that the question submitted was ambiguous or misleading. The question asked the jury to determine separately the negligence of the Bowens and Crow-son. A finding that the Bowens were not the proximate cause of the occurrence in question exonerated them from liability. Consequently, the question pertaining to Crowson\u2019s negligence was immaterial \u2014 in other words, any answer pertaining to Crowson\u2019s negligence would not have altered the verdict. See Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 752-53 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, putting the findings on Holdings: 0: holding that even if the district court erred in sustaining the objection the error was harmless because the witness answered the question in the negative and the court did not strike his answer 1: holding question of contributory negligence was harmless because once jury found defendant did not proximately cause the occurrence in question defendant was exonerated of liability such that neither an affirmative nor a negative answer to plaintiffs negligence could have altered the verdict 2: holding that in a fela case where the jury found negligence per se the defendant railroad could not challenge the validity of the verdict through postverdict discussions indicating that the jury believed the total award would be reduced by the plaintiffs contributory negligence 3: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction 4: holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cshall\u201d in subsection (b) of F.L. \u00a7 5-1029 is obligatory, not permissive. Indeed, the word \u201cshall\u201d is used throughout F.L. \u00a7 5-1029 in its mandatory sense, with the word \u201cmay\u201d being used when permissive action is implied, in explicit contrast to the word \u201cshall.\u201d Moreover, as we have explained, the historical context of the enactment of what is now F.L. \u00a7 5-1029 indicates that with respect to the alleged father in a paternity action, the testing afforded by that section upon motion has been referred to and treated as mandatory. To be sure, the Court of Appeals in child custody cases and in cases brought under the Estates and Trusts Article has held that it is within the discretion of the court to permit blood or genetic testing. See Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993)(<HOLDING>); Turner v. Whisted, supra, 327 Md. 106, 607 Holdings: 0: holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted 1: holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child 2: holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child 3: holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity 4: holding that in domestic law custody case blood tests to determine paternity of child born out of wedlock may only be ordered upon a showing of good cause under the best interest of the child standard", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "premises Coleman\u2019s quiet title action on his contention that certain of the loan documents contain forged signatures. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 16.) Coleman does not dispute that he signed some documents at Fairway Financial, but he does dispute the validity of his signatures on the Balloon Note and TIL Disclosure Statement. (Doc. No. 46-1 at \u00b6\u00b6 6-7, 43.) Wells Fargo argues both that Coleman has, consistently with the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing, failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the validity of the signatures, and ictions for the proposition at least some quiet title actions are unburdened by a statute of limitations as long as the challenged cloud on the title persists. See, e.g., Bangerter v. Petty, 225 P.3d 874, 879 (Utah 2009) (<HOLDING>); Salazar v. Thomas, 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 186 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial courts failure to dismiss the action to quiet title was error because the plaintiff was not in possession of the land in question but the error was not fatal to the claim because the superior court could sua sponte amend the pleadings to include an action in ejectment 1: holding that a plaintiff in possession of property may bring suit to quiet title against any or all tenantsincommon with competing claims 2: recognizing actions to quiet title are equitable in nature and a court sitting in equity has jurisdiction to quiet title as a remedy for fraud 3: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 4: holding there is no statute of limitations on action to quiet title by landowner who was in continuous possession of property under claim of ownership", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "She, not [the child], bears the primary responsibility to ensure that [the child] visit with her father according to the parenting plan. And she must, in good faith, make every effort to require [the child] to do so.\u201d (emphases added)). 10 . Because we find this issue is dispositive, we decline to reach Mother\u2019s arguments regarding admitting evidence and limiting cross-examination. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). Moreover, our decision on those two issues would not change the ultimate disposition of this case. See Weir v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 511, 517, 435 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Recco Tape and Label Co. v. Barfield, 312 Holdings: 0: holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error 1: holding no abuse of discretion in trial courts exclusion of evidence where evidence was cumulative 2: holding exclusion was harmless error 3: holding that the exclusion of cumulative evidence did not materially impact defendants right to present a defense 4: holding error in admission of evidence is harmless when it was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "agreements because, the district court reasoned, the agreements violate the Assignment of Claims Act (hereinafter the Act), 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3727, which governs the \u201ctransfer or assignment of any part of a claim against the United States Government,\u201d id. \u00a7 3727(a)(1). This determination was in error. The Act provides, in relevant part, that the assignment of a claim may be made \u201cafter a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided, and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued.\u201d Id. \u00a7 3727(b). In effect, the Act serves as a defense that the Government can raise against a claim and not, as the district court\u2019s analysis indicates, an ex ante bar to forming a contingency-fee agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 386 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Applegate v. United States, 35 Holdings: 0: holding a violation of the travel act 1: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 2: holding that 31 usc  235 the predecessor to  3729 did not become operative until final payment had been made on the false claims 3: holding that antiassignment provisions are not per se invalid as applied to health care providers 4: holding that counsels claim against the government pursuant to a contingencyfee agreement was invalid because it was in violation of the antiassignment act 31 usc  203 predecessor to the assignment of claims act", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "ing water right to acres put into irrigation within first years of appropriation)). Walton III allowed Walton to irrigate the 30 acres put into irrigation by his predecessors, but found that a delay of 23 years was not appropriation within a reasonable time, for the remaining acreage. Id. The parties generally agree that under Walton III the Court may look to Washington law for guidance in determining whether a non-Lummi has exercised due diligence to perfect a Winters right transferred with the sale of allotted lands. E.g. Lummi Brief, docket no. 718, at 32 (\u201cWashington law provides guidance for a determination of reasonable diligence and suggests that a successor must put water to use within fifteen years of the parcel leaving Indian ownership.\u201d); see also Walton III, 752 F.2d at 400 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff United States suggests that under Holdings: 0: holding the court may look to state law for guidance where federal law is not fully developed 1: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that federal courts presiding over causes of action created by state law should apply state substantive law but federal procedural law 4: holding that a federal court may resort to state law analogies for the development of a federal common law of privileges in instances where the federal rule is unsettled", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "193 N.W.2d 744 (1972). Moreover, we determine probable cause by an objective standard of reasonableness: whether the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of crime will be found. See State v. Craven, 253 Neb. 601, 571 N.W.2d 612 (1997). Here, Reilly had probable cause to search the car because of the dog\u2019s alert. A dog\u2019s identification of drugs in luggage or in a car provides probable cause that drugs are present. U.S. v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1994). But a person\u2019s mere proximity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 238 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, probable cause to search a car Holdings: 0: holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant 1: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 2: holding that there was not arguable probable cause to conduct extensive searches on night club and its patrons where only evidence was of one patron selling drugs 3: holding that search warrant for tavern and its bartender did not permit body searches of all bars patrons 4: holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "21, 2011 EEOC Addendum; November 15, 2012 EEOC Charge. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the Federal Defendants and her Title VII and ADEA claims fail on this independent basis. See Johnson v. Ashcroft, No. 00-cv-2743, 2001 WL 34366564, at *3 (D.D.C. June 21, 2001) (dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where the plaintiff did \u201cnot name either of the federal defendants\u201d in the plaintiffs EEOC complaint). The plaintiffs Complaint also asserts a claim of wrongful discharge related to her termination. Yet, Title VII and the ADEA provide the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging race and age discrimination. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 Holdings: 0: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies 1: recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap 2: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment 3: holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii 4: holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968)(\u201cThere is of course no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed.\u201d). If Congress imposes a \u201ccondition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously;\u201d otherwise, the State cannot \u201cvoluntarily and knowingly accept[ ] the terms of the \u2018contract.\u2019 \u201d Id. Spending clause legislation, when knowingly accepted by a fund recipient, imposes enforceable, affirmative obligations upon the states. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 427, 94 S.Ct. 2274, 41 L.Ed.2d 159 (1974), modified on another ground, 422 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 2625, 45 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975) (<HOLDING>); King, 392 U.S. at 333, 88 S.Ct. 2128; see Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: recognizing that states and local agencies must fulfill their part of a spending clause contract if they choose to accept the funds 2: holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment 3: holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca 4: holding that appellate courts may choose to accept or reject concessions of counsel and are not bound by them", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which a fair-minded jury could find that intentional racial discrimination on the part of the Defendants caused Andromeda to close. See Denny, 456 F.3d at 434. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count III. VI. Supplemental Jurisdiction The rulings above dispose of Plaintiffs\u2019 federal claims. The state law claims (Counts VI-V) remain. This Court could retain the state law claims only by exercising its supplemental jurisdiction. This case does not, however, present a compelling reason for this Court to decide claims that arise solely under state law. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts VI-V. The dismissal is without prejudice so that they may be refilled in state court if Plaintiffs so elect. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(c); Revene v. Charles County Commr\u2019s, 882 F.2d 870, 875 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). VII. Conclusion For the reasons stated Holdings: 0: holding that the lower court should have entered a final order on custody 1: holding appeal from an order dismissing action without prejudice was properly before this court 2: holding that a district court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs statelaw claims after dismissing the plaintiffs federal claims and did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand the case to state court 3: holding that an order dismissing a claim without prejudice is a final appealable order if the statute of limitations for that claim has expired 4: holding that the district courts order dismissing the pendent statelaw claims  should have been entered without prejudice", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "document, commonly referred to as the \"blue seal document,\" stated: I, the Secretary of State, of the State of Maine, certify that the office of the Secretary of State is the legal repository of the Great Seal of the State of Maine and also custodian of the records relating to the revocation, restoration and suspension of operators\u2019 licenses and registrations, and that the paper to which this is attached is a true copy from the records of this office. I further certify that, according to our records the license or right to operate of Morris D. Murphy, whose date of birth is July 9, 1958, was suspended effective September 15, 2008 by the Secretary of State Notice of suspension was sent by regular mail, no later than September 5, 2008 in accordance with the pro 406, 410-11 (2007) (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Kronich, 160 Wash.2d 893, 161 Holdings: 0: holding that the same types of evidence used to prove a title vii claim also may be used to prove a  1983 claim 1: holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination 2: holding that the invocation of a presumption of notice requires the agency to prove that the notice was properly addressed 3: holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner 4: holding that the dmv transcript used to prove revocation and notice was nontestimonial", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "have no right to determine any additional deficiency in respect of the same taxable year, except in the case of fraud, and except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, relating to assertion of greater deficiencies before the Board, or in section 273(c), relating to the making of jeopardy assessments. * * * 6 The cases cited supra pp. 197\u2014198 involve sec. 6212(c) or its predecessor, former sec. 272(f), both of which are textually similar to sec. 6223(f). One notable difference, however, is that sec. 6212(c) and former sec. 272(f) generally prohibit the Commissioner from mailing an additional deficiency notice for a taxable year for which the taxpayer has timely petitioned the Court with respect to a previous deficiency notice. Cf. Gmelin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-338 (<HOLDING>), aff\u2019d without published opinion, 891 F.2d 280 Holdings: 0: holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination 1: holding that irs could have discovered that its position was not justified had it adequately investigated the case before issuing the notice of deficiency 2: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice 3: holding that former sec 272f does not require that the commissioner wait until the period for filing a petition as to a deficiency notice expires before issuing another deficiency notice as to the same taxable year 4: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "accepted the scheme of entrant classes from England as adopted common law. The national character is now dominated by a rapid-paced urban and suburban culture. The exigencies of this urban civilization have produced a more \u2018gregarious society and have increased the probability that people will enter the property of others. [Recent Developments, Torts \u2014 Abrogation of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee, and Invitee, 25 Vand L.Rev. 623, 640 (1972) (footnote omitted).] \u201cToday, the preeminence of land over life is no longer accepted. Human safety may be more important than a landowner\u2019s unre stricted freedom.\u201d Smith, supra, 469 F.2d at 101; see also Michael Sears, Comment, Abrogation of the Traditional Common Law of Premises Liability, 44 U. Kan. L.Rev. 175, 185-86 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Kerrie Restieri-Heslin, Note, 24 Seton Hall Holdings: 0: recognizing theory of constructive possession 1: holding in regard to admission of dna statistical evidence and product rule calculations that the expert must show more than the theory for the evidence to be admitted the theory must be valid in its application 2: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 3: recognizing the common enterprise theory of marriage 4: recognizing the emergence of the more modern and humanitarian theory of compensation", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "has established procedures for termination that include elements such as a probationary period, warnings for proscribed conduct, or procedures for employees to air grievances. See Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 427, 773 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1989) (upholding finding of implied contract based on employee manual, words, and conduct of parties); Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 24-26, 766 P.2d 280, 284-86 (1988) (affirming finding of implied contract based on words and conduct of parties), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3163, 104 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1989); Lukoski v. Sandia Indian Management Co., 106 N.M. 664, 667, 748 P.2d 507-510 (1988) (upholding finding of oral contract amended by employee handbook); Forrester v. Parker, 93 N.M. 781, 782, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (1980) (<HOLDING>). We have upheld findings that there was no Holdings: 0: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 1: holding that when terminating nonprobationary employee employer is bound by policies established in personnel policy guide that control the employeremployee relationship 2: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 3: holding handbook binding on employment relationship where employee had not been issued a copy but employee helped draft the guide a copy was available in the department where she worked employees could review guide on request and it was published to employees in sense of having been made generally known to them and proclaimed officially by employer 4: holding that once the employees temporarytotaldisability period has ended and the employee is determined to suffer some permanent physical disability which prevents the discharge of assigned duties for the employer the employer bears no  341 liability for then terminating the employee under  341c", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "does not necessarily doom an application for relief under\u201d the CAT. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003.) To qualify for relief under the CAT, an applicant must establish that it is \u201cmore likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.\u201d 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.16(c)(2). As noted above, there is no evidence of past torture inflicted upon Funes, and, while Guatemala\u2019s human rights record remains poor, there is no evidence of \u201cgross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights\u201d of the sort that would entitle Funes to CAT relief. The IJ\u2019s finding that it is not more likely than not that Funes would be tortured if removed to Guatemala is supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218-23 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). PETITION DENIED. * This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody 1: holding that trial court abused its discretion in denying petitioners request for counsel in evidentiary hearing where petitioner had requested counsel and had indicated in his motion that all documents had been prepared by prison law clerk he had only ninthgrade education he had no training in the law and he lacked the skills necessary to participate in hearing 2: holding no past persecution where alien had twice been detained for twoday periods during which he was beaten and interrogated whose parents home had been searched whose work locker had been repeatedly broken into and who had been assigned poor work tasks denied bonuses and conscripted into the army where he was constantly harassed 3: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present 4: holding that petitioner was entitled to cat relief where he had been tortured in the past for speaking out about war country conditions had deteriorated since he fled army had continued to look for him and had engaged in reprisals against his family", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to release a prisoner rests on a myriad of considerations.... The chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause.\u201d Id. The Sandin court took pains to point out that the technical rule violation in that ease was not likely to affect the prisoner\u2019s parole prospects. The appellant in the case at hand has argued that the \u201ctechnical\u201d violation in this case did, in fact, affect his parole prospects \u2014 it terminated those prospects. In Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Farmer, 193 W.Va. 84, 454 S.E.2d 378 (1994), we indicated that \u201c \u2018[ejrrors involving deprivation of constitutional rights will be regarded as harmless only if there is no reasonable possibility that the violation cont th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); In re Shapiro, 122 Cal.Rptr. 768, 14 Cal.3d Holdings: 0: holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay 1: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea 2: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 3: holding defendant did not demonstrate that commonwealth failed to act diligently in commencing revocation hearing or that defendant prejudiced by delay 4: holding that no prejudice to the defendant arose from a delay in holding his parole revocation hearing twentyfour hours beyond the ninetyday limit", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "contended for the first time at oral argument (and afterwards in a letter filed under 5th Cir. R. 28(j)) that the district court's determination was tantamount to finding him responsible for (1) the \u201creasonably foreseeable acts\u201d of co-conspirators under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.3; (2) having \u201ctransferred any firearm ... with ... reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense\u201d under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2K2.1(b)(6); and (3) having committed first degree murder under \u00a7 2A 1.1, without addressing any of those guideline provisions. Because it was not properly briefed on appeal, that argument is waived. NLRB v. Seaport Printing & Ad Specialties, Inc., 589 F.3d 812, 816 n. 7 (5th Cir.2009); see also United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 611 n. 3 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See Bell, 371 F.3d at 244 (\"Our concerns Holdings: 0: holding that an inadequately briefed assertion is waived on appeal 1: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 2: holding that inadequately briefing an issue constitutes waiver 3: holding that partys failure to develop issue in argument section constitutes waiver of issue 4: holding that failure to brief an argument constitutes waiver", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cook chose not to present evidence available to him at the suppression hearing, but the issues he raised and were determined there are identical to the issues here. Next, Cook contends the suppression hearing was not a complete, full, and fair litigation of these issues, but was a summary proceeding addressing some immaterial evidentiary issues which likely would have been re-considered had he gone to trial. To the contrary, the constitutional issues in Cook\u2019s criminal proceedings were litigated in an evidentiary hearing at which he was represented by counsel, and had the right and opportunity to testify, present evidence, call and cross-examine witnesses, and appeal the court\u2019s ruling. See 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Utah App.2005) (<HOLDING>). There is no reason to doubt the quality, Holdings: 0: holding that a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is filed is entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 1: holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought 2: holding the completely fully fairly element is met if the party against whom preclusion is sought had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue 3: holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 4: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on statutory grounds \"to avoid constitutional issues.\u201d)). The United States has represented that Jane Doe will testify at trial, and the Confrontation Clause will not bar admission of the statements, even if they are testimonial, so long as Wilson has an opportunity to cross-examine Jane Doe regarding them. The Court has no reason to believe that the United States will not be true to that representation. So long as the United States remains true to that representation and Jane Doe testifies, there is no constitutional reason to prohibit admission of the statements. It may be that Doe\u2019s statements to Dr. Ornelas, which were part of a medical examination, were \"made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment, rather than to inculpate\u201d Chaco. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir.2009)(<HOLDING>). On the record before it, however, the Court Holdings: 0: holding that the state courts conclusion that statements to dr appleton were nontestimonial because they were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment rather than to inculpate was not an unreasonable application of the legal principle established by crawford  1: holding that statements in medical records given for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment are nontestimonial 2: holding that driving records were nontestimonial 3: holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors 4: holding statements inadmissible under colo r evid 8034  which was identical to the federal rule  because there was no evidence that the fiveyearold child was capable of recognizing at the time the challenged statements were made the need to provide accurate information for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment within the meaning of fedrevid 8034", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cit appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\u201d Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Here, Plaintiffs are the nonmoving party. II. DISCUSSION Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs\u2019 consolidated, amended complaint on several grounds, the first of which is that Plaintiffs\u2019 claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act provides that a federal securities fraud action must be brought within one year following the discovery of the untrue statement or omission giving rise to the claim. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 77m; see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1228 & n. Holdings: 0: holding that  10b and rule 10b5 apply to frauds against brokers 1: holding that a person violates  10b and rule 10b5 when he misappropriates confidential information  in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information 2: holding that actions asserting claims based on  10b and rule 10b5 must be initiated within a year of discovering the facts establishing the violation 3: holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5 4: holding that section 10b and rule 10b5 suits must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of state. The proposed class therefore lacks the geographic diversity that favors a finding of numerosity. Finally, the Plaintiffs have not established that all fifty potential plaintiffs were deprived of compensation and would be able to participate in the litigation. Despite these concerns, case law demonstrates that plaintiffs may establish that join-der would be impracticable with as few as fifty members. See In re Thornburg Mortg. Inc. Sec. Litig., 912 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1234 (D.N.M.2012) (Browning, J.)(citing Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d at 936 (\u201c[T]he difficulty in joining as few as 40 class members should raise a presumption that joinder is impracticable.\u201d)); Lopez v. City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. at 289 (citing Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 136 F.R.D. 672, 679 (D.Kan.1991) (<HOLDING>)). The Court has not refused to certify a class Holdings: 0: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 1: holding that joinder is impracticable where the class consisted of at least fifty members 2: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members 3: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 4: holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Defendant Phillip Davis pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841, and the district court sentenced him to 120 months of imprisonment. The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in designating Davis as a \u201ccareer offender\u201d pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines \u00a7 4B1.1 in light of Johnson v. United States, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (invalidating as unconstitutionally vague the \u201cresidual clause\u201d of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e)). For the reasons set forth in our recent decision in United States v. Pawlak, No. 15-3566, slip op. at 2-13, 822 F.3d 902, 903-11, 2016 WL 2802723 (6th Cir. May 13, 2016) (<HOLDING>), and upon the government\u2019s concession of Holdings: 0: holding an identical residual clause in the us sentencing guidelines unconstitutionally vague 1: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 2: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague 3: holding that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines notwithstanding the governments position that the residual clause of  4b12a was unconstitutionally vague following johnson 4: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "point out that ERISA contains a savings clause. Id. at 398. \u201cSpecifically, the savings clause provides that ERISA\u2019s preemption provision \u2018shall not be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.\u2019 \u201d /\u00bf.(quoting 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1144(d)(1998)). The Court then cited Gurry\u2019s analysis with approval for the proposition that nothing in \u00a7 34-34 conflicts with ERISA. Id. at 399. Judge Payne recognized that the Bankruptcy Code explicitly contemplated that \u201cstate laws have a central role in defining applicable exemptions to be made in protecting property of the estate from the reach of lding Missouri statute that exempted pension plan benefits from bankruptcy estate was not preempted due to savings clause); In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). See also In re Weinhoeft, 275 F.3d 604, 605 Holdings: 0: holding a tortious interference claim was preempted by erisa because it did not meet the legal standard announced by the supreme court in miller in order for it to regulate insurance within the meaning of erisas savings clause 1: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 2: holding florida exemption statute for employee benefit plans was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 3: holding texas exemption law was not preempted by erisa due to savings clause 4: holding that erisa completely preempted certain state law claims and finding that erisa preempted an employees common law tort and contract claim when the employee sought benefits under the employers disability policy", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for the sole reason that they refused to perform an illegal act. Tennessee common law, however, only requires a showing that the employee\u2019s refusal to perform an illegal act was a substantial factor in the employer\u2019s decision. 3.Most Significant Relationship Test Texas courts resolve conflicts of law in tort claims by applying the \u201cmost significant relationship\u201d test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Texas 1979) (\u201c[I]t is the holding of this court that in the future all conflicts cases sounding in tort will be governed by the \u2018most significant relationship\u2019 test as enunciated in Sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts.\u201d); see also Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). Section 6 states: (1) A court, subject to Holdings: 0: recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge 1: recognizing common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of ohio public policy based upon statutory and judicial sources 2: recognizing that a texas common law claim for retaliatory discharge is a claim sounding in tort 3: recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act 4: recognizing the difference between statutory cause of action for retaliation and common law tort of retaliatory discharge", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "might hurt you? A. From him. From him hurting my mom. Q. Your mom told you about that, didn\u2019t she? A. No. I was there. As indicated above, the definition of domestic abuse includes \u201cthe infliction of fear of imminent physical harm or bodily injury.\u201d SDCL 25-10-1(1). Whether Erica\u2019s fear was irrational, as the trial court concluded, must be analyzed in light of her knowledge of her father\u2019s violent history: [The victim\u2019s] state of mind could very well have been the product, in part at least, of her past interactions with appellant. The fear she claimed to have felt and the reasonableness of that fear could and should be determined with reference to her history with appellant. Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 82 Ohio App.3d 809, 613 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1992); see also Gordon, 553 N.E.2d at 921 (<HOLDING>). [\u00b6 21] To ignore Kevin\u2019s violent history is Holdings: 0: holding that a potentially inflammatory photograph of a victims face was relevant and that its admission was well within the discretion of the district court 1: holding that the impact upon the victims is relevant to circumstances of the crime 2: holding that evidence of prior confrontations was relevant as to whether victims fear was reasonable 3: holding that jury may consider victims mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victims knowledge and consent 4: holding that substantial evidence supported determination that petitioners failed to show that fear of sterilization was objectively reasonable", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "did not burden the rights of private parties. Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 804 (Fed.Cir.2002) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483). The Supreme Court's opinion in Landgraf stresses repeatedly the concern that private rights not be retroactively burdened. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (\"[ejlementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly\u201d (emphasis added)), 282 (\u201d[t]he introduction of a right to compensatory damages is also the type of legal change that would have an impact on private parties\u2019 planning\u201d (emphasis added)); see also id. at 266, 271, 272, 284, 114 S.Ct. 1483. 4 . See supra note 1. 5 . Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308, 313 (1991) (<HOLDING>). 6 . See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 7104(b), 7105(c), 7266; Holdings: 0: holding that where the law or regulation changes after a claim has been filed or reopened but before the administrative or judicial appeal process has been concluded the version more favorable to the appellant should  apply unless congress provided otherwise or permitted the secretary to do otherwise and the secretary did so emphasis added 1: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added 2: holding that this court has discretion to either address or remand arguments presented to it in the first instance provided it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim 3: holding that where congress has directed the agency to issue a rule without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such rule  congress has amended the law and does not offend the constitution 4: holding that the other source of law might be a moneymandating constitutional provision statute or regulation that has been violated or an express or implied contract with the united states", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Sony Pictures Entm\u2019t, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 135, 140, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 (2004) (citing Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 967, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243 (2002)). Typically, commercial speech is \u201cspeech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.\u201d Rezec, 116 Cal. App. 4th at 141, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 333 (internal citations omitted). The Court finds that the assurances made by RCHSD\u2019s staff do not constitute commercial speech. However, because Ms. Prescott has sufficiently alleged a UCL claim, based on the alleged misrepresentations on RCHSD\u2019s website, RCHSD\u2019s motion to dismiss her UCL claim is denied. ii. Standing on Behalf of Decedent Ms. Prescott has standing, as an individual representative, to bring k \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Here, as to the fraudulent prong of the UCL, Holdings: 0: holding that in the rule 23 class action context named plaintiff may appeal a denial of class certification even if his or her individual claims had been satisfied through the entry of judgment 1: holding that plaintiffs could only pursue ucl claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements 2: holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the ucl only if the party met the requirements for a class action 3: holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims 4: holding purposeful action of defendants in giving plaintiffs what they seek may not make moot plaintiffs claim in a class action", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ass\u2019n, 76 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex.App.2002) (stating that \u201c[t]he phrase \u2018unless otherwise provided\u2019 or similar language, when used in a statute, usually refers to other statutes pertaining to the same subject matter\u201d (reversed in part on other grounds, 141 S.W.3d 158 (Tex.2004))); Cook v. Turner, 219 Conn. 641, 644, 593 A.2d 504, 505 (1991) (concluding that the word \u201claw\u201d in the phrase \u201c[ejxcept as otherwise provided by law\u201d is \u201climited to state and federal statutes\u201d); Oregon County R-IV Sch. Dist. v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (stating that \u201c \u2018 \u201cexcept as otherwise provided by law,\u201d means except as otherwise provided by statute\u2019 \u201d (quoting Yates v. Casteel, 329 Mo. 1101, 1104, 49 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1932))); Manchin v. Browning, 170 W.Va. 779, 785, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Trujillo v. Tanuz, 85 N.M. 35, 40, 508 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding unenforceable a regulation that would have provided greater workers compensation benefits than permitted by statute 1: holding that based upon means similar to or supported by 2: holding that georgia refund statute signifies state waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of the statute 3: holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute 4: holding a party was limited to recovery provided for by the strict terms of the mechanics lien statute", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Tatarinov did not contest that fact, the Oregon Court of Appeals declined to correct the error. Id. at 81. Tatarinov sought habeas relief in federal court, but the district court denied his petition. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine bars federal courts from considering a federal constitutional argument on habeas review if \u201ca state court declined to address a prisoner\u2019s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement.\u201d Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected Ta-tarinov\u2019s claim based on its consideration of the equitable interests of the parties in his case, which is independent of federal law. See Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). The Oregon plain error rule is also an Holdings: 0: holding plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 1: holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard 2: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 3: holding that oregons plain error review is independent of state law 4: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K2.13, but refused to do so because it interpreted the Guidelines to prohibit a departure where, as here, the crime involved actual violence. Because the district court rested its decision on an issue of law, this court has jurisdiction to review its decision, and its decision is subject to de novo review. Section 5K2.13 states that \u201cthe court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if ... (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant\u2019s offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5K2.13 (1998) (emphasis added). The Guidelines thus prohibit departure where the offense involved actual violence. Accord United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court looked at all the Holdings: 0: holding that under  5k213 no departure may be given where the crime was violent in nature 1: holding that it was appropriate for the trial court to find that lack of a prior criminal record was not a mitigating factor in light of the violent nature of the crime committed 2: recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient 3: holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault 4: holding that the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence must actually be violent in nature quotation and alteration omitted", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "were sentenced, the amended VWPA thus had the potential to increase the amount of restitution they would have to pay, from an amount set by the court by taking into account appellants\u2019 financial circumstances, to full restitution. Accordingly, if the court determines that the VWPA should apply to this case, it must use the old version to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2d Cir.1997) (dictum). Baggett, 125 F.3d at 1322. Accord, United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1327 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1997); Williams, 128 F.3d at 1241; United States v. Thompson, 113 F.3d 13, 15 n. 1 (2nd Cir.1997); United States v. Sclafani, 996 F.Supp. 400, 403-04 (D.N.J.1998). But see, United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). We are persuaded by the analysis adopted in Holdings: 0: holding that the ex post facto clause prohibited retroactive application of the mvra because before the mvra became effective the victim and witness protection act authorized but did not compel district courts to order restitution 1: holding that retroactive application of mvra does not violate the ex post facto clause because restitution is not a criminal punishment 2: holding retroactive application of idra would violate the ex post facto clause 3: holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause 4: holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is directed exclusively at whether notice was given by the uncertified, putative class. Because there is no case or controversy between the Oil Companies and the named appellants over this issue, the district court had no authority to reach this issue before ruling on certification. Nevertheless, despite this apparent flaw in the district court\u2019s order, I agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that we lack the authority to vacate the ruling because there is no appealable order before us. 1 . Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir.2002). 2 . Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 3 . Id. 4 . Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 6 . See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 874 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Scott v. Maggio, 695 F.2d 916, Holdings: 0: holding that justiciability must be analyzed separately on the issues of money damages and the propriety of equitable relief 1: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 2: holding that money damages do not qualify as equitable relief within the meaning of  1132a3 3: holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted 4: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of fault is analogous to principles of comparative negligence, which have been held to be substantive. See Petersen v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir.1970) (recognizing that \u201cthat the Mississippi comparative negligence statute, \u2018is part of the substantive law of Mississippi\u2019\u201d) (citations omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court similarly considers the right to contribution among tortfeasors to be substantive. Estate of Hunter v. GMC, 729 So.2d 1264, 1276 (Miss.1999). Furthermore, courts from other states consistently hold that laws on apportionment of fault are substantive, not merely procedural. See, e.g., Matter of Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1992 A.M.C. 913, 35 Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 1204, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 20835 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Clawans v. United States, 75 F.Supp.2d 368, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that question of whether defendant tortfeasors were entitled to reduction in plaintiffs claims by amount of alleged nonparty tortfeasors responsibility was one of substantive law 2: recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law 3: recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts 4: holding the question of standing is distinct from the question of proof and once the plaintiffs alleged an interest peculiar to themselves and distinguishable from the public generally they were entitled to a factual hearing", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "States v. Harmon, 742 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir.2014) (discussing Giglio rule). 2 . The defendants\u2019 summary judgment briefs did contain some passing references to immunity. They argued that they did not lose the absolute immunity connected with the fulfillment of their duties under Giglio merely because third parties disseminated the Giglio materials to the police chiefs, the newspaper, and the website. The district court never reached this argument, because it found sufficient evidence that it was the defendants themselves who disseminated the materials to the police chiefs and the newspaper. We lack appellate jurisdiction to resolve a dispute concerning this factual finding in a qualified immunity appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). To the extent we may reach factual issues in Holdings: 0: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 1: holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity 2: holding that an eeoc reasonable cause determination letter did not constitute evidence precluding summary judgment when the other evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 3: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 4: holding district courts determination that summary judgment record raised genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners involvement in unconstitutional conduct did not constitute appealable final decision", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "if the producer intends it to be used for that disease or condition. FDA responds that \u201cfor such disease or condition\u201d refers only to the uses included on a drug\u2019s label. The statute does not unambiguously foreclose FDA\u2019s interpretation. Because Congress has not \u201cdirectly spoken to the precise question at issue,\u201d we must determine whether the agency\u2019s interpretation is \u201ca permissible construction\u201d of the Orphan Drug Act. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Chevron). We conclude that it is. First, FDA\u2019s reading of the statute closely hews to the text. See Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>). As the Fourth Circuit reasoned in Sigma-Tau Holdings: 0: holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent 1: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 2: recognizing that the government  must demonstrate the reasonableness not only of its litigation position but also of the agencys actions   3: recognizing that the reasonableness of an agencys interpretation turns in part on the constructions fit with the statutory language 4: holding that stare decisis required the court to adhere to a prior statutory interpretation despite the agencys subsequent interpretation of the statute contrary to the settled law", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "indirect criminal contempt proceedings must not only notify the alleged contemnor that sanctions are being sought, but that the proceedings will be criminal in nature. In re Marriage of Morse, 240 Ill. App. 3d 296, 304, 607 N.E.2d 632, 638 (1993), citing In re Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d 606, 616, 561 N.E.2d 394, 400-01 (1990), and Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 58-59, 558 N.E.2d at 425. Thus, indirect criminal contempt proceedings cannot be initiated by a pleading captioned so as to imply that the proceedings will not be criminal. Instead, a party seeking a finding of indirect criminal contempt must say so explicitly by filing a pleading captioned \u201cpetition for adjudication of criminal contempt.\u201d In re Marriage of Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 823, 597 N.E.2d 847, 860 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As with any other criminal defendant, an Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution 1: holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause 2: holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement 3: holding that pleading captioned petition for rule to show cause implies that proceedings will be civil because a criminal defendant can never be compelled to show cause 4: recognizing petitioners must be afforded the opportunity to show good cause for filing a longer petition", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "over Plaintiffs claims under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1331, 1340, 1346(a)(1) or 26 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 6330, 7429. 2. The United States Court of Federal Claims Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over Tort Claims. The Complaint alleges numerous claims of fraud, including \u201cmail fraud,\u201d \u201cconstructive fraud,\u201d \u201cmisrepresentation of material facts\u201d and \u201cconspiracy to defraud.\u201d See Compl. at 1. These claims, however, sound in tort. The United States Court of Federal Claims\u2019 jurisdiction does not extend to cases sounding in tort. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(a) (\u201c[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim ... for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Jurisdiction to hear such claims exclusively Holdings: 0: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 2: holding that the tucker act grants the united states court of federal claims jurisdiction to grant nonmonetary relief in connection with contractor claims including claims requesting an interpretation of contract terms 3: holding that plaintiffs negligence claims sounded in tort and thus could not be transferred to the united states court of federal claims 4: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 311 n. 16. Plaintiff\u2019s claims herein were of such a nature. 183 . Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a district court to dismiss a case when the plaintiff fails to prosecute his case. Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir.1997), (habeas corpus action); Dorsey v. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., 84 F.3d 170, 171 (5th Cir.1996), quoting Salinas v. Sun Oil Co., 819 F.2d 105, 106 (5th Cir.1987). The court may dismiss for want of prosecution either on a motion of a defendant or sua sponte when the court determines dismissal is necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Clofer v. Perego, 106 F.3d 678, 679 (5th Cir.1997), (<HOLDING>); Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d at 771; Long v. Holdings: 0: holding that district courts possess the inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute with or sans notice to the parties 1: recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process 2: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 3: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 4: recognizing a district judge may dismiss a case sua sponte under either rule 41b or its inherent authority to manage its docket", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Communications Act The Stored Communications Act (\u201cSCA\u201d) prohibits \u201cintentionally accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided,\u201d and thereby obtaining access to an \u201celectronic communication while it is in electronic storage.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2701(a). It also provides for the recovery of civil damages by a person aggrieved by a violation of the statute. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2707(a). Rene alleges that the Defendants violated the SCA when they accessed her email messages. The Defendants contend that any email messages viewed by them were not in \u201celectronic storage,\u201d and, as a result, do not fall within the protections of the statute. \u201cElectronic storage\u201d is defined as \u201cany temporary, intermediate storage .Supp.2d 965, 987 (C.D.Cal.2010) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Weaver, 636 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an individuals access to a service or website that requires an indication of assent to contractual terms before access to the service or website will be granted was sufficient evidence that the user clicked i accept  1: holding that even though an agreement was approved by the family court it retained its character as an agreement for purposes of legal analysis 2: holding that webmail messages opened and retained by the user absent a showing that the webmail service was archiving copies for backup purposes were not within the definition of electronic storage 3: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 4: holding that where weather alert service instructed user to reply stop to cease receiving text messages users message of stop to service was sufficient to create factual issue with regard to revocation of consent", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "he has refunded or paid restitution within twelve (12) months from the date of this Order to: A. Thomas Dunn in the sum of $1,105.76, plus interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 1999; B. The McCarthys in the sum of $1,176.00, plus interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 2000. 8. Rishel is Ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings; the People shall subrait a Statement of Costs within ten (10) days of the date of this Order. Respondent shall have five (5) days thereafter to submit a response thereto. 1 . At the time of this proceeding Rishel was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day pursuant to the sanction imposed by the Supreme Court in People v. Rishel, 956 P.2d 542 (Colo.1998). See In re C de Baca, 11 P.3d 426, 430 (Colo.2000)(<HOLDING>). 2 . C.R.C.P. 251.5 provides that misconduct Holdings: 0: holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase 1: holding insufficient officers advisement that defendants license may be suspended if he refused to submit to breath test when statute mandates that license will be suspended for refusal of chemical test 2: holding that code sections dealing with suspended sentences are to be liberally construed and that revocation of a suspended sentence lies within the trial courts sound discretion 3: holding that a suspended lawyer remains subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the court for acts committed while suspended 4: holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the court\u2019s approval, that certain information and documents exchanged during discovery and throughout the proceedings shall be deemed confidential. This confidential material would be excluded from public inspection and may only be made available to specific persons directly involved with the case. Having examined the submissions, the motion for a protective order is DENIED without prejudice. The court recognizes the parties\u2019 concern in keeping particular information confidential due to the sensitive nature of items such as trade secrets and customer lists. Nevertheless, the court is also required to balance that concern with that of the general rule of open, public proceedings within the United States court system. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Due to the significant nature of this issue, Holdings: 0: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 1: recognizing a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents including judicial records and documents 2: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 3: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 4: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of immunity.\u201d Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d at 1251. Accord Barreras v. State of N.M. Corr. Dep\u2019t, 133 N.M. 313, 319, 62 P.3d 770, 776 (Ct.App.2003) (\u201cIn the absence of affirmative legislation, the courts of this state have consistently declined to permit individuals to bring private lawsuits to enforce rights guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution, based on the absence of an express waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act.\u201d); Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 124 N.M. 479, 482, 952 P.2d 474, 477 (Ct.App.1997) (noting that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for violations of rights under the New Mexico Constitution against a city or its employees or agents unless the NMTCA waives immunity); Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch. Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 449, 744 P.2d 919, 922 (CtApp. 1987) (<HOLDING>); Begay v. State, 104 N.M. at 488, 723 P.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that nature of alleged bias must be personal and not arising out of litigation 1: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board 2: holding that a  1983 claim for damages was not prohibited by claim preclusion because the plaintiff could not have sought damages in his prior article 78 proceeding arising out of the same facts 3: holding that no waiver of immunity exists for damages arising out of alleged educational malpractice claim against a school board 4: holding that no recovery exists for speculative damages", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "particular address at which service was attempted; therefore, there was no evidence indicating that the mother\u2019s house was the defendant\u2019s \u201cdwelling house or usual place of abode.\u201d Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller\u2019s treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure discusses \u201cdwelling house or usual place of abode\u201d as follows: \u201cThe language \u2018dwelling house or usual place of abode\u2019 in Rule 4(e)(2) is taken directly from the former Equity Rule 13. Despite the length of time these words have been a part of federal practice, the judicial decisions do not rticular case. Courts evaluate those facts mindful that the purpose of Rule 4 is to ensure that service is reasonably calculated to provide a defendant with actual notice of the action. Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant had not changed his residence from his registered address despite the fact that the house had never had electricity service during the time that he had lived there 1: holding that one of several houses throughout the world among which the defendant divided his time constituted a dwelling house or usual place of abode for purpose of service of process regardless of the facts that it was not the defendants principal domicile and that he spent comparatively little time there 2: holding that one of the twelve or so homes throughout the world among which the individual defendant divided his time constitutes a dwelling house or usual place of abode for purposes of service of process even though that home is not the defendants principal domicile and even though he may spend comparatively little time there 3: holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service 4: holding that service was proper where a copy of the summons and complaint was left with the defendants wife at the defendants maryland house in which the defendant had lived before moving ahead of his family to arizona where he had purchased a house intending never to return to maryland and to move his family to arizona noting that the service was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of service at the defendants dwelling house or usual place of abode where the service succeeded in actually apprising him of the lawsuit", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "substances may have been marijuana being, used in a criminal enterprise in which the marijuana was delivered in amounts of less than one-fourth of an ounce, which would not constitute a felony offense. Considering the evidence, in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, indulging every reasonable inference that would support it, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not, the trial evidence would not enable reasonable and fair-minded people to find that the money is contraband under the charge submitted to the jury. Therefore, the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury\u2019s finding that the seized money is contraband. 1 . See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000) (<HOLDING>); Hirschfeld Steel Co. v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant physicians own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiffs failure to call an independent expert on the standard of care 1: holding that jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence 2: holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence  based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard 3: holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict 4: holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "re Marc Antoine Fenelon, No. A038 921 625 (B.I.A. Jan. 14, 2016), aff'g No. A038 921 625 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 14, 2009). We assume the parties\u2019 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. We have reviewed the decisions of both the IJ and BIA \u201cfor the sake of completeness.\u201d Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). Despite Fenelon\u2019s assertions otherwise, we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a controlled substance offense. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1252(a)(2)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Ortiz-Franco v. Holder, 782 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we retain jurisdiction to Holdings: 0: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies as long as an alien is removable regardless of whether the predicate offense was the reason for removal 1: holding a decision under the cat to deny even deferral of removal does not fall within the jurisdictionstripping provisions of either  1252a2b or  1252a2c 2: holding substantial evidence supported the denial of cat relief where the petitioners cat claim was based on the same testimony the ij found not credible and the petitioner pointed to no other evidence that the ij should have considered 3: holding that the jurisdiction stripping provision found at 8 usc  1252a2c applies only to removal orders not to applications for asylum withholding of removal or cat relief 4: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to the denial of deferral of removal under the cat", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "26-acre tract. 10 . If anything, Rubarts may lend support to an estoppel defense by the Dearings. See 896 F.2d at 112. The Dearings assert that Perry is estopped from asserting his homestead rights to the 26-acre tract the first time in their reply brief to this court. Because \"an appellant\u2019s original brief abandons all points not mentioned therein,\u201d and the argument has not been fairly presented to the bankruptcy court, we decline to consider this new argument. Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 905 F.2d 840, 854 (5th Cir.1990)(quoting Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1539 n. 14 (5th Cir.1984)). Accord City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 661 n. 1 (5th Cir.2003). 11 . See White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 313, 45 S.Ct. 103, 69 L.Ed. 301 (1924)(<HOLDING>). 12 . The affidavit itself does not contain Holdings: 0: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint 1: holding that the right of the debtor to claim property as exempt is generally determined on the facts as they exist on the date of the filing of the petition 2: holding that facts as they existed on the date of the original bankruptcy petition not on the date of conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 bankruptcy applied 3: holding that the determination of whether the debtor is using real property as his principal residence is made as of the petition date for the purposes of section 1322b2 4: holding that a debtors entitlement to an exemption under  522d1 is determined as of the filing date of  a bankruptcy petition", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "justified on balance, we emphasize that their appraisal of Bar-tell\u2019s mental disabilities was an insufficient predicate for abrogating her parental rights. Specifically, both the district court and Defendants place significant credence on Dr. Van Goethem\u2019s evaluation of Bar-tell\u2019s \u201climited\u201d intelligence level, see Bartell, 12 F.Supp.2d at 648, which is purportedly manifested by her low verbal IQ test score. While critical thinking and reasoning skills are undoubtedly relevant, at some level, to the ability of a parent to raise her child, the State must make a specific and tangible showing, not a presumptive one, on the precise nature of the links between these capacities and a particular child\u2019s needs. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Dr. Van Goethem\u2019s report is Holdings: 0: holding the online solicitation statute was not narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and there were more narrow means of achieving the states interest in protecting minors 1: recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment 2: recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety 3: holding that narrowtailoring requires a state to act with precision and to use the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest 4: holding that the government may not burden conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief unless the government acts by the least restrictive means to further a compelling state interest", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "law only. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (\u201cWe conclude that Young ... [is] inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law.\u201d). Moreover, Acting Commissioner Mauriello is merely a co-defendant along with NJ DEP. Nothing about this suit suggests that it is aimed a Mauriello\u2019s actions, apart from NJ DEP itself. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic- Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir.2001) (\u201cYoung does not apply if, although the action is nominally against individual officers, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and the suit in fact is against the state.\u201d) (citing Pennhurst); see also Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Ex Parte Young does not apply. (2) Nor Holdings: 0: holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state 1: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 2: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and operators at the time of release are responsible parties regardless of who caused the release of hazardous substances. New York v. Nat\u2019l Servs. Indus. Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 684 (2d Cir.2003); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. The term \u201coperator\u201d in the case of a facility means: \u201cany person who :.. operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9601(20)(A). Under CERCLA, \u201cany person who operates a polluting facility is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution.\u201d U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 65, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1886, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). \u201cThis is so regardless of whether that person is the facility\u2019s owner, the owner\u2019s parent corporation or business partner, or even a saboteur who sne 854, 854 (D.Del.1989) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Plaintiffs argue that the Fire Holdings: 0: holding that an organization lacked standing to challenge allegedly lax epa regulations of hazardous waste because its members did not have to follow the lax procedures 1: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation 2: holding that a states regulation of a hazardous waste site did not make it an operator of the site 3: recognizing oklahomas policy of allowing regulation instead of competition in waste disposal services 4: holding local regulation of hazardous waste disposal facilities preempted by comprehensive and detailed state regulatory scheme", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the armed robberies were offenses \u201coccurring on occasions different from one another\u201d using Shepard-approved materials. \u201cWe review de novo whether crimes were committed on occasions different from one another within the meaning of the ACCA.\u201d Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1261. II- McCloud contends that the Government failed to meet its burden of proof because the Shepard documents do not state the time and location of his prior convictions,' or otherwise indicate that the offenses were \u201ctemporally distinct.\u201d See id.; Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1315. The Shepard documents in this case include the charging documents for each armed' robbery, the transcript of the plea colloquy, and undisputed statements in the PSI. McCloud\u2019s arrest affidavits are not Shepard documents. See Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1383 (<HOLDING>); of United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 676 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an ij could not consider a police report as part of the record of conviction to determine whether an alien had committed a firearms offense because the police report could encompass many offenses with which the alien was never charged or convicted 1: holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal 2: holding that defendants prosecution on dui charges was not timeharred even though amended accusations were filed more than two years after offenses were committed because original citations pertaining to the same offenses and conduct were filed prior to the statute of limitations expiration 3: holding that courts may not use police reports to determine whether predicate offenses under  924e1 were committed on occasions different from one another  4: holding that under the bail reform act for a defendant to have been convicted of two or more offenses constituting crimes of violence offenses must have been committed on different occasions", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "body language would not be improper \u2014 was also reasonable. See Burks, 27 F.3d at 1429 & n. 3 (noting that trial counsel\u2019s evaluation of a potential juror\u2019s demeanor, tone, and facial expressions may lead to a \"hunch\u201d or \"suspicion\" that the juror might be biased, and that a peremptory challenge based on this reason would be legitimate); United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 740 (9th Cir.1989) (accepting as legitimate the government's explanation that a juror\u2019s \"fidgeting and looking around as he sat in the jury box ... made the prosecutor believe that the individual would not be an attentive juror\u201d). 12 . Although Collins does not challenge the prosecutor's strike against Juror 019, this strike is relevant to Collins\u2019 Batson challenge. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted); Purkett, Holdings: 0: holding intent may be inferred from all facts and circumstances 1: holding that parties may stipulate to facts from which jurisdiction may be inferred 2: holding that a prosecutors motive may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts 3: holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence 4: holding that an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "we must now determine whether Stebner was prejudiced sufficiently enough to render the jury\u2019s verdict manifestly unjust. See Erickson, 175 Mont. at 91, 572 P.2d at 520. \u00b621 We agree with Alside that Stebner was not prejudiced by Juror Schneider\u2019s comment regarding her research and subsequent understanding of the term \u201cpreponderance.\u201d The comment did not affect the verdict because the jurors had already voted eleven to one in favor of Alside when the comment was made. Also, two jurors testified that they based their vote on the evidence, not on Juror Schneider\u2019s comment. Three jurors testified that they based their vote on the evidence presented at trial. Moreover, no new information was presented on the definition of \u201cpreponderance.\u201d See Erickson, 175 Mont. at 92, 572 P.2d at 520 (<HOLDING>). According to the affidavits, the internet Holdings: 0: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation 1: holding no prejudice occurred because no new information was presented on the material matter in dispute 2: holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute 3: holding no issue of material fact as to whether defendant was volunteer because he received no compensation 4: holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims cannot be procedurally barred and thus may always be raised for the first time on post-conviction. See Stiles v. State, 902 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Okl.Cr. 1995). 13 . Sellers v. State, 889 P.2d 895, 897-98 (Okl.Cr. 1995); Castro v. State, 880 P.2d at 388; Mann v. State, 856 P.2d 992, 994 (Okl.Cr. 1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1869, 128 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994); Nguyen v. State, 844 P.2d 176, 178 (Okl.Cr.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 3006, 125 L.Ed.2d 697 (1993). 14 . 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The United States Supreme Court has not specifically set forth a standard by which to assess the effectiveness of appellate counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 392, 105 S.Ct. 830, 833, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has applied the Holdings: 0: holding that when a state provides a first appeal as of right due process requires that defendants receive the effective assistance of counsel during that appeal 1: holding that defendants are entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel on their first appeal as of right 2: holding that the due process clause requires that criminal defendants be provided the effective assistance of counsel on their first appeal of right but declining to devise the means by which to define the appropriate standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 3: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 4: holding a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "resolve the question of whether a confession, the voluntariness of which has been fully and finally litigated in prior proceedings, precludes a convicted person from subsequently presenting a prima faeie case that exculpatory results obtained from DNA testing of items of evidence would establish his or her actual innocence, requires us to interpret the relevant language of Section 9543.1. Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law, our standard' of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 472, 909 A.2d 1241, 1245 (2006). Consequently, we are not bound by the lower court\u2019s conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the applicable provisions of this statute. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 632, 874 A.2d 12, 17 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Our review is further governed by the Holdings: 0: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 1: holding that where the issue before the court is legal as opposed to factual an appellate court need not give deference to a trial courts decision 2: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court 3: holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review 4: holding that our court owes no duty of deference to the legal conclusions of lower courts regarding an issue of statutory construction", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "term would run concurrently with the pending state sentence. But when later asked whether the sentences should run concurrently, the federal sentencing judge indicated that they should not. The BOP subsequently denied NPT concurrent sentencing designation. Mr. Thomas argues, however, that the sentences should run concurrently because that is what he agreed to in his state plea agreement. But as we recently explained in a factually similar case, \u201c[although [Mr. Thomas\u2019s] state sentence provides for concurrent service of the federal and state sentences, the state court\u2019s decision cannot alter the federal-court sentence,\u201d which runs consecutively to, not concurrently with, the state sentence. United States v. Eccleston, 521 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.) (citing Bloomgren, 948 F.2d at 691) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 430, 172 Holdings: 0: holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over  1983 claims 1: holding that although the defendant was paroled rather than released unconditionally his state sentence was discharged for purposes of deciding whether the federal judge could impose a concurrent sentence 2: holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law 3: holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court 4: holding that whether a defendants federal sentence would run consecutively to his state sentence is a federal matter which cannot be overridden by a state court provision for concurrent sentencing on a subsequentlyobtained state conviction", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "102, 104 (1888). The Iowa Supreme Court similarly held \u201cthat the communication by a husband of a venereal disease to his wife, knowingly, is good and sufficient cause for a divorce, and is cruelty of the most flagrant kind.\u201d Holmes v. Holmes, 186 Iowa 336, 170 N.W. 793, 794 (1919). The Maryland Court of Appeals held that \u201cif a spouse, although knowing he or she is afflicted with a venereal disease, yet continues to maintain sexual relations and communicates the disease to the other spouse, such action constitutes extreme cruelty.\u201d Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A.2d 924, 925 (1940). And the Supreme Court of holding that knowing communication of an STD to a wife was \u201cextreme cruelty\u201d and grounds for divorce); Cadle v. Cadle, 28 Tenn.App. 498, 191 S.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Tenri.Ct.App.1945) (<HOLDING>). While the most recent of the above-cited Holdings: 0: recognizing a claim of cruel inhuman and degrading treatment based on alleged sexual abuse 1: holding that communication of a venereal disease would constitute cruel and inhuman treatment 2: recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment 3: holding that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law 4: holding cruel and unusual punishment complaint not preserved", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the elements of a cause of action.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Coody v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism\u2019d by agr.)); Reynolds v. Guido, 166 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). When asserting a limitations defense at the pleading stage, the defendant\u2019s burden to establish the accrual date includes negating the applicability of the discovery rule. Doe v. L cognizing a two-year statute of limitations for DTPA and negligence claims under Texas law). The Texas statute of limitations for fraud and breach of contract claims is four years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 16.004(a)(4) (Vernon 2002) (fraud); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. \u00a7 16.051 (Vernon 2008) (breach of contract); Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 468 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 Holdings: 0: holding that either a fouryear or a twoyear limitations period applies to claims under the idea in ohio for tuition reimbursement either way the claims were timebarred 1: holding that fouryear residual statute of limitations applied to claim for commonlaw rescission 2: recognizing a fouryear statute of limitation for fraud claims 3: holding fouryear period for statutory actions applies to section 440205 claims 4: holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "occurs prior to the fraud. The alleged fraud must be prior to or contemporaneous with the securities transaction in question.\u201d Perez-Rubio v. Wyck-off, 718 F.Supp. 217, 236 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (cited in Dietrich v. Bauer, 76 F.Supp.2d 312, 342 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). The fraud alleged by plaintiffs dates back to the first day of the relevant class period, February 19, 1998. Plaintiffs allege a continuous fraudulent scheme by defendants, and not that defendants only engaged in fraudulent acts when they announced in their February 1999 press release that the IPR & D figures for the acquisition of Rosetta and Sense8 were going to have to be changed. Further, the Supreme Court has approved of the \u201cfraud on the market theory.\u201d Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-50, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs impliedly allege that they relied Holdings: 0: holding that reliance is not a required element of securities fraud in a state enforcement action in idaho 1: holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana 2: holding reliance is still an element of a 10b5 action and that the fraud on the market theory subject to rebuttal is applicable to meet the reliance element in securities fraud cases where corporations make materially misleading statements in an impersonal and efficient market 3: holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense 4: holding that reliance may be established by proof that securities not traded on the open market could not have been issued at all but for a fraudulent scheme of the defendants the plaintiff still had to prove that he relied on the integrity of the offerings of the securities market", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "claim or might motivate the court of appeals to raise such a claim on its own. In summary, under the circumstances, the court of appeals ought to have addressed the preservation issue urged in the State\u2019s motion for rehearing. This case involves a serious question about whether error was in fact preserved under common, everyday notions of procedural default. This Court should either remand the case to the court of appeals to consider the issue or it should consider the preservation issue on discretionary review. I respectfully dissent to the Court\u2019s decision to dismiss this petition as improvidently granted. 1 . 791 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). 2 . Jones v. State, 942 S.W.2d 1, 2 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); see also Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 151 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>) and Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 199 n. 4 Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for rehearing regarding a preservation of error issue was an appropriate vehicle to force appellate courts to observe their systemic requirements 1: holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing 2: recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation 3: holding that if these preservation requirements are met any error in the denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error 4: holding that since prosecutorial comments did not constitute fundamental error absence of preservation of issue by defense counsel precluded appellate review", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of a motion to reopen and review de novo claims of due process violations including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.2005). Jurisdiction is proper under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252, and we deny the petition for review. The BIA has established several procedural requirements for aliens seeking to reopen their removal proceedings based on a claim that they were denied due process because of the ineffective assistance of their attorney. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. Petitioners concede that they did not satisfy the hozada requirements, but argue that compliance is unnecessary because their former counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness is obvious on the face of the record. See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525-26 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of Holdings: 0: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record 1: holding that failure to comply with the hozada requirements is not fatal where the alleged ineffective assistance is plain on the face of the administrative record 2: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 3: holding that the petitioner was not entitled to claim ineffective assistance because she did not comply with the lozada requirements and made no effort to explain her lack of compliance 4: holding that the bias reasonable rules for the normal ineffective assistance claim do not apply where facts demonstrating an attorneys ineffectiveness are not plain on the face of the administrative record", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the Guidelines defines sophisticated means as \u201cespecially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.\u201d U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2Bl.l(b)(9)(C), n. 8. Here, the record shows that Regensberg conducted a complex and sophisticated scheme, including the creation of fraudulent loan documents, detailed reporting of fake earnings, use of Ponzi scheme payments to lull his investors, and alteration of an account statement to make it appear as if he had not lost his investors\u2019 money. See United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir.2003) (\u201c[Ejven if each step in the scheme was not elaborate, the total scheme was sophisticated in the way all the steps were linked together....\u201d); United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As in Lewis, Regensberg\u2019s offense conduct, Holdings: 0: holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others 1: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety 2: holding that state and city tax evasion considered relevant conduct under conviction for federal tax evasion 3: holding that failure to make any tax payment despite having resources sufficient to pay all or a substantial portion of tax liability constitutes evasion 4: holding in tax case that the sophisticated means enhancement applied even when each step in the planned tax evasion was simple because when viewed together the steps comprised a plan more complex than merely filling out a false tax return", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and her statements were further corroborated by her mother [and other witnesses].\u201d). 15 Harper v. Barge Air Conditioning, Inc., 313 Ga. App. 474, 475 (1) (722 SE2d 84) (2011) (punctuation omitted); see also OCGA\u00a7 15-12-134. 16 Wood v. B &S Enters., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 128, 133 (4) (723 SE2d 443) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 17 Harper, 313 Ga. App. at 475 (1) (punctuation o 879, 884 (3) (694 SE2d 707) (2010) (\u201cIt is well settled that the permissible range of the state\u2019s closing argument is very wide.\u201d). 23 Id. (punctuation omitted). 24 Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 346 (16) (c) (687 SE2d 438) (2009). 25 The examining physician testified it is not unusual to observe a lack of injuries when oral sodomy and digital penetration are alleged. 26 See Arrington, 286 Ga. at 346 (16) (c) (<HOLDING>). 27 Pearson v. State, 277 Ga. 813, 815 (3) Holdings: 0: holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty 1: holding that defendants claim that state engaged in burdenshifting was without merit when state argued that defendant had not rebutted evidence and trial court instructed jury as to burden of proof 2: holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent 3: holding that a challenged jury instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof when the trial court elsewhere instructed the jury that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "substantial rights were not affected. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1423, 1433 n. 4, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (noting that where the affected rights relate to sentencing, the outcome a defendant must show to have been affected is his sentence). Therefore, the district court did not err by finding that the government did not breach the plea agreement, and we affirm. AFFIRMED. 1 . Melendez-Baez also mentions that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions to continue his sentencing hearing or to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. However, because Melendez-Baez failed to devote a discrete section of his brief addressing these arguments, he has abandoned them on appeal. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003) Holdings: 0: holding an issue abandoned in a counseled case where although the defendant made passing references to issues in his brief he did not devote a discrete section of his brief to the argument and the references were undertaken as background to claims that he had expressly advanced 1: holding that issues are deemed abandoned when the brief only makes a passing references to an issue 2: holding that petitioner abandoned issues and claims not sufficiently raised in his brief 3: holding that the appellant abandoned an issue to which he only made passing references 4: holding in counseled case that listed issue was abandoned where it was not discussed in the argument portion of the brief", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "partially closed to the public. They argue further that the denial of their 10(e) motion prevents them from having a complete record to be able to brief this court on the closure issue. We disagree. As the district court correctly observed, Rule 10(e) is a mechanism by which the court can \u201ccorrect omissions from or misstatements in the record for appeal.\u201d Order at 2, Aug. 26, 2011, ECF No. 557 (citing S & E Shipping Corp. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 678 F.2d 636, 641 (6th Cir.1982)). The Rule does not, however, \u201callow the court to add to the record on appeal matters that might have been but were not placed before it in the course of the proceedings.... \u201d United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 336 (7th Cir.1986); see also Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 875 (10th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the district court denied the Holdings: 0: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 1: holding appellants issue was rendered moot because appellant was given the opportunity to make a record in support of his motion for new trial and appellate court considered that record in disposing of only issue raised in the motion for new trial 2: holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless 3: holding that 10e motion to supplement the record must be denied where appellant knew of but failed to introduce the relevant evidence at trial because rule 10e does not grant a license to build a new record 4: holding where record fails to establish whether and how appellant presented motion for new trial to the trial court it was not timely presented", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "did not attempt to extract promises by jurors, but was instead attempting to ascertain whether they could impose the death penalty if they found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The questions were relevant to determine whether the jurors could impose the death penalty, to uncover bias or prejudice, and to assist both parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. {20} \u201c[T]he district court has discretion in determining how voir dire should be conducted and reversal is available only where the discretion is abused.\u201d Trujillo, 99 N.M. at 252, 657 P.2d at 108. Because this questioning did not commit jurors to return a death sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to question 1068, 1073-74 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 4. The State\u2019s Peremptory Challenges {21} Holdings: 0: holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case 1: holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to ask whether prospective jurors would place a greater amount of weight upon the testimony of law enforcement officers over that of the defendants 2: holding that the trial court did not err under either the federal or north carolina constitutions by allowing the state to exercise peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors based on their qualms regarding capital punishment 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "full search of automobile incident to citation for speeding since \"[n]o further evidence of excessive speeding] was going to be found\u201d once vehicle was stopped and citation issued). 22 . Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. 23 . United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1993). 24 . Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). 25 . United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). 26 . Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64 (citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-86, 105 S.Ct. at 1575 (rejecting a per se rule that a twenty-minute detention was too long under the circumstances)). 27 . United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 432 (5th Cir.2001). 28 . Id.; see United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542-43 (10th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); People v. Cox, 202 Ill.2d 462, 270 Ill.Dec. Holdings: 0: holding defendants nervousness in part presented officer with reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity 1: holding that prolonged detention beyond time necessary to write citation was unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 2: holding detention of passenger for warrant check violated fourth amendment absent reasonable suspicion 3: holding that reasonable suspicion justifies an investigatory detention 4: holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "C. Defendant\u2019s timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial \u00b647. Bateman filed a demand for a speedy trial on February 3, 2010, two days after his arraignment, and 310 days after his arrest. Therefore, Bateman claims that this factor should weigh in his favor. \u00b6 48. \u201cAlthough it is the State\u2019s duty to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has some responsibility to assert this right.\u201d Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1261. \u201c[F]ailure to assert this right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This Court has held that this factor weighs against a defendant who waits a significant amount of time after arrest to demand a speedy trial. C.f., Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 301 (Miss.1993) (<HOLDING>); Wall v. State, 718 So.2d 1107, 1113 Holdings: 0: holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal 1: holding that the defendants failure to assert his right to a speedy trial until one year after his arrest weighed heavily against him under this barker factor 2: holding that defendants assertion of his right to a speedy trial two months before his trial began did not satisfy this barker factor 3: recognizing that djelay arising from hearing the defendants motions not caused by the prosecution is not weighed against the prosecution in a speedy trial analysis 4: holding that a defendants failure to assert the right to speedy trial must be weighed against him in barker analysis", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which was issued against Moore for possession of a controlled dangerous substance. The Warrant was apparently based on the detective\u2019s observation of the substance in the jacket Moore had been seen wearing. Some time after Moore\u2019s arrest, the substance found in Moore\u2019s jacket tested negative for a controlled dangerous substance. A New Jersey Grand Jury voted no-bill against Moore for conspiracy, burglary, theft, and receiving stolen property. With regard to the second Warrant, Moore was found not guilty on a down-graded charge for failure to make lawful disposition of a controlled substance. Six months later Moore filed a complaint alleging various causes of action against several defen dants. Only Moore\u2019s claim for malicious prosecution was allowed to proceed. The parties Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also LAR 3.4. Having concluded that Holdings: 0: holding that notice of appeal was not effectively taken where appeal was filed simultaneously with timely motion for reconsideration because when timely motion for reconsideration is filed a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of the motion to reconsider has no effect 1: holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal 2: holding that this court has jurisdiction when the appellant has filed a docketing statement indicating an intent to appeal a particular order within the time for filing an appeal 3: holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial 4: holding court had jurisdiction where the appellant filed a motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees which evidenced an intent to appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Ill. App. 3d at 396-97. The trial court ruled that the real reason that the officers went to the defendant\u2019s home was to look for marijuana and that the theft investigation was just a ruse. This court agreed and also agreed that the officers\u2019 misrepresentation was so unfair that it rendered the defendant\u2019s consent invalid. Daugherty, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 400. We stated: \u201cWhere, as here, the law enforcement officer without a warrant uses his official position of authority and falsely claims that he has legitimate police business to cond 991) (finding consent invalid where the police officers misrepresented that, if the defendant would not consent to a search of his yacht, they could seize the yacht while they obtained a search warrant); People v. Bailey, 273 Ill. App. 3d 431, 437 (1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, Holdings: 0: holding that defendants consent was involuntary where defendant consented to search following a warrantless entry and officers explained that absent consent the officers would obtain a warrant 1: holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted 2: holding that officers may detain the occupants of a vehicle while executing a search warrant 3: holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car 4: holding that consent was invalid where the defendant initially refused request for search and officers made unsupportable legal threat to detain the defendants bag", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "solicitation. Even an unsophisticated consumer would understand that no call is placed unless the caller wishes to transmit a message, and the adjective \u201cimportant\u201d conveys no substantive information about that message. See Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051, 1055 (8th Cir.2002) (applying an objective \u201cunsophisticated consumer test\u201d when determining whether a debt collector\u2019s practices are deceptive or misleading in violation of the FDCPA). The Court concludes that the messages left by JCC on Zortman\u2019s voice-mail do not constitute \u201ccommunications\u201d with a person other than the consumer. \u25a0 The FDCPA recognizes that debt collection is a legitimate commercial activity. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1692(e); Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316, 318-19 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). The Act further recognizes that debt Holdings: 0: holding that a claim for violation of the fair debt collection practices act is not a personal injury tort claim 1: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt 2: recognizing that part of the purpose of the act is to prevent competitively disadvantaging debt collectors who do not engage in abusive practices 3: holding that debt collectors have no obligation to warn a consumer that her debt may increase over time 4: holding that the name under which a debt collector is licensed to do business is the debt collectors true name for purposes of the fdcpa", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Qiu failed to demonstrate his eligibility for withholding of removal to the extent his claim was based on his ex-wife\u2019s forced abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir.2007) (en banc) (providing that any alleged persecution must be \u201cpersonally experienced\u201d if it is to form the basis of relief). Qiu has not alleged that he engaged in any form of resistance that would render him eligible for relief. See Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (BIA 2006). Nor did the agency err by concluding that because Qiu is unmarried, any claim that he would face future persecution on account of possible future violations of the family planning policy would be too speculative to merit relief. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). B. Falun Gong The agency also reasonably Holdings: 0: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that she would be persecuted the bia did not err in denying asylum because her fear was speculative at best 1: holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best 2: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that he will be persecuted his fear is speculative at best 3: holding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best 4: holding that absent solid support in the record that a fear is objectively reasonable a claim of future persecution is speculative at best", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Morse v. Ripken, 707 So.2d 921, 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). The law, however, distinguishes between pure expressions of opinion, which are constitutionally protected, and mixed expressions of opinion, which, like factual statements, are not. Pure opinion occurs when the defendant makes a comment or states an opinion based on facts which are set forth in the a ion is based are stated in the article, but those \u201cfacts\u201d are either incomplete or incorrect, or the speaker\u2019s assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may imply a false assertion of fact. In that event, the statement is not protected as pure opinion. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); see also Anson v. Paxson Commc\u2019ns Corp., 736 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). Whether a statement is one of fact or one of Holdings: 0: holding that false arrest and false imprisonment claim were not duplicative 1: holding that defendants who were treated to expensive dinners and offered money were not adequately induced to show that they were not predisposed 2: holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983 3: holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback 4: holding that false remarks on a radio talk show were not automatically shielded from liability because they were opinion", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "circumstances are insufficient to meet the standard of reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant had knowingly hired or offered to hire his passenger to engage in a sexual act. Were we to hold otherwise, police officers would have carte blanche based on suspicion of solicitation of a prostitute to stop any vehicle late at night whenever he saw a driver and a known prostitute in the vehicle, to require the driver to exit the vehicle, and to question the driver and the passenger regarding their relationship. That conduct, no different than the conduct in the present ease, is tantamount to a seizure of a driver based on the mere presence of a passenger known to have committed a past criminal act. Cf. State v. Affsprung, 2004-NMCA-038, \u00b6\u00b64, 20-21, 135 N.M. 306, 87 P.3d 1088 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jones, 114 N.M. 147, 151, 835 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an officers request of a passenger who was present solely by virtue of the coincidence he was a passenger for the passengers identification just because the officer wanted to know who he was dealing with for safety purposes constituted an unlawful detention 1: holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety 2: holding asking passenger for identification not improper 3: holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous 4: holding officers request for passengers identification not unreasonable although unrelated to reason for stop where it did not prolong detention and passenger was under no obligation to answer", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Second, based on the Plan documents and the defendant\u2019s conduct, it appears that the Pension Board actually had the authority to determine issues relating to credited service, which forms the basis of this dispute. Third, as explained in more detail below, GM already has had the opportunity to litigate the question whether the plaintiff voluntarily walked away from his job in October 1978 when it contested \u2014 and lost \u2014 the plaintiffs worker\u2019s compensation claim. Therefore, pursuing that same issue through several internal and administrative procedures would serve no useful purpose. It is true that many courts insist on strict adherence to the administrative procedures set forth under a particular plan, see, e.g., Phipps v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 625 F.Supp. 1038 (S.D.Ohio 1985) (<HOLDING>); how ever, compliance with all administrative Holdings: 0: holding that employee could not sue due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies even though the employees request for internal review had become bogged down due to parties inability to jointly agree on a doctor to perform another evaluation 1: holding that claims not presented to the ij and bia should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies 2: holding that partys failure to file a timely internal administrative appeal as required by regulations of the department of agriculture constituted failure to exhaust administrative remedies and precluded judicial action 3: holding that plaintiff could not look to the courts for relief because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies under the adea 4: holding that failure to take available appeal to board of immigration appeals constitutes failure to exhaust administrative remedies and deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Beathard, 767 S.W.2d at 428; Losada v. S mant, Baccus, was indisputably acting covertly on behalf of law enforcement. He was cooperating in the hopes of completing enough \u201ccase credits\u201d to have his charges dismissed. Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of the corroboration of the informant, we must eliminate all of his testimony and determine whether there is other evidence that tends to connect Appellant to the offense of possession with intent to deliver. In Cantelon, an officer testified that the informant met the defendant at an agreed upon time and place, that he searched the informant, and that he watched as the informant, carrying a specific amount of cash and an audio recorder, met with the defendant and then returned without the cash, carryi Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>); Tave v. State, No. 2-02-449-CR, 2004 WL Holdings: 0: holding that an officers reasonable belief that he had witnessed a handtohand drug transaction helped provide a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of defendants vehicle 1: holding testimony of officer and narcotics investigator who both witnessed drug transaction coupled with audio recording of transaction constituted sufficient corroboration 2: holding that a fiduciary who receives consideration in connection with a transaction involving plan assets violated section 406b and a nonfiduciary who facilitated that transaction could be liable 3: holding that probable cause existed when trained narcotics officers observed what they believed to be a drug transaction 4: recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "destruction, impairment or loss of use of any common element; (E) Matters relating to or affecting the units or interests of the unit owners including but not limited to damages, destruction, impairment or loss of use of a unit or portion thereof, if: (i) Resulting from a nuisance or a defect in or damage to a common element; or (ii) Required to facilitate repair 'to any common elements; and (F)Any other matter to which the association has standing under law or pursuant to the declaration bylaws or any articles of incorporation. Or.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 100.405(4)(e). As defined in the statute, \u201ccommon elements\u201d include the hot and cold water systems. See Or. Rev.Stat. \u00a7 100.005(16); see also Ass\u2019n of Unit Owners of Bridgeview Condos. v. Dunning, 187 Or.App. 595, 612-13, 69 P.3d 788 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Plaintiff has statutory standing to sue Holdings: 0: holding that employers have standing to sue 1: holding that when a complaint alleges defects involving common elements a home owners association has standing to sue for damage to noncommon elements as well 2: holding elements of rescission are 1 3: holding the homeowners association had standing to sue under the theory of promissory estoppel 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it incorrectly interprets or improperly applies the law. In re Dep\u2019t of Family & Protective Services., 273 S.W.3d 637, 642-43 (Tex.2009) (orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Absent extraordinary circumstances, mandamus will not issue unless relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 210-11 (Tex.2004) (orig. proceeding) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839). Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately remedied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of interlocutory review. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding). As this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it Worth 2009, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); In re Garza, 153 S.W.3d 97, 100 (Tex.App.-San Holdings: 0: holding that mandamus is appropriate to challenge temporary orders because they are not subject to interlocutory appeal 1: holding same as to the filing of a notice of an interlocutory appeal 2: holding that mandamus was appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable 3: recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders 4: holding that mandamus is appropriate remedy because temporary order granting visitation is not appealable", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "placing other pedicle screws in those same patients, such information would demonstrate \u201cknowledge\u201d of how to do the surgery, but a lack of competence or care in the performance of the surgery. Plaintiffs\u2019 desire to introduce such other acts evidence ran more to showing lack of competence or care \u2014 that is, malpractice\u2014 with respect to other patients. From such evidence, the jury then could infer that Dr. Callahan had a propensity to commit malpractice by misplacing pedicle screws and thus may or perhaps must have committed similar malpractice in the surgery to Mr. Bair. However, Rule 404(b) bars the use of evidence of other alleged wrongs to show, circumstantially, action in conformity therewith. Thus, the legitimate probative value of the p App. 626, 607 N.W.2d 100, 105-06 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Tranisi, 212 Neb. 843, 326 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to sustain the states objection where questions to a witness go to his understanding of the law concerning parole and call for the legal knowledge of a lay witness 1: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 2: holding that mistrial was warranted for trial court allowing questions concerning prior malpractice lawsuits against witness because evidence of prior malpractice actions against a witness is not relevant to the witness competency or knowledge 3: holding that trial court properly barred certain questions about witness who was in federal witness protection program 4: holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an attorney knowingly misappropriated his or her client\u2019s funds. In re Barlow, 140 N.J. 191, 196, 657 A.2d 1197 (1995). Respondent is correct that we have held that shoddy recordkeeping alone does not suffice for a finding of knowing misappropriation. In re Konopka, 126 N.J. 225, 228, 596 A.2d 733 (1991); In re Librizzi, 117 N.J. 481, 491-92, 569 A.2d 257 (1990); and In re Gallo, 117 N.J. 365, 373, 568 A.2d 522 (1989). In In re Fleischer, 102 N.J. 440, 447, 508 A.2d 1115 (1986), however, we held that although poor accounting does not establish a knowing misappropriation, poor accounting is not a Wilson defense if evidence indicates knowing misappropriation. See also In re Skevin, 104 N.J. 476, 486, 517 A.2d 852 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028, 107 S.Ct. 1954, 95 L.Ed.2d 526 (1987) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); In re Irizarry, 141 N.J. Holdings: 0: holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement 1: recognizing that willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge under the lanham act 2: holding that a knowing misappropriation may be established by evidence that clearly and convincingly demonstrates that respondent knew the invasion was a likely result of his conduct and that  willful blindness satisfies the requirement of knowledge 3: holding that constructive knowledge satisfies the reason to know standard 4: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "authorizing the disclosure of grand jury documents and information to investigators and data analysts of the Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts (\u201cIFB\u201d). The IFB is a quasi-governmental agency created by statute to prevent and investigate fraudulent insurance transactions and composed of two voluntary private associations of insurance carriers. See United States v. Pimental, 199 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (D.Mass.2001) (describing make up and functions of the IFB); accord In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 158 F.Supp.2d at 98-99 (same); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 708 N.E.2d 644, 646-647 (1999) (same); see In Re Justices of the Superior Court, 218 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir.2000) (referring to IFB as \u201cquasi-governmental entity\u201d); United States v. Pimental, 201 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D.Mass.2001) (<HOLDING>). The government requested court authorization Holdings: 0: holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government 1: holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government 2: recognizing that federal government did not fund ifb 3: holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations 4: recognizing that stateimposed restrictions upon property may be attributed to the federal government for purposes of a takings analysis where the state officials acted as agents of the federal government or pursuant to federal authority", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "retaliated against. Accordingly, Texas Tech and TTUHSC\u2019s 12(b)(1) motion is DENIED. A State Must be a \u201cPerson\u201d Within the Meaning of the False Claims Act Having addressed the issue of whether Texas Tech and TTUHSC are immune from suit because of their status as state institutions, and having found that they are not entitled to sovereign immunity, the court turns now to unraveling the mystery of what is a \u201cperson\u201d for purposes of the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act does not define the word person. See 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3729. Ordinarily, \u201c \u2018in common usage, the term \u201cperson\u201d does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.\u2019 \u201d Will v. Michigan Dep\u2019t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>)(quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that 42 usc  1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations 2: holding that in actions brought under 42 usc  1983 federal courts apply the states statute of limitation for personal injury 3: recognizing that title iii enforcement statute 42 usc  12188 which incorporates the remedies of 42 usc  2000a3a does not include money damages 4: holding that person in 42 usc  1983 does not include states", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "seized motorist for the short period of time that it typically takes to locate and produce vehicle registration or ownership papers (even if the papers are contained within a vehicle being towed and thus not within immediate reach) is a relatively slight intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests. Consequently, in assessing whether, as of 8:02 p.m., the facts gave Rugen \u201ca particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Hornbecker] of criminal activity,\u201d Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (describing the \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d required to justify a Terry stop) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), we are somewhat less demanding than we would be if we were evaluating the lawfulness of a Terry stop that resembled a full, custodial arrest, see, e.g., Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (<HOLDING>); Stanley, 915 F.2d at 55 (similar); cf. United Holdings: 0: holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown 1: recognizing that the inquiry into whether the facts adequately supported a terry stop is informed by the nature and quality of the intrusion 2: holding that an investigatory stop must be supported by specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion 3: holding that for a terry stop to be considered valid from its inception the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion  quoting terry 392 us at 21 88 sct at 1880 4: holding that while nervousness may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances nervousness standing alone was insufficient to expand a terry stop into an inquiry into drug activity", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of [the stay put provision, Congress] unequivocally,\u201d intended to \u201cstrip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed\u201d and that the provision \u201cmeans what it says\u201d). The meaning of the phrase \u201ccurrent educational placement,\u201d never expressly defined in the statute, is at the heart of the dispute between the parties in the case at bar. In Burlington, the Court observed that an administrative decision in favor of the parents \u201cwould seem to constitute agreement by the State to the change of placement,\u201d 471 U.S. at 372, 105 S.Ct. 1996; in other words, the decision would seem to constitute a \u201ccurrent educational placement.\u201d Other courts have followed this understanding of the relevant statutes. See, e. g., Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Holdings: 0: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel 1: holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court 2: holding that the decision of the supreme court in burlington established that a ruling by the education appeals panel in favor of the parents position constitutes agreement for purposes of the pendent placement provision 3: holding that a panel of the court of appeals is bound by a prior decision of another panel of the same court addressing the same question but in a different case unless overturned by an intervening decision from a higher court 4: holding that where a panel of the court of appeals has decided the same issue albeit in a different case a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent unless it has been overturned by a higher court", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, the same immunity does not apply to prosecutor\u2019s actions that are administrative and investigative. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2734 n. 16, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Similarly, officials that initiate and prosecute agency enforcement measures subject to agency adjudication are entitled to absolute immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911-12, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). It is the official\u2019s function, not role or status, that determines whether absolute immunity applies. Id. at 511-13, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14. The Third Circuit has not addressed the issue of absolute immunity for child welfare work L.Ed.2d 719 (1991) and Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). In 1994, the Supreme Court denied a petition Holdings: 0: holding that while a witness and prosecutor were protected by absolute immunity for their participation in judicial proceedings they were not entitled to absolute immunity on a  1983 claim that they conspired to present false testimony 1: holding by a 21 vote that an ohio probate judge was entitled to absolute immunity for filing a criminal complaint 2: holding that social services attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity for actions related to the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency proceedings 3: holding that social worker was not entitled to absolute immunity for filing complaint becausejudicial proceedings were initiated by district attorney who filed petition for adjudication 4: holding that a judge was not entitled to absolute immunity for firing an employee", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the court to rely only upon the fact of conviction and the definition of the prior offense. Kirksey, 138 F.3d at 124. If the definition of the prior offense is ambiguous, however, the court must look beyond the definition to the charging document and to any statements incorporated into that document. Kirksey, 138 F.3d at 124-26. In conducting its ACCA assessment, a court may also consult the jury instructions in the earlier case to determine whether the erized Wardrick\u2019s 1988 conviction for resisting arrest as a violent felony. The act of resisting arrest poses a threat of direct confrontation between a police officer and the subject of the arrest, creating the potential for serious physical injury to the officer and others. See United States v. James, 337 F.3d 387 (4th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Wardrick\u2019s conviction for Holdings: 0: holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca 2: holding that to the extent a south carolina violation for failing to stop for a blue light required only negligent conduct it is not a violent felony under begay 3: holding that escape is categorically a violent felony under the acca 4: holding south carolina conviction for failure to stop for a blue light to be violent felony under acca because prohibited conduct creates potential for confrontation and violence", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Master, supra, 748 F.Supp. at 392 (\u201cThe court notes that there is no statutory language in the CERCLA statute which supports such an argument\u201d). Certain of the courts that have held governmental agency involvement can satisfy the NCP\u2019s public comment requirement appear to have relied on the fact that the agency\u2019s process itself involved opportunities for public input and involvement. See Estes v. Scotsman Group, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 988, 991 (C.D.Ill.1998) (\u201cCases allowing public agency involvement to be substituted for public comment have only allowed such a substitution if the public is provided an ample opportunity for comment and there is substantial involvement throughout the cleanup by a state agency\u201d); Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 779 F.Supp. 1519, 1537 (N.D.Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>), rev\u2019d. in part on other grounds, 2 F.3d 746 Holdings: 0: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 1: holding that the ncp public participation requirement was fulfilled because the indiana department of environmental management gave public notice and received public comments before issuing an npdes permit for the cleanup even if it did not hold a public hearing 2: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 3: holding that significant involvement of government agency charged with protecting public environmental interest satisfies public participation requirement in certain circumstances 4: holding that significant state involvement satisfies public participation requirement because it serves the identical purpose that the public notice provision seeks to effectuate", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Court noted that neither \u00a7 841(b)(1) nor the Sentencing Guide lines defined the words \u201cmixture\u201d or \u201csubstance.\u201d Id. at 461-62, 111 S.Ct. at 1925-26. The Court therefore applied the ordinary dictionary meaning of the terms and concluded that the combination of the pure LSD and blotter paper is a \u201cmixture\u201d within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 462, 111 S.Ct. at 1925. Amendment 488 does not contradict Chapman because the Sentencing Commission has the authority to review the work of the courts and revise the Guidelines by adopting an interpretation of a particular guideline in conflict with prior judicial constructions of that guideline. See Stinson, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 113 S.Ct. at 1919; see also Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 1857, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (<HOLDING>). At the time of the Chapman holding, the Holdings: 0: holding that the mere mandatory application of the guidelines  the district courts belief that it was required to impose a guidelines sentence  constitutes error 1: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony 2: recognizing that congress has the power to completely divest the courts of their sentencing discretion and that congress granted broad authority to the sentencing commission guided by specific goals and principles 3: holding that congress necessarily contemplated that the commission would review the work of the courts and revise the guidelines 4: holding that under the fsia congress contemplated waivers of a specific and explicit nature", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "search Bald\u00f3n, either predicated on individual suspicion, background information particular to Bald\u00f3n that would have been known to the parole officer, or the general mission of parole. Thus, the only issue we address on appeal is whether a parole agreement containing a consent-to-search clause renders suspicionless and warrant-less searches of parolees reasonable under the search and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution. Additionally, we only analyze the consent issue in this case on state constitutional law grounds. The United States Supreme Court has not yet directly weighed in on the issue to direct an outcome under the Fourth Amendment or to aid us in our resolution under our state constitution. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2199 n. pp.1976) (<HOLDING>). On the other hand, only a handful of courts Holdings: 0: holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given 1: holding search of probationers computer by probation officers was reasonable even in absence of a search provision when conditions on probationers computer use reduced his expectation of privacy in his computer 2: holding probationers acceptance of search provision of parole agreement did not constitute freely and voluntarily given consent 3: holding released offenders do not voluntarily consent to all conditions of parole 4: holding search provision in probation order constitute a reasonable and necessary element of the courts regulation of probationers which did not require the defendants consent", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "an inmate was injured by a foreign object in the food. His sole allegation that a security guard knew of an incident when pebbles were found in prison beans does not support a finding that Atkinson knowingly disregarded a substantial risk that an inmate would bite into or ingest a foreign object. The security guard did not indicate that Atkinson was aware of the pebbles. In a \u00a7 1983 suit, \u201c[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official ... is only liable for his or her own misconduct.\u201d Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Because Green was unable upon remand to remedy the insufficient factual allegations against Atkinson, the district court\u2019s dis missal of the claim was proper. See id.; George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Green also addresses the merits of new claims Holdings: 0: holding extraneous offenses of murder by cyanide poisoning relevant to charge of murder by chloroform poisoning 1: holding counsels decision to open after the states caseinchief did not amount to a constitutional violation 2: recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights 3: holding single incident of food poisoning did not amount to a violation of prisoners constitutional rights 4: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "By implicating the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 asks this court to look beyond the four corners of the 2007 Employment Agreement to the terms of the 2004 Employment Agreement and to conclude that the exclusion of a provision prohibiting Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 from reducing Colameta\u2019s salary or changing his job duties gave Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 the authority to do both. The 2007 Employment Agreement, however, is unambiguous; indeed, neither Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 nor the defendants argue to the contrary. The court therefore cannot use the 2004 Employment Agreement to assist in the interpretation of the 2007 Employment Agreement, whether through application of the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius or otherwise. See McAdams v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 287, 300 (1st Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). B. Prot\u00e9g\u00e9\u2019s Breach of the 2007 Employment Holdings: 0: holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous 1: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation 2: holding that principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has no place in interpretation of unambiguous contract 3: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 4: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court noted that a district judge in an extradition proceeding is acting pursuant to special powers and not any part of the judicial power of the United States. Id. at 120, 14 How. 103 (citing to Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 48). Modern courts continue to rely on the concepts expressed in Ferreira and Kaine in determining that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3184 does not violate the principle of separation of powers. See In re Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 864 n. 11 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3184 does not violate principles of separation of powers because a long line of precedents hold that a district judge acting pursuant to Section 3184 does not exercise any part of the judicial power of the United States); Lo Duca v. U.S., 93 F.3d 1100 (2nd Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). There are additional reasons why a court may Holdings: 0: recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine 1: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 2: recognizing that individual judges rather than the federal courts are subject to 18 usc  3184 that judges are thus functioning as commissioners under  3184 rather than exercising powers under article iii and that the statute thus does not violate the separation of powers doctrine 3: holding ifrp is neither a usurpation of sentencing courts article iii power nor violation of separation of powers doctrine 4: holding that 18 usc  3559c did not violate separation of powers doctrine or ex post facto clause", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to the question presented. Where the error is prejudicial, the defendant is entitled to have his motion reconsidered and passed upon as a discretionary matter.\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 346 N.C. at 124, 484 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 510, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980)); see also Barrow, 350 N.C. at 646, 517 S.E.2d at 378. Here, the trial court instructed the jury, without objection from the parties, as follows: As to the second question, members of the jury, it is your duty to recall the evidence as the evidence was presented. So you may retire and resume your deliberation. From these instructions, we are convinced that the trial judge did not impermissibly deny the request based solely on the unavailability of the transcript. See Barrow, 350 N.C. at 648, 517 S.E.2d at 378-79 (<HOLDING>); State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 35, 331 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge 1: holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in merely stating that the request could not be granted because there was no transcript at this point 2: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a transcript of a recording even though defense counsel did not stipulate to its accuracy 3: holding that appellant failed to preserve error because it did not present appellate complaint to trial court 4: holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "concludes that Syracuse is not entitled to any damages related to the removal of the certification tags. La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party \u201cmust make reasonable efforts to mitigate\u201d damages caused by another\u2019s breach of contract). B. Orion\u2019s Breach of Contract Claim Against Syracuse 1. Bar to Recovery of Damages by Syracuse The core of Orion\u2019s affirmative defenses is that Syracuse cannot recover on his claim because he breached the Agreement while Orion fully performed. See, e.g., B.F. Edington Drilling Co. v. Yearwood, 239 La. 303, 118 So.2d 419, 422 (1960) (concluding that party that installed well could not obtain payment of the contract price because the well did not meet the contract specifications); City of Houma v. C-Well Ltd., 515 So.2d 646, 648 (La.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>); Copeland v. Drury, 494 So.2d 1189, 1193 Holdings: 0: holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach 1: holding that party may not recover damages for breach of contract where its own bad faith caused the other partys breach 2: holding that a party cannot claim damages for breach of contract unless he has shown his full compliance with the contract and is not acting in bad faith 3: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 4: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "such decisions. 429 A.2d at 781. The court in City of Scranton, further noted that Section 1 of Act 111, 48 P.S. \u00a7 217.1, limits the issues that are subject to mandatory bargaining and that Act 111 \u201cdoes not remove all regulation [of policemen and firemen] from the scope of a municipality\u2019s managerial decision-making, particularly any regulation which might be considered \u2018essential for the proper and efficient functioning of a police [and fire] force.\u2019\u201d Id. [quoting Sharon v. Rose of Sharon Lodge, No. S, 11 Pa.Cmwlth. 277, 315 A.2d 355, 358 (1973)]. Accordingly, this court concluded in City of Scranton that Act 111 does not remove from the employer\u2019s managerial authority the total number of firemen on a force. Compare Appeal of City of Erie, 74 Pa. Cmwlth. 245, 459 A.2d 1320 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Subsequently, in City of Philadelphia v. Holdings: 0: holding that arbitration panel did not err in concluding that the number of firemen per rig constitutes a work condition rather than a matter of managerial prerogative and therefore was a proper subject of bargaining 1: holding that the district court did not err by compelling individual rather than class arbitration because the relevant agreements were silent as to class arbitration 2: holding that trial court did not err 3: holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal 4: holding that the number of rooms that housekeepers must clean is a mandatory subject of bargaining", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to confront the witnesses against him. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides: General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. \u00b6 14. The State argues that the passports needed no authentication because they are authentic on their face. The State concedes that the passport of Robert Keys was obtained through a fraudulent application because Bob used an alias to obtain the passport. We do not agree that a fraudulently obtained passport could be considered authentic on its face for the purposes of establishing the information contained within as factual. See U.S. v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 466 (2nd Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Gulotta v. United States, 118 F.2d 683, 685 Holdings: 0: holding that a passport is not competent evidence to prove the defendant was not in thailand absent proof by thai authorities that if the defendant had entered or exited thailand an entry would have been placed on his passport 1: holding that the defendants right to presence was not violated where the defendant had been present in the courtroom while the venire members were questioned notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was absent later when his attorney made his strikes over the lunch hour because the defendant was present in the courtroom when the clerk gave the strikes effect by reading off the list of jurors who had not been stricken 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding that it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to admit the passport as evidence that defendant could not have been served with process in new york because she had been in hong kong the defendant offered no attestation or testimonial authentication by the hong kong authorities who had affixed the stamps on her passport 4: holding that upon award of zero damages plaintiff has failed to establish an essential part of its proof and judgment should have been entered for defendant", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "reflected in Document 00813. The 00813 rates similarly do not prohibit a contractor\u2019s payment of higher wages to his employees. After a dispute arose about the switch, in a letter sent to Mor-ganti, the City wrote that it would reimburse the Hobby Airport contractors and subcontractors for variances between the 00812 rate and the 00813 rate. In response to the letter, Morganti requested the difference between the rates on behalf of itself and its subcontractors, including SES. The City denied the claim. It took the position that the switch to the 00813 rate did not harm Morganti and SES because none of their employees received a wage increase due to the switch. SES\u2019s presiden , No. 14-04-00120-CV, 2006 WL 176862, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (<HOLDING>). 2) Analysis Here, SES maintains that it Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs failure to allege citizenship of first defendant did not constitute good cause for second defendants failure to timely join in removal petition 1: holding that plaintiffs failure to notify attorney of receipt of right to sue letter and failure to confirm that the attorney had received the letter did not warrant the application of equitable tolling 2: holding that defendants failure to disclose sublease did not cause breachofcontract damages because plaintiffs deal fell through for reasons independent of failure to notify plaintiff 3: holding breachofcontract claim was preempted 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to secure financing for deal caused its damages rather than any action by defendant in breach of contract claim", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was initially made a party to this action but was subsequently removed as a party. 2 . The Depreciation Lands Museum, which is within 500 feet of the subject property, has a cemetery on its premises. 3 . The Township made only a fleeting reference to standing in its discussion of whether ASI's claims implicate an \"overwhelming federal interest.\u201d 4 . Although this regulation was passed pursuant to the ADA, the broad remedial language of the RA is similarly intended to extend relief beyond qualified individuals with disabilities. See Frederick L. v. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 364 F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed , 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (<HOLDING>); Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Holdings: 0: recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court 1: recognizing a corporations legal rights to confidentiality and privilege 2: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations 3: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition 4: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[the trustee, after notice and a hearing, may ... sell ..., other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.]\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 363(b)(1) (1985). * * * If there are objections, however, the trustee must seek approval of the proposed sale from the bankruptcy court. The appropriate standard used by courts in reviewing a trustee\u2019s recommendation has been enunciated in myriad ways. See, e.g., In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir.1991) (stating that sales are an exercise of a fiduciary duty that requires an \u201carticulated business justification\u201d); In re Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir.1985) (opining that the sale must result in the estate obtaining the best price possible under the circumstances); In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 866 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1988) (<HOLDING>); In re Phoenix Steel Corp., 82 B.R. 334, Holdings: 0: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 1: recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate 2: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty 3: holding that benefiting fiduciary must show he acted in good faith and that transactions were fair and equitable 4: holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "motion for appropriate relief was not proper because it was not made after a verdict had been reached. See State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 535, 391 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1990) (motion for appropriate relief is a \u201cpost-verdict\u201d motion); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1414(a) (1999) (motion for appropriate relief may be made \u201c[a]fter the verdict but not more than 10 days after entry of judgment\u201d). The Defendant\u2019s motions, therefore, must be characterized as \u201cpretrial\u201d motions brought \u201cprior to a trial that the Government had a right to prosecute and that... [Defendant was required to defend.\u201d Sanford, 429 U.S. at 16, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 20. Accordingly, the State\u2019s appeal of the trial court\u2019s 14 January 2000 order is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See McGraw v. State, 688 So. 2d 764, 771 (Miss.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 830, 139 L. Ed. 2d 51 Holdings: 0: holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment 1: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 2: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss 3: holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment 4: holding pursuant to sanford and serf ass that a defendants untimely motion for acquittal made subsequent to a jury deadlock must be treated as a pretrial motion and thus review of the trial courts judgment granting such motion is not precluded by the double jeopardy clause", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "because appellant Arn\u2019s application for the modification of his pretrial release conditions also was a pretrial motion providing excludable time, no violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred. See United States v. Wirsing, 867 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (9th Cir.1989). 2. The district court\u2019s misreading of a single phrase in the conspiracy instruction did not constitute plain error, because the written instructions provided to the jury properly stated the requisite conspiracy elements and unanimity requirement. See United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.1994). 3. The district court properly rejected appellants\u2019 proffered factual impossibility instruction, as impossibility is not a defense to conspiracy or attempt. See United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 4. The district court properly instructed the Holdings: 0: holding that the fccs orders relating to the tcpa are binding under the hobbs act 1: holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law 2: holding that bribing a public official does not amount to a conspiracy with that official to extort the briber under the hobbs act 3: holding that impossibility is not a defense to attempts or conspiracy under the hobbs act 4: holding that proof of racketeering was not a separate prerequisite to criminal liability under the hobbs act", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "his four and one-half-year sentence, not his habitual felony offender sentence. Although this is the argument that the State should have raised at Hall\u2019s hearing on his motion to correct his sentence, the Department does not have the authority to review and reject a trial court\u2019s specific award of credit. See Pearson v. Moore, 767 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (\u201cAs part of the executive branch, DOC lacks the power to adjudicate the legality of a sentence or to add or delete sentencing conditions.\u201d); Slay v. Singletary, 676 So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (en banc), aff'd, 688 So.2d 319 (Fla.1997) (\u201c[T]he Department of Corrections lacks the authority to correct an illegal sentence or render the illegality harmless.\u201d); Wilson v. State, 603 So.2d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>). \u201cSentencing is a power, obligation, and Holdings: 0: holding that a party to an administrative proceeding failed to effectively obtain judicial review where the party filed a response to another partys petition rather than a separate petition 1: holding that plan amendments are a settlor rather than a trustee function 2: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury 3: holding that the award of the credit is a judicial task to be accomplished at sentencing rather than an administrative function to be accomplished postsentencing 4: holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "analysis whether Kelly-Ryan at one point claimed that the policy was a marine insurance policy, because even a joint stipulation cannot cure a jurisdictional defect. See Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342 (9th Cir.1996); see also Galt G/S v. Hapag-Lloyd AG, 60 F.3d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201c[W]e inquire sua sponte whether admiralty or diversity jurisdiction provided the district court with an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.... \u201d). We thus turn to the question whether admiralty jurisdiction exists over Kelly-Ryan\u2019s claim against Royal. Admiralty jurisdiction hinges on whether the Big Shield insurance policy with the MEL endorsement is a maritime insurance contract. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 35-36, 20 L.Ed. 90 (1870) (<HOLDING>). If the Big Shield policy is maritime, \u201cand Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures 1: holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law 2: holding that the contract disputes act preserves admiralty jurisdiction in the federal district courts for suits arising out of maritime contracts 3: holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts 4: holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "device; a person who transcribes recorded testimony; an attorney for the government; or a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (in). Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2). The D.C. Circuit has held that Rule 6(e) qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding statute, even though the Criminal Rules are ordinarily not labeled as such. See Senate of P.R. v. United States Dep\u2019t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 582 & n. 23 (D.C.Cir.1987) (\u201calthough rules of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court generally do not qualify as \u2018statutes\u2019 for exemption (b)(3) purposes!,] [Rule 6(e)] does so qualify because it was specifically adopted by an Act of Congress.\u201d) (internal citation omitted). See also Fund for Constitutional Gov\u2019t v. Nat\u2019l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C.Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the FBI relied on Exemption 3 Holdings: 0: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute 1: holding that rule 6e qualifies as a statute for purposes of exemption 3 2: holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3 3: holding that  6103 qualifies as an exemption statute 4: holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir.1990). Here, the above-factors weigh in UNUM\u2019s favor. When UNUM\u2019s plan administrator decided to terminate Reagan\u2019s benefits, he had before him the following evidence to support his conclusion: (1) the fact that Dr. Kurkjian could find no objective evidence that Reagan suffered from any cardiac disease; (2) the fact that neither Dr. Kurkjian nor Dr. Laping believed that any restrictions or limitations upon Reagan\u2019s wo agree regarding Reagan\u2019s medical condition and ability to work, such a disagreement does not support a finding of arbitrary and capricious . In fact, reasoned differences among qualified medical experts preclude such a finding. See Smith v. Office of Civilian Health and Med. Program of Uniformed Servs., 97 F.3d 950, 959 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); see also Ladd v. ITT Corp., 148 F.3d 753, 756 Holdings: 0: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid 1: holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment 2: holding that the writ may not issue merely because a federal court finds that a state courts decision was erroneous or incorrect  3: holding that widespread disagreement among qualified medical experts over a medical issue virtually precludes a reviewing court from concluding that an agency decision that agrees with one side is arbitrary or plainly wrong even if the court finds other views more persuasive 4: holding that the plaintiffs experts were not qualified to offer a medical opinion as to the cause of death because they are not physicians nor otherwise properly qualified to offer a medical opinion", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not manage a fund entrusted to him by the client....\u201d); In re Gelson, 12 F.Supp. 924, 925 (E.D.N.Y.1935) (\u201cAn attorney receiving money which is the property of his client, does so in a fiduciary capacity, within the purview of the bankruptcy law.\u201d). Moreover, numerous cases have applied the defalcation exception to debts owed by corporate officers, notwithstanding the absence of any express trust. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939) (\u201cA director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders. Their powers are in trust.\u201d (citations omitted)); In re Hammond, 98 F.2d 703, 705 (2d Cir.1938) (\u201cIt can scarcely be doubted ... that a director [is a fiduciary].\u201d); In re Bernard, 87 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir.1937) (<HOLDING>). The district court\u2019s view that only the Holdings: 0: holding that under delaware law the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors 1: holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate 2: holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation 3: holding that officers directors and employees of a corporation may become personally liable under  1981 4: holding that directors and officers are fiduciaries", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Creek sub-watershed; and may significantly impact other wildlife. In contrast, the Forest Service asserts that its finding of no significant impact was reasonable because \u201cthe Forest Service and Fish and Wildlife Service biological analyses demonstrate that impacts to wildlife, including the northern spotted owl ... will not be significant. Watershed analysis demonstrates that none of the watersheds in the project area will be significantly affected.\u201d (Defi\u2019s Mem. In Supp. Of Mot. For Summ. J. and in Opp\u2019n to Pis.\u2019 Mot. For Summ. J. (\u201cDef.\u2019s Mem.\u201d) at 10.) 1. Northern Spotted Owl The EA concludes that the project \u201cwill affect, is likely to adversely affect\u201d the Northern Spotted Owl. (EA at 58, AR 417.) Standing alone, this suggests the need for an EIS. Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1125 (<HOLDING>). The Forest Service concludes however, that Holdings: 0: holding that the presence of one intensity factor may be sufficient to deem the action significant in certain circumstances 1: recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law 2: holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute 3: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 4: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "invasion, and Issa\u2019s blood found on a wooden fence slat in the back yard of the subject home, Issa\u2019s counsel argued in his closing that his client went with others to the victims\u2019 home but abandoned the robbery plan, was then shot by one of the other perpetrators, and remained in the back yard for some time after being wounded. And in a further effort to explain why all three victims testified that the perpetrator who struggled with C. D. was shot, Issa\u2019s counsel posited that this unknown perpetrator faked being wounde r v. State, 293 Ga. 282, 283 (745 SE2d 646) (2013) (punctuation omitted); accord Gordon v. State, 334 Ga. App. 633, 634 (780 SE2d 376) (2015). 61 Gordon, 334 Ga. App. at 634 (punctuation omitted); see McNair, 293 Ga. at 283 (noting that the rule of 7 5 SE2d 187) (2015) Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 1: holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy 2: holding that trial counsels strategy of explaining that defendant was at the scene of crime to deal drugs rather than commit robbery was not unreasonable 3: holding that trial counsels decision to submit evidence to the jury that his confession was coerced rather than submitting the evidence to the judge in a motion to suppress was a matter of trial strategy and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance 4: holding that counsels failure to object or request a limiting instruction for evidence of defendants incarceration was sound trial strategy", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "installation services. In addition, Siemens has stated that when installation services are provided, \u201cthey are part and parcel of the contract for sale of equipment to the customer.\u201d These are clear indications that Siemens has provided recurrent work for installation services as defined by the Kentucky courts. See Cain, 236 S.W.3d at 588; Fireman\u2019s Fund Insurance Company v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Ky.1986) (finding that \u201ca person who engages another to perform a part of the work which is a recurrent part of his business, trade, or occupation is a contractor\u201d). Siemens has also continued to provide installation services since the NAS contract and indicates that this work is recurrent. See Daniels v. Louisville Gas and Electric Company, 933 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Ky.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). We find that Plaintiffs placed an unwarranted Holdings: 0: holding that uncharged conduct may be considered at sentencing when that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that lg  e may be classified as a contractor when it subcontracted with tsa to conduct emissions testing at irregular or sporadic intervals which satisfied the definition of regular or recurrent work 2: holding that when attorneys were acting as members of the firm with respect to the case in question section 504b1 applies to allow  fee sharing with any member whether that membership is regular or sporadic 3: holding that duty to ensure that independent contractor performs its work in safe manner arises if the general contractor retains some control over the manner in which the independent contractor performs its work 4: holding that if contractor is hable to sub that liability though not yet satisfied by payment might well constitute actual damages to the contractor and sustain their suit under rule that contractor may only sue to recover its own damages", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "any case that specifically addresses the precise issue here, i.e., whether the US-CIS\u2019s termination of an alien\u2019s refugee status constitutes final agency action.\u201d R. 31 PagelD# : 568. But \u201cthe parties do cite cases that have considered whether the USCIS\u2019s termination of an alien\u2019s asylee status or its denial of an application to adjust status is final agency action within the meaning of the APA.\u201d Id. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that \u201c[t]hese cases provide a useful framework for resolving the issues before this Court.\u201d Id. Where removal proceedings are pending, such as in this case, further administrative relief is available and the termination of an alien\u2019s current status is an intermediate, nonfinal agency action. See Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); see also Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 1313, Holdings: 0: holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action 1: holding that termination of asylum is not final agency action because it is only an intermediate step in a multistage administrative process succeeded or accompanied by removal proceedings 2: holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application 3: holding that because the ij denied an asylum application as untimely we lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the final order of removal as it pertained to the asylum claim 4: holding issuance of administrative complaint to initiate proceedings not final agency action", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "only in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if the territory embraced by the reservation remained subject to the jurisdiction of the State.\u201d 219 U.S. at 10, 31 S.Ct. at 214. Within this framework, the federal assessment could be imposed in this case only to the extent of $15.00, the most that could be charged a defendant under the Virginia victim compensation scheme. Such a result seems counterintuitive, or at least impractical. Although the result follows from the reasoning of Press Publishing Co., it is not clear whether fines\u2014 especially unique fines such as the special assessments \u2014 must be treated in the same way as sentences of incarceration for purposes of the \u201clike punishment\u201d analysis. But cf. United States v. Kendrick, 636 F.Supp. 189 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (<HOLDING>); cf. also United States v. Patmore, 475 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction to review fines under the criminal sentencing reform act of 1982 because sentence is a broad term which encompasses a fine probation a term of imprisonment or any other form of punishment imposed by the court 1: holding that trial courts failure to give reasonabledoubt instruction sua sponte during punishment phase for extraneous offenses offered during punishment was harmless error in part because the jury assessed punishment far below maximum available despite states plea for maximum 2: holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a 3: recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense 4: holding that punishment in this court for an offense under ncgs  1381 north carolinas driving while intoxicated statute cannot exceed a fine of 1000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year the maximum punishment for a misdemeanor under 18 usc section 1 because to allow the greater punishment that could be imposed under state law would conflict with the federal policy of limiting us magistrates nonconsensual jurisdiction to that allowed under the federal definition of a misdemeanor", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Commentary to ABA Defense Function Standard 4-8.2. See also United States v. Ruth, 768 F.Supp. 1428, 1435 (D.Kan.1991). For other cases where courts have applied the Flores-Ortega standard to privately retained counsel who informed their clients that they would not continue to represent them on appeal, see Raney v. State, 986 So.2d 468 (Ala.Crim.App.2007); Esters v. State, 894 So.2d 755 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); and Wallace v. State, 121 S.W.3d 652 (Tenn.2003); Cabinatan v. United States, unpublished, 2011 WL 255691, *5 (D.Haw.2011) (rejecting the contention that, because the defendant's trial attorney \"was not retained or paid to prosecute an appeal, he therefore owed no duty to Cabinatan to file a notice of appeal.\"); Richardson v. United States, 612 F.Supp.2d 709, 715-16 (N.D.W.Va2009) (<HOLDING>); Schaefer v. United States, unpublished, 2008 Holdings: 0: holding the court lacked jurisdiction where the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal on the attorneys fee issue because a supplemental notice of appeal is required for us to have jurisdiction over an attorneys fees issue that becomes final subsequent to the initial notice of appeal 1: holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted 2: holding that trial counsel owes a criminal defendant a duty to file a notice of appeal regardless of whether the attorney was retained for the appeal or not 3: recognizing that exception to requirement of timely filing of notice of appeal exists in cases where defendant either was not told of right to appeal or was not furnished attorney to exercise those rights or was furnished attorney for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete appeal 4: holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "amply justified in concluding that despite the fact that the hearing on Nelson\u2019s motion in limine to exclude the Rule 404(b) evidence was deferred until trial, the speedy trial clock did not run during the entire pendency of this motion. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(h)(1)(F); United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir.1991) (\u201cMotions necessitating hearings, such as suppression hearings ... are governed by section 3161(h)(1)(F). As such, the entire time from the fifing of the motion to the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even when the hearing is deferred until trial.\u201d)(citing United States v. Garcia, 778 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir.1986) and United States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 796 (11th Cir.1984)); see also United States v. Beard, 41 F.3d 1486, 1488 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Thus, no more than 30 non-excludable days Holdings: 0: holding district courts should defer to hearing officers finding on the credibility and reliability of evidence of witnesses who testified before her 1: holding that a pretrial motion triggers an automatic exclusion under  3161h1f even though no actual delay results 2: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion 3: recognizing that a district courts decision to defer hearing a motion until trial does not render the intervening time nonexcludable under  3161h1f 4: holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "whether the trial court found that adultery caused the dissolution of the marriage or related to pre- or post-separation conduct, (2) state the basis for the trial court\u2019s award to Cynthia of more property than she requested, and (3) contained no explanation for the trial court\u2019s \u201charsh rebuke\u201d that Daniel had made a game of the divorce and the dissolution of his business and that his conduct constituted a \u201cmockery of our judicial system.\u201d Daniel asserts he is \u201cleft guessing\u201d as to the basis for the trial court\u2019s ruling and cannot adequately address the findings on appeal. Daniel\u2019s complaints necessarily relate to the trial court\u2019s failure to make additional findings pursuant to rule of civil procedure 298. See Moore v. Moore, 383 S.W.3d 190, 200-01 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Rule of civil procedure 298 provides that, Holdings: 0: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case 1: recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings 2: holding the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating error in the family courts findings of fact 3: holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by    evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact 4: recognizing distinction between findings of fact under section 6711 of the family code and findings of fact under rules of civil procedure", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "goal in construing statute is to fulfill intent of legislature). \u00b6 132 Before 1985, \u00a7 40-254(A) provided that a party dissatisfied with a Commission decision could commence an action \u201cto vacate and set aside\u201d the decision. A.R.S. \u00a7 40-254, Historical and Statutory Notes. Section 40-254(C) was the same as it reads today. Thus, before 1985, the superior court indisputably lacked authority to grant any relief under the statute other than affirming, modifying or setting aside a Commission decision. See Sun City Water Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm\u2019n, 113 Ariz. 464, 466, 556 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1976) (concluding court lacked authority to affirm Commission decision in part and remand another portion); Arizona Corp. Comm\u2019n v. Fred Harvey Transp. Co., 95 Ariz. 185, 190, 388 P.2d 236, 239 (1964) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 133 In 1985, the legislature amended \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 1: holding district court lacked authority to order placement at a school not approved by the state 2: holding superior court lacked authority to remand to commission 3: holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings 4: holding that where a superior court judge was named a defendant in an action for a writ of mandamus the prosecuting attorney is the proper court representative of the superior court judge", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Penn Central Transportation Company, 944 F.2d 164, 165-66 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906, 112 S.Ct. 1262, 117 L.Ed.2d 491 (1992). 7 .Id. at 166. 8 . For a discussion of the ownership and operational history of the Reading Terminal, see Reading Company v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F.Supp. 1218, 1222-25 (E.D.Pa.1993). 9 . Conrail has now dropped its motion for summary judgment on the immunity portion of Count II. ConraiTs Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 1. The summary judgment motions of the Uni .R. 406, 409 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1990) (concluding that an interpretation of language in the FSP. is within the Special Court\u2019s jurisdiction); Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Penn Central Corporation, 533 F.Supp. 1351, 1353-55 (Sp.Ct.R.R.R.A.1982) (<HOLDING>); Stratford Land and Improvement Company, Inc. Holdings: 0: holding that interpretation of contract documents regulations or a solicitation present no disputed issues of material fact and is a question of law 1: holding that the court had jurisdiction to decide issues relating to the fsp conveyance orders and an agreement entered pursuant to the conveyance orders 2: holding that the interpretation of both conveyance orders and documents is within the jurisdictional grant of  209e2 3: recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language 4: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of collateral procedural issues (such as limitations placed on attorneys\u2019 fees), which do not implicate the merits of the case, should remain binding and are ordinarily not subject to further review when the case is remanded to a federal transferor court. See Walitalo, 968 F.2d at 747-48 (\u201cthe district court did not err in specifying how the originating trial courts should calculate the amount of lead and liaison counsel\u2019s fees in those cases remanded for trial ... the district court appointed lead and liaison counsel and thus had authority to determine the amount of their compensation\u201d). The federal rulings also apply to a case remanded to state court upon a finding that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. See Willy, 503 U.S. at 137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076 (<HOLDING>). \u201c[I]t is well established that a federal Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court 1: holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims 2: holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 4: holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "between the two cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d United States v. Plancarte-Vazquez, 450 F.3d 848, 854 (8th Cir.2006). Although, after reviewing the sentencing transcript, I find the district court\u2019s view of Clark\u2019s testimony, both on direct examination and on cross, to be a real stretch, I cannot say it is clearly impermissible. Thus, I must determine whether Brown was a supervisor or manager based on the district court\u2019s view of the evidence, rather than Brown\u2019s view. Under our precedent, although it is a very close call, I cannot say the district court\u2019s determination \u2014 Brown was a supervisor based on his use of Clark to drive him to drug transactions, in exchange for food, drink, shelter, and marijuana \u2014 was incorrect. See United States v. Maejia, 928 F.2d 810, 815 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 262, 267 Holdings: 0: holding that when lawenforcement officers have legally stopped the driver of a vehicle they may consistent with the fourth amendment order a driver out of the ear for any reason or for no reason 1: holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial 2: holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver 3: holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another 4: holding that defendant may be considered to have a leadership role when he hired one driver and recruited another", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of any specific contractual duty. Notwithstanding, Granite Rock contends that the alleged tortious interference claim still meets the requirement that \u201cthe resolution of the lawsuit be focused upon and governed by the terms of the contract.\u201d Painters & Decorators, 707 F.2d at 1071. Granite Rock\u2019s theory is that because breach of the underlying contract is a necessary element of the tortious interference claim, the resolution of the tort claim is \u201cfocused upon\u201d and \u201cgoverned by\u201d the contract. We reject Granite Rock\u2019s argument, because its position clashes with the plain language of section 301(a) and the Majestic Housing requirement that the underlying agreement must have created the rights or liabilities which the parties seek to vindicate by their suit. Majestic Housin .1982) (<HOLDING>); United Food & Com. Workers Union, Local No. Holdings: 0: holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement 1: holding that the lmra preempted plaintiffemployees claim under michigan law for tortious interference with contractual relations breach of contract is an essential element of a tortious interference claim and resolution of such claim would require the court to interpret collective bargaining agreement to determine if that agreement had been breached 2: holding that mere reference to a collective bargaining agreement does not confer federal question jurisdiction under section 301a 3: holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under  301a of the lmra 4: holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the date of both the New Jersey Tort Claims Act amendment and the Supreme Court\u2019s affirmance in State v. Michaels), would serve to bar plaintiff\u2019s claim against these defendants unless plaintiff filed within the limitations period and satisfied the notice provision. Because plaintiff did not file her notice of claim until February 27, 1995, it would be untimely under this scenario. The court is puzzled as to why the individual defendants in opposing Newark\u2019s motion to remand or to dismiss did not flag this issue. 13 . New Jersey courts have relied on this section of the Restatement in other contexts. See, e.g., Rubin v. Nowak, 248 N.J.Super. 80, 83, 590 A.2d 249 (App.Div.1991). 14 . With respect to criminal proceedings, see, e.g., Day v. Zubel, 112 Nev. 972, 922 P.2d 536, 539 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Greenberg v. Wolfberg, 890 P.2d 895, 904, n. Holdings: 0: holding that because the claims were dismissed with prejudice there was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review 1: holding that a dismissal in the interest of justice was a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution action where the courts reasons for dismissing the criminal charges were not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused 2: recognizing the inherent anxiety associated with pending criminal charges 3: holding that the final termination of the criminal proceedings occurred when criminal charges  were dismissed with prejudice rather than when the accused was released from prison pending a retrial 4: holding that  1983 claims accrued when all charges were dismissed rather than a previous date on which the conviction was vacated on the theory that the charges remained pending until the dismissal", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "after having been ordered or directed to do so. Under these circumstances, a defendant necessarily knows that failure to appear will \u201caffect the judicial proceeding.\u201d Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. We have gone further and construed \u00a7 3146 as requiring a willful violation of a requirement to appear for a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Weaver v. United States, 37 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (9th Cir.1994) (\u201cTo establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3146, the government ordinarily must prove that the defendant (1) was released pursuant to that statute, (2) was required to appear in court, (3) knew that he was required to appear, (4) failed to appear as required, and (5) was willful in his failure to appear.\u201d); see also United States v. Smeaton, 762 F.2d 796, 797-98 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In this context, \u201c[wjillfulness requires a Holdings: 0: holding that willful failure to appear at sentencing supported obstruction of justice enhancement 1: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim 2: recognizing willful failure to appear as an essential element of the bailjumping offense 3: holding that failure to prove an essential element of an offense does not constitute fundamental error which may be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY MICHAEL R. MURPHY, Circuit Judge. This matter is before the court on Keith Frazier\u2019s pro se requests for a certif\u00edcate of appealability (\u201cCOA\u201d) and to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. Frazier seeks a COA so he can appeal the district court\u2019s dismissal, on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of his 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 petition. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing no appeal may be taken from a \u201cfinal order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court\u201d unless the petitioner first obtains a COA); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We grant Frazier\u2019s motion to proceed on Holdings: 0: holding that  2253c1a applies when a state habeas petitioner proceeds under  2241 1: holding that a  2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under  2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction 2: holding  2253clas coa requirement applies to state prisoners proceeding under  2241 when the petition relates to any of the incidents and circumstances of any detention pursuant to state court process 3: holding that a petitioner may not circumvent the requirements of the aedpa by filing a section 2241 petition 4: holding that  2253clas requirements apply when a state habeas petitioner is proceeding under  2241", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a search is unreasonably intrusive: (1) whether the police have a \u201cclear indication\u201d that the desired evidence will be found, (2) the presence of exigent circumstances such as the imminent destruction of evidence or a risk to individual safety, and (3) whether the methods used to obtain the evidence was performed in a reasonable manner. Id.) see also Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986). Applying the framework set forth in Schmerber to the conduct of Officers Olsen and Vesely, we note that prior to forcing open defendant\u2019s hand, the officers had been informed that the driver of the truck, in which defendant was a passenger, had been involved in a suspected drug transaction moments earlier. Upon approaching the truck, both officers ob .2d 519 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule defendant\u2019s assignment Holdings: 0: holding that defendants collective possession of plastic baggies beepers and scales  in conjunction with other evasive action  was sufficient evidence for jury to find conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine beyond reasonable doubt 1: holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under  856 where premises contained two white envelopes containing thirtytwo packs of crack cocaine equipment required for the manufacture and packaging of crack cocaine fortyone white envelopes containing particles of crack cocaine and crack cocaine stored in a laundry bag in the bathroom 2: holding that a federal agents expert testimony regarding the characteristics of crack cocaine and the methods of its distribution was admissible and highly relevant in helping the jury resolve the central issue of whether the defendant possessed crack cocaine with intent to distribute 3: holding police officers application of pressure to defendants throat causing him to spit out three plastic baggies containing crack cocaine was not unreasonably intrusive in light of the risk of losing the evidence and the potential health risk to the defendant 4: holding there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute where the defendant dropped a plastic bag containing loose white rocks of cocaine and there was no other indicia of the defendants intent such as the drugs being packaged in smaller baggies", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that \u201care distinctively incident to the provision of airline service,\u201d and thus necessarily exclude an air carrier\u2019s common law duty to exercise ordinary care. 813 F.Supp. at 517-18. The court opined that extending the pre-emptive reach of Section 1305 to exempt air carriers from \u201cordinary premises liability\u201d within a terminal building would justify exempting them from the duty to exercise reasonable care in their \u201cdowntown ticketing offices,\u201d or in any other facility they owned or operated. Id. at 518. The court found it \u201cimpossible to 'discern any 'policy reason\u201d justifying such an illogical result, and concluded that it \u201cis inconceivable that. Congress intended to preempt state common law duties in this context.\u201d Id. See also Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F.Supp. at 324 (<HOLDING>). The Court holds that Section 1305 does not Holdings: 0: holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim 1: holding that congress did not intend to preempt state common law actions for personal injury based on the negligence of the airline or its employees 2: holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim 3: holding that the airline deregulation act preempts claims under the illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act but does not preempt state breach of contract actions 4: holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "regarding Appellant\u2019s sores. Without objection, Officer Meyer testified: that upon pulling her over, he noticed her hand shaking; that her behavior was \u201cunusual\u201d; that after obtaining her consent to search the car, he found a glass pipe with off-white residue; that upon her arrest he found another glass pipe in the trunk of Appellant\u2019s car; and that upon a subsequent search, he found two small baggies containing a crystalline residue. This testimony, along with the items themselves and a lab report properly admitted into evidence, also establish the same essential fact as the testimony regarding Appellant\u2019s sores \u2014 that Appellant used methamphetamine. The testimony regarding Appellant\u2019s sores was, therefore, not prejudicial. See State v. Ponder, 950 S.W.2d 900, 910 (Mo.App. S.D.1997) (<HOLDING>). Point I is denied. Point II Appellant\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding admission of challenged evidence is harmless error where the record contains other properly admitted evidence that independently establishes guilt 1: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 2: holding that admission of evidence is harmless if it is cumulative to other legitimately admitted evidence that establishes a defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that if evidence is improperly admitted but other evidence establishes essentially the same facts there is no prejudice to the accused and no reversible error 4: holding improperly admitted evidence may be harmless if other evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error is insignificant by comparison", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "abuse\u201d. There is no evidence in the record that the insureds\u2019 understanding of the coverage departed in any way from that of the insurer\u2019s. Even when we resolve all doubts concerning the meaning of the language employed in the policy in favor of the insured, we conclude that the notice concerns discussed in Canadian Universal are not invoked in this ease. Even if we were to agree with the Martins that NUFIC failed to provide adequate notice of a substantial reduction of coverage in this case, the appellants would nonetheless be unsuccessful. Although NUFIC\u2019s earlier claims-made policy did not contain explicit exclusions for acts of sexual and physical abuse, such acts, nonetheless, are not covered as a matter of public policy. See D.W.H. v. Steele, 512 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn.1994) (<HOLDING>). b. Minn.Stat. \u00a7 245.814 The Martins also Holdings: 0: holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy 1: recognizing that texas public policy favors charitable gifts 2: holding nearly identical exclusion did not violate public policy noting there is no clear legislative pronouncement of public policy requiring umuim coverage for a named driver exclusion 3: holding that intentional acts exclusion applies to intentional act of child molestation 4: recognizingpublic policy favors arbitration", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "be tailored somewhat to meet ADEA\u2019s needs. ADEA damages are \u201cdeemed to be unpaid minimum wages and unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of [FLSA].\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 626(b); see Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964 n. 7 (4th Cir.1985) (explaining how the sections are linked). Instead of the private right of action terminating upon the filing of an action by the Secretary of Labor, \u00a7 626(c)(1) provides for a similar termination upon the filing of an ADEA action by EEOC. But there is no mention of attorney\u2019s fees beyond that contained in the above-quoted FLSA provision. Thus, this much is readily apparent\u2014 under FLSA, a defendant employer is liable for attorney\u2019s fees to a prevailing plaintiff-employee. Cf. Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763, 765-67 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). By virtue of the incorporation of \u00a7 216(b), Holdings: 0: holding that district court erred in awarding attorneys fees in civil rights action where plaintiff only recovered 1 in nominal damages 1: holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered 2: holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff 3: recognizing that under a limited exception attorneys fees may be recovered by a party who gains enforcement of a previous support order even when no contempt is ordered 4: holding that an employees private arbitration agreement with her employer precluded her from filing suit against the employer under the adea", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "benefits to a claimant's surviving spouse for the duration of the spouse\u2019s life where the claimant died of a non-work related cause while his claim was still pending. 217 S.W.3d 900, 901-03 (Mo. banc 2007). The General Assembly amended sections 287.020.1, 287.200, and 287.230 the next year (in 2008) to abrogate Schoemehl, and to make it clear that \u201ccompensation for a permanent total disability is payable only during the lifetime of the injured employee and is not payable to dependents after the employee\u2019s death when the employee dies from causes unrelated to the work injury.\" Gervich v. Condaire, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 617, 620-21 (Mo. banc 2012). Missouri courts thereafter concluded that the 2008 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act could not be retroacti -02 (Mo. banc 2008) (<HOLDING>). Strait held that if a worker\u2019s compensation Holdings: 0: holding new time period of 28 usc  2244d inapplicable to pending habeas petition where period ended before amendments effective date 1: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 2: holding that statute which became effective after claimants death but prior to the trial of wrongful death case was remedial constitutional and governed pending litigation proceedings that were pending when statute was enacted 3: holding that children could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of their mother where the mothers claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of her death 4: holding that wife could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of her husband where the husbands claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of his death even though husbands death occurred after the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments as wifes status as a dependent was subject to determination as of the time of husbands injury", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "rise above the level of stray remarks ... when the statements are: (1) made by the decision maker or one whose recommendation is sought by the decision maker; (2) related to the specific employment decision challenged; and (3) made close in time to the decision.\u201d); Ruane v. Continental Cas. Co., No. 96 Civ. 7153, 1998 WL 292103, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1998); Mosberger v. CPG Nutrients, Civ. No. 01-100, 2002 WL 31477292, at *7 (W.D.Pa. Sept.6, 2002) (\u201cDiscriminatory stray remarks are generally considered in one of three categories \u2014 those made (1) by a non-decisionmaker; (2) by a decisionmaker but unrelated to the decision process; or (3) by a decisionmaker but temporally remote from the adverse employment decision.\u201d) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Add 753 (4th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 2. Application The complaint purports to Holdings: 0: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 1: holding that threats to fire employees based on legitimate concerns about productivity do not constitute harassment because any threats made to these plaintiffs  were no greater than justified by their lack of sales 2: holding that incidents of harassment and unfulfilled threats of injury are not persecution absent physical harm 3: holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent 4: holding that evidence of a general atmosphere of discrimination harassment or threats is relevant to the determinations of intent andpretext", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Here, a site plan depicting the easement over Lot 17 is recorded. This version of the plan was recorded 18 days after the property was conveyed to the Horgans, but had been submitted to and approved by the planning board prior to the sale. The plaintiffs argue that the fact that this plan was not recorded until after the conveyance is significant. We disagree. The plan was approved prior to the sale and recorded a short time later. The CCR acknowledges that subsequent site plans may be recorded, but that such plans become part of the master site plan. Further, the Horgan deed recognizes that the property is subject to the CCR. The plan depicting the easement, therefore, is valid, notwithstanding that it was recorded after the property was conveyed. See also Close, 146 N.H. at 484 (<HOLDING>). The question is whether another document Holdings: 0: holding that purchaser did not take property subject to unrecorded easement created by private agreement 1: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 2: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement 3: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 4: recognizing ways in which an easement may be created", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "loss amounts between herself and Walsh constitute prosecutorial misconduct because one of the stipulations must be \u201cinaccurate.\u201d Cf. United States Attorneys\u2019 Manual \u00a7 9-16.300 (prohibiting government attorneys from stipulating to a fact that is not accurate). The argument initially fails to recognize that two different loss amounts, for two different defendants, can both be accurate because the different loss amounts reflect the different loss for which each defendant was responsible. Furthermore, the government\u2019s different loss calculations cannot be prosecutorial misconduct \u2014 let alone misconduct that rises to plain error \u2014 because the government has no obligation to stipulate to identical loss amounts with co-conspirators. United States v. Pierce, 409 F.3d 228, 233-34 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Our circuit has approved a government Holdings: 0: holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim 1: recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud 2: holding loss stipulation of between 70000 and 120000 with one defendant and between 120000 and 200000 with coconspirator permissible in a mail fraud case 3: holding that the first element of mail fraud  knowing participation in a scheme to defraud  can extend beyond the specific mailing and that the loss calculation for a mail fraud conviction may include any loss from the fraudulent scheme that the mailing furthered 4: holding that evidence may be introduced to provide necessary background information to show an ongoing relationship between the defendant and a coconspirator and to help the jury understand the coconspirators role in the scheme", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "was therefore largely immaterial to the revocation of appellant\u2019s probation, we conclude that appellant\u2019s due process rights were not violated. Accordingly, revocation of probation and ordered execution of the previously imposed sentence of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia is hereby Affirmed. 1 . D.C.Code \u00a7 48-904.01 (2001). 2 . D.C.Code \u00a7 22-2105 (2001). 3 . D.C.Code \u00a7 25 \u2014 1001(a) (2001). 4 . During discussion on the admi pplying a \"clear and convincing\u201d standard, but the judge declined to do so because of the inconsistency between Lieutenant Murphy's testimony at the PWID trial and at the revocation hearing. Judge Keary's finding was not precluded by Judge Diaz\u2019s acquittal on the PWID charge under the stricter standard for criminal conviction. See id. at 711 Holdings: 0: holding that neither the doctrines of double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel apply to probation revocation proceedings after an acquittal on the charge used as basis to revoke probation 1: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 2: holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings 3: holding that it is sufficient grounds to revoke a probation if only one condition of the probation is broken 4: holding that the general rules of preservation apply in probation revocation proceedings", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "prompting Bush to re-enter the home and shoot at Gina. See A.R.S. \u00a7\u00a7 13-303, -1001(A)(1), - 1105(A)(1). The aggravated assault convictions were established by evidence that Bush shot Gina twice and seriously injured her soon after he initially entered the home. See A.R.S. \u00a7\u00a7 13-303, -1203(A), -1204(A)(1) and (2). \u00b6 139 Other considerations set forth in Gordon support imposition of consecutive sentences. Because the attempted murder and aggravated assaults occurred at different times during the home invasion and involved separate acts, it was possible for Forde to commit the former crime without committing the latter ones. Also, the aggravated assaults caused Gina to suffer physical injuries that were not inherent in the attempted murder. See Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 315, 778 P.2d at 1211 (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, Forde\u2019s conduct Holdings: 0: holding that uncharged sexual acts committed upon the same victim are admissible to show the conduct of the defendant toward the victim and to corroborate the evidence of the offense charged in the indictment 1: holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime 2: holding that a defendant more likely committed multiple acts if the defendants conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime 3: holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime 4: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "supra, 99 N.J. at 23, 489 A.2d 1148; Coons II, supra, 96 N.J. at 440, 476 A.2d 763; Salorio v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d 1100, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983). For example, in New Jersey Bd new rule would have on the effective administration of justice, the third factor. In State v. Burstein, supra, 85 N.J. at 410, 427 A.2d 525, we held that even limited retroactive application of the rule announced in State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595, 397 A.2d 671 (1979), namely, that a delay in presenting tapes of intercepted conversations for sealing requires suppression unless there was satisfactory explanation for delay, would inflict \u201cvirtually incalculable\u201d costs on our administration of justice. See also State v. Catania, supra, 85 N.J. at 447, 427 A.2d 537 (<HOLDING>). IV Any prospectivity decision necessarily Holdings: 0: holding that the rule announced in ring does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review 1: holding that the rule announced by booker  does not operate retroactively 2: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases 3: holding that rule announced excluding the results of a wiretap because of improper minimization should not be applied retroactively because to reopen cases even on a limited basis for detailed hearings on the reasonableness of the interception of each phone call during each wiretap would overwhelm the courts 4: holding that secrecy is essential to establishing a violation of massachusetts wiretap act", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "employee\u2019s consent to enter the special employment relationship. Those courts have not, however, considered whether the employee must know the corporate identity of the special employer for whom she agreed to work or whether her consent to work for a borrowing entity is tantamount to consent to work for the corporate entity of which the borrower is a part. Rather, the cases have analyzed only whether the employee agreed to work for an entity other than the general employer, an issue that is undisputed in this case. See Pacenti v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 245 N.J.Super. 188, 584 A.2d 843, 845 (App.Div.1991) (inferring requisite consent from the employee\u2019s reporting to borrower\u2019s place of business and accepting its supervisors\u2019 decisions, policies and training); Murin, 573 A.2d at 991-94 (<HOLDING>); Chickachop v. Manpower, Inc., 84 N.J.Super. Holdings: 0: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 1: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work 2: holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer  or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer 3: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation 4: holding that section 319s mandate that the employer is subrogated  to the extent of compensation payable does not mean that the sole right to recover from the tortfeasor is in the employer rather the right of action against the tortfeasor remains in the injured employee and suit is to be commenced in his name", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of counsel claim, Petitioner's failure to allege in his petition any arguments or facts in support of the claim would, in any event, render it entirely deficient. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (requiring a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to show that counsel's representation \"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness\u201d and that \"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,\u201d and further requiring that \u201ca court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance\u201d); see also Murray, 477 U.S. 478 at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (<HOLDING>) 7 . The court need not reach the issue of Holdings: 0: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective 1: recognizing that the defendant whose trial counsel represented him on motion for new trial had no opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to appeal and remanding the case for a hearing solely on this issue 2: holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal 3: recognizing that strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims 4: holding that so long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in strickland v washington supra we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in procedural default", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Sugar and Stark to continue on their way, however, he held them there until a canine unit arrived. The question is whether this 10 to 15 minute-long seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion. First, in his initial encounter with defendants, Crivello said he would hold the vehicle until the canine came if defendants refused to consent to a search. But an assertion of one\u2019s constitutional rights should not be the basis for an otherwise unjustified detention. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (\u201cWe have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.\u201d) (citations omitted). In fact, their refusal to consent to the 6 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Soule, 908 F.2d at 1036 (holding that where Holdings: 0: holding evidence was insufficient to link defendant to drugs in borrowed vehicle when the drugs were not in plain view the defendant disavowed knowledge that drugs were hidden in floorboard of car and a person antagonistic toward defendants husband had access to the car before she borrowed it 1: holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate legitimate expectation of privacy where he could not show that he had the owners permission to use the car or demonstrate prior use or control of the car 2: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 3: holding that the driver of a borrowed car had the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy to support standing for fourth amendment purposes 4: holding that a defendant who had borrowed a car for a limited period of time had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cars locked trunk where it was the very person from whom he had borrowed the car who first called the police after he failed to return the car", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in their capacity as Trustees of the Family Trust. Nonetheless, Sternberg contends that the Olsons waived any defects in service of process and jurisdiction. Pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1), the defenses of insufficiency of service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction are waived by failure to raise them in either a motion to dismiss filed under the rule or in the answer. In the present case, however, the Olsons never filed any motions or responsive pleadings but rather, allowed a default judgment to be entered against them. Because they never entered an appearance in the original action in their capacities as Trustees of the Family Trust, they did not waive the defenses of deficient process and lack of jurisdiction. Compare Smith v. Arnold, 4 Mass.App.Ct. 614, 616 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Judgment and Order of Holdings: 0: holding that defendant did not waive his special appearance by filing a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance 1: holding that party waived special appearance 2: holding that defendant did not waive special appearance 3: holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts 4: holding that where the defendant filed a special appearance to challenge the courts jurisdiction over his person he was bound by the courts determination and could not relitigate it", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of an \u201cinfamous crime,\u201d Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534, 541, 29 N.E.2d 588, 588 (1940) (Shake, J.). Although it contains a categorical limitation, the Infamous Crimes Clause does not contain a durational limitation. Consequently, if misdemeanor battery is an \u201cinfamous crime,\u201d then it is only by legislative grace that Snyder\u2019s right to vote was restored when he was released from incarceration. To be sure, the power to disenfranchise permanently persons convicted of any crimes even though they have completed their sentences might be limited by other provisions of the Indiana Constitution, such as the Proportionality Clause of Article I, \u00a7 16, and it may also be limited by the Equal Protection Clause, cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43-56, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974) (<HOLDING>). It is, however, unnecessary to consider here Holdings: 0: holding that section 2 of the fourteenth amendment permits states to disenfranchise convicted felons who have completed their sentences 1: holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that bankruptcy jurisdiction is not within section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 3: holding second amendment right is incorporated against the states through fourteenth amendment 4: holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is sued for breach, it may defend on the ground that there existed a legal excuse for its nonperformance at the time of the alleged breach. Faced with two parties to a contract, each of whom claims breach by the other, courts will \u201coften ... impose liability on the party that committed the first material breach.\u201d Barron Bancshares, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2004) (citations omitted) F.3d 1260 (Fed.Cir.1999) (explaining contractor obligated to adhere to contract\u2019s dispute clause because Government\u2019s breach was not material ); Gibson v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 160 F.3d 722, 727 (Fed.Cir.1998) (justifying termination of employment after employee\u2019s material breach of \u201clast chance\u201d employment agreement); Thomas v. Dep\u2019t of Housin .2d 1273, 1279 (Fed.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). 2. Restitution Outside of the FIRREA context, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding fraud committed by contractor amounted to material breach justifying governments termination of contract 2: holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract in retaliation for petition was not protected by first amendment 3: holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract 4: holding contractor liable for total or material breach thus excusing government from payment of contract price", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the trust, if any, are not set forth, and the trust is not identified by title or date, shall grant and is hereby declared to have granted a fee simple estate with full power and authority in and to the grantee in such deed to sell, convey, and grant both the legal and beneficial interest in the real estate conveyed, unless a contrary intention sh o, 417 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), Hoffenberg never had the legal ability to grant an easement over his own property. In Hensel, the appellant acquired title to lots A, B, C and D. Appellant later sold lots B, C and D to appellee. Thereafter, the parties entered into a written contract which provided that lot B was to be repurchased by appellant. As originally drawn, that contract provided for an easement t pt. 87 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.1991) (<HOLDING>); Hayes v. Moreau, 104 N.H. 124, 180 A.2d 438 Holdings: 0: holding one cannot grant an easement to oneself one can only reserve such interest in land granted to another 1: holding that the owner of an equitable interest in property in the form of a land contract can grant a mortgage on that interest under ohio law 2: holding no easement can be created over a section of land in favor of another adjoining parcel when one owner owns both properties 3: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 4: recognizing that one cannot have an easement in his own land", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Justice. The petition for the writ of certiorari is denied. See Ex parte Bonner, 926 So.2d 339 (Ala.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Ex parte V.S., 918 So.2d 908 Holdings: 0: recognizing that rule 32 is a postconviction remedy 1: holding that an appellant cannot raise an issue on appeal from the denial of a rule 32 petition which was not raised in the rule 32 petition 2: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition 3: holding that where the petitioner alleges that he failed to receive notice of the dismissal of his rule 32 ala rcrim p petition in time to effect a timely appeal therefrom and the events about which the petitioner complains all occurred before june 1 2005 the effective date of the amendment to rule 32 providing a different remedy for obtaining an outoftime appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition a petition for a writ of mandamus is the only appropriate remedy 4: holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "injunctive relief against the individual Defendants in their official capacities, and against Defendant OASAS, the Court finds that they are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment; and, therefore, grants this portion of Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. See Walker v. Connecticut, 106 F.Supp.2d ed immunity] is whether the state of the law ... gave [the defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.\u201d Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). As qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the burden of pleading it falls on the defendants. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The qualified immunity determination consists Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants have failed to adhere to the requirements of nepa 1: holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding that the party seeking a new trial must make an affirmative showing that some extraneous influence came to bear on the jurys deliberations internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding that defendants bear the burden of showing that the challenged act was objectively reasonable citation omitted 4: holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "2005 proceedings. However, the written record of those proceedings reflects that Wolf waived his right to counsel. Therefore, the question is whether Chant\u2019s procedural bar applies in cases where a defendant waives the right to counsel. [\u00b6 6.] Chant adopted the rule set forth in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d BIT (1994). Custis held that there was no right to collaterally attack the validity of prior convictions used for sentence enhancement \u201cwith the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel[.]\u201d Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 1734. In discussing the nature of the right to counsel violations that would permit a collateral attack, the Supreme Court observed: \u201cIf the accused ... is not represented by cou -99 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dahler, 171 F.3d 441, 442 Holdings: 0: holding that committee failed to carry its ultimate burden 1: holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner 2: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction 3: holding that the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving the invalidity of the waivers of counsel for prior colorado convictions 4: holding that a defendant may challenge the validity of prior convictions during a sentencing hearing and that the burden to establish invalidity is on the challenging party", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "sense. Asking jurors to forget that Butler is a convicted child molester simply asks too much of fallible human beings. Some occurrences cannot be forgotten, notwithstanding the court\u2019s admonishments to the contrary. This is one of those situations, or at least we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not. We sustain point one. We also sustain point two based on the denial of a mistrial. Butler\u2019s remaining two points are not reached. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. 1 . The court could have refused to administer the oath to Butler and refused to withdraw his un-sworn testimony from the jury's consideration on the ground that he had waived any complaint about his unsworn testimony. See Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). However, the court chose to administer the Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint is waived by the failure to object during the witness unsworn testimony 1: holding defendant waived complaint 2: holding claimed errors waived for failure to timely object 3: holding that a defendant waived a sentencing issue by failing to object in district court 4: holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a \u00a7 2255 waiver because Second Circuit law clearly upholds waivers of direct appeals and had not struck down \u00a7 2255 waivers that have come before it). General enforcement of \u00a7 2255 waivers may be subject to exceptions, just as enforcement of direct appeal waivers is. For example, in this Circuit, a direct appeal waiver cannot bar claims that the plea was not knowing and intelligent, that the sentence imposed is in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute, that the sentence is based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, or that defendant was denied ineffective assistance of counsel after entry of the guilty plea. Attar, 38 F.3d at 732-33; Wessells, 936 F.2d at 167. Such exceptions may be warranted for \u00a7 2255 waivers as well. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 922-24 (<HOLDING>). But see Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1187 (holding Holdings: 0: holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary 1: holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel 2: holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence 3: holding that plea did not waive claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to seek suppression 4: holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Government failed to prove that he possessed the SSN \u201cin relation to\u201d his false representation offense, he has waived any such argument on appeal by failing to raise it in his Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion before the district court. United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190, 200 (4th Cir. 2012). Castellanos-Loya next urges that the district court abused its discretion in declining to prohibit testimony about the date of birth associated with the SSN, due to the Government\u2019s late disclosure of the pertinent information. We have reviewed the record and conclude that, regardless of whether the district court properly considered the factors enumerated in United States v. Hastings, 126 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir.1997), any error was harmless. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Castellanos-Loya attacks his Holdings: 0: holding that evidentiary rulings are subject to harmless error renew 1: holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review 2: holding blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis 3: holding that confrontation clause issues are subject to harmless error analysis 4: holding trial errors are subject to a harmless error analysis", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "103 S.Ct. 2841. Although the question was left unresolved in Franchise Tax Board, the Court resolved this issue definitively a few years later in Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 64-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542. There, the Court limited application of the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, with respect to ERISA claims, to only those claims which fall court cannot resolve a dispute where a claim is preempted under \u00a7 514, but outside the scope of \u00a7 502 because it lacks removal jurisdiction); Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639-40 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that if the issue is merely preemption under \u00a7 514(a), it serves only as a federal defense, and the complaint should not be recharacterized as federal); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Sec. Plan, 879 F.2d 90, 93-94 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Warner, 46 F.3d at 535 (that a claim is Holdings: 0: holding that  502a may serve as an independent basis for preemption where  514a the blanket erisa preemption provision is inapplicable 1: holding that complete preemption exists when a remedy falls within the scope of or is in direct conflict with erisas civil enforcement section 2: holding that  514a preemption defense will not justify removal unless claim falls within the scope of erisas civil enforcement provision  502 3: holding  502 overpowers erisas savings clause 4: holding removal and preemption are distinct concepts erisa preemption does not allow removal unless complete preemption exists", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "below fair value. See Torrington\u2019s Br. Resp. to SKF\u2019s Mot. J. Agency R. at 11. Tor-rington argues that only if the transactions are truly without consideration can they fall within NSK\u2019s exclusion. See id. at 12. Commerce concedes that the case should be remanded to it to exclude the sample transactions for which SKF received no consideration from SKF\u2019s United States sales database. See Def.\u2019s Partial Opp\u2019n to Pis.\u2019 Mots. J. Agency R. at 27. Commerce is required to impose anti-dumping duties upon merchandise that \u201cis being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value.\u201d 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1673(1) (1988). A zero-priced transaction does not qualify as a \u201csale\u201d and, therefore, by definition cannot be included in Commerce\u2019s FMV calculation. See NSK, 115 F.3d at 975 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the distribution of AFBs for no Holdings: 0: holding an implied dedication gives rise to a servitude of public use and does not transfer ownership 1: holding that both tria  201 and fsia  1610g require plaintiffs to prove some terrorist state ownership in order to attach and execute on property and finding that ownership interest through federal interstitial rule making 2: holding that the term sold  requires both a transfer of ownership to an unrelated party and consideration 3: holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury 4: holding that a contract without a minimum quantity term is unenforceable for lack of consideration and mutuality", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "punctuation omitted). We presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable. Id. This presumption, however, may be rebutted by reference to the statutory sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a). Id. Price, however, did not receive a Guidelines sentence but a sentence varying below her Guidelines range by twelve months. The only evidence that Price offers in support of her argument that her below-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable is her past history of family problems. The district court considered this evidence but found that it was not sufficiently compelling to warrant a greater variance, and we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining the extent of the variance. See United States v. Austad, 519 F.3d 431, 434 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Gall v. United States, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 128 Holdings: 0: recognizing that while our reasonableness review may take into consideration the extent of the district courts deviation from the guidelines range we must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance 1: holding that a reviewing court must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance above the guideline range 2: holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range 3: holding that there must be sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate the courts consideration of the relevant section 3553a factors 4: holding that we review factual findings underlying a decision to apply a sentencing enhancement for clear error and give due deference to the district courts application of the guidelines to the facts", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "32(c), formerly 32(a). The Court concluded that it made \u201cno sense to impute to Congress an intent that a defendant have the right to comment on the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure but not the right to be notified that the court is contemplating such a ruling.\u201d Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-36, 111 S.Ct. 2182 (emphasis in original). Although Burns itself dealt with the need for notice regarding potential upward departures, Townsend notes that some lower courts have extended its reasoning to adjustments, see United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.1991), abrogated on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (1994); but see United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that more stringent requirements of  1823e do not apply retroactively 1: holding that the notice requirements of section 101101 do not apply to employees because they are not governmental units 2: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 3: holding that burns notice requirements did not apply to adjustments which are more predictable than departures 4: holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "612 (N.D.Iowa 1972) (stating that \u201cabsent other considerations\u201d it would be unreasonable to allow the filing of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion based upon perjury of a third-party witness more than one year after entry of judgment). Like the plaintiff in Lester, Swanson seeks to vacate the judgment because Donna, a third-party witness, committed perjury. Swanson did not file his motion, however, until nearly 32 months after the entry of the judgment in this case. Swanson\u2019s motion thus would be untimely if Jones, rather than Donna, committed perjury. And like the court in Lester, the court here finds no reason to treat Donna\u2019s testimony differently than Jones\u2019s testimony. The court thus finds that Swanson\u2019s motion was not filed in a reasonable amount of time. See also Middleton, 388 F.3d at 614 (<HOLDING>). Swanson attempts to distinguish Lester by Holdings: 0: holding that a 13 month delay was unreasonable 1: holding threeyear delay without mitigating circumstances was unreasonable 2: holding that a five month delay was unreasonable 3: holding that a 26month delay was a period of time which constitutes a patently unreasonable delay absent mitigating circumstances 4: holding that a six month delay was unreasonable", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "water charges in order to assist in meeting its debt obligations. 5 . The sole case cited by Engelman in support of its contention \"that property owned by districts, like Engelman, created under Article XVI \u00a7 59 of the Texas Constitution are [sic] exempt from forced sale and taxation\u201d sheds little light on the issue raised in this case. See Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 144 Tex. 326, 190 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1945) (noting in dicta that LCRA's enabling legislation exempted its property from forced sale). As mentioned above, there is no dispute that Engelman's water rights and allocations may not be the subject of a forced sale because these assets are the property of a governmental agency. See Satterlee v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., 576 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The viability of these alternatives will Holdings: 0: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 1: holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca 2: holding that lcras property devoted exclusively to public use is exempt from taxation under article xi section 9 3: recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe 4: holding that article xi section 9 extends to property held by government agencies", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Haynor v. General Motors Corp., No. 81539, Dec. 17, 1985. In light of the defendant\u2019s acknowledgment through its representatives LaLonde and Crabill that a \u201ccompensable injury\u201d is defined by the workers\u2019 compensation laws (\u201c \u2018compensable injury\u2019 is not defined anywhere in the agreement, but rather, it is defined by the administrative agencies of the state,\u201d LaLonde\u2019s Dep., A.R. 251-52; \u201c[t]he answer to this question [of whether Mr. Haynor\u2019s status was correctly reflected in his employment record\u201d] lies with the Workers Compensation Activity and Labor Relations,\u201d Letter to Russell C. Babcock from Preston M. Crabill, Jan. 25, 2007, Ex. 4 to PL\u2019s Cross Mot. for Summary Jmt. [dkt. # 18]), it is virtually incomprehensible why the defendant would rely on an an 547, 553 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). As noted earlier, the Pension Committee and Holdings: 0: holding that under erisa a plan administrators decision to deny an employee longterm disability benefits is arbitrary and capricious if the administrator ignores favorable evidence  and selectively reviews the evidence it does consider 1: holding that the plan administrators failure to address the social security administrations finding of the claimants disability rendered the decision arbitrary and capricious 2: holding that a social security disability determination is a legal proceeding 3: holding that a failure of an erisa plan administrator to address the social security administrations determination that claimant is totally disabled is yet another factor that can render the denial of further longterm disability benefits arbitrary and capricious 4: holding that an erisa plan administrator is not bound by an ssa disability determination when reviewing a claim for benefits", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense other than that for which the extradition has been granted .... \u201d Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, art. 17, Feb. 6, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (emphasis added). At the outset, as the government points out, Gov\u2019t\u2019s Opp\u2019n to Agustin\u2019s Specialty Mot., at 5 n.2, Agust\u00edn may not have standing to raise a challenge under the Rule of Specialty since the D.C. Circuit has declined to resolve conflicting authority and opine \u201cas to whether a criminal defendant\u2014as opposed to the extraditing state\u2014has standing to assert the doctrine of specialty.\u201d United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Todd, 287 F.3d 1160, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892 n.1 Holdings: 0: holding that the speedy trial clock for state charges did not begin to run when the defendant was taken into custody by federal authorities on federal charges but rather when he was indicted for the state charges 1: holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted 2: holding that student stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to speech when he alleged that school officials prevented him from openly stating that he was homosexual and retaliated against him for doing so 3: recognizing that we are leaving certain legal questions raised by the government unresolved including whether defendant lacks standing to bring a claim of violation of rule of specialty based on alleged threats to prosecute him for visa and tax fraud when he was not extradited to face such charges 4: holding that although plaintiff was liable for medical services rendered he was not bound by the amount of the charges listed in the admission contract as he was entitled to question the reasonableness of the charges", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "individuals without first obtaining class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.\u201d Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Additionally, we .have noted, in a different posture, that the EEOC is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant in a class action. EEOC v. Bruno\u2019s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir.1993). In Bruno\u2019s, the defendant restaurant fired its pregnant waitresses. The EEOC investigated and found reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had illegally discriminated against them. Id. at 286-87. The defendant rejected the EEOC\u2019s efforts to settle and the EEOC brought suit. The district court dismissed the EEOC\u2019s action ) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Keep. Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court has rejected the notion that the agency must expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that an employer violates the nlra when it fails to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of its duties internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding the eeoc is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted 4: recognizing that this court has rejected the notion that the agency must expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "see also Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharow, 91 N.Y.2d 39, 666 N.Y.S.2d 990, 689 N.E.2d 884, 889-90 (1997). . In their merger agreement, Vocada and Nuanee agreed to arbitrate \u201cany ... dispute relating to the -Earnout Consideration.\u201d This clause is narrow. It does not require arbitration of all disputes arising out of the merger agreement; instead,- it requires arbitration only of disputes related to the earnout consideration. See State v. Philip Morris Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 574, 838 N.Y.S.2d 460, 869 N.E.2d 636, 639-40 (200.7) (observing that an arbitration clause that covers \u201cany dispute ... relating to\u201d an auditor\u2019s calculations and determinations is \u201cmisleadingly called broad\u201d (alterations and emphasis omitted\u00bb; Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp., 302 A.D.2d at 119, 126, 752 N.Y.S.2d 611 (<HOLDING>); We\u2019re Assocs., Inc. v. Int\u2019l Bus. Machines Holdings: 0: holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause 1: holding that an arbitration clause that covered any irreconcilable difference of opinion  as to the interpretation of this contract was a narrowclause 2: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation 3: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 4: holding that consideration for a contract as a whole covers the arbitration clause", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "breached the duty; (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury; and (4) damages resulted. Id. at 665. Attorney-Client Relationship. The AMn Gump Defendants deny that they represented Grady and Chama, and thus deny that they owed a duty to them. The Court, however, concludes that there is sufficient evidence in the record to determine that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the AMn Gump Defendants and Grady. The Court has found that Kelso was an agent of Grady\u2019s who had the authority to hire counsel for Grady and Chama to design and implement the Chama reorganization scheme; Kelso did hire counsel for Grady and Chama for this purpose. An agent may employ counsel for Ms principal. See Randolph v. Resolution Trust Corp., 995 F.2d 611, 616 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1294, 127 Holdings: 0: recognizing this possibility in vacating a summary judgment and remanding the determination as to whether an attorneyclient relationsmp existed 1: holding that before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion the court must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law 2: holding that a court may consider undisputed summary judgment type evidence when determining whether a reasonable possibility of recovery under state law exists 3: holding that consideration of summary judgment motion should await determination of jurisdiction 4: holding that summary judgment was improper where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether prison officials prevented inmate from filing grievances", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. Id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. (quotations omitted). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have focused the Cort analysis to \u201cemphasize the centrality of the second factor \u2014 Congressional intent; treating the other factors as \u2018proxies of for the Eleventh Circuit in Arrow Airways, Inc. v. Dade County, 749 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.1985) held that \u201c[b]ased upon the ... lack of any evidence in the 1982 Act of an intent to create a private right of action, we conclude that the district court properly held that Appellants had no express or implied cause of action under 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 2210.\u201d Id. at 1491; see also Four T\u2019s, Inc. v. Little Rock Municipal Airport Commission, 108 F.3d 909, 915-16 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Holdings: 0: holding that no private right of action exists 1: holding that no private right of action exists under any of the provisions of the airport and airway improvement act 2: recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations 3: recognizing private right of action 4: holding that a private right of action exists", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) wherein the Supreme Court stated that in analyzing issues of personal jurisdiction, \u201cwhen commercial activities are \u2018carried on in behalf of an out-of-state party those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party.\u201d 471 U.S. at 480 n. 22, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Central argues that if CEJ is indeed an indispensable party to an action involving the 902 Patent because it retained substantial rights in that patent, then all of Mitutoyo\u2019s threats of litigation in defense of the 902 Patent must have been made by Mitutoyo on behalf of CEJ because Mitutoyo lacks the power to bring such an infringement action on its own. (See Pl.\u2019s Obj. at 19 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>)).) But see Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that the assignor of a patent retained substantial rights in the patent and must be added as an indispensable party 1: holding that where patent owner licensor retained substantial rights under license agreement licensee did not have an independent right to sue for infringement 2: holding that a written instrument was needed to document the transfer of proprietary rights to support standing to sue for patent infringement 3: holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement 4: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "38,122 includes several elements, each of which is capable of being readily understood: (1) a person must intend to obtain an economic benefit for himself by (2) holding himself e of law \u2014 a commercial enterprise\u2014 therefore, it is not facially overboard. See Cells, 354 S.W.3d at 32 (citing Manrique, 40 S.W.3d at 554). The State of Texas has a compelling interest in this regulatory framework; the benefit is to the citizens as a whole. See id. at 33 (citing Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963)) (recognizing that a state has a \u201csubstantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the State\u201d) (other citations omitted). Appellant also urges that neither Cells nor Manrique had the benefit of Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 24 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also argues the burden is on the Holdings: 0: recognizing the compelling interest in highway safety 1: holding that narrowtailoring requires a state to act with precision and to use the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest 2: holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest 3: holding the online solicitation statute was not narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest and there were more narrow means of achieving the states interest in protecting minors 4: holding total ban on indecent dialaporn telephone communications not narrowly drawn to serve the governments compelling interest in protecting children", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "her work to heightened scrutiny. A Title VII retaliation claim predicated on Knight\u2019s alleged retaliatory supervision of Perry is not in the operative second amended complaint for the obvious reason that his supervision of Perry post-dates the amended pleading\u2019s filing and, thus, had not yet occurred. While the operative complaint does set forth a Title VII retaliation claim, that claim does not allege that the filing of this lawsuit is the protected activity for which Perry suffered adverse action. At no time did Perry file a motion in the district court to amend the second amended complaint to add a Title VII retaliation claim based upon Knight\u2019s alleged post-lawsuit retaliatory conduct, as this circuit generally requires. See Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Notwithstanding the nonexistence of the Title Holdings: 0: holding that an officials failure to forward a complaint letter on the basis that plaintiff had filed an eeo complaint was direct evidence of retaliation 1: holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation 2: holding that a title vii retaliation claim was not properly before the court because although the plaintiff had not been fired when he filed his complaint the plaintiff never amended his complaint to include a claim of retaliation based on his termination 3: holding court did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs retaliation claim where plaintiff did not check the retaliation box or describe anything that indicates such a claim in the eeoc complaint 4: holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "concluded that Hampton had an opportunity to present evidence of prejudice. The trial court denied Hampton any such opportunity. Because prejudice is a necessary Barker factor and the trial court failed to comply with the instructions on remand, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court\u2019s finding that Hampton was not denied a speedy trial. We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Circuit Court of Tunica County, and remand for a new hearing in which the parties will be allowed to present evidence related to the Barker factors. \u00b6 26. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., RANDOLPH, P.J., KITCHENS, CHANDLER, PIERCE, KING AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. LAMAR, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. 1 . Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 2 . One 1970 Mercury Cougar, VIN No. Holdings: 0: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial 1: holding that the excusable neglect inquiry is at bottom an equitable one that should be made by considering the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party the length of the delay and its potential impact upon judicial proceedings the reason for the delay including whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant and whether the movant acted in good faith  2: holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay 3: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant 4: holding that the length of a continuance was not unreasonable because of defendants part in extending the delay", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing.\u201d (Third Am. Compl. \u00b6 461.) Henneberry fails, however, to provide the Court with any factual allegations that show any duty specifically owed to Henneberry that is separate and outside of a duty SCOA may have owed all of the shareholders. Simply stating a duty existed does not make it so where the preceding factual allegations do not support such a claim. See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir.1994) (\u201c \u2018[Cjourts do not accept conclusory allegations on the legal effect of the events plaintiff has set out if these allegations do not reasonably follow from his description of what happened.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 233 (1st Cir.1977))); Salahuddin v. Jones, 992 F.2d 447, 449 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Holdings: 0: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 1: holding district courts dismissal of plaintiffs claims proper where plaintiff only made wholly conclusory and inconsistent allegations 2: holding party opposing summary judgment does not show genuine issue for trial by replacing conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit 3: holding that securities fraud claims cannot rest on speculation and conclusory allegations 4: holding that district courts dismissal of state law claims was proper where the district court had properly dismissed all of the federal questions that gave it original jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the United States of jurisdiction in public-utility rate cases\u201d); id., at 8419 (remarks of Rep. Hancock) (\u201cthe Johnson bill seeks to [save time and money] by divesting the Federal courts of all jurisdiction in public-utility cases except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States after the final decision of the State court of last resort\u201d). 23 This Court has long recognized the dangers inherent in disrupting the administration of state tax systems. See, e. g., Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871) (\u201cIt is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as li , at 299 (<HOLDING>); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that declaratory relief is improper when a prosecution involving the challenged state statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated and the same principles that govern the propriety of federal injunctions of state criminal proceedings govern the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings 1: holding that federal courts will not enjoin the collection of unconstitutional state taxes where the taxpayer has a plain adequate and complete remedy at law 2: holding that the same considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes save in exceptional cases require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure 3: holding the federal and state tests to be the same 4: holding that the exceptional circumstances test does not apply to declaratory judgment actions", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Lu, such medical evidence would have been too speculative to have made a difference on the question of whether there was new and material evidence to reopen as to the claim for service connection of the veteran\u2019s death. See 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7261(b); Edenfield, 8 Vet.App. at 390-91 (as to nonprejudicial error); see also Dean v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 449, 455 (1995) (concluding that even if physician\u2019s statement were of record, it would be insufficient to render claim well grounded \u201cbecause it would be an opinion only as to the likelihood of the veteran\u2019s subsequently developing Huntington\u2019s chorea, not an opinion that the disability had its onset in, was aggravated by, or would otherwise be related to the appellant\u2019s condition in service\u201d); Johnson (Ethel) v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 423, 427-28 (1995) (<HOLDING>). III. Conclusion Upon consideration of the Holdings: 0: holding that trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed to introduce defendants prior consistent statement statement was not admissible because it was made after defendant had been arrested clearly not a time when the effect of the statement could not have been foreseen 1: holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr  3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim  that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service 2: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death 3: holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party 4: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death because a reasonable teller upon hearing the statement normally and reasonably would fear that his or her life is in danger", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 162. Although Rule 39 provides for joinder in mandatory terms, \u201cthere is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision.\u201d Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.1974); see Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49; Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. In this regard, we note that the trial court has \u201cbroad\u201d discretion in deciding matters regarding joinder. Royal Petroleum Corp. v. Dennis, 160 Tex. 392, 332 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex.1960); Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 180. Similarly, the standard of review on severance is abuse of discretion. In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.). Appellees assert that joinder of the McAdams and Chilcoat 477 (1942) (<HOLDING>); Kodiak Res., Inc., 361 S.W.3d at 248-49 Holdings: 0: recognizing that other courts have applied rule 8b to cases involving multiple defendants but stating that it seems to us that contrary to the jurisprudence in other circuits when a joinder of offenses charged against the same defendant is challenged the literal meaning of the rule 8 requires application of rule 8a irrespective of whether multiple defendants are involved in the case 1: holding under prior rule regarding joinder that royalty owners under the other lease contracts in a unitized block are necessary parties to suit under prior version of rule 39 2: holding that a case may be dismissed sua sponte under rule 12b6 prior to service without motion by defendants or briefing by the parties 3: recognizing rule 4: holding that a necessary party under rule 19a would be entitled a priori to intervene as of right under rule 24a", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "requires that the property be acquired in joint names of husband and wife.\u201d) (quoting Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 360 Pa.Super. 487, 498, 520 A.2d 1195, 1201 (Pa.Super.Ct.1987)); Augello v. United States, No. 1:92-CV-697, 1993 WL 330472, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 1993) (\u201cUnder Pennsylvania law, a tenancy by the entirety is a special form of co-ownership that arises between husband and wife when property is placed in the name of both spouses.\u201d); United States v. Cusumano, No. 90-00091-01, 1991 WL 274835, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 18, 1991) (\u201cProperty acquired in the names of both husband and wife is presumed to be held by the entireties, and the placing of property in the names of both spouses, without more, creates an entirety estate.\u201d); Raffaele v. Granger, 100 F.Supp. 390, 391 (W.D.Pa.1951) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir.1952). The Holdings: 0: holding that property held by husband and wife in tenancy by entirety cannot be reached by husbands creditors absent fraud 1: holding that bank accounts in husbands and wifes joint names were property in a tenancy by the entirety 2: holding that husband and wifes failure to recite marital status in the deed did not defeat tenancy by the entirety 3: holding that contents of joint bank accounts which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant were sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion 4: holding that where bank account titled in the names of two married persons a presumption arises that both hold the funds in the account as a tenancy by the entirety", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the domain of expert testimony. The weight to be given such an opinion is for the finder of fact, in this case the commissioner, and that may be affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert and other surrounding circumstances. (Internal citations omitted.) The deputy\u2019s reference to the physicians\u2019 opinions reflects that he accepted such opinion and gave weight to it so as to find causation in this case. While the deputy\u2019s findings of fact could have expanded on the details of causation, his reference to the opinion of the two treating physicians was sufficient. The deputy\u2019s analysis adequately supports the deputy\u2019s conclusion that the mental injury was compensable due to a traumatic work-related injury. See Mortimer v. Fruehauf Corp., 502 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Iowa 1993) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, a remand for further findings and Holdings: 0: holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable 1: holding that sexual assault of a minor resulting in psychological harm may be compensable under the tca even in the absence of personal injury 2: recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury 3: holding that psychological trauma resulting from abuse that impedes disclosure does not constitute mental incapacity for purposes of statute of limitations 4: holding in aggravated sexual assault case that testimony regarding psychological trauma suffered by child victim and its physical manifestations properly admitted", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "acts because of the information she obtained as a public employee.\u201d Kelly v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-2101 (JFB) (ETB), 2012 WL 1077677, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012). In the face of this clear and consistent case law, plaintiff was unable, in either her brief or at oral argument, to cite a single decision holding that speech analogous to the e-mails at issue here is protected under the First Amendment. Thus, pursuant to Garcetti and its progeny, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that plaintiff was speaking as a public employee, rather than as a private citizen, in her internal correspondence to District employees. See Nadolecki v. William Floyd Union Free Sch. District, No. 15-CV-2915 (JMA) (AYS), 2016 WL 4768823, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2016) (<HOLDING>), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaints  were all pursuant to his official duties as a teacher because he made complaints regarding the reading program integration of classes the math curriculum special accommodations and services having to do with student ieps and the effects that scheduling cuts would have on his math class 1: holding that an official has defrauded the public of his services if he secretly makes an official decision based on his own personal interests rather than the best interests of his constituents 2: holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen 3: holding that a seventeenyearold student lacked the capacity to consent to engage in sexual conduct with a teacher and consequently her allegations of a seeminglyconsensual sexual relationship with the teacher were sufficient to state a  1983 claim based on a violation of substantive due process 4: holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "regard as improper[.]\u201d Id. at 419. The same test for undue influence applies to wills and deeds, although the absence of independent advice may be more significant in the case of deeds than wills. Ryan v. Colombo, 77 Or App 71, 77, 712 P2d 139 (1985) (citations omitted). In such cases, the first question is whether there was a confidential relationship, in which the testator placed confidence in the beneficiary and the beneficiary exercised dominance over the testator. Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 124 Or App 299, 308, 862 P2d 509 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 381 (1994). Plaintiffs contend that, given Wilma\u2019s role in administering Jack\u2019s medication and taking him to medical appointments, among other factors, there was a confidential relationship. See In re Reddaway\u2019s Estate, 214 Or at 421 (<HOLDING>); Ramsey v. Taylor, 166 Or App 241, 262-63, 999 Holdings: 0: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave 1: holding as a general rule that a bank and its customers do not have a special or confidential relationship 2: holding that the physicianpatient relationship terminated when the patient missed a scheduled appointment and did not see the physician again and that the relationship did not continue despite the fact the patient later secured a refill of a prescription that was prescribed during the relationship 3: holding special relationship existed between caregiver and developmentally disabled individual 4: recognizing that a caregiver and patient relationship may be confidential", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to defectively record their mortgage in reliance on a settled expectation that they could avoid the bank\u2019s lien. We next address the presumption that an amendment altering a prior statute suggests that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the law \u201cunless it clearly appears that the amendment was passed to clarify the legislature\u2019s original intent.\u201d Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Indiana Dept. of Ins., 868 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citing Wright v. Fowler, 459 N.E.2d 386, 389-90 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (interpreting an amendment to have changed the law in part because the assembly added categories of employers to the statute and separately added provisions to provide procedures for addressing those employers)); Olatunji v. State, 788 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court of Indiana recently muddied Holdings: 0: holding that a legislative amendment that appeared to approve the analysis of a recent indiana supreme court case was a clarification rather than an amendment 1: holding district court erred in relying on authority other than that of the supreme court of the united states in its analysis under  2254d 2: holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case 3: holding that the 2010 amendment was a clarification 4: holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "did not provide transcripts from the hearing where the order was entered; her appeal only notes the order granting possession to the Trust, and at the sanctions hearings (transcripts of which Crockett did provide) she did not object to the entry of the order, only to the subsequent grant of possession. Even mindful that Crockett is proceeding pro se, we are unable to assess the initial entry of the protective order both because the point is raised for the first time on appeal, and because we have no record by which to evaluate the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 799 A.2d 381, 388 (D.C.2002) (arguments not raised below are normally spurned on appeal); Van Durr v. Kator & Scott, Chartered, 788 A.2d 579, 580-81 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Dudley Trust Found., 675 A.2d 45, Holdings: 0: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 1: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 2: holding petitioners pro se status did not constitute adequate cause for failure to raise claims earlier 3: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se 4: holding that this court was unable to reach alleged errors where pro se appellant did not provide an adequate record", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "applied the relevant substantive law. Id. The grant of summary judgment in this case is reviewed in light of the quite summary procedural requirements provided by the statutory law of civil forfeitures. United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir.1983). 3 . Ordinarily, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the party seeking to use it, or else it is waived. See, e.g., Kern Oil & Ref. Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 840 F.2d 730, 735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 378, 102 L.Ed.2d 367 (1988). The government did not brief the issue in this case; however, we raise it sua sponte in order to affirm the district court\u2019s decision. See Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The preclusive effect of a state court Holdings: 0: holding that sua sponte grant of summary judgment without notice to the parties constitutes reversible error 1: holding that the court can raise res judicata sua sponte even on appeal 2: holding that district courts sua sponte grant of summary judgment to nonmoving party is an accepted method of expediting litigation 3: recognizing that in the interest of judicial economy res judicata may properly be raised by a district court sua sponte particularly where both actions are brought in the courts of the same district 4: holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.\u201d Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000). For example, in Zheng v. United States Att\u2019y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam), we held that the petitioner, who was dragged by his arms to a detention yard, detained for five days, forced to watch reeducation videos, to stand in the sun for two hours, and to sign a pledge not to practice his religion, failed to establish past persecution. Id. at 1289-92. Because Zheng had presented no evidence that he was physically injured, we concluded that the \u201cfive-day detention during which he was not harmed [did] not compel the conclusion that he experienced past persecution.\u201d Id. at 1290; see also Djonda v. United States Att\u2019y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Tawm v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 740, Holdings: 0: holding that insults harassment death threats and a beating did not compel eligibility for withholding of removal 1: holding that evidence of kidnapping at gunpoint interrogation and beating did not compel finding of persecution 2: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 3: holding that minor abuse during brief detention did not compel finding of past persecution 4: holding that a minor beating even in conjunction with threats did not compel a finding of persecution", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract claims when the assignee sued only in its capacity as a third party health care provider). Defendant therefore misapplies the general rule of exclusivity to the facts of this case, which resemble those in The Meadows. In that case, an assignee of the plan participant filed negligent misrepresentation, estoppel, and breach of contract claims against the plan. The district court dismissed the action, stating that because the plaintiff sued in its capacity as assign-ee, ERISA preempted the state law claims. Id. at 1008. When the plaintiff filed similar claims based on its status as a third party provider, however, and not as an assignee, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court\u2019s remand of the case to state court, /\u00bf(<HOLDING>). In its complaint, its motion for remand, and Holdings: 0: holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted 1: holding the state law claims were not preempted 2: holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation 3: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 4: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the superior court \u201cfor appointment of mental health experts,\u201d Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.2(d), the supreme court evinced its intent that, once a court has made the reasonable grounds finding, the matter move on to the next phase of the Rule 11 process and the issue of a defendant\u2019s competency be determined after full proceedings consistent with the rule. See, e.g., Ariz. R.Crim. P. 11.3(a) (requiring court to appoint two or more mental health experts upon finding reasonable grounds for examination exist). Were we to interpret Rule 11.2 as permitting the superior court to review another court\u2019s reasonable grounds finding, we would be inserting words into the rule that do not exist. This we cannot and will not do. See Cervantes v. Cates, 206 Ariz. 178, \u00b6 24, 76 P.3d 449, 455 (App.2003) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 14 For the reasons stated, we conclude the Holdings: 0: holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature 1: recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules 2: recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings 3: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 4: holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "each factor.\u201d Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 17; see also Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (explaining that a district court is \u201cnot required to weigh all statutory factors equally\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have unanimously held that a district court does not abuse its discretion in placing primary emphasis on the gravity of the juvenile\u2019s offense. See Hemmer, 729 F.2d at 18 (\u201cIn light of the gravity of the crime involved [ (armed robbery) ], weighed against the other five section 5032 factors, we cannot say that the district court struck the balance improperly.\u201d); see also Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 307 (explaining that \u201c[t]he seriousness of the offense, for instance, can be given more weight than other factors\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wellington, 102 F.3d at 506 (<HOLDING>); A.R., 38 F.3d at 705 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding that a district court is entitled to give more weight to the seriousness of the offense than to other factors 1: holding that a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived for failure to present the issue first to the trial court 2: holding that the weight of a classification determination depends upon all those factors which give it power to persuade 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cthe mere imposition of hardship on family relationships ... necessarily accompanies the order of any prison sentence\u201d). Here, the district court explained that a below-Guidelines sentence was warranted because the Guidelines range was based on Edwards\u2019s intended loss, not the actual loss he caused. But it is unexceptional that the actual losses were less than the intended losses. I expect the amount the run-of-the-mill thief intends to steal is usually greater than the amount he actually steals. The fact that the losses attributed to Edwards were intended rather than actual simply reflects the fact that Edwards got caught. He should not benefit from that fact. Fourth, we should consider whether the district court \u201cbase[d] the sentence on impermissible factors.\u201d Hunt, 521 F.3d at 649 (<HOLDING>). Here, although the district court\u2019s sentence Holdings: 0: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint 1: holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention 2: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard 3: holding that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a belowguidelines sentence in part because it disagreed with the jurys finding that the defendant had the intent to defraud 4: holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "tire had at one time possessed confidential information for the construction of OTR\u2019s Outrigger tire. The district court therefore drew a reasonable inference that West, through its manufacturer, improperly used trade secrets related to OTR\u2019s Outrigger tire. See id. 3. The district court did not clearly err in finding that OTR was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill are cognizable irreparable harms in the trademark infringement context. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm\u2019t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir.2013). Although the district court\u2019s finding of reputational injury was not based on any evidence that West\u2019s lookalike tire was an inferior product, see id. at 1250-21 (<HOLDING>), the court\u2019s finding of goodwill injury was Holdings: 0: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 1: holding that temporaryinjunction orders simple recitation of conclusory statement that plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury for which it has no other adequate legal remedy does not satisfy rule 683s requirement that a temporary injunction order specify reasons why plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law 2: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate 3: holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer 4: holding that a movant for a preliminary injunction must first demonstrate that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "lot. Finally, the third paragraph again declares that Tilbury I and Tilbury II are separate lots that could be remodeled or replaced subject to compliance with the current Deed Restrictions\u2019 regulations on matters such as building materials, color, and location relative to the setback lines. Plaintiffs contend the declaratory judgment does not duplicate their preexisting pleadings because, in their view, these declarations deal with future rights. As explained above, however, the declarations focus on present compliance with the Deed Restrictions. Moreover, to the extent these declarations have future operation, they duplicate the relief plaintiffs sought by injunction. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 425-26 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs also cite cases addressing the Holdings: 0: recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act 1: holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief 2: holding plaintiff had no right to recover attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because declarations requested no greater or different relief than claim for injunctive relief for constitutional violation 3: holding attorneys fees waived in lawsuit brought under declaratory judgments act to interpret statute 4: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "should be made only rarely, and because the Court has already adjusted downward Class Counsels\u2019 rates and hours to make them reasonable, the Court DECLINES to make any adjustment to the lodestar figure. See Clark, 803 F.2d at 990-91 (1986). Accordingly, the Court awards attorneys\u2019 fees in the amount of $197,318.27. II. Costs \u201cAn award of standard costs in federal district court is normally governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), even in diversity cases.\u201d Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted); see Drumm v. Morningstar, Inc., 695 F.Supp.2d 1014 (N.D.Cal.2010) (\u201cSince the awarding of costs here is procedural, not substantive, federal law governs.\u201d); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F.Supp. 1379, 1393-94 (D.Alaska 1990) (<HOLDING>). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) Holdings: 0: holding that judgment based on terms of settlement agreement must be interpreted under law of contracts rather than law of judgments 1: holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law 2: holding that federal circuit would henceforth apply its own law rather than regional circuit law to questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal and state law rights 3: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law 4: holding that federal law regarding costs applies rather than more generously interpreted state law", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "... mitigation.\u201d). In either event, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ or DEP on this issue. In this appeal, the Authority argues that section 373. urance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)). While the Authority cites to legislative history that seems to indicate that the legislature\u2019s intent was to require the mitigation to \u201cfully offset\u201d the adverse impacts, the statute as enacted does not contain that language, and this court cannot rewrite the statute to say so. See State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993) (\u201cIt is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.\u201d); Ervin v. Collins, 85 So.2d 852, 855 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). Ironically the statute itself, as written, Holdings: 0: holding that it is not 1: holding that speculation as to how the evidence might have been beneficial was not enough 2: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous 3: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 4: holding that the court is not permitted to revise an unambiguous statute by engrafting  our views as to how it should have been written", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "principles, this Court has long recognized three categories of police interactions with private citizens: (1) a full-scale arrest, which requires probable cause, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn.2012); (2) a brief investigatory detention, requiring reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tenn. 2012); and (3) a brief police-citizen encounter, requiring no objective justification, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. Ingram, 331 S.W.3d 746, 756 (Tenn.2011). See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d at 656; State v. Holdings: 0: recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to  1983 claims 1: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights 4: recognizing a threetier analysis for warrantless encounters with police", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and definite promise that the parties would enter into a legally executable lease that would induce detrimental reliance by Andersen. See Moore, 2007 WL 2331021, at *6-7 (rejecting a landlord\u2019s claim that a tenant\u2019s promise that he \u201cwill start putting the package together ... [the tenant] would like to get this in the June 17th meeting for approval.... This is a busy time for everyone ..., but lets get this deal done, behind us, and open!\u201d was a \u201cclear and definite promise\u201d). Andersen argues that Kranz\u2019 internal e-mail to Gower on February 25 was a clear and definite promise that FCOA would sign the lease. However, this cannot constitute a clear and definite promise because the promisee must be aware of the promisor\u2019s promise. See Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795-96 (Iowa 1971) (<HOLDING>). Even if Kranz\u2019 e-mail constituted a clear and Holdings: 0: holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence 1: holding that promissory estoppel existed when the grantor agreed to use the property for only residential purposes took title with knowledge of that promise and the grantee relied upon that agreement 2: holding that any promise involving real property is enforceable only if that promise meets the requirements of the statute 3: holding when a deed provides grantee would take subject to the state of facts which a personal inspection or accurate survey would disclose grantee has no claim against grantor for power line easement 4: holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "tenants, and brokers verified that the increased proximity decreased the building\u2019s market value. Further, contrary to the court of appeals\u2019 conclusion, there is evidence that other landowners in the area did not suffer the same injuries. The land north of INP was vacant, and the properties south of INP endured only minor changes. Additionally, there is no evidence that the frontage road\u2019s relocation impaired the perceived safety of any buildings on those properties or placed them in violation of city ordinances or deed restrictions. And, in any event, even if the condemnation did affect some neighboring landowners similarly, \u201cinjury to several landowners on the same street is not community injury simply because they all suffer alike.\u201d Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 781. In sum, .1965) (<HOLDING>). The court of appeals agreed with the State Holdings: 0: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation 1: holding that where by virtue of state action access is limited but remains reasonable there is no such denial of access as entitles the landowner to compensation 2: holding that landowner was entitled to compensation because the condemnation destroyed all reasonable access to remainder property 3: holding that in condemnation proceedings the landowner has the burden of establishing the value of the property 4: recognizing when a lease terminates upon condemnation tenant is entitled to no compensation for loss of leasehold interest", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Thus, Blair extended Bassler beyond its reach. Neither Blair nor Bassler offers authority for the proposition that the Borrowers need a private right of action under Section 7(d) or Section 29(b) in order to assert an affirmative defense that the Notes are void and unenforceable because they violate Section 7(d) and Regulations G and U. No private right of action under a statute is necessary to assert a violation of that statute as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86, 102 S.Ct. 851, 70 L.Ed.2d 833 (1982) (allowing defense under \u00a7 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act where defendant had no private right of action to enforce the statute); United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 566, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961) (<HOLDING>); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat\u2019l Harrow Co., 186 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding conflict of interest on the part of a government official who participated in contract negotiations in violation of federal law rendered contract unenforceable 2: holding an administrative rule referred to in the contract became part of the contract under the doctrine of incorporation 3: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable 4: recognizing an exception to the conflict rule where the conflict arose after the award of the contract", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "formal County policies or longstanding County practices. a. Seizure under \u00a7 5150 It is undisputed that Deputy Perez made the decision to take Harvey into custody pursuant to \u00a7 5150. Section 5150 provides that \u201c[w]hen any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer [or other designated persons] may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation.\u201d See Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code \u00a7 5150. The lawfulness of a detention under \u00a7 5150 is measured by Fourth Amendment standards. See Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); People v. Triplett, 144 Cal.App.3d 283, 287, Holdings: 0: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 1: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 2: holding seizure of suspected mentally ill person for psychiatric evaluation is analogous to a criminal arrest and must therefore be supported by probable cause 3: recognizing that an officer must have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the person has been is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity to frisk an individual for weapons and must have probable cause to conduct a further seizure 4: recognizing that an immigration arrest and detention needs to be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "position on what constitutes \"examined.\u201d 6 . According to Citrix\u2019s invalidity expert Dr. Jeffay, the name \"ReadMe\u201d was a play on the Alice in Wonderland story, in which Alice confronts magical treats labeled \"Eat Me\u201d and \"Drink Me.\u201d 7 . However, courts have found software manuals to be sufficiently enabling. See Microstrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects Americas, 410 F.Supp.2d 348, 362-63 (D.Del.2006), aff'd, 238 Fed.Appx. 605 (Fed.Cir.2007) (\"manuals are themselves prior art and provide clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a conclusion of invalidity\u201d). 8 . Because the Court will limit its analysis to prior public use, Pixion's reliance on cases concerned only with prior publication is unavailing. See e.g. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). 9 . See also Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Holdings: 0: holding prior publication must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim internal citations omitted 1: holding that the elements of a hostile work environment claim are the same across discrimination contexts and applying those elements specifically to the age discrimination in employment act 2: holding that apprendi leaves undisturbed the principle that while the prosecution must indeed prove all the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt the legislation creating the offense can place the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant internal citations omitted 3: holding that the creditor must prove the elements of actual fraud 4: holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cannot dispose of the tortious interference counts. See doc. 184, at 55 n. 88. 13 . See amended complaint, doc. 172, \u00b6 19.3(d) (allegation (7)); \u00b6 19.3(c)-(d) (all other allegations). 14 . See Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So.2d 1126, 1128 (Fla.3d DCA 1989) (\u201cFraud in the inducement and deceit are independent torts for which compensatory and punitive damages may be recovered\u201d), citing Sprayberry v. Sheffield Auto & Truck Serv., Inc., 422 So.2d 1073 (Fla.lst DCA 1982) (\u201c[0]ne who has been fraudulently induced into a contract may elect to stand by that contract and sue for damages for the fraud\u201d); accord, Gold v. Wolkowitz, 430 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1983); see also Wallis v. South Florida Savings Bank, 574 So.2d 1108, 1110 (Fla.2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); Lou Brachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570 Holdings: 0: recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule 1: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 2: holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement 3: holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims 4: holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude independent tort claims that fall outside the scope of a breach of contract", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "capacity to make that choice intelligently and understanding^,\u2019 any subsequent plea should be deemed involuntary as a matter of law and the appellate court would have the authority to reverse absent a motion to withdraw or a contemporaneous objection. Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.165(b)(2)). A. Case number 2014-CJ-655 The unverified \u201cI choose to represent myself\u2019 form and the trial court\u2019s five questions to D.A.C. are inadequate to constitute the \u201cthorough\u201d waiver of counsel required by rule 8.165(b)(2). See T.G., 800 So.2d at 211 (\u201cAlthough the inquiry for juveniles must be at least equal to that accorded adults, courts should be even more e\u00e1reful when accepting a waiver of counsel from juveniles.\u201d); A.S. v. State, 62 So.3d 695, 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>); G.T. v. State, 948 So.2d 900, 902 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that lower courts misunderstood the requirement for finding a valid waiver of the right to counsel where neither the trial court nor the arizona supreme court undertook to focus on whether edwards understood his right to counsel and intelligently and knowingly relinquished it 1: holding fundamental error occurred because the trial court failed to inquire thoroughly whether the juvenile understood her right to counsel and had the capacity to intelligently choose to waive counsel and failed to obtain the required verified written waiver 2: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 3: holding that accused must competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel 4: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Further, Sattler cannot demonstrate a legitimate claim of entitlement to a particular prison grievance procedure. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.1988). Sattler\u2019s claim that he did not receive adequate notice that prison regulations prohibited being naked in his cell, however, may have merit. Due process requires fair notice of prohibited conduct before a sanction can be imposed. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988). Although \u201cindecent exposure\u201d was proscribed in the prison\u2019s regulation on sexual misconduct, it is not clear that this prohibition would include Sattler\u2019s nudity within the confines of his own cell. See United States v. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). To the extent Sattler has alleged a due Holdings: 0: holding that a regulation must sufficiently convey the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices to avoid unconstitutional vagueness 1: holding that interpretation of regulation by va that conflicted with plain meaning of regulation not entitled to deference 2: holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended 3: holding that the taxpayer sufficiently tendered its unconstitutional vagueness challenge against the boards regulation in the claim for a refund 4: holding that ojrdinarily when a regulation is not promulgated in compliance with the apa the regulation is invalid however when equity demands the regulation can be left in place while the agency follows the necessary procedures citation omitted", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "giving rise to their complaint occurred. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 1309, at 696 (2d ed.1990). In some cases, however, the substantive na ture of the lawsuit and the general rules of pleading require the plaintiff to allege when defendant\u2019s illegal acts occurred. Id. Significantly, courts have required that a plaintiff plead time when the events in question spanned a number of years and when the date plaintiff discovered his injury appeared to be remote in time. See, e.g., Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corporation, 717 F.Supp. 1537 (S.D.Fla.1989) (requiring a more definite statement of time and place where events underlying breach of contract claim spanned seven years); Stewart Coach Indus., Inc. v. Moore, 512 F.Supp. 879 (D.Ohio 1981) (<HOLDING>). A claim that the applicable statute of Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 1: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud 2: holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment 3: recognizing that the risk of fraud or corruption is more remote at the petition stage of an initiative than at the time of balloting 4: holding that a plaintiff has a duty to plead the date of discovery of fraud where the alleged fraud apparently occurred at a remote time", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is not.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909) (alteration in original). In the case of statutory aggravating circumstances in a capital punishment scheme, a circumstance may be so vague as to provide no such meaningful basis for distinguishing a death penalty case from other murders and, thereby, run afoul of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. Such \u201c[c]laims of vagueness ... characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman.\u201d Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-362, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29, 100 Holdings: 0: holding that heinous atrocious or cruel is unconstitutionally vague language 1: holding that oklahomas especially heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that there is no serious argument that the especially heinous cruel or depraved aggravating factor is not facially vague 3: recognizing that north carolinas heinous atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance requires a limiting construction 4: holding unconstitutionally vague under the reasoning of godfrey an aggravatingcircumstances instruction directing jurors to determine whether the murder was especially heinous atrocious and cruel", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of privacy considering the specific facts of the case.\u201d Gomez, 16 F.3d at 256. See also, McCaster, 193 F.3d at 83-84 (8th Cir.1997) (finding abandonment where the defendant told officers bag was not his and that he had never seen it before). Even without this express disclaimer by Defendant, the seizure and search of the trash bag would still not be subject to suppression. The Supreme Court held in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988), that there is no expectation of privacy in a trash bag left in an area accessible by others, including animals, children, scavengers and members of the public. Id. 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. 1625; accord, United States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421, 1423-24 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The lack of an expectation of privacy is even Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic bags placed in or near his open garbage cans and that the police did not violate his fourth amendment rights in seizing and searching the bags where they were able to do so without trespassing on the defendants property 1: holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street 2: holding that while the necessary regulation of garbage must compel a person to reasonably expect that a licensed trash collector will remove his garbage this expectation does not also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion 3: holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in trash cans 4: holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage located outside curtilage of home", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "doctrine as codified at 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 107. (Def.\u2019s\u2019 Br. at 2). In support of their fair-use defense argument, the defendants have submitted video of the original WWITB video and the South Park episode \u201cCanada on Strike.\u201d (Docket # 10). Ordinarily, courts may not rely upon materials outside of the pleadings when considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). There is an exception to this general rule, however, where the material in question is expressly referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claim. See Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.2002); see generally Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is no doubt that the two videos Holdings: 0: holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 1: holding that a court may consider documents that have not been incorporated by reference where the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect which renders the document integral to the complaint 2: holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 3: recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that Ann. \u00a7 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon Supp.2006) (defining \u201cconspicuous\u201d for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code). Nothing appears on the face of the two-page, single-spaced \u201cBank of America Mortgage Addendum to Contract\u201d to attract the attention of a reasonable person to the jury waiver provision when he looks at the addendum. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.1993) (recognizing that to be conspicuous, something must appear on the face of the contract to attract the attention of a reasonable person when he looks at it). Nor did Martin or Powell initial the waiver provision, which would have established their actual knowledge of the waiver. See, e.g., Sydlik v. REEIII, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 329, 332-33 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, factor six, the conspicuousness Holdings: 0: holding that signatorys initials by specific indem nity provision established signatorys actual knowledge of provision 1: holding that a provision of the constitution is to be construed in the sense in which it was understood by the framers and the people at the time of its adoption but that if new products or circumstances that did not exist at the time the constitutional provision was enacted fall within the meaning of the provision the constitutional provision applies to them 2: holding that question was within arbitration provision because provision contained no specific language precluding arbitrators from reaching question 3: holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision 4: holding that fehbas complete preemption provision closely resembles erisas express preemption provision and precedent interpreting the erisa provision thus provides authority for cases involving the fehba provision", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in essence a volunteer to reimbursement of attorney and accounting fees is not an absurd result. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Lamie has pointed the way toward a strict reading of parts of the Code dealing with compensation. See Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). It is true that section 503(b) is \u201cinclusive\u201d in its listing of administrative expenses. See Code \u00a7\u00a7 503(b), 102(3). However, the specificity (and exclusive language) of section 503(b)(4) suggests a limited scope for that category of expense. Moreover, section 503(b)(4) represents a limited exception to the general rule that general unsecured creditors are not entitled to payment for professional fees incurred. See In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). For all these reasons, the court holds the Holdings: 0: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 1: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 2: holding that a creditors attorney must ordinarily look to its own client for payment 3: holding that an attorney could obtain a judgment for attorney fees against his own client in the divorce division of the circuit court of cook county where there was no objection 4: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trial court to strike the improper findings of violation). AFFIRMED and REMANDED with directions. WOLF, C.J.; PADOVANO and POLSTON, JJ., concur. 1 . The State argues that the trial court\u2019s finding that appellant violated his probation by leaving the scene of a traffic accident involving property damage was permissible because leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only, in violation of section 316.061, Florida Statutes (2002), is a lessor included offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, in violation of section 316,027 (2002). The trial court did not, however, find that appellant committed a lesser offense. Rather, it found that appellant committed both offenses. This cannot be so. See Peterson v. State, 775 So.2d 376, 377-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The Appellant also argues that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that an automobile dealers liability insurer was not liable for any damage allegedly caused by the negligence of the dealer and sustained in an accident involving an automobile purchased from the dealer or to defend the dealer in the negligence action where the injury occurred outside of the policy period and occurrence was defined in the policy as an accident including injurious exposure to conditions which results during the policy period in bodily injury or property damages   1: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 2: holding that the words at the scene   imply a specific place    and limit rather than expand the officers power to arrest and the scene is the place where the accident occurred 3: holding scene of accident was suspicious place 4: holding that convictions for both leaving the scene of an accident involving injury and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage only were inconsistent and therefore could not be sustained", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and remand the case to the district court. Riley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J. 1 MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). 2 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i). 3 Contrary to the majority\u2019s suggestion, ante, p 482, n 11, defendant has not been charged with conspiracy to deliver narcotics to Hoyt in Florida or in Michigan. Defendant is charged with conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver does not logically require two persons for its completion. A conspiracy between Hoyt and his Michigan partner already existed before Hoyt traveled to Florida to purchase cocaine. It is this preexisting Michigan conspiracy that the prosecutor alleges that Blume became a member of by all y murder, 50 U Chi LR 1431, 1433-1439 (1983) (<HOLDING>). 11 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), \u00a7 Holdings: 0: recognizing six bases territorial national protective universal passive personality and objective territorial 1: recognizing common law privileges 2: recognizing four bases territorial roman injured forum cosmopolitan 3: recognizing three bases common law or territorial significant activity and integral relation 4: recognizing five bases territorial national protective universal and passive personality", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "understanding of the English language and the complexity of the proceedings, issues, and testimony. United States v. Khehra, 396 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir.2005). Applying those factors, the court in Khehra did not find error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to appoint an interpreter for a defendant whose native language was a Punjabi dialect, but who communicated in English to his customers and vendors on a regular basis, failed to assert any problem with communication, informed his counsel that he did not need an interpreter, had evidence presented against him at trial of him communicating in English while committing the alleged crime, and did not have a complex trial. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Osuna, 3 Fed.Appx. 739, 740-41 (10th Cir.2001), cert. de 2d 505, 508-09 (1989) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, superseded on other grounds by Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court was under no obligation to appoint an interpreter where defendant did not request one and spoke english reasonably well 1: holding that it was not error for a trial court to have failed to provide sua sponte a competent interpreter where counsel did not request one prior to trial and defendant spoke and understood english well enough to conversantly discuss the crime with a police officer and had no trouble answering questions at the sentencing hearing 2: holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys 3: holding that trial court need not appoint an interpreter where counsel indicated that he could communicate with defendant and that defendant could understand questions and answers 4: holding that it was improper when prosecutor posed questions to defense counsel that could have been read as posed only to the defendant and whose answers could only have been provided by the defendant", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with our Davis approach of analyzing the testimonial nature of a statement independently of its admissibility under the rules of evidence. See Moore v. State, 169 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex.App.-Texarkana July 26, 2005, no pet. h.). 14 . See Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (witness initiated contact); Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 697-98 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed) (finding that admission of non-testifying witness\u2019s self-initiated statements to police officers in response to unstructured questions during the investigation of a crime did not violate Crawford)-, Davis v. State, No. 2-03-305-CR, 2005 WL 183141, at *2, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 712, at *4 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Jan.27, 2005, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Forrest, 164 N.C.App. 272, Holdings: 0: recognizing that not all statements obtained by the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation 1: holding statements by coconspirator nontestimonial and thus admissible 2: holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant 3: holding that miranda does not apply to statements of the defendant which are voluntary and unsolicited and not the product of custodial interrogation 4: holding that voluntary statements to police initiated by witness are not interrogation and therefore are nontestimonial", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(2004). \u201cCommon issues ... predominate if they \u2018ha[ve] a direct impact on every class member\u2019s effort to establish liability and on every class member\u2019s entitlement to injunctive and monetary relief.\u2019 \u201d Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Each party must be able to prove their own individual case, and in so doing, prove the case of the other unnamed class members. See Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co., 859 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). If Plaintiffs must still present a great deal of individualized proof or argue individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements of their claims, class certification is not appropriate. See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1255; see also Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Failure to prove elements of claims Here, Holdings: 0: holding that fmla does not impose individual liability 1: holding no individual liability under the adea 2: holding that where both liability and damages depend on individual factual determinations claims may only be determined on individual basis 3: holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud 4: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the burdens of the regulation upon the interstate market, while excluding similar in-state interests. The court concludes therefore that, in light of the exemption for the local preference, Section 115A.47 is not evenhanded in its application. Further, in support of its argument that the effects of Section 115A.47 are merely incidental, the State asserts that any impact on interstate commerce is small because most waste is already managed in Minnesota. The MPCA estimates that approximately 193,000 tons of Minnesota waste per year, or four percent of the total waste generated in Minnesota, is managed outside of the State. The court finds that this argument misconstrues the nature of the incidental impact on interstate commerce that is permissible. See Waste Systems, 985 F.2d at 1387 (<HOLDING>). The volume of interstate commerce impacted is Holdings: 0: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss 1: holding under the policy language that diminution of market value is not a cause of loss but a measure of a loss caused by something else 2: holding that the loss of a contract failed to constitute ascertainable loss under cutpa 3: holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand 4: holding that the loss of 10400 tons annually was not incidental", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "harm in order to further the military goals of that organization. Id. at 323-24. Judge Williams focused instead on those who (1) \"attempt!] or engage!] in belligerent acts against the United States, either domestically or in a foreign combat zone; (2) on behalf of an enemy force.\u201d Id. at 285. 32 . See generally id. at 230-31 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment); but see id. at 314-22 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that law-of-war principles must account for recent developments in how warfare is conducted). 33 . Id. at 231 (emphasis added). . 34 . al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 555 U.S. 1066, 129 S.Ct. 680, 172 L.Ed.2d 649 (2008). 35 . al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220, 129 S.Ct. 1545, 173 L.Ed.2d 671. 36 . See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (<HOLDING>); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, P.L. 109-148, Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts have statutory habeas jurisdiction over petitions filed by guantanamo detainees 1: holding section 1252a2c precludes habeas jurisdiction 2: holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo 3: holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration 4: holding alien detained as enemy combatant at guantanamo bay has no constitutional right to writ of habeas corpus", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "manner. See id. IV Finally, Queen challenges his sentence, contending that the district court,.in adjusting his offense level upward by two levels based on perjury, failed to make findings detailed enough to satisfy the requirements for an upward adjustment outlined in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Under Dunnigan, in. order to make an adjustment for perjury, a court must find that all of the elements of perjury were present in the defendant\u2019s testimony. That is, the court must find that the defendant\u2019s testimony was untruthful as to a material matter, and that, the false testimony was willful. Id. at 94-95, 113 S.Ct. at 1116-17. Although \u201cit is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perju Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt 1: holding evidence of prior witness intimidation admissible to show criminal intent and guilty conscience 2: recognizing that even evidence of a defendants and a witnesss prior bad acts was admissible to show inter alia the defendants familiarity with the witness 3: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties 4: holding on a criminal appeal that prior bad acts evidence is admissible to prove intent to commit the charged crime", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "by Pub.L. No. 76-2004, \u00a7 4 (eff. July 1, 2004); Pub.L. No. 82-2004, \u00a7 2 (eff. July 1, 2004); and Pub.L. No. 2-2005, \u00a7 36 (eff. April 25, 2005)). 2 . Ind.Code \u00a7 9-30-5-1 (2004). 3 . Ind.Code \u00a7 9-30-5-5. 4 . We note that, had the jury found Radiek guilty of both operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing death as a class C felony and operating a vehicle with a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II causing death as a class C felony, the trial court could not have entered judgment of conviction on both verdicts due to double jeopardy principles. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that \"[ejnhancement of one offense for the very same harm as another is not permissible.\u201d Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312, 314 (Ind. 2002); see also Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (<HOLDING>). SULLIVAN, Judge, dissenting. The jury did not Holdings: 0: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 1: holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute 2: holding that where a burglary conviction is elevated to a class a felony based on the same bodily injury that forms the basis of a class b robbery conviction the two cannot stand 3: holding in part that robbery as a class b felony is not necessarily a lesserincluded offense of robbery as a class a felony 4: holding that the defendants homeinvasion robbery conviction violated double jeopardy because it arose from the same incident as the defendants burglary with an assault or battery conviction", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the FLSA is the exclusive remedy for FLSA created rights, particularly where the state law claims arise out of the same facts and circumstances as the federal claims, thus the plaintiffs are impermissibly attempting to enforce the FLSA by using Rule 23 to create an opt-out class. Id. at 4-5, 7. According to the defendants, allowing an opt-out class on parallel state law wage and hour claims would frustrate the FLSA\u2019s \u00a7 216(b) goal of \u201climiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted claims in their own right and freeing employers of the burden of representative actions.\u201d Id. at 6-7 (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480(1989)). In contrast, the plaintiffs argue there is no conflict between the 4, 1152-54 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not Holdings: 0: holding flsa did not preempt state law fraud claim 1: holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa 2: holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim 3: holding that the flsa does not preempt state law contract provisions that are more generous than the flsa demands 4: holding under flsa", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to rely upon them. However, in each of those cases there was no evidence presented (beyond the fact that the employees commenced or continued to work) that the employees assented to the policies. When an employer offers to restrict its power to discharge, the employee\u2019s assent to the restriction need not be evinced by anything more than commencing or continuing employment. As a matter of public policy, we see no need for any further manifestation of assent. Once the employee has successfully shown that the employer has demonstrated an intent to restrict its power to discharge, absent evidence to the contrary, the court will imply in law that the requirement of mutual assent has been met. There need be no separate factual finding of mutual assent. Accord Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (<HOLDING>). In this case, if Paxton made a sufficiently Holdings: 0: holding employer statements of policy can give rise to contractual rights without evidence of mutual agreement 1: holding that mutual mistake as to essential element of plea agreement can invalidate entire agreement 2: holding that the implementation of a policy that violated a consent decree could give rise to contempt proceedings 3: holding that evidence of a cursory investigation can give rise to an inference of an unlawful motive 4: holding that the creation drafting editing or making of the statements at issue can give rise to liability under  10b", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and were in any event rescinded before they were enforced; and the last was a prudent precaution for this employer in these circumstances. Kader has demonstrated that an uneasy and stressful environment existed, but he has adduced no evidence to support an inference that his employer intentionally created an intolerable workplace. Kader\u2019s showing is therefore insufficient as a matter of law: a claim.of constructive discharge must be dismissed as a matter of law unless the evidence is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to infer that the employer deliberately created working conditions that were \u201cso difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee\u2019s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.\u201d Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (<HOLDING>). See also Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding defendants belief that his work was unfairly criticized is not sufficient for constructive discharge 1: holding the claim of constructive discharge does not accrue until an employee resigns 2: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 3: holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act 4: holding no claim for constructive discharge where employee was dissatisfied with his compensation assignments and criticisms of his work but rank and salary were never reduced", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in a civil legal malpractice action for breach of contract. In the instant case, the Plaintiffs requested damages \u201cincluding, but not limited to, the loss of the value of BCA\u2019s stock (estimated to be $2.5M), and the interest and penalties that have accrued on the taxes since July 14, 2006, when the Company was sold [to] Avant.\u201d Amended Complaint, 1/10/11, par. 39. Defendants contend that the above claim for damages is inconsistent with proof of actual loss as required in legal malpractice actions. See Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984) (stating that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice, whether the action is denominated assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss); see also Kituskie v. Corbman, 552 Pa. 275, 714 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding breach of fiduciary duty claim is essentially a negligence or professional malpractice claim 1: holding that  the threat of future harm not yet realized is not enough  2: holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm 3: holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm 4: holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "filed its petition in the justice court against Basil Brown and all occupants, one of whom was Basil\u2019s wife Yvonne. After Basil and Yvonne signed and filed an answer, the justice court signed a judgment of eviction against Basil. In response, Basil and Yvonne signed and filed a notice of appeal from that judgment pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 749, and Yvonne signed and filed a pauper\u2019s affidavit pursuant to rule 749a. After the case was appealed to the county court at law, Apex amended its petition to name Yvonne as one of the defendants, and Yvonne testified at the de novo trial. Both an appeal bond filed pursuant to rule 749 and a pauper\u2019s affidavit filed pursuant to rule 749a operate as an answer. See Hughes v. Habitat Apts., 860 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex.1993) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Montgomery v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. Holdings: 0: holding paupers affidavit sufficed as a pro se answer 1: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 2: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 3: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial 4: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1 . Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir.2007). 2 . Id. 3 . Id. 4 . Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir.2007). 5 . Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,-U.S.-,-, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989)). 6 . Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 394 F.3d 262, 270 n. 18 (5th Cir.2004). 7 . Corry, 499 F.3d at 397 (quoting Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 8 . Ellis, 394 F.3d at 273. 9 . Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 97 F.3d 822, 828 (5th Cir.1996). 10 . Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1309 (5th Cir.1994). 11 .See Duhon, 15 F.3d at 1308 (<HOLDING>). 12 . See 2003 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1274 Holdings: 0: holding that an employees inability to lift more than 30 to 40 pounds did not substantially limit his ability to engage in ordinary daily activities 1: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 2: holding that a plan administrator did not abuse its discretion in denying disability benefits to a sixtyfiveyearold man where medical evidence showed he was capable of performing sedentary to light work despite being unable to squat stoop bend or lift more than twentyfive pounds 3: holding that restrictions that plaintiff not lift more than twentyfive pounds or bend repetitively are not evidence of a permanent impairment that substantially limits any major life activity 4: holding that the plan administrator did not abuse her discretion by denying benefits when faced with conflicting medical reports", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, Or\u00edn S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 6.9(b) at 824 (3d ed.2007) (\"it is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of intelligent waiver, and thus in this context intelligence is not equated with wisdom\u201d) (quoting Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir.1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 . See Dolchok v. State, 639 P.2d 277, 281 (Alaska 1982); Trumbly v. State, 515 P.2d 707, 708 (Alaska 1973); cf. Bowker v. State, 373 P.2d 500, 501-02 (Alaska 1962). 29 . 100 P.3d 440 (Alaska App.2004). 30 .422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 31 . 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). 32 . Crawford, 100 P.3d at 446-47. 33 . Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153, 156 (Alaska App.2008); Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 86) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A.2d 887, Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 1: holding request to lie down and think about what happened  not a clear invocation of the right to silence 2: holding defendants request to lay down and think about what happened did not constitute invocation of right to silence as not every break in questioning compels renewed administration of the miranda warnings 3: holding a suspects request for some time to think alone was not an invocation of the right to silence 4: holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "statutes, it does not express a legislative intent to override the double jeopardy principle prohibiting the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense, i.e., a primary offense and one lesser included within it. See Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734; Turner, 221 Va. at 529-30, 273 S.E.2d at 46-47. Thus, I would hold the Commonwealth may simultaneously prosecute an individual for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and a lesser-included offense but double jeopardy protections prevent it from imposing multiple punishments for those crimes because (1) they constitute only one offense and (2) the legislature has not clearly expressed an intent to permit the imposition of multiple punishments. Cf. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 548, 553, 514 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1999) (<HOLDING>). A second set of interpretations involves the Holdings: 0: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 1: holding that under section 172550 two prior violations of the controlled substances act occurring in the same incident should be treated as one offense and noting that if multiple prior convictions are obtained for violations of the controlled substance act unrelated to one another and not arising out of a single incident there is no prohibition against counting each conviction separately for sentencing purposes 2: recognizing legislature knows difference between prosecution and conviction by noting former jeopardy provisions of code  192294 provide that if the same act be a violation of two or more statutes  conviction under one of such statutes  shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others and holding that if the legislature had intended that the statutory bar apply to  felony cases tried in the circuit court after the resolution in district court of misdemeanor charges arising out of the same act it would have provided that a conviction for a criminal offense arising out of one act would bar a later conviction for another offense arising out of the same act 3: holding that where a conviction is reversed after trial the double jeopardy clause does not bar a government appeal that if successful would only reinstate the conviction and would not subject defendant to a second trial 4: holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "its character. Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188, 190 (Colo.1991). Such evidence \"forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.\" People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo.1994) (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1985)); see People v. Lobato, 187 Colo. 285, 289-90, 530 P.2d 493, 496 (1975) (\"[Where ... the events leading up to a crime are a part of the scenario which explain the setting in which it occurred, no error is committed by permitting the jury to view the criminal episode in the context in which it happened.\"). For example, res gestae evidence can be used to explain the cireumstances surrounding an arrest. People v. Walters, 821 P.2d 887, 890 (Colo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence considered to be part of the res Holdings: 0: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 1: holding that sheriffs testimonythat when he arrived on the scene he believed that a crime was occurringwas admissible 2: holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force 3: holding that a defendant charged with voluntary manslaughter would be entitled to an acquittal on the ground of selfdefense if he reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by using deadly force 4: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an ERISA plan administrator to conduct or permit discovery. Id. The district court\u2019s remand for further development of the record indicated that the district court would refuse to uphold the decision to expel the employer on the existing record. Id. But we noted that the pension fund \u201cremain[ed] free, on remand, to confirm or reinstate the expulsion order on the existing record and then defend its decision in the district court. The issue would then be reviewable on appeal from the court\u2019s final judgment.\u201d Id. We then held that \u201c[t]he fact that an interlocutory discovery order may be onerous or inconvenient does not make the order immediately appeal-able under the collateral order doctrine.\u201d Id.; see also Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Liberty relies on Chronister in support of Holdings: 0: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 1: holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted 2: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant 3: holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage 4: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court to Claims Court. In the instant matter, this very court is the proper forum for the proceeding erroneously filed in our district court. That fact should make the case for transfer all the more compelling. This court\u2019s qualification as the proper forum also suggests the appropriateness of our rendering the transfer decision here and now. It would be a curious procedure indeed to remand this aging matter to the district court so that a district judge could decide whether or not to ticket as a \u201ctransfer\u201d the parties\u2019 return trip here. Nor is such a convoluted procedure necessary to a fair decision: all the considerations relevant to \u201cthe interest of justice\u201d appear from the record to be within our plain view. See Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1388 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). To assure that we have given that interest Holdings: 0: holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors 1: holding that it is appropriate to remand to the plan administrator when the administrative record is incomplete 2: holding that remand is unnecessary when only one conclusion is supportable on the record 3: holding that in the absence of demonstrated prejudice remand is unnecessary 4: holding remand unnecessary where outcome is clear as a matter of law", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the two-prong test set forth in Terry v. Ohio.\u201d United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir.2001). \u201cFirst, we ask whethe not have a key to the closet does not defeat standing because he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the room containing the closet. ORDER The motion to suppress is ALLOWED. 1 . Nearby, on Route 44, the Sheriffs office instituted a ruse called the Sugar Tree stop. A sign states that there is a drug stop ahead with drug-sniffing canines. When cars take the \"Sugar Tree\u201d exit, cruisers follow them in order to detect a motor vehicle violation. Once a car is stopped, if the inhabitants don't consent to a search, the car is held until a canine arrives. This practice has been heavily litigated. See United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 827-28 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, Holdings: 0: holding that the sugar tree checkpoint program violated the fourth amendment when officers operating the checkpoint were instructed to stop every vehicle that took the exit regardless of whether a traffic violation had occurred 1: holding that the sugar tree ruse did not violate the fourth amendment when officers only stopped vehicles for minor traffic violations 2: holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit 3: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 4: holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.\u201d Other circuits have uniformly held that \u00a7 3161(b)\u2019s thirty-day rule is not violated \u201c[w]hen a defendant is indicted within the thirty-day period and then re-indicted on identical charges based on identical facts after the expiration of the thirty-day period.\u201d United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 151 (6th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Perez, 845 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir.1988) (finding that initial indictment returned by a grand jury whose term had expired tolled the thirty-day period such that a subsequent valid indictment which was \u201cidentical in all material respects to the void indictment\u201d was timely); United States v. Mitchell, 723 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rabb, 680 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Holdings: 0: holding that additional facts in superseding indictment filed more than thirty days after arrest did not violate sta 1: holding that a subsequent indictment does not restart the thirtyday speedy trial clock but rather tolled it when the original indictment was dismissed the thirtyday period again continued to run it did not begin anew the second indictment was then filed before the thirtyday period expired therefore the filing of the second indictment even though filed after thirty days following defendants arrest did not violate his rights under the speedy trial act 2: holding that when first indictment was filed within the thirtyday period there is no speedy trial act violation when a subsequent indictment repeating one charge from the initial indictment and adding other counts is filed outside the thirtyday window 3: holding that when initial indictment was filed within the thirtyday period a superseding indictment filed outside the thirtyday window which did not change the original charges did not violate the speedy trial act 4: holding initial indictment which was subsequently found to be invalid tolled the thirtyday period and superseding indictment alleging different charges based on same fraudulent acts as earlier indictment was therefore timely", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the injury became manifest. In the alternative, he asserts that the side effects resulting from the castration represent an injury that is \u201cseparate and distinct\u201d from the original mutilation and, accordingly, the cause of action did not accrue until discovery. Since we hold, infra, that Briley\u2019s cause of action against those who participated in the \u201cplea bargain\u201d did not accrue until he discovered the fraud or could have done so in the exercise of reasonable diligence, we need not reach the merits of these assertions. 6 . We are aware of California Code of Civil Procedure \u00a7 352 which allows for tolling the limitations period on account of minority, insanity, and imprisonment, none of which, however, is relevant here. See Ney v. State of California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1971) (<HOLDING>). 7 . Indeed, it was a concern for the remedial Holdings: 0: holding that the threeyear statute of limitations applicable to  1983 actions in arkansas governed idea claims 1: holding that a twoyear statute of limitations period applies to all  1983 actions brought in pennsylvania 2: holding that in california the oneyear statute applies to a  1983 action 3: recognizing  3381 as the applicable statute of limitations for  1983 actions brought in california but nevertheless applying  3523 to a case where the plaintiff had been previously imprisoned 4: recognizing a hypothetical situation where california law left a party free to sue on a claim in maryland even after the claim was precluded in california because the california statute of limitations had expired", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996)(en banc) (citation omitted). A reviewing court does not assess the credibility of witnesses, but rather assumes \u201cthat the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government.\u201d Green, 599 F.3d at 367 (quoting United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1402 (4th Cir.1993)). 1. As a preliminary matter, we reject the notion that Darby\u2019s conviction should be vacated on the conspiracy charge merely because his co-conspirator Melvin Wright was acquitted on the same charge. It is well established that an acquittal of the appellant\u2019s alleged co-conspirator does not necessitate that the appellant\u2019s conviction be vacated. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant cannot challenge his conviction merely because it is inconsistent with jurys verdict of acquittal on another count 1: holding that a criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it was inconsistent with the jurys verdict of acquittal on another count citations omitted 2: holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count 3: holding that the jurys guilty verdict for the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a class a misdemeanor was not wholly inconsistent with its acquittal of the defendant on the charge of public intoxication 4: holding that under aspinwall when the trial court submits to the jury a good count  one that is supported by the evidence  and a bad count  one that is not supported by the evidence  and the jury returns a general verdict this court cannot presume that the verdict was returned on the good count in such a case a judgment entered upon the verdict must be reversed", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to show bias or motive to lie it probable would have effected the trial\u2019s outcome. In short, the Confrontation Clause error cannot be deem harmless under either the Chapman or Brecht standard. Brief in Supp. of Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal Denial of Mot. for Relief of Judgment at 20-21. As mentioned, it is not clear why the trial but only if its application trenches upon a defendant\u2019s confrontation or due process rights. See Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 573-74 (6th Cir.2007); Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736-37 (6th Cir.2000). Those rights can be curtailed if the State has articulated \u201cvery substantial\u201d interests served by the limitation on those rights. Vasquez, 496 F.3d at 573; see also Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (<HOLDING>). That begs the question here. The Sixth Holdings: 0: recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination 1: holding that although there is a right to appeal a change in permanency plan that right is not absolute and does not require the stay of a tpr proceeding 2: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts 3: recognizing that the beyondareasonabledoubt standard of proof is appropriate in criminal cases due to the gravity of the private interests affected and the severe societal loss that occurs when an individual is erroneously subject to criminal punishment 4: holding that the right to confront and to crossexamine is not absolute and may in appropriate cases bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "where there was no evidence son was dishonest, financially irresponsible or self-dealing, or uncaring and did not tend to her needs); In re Moses, 273 Ga.App. 501, 615 S.E.2d 573 (2005) (affirming trial court's decision to appoint ward\u2019s sister rather than daughter as guardian of the person where although there was statutory preference for children over siblings, evidence showed ward expressed preference for sister and daughter was neglectful and abusive to ward); In re Hodgman, 269 Ga.App. 34, 602 S.E.2d 925 (2004) (finding no abuse of discretion for trial court to depart from statutory preference in appointing guardians where evidence demonstrated son mismanaged ward's assets, acting in a manner contrary to the ward's best interest); Brown v. Storz, 710 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. E.D.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Whitton, supra note 5, at Holdings: 0: holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable 1: holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial 2: holding evidence supported appointment of mother as guardian of incompetent ward where substantial evidence demonstrated wards spouse was a habitual drunkard 3: holding that the same inference on the same record as that here was supported by substantial evidence 4: holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "constitutional rights, the specific relief which they presently request cannot be granted. We have already determined that the district court is without jurisdiction to review the North Carolina Supreme Court\u2019s decision that Guess\u2019 license was properly revoked. Because of this decision, the relief the Patients seek, homeopathic care from Guess, cannot be given. In limiting their prayer for relief to an injunction against the Board\u2019s revocation of Guess\u2019 medical license, to the extent of the relief requested, the Patients become \u201ca litigating agent of a person who was a party to a prior action_\u201d Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 4449 n. 7 (1981) (citing St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8 v. Herald Co., 402 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>)). The Patients effectively seek to relitigate Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: holding that a union may not relitigate an action for severance pay which the employees previously lost even though the union facially asserts a new theory of recovery and was not involved in the initial action 2: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 3: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 4: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "testimony was admissible because it did not directly comment on whether the victim at issue had symptoms consistent with \u201crape trauma syndrome.\u201d Id. In a later case, we allowed expert testimony to explain to a jury why children victims may delay reporting their sexual abuse. State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Iowa 1992). Again, the expert witness avoided commenting directly on the child at issue and only testified generally about victims of sexual abuse. Id. We have also analyzed expert witness testimony under the hearsay exception. Under a hearsay analysis, when the child makes statements for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment, those statements fall under the hearsay exception contained in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(4). See State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Iowa 1998) (<HOLDING>). The child must make the statements to a Holdings: 0: holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child 1: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify 2: holding that a sevenyearolds statements to a nurse practitioner about her fathers alleged child abuse were nontestimonial because there was no evidence that the child was aware that the statements would later be used at a trial 3: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child 4: holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that portion of the agreement over twenty years ago, the Tennessee U.D.C. knew of Vanderbilt\u2019s noncompliance, and the Tennessee U.D.C. did not file suit to enforce the agreement. The agreement regarding the name of the dormitory is another matter. Vanderbilt did not publicly announce its intention to rename Confederate Memorial Hall until September 2002, and the Tennessee U.D.C. filed its lawsuit seeking to enforce the portion of the agreement pertaining to the name of the dormitory well within any applicable statute of limitations. It would be fatuous to assert that the Tennessee U.D.C.\u2019s delay of less than two months in filing the lawsuit was \"unreasonable\u201d or that Vanderbilt was somehow prejudiced in the interval. Dennis Joslin Co. v. Johnson, 138 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>). Vanderbilt did not renew this particular Holdings: 0: recognizing laches as an equitable defense to a motion to reopen 1: recognizing laches as an affirmative defense 2: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 3: holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded denial of equitable relief on grounds of laches was error 4: holding that a laches defense must be premised on an unreasonable delay that has somehow prejudiced the party asserting the defense", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "addressing a different removal-related issue, has endorsed this reasoning, Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir.2005), and observed an admonishment from the United Stated Supreme Court that \u201cthe Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court.\u201d Id. (citing Weaker v. Nat\u2019l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186, 27 S.Ct. 184, 51 L.Ed. 430 (1907)). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have gone even further in protecting the rights of defendants. They have interpreted \u00a7 1446(b) as allowing each defendant thirty days from service to file a notice of removal, regardless of whether other defendants have so filed. Marano, 254 F.3d 753 (<HOLDING>); Brierly, 184 F.3d 527 (holding same). The Holdings: 0: holding that the thirty day removal period runs from the date of fdics plea in intervention and notice of substitution 1: holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal 2: recognizing that exceptional circumstances might permit removal when a laterjoined defendant petitions for removal more than thirty days after the firstserved defendant is served 3: recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired 4: holding that the laterserved defendants  had thirty days from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the unanimous consent of their codefendants even though the firstserved codefendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty days of service", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which, given the pleadings in this case, is how the occupants of Toyota vehicles allegedly were injured in the underlying cases and will be the focus at trial. See Moore v. Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp., 278 S.W.3d 27, 38 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (concluding, in products liability action, that no substantial connection existed between defendant\u2019s contacts with Texas and operative facts of litigation because focus of trial would be on injury allegedly caused in Louisiana by a defective product that was manufactured in New York). None of these activities establish contacts that bear a substantial connection to the operative facts of this litigation. See Info. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Rawlinson, 302 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Yfantis v. Balloun, 115 S.W.3d 175, 183 Holdings: 0: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 1: holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit 2: holding licensing agreement between defendant and nonparty texas resident was not relevant to specific jurisdiction 3: holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas 4: holding defendants ownership interest in texas company that was not party to lawsuit was not relevant to specific jurisdiction", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "In addition to the compensation provided by this chapter, an employee who becomes either totally or partially disabled from an occupational disease is entitled to receive for treatment of the occupational disease, without limitation as to length of time or dollar amount, reasonable medical services, hospitalization, medicines, and other treatment approved by the division. (Emphasis added.) In response, the State Fund contends it is not responsible for the 1992 and 1993 surgeries because Caekaert aggravated his condition by working in the poultry business between 1988 and 1992. The State Fund asserts that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Court correctly concluded that the \u2018last injurious exposure doctrine\u201d applies. See Belton v. Carlson Transport (1983), 202 Mont. 384, 389, 658 P.2d 405, 408 (<HOLDING>); EBI/Orion Group v. State Compensation Mutual Holdings: 0: holding once a claimant reaches maximum healing or a medically stable condition the initial insurer at risk is not responsible for subsequent injuries or conditions 1: holding that claimant was entitled to recover for injuries resulting from a stumble that aggravated or accelerated the arthritic condition of his knee 2: holding the defendant responsible for the greater of the actual or intended loss 3: holding that receiving advice or treatment during the exclusionary period for a condition which proves to be the same condition the claimant seeks benefits for qualifies as a preexisting condition regardless of whether there was an accurate diagnosis 4: holding that a condition subsequent presupposes an existing obligation that is to be defeated or forfeited if the condition is not fulfilled", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all the issues so triable. If the party has demanded a jury trial on only some issues, any other party may-within 10 days after being served with the demand or within a shorter time ordered by the court-serve a demand for a jury trial on any other or all factual issues triable by jury. (d) Waiver; Withdrawal. A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent. Fed.R.Civ.P. 38. Although ues will not give rise to a demand for a jury trial. Fredieu v. Rowan Cos., 738 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir.1984). \u201cNew issues\u201d do not relate to new theories of recovery. Id.; Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 505 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). Rather, Rule 38(b) is concerned with issues Holdings: 0: holding party should not rely on courts power to remand for new trial under iowa rule of appellate procedure 26 now rule 626 as a substitute for careful trial preparation and presentation of evidence 1: holding that an issue not raised on direct appeal of sentence is barred by the law of the case from presentation in a subsequent appeal 2: holding that the movant was not entitled to new trial under rule 59 based on a defense which if properly placed in issue would have affected the course of the jury trial 3: holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed 4: holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under  rule 38b", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Cal.App.3d 654, 109 Cal.Rptr. 269 (1973); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So.2d 596 (La.App.1976), writ denied, 340 So.2d 990 (La.1977); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Civ.App.1978); Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981); Tingle v. Arnold, Cate, & Allen, 129 Ga.App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1983). We find these cases to be dis-positive in deciding the case at bar. The Code of Professional Responsibility is designed not to create a private cause of action for infractions of disciplinary rules, but to establish a remedy solely disciplinary in nature. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff supra.\u201d 521 So.2d at 23. See also Ex parte Toler, 710 So.2d 415 (Ala.1998)(<HOLDING>); Gaylard v. Homemakers of Montgomery, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding violation of the rules of professional conduct does not create a legal duty on the part of the lawyer nor constitute negligence per se although it may be used as some evidence of negligence 1: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 2: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 3: holding that although violation of rules of professional conduct does not constitute negligence per se such violations may be relevant and admissible in assessing the legal duty of an attorney in a malpractice action and whether that duty was breached 4: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Bealieau, 2008 WL 4372761, *4 (D.Mass.2008) (finding Garcetti inapplicable to \u201cpublic officials\u201d); Miller v. Town of Hull, Mass., 878. F.2d 523, 530 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that the court had \u201cno difficulty in finding that the act of voting on public issues by a member of a public agency or board comes within, the freedom of speech guarantee of the first amendment\u201d in a retaliatory discharge claim by a board member, although additionally noting that a State statute permitted removal only for \u201cinefficiency,, neglect of duty or misconduct in office\u201d). Other federal courts have rejected arguments based on Bond or Miller, however, the facts of those cases distinguish them from the holdings of Bond and Miller. See Shields v. Charter Tp. of Comstock, 617 F.Supp.2d 606 (W.D.Mich.2009) (<HOLDING>); Rash-Aldridge v. Ramirez, 96 F.3d 117, 119 Holdings: 0: holding that an association board could assess the members without a member vote to pay for a vertical seawall to protect the common elements from storm damage because if work was necessary board authority was sufficient 1: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board 2: holding that a town board could prevent an elected member from speaking at a town meeting where the board member could not identify any topic of discussion he was prevented from exploring during the meeting of the board to discuss the same issues where he was given ample time to speak 3: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 4: holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(stating that \"appellate courts must apply a 'clearly erroneous\u2019 standard of appellate review to a trial court\u2019s ruling on a Batson claim\" because \"the trial court is in the best position to determine whether a prosecutor\u2019s facially race-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike is genuinely race-neutral\"); Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 421-22 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (stating that the trial judge is in a unique position to determine whether a prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge for race-neutral reasons, therefore the trial judge's decision is accorded great deference and will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous). 32 . We note that neither the defense nor the State requested findings of fact. See, e.g., State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). 33 . What the prosecutor could have Holdings: 0: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 1: holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress 2: holding remand proper on circuit courts own motion in a workers compensation case where the commission failed to make essential findings of fact because to hold otherwise would in such cases make the determination of the rights of the parties turn upon the neglect of the commission to make essential findings of fact or require the appellate court to make the omitted findings of fact which our statute forbids 3: holding that when a court has given a party a full and fair opportunity to litigate a motion to suppress and then  has decided the motion on the merits the party may be estopped from bringing the same motion in subsequent litigation 4: holding that upon the request of the losing party on a motion to suppress evidence the trial court shall state its essential findings", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "distinction between the school children in Schempp and the plaintiffs in Valley Forge. \u201cWe simply cannot see,\u201d said the Court, \u201cthat respondents have alleged an injury of any kind ... sufficient to confer standing. Respondents complain of a transfer of property located in Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia.... They learned of the transfer through a news release.\u201d Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486-87, 102 S.Ct. at 765-67 (footnotes omitted). The circuits have thus recognized that \u201c[t]he practices of our own community may create a larger psychological wound than someplace we are just passing through.\u201d Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools, 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir.1994). Plaintiffs who \u201care part of the [community where challenged (6th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). Though individuals offended by a religious Holdings: 0: recognizing legislature reallocated the regulatory authority from the cities over the property on which dfw airport is located to the airport board 1: recognizing that presence of sectarian chapel in airport impaired use of airport by passengers 2: holding that a dog sniff of the exterior of luggage in a public airport does not constitute a search under the fourth amendment 3: holding that no private right of action exists under any of the provisions of the airport and airway improvement act 4: holding that county airport board and twenty board members in their representative capacities had sovereign immunity in suit for negligence", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to report as requested to the probation officer and failure to notify the probation of any change in his residence. Oh appeal, Angelo-Guarino argues that upwardly variant sentence is unreasonable because the district court based the sentence on improper considerations and unfounded speculation. After thorough review, we affirm. We review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2006). \u201c[R]easonableness\u201d review \u201cmerely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.\u201d United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, \u2014 U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)); see also United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). We review de novo whether a factor considered Holdings: 0: holding apprendi is not implicated by an application of the sentencing guidelines that increases the sentencing range so long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum 1: holding that despite the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines they remain the starting point and the initial benchmark of a district courts sentencing analysis the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process and that failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range  or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceemdashincluding an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range constitutes significant procedural error  2: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines increased minimum sentencing range 3: holding that district courts decision to exceed the advisory sentencing range in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines ussg  7b14 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 4: holding that retroactive application of advisory sentencing guidelines violated ex post facto clause because guidelines created sufficient risk of increased sentencing range", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was performed for the purposes of both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. After the panel returned a guilty verdict, counsel discussed mitigation strategy with Wickline two or three times. Wickline did not want to speak with a psychiatrist or a probation officer or involve his family. Consequently, Wickline and his counsel reached the decision to focus on their strongest mitigating factor \u2014 that the Lerches facilitated the murders by participating in drug dealing and attempting a drug rip-off. Wickline made the final decision to proceed with this strategy. Based on the record evidence of Wickline\u2019s strategic choices, counsel\u2019s investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Coleman I, 244 F.3d at 545-46 (<HOLDING>). But see Coleman II, 268 F.3d at 452 (finding Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel 1: holding that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a particular mitigating factor where despite a reasonable investigation by counsel counsel was not put on notice of any such mitigating evidence 2: holding that petitioner was not deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing where petitioner did not cooperate with counsel regarding the investigation and identification of mitigating evidence imposed restrictions upon counsel and refused to submit to further psychological or psychiatric testing 3: holding that the statutory right to counsel at a civil commitment hearing implicitly includes the right to the effective assistance of that counsel 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "between Allen and Forte. Id. at 1303. Importantly, the court observed that \u201ccontractors ... share an economic relationship and community of interest with the architect on a construction project,\u201d id., and that \u201ctoo much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands of the supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the contractor.\u201d Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.Cal.1958)). By recognizing an independent duty in tort, Forte Bros, represents an exception to the general rule propounded in Car-dente. Kennett, 798 A.2d at 418. The exception carries currency in the construction context, see Boren v. Thompson & Assoc., 999 P.2d 438, 445 (Okla.2000) (<HOLDING>), and has superficial appeal here, particularly Holdings: 0: holding in part that the liability insurance company of the subcontractor which had named the general contractor as an additional insured on the subcontractors policy was liable to reimburse the general contractor for a settlement payment the general contractor had made to the subcontractors employee 1: holding that contractor owed general negligence duty to thirdparty by dangerous condition contractor created on road 2: holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim 3: holding that duty to ensure that independent contractor performs its work in safe manner arises if the general contractor retains some control over the manner in which the independent contractor performs its work 4: holding relying in part on forte bros that an architectural firm had duty to ensure that general contractor had secured statutorily required payment bond before certifying payments to contractor", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "industry; i.e., the employers, the Union, and the employees. rv Many states have denied real-estate exemptions to schools that do not provide traditional types of education and that primarily benefit a particular occupation, profession, or group rather than the public. See, e.g., Alcoser v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal.App.3d 907, 169 Cal.Rptr. 91, 92-93 (1980) (denying exemption to construction trade school because Gymnastics & Performing Arts Educ. Found., Inc. v. City of Rutland, 143 Vt. 294, 465 A.2d 1363, 1365 (1983) (denying exemption to nonprofit school for gymnastics and performing arts because it provided \u201can essentially private benefit to a limited class of persons\u201d); Engineers and Scientists of Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 38 Wis.2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572, 578 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Other states have adopted an intermediate Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 1: holding property for continuing education and professional advancement of engineers and scientists was not within legislatures intent when it exempted property for educational associations 2: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate 3: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property 4: holding that property manager not a professional when management authority had not been delegated to it", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1306 (Fed.Cir.1999). When an appellant \u201cstates that a reason for a filing delay is physical or mental illness, [s]he must receive explicit information regarding the legal standard for establishing good cause on that basis, and [s]he must be afforded a fair opportunity to submit evidence and argument to show that [s]he met that standard.\u201d Id. (quoting Lacy v. Dep\u2019t of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 434, 438 (1998)). The Lacy criteria provides that the petitioner be afforded an opportunity to (1) identify the time period during which she suffered from the illness, (2) submit corroborating evidence showing that she suffered from the illness during that time period, and (3) explain how the illness prevented her from timely filing an appeal or requesting an extension of time. 78 M.S.P.R. at 437 (<HOLDING>); see Smith, 168 F.3d at 1306 (endorsing the Holdings: 0: holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available 1: holding that the state is not allowed to suppress evidence but it need not collect evidence for the defendant 2: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid 3: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence 4: holding remedy for lack of sufficient corroborating evidence is acquittal", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "work release. Defense counsel\u2019s advice implying that Ostrander was eligible for work release and that he had a very good prospect of receiving it soon after sentencing was unrealistic. 46 F.3d at 355. Ostrander was not eligible for work release and a minimal amount of research by defense counsel would have informed him of that. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that Ostrander had received ineffective assistance of counsel: We think that this misadvice falls well below the range of competence we must expect from defense lawyers.... There is a difference between a bad prediction within an accurate description of the law and gross misinformation about the law itself. If the lawyer simply underestimates the sentence, there may not be ineffective assistance.... We can 4th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). Not only does Ross\u2019s case include gross Holdings: 0: holding statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a voluntary plea of guilty 1: recognizing defense counsels misrepresentations can undermine validity of guilty plea citing tollett v henderson 411 us at 26667 93 sct 1602 2: holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary 3: holding failure to advise of right to subpoena witnesses does not affect the validity of a guilty plea 4: holding that a valid guilty plea waives a statute of limitations defense", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "omitted); accord Kenton v. Wood, 56 Ariz. 325, 331, 107 P.2d 380, 383 (1940) (\u201c[D]i-rectors are trustees for the benefit of the stockholders.\u201d). \u00b6 16 In support of their contention that this case arises out of contract, Defendants argue that they had no duty to preserve development opportunities for Corvallas absent an alleged oral agreement with Plaintiff, and that they were free to pursue real estate developments outside Corvallas. But Defendants\u2019 argument goes to the merits of Plaintiffs claim, not to its fundamental nature: Plaintiff did not sue for breach of any alleged oral agreement, and the validity and terms of such an agreement were not necessary to the disposition of the claim. Compare Asphalt Eng\u2019rs, Inc. v. Galusha, 160 Ariz. 134, 138, 770 P.2d 1180, 1184 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Further, a defense based on the absence of a Holdings: 0: holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated 1: holding that under delaware law the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors 2: holding that the amount of time devoted to managerial duties and the significance of those duties present factual questions 3: holding that a breach of duties that a fiduciary contractually assumes beyond those duties imposed by law is considered to arise out of contract 4: recognizing similar duties", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to confirmation of an arbitration award under the New York Convention, we may look to authority under the FAA. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974. III. We may decline enforcement of an arbitral award on the basis that \u201cthe arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.\u201d 21 U.S.T. 2517, Art. V, \u00a7 (l)(d). To determine whether the procedure used was contrary to the parties\u2019 agreed arbitral procedures, we must begin with the language of the parties\u2019 arbitration agreement. See Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir.2005); Coast Trading Co. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. generally Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, Holdings: 0: holding that in the context of an arbitrability determination the court reviews the contract de novo 1: holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo 2: holding that statutory construction is a question of law which this court reviews de novo 3: holding that an appellate court reviews a trial courts grant of a summary judgment motion de novo because it is a question of law 4: recognizing that appellate court reviews questions of law de novo", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "investigation would probably have required sending a team of lawyers and accountants to Sarasota to conduct a field audit of JHIS\u2019s books and records. But the appropriate inquiry here is not what Jackson Hewitt might have learned upon further investigation of Prewett and JHIS in 2002. Instead, the focus must be on what Jackson Hewitt actually knew in 2004 and 2005 when the Kamans were making their investments. When Valmont contacted Cort at Jackson Hewitt in 2002, Jackson Hewitt had already experienced an uneventful relationship with its franchisee, SFS, for nine years. And SFS, in a letter signed by Scott, successfully allayed Hapward\u2019s concerns about JHIS with reassuring but false information and a change of the corporate name. Although Prewett successfully solicit 25 (Tex.Civ.App.) (<HOLDING>), affirmed in part and reversed in part on Holdings: 0: holding that a franchisor did not waive  his arbitrable claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in california state court because that action involved different issues 1: holding that in an action by a customer of a mobil dealer against the franchisor on an apparent agency theory the trial court improperly excluded a letter showing that the customer believed that the service station was owned by an individual not the franchisor 2: holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding 3: holding that an order by the trial court remanding the cause to the agency to impose a sanction other than the one imposed by the agency was not a final and appealable order because it did not terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits 4: holding that the customer of a chevron dealer could not maintain an action against the franchisor on an apparent agency theory when the customer knew that the station was independently owned and operated", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen). Furthermore, despite Chen\u2019s submission of various allegedly official Chinese government documents, as well as recent country reports and a letter from her its discretion in concluding that Chen provided insufficient evidence that the birth of her U.S. citizen children violated the family planning policy in her area of residence in China, or that the implementation of sanctions resulting from any possible violation would rise to the level of persecution. Cf. Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We decline to examine Chen\u2019s argument Holdings: 0: holding that an applicants fear was not objectively reasonable because it lacked solid support in the record and was merely speculative at best 1: holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be persecuted his fear was speculative at best 2: holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best 3: holding that absent solid support in the record a petitioners fear is speculative at best 4: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that she would be persecuted the bia did not err in denying asylum because her fear was speculative at best", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and because it shows the defendant\u2019s efforts to avoid detection regarding his activities. See Fed.R.Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make a fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than without the evidence); United States v. Cusack, 229 F.3d 344, 347-48 (2d Cir.2000). Even relevant evidence may be held inadmissible, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 403 explains that unfair prejudice is an \u201cundue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.\u201d See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding guidelines to be only advisory 1: holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence 2: holding that the advisory committee notes are a helpful guide for interpreting the federal rules of evidence 3: holding that the cocaine guidelines  are advisory only 4: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of what constitutes an adequate \u201cindependent duty\u201d for imposing common-law indemnity from a general contractor to a subcontractor for injuries to another. Thus, the standards discussed above, in reference to National Tank\u2019s third-party claim for indemnity against Eagle Grove, for what constitutes the necessary \u201cindependent duty\u201d appear to be equally applicable here. Thus, the question is whether Gehrke\u2019s alleged duty to supervise and maintain the safety of the job site is the sort of duty of \u201ca specific, defined nature,\u201d running from Gehrke to National Tank, and not simply the general duty of care owed to each member of society. See, e.g., Hysell, 534 F.2d at 782-83; accord Johnson, 481 N.W.2d at 320 (quoting this standard from Hysell); Abild Constr. Co., 144 N.W.2d at 310-11 (<HOLDING>); see also Woodruff Constr. Co., 406 N.W.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that an indemnity provision need not be valid and enforceable to trigger obligations under the contract so long as the parties agreed to indemnity 1: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant 2: holding that a party that settled but failed to immediately notify a third party of indemnity claims did not waive indemnity claims 3: holding that a duty not to cause injury to another by ones negligent act is too broad to serve as a basis for permitting indemnity of an employer to a third party 4: holding that an indemnitee must be proven to be free of negligence in order to receive indemnity either under a general indemnity agreement or under implied indemnity", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "setting. Eleven also included language in his motion declaring that, if the case had been again dismissed in the meantime, the document should be considered his notice of appeal. A trial court is required to consider and rule on a motion within a reasonable time. Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding); Kissam v. Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, orig. proceeding). When a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, considering and ruling on that motion is a ministerial act, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Chiles v. Schuble, 788 S.W.2d 205, 207 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation 1: holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying the habeas petitioners motion to conduct dna testing which was unavailable at trial 2: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion 3: holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child 4: holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the basis of the inside influence or economic leverage of a particular creditor.\u201d H.R.REP. 103-835. State and Federal governments \u201cmust abide by the regular processes of the bankruptcy court applicable to all claimants.\u201d 140 Cong.Ree. H10752-01, H10772. III. Conclusion We conclude on the basis of the foregoing discussion that Congress has the authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it acts pursuant to the powers accorded it under the Bankruptcy Clause, Art. I, \u00a7 8, cl. 4; that it expressly and unequivocally did so when it enacted \u00a7 113 of the Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 106; and that \u00a7 113 applies retroactively to this case. Accordingly, the judgment is Reversed and the cause Remanded. 1 . But see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1023 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 2 . To the extent 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 106(a) could be Holdings: 0: recognizing that congress has specifically abrogated the eleventh amendment defense when legislating pursuant to  5 of the fourteenth amendment and its article i  8 plenary power over commerce but refusing to extend authority to abrogate to legislation enacted pursuant to the indian commerce clause the indian gaming regulatory act 1: holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes  is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i  8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce  with the indian tribes 2: holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause 3: holding that the eleventh amendment bars con gress from using its power under the indian commerce clause of article i to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts under article iii 4: holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "$50-$70. 363 F.3d at 202. We held that the interstate commerce nexus was satisfied because the tavern sold beer that was manufactured outside of the Virgin Islands. Id at 211. Likewise, in United States v. Claus have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19, 125 S.Ct. 2195. Although this robbery was of a small business that purchased alcohol sold in interstate commerce, if robberies oc curred at and led to the closure of such establishments on a large scale, the effect on interstate commerce would be substantial. For that reason, the size of Jeanette\u2019s business and the fact that the appellants stole only $121 dollars, a wallet, and two cell phones did not make this crime too small to satisfy the de minimis standard. See Walker, 657 F.3d at 180 (<HOLDING>); Haywood, 363 F.3d at 202, 211 n. 7 (holding Holdings: 0: recognizing de novo standard of review 1: holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation 2: holding that district court properlydiscounted four calls as de minimis 3: holding that a robbery of 40 to 50 satisfied the de minimis standard 4: holding that to demonstrate retaliation complainedof action must be more than de minimis ", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Application to Congenital Conditions The Federal Circuit has made clear that the only prerequisite for the application of the presumption of soundness is that the veteran\u2019s entry examination be clear of any noted diseases or disabilities. See Wagner, 370 F.3d at 1096. This Court has recognized that service connection may be granted for congenital diseases. See Monroe v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 513, 515 (1993). We have also held that the presumption of soundness applies if a veteran\u2019s congenital condition is not noted at entry. See id. The presumption of soundness does not, however, apply to congenital defects, because such defects \u201care not diseases or injuries\u201d within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1110 and 1111. 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.303(c); see Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1385-86 (Fed.Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); see Winn, 8 Vet.App. at 516 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that the presumption that rule 45 does not apply to the federal government can only be overcome by affirmative evidence 1: holding that harmful error analysis does apply to defects in an explanation required by section 5403b 2: holding that the presumption of soundness does not apply to congenital defects 3: holding that a district judge does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the guidelines sentence should apply 4: recognizing presumption", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cWe allow the admission of survey evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule if the survey is material, more probative on the issue than other evidence and if it has guarantees of trustworthiness.\u201d (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)), C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir.1981) (\u201cSurveys and customer questionnaires are admissible, if they are pertinent to the inquiry, upon a showing that the poll is reliable and was compiled in accordance with accepted survey methods.\u201d), Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir.1980) (\u201cTo qualify a study or opinion poll for admission into evidence, there must be a substantial showing of reliability.\u201d), and Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Courts have, however, rarely articulated Holdings: 0: holding that testimonial statements are subject to the requirements of the confrontation clause even if they are otherwise admissible under the hearsay exception for excited utterances 1: holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined 2: holding that surveys are admissible only if they are conducted with proper safeguards to insure accuracy and reliability 3: holding that the remedy under another subsection of  1581 is not manifestly inadequate because  1581s builtin safeguards and limitations    are not to be dismissed because they are inconvenient 4: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trial court. We read the trial court\u2019s comment that Digital Broadcast had not complied with the requirements of Rule 55(c) as a reference to the requirement of a verified answer or assertion of the court\u2019s lack of jurisdiction. Although the trial court did not explain why the asserted lack of personal jurisdiction was insufficient, we conclude that the assertion fails as a matter of law. Digital Broadcast\u2019s only asserted defense was that the Superior Court lacked personal jurisdiction because Digital Broadcast is incorporated and located elsewhere and has \u201cno business operations in the District of Columbia.\u201d In asserting that defense, Digital Broadcast bore the burden of alleging facts that, if proven, would demonstrate a lack of personal jurisdiction. Cf. Venison, 756 A.2d at 911-12 (<HOLDING>). Digital Broadcast failed to meet that burden. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons 1: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 2: holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case 3: holding that the simple assertion that the district of columbia failed to follow the proper procedures in selling a property for delinquent taxes without citing supporting evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie defense under rule 60b 4: holding that a movants failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief is a proper ground for the bia to deny a motion to reopen", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "same FERC decision. On November 26, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Response. On January 22, 2015, the court held a final oral argument in San Francisco, California (\u201c1/22/15 TR 1-92\u201d). III. DISCUSSION. A. Whether Plaintiffs Have Standing. As a matter of law, a \u201cplaintiff must be in privity with the United States to have standing to sue the sovereign on a contract claim.\u201d S. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. United States, 422 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Privity \u201ctakes on even greater significance in cases such as this, because the \u2018government consents to be sued only by those with whom it has privity of contract.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Erickson Air Crane Co. of Wash. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also Anderson v. Unit ed States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); see also id. (\u201cTo have standing to sue the Holdings: 0: holding that because private plaintiffs were signatories of a breached contract they were entitled to recoveiy independent from that of the corporation but denying expectancy damages claim and not addressing claim for reliance damages 1: holding that absent privity between plaintiffs and the government there is no ease 2: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable 3: holding that privity is lacking where plaintiffs were not signatories to the contractual documents 4: holding that contractual privity between the buyer and seller was not necessary for a cfa claim", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "accounting firm was not an abuse of discretion because the testimony helped establish Spivak\u2019s state of mind. Under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403, the district court\u2019s ruling excluding both Bill Feinberg\u2019s testimony and Cohn\u2019s testimony about Joseph Reda\u2019s comments was not an abuse of discretion. An erroneous jury charge is one that misleads the jury as to the proper legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury of the law. See Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir.1997). \u201cChallenged jury instructions are reviewed de novo, but this Court will reverse only if all of the instructions, taken as a whole, caused the defendant prejudice. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Thomley v. Penton Publ\u2019g, Inc., 104 F.3d 26 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>).\u201d Hester v. BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178,186 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that to grant a new trial the error must be more than harmless 1: holding cumulative error not reversible if it is more probably harmless than not 2: holding exclusion was harmless error 3: holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that admission of hearsay constituted harmless error when there was more than sufficient other evidence in the record to support the verdict", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "this concept of perhaps somebody suggested mutual consent, to which he concurred. The court found plaintiff had something to gain from the novation in that [o]n the record the file became listed as a resignation. He had that to gain from and I don\u2019t see that he had anything else, particularly, to gain from it. The facts presented lead us unequivocally to the conclusion that defendant Brown Boveri breached the employment contract. There is an emerging pattern of persuasive out-of-state case law supporting the propositions that Brown Boveri\u2019s attempt to reclassify plaintiff to a lesser job status constructively discharged him in violation of his employment contract, see, e.g., Knee v. School District No. 139, In Canyon County, 106 Idaho 152, 153-55, 676 P.2d 727, 728-30 (Ct.App.1984) (<HOLDING>); Sanders v. May Broadcasting Co., 214 Neb. Holdings: 0: recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard 1: holding that a constructive discharge would constitute a tangible employment action and prevent the employer from utilizing the affirmative defense to vicarious employer liability for sexual harassment 2: holding that constructive discharge may qualify as a tangible employment action depriving employer of right to assert affirmative defense when a supervisors official act precipitates the constructive discharge 3: recognizing the principle that where sufficient words or actions by the employer would lead a prudent man to believe his tenure has been terminated a constructive discharge is present 4: holding defendants belief that his work was unfairly criticized is not sufficient for constructive discharge", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "requires that Yoon \u201creside[] continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove [him] from the United States.\u201d Id. at \u00a7 1182(h)(2) (emphasis added). For both a cancellation and a \u00a7 212(h) waiver, the period of lawful continuous residency terminates when the alien is served with a notice to appear. Id. at \u00a7\u00a7 1229b(d)(1) and 1182(h). Yoon gained lawful entry into the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) on May 15, 1996. However, residence in the CNMI before 2009 was not residence in the United States. See Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-229, \u00a7\u00a7 701-702, 122 Stat. 754 (2008) (codified at 48 U.S.C. \u00a7 1806); Eche v. Holder, 694 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Yoon\u2019s admission into the CNMI on May Holdings: 0: holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence 1: holding that residence in the cnmi before 2009 was not residence in the united states for naturalization purposes 2: holding residence means legal residence for will probate 3: holding that a warrant authorizing the search of a residence vehicles at the residence and all persons found in the residence was not overly broad given that search was limited to places were drugs or weapons might be found 4: holding that a realestate appraisal was not a guarantee of the condition of the residence but a valuation of the residence and thus not a misrepresentation", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "court cases, the wardens argue that defense counsels\u2019 failure to inform Miller and Haynes of the prosecution\u2019s right to appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence does not comprise ineffective assistance because the prosecutor\u2019s right of appeal represents a collateral, as opposed to a direct, consequence of the plea. We reject this argument on two grounds. First, the wardens\u2019 reliance on circuit court cases is improper. The AEDPA prohibits use of lower court decisions in determining whether the state court deei sion is contrary to, or is an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (defining \u201cclearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court\u201d to mean holdings of Supreme Court decisions); Harris, 212 F.3d at 944 (<HOLDING>). Second, the wardens\u2019 argument is incompatible Holdings: 0: holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction 1: recognizing that the new  2254d is a retrenchment from former practice which allowed the united states courts of appeals to rely on their own jurisprudence in addition to that of the supreme court 2: holding that a state court criminal judgment is final for purposes of collateral attack in federal court at the conclusion of review in the united states supreme court or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires 3: holding that no federal court other than the supreme court may entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a judgment of a state court 4: holding district court erred in relying on authority other than that of the supreme court of the united states in its analysis under  2254d", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that any judgment against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, or the Division of Workers\u2019 Compensation would be paid by New Jersey\u2019s state treasury. Dist. Ct. Op. at 13-15. Because the State of New Jersey was thus the real party at interest, the District Court properly held that these entities are immune from a suit seeking money damages. Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir.1989). As Hogg\u2019s made neither a demand for injunctive relief, nor any allegation of a continuing violation of constitutional rights, there is no basis for excepting the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676-78, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 449 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). As noted, the District Court also dismissed Holdings: 0: holding state university is not a person under  1983 1: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 2: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 3: holding state is not a proper defendant under  1983 4: holding that state of new jersey is not a person under  1983 and thus not amendable to suit under that statute", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the amount of cocaine contained in the residue was so minute that it could not effectively be weighed or measured. Further, Jones\u2019s counsel contended in his closing argument that, although the residue itself was visible, it had to be tested multiple times before the police could make a positive determination that it contained cocaine. We conclude that Jones\u2019s counsel placed in dispute the issue of whether Jones knew the illicit nature of the substance on the pipe. Under Delva, it was fundamental error for the trial court to fail to properly instruct the jury on that disputed element of the crime charged against Jones. Since such fundamental error is not subject to harmless error analysis, Jones\u2019s conviction must be reversed. See Reed v. State, 887 So.2d 366, 369-70 (Fla.2002) (<HOLDING>). Section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), Holdings: 0: recognizing plain or fundamental error 1: holding that the omission of an element is not a structural error subject to automatic reversal but rather  where objected to  is subject to harmless error analysis 2: holding that lack of appellate jurisdiction is fundamental error 3: holding that failure to give proper instruction regarding disputed element of crime charged was fundamental error requiring reversal and stating that fundamental error is not subject to harmless error review 4: holding that when none of the required explanations were given that was fundamental error requiring reversal", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "some apparently directive or dispositive words,\u201d such as, \u201c \u2018the plaintiffs motion [for summary judgment] is granted.\u2019 \u201d Because the opinions or memo-randa sometimes lacked all the requisite elements of a judgment, and because judges sometimes later signed formal judgments in addition to those opinions and memoranda, Rule 58 was amended to clarify when a judgment became \u201ceffective, starting the time running for post-verdict motions and for the purpose of appeal.\u201d Given this clear need for certainty, we should not cloud the issue of when a federal court judgment is \u201crendered\u201d \u2014 it is \u201crendered\u201d when it is set forth in writing on a separate document and entered on the civil docket, in compliance with Rule 58. See United States v. Woods, 885 F.2d 352, 353 (6th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added); Simon v. City of Clute, 825 Holdings: 0: holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late 1: holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion 2: holding that when the lower court has clearly evidenced its intent and the opposing party has not objected to the absence of a separate judgment the requirements of rule 58 are waived 3: holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner 4: holding that a portion of a district courts summary judgment order that determines which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial is not appealable", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "it reveals information not exposed to the public, we note preliminarily that the Government points to not a single actual example of visual surveillance that will be affected by our holding the use of the GPS in this case was a search. No doubt the reason is that practical considerations prevent visual surveillance from lasting very long. Continuous human surveillance for a week would require all the time and expense of several police officers, while comparable photographic surveillance would require a net of video cameras so dense and so widespread as to catch a person\u2019s every movement, plus the manpower to piece the photographs together. Of course, as this case and some of the GPS cases in other courts illustrate, e.g., Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 447, 459, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 (holding use of GPS Holdings: 0: holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public 1: holding warrantless gps tracking of vehicle for several days generating highly accurate record of the trackers whereabouts throughout its period of operation unjustified 2: holding in light of knotts that lower court did not abuse its discretion in cutting short testimony about use of gps device appellant did not cite knotts in his briefs or affirmatively argue use of device was a search 3: holding locomotive was not in use when it was parked on a repair track for inspection was in a blue flag area and had not yet been released for use following the inspection 4: holding use of gps device to track suspect for 65 days was search", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "devoid of any evidence that APHIS made determinations that the field tests at issue involved either \u201cnew species or organisms or novel modifications that raise[d] new issues.\u201d Likewise, there is no evidence that APHIS considered whether the field tests, notwithstanding the initial application of the \u201cconfined field release\u201d exemption, \u201cmay have [had] the potential to affect \u2018significantly\u2019 the quality of the \u2018human environment.\u2019 \u201d This absence manifests arbitrary and capricious agency action which is inconsistent with the terms used in APHIS\u2019s own regulations, and which violates NEPA. Ctr. for Food Safety, 451 F.Supp.2d at 1183-86 (reviewing similar field test permits and reaching the same conclusion); see also Back Country Horsemen of Am. v. Johanns, 424 F.Supp.2d 89, 99 (D.D.C.2006) (<HOLDING>). The record contains substantial evidence that Holdings: 0: recognizing that an agencys interpretation of the scope of its own categorical exclusions is given controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the terms used in the regulation quoting alaska ctr for envt v us forest serv 189 f3d 851 857 9th cir1999 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation citation and quotation marks excluded 2: holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 3: holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 4: holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "communications were similar. Each communicated its desires and opinions to a governmental entity with regulatory authority to take action affecting the property. Like SARA in relation to San Antonio, the TWDB made its opinion known to the Corps but had no authority to take the action affecting the owner\u2019s property rights. SARA further sought a cooperation agreement between it and San Antonio. As Westgate\u2019s focus on direct action implies, causation is an issue to be considered by Courts in takings cases. This is not the first time courts have addressed causation in a takings action. In 1941, we held that the \u201ctrue test\u201d is whether the State\u2019s intentional acts \u201cwere the proximate cause of the taking or damaging of such property.\u201d State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731, 737 (1941) (<HOLDING>); see Roberson v. City of Austin, 157 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding the installation of catv facilities on plaintiffs property to be a physical taking 1: holding that invasion of an identifiable customers account is not a necessary element proof under the statute 2: holding that under delaware law the policys definition of personal injury as wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private occupancy applies only to damages incurred as a result of an invasion of an interest in real property 3: holding that a direct physical invasion of the property was not necessary under the 1876 constitution for a taking to occur 4: holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "example, at a status hearing on November 7, 2004, which was only approximately one week before the evidentiary hearing, Over-ton\u2019s counsel made no argument that the ordered DNA testing had not yet been completed. This is consistent with the State\u2019s argument that Overton withdrew his motion for a continuance at a status hearing on October 29, 2004. Moreover, even if the ordered DNA testing had not been completed, there was no undue prejudice to Overton. Overton has not asserted any reason why DNA testing of the crime scene swabs will produce different results than the other DNA testing, which linked Overton to the scene. Overton\u2019s argument that DNA testing of these crime scene swabs would have changed the outcome is purely speculative. See Martin v. State, 455 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1984) (<HOLDING>). Overton\u2019s claim that the trial court\u2019s denial Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence 1: holding the defendants claim that he was denied the right to testify was appropriate for direct review when the record was adequately developed to permit full consideration of the defendants claim the pertinent facts were undisputed a pcr hearing was not necessary to resolve a factual dispute and would not aid in the application of the law and the defendants claim was presented not as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim but rather as an error committed by the trial court in excluding the defendants testimony which was not an appropriate basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 2: holding that there was no brady violation because the exculpatory effect of the disputed documents was merely speculative 3: holding that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying the appointment of the defendants requested expert as there was no undue prejudice to the defendant because the defendants claim on the predicted effect of the experts testimony was purely speculative 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "results in a work-related \u201cinjury\u201d or not \u2014 are entitled to a maximum of 100% of their back pay, as long as that sum does not lead to double recovery. Duplicative benefits must be deducted, as the district court did here. We reach the same conclusion on a second, independent ground. As we have noted above, relief under Title VII in the form of back pay is purely \u201cequitable\u201d in nature. See supra pp. 514-15. By contrast, relief under FECA consists of \u201ccompensation\u201d (i.e., damages) defined as a per centage of the employee\u2019s monthly salary. Because the exclusivity provisions of FECA are limited solely to other forms of \u201ccompensation,\u201d they are simply not applicable to the types of \u201cequitable\u201d relief authorized by Title VII. See, e.g., Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1380, 1337 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 2825, Holdings: 0: holding that compensatory time used by plaintiff police officers can be deducted from award of back pay 1: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 2: holding that compensatory money damages are generally distinct from equitable forms of relief such as injunctions or back pay 3: holding that money damages do not qualify as equitable relief within the meaning of  1132a3 4: holding that equitable relief under  502a3 does not include compensatory and punitive damages", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "disorderly persons offenses, however, may be submitted to the jury in criminal trials as lesser-included offenses, despite the general jurisdiction of the municipal court in such matters. See N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8(e); R. 3:15-3. See also, e.g., DeLuca, supra, 108 N.J. at 111, 527 A.2d 1355 (stating that \u201cSuperior Court may assert jurisdiction over non-indietable offenses when they are lesser included offenses of the indictables\u201d for purpose of submitting disorderly persons charges to jury); State v. Braxton, 330 N.J.Super. 561, 563, 568, 750 A.2d 185 (App.Div.2000) (affirming conviction where defendant was acquitted of charged aggravated assault and convicted of lesser-included offense of disorderly persons simple assault); State v. Green, 318 N.J.Super. 361, 375, 724 A.2d 254 (App.Div.1999) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 163 N.J. 140, 747 A.2d 1234 (2000); Holdings: 0: holding that simple possession is not a lesserincluded offense of distribution of a controlled substance 1: holding military judge did not err by considering appellants admissions concerning the elements of the lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault in determining appellant was guilty of the greater offense of attempted premeditated murder 2: holding that counsel was deficient when he failed to object to error in jury charge referring to aggravated assault when the charge was assault on a public servant 3: holding that failure to give lesserincluded charge of simple assault as lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault on police officer was reversible error 4: holding that had trial counsel requested charge on lesserincluded offense of child molestation to charged offense of aggravated child molestation trial court would have been required to give the charge on the lesserincluded offense when defendant testified that during incident in question he was hugging the victims stomach not performing oral sex", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that eight major oil companies were violating the Federal Trade Commission Act was not final agency action. See id. at 246, 101 S.Ct. 488. The Court reasoned that the FTC\u2019s averment of \u201creason to believe\u201d 'that the oil companies were violating the FTCA was \u201cnot a definitive statement of position [but instead] represented] a threshold determination that further inquiry [was] warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings.\u201d Id. at 241, 101 S.Ct. 488. The Court then determined that, because the issuance of the complaint served only to initiate the proceedings by which a definitive agency position could become known, the complaint had no legal force or practical effect that was comparable to the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151-53, 87 S.Ct. 1507 (<HOLDING>). See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 241-43, 101 Holdings: 0: holding if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary adjudication a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable 1: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable 2: holding that summons issued nearly seven months after the show cause order was entered was not issued immediately as required by statute 3: holding that regulations issued by commissioner of food and drugs were ripe for review because they were definitive immediately effective and directly and immediately affected petitioners daily business activities 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "exist and the factual basis for each such claim.\u201d). 20 See OCGA \u00a7 9-11-9.1 (e) (\u201cIf a plaintiff files an affidavit which is allegedly defective, and the defendant to whom it pertains alleges, with specificity, by motion to dismiss filed on or before the close of discovery, that said affidavit is defective, the plaintiff\u2019s complaint shall be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim____\u201d); OCGA \u00a7 9-11-56 (c) (\u201cThe judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; but nothing in this Code section shall be const 6, 8 (658 SE2d 792) (2008) (<HOLDING>). 24 Kaminer, 282 Ga. at 834 (1) (citation Holdings: 0: holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence 1: holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence 2: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 3: holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action 4: holding that negligence does not violate the due process clause but reserving the question whether gross negligence does", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a repository of other contraband, courts are \u201centitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.\u201d United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3rd Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986)). Drag dealers typically need a place to store and utilize not only the drags that they distribute but such items as scales, packaging materials, ledgers and cash. The magistrate considering the warrant application could reasonably infer that such evidence probably would be found at Stevens\u2019 home. Numerous courts have upheld a finding of probable cause for a search warrant in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305-07 (3rd Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86-88 Holdings: 0: recognizing the absence of drug paraphernalia suggestive of personal use as evidence of an intent to distribute 1: holding magistrate could infer that evidence of drugs or paraphernalia would be located in experienced drug dealers home 2: holding that guns were properly admitted to  prove intent to distribute drugs because it has uniformly been recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that such weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug paraphernalia 3: holding that a reputation for sobriety from drugs and alcohol is pertinent to the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia because intent to use is an element of the offense 4: holding evidence of plastic jeweler bags together with drug ledger amount of drugs and lack of paraphernalia to consume drugs was sufficient to support jurys finding of intent to distribute and absence of money and digital scales was not outcome determinative in light of other evidence", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "any fixed improvement or any project, whether or not fixed, involving construction, alteration, removal or repair for the public use of the United States or its allies, including but not limited to projects or operations under service contracts and projects in connection with the national defense or with war activities, dredging, harbor improvements, dams, roadways, and housing, as well as preparatory and ancillary work in connection therewith at the site or on the project 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651(b)(1). Courts have found that public work generally consists of \u201cwork constituting government-related construction projects, work connected with the national defense, or employment under a service contract supporting either activity.\u201d Univ. of Rochester v. Hartman, 618 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Makris v. Spensieri Painting, 669 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a professor who suffered a fatal fall collecting soil samples in antarctica was not engaged in public work within the meaning of the dba 1: holding that the complaint stated a claim under the flsa where it alleged that parties were an employer and employees within meaning of act and that the defendantemployers operation constitutes an enterprise engaged in commerce  within the meaning of  the act 2: holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption 3: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983 4: holding that if a provision of the dba specifically modifies a provision of the lhwca the dba provision controls in a dba case", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "had filed both lawsuits. See id. at 359-60 (citing to two family law cases, Evans v. Evans, 186 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1945, no writ) and Mills v. Howard, 228 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1950, no writ)). 3 . Because the United States Supreme Court has held that contravention of a strong public policy is an exception to enforcement of a forum selection clause, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), appellees\u2019 showing that Florida would apply Florida rather than Texas law to the non-compete agreement also supports the enjoining of the proceeding in the parties\u2019 contractually selected forum of Florida. See also Holeman v. Nat\u2019l Business Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Regarding Autonation\u2019s claim that the Holdings: 0: holding that jurisdiction existed over two georgia residents who leased a machine from a texas resident because they 1 solicited and negotiated the lease agreement by two telephone calls to texas 2 sent correspondence and payments by mail to texas 3 paid for the transfer of the machine from texas and 4 caused their insurance agent to contact the texas resident in texas to arrange coverage for the machine 1: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 2: holding that jurisdiction existed over nonresident printing customer despite the fact that texas printer solicited the business in alabama and nonresident sent no personnel to texas because nonresident placed additional orders from which it expected to profit sent payments to texas sent and received printing materials to and from texas paid for shipping of printed goods from texas and sent payments to texas the transactions were governed by texas law and substantial part of performance occurred in texas 3: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 4: holding that appellant failed to establish abuse of discretion in dismissal of texas suit in which appellant failed to show georgia would refuse to apply texas law", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "do not object to the final judgment to engage in yet another round of costly and time consuming litigation. As the Second Circuit has observed, \u201cin making the choice between the possibility of harm to the late-arriving prospective intervenors as against the possible harm to parties who have participated diligently during the pertinent portions of this litigation, it does not strike us as unjust that intervention on the part of the late-arrivers must yield under all of the circumstances herein.\u201d Yonkers Bd. of Ed., 801 F.2d at 596. II. Motion for an Extension of Time to Appeal Intervenors\u2019 failure to establish their standing is fatal to their motion for an extension of time to file an appeal. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of World-Com, Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Even assuming intervenors had met their Holdings: 0: holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention 1: holding that standing is an essential and unchanging part of the easeorcontroversy requirement of article iii 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 3: holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention 4: recognizing that standing is an essential component of our appellate jurisdiction and permitting party to appeal only after determining that they had met the requirements of article iii standing", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a specific individual to qualify as a \u201cmeans of identification\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1028A. We review properly preserved questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Krawczak, 331 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir.2003). However, where a defendant fails to present the issue to the district court, like Wilson in this case, we review only for plain error. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir.2006). As discussed below, we find no error, much less plain error. This Court has not previously resolved this specific issue in a published opinion, and there appears to be some conflict in the circuits on whether the use of someone\u2019s name qualifies as a \u201cmeans of identification\u201d under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1028A. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230 (4th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882 Holdings: 0: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 1: holding a bare name alone was not sufficient to identify the specific individual as required under the statute 2: holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged 3: holding that at a bare minimum the district court was required to provide a pro se prisoner with fair notice of the summary judgment rule requirements 4: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an application. United States v. Errera, 616 F.Supp. 1145, 1149 (D.Md.1985) (citations omitted); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237-38, 103 S.Ct. 2817, 2331-32, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). There is no magic formula for evidence of intent to flee. The issuing judge must simply determine whether the affidavit supporting the wiretap application under \u00a7 2516(l)(i), when read as a whole, establishes probable cause to believe that the missing individual is purposely evading the authorities out of fear that he will otherwise be prosecuted for an enumerated crime. Moreover, the Court notes that determinations by an issuing judge are accorded substantial deference upon a subsequent suppression motion. United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504, 1506 (9th Cir. 1986); see Errera, 616 F.Supp. at 1149 (<HOLDING>). The function of this Court, which is Holdings: 0: holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself 1: holding that the validity of an administrative order is properly before the court when it has been directly placed in issue 2: holding that failure to follow state law requiring issuing judge to record testimony did not affect validity of warrant 3: holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed 4: holding that where electronic surveillance has been authorized by a judicial officer the fact that the issuing judge found probable cause is itself a substantial factor tending to uphold the validity of the order issued ", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "inside of the containers. Because Coro\u2019s failure to alert was inconclusive on the essential question of whether the package contained illegal narcotics and because the facts set forth in the search warrant affidavit otherwise were sufficient to establish probable cause, there was a substantial basis for the issuing court\u2019s determination of probable cause. {34} Lastly, Defendant claims that, pursuant to Nyce, our inquiry must be \u201cparticularly exacting\u201d because Defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cequally consistent with legal activity.\u201d See Nyce, 2006-NMSC-026, \u00b6 14, 139 N.M. 647, 137 P.3d 587 (purchasing tincture of iodine and hydrogen peroxide at multiple stores in a hurried manner is equally consistent with lawful activity); State v. Anderson, 107 N.M. 165, 169, 754 P.2d 542, 546 (Ct.App. 1988) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. As we acknowledged in Nyce, Holdings: 0: holding that merely traveling with drug dealers did not create probable cause at time of defendants arrest 1: holding that facts consistent with a drug courier profile are insufficient in themselves to establish probable cause because they are generally descriptive of hundreds of innocent persons traveling through new mexico on the interstate every day 2: holding that factors which by themselves were quite consistent with innocent travel collectively amounted to reasonable suspicion 3: holding that unknowing drug courier testimony was admissible in a complex drug importation case 4: holding that federal agents had probable cause to search defendants truck for drugs and contraband even though defendants conduct was consistent with innocent behavior", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "see also id. at 580 (Kavanaugh, J.,- concurring) (\u201c[Bjeing called the n-word by a supervisor \u2014 as Ayissi-Etoh alleges happened to him \u2014 suffices by itself to; establish a racially hostile work environment.\u201d). But the severity of a supervisor\u2019s use of \u201cprobably the most offensive word in English,\u201d id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted), is far greater than a somewhat bizarre. and ambiguous, albeit offensive, question allegedly posed by a supervisor in response to a complaint about an unambiguously non-racial workplace display. Rather, Ms. Stiger\u2019s-'offen-sive question is more akin to the sort of derogatory remarks that courts in this Circuit have deemed non-actionable in the past. See, e.g., Freedman v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, Holdings: 0: holding that a supervisor was not similarly situated to another supervisor with the same title where the former could not perform the latters duties 1: holding that there was nohostile work environment where a supervisor after negotiating with another supervisor for a printer told a jewish employee soon im going to be the only one at this terminal wearing a yarmulka 2: holding that a supervisor who approached an employees desk with a workissued gun and said im going to screw you up contributed to a hostile work environment 3: holding plaintiffs supervisor subject to suit 4: holding that comments not directed at plaintiff including a supervisor who called another worker the nword were relevant to the evaluation of hostile work environment claim", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Nevertheless, the next day Hilliard informed the commission about Wilkinson's refusal to clean the safe. 6 . See note 9, infra. 7 . See note 1, supra. 8 . It should be noted that defendants\u2019 legal position is that \"[a]s a limited term appointee [Wilkinson] has no due process or other right to re-appointment * * *\" and that \"[n]o cause is required to disapprove an appointment.\" Thus, defendants have argued on appeal that Wilkinson\u2019s appropriate remedy was an appeal to the Personnel Appeal Board (PAB). But if the 1994 amendments truly had converted Wilkinson to a limited-term, non-classified employee, as defendants contend, then the PAB would have lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal. See Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education v. Newman, 688 A.2d 1300, 1303 (R.I.1997) (<HOLDING>). 9 . The 1978 version of G.L.1956 \u00a7 12-1.2-6 Holdings: 0: holding that the pab has no jurisdiction over nonclassified employees who are subject to the exclusive control of the commissioner of higher education     1: holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings 2: holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive 3: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties 4: recognizing that only void judgments are subject to collateral attack and that a judgment is void only when court had no jurisdiction of the parties or property no jurisdiction of the subject matter no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment or no capacity to act", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Refining and Marketing Co., supra, this court held that defendant Getty\u2019s failure to promote Cuffy and its alleged breach of an EEOC Settlement Agreement in 1981 were insufficiently related to Getty\u2019s suspension of Cuffy in 1984 to constitute a continuing violation: Moreover, the discriminatory nature of each act is not of itself sufficient to demonstrate the necessary relationship. There is simply no intrinsic connection between these events, other than the involvement of the defendant, to show that they are part of a pattern of discrimination. These acts are best understood as \u201cisolated instances of discrimination,\u201d and insufficient to support a continuing violation theory. Cuffy, 648 F.Supp. at 810; see also Bronze Shields, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d at 1080-1084 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Carr alleges two discrete Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan 1: holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim and they did so at their own risk 2: holding that plaintiffs could not relitigate their claim that they were entitled to vsf benefits and that while plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the foregoing actions they opted not to do so and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now 3: holding that neglect was not excusable where the defendants did not do all that they were required to do after they received the summons and complaint in that they did not contact a lawyer or make any other arrangements with respect to their defense 4: holding that continued use of an eligibility roster for hiring did not constitute an ongoing violation so as to preserve plaintiffs claims after they learned their names were excluded from the roster", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statute of limitations argument nor their argument that the willfulness claim lacks specificity argument is well-taken. There are, however, alternative grounds on which COUNT IV must be dismissed. B. Lack of Personal Liability under the FMLA as to Mr. Dods Personal liability for violations of Federal employment laws generally has been rejected (unless the defendant engaged in \u201cnondelegable acts\u201d like harassment). The term \u201cemployer\u201d in the FMLA should be construed consistently with the way that term has been construed in Title VII cases (and in cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 12101 et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et. seq.). See Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441 (E.D.Tenn.1995) (<HOLDING>). Ms. Carter urges, instead, that the court Holdings: 0: holding that a civil rights plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under fmla against individual individual is not employer subject to liability under the act 1: holding that fmla permits individual liability for public officials 2: holding no individual liability under the adea 3: holding individual defendants subject to suit 4: holding that fmla does not impose individual liability", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "review\" to the rule 11 violations in this case. In the absence of express language in any of our cases holding that harmless error review does not apply to preserved claims of rule l1(e) violations, the State nevertheless urges us to apply harmless error review of preserved rule 11 violations because \"it does so in nearly every other context,\" because \"other states do so,\" or because it is good public policy. We decline to do so. T76 First, the State argues that because we apply harmless error in other contexts, we should also apply harmless error to a preserved rule 11(e) claim of error. In support of its argument, the State cites to cases involving the question of whether a trial court's error affected the outcome of a trial. See, eg., State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 578, 576 (Utah 1983) (<HOLDING>); State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah Holdings: 0: holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt 1: holding that the trial courts erroneous admission of an experts opinion that the defendant was guilty was harmless where the prosecution produced overwhelming evidence of guilt 2: holding that erroneous instruction that flight from the scene of the crime implied guilt was harmless because there was other evidence to sustain a conviction 3: recognizing that if there is evidence upon which one may reasonably infer an element of the crime the evidence is sufficient to sustain that element and where reasonable minds could differ the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction 4: holding that mcbrides presence at and flight from the scene was insufficient to sustain his conviction where the state failed to present any evidence that established mcbrides intent that the victim be shot or that he committed an act in furtherance of the shooting", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "bills that [she had with her that day] that would indicate whether or not [the] property was occupied back in 2006.\u201d Id. at 16. She also admitted that she did not produce her 2007 utility bills, although the defendant had requested such documents prior to the examination. Id. at 17; see also Def.\u2019s Mot., Ex. 6 (Aug. 14, 2007 Letter Requesting Documents). In light of the evidence cited by the defendants (of which these are only a few examples), a reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff breached the insurance policy by not carrying out her duties as the insured party, thereby rendering the policy void. See Claflin, 110 U.S. at 96-97, 3 S.Ct. 507 (ruling that providing false statements during the purchase of a property was a breach of the policy); Taubman, 160 F.2d at 162 (<HOLDING>); Stover, 658 F.Supp. at 160 (concluding that Holdings: 0: holding that an insured partys refusal to produce requested documents constituted a breach of the insurance contract 1: holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident 2: holding that party may not recover damages for breach of contract where its own bad faith caused the other partys breach 3: holding that an insurance contract between the parties and a breach thereof by the defendant is an element of a bad faith refusal claim 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a bag of marijuana and an audiotape recording of the drug transaction, on which the defendant\u2019s voice was identified. 85 S.W.3d at 462. In addition, a videotape recording was made of the informant\u2019s actions as he entered the defendant\u2019s car. Id. This evidence was held to sufficiently connect the defendant with the crime. Id. Likewise, in Jefferson, an officer testified that he searched the informant, placed an audio recording device on her and turned it on, observed the informant enter a house to make a drug transaction, turned the device off when she returned and introduced the recording into evidence and identified the defendant\u2019s voice on the recording. This evidence was held sufficient to corroborate the informant\u2019s testimony. 99 S.W.3d at 792; see also Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 708-11 (<HOLDING>); Dennis v. State, 151 S.W.3d 745, 749 Holdings: 0: holding that ownership of vehicle and presence at scene of crash sufficiently corroborated appellants statement 1: holding testimony of officer and narcotics investigator who both witnessed drug transaction coupled with audio recording of transaction constituted sufficient corroboration 2: holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence 3: holding informants testimony corroborated by evidence consisting of defendants presence at scene coupled with cash found in his pocket carrying serial numbers matching those provided to informant for controlled buy and videotape of transaction included conversation of defendant regarding prior drug sale 4: holding that affidavit officer submitted to state court judge coupled with officers sworn testimony before that judge regarding informants controlled drug purchases at defendants residence sufficed to establish probable cause", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual\u2019s impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs.\u201d Id. Despite the broad nature of this example, the Court finds Whitfield also has not met her burden of proving she is substantially limited in the major life activity of work. While the record contains evidence of Whitfield\u2019s medical limitations, there exists nothing connecting those limitations to ability to perform other jobs in the community. The general statement in the Interpretive Guidelines about back injuries, in isolation, cannot boost Whitfield over the summary judgment hurdle. Cf. McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that a trained computer technicians carpal tunnel syndrome did not render him disabled under the ada because he could still function as a computer repair technician 1: holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity 2: holding as a matter of law that a permanent twentyfive pound lifting restriction does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity 3: holding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome who could not perform heavy lifting failed to meet burden of establishing substantial limitation in major life activity of work 4: holding as a matter of law that a twentyfive pound lifting limitation particularly when compared to an average persons abilities  does not constitute a significant restriction on ones ability to lift work or perform any other major life activity", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "nascent cause of action. True enough. But federal FOIA jurisprudence leaves no doubt that a lawyer\u2019s request for information must plainly spell out the representative capacity and the identity of the client before that client can bring a FOIA action in her own name. When an attorney files a FOIA request on behalf of a client, the attorney is the one to whom courts have granted standing to sue. See Constangy, Brooks & Smith, by Bridgesmith ex rel. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 839, 840 n. 1 (6th Cir.1988) (noting that the plaintiff, a law firm, had standing to request the FOIA documents on behalf of its client); see also Burka v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Health & Human Servs., 142 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C.Cir.1998); Unigard Ins. Co. v. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 997 F.Supp. 1339, 1341 (S.D.Cal.1997) (<HOLDING>) In Three Forks Ranch Corp. v. Bureau of Land Holdings: 0: holding that when attorney representing unigard submitted a foia request in his own name unigard lacked standing because its name did not appear on the request itself 1: holding that the united states court of appeals for veterans claims abused its discretion denying a request for supplemental attorney fees when plaintiff successfully defended part of his eaja fee request 2: holding that an officers request for a citizens identification by itself did not amount to a seizure 3: holding that the ij did not abuse his discretion in denying request for further continuance where the ij granted previous request 4: holding that the filed rate doctrine barred request for damages but did not preclude request for injunction and civil penalties", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "primarily on an assessment of credibility. Purkett, 514 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1772, 131 L.Ed.2d at 840. The explanations given were race-neutral. The decisive question is whether counsel\u2019s race-neutral explanation will be believed by the trial court. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409; State v. Wilhite, 858 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Mo.App.1993). The trial court accepted the explanations. We have examined the explanations and the circumstances which appear in the record. It is clear from the findings that the trial court viewed the plausibility of the state\u2019s explanations in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the ease, as Parker requires. Parker, 836 S.W.2d at 934, 939. See also Purkett, 514 U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771, 131 L.Ed.2d at 839 (<HOLDING>). The trial court took a permissible view of Holdings: 0: holding that the absence of legitimate income supports the finding of probable cause in a forfeiture action 1: holding that the record supports the trial judges implicit finding of nonpretextuality 2: holding that a courts determination to discount the testimony of the defendants expert witnesses was a proper exercise of his discretion in weighing the demeanor credibility and persuasiveness of the evidence when ruling on a motion for a new trial 3: holding that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant in the third batson step where a trial judge may find lack of persuasiveness supports a finding of pretext 4: recognizing that the dc circuit has stated that by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of  competing studies the district court conflates the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder ", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the pretrial deadlines, treated the deadlines as statutes of limitations, \u201cchiseled in concrete,\u201d and therefore sanctionable if violated. Scheduling orders are clearly valuable tools for promoting the efficient management of a trial court\u2019s docket. However, as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals recognized in Maddox: [T]he imposition of a sanction that precludes a material witness from testifying, and, consequently, effectively dismisses a potentially meritorious claim without a trial, should be reserved for egregious violations of the court\u2019s scheduling order, and should be supported by evidence of willful or contemptuous or otherwise opprobrious behavior on the part of the party or counsel. 921 A.2d at 922. See also Revco, D.S., Inc. v. Cooper, 873 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Based on our review of the record and the Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants discovery requests were untimely because they were not served in time for the responses to be due before the discovery deadline 1: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 2: recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available 3: holding that discovery sanctions so severe they prevent a trial on the merits are warranted only where the record reflects a partys flagrant bad faith or counsels callous disregard for the discovery rales 4: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to extend discovery where no effort was made to explain why the requested discovery could not have taken place within the original discovery period", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as possible, because, yes, I was in fear for my safety at that time. Examining the encounter in context, however, in light of the testimony of Stratton, I find that the second movement was witnessed as the officers approached, before McKoy was asked to leave the car, and that promptly upon being asked, McKoy left his vehicle. 3 . Of course, the police did not actually stop the car in this case. At the point when they asked McKoy to leave the car, however, they had seized him for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The police officers in this case were justified in stopping the defendant and effecting this initial seizure because they had probable cause to believe he had committed two separate traffic violations. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The officers in this case were also permitted Holdings: 0: holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred 1: holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment 2: holding that the subjective intent of the officer is no longer determinative wjhen applying the objective test generally the only determination to be made is whether probable cause existed for the stop in question and that per whren a violation of traffic law provided sufficient probable cause to make the subsequent search and seizure reasonable 3: holding that probable cause to believe the traffic code had been violated rendered the stop reasonable under the fourth amendment regardless of officers subjective intent 4: holding a warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the fourth amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "against unconsenting states or state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest, regardless of the remedy sought, including 'pendent state law claims.\u2019 \u201d), citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Rakow v. North Dakota ex rel. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 2000 WL 227850 at *1 (8th Cir., February 24, 2000) (The plaintiff's claims were \"barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits federal courts from hearing suits against states and state officers in their official capacities when, as in this case, the suit alleges a violation of state law and regardless of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought.\u201d) [Table Decision]; see also, Bisciglia v. Lee, 370 F.Supp.2d 874, 878 (D.Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we recommend that the Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983 1: holding state of north carolina and state official sued in their official capacity are immune from  1983 and  1985 actions in federal court 2: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against a state official sued in his or her official capacity 3: holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity 4: recognizing that when a state employee is sued in his official capacity the state is the real party in interest and as a result the eleventh amendment is implicated", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "We disagree. The first and the third of these factors apply to any multiunit rental facility. The second is irrelevant: Hoosiers who live in rural areas are entitled to no less protection against invasion of their homes. The fourth, assuming it applied to the third home, is in and of itself innocuous. Probable cause clearly existed with respect to the first two homes, and the totality of the circumstances established some suspicion or possibility of a joint drug-dealing enterprise at the Farm. But this is not enough. The affidavit did not allege any facts linking the third home to the surrounding criminal activity. The lack of any nexus is a critical point in assessing the reasonableness of the officer\u2019s reliance on the warrant. Cf. Stabenow v. State, 495 N.E.2d 197 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Objective good faith \u201crequires officers to Holdings: 0: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search 1: holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception 2: holding that there was probable cause for arrest where officers knew defendants had recently been with suspected drug dealer officers saw defendants car being maneuvered so as to indicate that surveillance had been detected and when officers approached car defendant attempted to place package under car and then pulled the package back inside the car and closed and locked the car door 3: holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car 4: holding that cocaine seized pursuant to search of defendants car was not admissible under good faith exception because affidavit did not establish connection between car and criminal activity", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in that opinion, however, that the Seventh Circuit would permit an indemnification or contribution claim to be brought by the employer against the supervisor. Likewise, the legislative history of the FLSA cited by Defendants does not support such a claim. See Herman, 172 F.3d at 144 (noting that the text of the FLSA makes no provision for contribution or indemnification and the Act\u2019s legislative history is silent on a right to contribution or indemnification). Other cases cited by Defendants demonstrate the federal courts\u2019 refusal to recognize a federal common law right to indemnity or contribution except in limited circumstances. (Defs.\u2019 Resp. at 7, citing, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981) (<HOLDING>), and Tumer/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding employer had no right of contribution under equal pay act title vii or federal common law against unions that allegedly bore at least partial responsibility for statutory violations 1: holding that same standard applies to equal pay act and title vii wage discrimination claims 2: recognizing a right to contribution 3: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 4: holding that  final responsibility for enforcement of title vii is vested with federal courts", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and conspired uage and gestures of a custodial office[r] do not, even if true, amount to constitutional violations.\u201d Robertson v. Plano City of Texas, 70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir.1995). Likewise, claims of verbal abuse and harassment are not actionable under \u00a7 1983. Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d 271, 274 n. 4 (5th Cir.1993). Thus, Plaintiffs complaints of verbal abuse, harassment, and threats should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. To the extent that Plaintiff complains that certain Defendants failed to answer his jail grievances or denied his grievances and the appeals, he has not demonstrated that he had a constitutionally protected interest in the Taylor County Jail grievance procedures. See Piper v. Alford, No. 3:02-CV-2640-P, 2003 WL 21350215, at *2 (N.D.Tex., June 4, 2003) (<HOLDING>). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim 1: holding that there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure 2: holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure 3: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 4: holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphases added). Section (B)(ii) does not lend itself to the interpretation advocated by the Government. Nowhere is it \u201cspecified\u201d that the bond determination is a \u201cdiscretionary\u201d decision of the Attorney General. Compare 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 241.5(b) (2004) (providing that the Attorney General \u201cmay require the positing of bond in an amount determined by the [Attorney General] to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal,\u201d but failing to \u201cspecify\u201d that that determination is \u201cdiscretionary\u201d), with 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 241.5(c) (noting that the Attorney General \u201cmay, in his or her discretion, grant employment authorization ....\u201d) (emphasis added). Accord Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689-90 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Simply, it is not \u201cspecified\u201d that the bond Holdings: 0: holding that the jurisdictional bar in section bii applies only to acts over which a statute gives the attorney general pure discretion unguided by legal standards or statutory guidelines 1: holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute not of challenge to statute itself 2: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 3: holding that the oneyear bar contained in  2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar 4: holding that the jurisdictional bar applies to the denial of deferral of removal under the cat", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "135 N.M. 192, 86 P.3d 617, 619 (Ct.App.2004). A contract is ambiguous if it is \u201creasonably and fairly susceptible of different constructions.\u201d Id. \"[I]n determining whether a term or expression to which the parties have agreed is unclear, a court may hear evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract and of any relevant usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance.\u201d C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (1991) (footnote omitted). \"Further, the language of the entire agreement should be construed together.\u201d Allsup\u2019s Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1, 12 (1999). 12 . See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1152-53 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). But see Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 1: recognizing that analysis of whether certain expenses qualify as deducti ing royalty contracts 2: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 3: holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs 4: holding that the enactment of firrea breached certain government contracts", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1136, 1140-41 (App.1996); Deuel v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 165 Ariz. 524, 526-27, 799 P.2d 865, 867-68 (App. 1990) (setting forth due process rights of covered public employees); accord 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 2301 (1996) (setting forth federal merit system principles); see generally Daryl Man-hart, Commment, Property and Liberty Limitations on the Dismissal of Arizona Public Employees, 1977 Ariz. St. L.J. 835, 853-54 [hereinafter \u201cManhart\u201d] (discussing law enforcement merit systems). \u00b6 15 The right to treatment based on merit and a hearing by a neutral board before discipline becomes final are therefore central merit system principles of public employment for purposes of A.R.S. \u00a7 38-1003. See Evans v. State ex rel. Ariz. Corp. Comm\u2019n, 131 Ariz. 569, 572, 643 P.2d 14, 17 (App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Bishop v. Law Enforcement Merit Sys. Council, Holdings: 0: recognizing that the focus must be on whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial 1: holding no violation of substantial rights occurred during voir dire where record did not show that defendant was denied fair and impartial trial 2: recognizing requirement that state personnel board be a fair and impartial tribunal 3: recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing 4: holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on the grounds that the non-diverse employees of a diverse defendant had not been negligent). In this case, any finding of fraudulent joinder as to Pierce & Associates is necessarily dispositive, in part or, more likely, in whole, of the liability of U.S. Bank, because Plaintiffs allege the law firm acted at all times as the agent of Firstar, U.S. Bank\u2019s predecessor in inter est. See Complaint \u00b6 22. See also United States v. 7108 West Grand Ave., Chicago, Ill, 15 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201c[A]n attorney\u2019s errors and misconduct are attributed to his clients. The clients are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by his chosen agent\u2019s deeds.\u201d); Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill.2d 1, 287 Ill.Dec. 510, 816 N.E.2d 272, 279 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Given that the alleged misconduct of Pierce & Holdings: 0: holding that a client is vicariously liable for an attorneys allegedly intentional tortious conduct if the attorney acted as the clients agent 1: holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client 2: holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case 3: holding that licensed agent is in privity with principal for purpose of establishing identity of parties record establishes classic employeremployee relationship in which corporation is vicariously liable for conduct of agent 4: holding that when an attorney represents multiple clients and a dispute between the attorney and one client later occurs there is a waiver of the privilege but only by the client asserting the liability", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of section 121. Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, no protection was afforded to patent applications filed as a result of a restriction requirement \u2014 referred to at the time as a \u201crequirement for division\u201d \u2014 and such applications were often rejected or held invalid on double patenting grounds. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 358 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cSGK\u201d) (Newman, J., concurring); In re Eisler, 40 C.C.P.A. 913, 203 F.2d 726 (1953). Thus, although a requirement for division embodied a determination by the PTO that the patent application contained more than one patentably distinct invention, such a determination did not protect the divisional application from rejection on grounds of double patenting. In re Isherwood, 46 App.D.C. 507, 512 (D.C.Cir.1917) (<HOLDING>). The PTO and the courts were therefore not Holdings: 0: holding that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that a defendants trial take place in a specific courtroom or division within a federal district and that the jury pool need not include anyone from the division in which the crime occurred 1: holding that the attorney generals decision not to provide representation to an employee is reviewable by the appellate division not by the law division where the actions against the employee are pending 2: holding that reconsideration of the correctness of property division was barred on appeal from the judgment enforcing that division 3: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order 4: holding that an examiner is not estopped from rejecting a divisional application because of an earlier requirement for division", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "2. 19 . Dr. Strong\u2019s Report at 2 (emphasis added). 20 . Dr. Strong\u2019s Report at 2. 21 . Dr. Strong\u2019s Report at 2. 22 . Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 46], 23 .28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346(b)(1). 24 . Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 384 (Miss.2009). This element, like all elements of a medical malpractice case, must be satisfied by expert testimony. Coleman v. Rice, 706 So.2d 696, 698 (Miss. 1997). 25 . Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So.3d 742, 753 (Miss.2011). 26 . Drummond v. Buckley, 627 So.2d 264, 268 (Miss.1993). 27 . Dr. Strong\u2019s Report at 1. 28 . Government's Brief at 4. 29 . Government\u2019s Brief at 4. 30 . Conn's Brief at 2. 31 . Dr. Strong\u2019s Report at 1. 32 . See Patterson, supra at n. 31. 33 . Dr. Strong\u2019s Report at 2. 34 . Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 387 (Miss.2009) (<HOLDING>). The expert \"must articulate an objective Holdings: 0: holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally recognized and accepted standard of care 1: holding experts testimony was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the testimony at most showed the defendant deviated from the experts personal standard of care rather than the generally accepted standard of care 2: holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider 3: holding that a manufacturers insert in and of itself may not establish the relevant standard of care in a medical negligence action but may be considered by the fact finder along with expert testimony to define the standard of care 4: holding that an experts personal preference does not establish a national standard of care", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which led the DOE to believe that \u201cmoney may be due back to the DOE.\u201d The e-mail further stated that, \u201c[u]ntil the DOE is confident that no money is owed to it for prior false invoices from [RESG], the account will remain frozen and money withheld in order to protect the City\u2019s interests and tax payer dollars.\u201d Before the District Court, and now on appeal, UCF has argued that the objection in the February 3 e-mail was insufficiently specific inasmuch as it did not directly address each of the 3,913 invoices in the allegedly stated account. We are aware of no authority under New York law that requires such extreme specificity. On the contrary, numerous New des the plaintiffs statement of an account. See Navimex S.A. De C.V. v. S/S \u201cNorthern Ice\u201d, 617 F.Supp. 103, 106 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Upon a thorough review of the record, and in Holdings: 0: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account 1: holding that a supplementary statement of account dated february 1978 did not constitute an account stated because there was an underlying dispute between the parties as evidenced by defendants objection in january 1978 to plaintiffs august 1977 statement of account thereby precluding a finding of consent by the defendants to the february 1978 statement 2: holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection  and admonished the jury to disregard the statement 3: holding that it was error for the court to rule that the statement of mortgage debt was incorrect prior to submission of the auditors statement of account 4: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Loschiavo for the proposition that \u00a7 1983 could be used to enforce regulations \u201cwhich have the force of law\u201d). The current Sixth Circuit precedent treats regulations as \u201claws\u201d under \u00a7 1983 and looks to determine whether the regulation at issue creates rights. In essence, regulations are treated in the same manner as statutes for purposes of determining whether they create new enforceable rights under \u00a7 1983. A such, district courts in the Sixth Circuit must determine, just as with federal statutes, whether federal regulations presented by \u00a7 1983 plaintiffs create enforceable rights. This court questions whether the Sixth Circuit\u2019s rule can be correct in light of the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Alexander v. Sandoval and Gonzaga University v. Doe. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (<HOLDING>). These two decisions, when read together, Holdings: 0: holding that as the court has made clear in several recent decisions a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue 1: holding federal regulations have the force of law and may create enforceable rights 2: holding that regulations do not create enforceable rights when they are too far removed from congressional intent 3: recognizing that these two recent supreme court decisions resolve the issue of whether federal regulations alone can create enforceable rights under  1983 4: holding that because federal regulations have the force of law they may create enforceable rights under  1983", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "informal refund claim based on written protests prior to payment); Night Hawk Leasing Co. v. United States, 84 Ct.Cl. 596, 603-04, 18 F.Supp. 938 (1937) (concluding that the taxpayer made an informal refund claim by writing an objection on the back of a check submitted as payment of the tax). Contrary to the assertions in plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Evans\u2019 March 29, 2012 memorandum does not satisfy either of the requirements for informal claims. First, although the memorandum states that Mr. Evans verbally \u201cconceded\u201d that Mr. Ishler \u201chas an open informal claim due to the documented discussions with IRS officials,\u201d Compl. Ex. A at 1, it does not reference any written component of that alleged claim. See, e.g., Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (Ct.Cl.1981) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). Second, the memorandum Holdings: 0: holding that oral assertions by the taxpayer during an audit were insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an informal refund claim 1: holding that an oral challenge to the venire is insufficient 2: holding that while the contract did not establish a formal fiduciary relationship the pleadings were sufficient to raise an issue as to the existence of an informal one 3: holding that a negative performance evaluation on its own is insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action as a matter of law 4: holding that a motion to liftthe bankruptcy stay in order to pursue a claim is an informal proof of claim", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Convention, finding that Li had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. The BIA affirmed the IJ\u2019s decision. We hold that the evidence in the record is insufficient to compel a finding that Li established a well-founded fear of persecution. The single threat to handcuff Li does not constitute past persecution. Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir.2000) (defining persecution as an \u201cextreme concept\u201d that includes the \u201cinfliction of suffering or harm\u201d (citations omitted)). Nor does the combination of the threat, the experience of his father\u2019s friend, and the State Department Profile establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Arrest alone, even on account of a protected category, does not constitute persecution. Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). While the State Department Profile does Holdings: 0: holding that beatings vandalism threats and humiliation in the aggregate  rise to the level of persecution as contemplated by the act 1: holding that imputed political opinion is a protected ground 2: holding that forced recruitment does not amount to persecution without a showing that it was on account of petitioners political opinion 3: holding that the record did not compel a finding of persecution where an alien was detained for five or six days 4: holding that detention of five or six days on account of imputed political opinion without beatings tortures or threats did not rise to the level of persecution", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of [the procedural rule governing class actions] are met.\u201d (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int\u2019l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.1971))). 12 .See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.1993) (\"An opinion issued in a case brought by a party without standing is advisory because rather than remedying an actual or imminent harm, the judgment addresses only a hypothetical injury.\u201d). 13 . See id. 14 . E.g. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 443-445 (Tex.1989). 15 . 135 S.W.3d 657, 679 (Tex.2004) (footnote omitted). Cf. Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So.2d 988 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). 16 . See, e.g., Martinez v. Second Injury Holdings: 0: holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act 1: holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort 2: holding that an insurers violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable under the consumer protection act 3: holding that plaintiffs complaint that the value of her car was less because it was equipped with gen3 seatbelt buckles is actionable under the state consumer protection law even though the alleged defect has never manifest itself in an emergency or caused damages 4: holding on habeas review that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes and reciting among other facts that defendant was transported to a police station for questioning in an unmarked police car which was not equipped with a shield inside the car", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "received title\u2014 subject to Cox\u2019s repurchase option\u2014to a tract that had been valued three months earlier at nearly $2.5 million. Christopher assumed the outstanding AgSouth mortgage, which had an unpaid principal balance of around $700,000, and paid Banks $500,000 for Banks\u2019s share of the property\u2019s equity. Christopher did not make any payment to Cox for his share of that equity. In other words, Christopher received title to the Cox tract in exchange for consideration equal to about half the property\u2019s value: $1.2 versus $2.5 million. A gross disparity between the sale price and the actual value of the land is evidence of the parties\u2019 intent to create a security interest\u2014a mortgage\u2014rather than a sale. See Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139, 147-48, 13 L.Ed. 927 (1851) (<HOLDING>); Conway\u2019s Ex\u2019rs and Devisees, 11 U.S. at 241 Holdings: 0: holding that extraneous evidence is admissible to inform courts of all material facts surrounding the delivery of the deed and concluding that it is of great importance to inquire whether the consideration was adequate to induce a sale 1: holding that the delivery of the deed following a foreclosure sale was a ministerial act that was not prohibited by the automatic stay 2: holding that once the defendant is before the court the court will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding his presence there 3: holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed 4: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 1 . We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. 2 . Highway 80 runs northeast from the border town of Douglas, Arizona, through the sparsely populated \u201cbootheel'' section of southwestern New Mexico before intersecting Interstate 10. 3 .It is unclear from the record whether the present stop was one of the two or in addition to the others. 4 . Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 5 . At oral argument, Montes-Ramos' counsel advised the Court that Montes-Ramos is no longer in custody. Because he is challenging the underlying conviction, not the sentence, Montes-Ramos' appeal is not moot. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Fifth Circuit went on to conclude the Holdings: 0: holding that where a conviction survives an apprendi challenge under plain error review a sentence appropriate for that conviction also survives 1: holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction 2: holding that  once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual in custody for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it 3: holding that when the consequences of the conviction are not severe and imminent an appeal is moot when the judgment is voluntarily satisfied 4: holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is true. Randall\u2019s Food Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644; Marchal, 859 S.W.2d at 412. For. a defendant to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant must conclusively negate at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiffs causes of action or conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1995). In his first point of error, Perrotta contends the trial court erred by rendering summary judgment for Farmers on both his contractual and extra-contractual claims. We will first consider the judgment rendered on the contractual claims. A. Breach of Contract In its motion for summary judgment, Farmers claimed that Perrotta breached several conditions .2d 948, 949 (Tex.App.\u2014Beaumont 1989, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Insurance policies are governed by ordinary Holdings: 0: holding policy provision requiring an insured to submit to an examination under oath is a condition precedent to suit rather than a cooperation clause 1: holding that a prior suit and a subsequent suit between the same parties did not involve the same claim because the evidence necessary to sustain the subsequent suit was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to relief in the prior suit 2: holding the failure of the insureds to submit to an euo a condition precedent to sustaining a suit on the insurance policy required abatement of the suit 3: holding insureds failure to comply with terms of policy requiring him to sign and return an euo was a material breach 4: holding that defendant insurance company could not be held liable in negligence to a plaintiff for failure to disclose the insureds medical condition where defendant insurance company had not assumed a professional and expert position with respect to the insureds physical condition", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "made in open court, unless the defendant has, prior to that time, sought affirmative relief.\u201d Id. at 325 (quoting Greenberg v. Brookshire, 640 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.1982)). When nonsuit is filed after an unfavorable partial summary judgment has been entered against the claimant, the nonsuit is with prejudice as to those claims of which the judgment has disposed. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex.1995); see also Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 868 n. 7. This concept promotes judicial efficiency, protects parties from multiple lawsuits, and prevents inconsistent judgments through the preclusion of matters that have already been decided or which could have been litigated in a prior suit. See In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tex.2008); see also Epps, 351 S.W.3d at 870 (<HOLDING>); Yazdchi v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 177 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing that dilution of disfavored partys electoral power constitutes adverse effect cognizable under the first amendment 1: recognizing need for coordinating rulings on discovery disputes 2: holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose 3: recognizing that nonsuit filed for the purpose of circumventing unfavorable legal restrictions or rulings are disfavored 4: holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "349 (1979) [\u201cPedlar, Community Property\u201d]. The article suggests the possibility that \u201cthe Devil himself could effectively receive a discharge in bankruptcy if he were married to Snow White.\u201d Id. at 382. To this I would add: if he does not treat her better than his creditors, she will, by divorcing him, deny his discharge^ ] The cases are uniform in recognizing this effect of Section 524(a)(3). See, e.g., Soderling, 998 F.2d at 733 (\u201c[a]ll claims against a marital community are discharged,\u201d except for nondischargeable community claims); In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 360 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) (stating in dicta that after-acquired community property is immune from collection efforts, even if creditor\u2019s claim is only against non-debtor spouse); In re Hull, 251 B.R. 726, 732 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Rollinson, 322 B.R. 879, 883 Holdings: 0: holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines 1: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 2: recognizing effect of section 524a3 3: holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect 4: holding to the same effect", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "only if the circumstances alleged to be in aggravation ... are found to be true by the trial judge ... and factual findings and reasons in support of such findings are set forth on the record at the time of sentencing.\u201d). In effect, the State suggests that even though the fact-finder did not validly find any aggravating factor that exposed a defendant to an aggravated sentence, a sentence should be upheld if an appellate court could find in the record some aggravating factor that could expose the defendant to a greater sentence and thus allow the sentencing judge to consider other facts not found by the jury in imposing a sentence within the higher range. \u00b6 18 The State misapprehends the role of a reviewing court in non-capital criminal sentencing. When a trial court im (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The State also assumes that an unenumerated Holdings: 0: holding that juvenile adjudications are prior convictions for purposes of the apprendi exception and indicating that the main concern in apprendi was whether the prior convictions procedural safeguards ensured a reliable result not that there had to be a right to a jury trial 1: holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 2: holding that the prior conviction exception should not extend to nonjury juvenile adjudications 3: holding that a juvenile adjudication should not be counted as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes 4: holding that a nonjury juvenile adjudication that  afforded all constitutionallyrequired procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of males from the team and the goal of redressing past discrimination and providing equal opportunities for women.\u201d Id. It is beyond question that redressing the disparate athletic opportunities available to males and females is an important governmental interest. See Mularadelis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 464; see also Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F.Supp. 164, 170 (D.Colo.1977) (noting that because the athletic opportunity for females has historically been limited, \u201cthe encouragement of female involvement in sports is a legitimate objective\u201d). Excluding males from female teams is substantially related to achieving that objective. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Hoover, 430 F.Supp. at 170. But see Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass\u2019n, 378 Mass. 342, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, plaintiffs have not Holdings: 0: holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause 1: holding that section 922k passes muster under intermediate scrutiny and would also pass muster under a strict scrutiny analysis 2: holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny 3: holding that such a classification could not pass muster under the strict scrutiny required by the massachusetts equal rights amendment 4: holding statutory classification of victim and a defendant involved in issuance of a protective order did not violate defendants equal protection rights", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir.2009). Federal Rule of Civil Pro cedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails \u201cto state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\u201d This rule must, however, be interpreted in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. Rule 8(a) calls for \u201ca short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-82, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-51, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (applying Rule 8(a) and plausibility standard to Rule 12(b)(6) motion raising qualified-immunity defense); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 5. Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (<HOLDING>). As a result, \u201c[a] motion to dismiss for Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions 2: holding rule 8as simplified pleading standard applies to most civil actions 3: recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure 4: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "compared to Sieg\u2019s multiplier of 73%. Assuming an adjusted book value of $78.34 per share (book value adjusted by partially restating inventory to a FIFO basis per Ma-roney\u2019s testimony), Sieg\u2019s per-share value would have been $57.19 compared to the court\u2019s value of $62.67, a difference of only $5.48 per share. Even if the marketability discount taken by Sieg is not allowed in Iowa, an issue we do not decide, the impact this error had on Sieg\u2019s valuation of the stock was slight and would certainly support the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion to deny the substantial attorney fees sought by the dissenters, particularly in view of the fact the use of a marketability discount was not done in bad faith. See Waters v. Double L, Inc., 114 Idaho 256, 755 P.2d 1294, 1305 (Idaho Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), modified, 115 Idaho 705, 769 P.2d 582 (1989); Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages 1: holding a summary judgment to be final although motion to assess attorney fees remained pending because award of attorney fees is collateral to judgment 2: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case 3: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (Dkt. No. 5) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the Note or the Mortgage to his Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff did not even disclose the principal amount of the loan or the interest rate terms about which he complains. Defendant at taches copies of the Note and Mortgage to its Motion. The Court considers these documents in this motion to dismiss, although they are not formally attached to the Complaint, because they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to Plaintiff's claims. See Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999). See also Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A civil conspiracy, by itself, is not a Holdings: 0: holding that if the plaintiff fails to attach the written instrument upon which he relies the defendant may introduce the pertinent exhibit which becomes a part of the pleadings 1: holding that trial court erred by not allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of prior dealings with the defendant 2: holding that for the purpose of deciding a motion to dismiss the complaint includes any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference 3: holding that a ruling of the trial court to which no error has been assigned becomes the law of the case and is not subject to review by the court of appeals 4: holding that final judgment on the merits in one action bars any further claim based on the same nucleus of facts for it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies ", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Terny from receiving advancements. The \u201cright to advaneement does not go away simply because the entity from which advancement is sought is alleging that the [defendant] has committed perfidious acts against it.\u201d DeLucca, 2006 WL 224058, at *11. However, Confederate argues that Terny is not entitled to any advances since he has not been sued as a director, but rather in his capacity as a shareholder or consultant. (PI. Opp. at 3). While this argument may limit the scope of work for which Terny is entitled to advancement, it does not eliminate the right to advancements in their entirety- Terny is only entitled to seek advancement of those fees incurred in connection with proceedings which are \u201cby reason of the fact\u201d that he was a director of Confederate. See Homestore, 888 A.2d at 214 (<HOLDING>). In addition, \u201call contracts providing for the Holdings: 0: holding that a nexus between the corporate officers or directors official activity and the matter for which indemnification is sought must be shown though no more than a nexus whether a nexus exists is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court considering all the circumstances surrounding the proposed indemnification 1: holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation 2: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 3: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 4: recognizing the need for a nexus or causal connection between the claim against the officer and onces official corporate capacity", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "production of otherwise discoverable information. b. Applying the Standard \u00b6 32 We now turn to the application of this standard to the facts in this case. Applying the first factor, the strength of the relationship between the confidential information and the issue in dispute, we note that the discovery sought is strongly related to the core issue in the litigation: whether the disabilities at issue were caused by Defendants\u2019 malpractice or by other sources. Christopher Cunniff, a medical doctor, submitted an affidavit stating that, \u201cto a reasonable degree of medical probability,\u201d Patrick\u2019s \u201cfamily history\u201d was a \u201ccontributing factor to his alleged disabilities\u201d and that \u201cthe characteristics exhibited in Patrick [ ] appear to be familial characteristi N.Y.S.2d 817 (N.Y.App.Div.1991) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 33 The second and third factors deal with Holdings: 0: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 1: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 2: holding academic records of siblings admissible based on expert affidavit stating that a possible connection existed between the neurological problems of the plaintiff and those of her siblings which would support a defense that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff have a genetic cause 3: holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim 4: recognizing the relationships between a decedent and his or her parents and siblings", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at 584. \u00b6 9 In Lam v. Peyton, 268 F.Supp. 253, 254 (W.D.Va.1967), the court relied on that language in Kercheval in rejecting the defendant\u2019s claim that the state had been required to provide independent evidence of the corpus delicti through a witness in a guilty plea proceeding. The court concluded that \u201ccorpus delicti must be established in order to admit an extra-judicial confession\u201d and refused to apply that rule to \u201ca formal plea of guilty.\u201d Id.; see also Waley v. United States, 233 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.1956) (corpus delicti rule inapplicable to plea of guilty made at trial); State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 439 S.E.2d 547, 568 (1994) (finding corpus delicti rule inapplicable at jury trial for sentencing of defendant who had pled guilty to first-degree murder); Mullen, supra, at 408 (<HOLDING>); but see Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa. 281, Holdings: 0: recognizing first two exceptions 1: recognizing exceptions to immunity 2: recognizing the permissible use of hearsay without corroboration 3: recognizing two exceptions to eleventh amendment bar 4: recognizing infrajudicial statements among exceptions to corpus delicti rule defendant may plead guilty without independent proof of a crime and a defendants incourt confession requires no corroboration", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the notes in the financial statement that over $4,000,000 of that loss was due to a onetime, nonrecurring compensation expense to Nexity\u2019s founders. Review of Blackmon\u2019s deposition testimony reveals that he understood from the Nexity officers that the company was progressing according to its general strategic plan. Nexity officers apparently stated only in general terms that Nexity was doing well. The following is an excerpt from Blackmon\u2019s deposition transcript: \u201cA: ... I had conversations with Ken [Vassey] about how Nexity was doing, and he assured me that Nexity was doing f\u00edne, that all they needed tating that a person cannot blindly rely on an agent\u2019s oral representations that are contrary to written disclosures); and Wamser v. J.E. Liss, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 393, 399 (E.D.Wis.1993)(<HOLDING>). Therefore, the alleged oral Holdings: 0: holding that written judgment controlled over oral pronouncement 1: holding that oral pronouncement prevailed over the written order 2: holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control 3: holding that written information cures oral misstatements and omissions 4: holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to mean power devices that have control circuits. In addition to unrefuted admissions by professionals in the semiconductor industry that \u201csmart power\u201d is generic, ST also prepared a 150-page chronology from 1982 through the present that digested the pervasive uses of \u201csmart power\u201d to identify devices that utilize a certain type of technology, particularly integrated circuits that combine both power and logic. This chro nology provided evidence from a variety of sources including trade journals, newspapers and other publications, and advertisements. In addition, the chronology also set forth evidence from patent, trademark and copyright registrations indicating that ding that \u201csoftware news\u201d probably generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 751, 54 Holdings: 0: holding that liquid controls is generic 1: holding that light beer is generic 2: holding that a database is a generic computer element 3: holding that crab house is a generic term referring to a class of restaurants that serve crabs 4: recognizing how generic and lightly invoked is the need for uniformity", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Hector Roderico Garcia, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (\u201cBIA\u201d) order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge\u2019s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We dismiss the petition for review. Garcia does not challenge the BIA\u2019s dismissal of his appeal for failure to file a brief. He did not exhaust the claims presented to this court, and we must therefore dismiss his contentions. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 2: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 3: recognizing that issue exhaustion is a mandatory although not jurisdictional requirement 4: holding that issue exhaustion is mandatory even if not a statutory jurisdictional requirement", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to consider Harris\u2019s invitation to presume malice under these circumstances, Harris has not established another key element of Ohio\u2019s malicious-prosecution claim \u2014 the lack of probable cause \u2014 for any of the three counts with which he was charged. First, a reasonable factfinder could fairly conclude that the officers had probable cause to charge Harris with criminal assault under Ohio Revised Code \u00a7 2903.13(a), which proscribes \u201cknowingly causfing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm to another.\u201d Ohio Rev.Code \u00a7 2903.13(a); see also Ohio Rev.Code \u00a7 2901.22(b). State prosecutors brought the assault charge against Harris in state court only after obtaining an indictment, which establishes \u201cprima facie evidence of probable cause,\u201d Carlton, 662 N.E.2d at 1121, t th Cir. Apr. 4, 1994) (<HOLDING>). In attempting to escape the reach of these Holdings: 0: holding in a nonohiolaw case that probable cause existed where plaintiff shoved police officer in the chest 1: holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause 2: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 3: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law 4: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "homesteads under the TT government could be given a specific parcel of land, but that it could not be more than five hectares in area. Richard G. Emerick, Land Tenure in the Marianas, in 1 Office of the Staff Anthropologist, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Land Tenure Patterns, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 233-34 (1958). 45 See Pelisamen, 3 CR at 794-95; see also Cruz v. Johnston, 6 TTR 354, 357-58 (Trial Div. 1973) (noting that homesteaders who received certificates of compliance were entitled to deeds of conveyance, and holding that the issuance of such deeds may be compelled). 46 Reply Brief for Appellant MPLC at 5. 47 Conclusions of Law, supra note 16, \u00b6 5. 48 Brief for Appellant MPLC at 8-9. 49 Cf. McCullen v. Sproles, 28 So. 2d 218, 220 (Miss. 1946) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 50 See 67 TTC \u00a7 208 (1970 Ed.) (\"Deeds of Holdings: 0: holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff 1: holding that recitals in land patent were affirmative evidence that patentee paid requisite price for land 2: holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land 3: holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land 4: holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u2014 the standard we must apply here \u2014 than for a statutory claim under Title VII. We believe the fact that verbal harassment is gender-specific gives it no greater claim as a constitutional violation than verbal harassment generally. Thus, we must look at this claim as one for psychological abuse. B We next consider whether plaintiffs allegation of psychological abuse states an actionable claim. Defendant argues that psychological abuse absent physical contact or a threat to bodily integrity is not a deprivation of constitutional rights. No published authority addresses this particular issue in a school context. In other contexts, however, even extreme verbal abuse typically is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation. Cf. Collins v. Gundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). We have decided one substantive due process Holdings: 0: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress and that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 1: holding that verbal abuse where sheriff laughed at prisoner and threatened to hang him did not state constitutional deprivation actionable under  1983 2: holding that title 42 usc  1997ee requires proof of a physical injury before a prisoner can recover for emotional or mental distress holding that verbal abuse is not actionable under section 1983 and also recognizing a de minimus standard for 8th amendment excessive force claims 3: holding that under  1983 violations of constitutional rights are actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury 4: holding state is not a proper defendant under  1983", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 454 N.E.2d 522, 525, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. 1983), most appellate courts to consider the question have held that \u2014 even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization permitting delegation of a particular function \u2014 an attorney general or similar official may delegate prosecutorial duties to assistants authorized to practice law, given the impossibility of personal performance of every statutory duty. See United States v. Kleve, 465 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1972) (\u201cDefendants\u2019 contention that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution cannot be delegated authority by the United States Attorney to file the certificate lacks merit.\u201d) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3731); see also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404 Holdings: 0: holding that prosecution of defendant in the united states for hostage taking based on acts committed outside the united states did not violate due process 1: holding that assistant united states attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by the united states attorney 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states 3: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states 4: holding that it would be improper for a united states district attorney to prosecute a defendant using information the prosecutor had obtained while acting as the accuseds private attorney", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation was motivated by racial animus, the claim is not dependent upon proof of racial bias. The reasonable accommodation claim necessarily fails, however, because Philip failed to prove he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Second and distinct from his ADA claim, however, Philip contends Ford\u2019s refusal to place him in the permanent position was racially motivated. Philip points to two similarly situated white employees who were grandfathered into the position de spite their lack of seniority, and argues Ford\u2019s refusal to grant him a similar exception was due to race. Id. This latter claim is in no way dependent upon Philip proving he is covered under the ADA. See Austin v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 198 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) was a member of a protected group, 2) was Holdings: 0: holding that the employers discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge 1: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 2: holding that plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of discrimination where plaintiff failed to meet minimum qualifications for job 3: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 4: holding that a plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination because she failed to show valid comparators and presented no other circumstantial evidence of discrimination", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See Petitioner Sprint\u2019s Br. at 28 (citing Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. at 13,198-99). Sprint claims that these historical observations are somehow preclusive, in that they may influence the district court\u2019s judgment on the contract claim or be cited by other IXCs who refuse to pay Sprint\u2019s access charges. It is clear that the passages from the Declaratory Ruling cited by Sprint are merely descriptive statements by the agency, not legal conclusions. The statements have no force of law, so they cannot conclusively cause the adverse collateral consequences suggested by Sprint. In short, Sprint is quibbling over FCC observations that have no binding effect whatsoever. This is never a basis for review in this court. Cf. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 198 F.3d 266 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Sprint further argues that the FCC Holdings: 0: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law 1: holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions 2: holding that a decision is final when it leaves nothing more for the court to do 3: holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law 4: holding an agency decision is not final during the time the agency considers a petition for review", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 85, 86. Retail Property Trust, 768 F.3d at 947-48, n.5. 21 . ECF No. 16 at 6. 22 . 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 40103. 23 . United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969). 24 . 49 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 40101-46507. 25 . 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 41713. 26 . 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 42121. 27 . ECF No. 16 at 6. 28 . Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007). 29 . Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Hldgs., Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2009). 30 . Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2014). 31 . Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468 (affirming dismissal of passenger's failure-to-warn claims); Martin, 555 F.3d at 812 (reversing dismissal of airline's indemnity claim); Ventress, 747 F.3d at 723 (affirming judgment on the pleadings). 32 . Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468 (<HOLDING>); Martin, 555 F.3d at 811-812 (holding that FAA Holdings: 0: holding state failuretowarn claims were preempted because any warning label linking said drugs to suicide would have been false and misleading 1: holding that failuretowarn claims based on theory that faarequired warnings are insufficient are preempted 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding the state law claims were not preempted 4: holding that a failuretowarn claim against a pharmaceutical company was not impliedly preempted", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "attention of the court. If the court finds that the petitioner is indigent, it shall allow petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis. If the court finds the indigent petitioner is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction, and has requested representation, it shall order a copy of the petition sent to the Public Defender\u2019s office. P-C.R. 1, \u00a7 2. Although Barclay was in prison and attached an affidavit of indigence to his petition, the court did not forward his petition to the Public Defender\u2019s office as required by P-C.R. 1, \u00a7 2. The State recognizes that the court erred in this omission but asserts that it is harmless error. We disagree. There are two reasons behind the rule requiring Barclay\u2019s petition for post-conviction relief to be for .1994), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied (<HOLDING>). Barclay properly filed with his petition an Holdings: 0: holding that a prior conviction in a georgia state court was appropriately used to qualify the defendant as a career offender because he failed to prove he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel 1: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself 2: holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection 3: holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so 4: holding that when the defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty he waived any claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the defendants inculpatory statements", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Under \u00a7 15-18-8, Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement. The circuit court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to order that Austin serve only 26 months in confinement. Accordingly, we must again remand this case for the circuit court to conduct another sentencing hearing and to again reconsider the execution of Austin\u2019s 20-year sentence. As we stated in our original opinion: \u201cBecause the 20-year sentence was valid, the circuit court may not change it. See Wood[ v. State, 602 So.2d 1195 (Ala.Crim.App.1992)]. However, the court may either split the sentence in compliance with \u00a7 15-18-8, i.e., with no more than 5 years in confinement [and no less than 3 years in confinement], see, e.g., Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2001)(<HOLDING>), or, if it determines that splitting the Holdings: 0: holding that judge found sentence enhancements mandatorily imposed under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict or facts admitted by the defendant violate the sixth amendments guarantee of the right to trial by jury 1: holding that the newly amended  15188 allows a trial judge to suspend a sentence imposed upon application of the schoolhousing enhancements despite the prohibition against probation in  13a12250 and 13a12270 2: holding that probation is not a sentence 3: holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation 4: holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the verdict only if the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1192 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1002 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1200, 116 S.Ct. 1701, 134 L.Ed.2d 800 (1996); United States v. Moralez, 964 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir.1992). The jury found Granados guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion and attempt to commit extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1951(a). Extortion is the wrongful use of force or fear, including fear of economic harm, to obtain money or property from another person. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion); United States v. Sturman, 49 F.3d 1275, 1281 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lisinski, 728 F.2d 887, 890 Holdings: 0: holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm 1: recognizing  1951 includes fear of economic harm 2: holding that expenses includes costs 3: recognizing the economic realities test 4: holding that an asylum applicant must show at least a deliberate imposition of a substantial economic disadvantage in order for the harm to constitute economic persecution", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "tort cases without express focus on choice of law issues. See, e.g., Carmichael v. KBR, 572 F.3d 1271, 1288 n. 13 (11th Cir.2009) (providing that the court\u2019s analysis \u201cwould remain the same regardless of which state\u2019s law applied\u201d); see also Taylor v. KBR, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir.2011) (dismissing on political question grounds -without discussing choice of law); Lane v. Halliburton, supra. The evidence of sensitive military decisions persuaded these courts that such cases are not \u201ctypical negligence action[s]\u201d where the fact-finder can \u201cdraw upon common sense and everyday experience\u201d in determining whether a military contractor acted reasonably. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1289. But cf. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359-62 (11th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Differences among the tort regimes of the Holdings: 0: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 1: holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error 2: holding that submissions qualified as cda claims when the contractor asserted in writing and with sufficient specificity a right to additional compensation and the contractor communicated his desire for a contracting officer decision 3: holding that private contractor failed to demonstrate that claims against it required reexamination of a military decision 4: holding that a contractor lacked standing because it failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not have authority over Plaintiffs teaching or writing, they could not give him orders that he had to obey, and they did not have ultimate authority over whether or not he would be retained by University.\u201d Id. at 629. Similarly, the Journalism Department faculty were responsible for reviewing Ku-bik\u2019s progress and for making a recommendation, but did not have authority to reappoint Kubik. In fact, the Department\u2019s first recommendation that Kubik not be reappointed was rejected by Dean Gha-nem. Kubik attempts to distinguish Sam Han by arguing that the Sixth Circuit was applying an Ohio statute, but the statutory language is substantially identical. See Ohio. Rev. Code \u00a7 4112.02. See also Masi v. DTE Coke Operations, LLC, No. 06-11592, 2007 WL 2827845, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (<HOLDING>). Kubik cites Dutt v. Delaware State College Holdings: 0: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 1: holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under  1981 2: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 3: holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff 4: holding that the defendants were not liable for failing to perform the thorough professional investigation the plaintiff would have preferred", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on March 6, 2008. Among the forms was an arbitration agreement. When the Estate filed this action, the defendants timely requested arbitration. The Estate argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and otherwise unenforceable. In an order that did not explain its reasoning, the trial court denied arbitration. There is no evidence that the signing of these documents involved procedural un-conscionability, and the trial court did not find that any procedural unconscionability occurred in this case. From the transcript of the hearing, it appears the trial court held that the agreement was unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable. We conclude that the trial court erred in this ruling. See FL-Carrollwood Care, LLC v. Gordon, 72 So.3d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (<HOLDING>). In addition to providing for arbitration as a Holdings: 0: holding that arbitration agreement was not unconscionable where agree ment did not limit punitive damages and limitation of liability provision was severable if unenforceable 1: holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced 2: holding that limitation of liability provisions in arbitration agreement included in nursing homes admissions documents violated public policy and were not severable because they constituted financial heart of arbitration agreement 3: holding that an arbitration clause is valid despite an accompanying limitation on liability because the latter is severable in the event it is found unconscionable 4: holding that under a severability clause arbitration provision was not rendered unenforceable because it contained an invalid limitation on punitive damages", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in the instant case. The Department has acknowledged the finality of its decisions in its formal written reports submitted to Congress. Likewise, the Department\u2019s Operational Plan states that \u201csampling for non-response will be used to complete the census enumeration.\u201d As read in the Appropriations Act of 1998 \u00a7 209(c)(2), the Census 2000 Operational Plan \u201cshall be deemed to constitute final agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 2000 decennial census,\u201d thus making the question of use ripe for adjudication. Appropriations Act of 1998 \u00a7 209(c)(2) (emphasis added). Defendant\u2019s suggests that the case is not ripe because \u201cCongress has not reached its ultimate legislative conclusion regarding a s al Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Holdings: 0: holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review 1: holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed 2: holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred 3: holding that termite damage does not fall within the meaning of property damage in the policy because the alleged misrepresentations did not cause the damage the termites did 4: holding that a partys responsibility for damage from any cause included damage cause by the indemnitee", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "he believed Reuland lied to him. Hynes\u2019s counsel attempted to broaden this to simply \u201che had lied period,\u201d but the court responded: \u201cThat is not what the evidence is____The whole issue whether he lied to him. This really isn\u2019t ... a Pickering question, it\u2019s a causation question. It is a way of focusing more precisely on your version of what caused the demotion.\u201d Rather than persist in her Pickering argument, Hynes\u2019s counsel replied, \u201cI think that is right. I think what Your Honor has proposed will work.\u201d Generally, we need not consider a claim on appeal where the party advancing it consented not to submit it to the jury below. See Coffey v. Dobbs Int\u2019l Servs., Inc., 170 F.3d 323, 325 n. 2 (2d Cir.1999); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). By failing to make clear to the district Holdings: 0: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source 1: holding that theories of liability or defense pleaded and proved but not submitted are abandoned 2: holding that a theory of recovery pleaded but not submitted to the jury by explicit agreement need not be considered on appeal 3: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 4: holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the summary judgment motion, the district court recognized that Autrey could prevail on his claims of malicious prosecution and his Fourth Amendment claim of wrongful arrest only if the plaintiff could somehow establish that no probable cause for his prosecution had been established. Because a state-court judge had already determined that probable cause existed to bind Autrey over for trial, however, the district court determined that principles of collateral estoppel precluded the plaintiff from pursuing a second time an identical challenge to the quantum of evidence necessary to initiate a criminal prosecution. Additionally concluding that the plaintiff failed to make any showing \u201cthat Kennedy an 456 Mich. 365, 572 N.W.2d 603, 610 (1998) (Michigan tort of malicious prosecution) (<HOLDING>). When deciding what role the Michigan state Holdings: 0: holding that malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause 1: holding that a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution action must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying criminal charge 2: holding that a malicious prosecution plaintiff must show inter alia that the criminal proceeding was initiated without probable cause 3: holding that the plaintiff must show that the person instituting or maintaining the prosecution lacked probable cause for bringing the action 4: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "which you indicated was the last day that you worked, through April the 26th of 2001, did you speak to any member of management relative to any of the reasons why you were absent from work? A. No, I didn\u2019t. (Id. at 76.) The Court finds that the notice given to the Defendant through the automated telephone system was simply inadequate to invoke the protection of the FMLA. Courts have consistently held that to give adequate notice to invoke the FMLA, an employee must inform his employer that he has a serious health condition. Ha/mmon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999); Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149, F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998); Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.1995); see also Taylor v. Invacare Corp., 64 Fed. Appx. 516 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Simply selecting the \u201cill\u201d option on an Holdings: 0: holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave 1: holding that employer controlled the victims will at least in part by using his position as the victims employer 2: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 3: holding that employers knowledge of employees criminal conviction for intoxication did not put employer on notice that employee might be a thief 4: holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc  2612a1 has occurred", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Amtrak\u2019s motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts II, IV and the age and perceived disability discrimination claims in Count V; and DENIED with respect to Counts I and III and the claims of race and gender discrimination in Count V. Green and Porter\u2019s motion for summary judgment is DENIED with respect to the \u00a7 1981 termination claim in Count I and the claims of race and gender discrimination in termination in Count V; and GRANTED with respect to the age and perceived disability discrimination in termination claims in Count V, and the failure to hire claims of Counts I and V. 1 . To the extent plaintiff also set forth claims against Green and Porter under Title VII, Title VII does not provide for liability against individual employees. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Martin v. Howard Univ., No. 99-1175, 1999 WL Holdings: 0: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 1: holding that an employer alone is liable for a violation of title vii by supervisory employees 2: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 3: holding that individual defendants with supervisory control over plaintiff cannot be held personally liable under title vii 4: holding individual employees may be liable under title vii", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "482 F.3d 860 (6th Cir.2007), the Sixth Circuit found that an administrator had acted arbitrarily and capriciously where he failed to \u201c \u2018review ... the quality and quantity of the ... evidence and the opinions on both sides of the issues.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 865 (quoting McDonald v. W.S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161, 172 (6th Cir.2003)). The court held that the administrator\u2019s denial of benefits failed under this standard. Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, the existence of a conflict of interest that arises from a plan administrator deciding issues in which the company has a financial interest does not require a different standard, although the conflict \u201cshapes\u201d the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>) (citing Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Holdings: 0: holding that the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard applies where a plan administrator despite delegating its claim processing duties to a third party exercises the ultimate authority to determine for itself whether payments should be made out of its own assets 1: holding that a court is to factor an insurers dual role into its review under the arbitrary and capricious standard though the standard remains arbitrary and capri cious 2: holding that when applying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review the courts role is to determine whether the plan administrators decision was completely unreasonable 3: holding that where a company pays plan beneficiaries from its own assets its perpetual conflict with its profitmaking role as a business must shape  the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard 4: holding that a company that generated revenue from the sale of its assets remained in business", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Second Circuit described it, the day \u201cwhen [the petitioner] was denied leave to appeal,\u201d Geraci 211 F.3d at 9 (emphasis added). Second, the court noted that \u201c[t]he coram nobis petition was denied on February 17, 1998 and the time clock started to run again .... until February 24, 1998, the day the [habe-as] petition was filed, a total of seven days.\u201d Geraci 211 F.3d at 9. This calculation of \u201cseven days\u201d indicates that the court necessarily included either the date the coram nobis petition was denied or the date the habeas petition was filed. Upon consideration, it must have been the latter, because in determining whether a habeas petition is timely filed, a court must include the petition filing date within the limitations period. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Geraci\u2019s primary holding \u2014 that a coram nobis Holdings: 0: holding that the habeas petition did not qualify for equitable tolling because the petitioner discovered that his attorney had lied about filing a petition in early 2008 and yet the petitioner did not file one himself until nearly two years later 1: holding that employer was estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense where the insurer had arranged to have the claimant examined by one of its physicians after the statute of limitations had run 2: holding that where the limitations period had run for 364 days petitioner had one day remaining  in which to file the  habeas petition 3: holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending 4: holding that dismissing a habeas petition as timebarred under the aedpa does not violate the suspension clause because petitioner had years to file the petition and gave no explanation why he failed to file on time", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "procedures to obtain an untainted interview with L.B. were unsuccessful, because L.B.\u2019s father spoke with her privately before she left for the shelter home. To determine what process is constitutionally due, we look to three somewhat flexible demands of procedural due process: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. 2493, 2503-04, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (<HOLDING>). As the district court noted, \u201c[t]he bonds of Holdings: 0: holding that a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 1: holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody 2: holding that a child has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment under the fourth amendment 3: recognizing the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 4: recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Code \u00a7 288(a), does not qualify as a crime of violence. He contends that Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled United States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.2003). This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511-16 (9th Cir.2009). Perez-Ramos also contends that Nijhawan v. Holder, \u2014 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), effectively overruled Medina-Villa. This contention fails. See Nijhawan, 129 S.Ct. at 2300. Finally, Perez-Ramos\u2019s contention that we must call for en banc review based on a conflict between Estrada-E spinoza and Medinor-Villa is without merit. See Pelayo-Gareia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1013-16 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: recognizing the two distinct generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and holding that a statute contains the element of abuse under the medinavilla definition if it applies to sexual conduct with children younger than fourteen years 1: holding that the new york misdemeanor offense of sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an aggravated felony under ina  101a43asexual abuse of a minor 2: holding that a conviction under  22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach 3: recognizing that estradaespinoza and medinavilla set out two different generic federal definitions of sexual abuse of a minor  and looking to both definitions to determine whether conviction under calpenal code  2615d qualifies as generic federal crime of sexual abuse of a minor under categorical approach 4: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was under theories of Article I rejected by the Court in Seminole. As the Third Circuit stated in a related context: If a state\u2019s conduct impacting on a business always implicated the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would have almost unrestricted power to subject states to suit' through the exercise of its abrogation power. Congress could pass any law that tangentially affected the ability of businesses to operate and then create causes of action against the states in federal court if they infringed on those federally created rights. This result would be unacceptable and would conflict directly with the strict limits on Congress\u2019s powers to abrogate a state\u2019s El Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F.Supp. 400 (D.N.J.1996) (<HOLDING>), appeal pending, No. 97-1246 (Fed. Cir. argued Holdings: 0: holding that a patent is property for purposes of the fourteenth amendment and that remedial legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity under seminole is constitutional 1: holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity 2: holding retroactive a pennsylvania case abrogating common law sovereign immunity 3: holding the fourteenth amendment partially abrogated eleventh amendment sovereign immunity 4: holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with Tang\u2019s assertion that the omitted portion of his statement \u201cspecifically rebuffs] the defamatory charge that [the] article imputed to [Tang].\u201d Rather, this is but one interpretation depending on the listener\u2019s point of view. In the absence of evidence that it omitted Tang\u2019s remarks to portray his statements falsely, the First Amendment protects the Houston Chinese Press\u2019s editorial choice regarding what material it included in the article. See id. Tang offered no evidence to controvert Wang\u2019s testimony regarding his interpretation of Tang\u2019s remarks. Nor has Tang offered sufficient evidence to show that Wang\u2019s interpretation was not a plausible or reasonable one in light of the tenor of the press conference and the provocative nature of Tang\u2019s analogy. See Cantu, 168 S.W.3d at 855 (<HOLDING>). Given Wang\u2019s understanding of Tang\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings 1: holding that understandable misinterpretation of ambiguous facts does not show actual malice 2: holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel 3: holding exclusion was not ambiguous 4: holding that mere surmise or suspicion of malice does not carry the probative force necessary to form the basis of a legal inference of malice", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "t Den-ton\u2019s argument that defendants decided to investigate the June 30, 2011, arrest, terminate his employment, and release the video to the Tulsa World in retaliation for the July 7, 2011, email he sent to his fellow union members. Denton also argues that because Owasso declined to impose any significant discipline against a group of police officers who engaged in similar conduct during the arrest of a suspect several years earlier, the harsher decisions made with regard to Denton must have been linked to his union activity when he sent the email. Although the Garcetti/Pickering analysis applies to an association based retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only satisfy the first, fourth, and fifth prongs of the test. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we examine whether the email was Holdings: 0: holding that the disappearance by merger of a corporate employer which has entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union does not automatically terminate all rights of the employees covered by the agreement and that in appropriate circumstances present here the successor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the agreement 1: holding that a court should not require a showing of public concern or engage in judicial balancing of the employers interest against the employees interest when the public employee alleges retaliation for participation in a union with which his employer has signed a collective bargaining agreement 2: holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union 3: recognizing the public interest exception 4: holding that the scope of a government employees first amendment rights depends on the balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. USSG \u00a7 4B1.2(a). In addition, relevant commentary to this section provides: \u201cCrime of violence\u201d includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included as \u201ccrimes of violence\u201d if (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (ie., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convict 261, 262, 264 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). However, we acknowledge that the Eighth Holdings: 0: recognizing that felony and misdemeanor dwi are separate offenses because a prior conviction is an essential element of felony driving while intoxicated but it is not an element of the misdemeanor offense 1: holding morevstat  569055 qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of ussg  4b12a 2: holding that assault conviction for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and causing serious bodily injury to the person of another with the motor vehicle qualified as a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a 3: holding a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated dwi may be a crime of violence 4: holding that misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under ussg  4b12a", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646); Red Star Towing, 552 F.Supp. at 371 (\u201c[Fitzgerald] established that a litigant in admiralty is not entitled as a matter of right to a non-jury trial ....\u201d) Furthermore, when non-jury admiralty claims are joined with legal claims carrying a jury right, the constitutional right to a jury should prevail. See Mayer v. Cornell Univ., 909 F.Supp. 81, 85 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (stating \u201cgeneral rule\u201d that \u201cwhen admiralty claims are joined with claims which carry the right to a jury, the right to a jury prevails\u201d); In re Complaint of Berkley Curtis Bay Co., 569 F.Supp. 1491, 1494 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (\u201c[W]here the nonjury\u2019 admiralty tradition and a plaintiffs jury right conflict, the jury right must prevail.\u201d); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.Supp. 1275, 1276-77 (D.Conn.1976) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 38.32 Holdings: 0: holding that a demand for a trial by jury is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty 1: holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored 2: recognizing that parties had right to trial by jury in trespass action but holding that parties waived that right under cr 3804 by not filing a demand for a jury trial 3: holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed 4: holding that under rule 38e there is no right to a trial by jury if plaintiff chooses to identify his claim as admiralty or maritime as permitted by rule 9h", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; or (e)having an interest in, using, or possessing a real or immovable property in this state. In addition, La. R.S. 13:3202 expressly limited La.R.S. 13:3201 to causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated therein. 3 . In 1984, the designations were also changed from letters to numerals such that Subsection (h) is now Subsection (8). 4 . This Court has noted the difference, in the context of personal jurisdiction in products liability cases, between a manufacturer and a distributor. McBead Drilling Co. v. Kremco, Ltd., 509 So.2d 429, 432 (La.1987) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Federal circuit courts are somewhat Holdings: 0: holding over 1: holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 2: holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold 3: holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident auto distributor whose only connection to the forum resulted from a customers decision to drive there failed to provide the defendant with clear notice that it would be subject to suit in the forum state and thus an opportunity to alleviate the risk of burden some litigation there 4: holding that in litigation arising from a product related injury in the forum state there are significant differences between the exercise of jurisdiction over a retailer who simply sold the product locally and the exercise of jurisdiction over a manufacturer whose products were sold over a large area", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a prepayment of royalties pursuant to 30 U.S.C. \u00a7 1726(b) shall be distributed as follows: (1) a portion of the receipts, estimated by the taxation and revenue department to be equal to the amount that the state would have received as its share of royalties in the same fiscal year if the prepayment had not been made, shall be distributed to the public school fund; and (2) the remainder shall be distributed to the common school permanent fund. 2 . In addition to their claim for prospective relief, Plaintiffs originally claimed a right to payment of past royalties. The Eleventh Amendment, however, clearly bars any claim for the retroactive payment of royalties the State has received pursuant to the FMLA. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-671, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (<HOLDING>). 3 . In previously holding that FMLA Holdings: 0: recognizing that claims against a state under  1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment 1: holding that judgments for prospective relief that have an ancillary effect on the state treasury do not offend the eleventh amendment 2: holding the eleventh amendment barred the retroactive payment of state benefits wrongfully withheld 3: recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment 4: holding the eleventh amendment barred that portion of a district court order directing retroactive payment of aid benefits from the illinois treasury", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Privilege (2d ed. 1990); cf. Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied sub nom., Gamer v. First American Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1191, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (in analyzing attorney-client privilege issues, \u201c[cjoneeptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an entity ... are not useful tools of analysis.\u201d). This is such an instance. Plaintiffs have sued not only the Town of Georgetown, but the individual members of its Town Council. See D.I. 1. The Court must, therefore, examine the legal relationship that exists between the Town Council and its individual councilmembers in evaluating attorney-client privilege issues. See Del.U.R.E. 502(b)(3); Kirby v. Kirby, No. 8604, 1987 WL 14862 (Del.Ch. July 29, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, Holdings: 0: holding that independent directors can be entrusted with the decision to sue other directors on behalf of the corporation 1: holding the privilege belonged to both the corporate client  a closely held charitable foundation  and its directors because at the time of the privileged communication the directors collectively were the client 2: recognizing privilege for corporate officers directors and shareholders to influence the actions of their corporation 3: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 4: holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of her continued failure to cooperate and open disobedience to plaintiff in administrative matters; and 4. On May 8, 1996, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant President Judge Bonavi-tacola stating that he would attend a meeting of the Administr s instance, plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to demonstrate that his complaints did not relate solely to the removal of his personal responsibilities but also touched on the issues of the proper role of a guberna-torially appointed President Judge versus a judicially appointed Court Administrator and the extent of political influence on administrative decisions in the judiciary, issues which are of general public concern. See Complaint \u00b6\u00b6 43, 48-49, 51; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (<HOLDING>). And the fact that these communications were Holdings: 0: recognizing that even as to an issue that could arguably be viewed as a matter of public concern if the employee has raised the issue solely in order to further his own employment interest his first amendment right to comment on that issue is entitled to little weight 1: holding that the trial judge did not err by denying a motion to recuse that alleged in part that a defendant had previously worked on the judges election campaigns 2: holding that a question relating to whether assistant district attorneys felt pressured to work on political campaigns touched on a matter ofpublic concern even though the rest of the questions in the questionnaire at issue did not 3: holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation 4: holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and no argument that its increasing the fee contravened state law. Although the plaintiff couched its appellate arguments in terms of whether the unilateral amendment of the alleged contract was \u201clawfully authorized,\u201d the only question was whether the State would breach the alleged contract that the license represented by its increasing the fee, not whether the State would act contrary to statute in doing so. See id. at 77-78, 308 S.W.2d at 840. The Dodgen court held that the State was not so bound; in so holding, the court distinguished the case from those in which a plaintiff seeks to determine whether State officials are acting outside their statutory or constitutional authority. See id. at 78-79, 308 S.W.2d at 840 (distinguishing Cobb, 144 Tex. at 365-66, 190 S.W.2d at 712 (<HOLDING>)). In the case before us, the protesting Holdings: 0: holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state 1: holding the rule against taxpayer standing applies both to federal taxpayers and state taxpayers challenging state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as state taxpayers 2: holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that suit by taxpayers alleging that they fell outside statutorily defined class subject to occupation tax so that states attempt to collect such tax from them was illegal was not suit against state", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "jurors should have been allowed to hear the 911 tape is no exceptio be worded Independently of our concern regarding the decision about the tape, we also hold that the conference triggered Frantz\u2019s Faretta rights because it resolved the content of the judge\u2019s response to the jurors\u2019 request. The chance to shape the jury\u2019s interpretation of an important tactical decision is at least as important as the chance to make the decision itself. And regardless of the judge\u2019s leeway in granting the jurors\u2019 request, the substance and wording of the judge\u2019s response could have influenced the jurors\u2019 interpretation of the tape\u2019s absence. We have repeatedly recognized how seriously jurors consider judges\u2019 responses to their questions. In federal court, we allow trial judges substantial th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Because of the delicate nature of such Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendants participation in formulating a response to a deadlocked jury  may be important to ensuring the fairness of the verdict particularly because there may be holdout jurors 1: holding that trial court was not required to instruct the jury to continue deliberations because despite jurors initial indication that the verdict was not hers she unequivocally affirmed the verdict in response to additional questions 2: recognizing that immunity may be waived 3: holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate liability was hotly contested at trial the jury was deadlocked the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict 4: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s granting of motion to dismiss). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). However, a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992); Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Biggs, 237 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Therefore, when the issues are purely questions of law, as here, we effectively conduct a de novo review. See Pallares v. Magic Valley Elec. Coop., Inc., 267 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2008, pet. refd); see also Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex.1989) (<HOLDING>). III. Analysis By his sole issue, Dr. Salinas Holdings: 0: holding that the function of the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether issues of fact exist and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves 1: holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact 2: holding that courts must decide pure questions of statutory construction 3: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 4: holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "was a GS-13 who performed duties similar to the ones plaintiff performed as Acting Team Leader. Id. 52:4-5. Yet plaintiff also conceded that Lane was not promoted to a GS-14 level. \u201cQ. And did Iris Lane, did she ever become a GS-14? A. No.\u201d Id. 52:6-8. Plaintiff therefore identifies no other individuals who were promoted when her alleged request was denied. Even if the Court looks more expansively at plaintiffs proposed comparables described above, there is no evidence that individuals performing work similar to plaintiff were employed at or above a grade 14 level. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff herself admits that Iris Lane performed similar work and was also a grade 13. Id. 52:4-5. Kress indicates he performed similar work to plaintiff a Sept. 19, 2007) (<HOLDING>). B. 2003 Performance Evaluation Plaintiff next Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because there was no evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiffs protected conduct 1: holding that fourth element of a prima facie case is satisfied when the employees who were more favorably treated were situated similarly to the plaintiff 2: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position 3: holding that because there was no evidence before the court of any similarly situated employees who were promoted to a higher salary grade when plaintiff was denied a promotion plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote 4: holding that district court erred by requiring plaintiffs to show that they were better qualified than employees who were promoted in order to make a prima facie case", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Thus, facilitation of aggravated burglary presents a risk of physical injury sufficient to be classified as a \u201cviolent felony.\u201d Sawyers, relying on United States v. Pazzanese, 982 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.1992), argues that criminal facilitation is never a \u201cviolent felony\u201d under the ACCA. Although Sawyers commingles the arguments, there are essentially two components to this claim: first, because of the categorical approach, facilitation crimes cannot be classified as a \u201cviolent felony\u201d based on the underlying crime; and second, facilitation does not meet the inherent mens rea requirement in the ACCA. The first argument is quickly disposed of. First, criminal facilitation in Tennessee requires the government to show that the underlying crime actually occurred. See Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 951 (<HOLDING>)(fodtnote omitted); see also State v. Virges, Holdings: 0: holding that proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not a necessary element in a conviction for the commission of the felony 1: holding that for facilitation of a felony the state must prove the commission of a specified felony and the assistance the accused gave to the person committing the specified felony 2: holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law 3: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 4: holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to create a new right,\u201d but instead were intended to overrule Texport and thus to clarify the pre-existing right to drawback of HMT. See Aectra, 565 F.3d at 1369-70; Recording of Oral Argument at 12:15-13:55 (Shell argued that statement in Aectra is inconsistent with conceptual underpinnings of default rule). Shell\u2019s \u201cdefault rule\u201d argument is both untimely and lacking in merit. As noted above, Shell raised the argument for the first time at oral argument. Shell\u2019s briefs do not even allude to the default rule, much less articulate a position on the relevance and application of the rule to the facts of this case. By failing to brief the point, Shell waived its right to press its default rule argument here. See, e.g., Novosteel SA v. United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1273-74 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). However, even if Shell had briefed (and thus Holdings: 0: holding that issue raised for the first time in reply brief was waived 1: holding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived 2: holding that party waived argument which was not presented to court of international trade until after the party had filed its principal summary judgment brief reasoning that parties must give a trial court a fair opportunity to rule on an issue other than by raising that issue for the first time in a reply brief 3: holding that this court will not address the merits of an issue presented for the first time in a reply brief 4: holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "IN PART. ORFINGER and EVANDER, JJ\u201e concur. 1 . Despite the fact that Nicole\u2019s current full-time job compensates her better than any job she had prior to or during her marriage, she still earns approximately one third of the income earned by Robert. 2 . We would also recede from the other panel decisions from our court that have followed or applied the same rule announced in Martin. See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 895 So.2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Widmer v. Widmer, 713 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Fullerton v. Fullerton, 709 So.2d 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Ingle v. Ingle, 640 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). 3 . We note that a panel of this court several years ago signaled the court's willingness to reconsider Martin. See Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So.2d 1023, 1031-32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). The trial courts within Holdings: 0: recognizing that although this court has not looked kindly on bridge the gap rehabilitative alimony awards in the past in a proper case it might do so in the future 1: holding that for 9year marriage where wife was 29years old and able to be selfsufficient rehabilitative alimony should have been awarded reversing permanent periodic alimony as inappropriate 2: holding that length of marriage and the proper amount or duration of alimony do not correlate in any mathematical formula 3: holding that the proper focus should be on whether the outofstate defendant engaged in any act that might provide the court with jurisdiction 4: recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Clouse, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that service had been completed for purposes of the savings statute when a process server served the defendant\u2019s wife and office manager at the defendant\u2019s office after she represented herself as her husband\u2019s agent, but in fact was not. 274 S.W.3d at 345-46. Here, the Barners\u2019 attorney sent the complaint and summons for T/C LLC by certified mail to the wrong registered agent, which accepted service on T/C LLC\u2019s behalf and sent a return receipt to the Barners\u2019 attorney showing that service had been completed. This case is much closer to Cole and Clouse than to cases in which the Arkansas courts have held that the savings statute did not apply. See, e.g., Posey v. St. Bernard\u2019s Healthcare, Inc., 365 Ark. 154, 226 S.W.3d 757, 761, 765-66 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Hicks v. Clark, 316 Ark. 148, 870 S.W.2d 750, Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs did not complete service for purposes of the savings statute when they served the defendant with a complaint signed by an unlicensed attorney a nullity under arkansas law and made no attempt to serve the defendant with the amended complaint 1: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 2: holding defendant waived complaint 3: holding that the plaintiff did not complete service when she made no attempt to serve the defendant within the time required by the arkansas procedural rules 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "alleged interest created by the State rises to the level of \u2018property,\u2019 thereby securing the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\u201d). Significantly, \u00a7 42-56-22, like \u00a7 42-56-21, vests Wall with total discretion over whether Young may work at all, by making the labor of prisoners subject to the \u201cdiscretion of the director\u201d and contingent upon receipt of the \u201cexpress consent of the director.\u201d Such discretion evidences a lack of intent to provide prisoners with a protected property interest. See, e.g., Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir.1995) (reasoning that \u201c[wjhere the statute or policy ... grants to the decisionmaker discretionary authority in implementing it, a protected property interest is not created\u201d); cf. Bishop v. State, 667 A.2d 275, 277-78 (R.I.1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, under Rhode Island law, a Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendant challenges the use of documents purporting to establish the washington classification of an outofstate conviction the state must present additional evidence of the proper classification so as to carry its burden of proving the defendants criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that a prisoner has no constitutionallybased liberty interest in a particular prison classification  because an inmate is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison 2: holding that prisoner had no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in prisoninmate classification system process where director of department of corrections retained unfettered discretion in classification and housing of prisoners 3: holding that a statecreated liberty interest in ones classification may exist where classification imposes atypical and significant hardship 4: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "471 (5th Cir.2002)). 19 . McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2007). 20 . Id. 21 . Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.2003). 22 . We also note that if the ALJ\u2019s conclusion were relevant in this appeal, then the ALJ\u2019s other conclusion \u2014 that \"the facts fail to validate [Etienne's] assertion that the reason for her separation was due to the complaint she logged with the [EEOC]\u201d \u2014 also presumably would be relevant. We doubt that Etienne desires such a result. 23 . Laxton, 333 F.3dat 579. (quoting Evans v. City of Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2001)). 24 . Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, - U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). 25 . Cf. Pennington v. Tex. Dep\u2019t of Family & Protective Servs., 469 Fed.Appx. 332, 338 (5th Cir.2012) Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims 1: holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient 2: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 3: holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the applicant\u2019s information-a confidential informant, Slycord, and Carroll-White-were facing criminal charges. However, a fair read of the application in its entirety makes this point clear. The application states that Slycord and Carroll-White\u2019s shared residence was raided on December 4, 1999, and that officers found a substantial amount of methamphetamine therein. It further states that the signing officer interviewed Carroll-White and Slycord two days later, on December 6. The issuing judge could reasonably infer that Carroll-White and Slycord were likely to face serious drug charges. Moreover, even if the warrant application were corrected as Oleson suggests, probable cause would still exist to support its issuance. See United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not err in denying Holdings: 0: holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within 1: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 2: holding that probable cause is the appropriate standard for  3144 material witness warrants 3: holding that hearing on warrants validity required only where defendant can show warrant would not have established probable cause if corrected 4: holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "strategic purposes. The courts were justifiably cautious in observing the potential preclusive effect of such weak class actions. Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 39-0211, 220 F.R.D. 64,-, 2004 WL 187332, at *18 (M.D.Tenn. Jan. 14, 2004). In contrast, in this case the court is satisfied that the interests of the named plaintiffs are aligned with the interests of the absent class members. Although the named plai ndem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 211 (5th Cir.2003) (observing that \u201c[fjraud actions that require proof of individual reliance cannot be certified as Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) class actions\u201d; holding the district court committed reversible error by certifying a class in a RICO fraud action); Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197, Holdings: 0: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 1: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 2: holding that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not provide a sufficient basis for jurisdiction because they do not mandate payment of money by the government 3: holding fraud claims do not provide a suitable basis for classwide relief 4: holding that claims not properly raised on direct appeal will not be considered as a basis for collateral relief", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the constitutional right \u201cat de minimis cost to valid penological interests.\u201d ... Ramirez, 379 F.3d at 126 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in the original). While the Tuner factors \u201cserve as guides to a single reasonableness standard,\u201d the first factor \u201c \u2018looms especially large\u2019 because it \u2018tends to encompass the remaining factors, and some of its criteria are apparently necessary conditions.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213-14 (3d Cir.1999)). If the connection between a prison policy and the government\u2019s asserted interests is too tenuous, the policy is \u201carbitrary or irrational\u201d and \u201cfails irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.\u201d Wolf, 297 F.3d at 309-10. Accord Ashker v. Califonia Dept. of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has made clear that the Holdings: 0: holding that where one argument is dispositive of the appeal we need not address the defendants other arguments 1: holding that if a policy fails the first tuner prong the court need not address the other factors 2: holding appellate court need not address issues unnecessary to its decision 3: holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case 4: holding that this court need not address the merits of an argument raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and the failure of the City to award promotions to the plaintiffs. Only one racist comment was mentioned\u2014 the \u201crug head\u201d remark \u2014 and that comment was directly tied to the failure to promote one of the plaintiffs\u2019 black colleagues. The plaintiffs claim to have verbally notified EEOC officials about other facts that support their hostile-work-environment claim, but the record contains no evidence beyond bald, nonspecific assertions that they did so. No decision in this circuit has held that EEOC charges regarding discrete acts of discrimination are alone sufficient to put the EEOC on notice of a hostile-work-environment claim. Several unpublished decisions of this court have in fact held to the contrary. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Cleveland, 294 Fed.Appx. 226, 234-35 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 Fed.Appx. Holdings: 0: holding that because the amendment added a new substantive theory which is fundamentally distinct from the original race discrimination charge it did not relate to or grow out of the plaintiffs original eeoc charge 1: holding that claimant exhausted administrative remedies only as to the complaints made in the original charge and factually related claims that reasonably could be expected to grow out of the administrative investigation of that charge 2: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 3: holding that an eeoc investigation of a hostile work environment could not reasonably be expected to grow out of a charge describing the denials of a promotion and a handicapped parking space 4: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "contract on or about December 18, 2000. Both parties stipulated that DPS removed its employees from the Rollins project on Monday, December 18, 2000 and provided no further services to Rollins after that date. In light of this jury finding and the stipulated evidence, we must conclude that DPS received notice of contract termination from Rollins no l nce of any costs avoided to allow the jury to properly calculate net damages. See Farris, 516 S.W.2d at 283-84. However, this general rule does not apply in situations where the breach of contract occurs in such a manner that the non-breaching party does not have the opportunity to reduce its expenses. See Houston Chronicle Publ\u2019g Co. v. McNair Trucklease, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 924, 932 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). We must analyze the jury award for the breach Holdings: 0: holding that if plaintiff substantially performed its contractual obligations then it would be entitled to the payment due under the contract less the cost of any correction of defects in its performance even if it breached the contract 1: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 2: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach 3: holding that if the defendants breach does not permit the plaintiff to reduce its overhead then defendant is not entitled to a reduction in the damages awarded against it 4: holding that it is wellsettled that although a plaintiff is entitled to full recovery for its damages it is not entitled to a double recovery for the same loss or injury", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "they differ, the Constitution must be taken as a limitation or qualification of the general principle previously declared, according to the subject and the language employed.\u2019 Id. at 459 (citation omitted in original). In Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865), the Court considered a provision of the Maryland Constitution of 1864 which was also identical to Art. II, \u00a7 10 of our present Constitution. In holding that the legislature could constitutionally provide for appointment to an office created by it, notwithstanding the separation of powers provision of the Declaration of Rights, the Court said: \u2018The Act in question, creating the office, does prescribe a different mode of appointment. Where the office is of legislative creation, the Legislature can modi 6, 270, 93 A. 518, 520 (1915) (<HOLDING>); Ash v. McVey, 85 Md. 119, 129-31, 36 A. 440, Holdings: 0: holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted 1: holding that the legislature which created the state board of education has the power to abolish modify and control it and therefore had the power to do away with the prerequisite that the senate affirm the governors appointments of all commissioners serving on the board 2: holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor 3: recognizing that the state courts have the power to abolish the tort of alienation of affections 4: holding that the governor did not have to obtain the consent of the senate for the appointment of a candidate when the first candidate had been rejected by the senate the senate was not in session at the time that the second candidate was appointed and because the legislature which created and therefore controlled the office did not require by statute that the governor seek the senates approval in those circumstances", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "yield of money is approximately two percent); O\u2019Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.1982) (Posner, J.) (\"In periods when no inflation is anticipated, the risk-free interest rate is between one and three percent.\u201d); id. at 1200 (indicating that one-half percent is \"lower than most economists believe [the real rate of interest on safe investments] to be for any substantial period of time\u201d); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F.Supp. 1271, 1293-94 (D.Conn.1974) (explaining that: an inflation-adjusted discount rate should be used; the rate should be about two percent during stable periods of low inflation; and it should be approximately one and one-half percent when inflation is high and/or unpredictable); see also Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 548-49, 103 S.Ct. at 2556 (<HOLDING>); Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 722 F.2d 114, 122 Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court using a real growth rate of between one and three percent will not be reversed if it explains its choice 1: holding that a four percent error rate constitutes substantial compliance with a statute 2: holding that a 50 percent error rate would constitute a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation 3: holding that where the proper rate of interest was eight percent but the court ordered six percent movant had waived right to higher rate by not raising the issue earlier in its petition for review 4: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "contains sufficient evidence for a jury to convict the defendant.\u201d United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir.1995). Rather, reversal is appropriate where an error has a substantial influence on the outcome of a trial or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. United States v. Medina-Copete, 757 F.3d 1092, 1108 (10th Cir.2014). In determining whether Mr. Smith\u2019s testimony had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial, we And three factors relevant to this case: (1) the strength, importance, and pervasiveness of the erroneously admitted testimony; (2) the strength of the admissible evidence; and (3) whether the district court\u2019s instructions to the jury mitigated any error. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 914-15 (10th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Tome, 61 F.3d at 1455 (holding that the Holdings: 0: holding although admission of victim impact testimony was error it was harmless in light of strong evidence against defendant 1: holding that error in admission of videotape was harmless because it was cumulative of childs properly admitted live testimony 2: holding that improper admission of expert testimony was harmless in light of otherwise overwhelming evidence and fact that testimony covering substantially the same area was introduced without challenge 3: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 4: holding that other evidence properly admitted at trial was sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the improper admission of unreliable expert testimony was harmless", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "arrested twice in the year preceding the stop, once for manufacturing methamphetamine and once for possession of marijuana. This information was validly considered as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus. However, given that Detective Schaffner\u2019s records check did not indicate that either of those arrests had resulted in a conviction, the Court accords this factor little weight in the overall analysis. 2. Nervousness Similarly, nervous behavior is not in itself sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, but is a factor that may be considered in the analysis. United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. '2007); see also United States v. Crap-ser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). The government contends that Garcia\u2019s extreme Holdings: 0: holding defendants nervousness in part presented officer with reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity 1: holding that reasonableness for qualified immunity purposes requires an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances 2: holding nervousness is of limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists 3: holding that eight factors including the drivers criminal record nervousness and lack of registration justified terry detention 4: holding that while nervousness may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances nervousness standing alone was insufficient to expand a terry stop into an inquiry into drug activity", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,\u201d or (4) the warrant is \u201cso facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.\u201d Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421 (citations omitted). There is no evidence in the record that Officer Hayhoe made any misrepresentations to the issuing state court judge, nor did he make any statements in reckless disregard for the truth. The only incorrect information given to the state court judge was that Taylor\u2019s apartment was unit # 4 instead of unit # 3. At the time it was given Officer Hay-hoe believed this information was correct. The officers did not search Taylor\u2019s apartment (unit # 3) until after a corrected search warr L.Ed.2d 249 (1990); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 448, Holdings: 0: holding that the structure purchased solely for demolition by the birmingham airport authority did not constitute a building for the purpose of thirddegree burglary 1: holding that the insertion of a key into the door of a car to see if it fit constituted the beginning of a search because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 2: holding that mere insertion of key was not a search or at least not an unreasonable search protected by the fourth amendment 3: holding that insertion of a crowbar into the door of a suspects house by officers before they announced their presence constitutes an unreasonable search 4: holding that the insertion of a key into a lock solely for the purpose of identifying ownership does not constitute a search", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not filed for bankruptcy, could have brought them notwithstanding Cannon\u2019s misappropriation of trust property, the presence of the express trust in this case complicates matters. Since Bradford did not accept the trust funds as a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice of Cannon\u2019s breach of trust, under general common-law principles the funds Cannon misappropriated remain subject to the express trust. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 530 U.S. at 252, 120 S.Ct. 2180 (\u201c[W]hatever [the trustee] recovers he will hold subject to the trust.\u201d). Consequently, the trustee\u2019s recovery, if any, in this case will benefit Cannon\u2019s clients \u2014 not the general creditors of the estate. As we previously discussed, section 541 excludes from the debtor\u2019s estate property hel 2d 114 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley, 901 F.2d 979 Holdings: 0: holding that a trustee had no standing to pursue claims of fraud against the debtors accountant because under connecticut law those claims belonged to investors 1: holding that under the rule against splitting a cause of action a new claim for damages is not barred if the underlying cause of action had not accrued at the time of filing the previous lawsuit 2: holding that the trustee had standing to pursue an action for churning against the debtors broker relating to transactions in a discretionary account but did not have standing to bring a suit for fraud since that cause of action accrued to creditors under new york law 3: holding that the rico bar applies even where the plaintiff does not have standing to bring a securities fraud action 4: holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a permanent nuisance action for injury to property because none of the plaintiffs were the owners of the land when the cause of action accrued with the first injury", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to clothe his argument under the guise of Supreme Court authority. Rather, he cites only our holding in Rodriguez to support his claim. Rodriguez itself makes clear, though, that its holding is based solely on Ninth Circuit precedent. Id. (\u201cTo the extent Nelson [v. McCarthy, 637 F.2d 1291, 1296-97 (9th Cir.1980),] requires pre-waiver clarification of a suspect\u2019s wishes concerning his Miranda rights, it has not been superseded by Davis and remains binding precedent.\u201d). Because state courts are not bound under AEDPA by precedent other than that established by the Supreme Court, Rodriguez is immaterial to our review of the state court\u2019s decision to the extent Sessoms relies on it to argue that clarifying questions were required. Compare Albemi v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), with Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 Holdings: 0: holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under  2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner 1: holding that the sixth circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that of the supreme court in determining what is clearly established federal law 2: holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied 3: holding state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the supreme court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators courtroom conduct 4: holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "257 S.E.2d 808, 818 (1979) (quoting Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 764, 99 S.E. 562, 564 (1919))). \u201cWhether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.\u201d Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 1, 12-13, 492 S.E.2d 826, 832 (1997). Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 263, 277, 597 S.E.2d 242, 249 (2004). Absent a direct admission by the defendant, intent to distribute must necessarily be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973). Virginia courts have considered a number of factors alone and in combination when determining if an intent to distribute exists: 1) packaging (see McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 545 S.E.2d 541 (2001) (<HOLDING>)); 2) quantity (see Early v. Commonwealth, 10 Holdings: 0: holding that large amount of cocaine packaged in individual baggies was one basis for affirming conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense 1: holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle 2: holding that cocaine packaged in two individually wrapped blocks in a single plastic bag supported a finding of distribution 3: holding officers observation of plastic bag protruding from defendants pocket coupled with defendants behavior and officers knowledge that the area was commonly used for narcotic transactions and narcotics are commonly packaged in plastic bags provided sufficient probable cause to seize the plastic bag and arrest the defendant 4: holding there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to distribute where the defendant dropped a plastic bag containing loose white rocks of cocaine and there was no other indicia of the defendants intent such as the drugs being packaged in smaller baggies", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "statute and thus was invalid. See Felton I, 4 Vet.App. at 369-71; Ozer I, 14 Vet.App. at 263-64. Indeed, as the preceding discussion shows, the Court\u2019s denunciation of the regulation was even stronger in Felton I than in Ozer I. See ibid. Therefore, the Court holds that the Secretary was substantially justified in promulgating the regulation at issue here. See Felton II, 7 Vet.App. at 282-84; Secretary\u2019s Oct. 2002 Mem. at 2 (attesting that Federal Register \u201ccontained no discussion of public comments having been solicited or received\u201d). As to the second part of action at the administrative level, VA\u2019s application of the regulation in the instant case, VA and the BVA were bound by law to apply the regulation to the appellant\u2019s claim. See Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 103, 110 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as in Felton II, \u201cthe regulation Holdings: 0: recognizing that zoning agency bodies   are not bound by strict rules of evidence 1: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it 2: holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls 3: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 4: holding that a panel of this court is bound by a holding of a prior panel but is not bound by a prior panels dicta", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "portion of the affidavit on tape.\u201d We are satisfied that under Criminal Rule 37(a)(l)(ii) Officer Mowry\u2019s off-the-record statement to Magistrate Johnson may not be considered as part of the affidavit in support of the search warrant. The affidavit consists of four handwritten paragraphs followed by the words \u201ccontinued on tape,\u201d and six paragraphs transcribed from the testimony which was then recorded. Neither the written nor the taped portions of Officer Mowry\u2019s affidavit contains any express connection between White and 21-D Kennedy Camp. The \u201ccomposite affidavit\u201d cannot be supplemented by additional material which the officer later testifies that he also told the magistrate, but which does not appear of record. See United States v. Anderson, 453 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>). The state\u2019s reliance on Nelson v. State, 628 Holdings: 0: holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant 1: holding that all data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of the affidavit 2: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause 3: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 4: holding that the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "an auto liability line of insurance with nearly identical language to the Nationwide Auto Policy at issue here. Id. at 1274. The Domino\u2019s auto policy' agreed to \u201cpay all sums Domino\u2019s is legally required to pay \u2018caused by an accident\u2019 and resulting from the \u2018ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto.\u2019 \u201d Id. Just like Titan, Domino\u2019s had selected \u201cany auto\u201d in the covered auto section. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court\u2019s holding that Domino\u2019s auto coverage was triggered by the accident. Id. at 1272. The Ninth Circuit, citing California state law precedent, held that the employee\u2019s personal car was a \u201ccovered auto\u201d under the \u201cany auto\u201d designation in Domino\u2019s auto policy. Id. at 1275; See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Swearinger, 169 Cal.App.3d 779, 214 Cal.Rptr. 383 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Nationwide cites Ogden v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Holdings: 0: recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts 1: holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute 2: holding that a vehicle owned by a host family for a school overnight event fell under the any auto designation in the school districts auto policy 3: holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers  who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district  are acting in conjunction with school officials 4: holding school districts had standing to bring claims against the state asserting that school financing system had become unconstitutional", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Tourtellot, No. 12-CV-413 (M.D.N.C. June 13, 2012) (Doc. 15 at 9-10) (finding that, under either mandatory withdrawal standard, legal issues triggered \u00a7 157(d)). Defendant Debtors\u2019 complaint raises a claim of trademark infringement. (Doc. 5 \u00b6\u00b6 93-95.) It alleges that UD filed a federal application to register \u201cAROUNDCAMPUS\u201d as a trademark and service mark. (Id. \u00b6 19.) The application currently awaits decision before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. (Id.) It further alleges that the mark 6 F.3d 144, 152-53 (4th Cir.2012) (laying out a multi-part test to establish trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act and articulating \u201cat least nine factors\u201d relevant to one part of that test); cf. In re Singer Co., N.V., No. 01 CIV. 0165, 2002 WL 243779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2002) (<HOLDING>). Defendant Debtors cite Doctors Assoc., Inc. Holdings: 0: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement 1: holding that the assignor of a patent retained substantial rights in the patent and must be added as an indispensable party 2: holding that copyright infringement defendant failed to prove the affirmative defense of unclean hands which was based on the patent holders marking of its product with an expired patent because there was no evidence that the patent holder had acted with the requisite intent to deceive 3: holding that whether an accused product infringes a patent requires significant and material consideration of patent law and thus withdrawal of reference was mandatory 4: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by the agency\u2019s power to bring suit to require compliance. Another example of this usage, albeit in a slightly different context, appears in the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act; under this statute, suits may not be instituted by individuals or organizations if the EPA or the appropriate state enforcement authority \u201chas commenced and is diligently pursuing a civil or criminal action ... to require compliance\u201d with the Act\u2019s substantive provisions. 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 1365(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Despite this reference to \u201crequir[ing] compliance\u201d in the statutory language, the Supreme Court held in Romero-Barcelo that the Clean Water Act does not require the issuance of an injunction in all cases where a statutory violation has been identified. 456 U.S. at 313, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (<HOLDING>). These examples demonstrate that a statutory Holdings: 0: holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable 1: holding so under circumstances similar to the present ones 2: holding that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history suggests that appointment is permissible only in some limited set of circumstances 3: holding that the grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests a duty to do so under any and all circumstances 4: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., 552 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1977). Indeed, Gulf and Western, holding that the agricultural exemption does not apply to tomato packing facilities that processed tomatoes grown by independent farmers, is controlling here. As in Gulf and Western, the processing activities here are subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act since they are independent of the contract growers\u2019 activity and nonagricultural in nature. REVERSED. 1 . This provision is to be read in parallel with the agricultural exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Bayside Enterprises v. NLRB, 97 S.Ct. 576, 578, 97 S.Ct. 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 494 (1977). 2 . Defendant gains no support from Abbott Farms v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1973) (<HOLDING>) in view of the Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Holdings: 0: holding evidence of one possible burglary before incident at issue insufficient to demonstrate prior criminal activity 1: holding that abbotts feedmill operation was an agricultural activity because incident to a poultry raising venture 2: holding that raising a complaint about a violation of an internal policy is not considered protected activity 3: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal 4: holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "May 10, 1985). The district court was asked to render a decision on the merits without trial based on stipulated evidence. Schneider, 1985 WL 570618, at *1. On appeal, we held that the district court should have addressed whether there had been actual discharge because its findings of fact suggested that an actual discharge had occurred. Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384. A motion for summary judgment presents different opportunities and imposes different responsibilities on the parties. See Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.2006) (\u201cWithout some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets of factual disputes to gild a party\u2019s arguments.\u201d); see also Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Schneider, who Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument on appeal 1: recognizing that failure to develop claim on appeal constitutes waiver 2: holding that defendants failure to appeal the voluntariness of a plea constitutes waiver of the issue on subsequent appeal 3: holding that failure to brief an argument constitutes waiver 4: holding failure to brief argument constitutes waiver", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "different grounds than those relied upon by the district court, and AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND Shankle\u2019s case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1 . Circuit City reserved the right to modify the rules of the arbitration agreement, and it has modified one of the rules at issue in the present case. This modification is discussed in section III.D. infra. 2 . Even though Morrison\u2019s case has been arbitrated, the claims she raises in this appeal are not moot because this court could still grant effectual relief in the present case, if we were to determine that the arbitration agreement was in fact unenforceable and thus arbitration should never have taken place. Cf. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (<HOLDING>). As discussed infra, however, we ultimately Holdings: 0: holding that even though the appeal was not moot because effective relief was possible it was inequitable to require that the debtors counsel disgorge fees and costs awarded by the bankruptcy court 1: holding that the case was not moot even though claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were no longer alive because the plaintiff had requested pecuniary relief 2: holding that appeal of irs summons was not moot even though subject of summons had already turned over the evidence at issue because court could still order some partial relief 3: holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired 4: holding appeal moot on this basis", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "entered pursuant to a nolo contendere plea constituted a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d within the meaning of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4B1.2(1). The Information merely stated, \u201cwithout elaboration,\u201d that the defendant had committed \u201cthe crime of intimidation based on bigotry and bias ... in violation of General Statute No. 53a-181b.\u201d Id. at 56. However, the court held that \u201cthe plea proceeding includes a lucid description of the conduct for which Palmer was convicted, that conduct manifestly constitutes a \u2018crime of violence\u2019 ..., and Palmer\u2019s on-the-record agreement to the description of his conduct proffered by the prosecuting attorney results in the functional equivalent of a plea agreement with respect to that conduct.\u201d Id. at 59; see also United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 503-04 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). The reasoning in Palmer is persuasive. As Holdings: 0: holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime 1: holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record 2: holding that the record did not establish that a prior conviction was for a sexual act for purposes of the 18 usc  2241c sentence enhancement but remarking that a transcript of etimanis plea of nocontest might have clarified the exact nature of his prior conviction but none was provided 3: holding district courts use of state psr from different prior conviction permissible to establish fact of pri or conviction considered for acca sentence enhancement 4: holding that to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice the parties should make use of a redacted record stipulation affidavit or other similar technique whereby the jury is informed only of the fact of a prior felony conviction but not the nature or substance of the conviction", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the district court\u2019s denial of his 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 petition, challenging his guilty plea conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(a)(1) and 846; and manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of \u00a7 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253. Reviewing de novo, see Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988), we affirm. Brees may not challenge his conviction or sentence pursuant to a \u00a7 2241 petition because he has failed to demonstrate that any remedy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam); see Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court properly Holdings: 0: holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive  2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court 1: recognizing that   2241 is not available under the inadequateorineffectiveremedy escape hatch of  2255 merely because the court of appeals refuses to certify a second or successive motion under the gatekeeping provisions of  2255 2: holding that district court has no jurisdiction to decide unauthorized second or successive  2255 claims 3: holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa 4: holding that a prisoner cannot use the savings clause of 28 usc  2241 to escape the restrictions on successive  2255 motions and the failure to raise an available claim earlier", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and unqualified. Id. at 256, 103 S.Ct. at 2990-91. That interest must be balanced against the government\u2019s interest in the health, education, and welfare of children as citizens. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 ed legal norms regarding the degree of suspicion a child welfare worker must possess before initiating custody proceedings. Callahan, 880 F.Supp. at 332 (conducting thorough review of all-circuit case law). See also Doe v. State of Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir.1993) (cas\u00e9 worker and supervisor entitled to qualified immunity because law not clearly established with respect to claim that case worker manipulated children to state false allegations of abuse), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to prove that child care workers alleged conduct in programming children to accuse parent of abuse violated amorphous right of family integrity 1: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children 2: holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right 3: recognizing duty of parent to control conduct of child 4: holding right to family integrity is nebulous in nature and not sufficiently particularized for government officials to know that their conduct in removing children from parents custody without court order violated parents substantive rights", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "58 F.3d 896, 903-04 (3d Cir.1995) (\u201cthe fact that the ... plans used terms such as \u2018lifetime\u2019 or \u2018for life\u2019 to describe the duration of retiree medical benefits, while at the same time expressly reserving the company\u2019s right to terminate the plans under which those benefits were provided, did not render the plans \u2018internally inconsistent\u2019 and therefore ambiguous.\u201d). When the benefit plans and the collective bargaining agreement are read as a whole contract, it is clear that the phrase \u201cwill be covered\u201d cannot mean a lifetime of unaltered coverage, as the plaintiffs contend, because the health benefit plans contain language in which the insurance company and NSTAR reserve the right to change or cancel coverage. See DeGeare v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 812, 816 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 489 Holdings: 0: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits 1: holding that employers promise to provide welfare benefits until death of retiree did not create vested rights because employer had expressly reserved the right to terminate or amend the plan 2: holding employers promise that retiree benefits will continue did not create vested lifetime benefits in the face of a termination clause 3: holding that rights in a government benefits program were not vested property for purposes of the takings clause of the fifth amendment 4: holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "citizens from harm caused by criminal conduct); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1981) (neither District nor police officials can be held liable for failure of police properly to respond to request from victims for protection from burglars); see also District of Columbia v. Forsman, 580 A.2d 1314, 1317-18 (D.C.1990) (District owes no individualized duty, in context of issuing building permits, to ensure that person to whom permit is issued secures liability insurance adequate to compensate neighbors for damage to their property caused by collapse of permittee\u2019s structure). 5 . My colleagues dispute this analogy upon the ground that the public duty doctrine \"is applied to determine whether a duty exists.\u201d That, however, is also the essenc 140, 142-43 (D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>). My colleagues apparently contend that Nichol Holdings: 0: holding that hospital may be held liable for negligence of emergency room physicians under apparent agency doctrine 1: holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service 2: holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries 3: holding bad faith not merely negligence must be proved if insurer is to be held liable for damages over policy limits for refusing to settle 4: holding that district could be held liable if affirmative negligence of ambulance service actively worsens plaintiffs injuries", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir.1980). Their actions are in a \u201clegislative capacity\u201d if they are an \u201cintegral part,\u201d Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); Eastland v. United States Servicemen\u2019s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 1821, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975), of legislative actions undertaken by the local governmental body. Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1423 (4th Cir.1983) (indicating that county council members acted in their legislative capacity if the action taken by the council in which they participated was legislative). Not all actions undertaken by local governmental bodies that have legislative responsibilities are necessarily \u201clegislative.\u201d E.g., Scott, 716 F.2d at 1423 (<HOLDING>); Trevino v. Gates, 17 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Holdings: 0: holding a dedication of a rightofway in connection with a subdivision did not vest rights in the property owner for the purpose of estopping the county from changing the zoning classification absent a showing that the planning commission or county knew that the sewer permit would not be granted or that the countys subdivision regulations guaranteed the zoning of the property would not change 1: holding that county councils action in delaying consideration of zoning permit was not legislative 2: recognizing that the zoning code of a homerule city is a legislative enactment 3: recognizing that zoning and rezoning are legislative matters 4: holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "E.g., Gafford v. State, 387 So.2d 333, 337 (Fla.1980); Lewis v. State, 377 So.2d 640, 646-47 (Fla.1980); Fleming v. State, 374 So.2d 954, 957-59 (Fla.1979). The United States Supreme Court has reversed a death sentence on federal constitutional grounds where the state supreme court rejected all three of the theories relied on by the sentencing jury in support of an aggravating factor. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978) (per curiam). The Court held the defendant\u2019s right to due process was violated by the state supreme court\u2019s affirmance of his sentence on the basis of a theory that the sentencing jury had not been instructed to consider. Id. at 16-17, 99 S.Ct. at 236-237. See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 44 . An essential premise of the Majority\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing 1: recognizing that the fear experienced by the victim before death is a significant factor in determining the existence of this aggravating circumstance 2: holding sentencers application of outrageously or wantonly vile horrible and inhuman aggravating factor to particular case unconstitutional and invalidating death sentence based solely on that factor 3: holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age 4: recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trials cover proceedings for a voir dire examination of potential jurors. Press-Enterprise was subsequently relied on in Waller v. Georgia (1984), 467 U.S. 39, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 104 S. Ct. 2210, where the court held that the sixth amendment right to a public trial applies to hearings on motions to suppress evidence. The court noted that Press-Enterprise was premised on the first amendment right of the public and the press to attend voir dire proceedings but added, \u201cNevertheless, there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.\u201d (Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 38, 104 S. Ct. at 2215; see also United States v. Kobli (3d Cir. 1949), 172 F.2d 919 (<HOLDING>).) Accordingly, it is clear that the public Holdings: 0: holding that the closure of a courtroom during jury selection a structural error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings 1: holding a material departure from statute governing jury selection is one that affects the substantial rights of a defendant in securing an impartial jury 2: holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial 3: holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant 4: holding that a defendants guilty plea   forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at sentencing, \u201cquick, temporary transfers do not violate the IAD.\u201d Id. at 541-42 (citing Taylor v. United States, 504 U.S. 991, 112 S.Ct. 2982, 119 L.Ed.2d 599 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)). Much of the legal foundation of the Taylor rule was abrogated by the Supreme Court of the United States\u2019 holding in Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079. In Bozeman, the Supreme Court held that \u201cevery prisoner arrival in the receiving state, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving state, triggers [Article] IV(e)\u2019s \u2018no return\u2019 requirement.\u201d 533 U.S. at 154, 121 S.Ct. 2079. The Supreme Court reasoned that the language of the IAD was absolute and militated against an implicit exception, even for de minimis violation 5 (Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 772 P.2d 1291, Holdings: 0: holding the iad inapplicable to a prisoner at a temporary holding facility and noting that while there may be an occasional case in which a prisoner awaiting transfer is involved in rehabilitative programs offered at the local facility such rehabilitation efforts themselves ultimately would be disrupted by that prisoners transfer to his permanent correctional residence 1: holding that because the stated purpose of the iad is to prevent interference with a prisoners rehabilitative environment there is no reason for the iad to apply to a prisoner until he or she is assigned to the institution where the sentence will be served 2: holding the iad was not applicable to a prisoner who had been sentenced but was incarcerated in a local jail or holding facility while awaiting transfer to the assigned penal institution 3: holding that iad is not applicable until a state lodges a detainer in the jurisdiction where the prisoner is incarcerated 4: holding that a youth detention facility was a jail for purposes of statute requiring credit for time served in jail while awaiting trial", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by the parties or some other established exception.\u201d Merlino v. Delaware County, 556 Pa. 422, 425, 728 A.2d 949, 951 (1999). In cases where parties to a contract agree to shift fees, \u201cprovisions for the payment of \u2018costs of collection\u2019 have often been held to include reasonable attorney\u2019s fees in the event that it is necessary to institute legal action to collect.\u201d Wrenfield Homeowners Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. DeYoung, 410 Pa.Super. 621, 600 A.2d 960, 964 (1991). Additionally: \u201cTaxable costs are generally payable incident to a final judgment, i.e., after termination of the action by discontinuance or final disposition.\u201d Miller Elec. Co. v. DeWeese, 589 Pa. 167, 175, 907 A.2d 1051, 1056 (2006). See also Joseph F. Cappelli & Sons, Inc. v. Keystone Custom Homes, Inc., 815 A.2d 643 (Pa.Super.2003) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 26 Instantly, the \u201cDefault and Remedies\u201d Holdings: 0: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 1: recognizing right to counsel fees arose as result of favorable verdict in underlying litigation 2: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 3: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "expectation that it w[ill] arrive in th[e] forum,\u201d 629 N.W.2d at 675, sufficient to constitute purposeful availment in Maryland. To satisfy the \u201cpurposeful availment\u201d requirement in Maryland, mere foreseeability that a defendant\u2019s products will enter the State and cause injury here is insufficient. Bond, 391 Md. at 730, 895 A.2d at 1005. Rather, the defendant must \u201ccreate a \u2018substantial connection\u2019 \u201d with Maryland such that having to defend a lawsuit in the State would be foreseeable. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. a ng that a Maryland court could exert jurisdiction over a Kentucky resident whose agent engaged in \u201cintensive\u201d negotiations with a temporary resident of Maryland to resolve a contract dispute); Harris v. Arlen Properties, 256 Md. 185, 260 A.2d 22 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Purposeful availment, however, will not arise Holdings: 0: holding that a maryland court could exercise jurisdiction over an outofstate real estate development company that scouted potential development sites in maryland and through its agents filed a building permit in the state and arranged for the washington suburban sanitation commission to install a storm drain 1: holding that the university of maryland law school was a state agency 2: holding that a question of fact existed as to whether defendants alleged predicate acts directly injured plaintiff under the parties real estate development contract after defendants forced plaintiff out of further development of the property 3: holding that a maryland court could exercise jurisdiction over an outofstate hospital that provided services to maryland residents and registered as a maryland provider designating itself as a liver transplant referral center 4: holding that a maryland court could not exercise jurisdiction over an ohio lawyer when a maryland client initiated five of seven contacts with the lawyer the parties created the attorneyclient relationship in ohio and the attorneyclient relationship involved only events in and the law of ohio", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "deadline waives its right to challenge the report on appeal. Neason v. Buckner, 352 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Troeger, 274 S.W.3d at 108. In that event, we do not consider the merits of the defendant\u2019s objections. See Neason, 352 S.W.3d. at 259; Troeger, 274 S.W.3d at 108. The Hospital complains that the expert reports addressed only the doctors\u2019 conduct and did not name the Hospital; however, the Hospital concedes-that Nguyen pleaded that the Hospital was vicariously hable for the conduct d on a potentially frivolous vicarious liability claim would encourage claimants to artfully plead vicarious liability claims against hospital, defendants to avoid dismissal-of those defendants from the case. See Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248, 261 (Tex.2012) (<HOLDING>). The Hospital would have this court add to the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith 1: holding expert may consider and assume validity of matters set out in pleadings in the suit absent a showing that thepleadings are groundless or in bad faith or rebutted by evidence in the record 2: holding that where the plaintiff is pro se the court must consider as evidence in his opposition to summary judgment all of plaintiffs contentions offered in motions and pleadings where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and where plaintiff attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct 3: holding that for a defendant to recoup attorneys fees under  706k of title vii a court must find that the plaintiff litigated his or her claim beyond the point where it became frivolous unreasonable or groundless or where plaintiff acted in bad faith 4: holding expert testimony is not required as a per se rule  in bad faith actions", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "he or she is innocent of these allegations would do. Wyche and McCord are thus archetypal eicirmsic-fabrication cases. Moreover, the confession cases the majority relies upon are wholly distinguishable. Many of these confession cases involve situations where the police lie to the suspect by falsely claiming that a eodefen-dant has already confessed and implicated the suspect, so the suspect might as well come clean. See, e.g., Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420; Burch, 343 So.2d at 833 (substantially similar, but involving \u201cfailed polygraph\u201d ruse). Even in those cases that do not involve this precise species of misrepresentation, the misrepresentation is still intrinsic to the case the police are actually investigating. See, e.g., Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988, 994 (Fla. 1997) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Connor v. Holdings: 0: holding that physical brutality led to an involuntary confession 1: holding that impermissible police procedures rendered confession involuntary 2: holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary 3: holding that later declarations during defendants confession leading officers to evidence of the crime constituted part of one continuous confession that began at the police station 4: holding that pjolice misrepresentation alone does not necessarily render a confession involuntary in the context of a case where police allegedly misrepresented that they possessed physical evidence of the crime at issue", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "rights shall be liable in a suit for damages.\u201d Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983). As this statement makes clear, the party from whom damages are sought must have acted under color of state law. Therefore, the relevant inquiry in Yanaki was whether the private defendants (the only parties sued) acted under color of law. We affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because we found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficiently that the private defendants had acted under color of state law because the conduct of the private defendants in obtaining the relevant court orders could not be attributed to the state so as to satisfy the first part of the under-color-of-law test. See Yanaki, 415 F.3d at 1209-10 (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 1211 (Holloway, J., Holdings: 0: holding that the involvement of the police in executing the courtordered search without more does not convert the private defendants abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of  1983 liability and because yanaki and moss allege nothing more than private misuse of state laws their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test 1: holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for  1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor 2: holding that private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the state 3: holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability 4: holding that to prevail on a  1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "damages for Tele-group\u2019s alleged breach of its agreement to use its best efforts to ensure that their stock was registered and freely tradeable. Claimaifts appeal from an order of the District Court affirming the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s order subordinating their claims against the bankruptcy estate pursuant to \u00a7 510(b). Claimants argue that \u00a7 510(b) should be construed narrowly, so that only claims for actionable conduct-typically some type of fraud or other illegality in the issuanc se from\u201d the purchase or sale of Telegroup\u2019s common stock because they allege a breach of the purchase agreement whereby claimants acquired shares of- Tel-egroup stock, which required Telegroup- to use its best efforts to register its stock. See In re NAL Fin. Group, Inc., 237 B.R. 225 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 Holdings: 0: holding that claims for breach of debtors agreement to use its best efforts to register its securities arise from the purchase of those securities for purposes of  510b 1: holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities 2: holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities for purposes of  510b 3: holding that plaims for breach of a merger agreement arise from the purchase or sale of debtors securities 4: holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtors securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "it required to credit their opinions over other evidence that was relevant to her medical condition. See id. Because, as the district court decided, Ms. Atkins\u2019 \u201cevidence was not thorough enough to be considered reliable,\u201d Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 890, and the additional medical evidence she submitted \u201cdid not meet the degree of specificity [she] had been advised was required,\u201d id. at 891, Sedgwick gave proper weight to Dr. Shadid\u2019s and Ms. Burrows\u2019 opinions. Sedgwick\u2019s reliance on its consulting doctors\u2019 paper review of the medical records of Dr. Shadid and Ms. Burrows was not, under the circumstances presented here, arbitrary and capricious. See Hufford v. Harris Corp., 322 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1359 (M.D.Fla.2004); see also Davis v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 444 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, No. 06-70, 2006 WL 2007574 Holdings: 0: holding that review of medical history during an examination assisted doctors medical conclusions 1: recognizing it is common and reasonable for doctors to examine medical records and arrive at professional opinions 2: holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act 3: holding that an employer must permit cpa to examine employers records 4: holding that a patients settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "nature of the suit because this case can be resolved on a narrower ground. Assuming without deciding under the Koch Fuels rationale that Concor-dia\u2019s designation of the action as arising in admiralty did not necessarily control the entire action, we nonetheless conclude that Pa-nek waived his right to a jury by making a 9(h) election to proceed \u201cIn Admiralty\u201d without making a demand for a jury in the counterclaim. To begin, Rule 9(h) applied to Panek\u2019s counterclaim because his claims for breach of contract and negligence were saving 5, 8 (D.Mass.1988) (\u2018Where a claim is made in accordance with Rule 9(h), the existence of diversity as an alternative basis of jurisdiction will not entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.\u201d); Banks v. Hanover Steamship Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77 (D.Md.1967) (<HOLDING>). Panek argues that the words \u201cIn Admiralty\u201d in Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures 1: holding that a party need not make a specific reference to rule 9h to fall under admiralty jurisdiction 2: holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction 3: holding that substantive admiralty law applies though suit was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction 4: holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a gate-keeping function, the court\u2019s focus is on the expert\u2019s methodology, while the \u201csoundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert\u2019s analysis and the correctness of the expert\u2019s conclusions based on that analysis are factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact.\u201d Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786). In this case Dickson has formed an opinion \u2014 based on his experience with roofs in general and his inspection of the particular roof in question \u2014 as to what caused the damage to the roof. (Dickson\u2019s Dep. at 74-91.) It is not this court\u2019s job to determine whether his opinion is correct \u2014 it is the plaintiffs job to attack the validity of his opinion on cross-examination. See Smith, 215 F.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Dickson will be allowed to testify Holdings: 0: holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct 1: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 2: holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent 3: holding that it is not 4: holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to allow all express warranties of limited duration to impliedly exclude or modify implied warranties. Instead, we base our holding on the fact that here, paragraph 55\u2019s global warranty was incorporated into the specifications, and even the commentary to \u00a7 12A:2-316 recognizes that the instance in which a \u201cbuyer gives precise and complete specifications to the seller\u201d is not the ordinary circumstance that the section is designed to address. Nevertheless, we believe our holding is in line with the general purpose of \u00a7 12A:2-316, which, according to the commentary, is to ensure that there are no surprises concerning which warranties accompany the goods sold. See N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 12A:2-316 cmt. n. 1. See also Travel Craft, Inc. v. Wilhelm Mende GmbH & Co., 552 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>). Because we conclude that in this case there Holdings: 0: holding that to apply indcode  26123162 which is identical to  12a2316 in favor of  the buyer and drafter of the warranty would subject the seller to the same type of surprise the provision is intended to prevent 1: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 2: holding that breach occurred when seller told buyer that seller would do no more to rectify alleged warranty violation 3: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 4: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rather than opinions. As we said in Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir.1967), \u201c[a] single sentence contained in a letter or speech of an employer, cannot be considered apart from the entire statement and background in which it was made.\u201d HCEA places great weight on one sentence from the letter, where Stewart, after explaining that PECCA removes principals and assistant principals from the collaborative conferencing unit, stated, \u201cI trust this information will be shared appropriately with any HCDE administrators who inquire about remaining members of [HCEA].\u201d While this statement could conceivably be read as a command in other contexts, here the full text of the letter confirms that Stewart\u2019s statement is a request rather than an order. Notab 2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>). Third, HCEA contends that the district court Holdings: 0: holding that where contract does not authorize employers selective discharge of union officials discharge violates section 8a3 1: holding that threatening to discipline employees for not reporting union solicitation violated  8a1 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that threatening to discharge union secretary for presenting employee grievances violated  8a1 4: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir.1999). Crimes against vulnerable victims also warrant additional punishment because the criminal\u2019s choice of such victims evidences an \u201cextra measure of criminal depravity.\u201d United States v. Castellanos, 81 F.3d 108, 111 (9th Cir.1996). Further, the vulnerable victim enhancement serves the special needs of vulnerable victims by creating a greater level of societal protection for those who are most in need of such protection. See United States v. Randall, 162 F.3d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1998). Section 3Al.l(b)(l) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that: \u201cIf the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, increase [the offense level] by 2 additional levels.\u201d We have explained the applicat 5 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Randall, 162 F.3d 557, 560 Holdings: 0: holding that prosecutors statement that crime shouldnt go on was simply a way of saying that defendant had engaged in criminal conduct and should not be permitted to continue that criminal conduct 1: holding a sleeping victim of sexual abuse was particularly susceptible to criminal conduct 2: holding a car salesman who was obligated to go on a drive with assailants was particularly susceptible to criminal conduct 3: holding that criminal conduct on premises was not foreseeable 4: holding persons known to have fallen for telemarketing scams previously were particularly susceptible to criminal conduct", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See Fla. Stat. \u00a7 768.28(9)(a) (providing immunity for officers in tort unless they \u201cacted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.\u201d); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 584 (11th Cir. 1990) (\u201c[T]he conduct is privileged and the actor is never liable where he does no more than insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though the actor is well aware that such insistence is sure to cause emotional distress.\u201d). Further, because Sada was not deprived of any constitutional or statutory rights, the City is not municipally liable for claims of negligence for any insufficient training under \u00a7 1983. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (<HOLDING>). And lastly, because there was probable cause Holdings: 0: holding that a superior can be held liable in his individual capacity if he participated in the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights 1: holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect 2: holding that the constitutional requirement for ripeness is injury in fact 3: holding officer liable for deprivation of constitutional rights despite argument that officer although present was not in control of the situation 4: holding that if a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized a constitutional deprivation is immaterial", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). 13 . The per se ban on simultaneous negotiation of settlement terms and attorney's fees pronounced in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (3d Cir.1977), has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 738 n. 30, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1543 n. 30, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986), at least as to statutory fee actions under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1988. See Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 137-38 & n. 16 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Applying either the letter or the spirit of Holdings: 0: recognizing rule 1: recognizing prandinis overruling 2: recognizing privilege 3: recognizing change 4: recognizing presumption", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for the Hostile Work Environment Because the district court concluded that Bell Atlantic was entitled to summary judgment on the first element of a hostile work environment claim, it did not reach the second element: whether any harassing conduct can fairly be imputed to the employer for purposes of assessing liability. See Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d at 122. Bell Atlantic submits that, on the record before this court, this question of vicarious liability can be resolved in its favor as a matter of law, thereby providing an alternative ground for affirming the district court\u2019s award of summary judgment. In the exercise of our discretion and in the interests of judicial economy, we address this issue, see Booking v. General Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418-19 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>), and conclude that disputed issues of fact Holdings: 0: holding that subject to limited exceptions this court will not consider issues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendants first appeal the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand 2: holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived 3: recognizing appellate courts discretion to consider issues raised in the district court but not resolved there 4: recognizing that an appellate court ordinarily will not consider issues that were not raised at trial", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "where the underlying claim is for breach of a contract); W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 81-82, 308 S.W.2d 838, 842 (1958) (drawing no distinction between the individual defendant and the agency defendant in holding that a suit seeking \u201cenforcement of contract rights\u201d is barred by immunity in the absence of any \u201cstatutory provision governing or limiting the manner of sale\u201d). The underlying nature of Multi-County\u2019s contract claim is not altered simply because it seeks to prevent the governmental entities from continuing the alleged breach of contract in the future rather than seeking monetary damages for a breach that may have occurred in the past. In sum, this is a contract action to which governmental immunity applies. See, e.g., Dodgen, 158 Tex. at 79, 308 S.W.2d at 840-41 (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. City of McKinney, 236 S.W.3d 481, Holdings: 0: holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its contract with the government 1: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 2: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 3: holding that plaintiff was entitled to sue under rule 10b5 for the difference between the price and the value received from the sale of the security where as here the evil is not the price at which plaintiff bought but the fact of being induced to buy 4: holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit \u2014 not that the prisoner will ultimately prevail on his claim. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318-19 (citations omitted). Here, Abdur\u2019Rahman met these requirements. 1. Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective Abdur\u2019Rahman argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to address cumulative errors and correct the accomplice jury instruction. (See Pet\u2019r State ment, R. 367, Page1D 520-23.) This is sufficient to meet the first prong of the Martinez/Trevino test. 2. Petitioner alleges post-conviction counsel was ineffective Martinez does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Atkins, 792 F.3d at 661 (<HOLDING>). However, as evidenced by the briefs in this Holdings: 0: holding that review of counsel ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review 1: holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness 2: holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo 3: holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not 4: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "has not imposed strict liability for disparate impact. Pfaff recognized that a defendant may rebut a plaintiffs showing of disparate impact by \u201csupplying] a legally sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason.\u201d 88 F.3d at 746-747 (noting that \u201cthe appropri ate standard of rebuttal in [Title VII] disparate impact cases normally requires a compelling business necessity\u201d). The question here is what constitutes a legally sufficient reason for a municipality executing its congressionally mandated duties under TEFRA. While we are mindful of the guidance Title VII often provides in FHA,cases, the defense of \u201cbusiness necessity\u201d in the employment discrimination arena does not transpose cleanly into the circumstances present here. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3rd Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). Congress required the city council to hold a Holdings: 0: recognizing that importing the defense of business necessity from the employment discrimination context to a claim under the fair housing act is of somewhat uncertain application 1: holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration 2: holding that the elements of a criminal necessity defense under  951 are the same as the civil privilege defense 3: holding that the most analogous claim for relief under new york law is a claim for employment discrimination 4: holding that city council is entitled to absolute legislative immunity from claim under the age discrimination in employment act", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "must be interstate or foreign.\u201d). The FAA requires the enforcement of an arbitration agreement upon proof (1) that a written agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) that the written agreement is contained within a contract involving \u201ccommerce.\u201d 9 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2 (1947). However, Mary argues the FAA does not apply to insurance contracts in South Carolina. Section 15-48-10(b)(4) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2012) provides that a written agreement to arbitrate shall not apply to \u201cany claim arising out of personal injury, based on contract or tort, or to any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract.\u201d Mary correctly states the FAA\u2019s mandate conflicts with section 15-48-10(b)(4). See Am. Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 272 F.Supp.2d 578, 582 (D.S.C.2003) (<HOLDING>); see also Cox v. Woodmen of The World Ins. Holdings: 0: holding section 154810b4s prohibition on arbitration reverse preempts the faa through application of the mccarranferguson act and prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses in insurance policies governed by south carolina law 1: holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed 2: holding that the federal arbitration act requires enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration clauses even when massachusetts law provides for a substantive right to bring a class proceeding 3: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added 4: holding that the faa requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition because it raises the recurring issue whether evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct may be introduced at the sentencing stage of a capital trial. As I have noted before, see, e. g., Miranda v. California, 486 U. S. 1038 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Lynaugh, 484 U. S. 935 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), the States\u2019 highest courts have reached varying conclusions on this issue. In addition, the petition poses a second question of profound constitutional significance: whether a defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to a jury in a capital sentencing , 492 N. E. 2d 1303, 1315-1316 (1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1101 (1987). In 1978, Holdings: 0: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants 1: holding that a court need only explain that a unanimous vote is required before a jury can impose the death penalty 2: recognizing that before the case was submitted to the jury the trial court charged the jury that if it were unable to reach a unanimous recommendation the court would impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 3: holding that where a jury fails to return unanimous answers to some of the questions on a special verdict form the trial judge can enter judgment on the basis of the unanimous verdicts if they are dispositive of the case 4: holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches. \u00a7 443.036(21)(d)l, Fla. Stat. (2002). Although Comanic\u2019s job remained the same throughout her base period , her employer technically changed. Specifically, for the first quarter of her base period her pay checks were issued by the Peace Child Care Center, Inc. In the last three quarters of Comanic\u2019s base period, her pay checks were issued directly by the Church. We find that these employers both qualify as non-liable employers under section 443.036(21), Florida Statutes (2002), and w only with small children, performing day-to-day responsibilities, with no direct contact with the Church, is irrelevant in determining the primary purpose of the child care center. St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 783, 101 S.Ct. 2142 (<HOLDING>). Further, the employee policy, which Comanic Holdings: 0: holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa 1: holding that where only one interpretation of contractual terms is possible a court may decide the meaning of those terms as a matter of law 2: holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision 3: holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works 4: holding that the court could review the south dakota supreme courts interpretation of its unemployment compensation tax statute because its analysis depended entirely on its understanding of the meaning of futa and the first amendment", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "agree for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the following four elements must be present: (1) An issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; (2) The prior, action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Frederick v. Action Tire Co., 744 A.2d 762, 766 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999). We agree with defendant that decisions of the Worker\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board may preclude relitigation of the same issue, that is the causation of plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., id. (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff does not appear to contest this Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff who slipped and fell on ice while securing cars on his employers motor vehicle carrier preparing to travel was very close to the vehicle and engaged in a task related to the vehicle and therefore was an occupier of a motor vehicle 1: holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle 2: holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle  3: holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling 4: holding that the wcabs decision that an employees motor vehicle accident did not cause his injuries precluded a subsequent tort action on the same issue", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "governmental agency responsible for enforcing the code or regulation. (b) Complained to the landlord concerning the maintenance or condition of the park, rent charged or rules and regulations. (e) Organized, became a member of or served as an official in a homeowner's association, or similar organization, at a local, regional, state or national level. (d) Retained counsel or an agent to represent his interests. The plain language of this section creates a retaliatory eviction defense that may be raised in an unlawful detainer action. This is an affirmative defense, and the tenant therefore bears the burden to prove that the primary motive for the eviction is retaliation for tenant actions that are protected by the statute. Cf. Wright v. Brady, 126 Idaho 671, 889 P.2d 105 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). Here, Powell presented evidence and argument Holdings: 0: holding that laches is an affirmative defense 1: holding that retaliatory eviction is an affirmative defense to an unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to ic  6301 et seq 2: holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers 3: holding that fair use is an affirmative defense 4: holding that to avoid an affirmative defense  a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "company. The member-agent allegedly funneled the substantial profits acquired by these schemes through her attorney\u2019s trust account into M.I.\u2019s bank accounts. Because the title company im-permissibly used the Fund\u2019s title insurance and closing forms to conduct these deals, the Fund maintained that the substantial profits should be preserved so the money would remain available to insure the non-party purchasers. The trial court granted the Fund\u2019s ex parte motion for injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court denied M.I.\u2019s motion to dissolve the injunction, but modified some of its terms. The instant appeal and cross-appeal followed. Generally, an injunction seeking to freeze a bank account is improper. E.g., Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed\u2019n, Inc., 498 So.2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (<HOLDING>). However, injunc-tive relief is appropriate to Holdings: 0: holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages 1: holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages 2: holding that the potential loss of valuable business may constitute irreparable harm 3: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm 4: holding that loss of customers and resulting injury to goodwill can constitute irreparable harm that is not compensable by an award of money damages", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "KSU is bound and which clearly require more than moving for dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment. See 34 C.F.R. \u00a7 674.49(b)-(e). Therefore, we hold that KSU knowingly and voluntarily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by agreeing, as a prerequisite to its participation in the Perkins Loan program, to undertake certain enumerated actions in federal bankruptcy court in the event of a claim for discharge filed by the student-borrower. C. Finally, even though we have concluded that KSU waived immunity by entering into an agreement with the DOE which subjects it to the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court, we must examine whether the waiver is valid. This determination hlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 118 S.Ct. 1517, 140 Holdings: 0: holding that although congress expressed its intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity in 11 usc  106a it could not do so under seminole tribe 1: holding that  106a  b offend the eleventh amendment 2: holding that judgments for prospective relief that have an ancillary effect on the state treasury do not offend the eleventh amendment 3: holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation 4: holding 11 usc  106a unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "federal authority by making all assaults against them felonies. The latter would require us to glean an \u201cassault prong\u201d from two subsections and apply the simple assault clause. But without a good reason to do so, we cannot disregard the statutory structure of \u00a7 111(a) in this manner, particularly where the text clearly directs that \u201cacts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault.\u201d Contra Jones, 526 U.S. at 239, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (interpreting statute contrary to structure to avoid \u201cgrave and doubtful constitutional questions\u201d). Moreover, in addition to the plain language of the statute, case law supports Vallery by stating or implying that the simple assault provision applies to the entirety of \u00a7 111(a). See United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Yates, 304 F.3d at 822 (\u201cWe hold that, in the Holdings: 0: holding that specific intent is not element of assault resulting in serious bodily injury 1: holding that second element of qualified immunity test is whether the law violated was clearly established 2: holding that a reference to the violent crime sentencing statute in the second degree assault statute required automatic imposition of violent crime sentencing for a defendant convicted of second degree assault 3: holding the second element of assault is assault resist oppose impede intimidate or interfere with and that the word forcibly  modifies each of the prohibited acts specified in the second element 4: holding that consent is not a defense to the charge of second degree assault where the assault occurred in the context of a prison fight between inmates", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "478 U.S. 675, 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3165, 92 L. Ed.2d 549, 559 (1986). Moreover, we agree with the trial court that there is little doubt that, in the context of a boarding school, the school effectively acted as the \u201chousehold\u201d within which the abusive conduct occurred. The school acted in a parental capacity to the students within its care, providing for them necessary shelter, food, education, recreation, and succor. Its control over and duty of care for the students housed within its confines did not markedly differ from that assumed by parents. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562, 602, 734 A.2d 1196 (1999), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L. Ed.2d 554 (2000). Compare Smith v. Estate of Kelly, 343 N.J.Super. 480, 502, 778 A.2d 1162 (App.Div.2001) (<HOLDING>). In a very real sense, the school and its Holdings: 0: holding that requiring church to make contributions to workers compensation fund opposed by such church did not violate first amendment 1: holding that the catholic church was not within a parishioners household 2: holding church services constitute property within meaning of  548 3: holding that denial of tax exemption for part of church property that was not necessary for occupancy and enjoyment of church did not violate first amendment 4: holding that irs examination of corporate minute books of a church to determine whether it qualified for tax exemption was not unconstitutional interference with religious affairs of the church under the first amendment", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction over the custody determination.\u201d We conclude that the juvenile court did not have the power to assume jurisdiction over the case or to make a custody determination. Even assuming that the father\u2019s dependency petition was sufficient to invoke the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction, and we maintain that it was not, the juvenile court failed to address the allegation of dependency in any of its orders or judgments. There is no mention of dependency in the juvenile court\u2019s final judgment entered on July 17, 2008, yet the juvenile court proceeded to make an adjudication of the child\u2019s custody. In K.C.G. v. S.J.R., 46 So.3d 499, 501-02 (Ala.Civ.App.2010), this court stated: \u201cOnce the dependency jurisdiction of a juvenile court has been properly invoked, the juvenile court has an 2) (<HOLDING>); J.W. v. W.D.J., 743 So.2d 467, 469 Holdings: 0: holding that juvenile court that had never declared child dependent had no jurisdiction to enter order affecting visitation rights of father 1: holding that once juvenile court found children dependent it had exclusive jurisdiction to determine their custody 2: holding that juvenile court never assumed jurisdiction to determine issue of custody of child when evidence revealed that there was no emergency situation rendering the child dependent as al leged in mothers petition 3: holding that juvenile court that determined child was not dependent had no jurisdiction to thereafter determine custody of child 4: holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "be issued, the check was a direct transfer from Video Depot to Hilton. Once the check was issued, Arlynn no longer had legal control over the funds, even if he retained physical control over them. Arlynn therefore did not have the right to use the money for any other purpose than to give it to Hilton. Hilton maintains that Arlynn had dominion over the $65,000 because he was Video Depot\u2019s principal and, in that capacity, directed Video Depot to purchase the cashier\u2019s check. The bankruptcy courts are split on the question of whether the principal of a debtor corporation necessarily is the initial transferee of corporate funds used to satisfy a personal obligation. Compare General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. v. Broach (In re Lucas Dallas, Inc.), 185 B.R. 801, 809 (9th Cir.BAP1995) (<HOLDING>); Richardson v. FDIC (In re M. Blackburn Holdings: 0: holding that the principal of a corporate debtor does not become a transferee by the mere act of causing the debtor to make a fraudulent transfer 1: holding that principal who caused debtor to issue cashiers check to satisfy personal obligation was not initial transferee 2: holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default 3: holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it 4: holding that a fraudulent transfer claim against a corporate debtors control person belongs to the corporate debtor not to specific creditors", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "defense counsel to make a reasonable showing of materiality before the court will order discovery. When requesting an officer's personnel file, defense counsel must show that it is reasonably likely that the file will contain relevant information. We review an order denying a motion to compel discovery for abuse of the discretion granted by this rule. In this case, the ree-ord supports Judge Miller's conclusion that Booth's request was based only on conjecture. Booth did not make any showing that the police used excessive force against him in this case. And Booth did not make a showing of any likelihood that 0) (denying disclosure of psychiatric evaluation of prosecution witness in the absence of a showing of relevance); Sawyer v. State, 244 P.3d 1130, 1133-34 (Alaska App. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Carman v. State, 658 P.2d 131, 140 (Alaska Holdings: 0: holding that other incidents involving children handling firearms were not sufficiently similar to require discovery 1: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 2: holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances 3: holding that evidence of similar incidents is probative as to notice element in premises liability case 4: holding 911 dispatchers promise to send someone out was not affirmative act as there was no indication that the dispatcher handling of a victims call exceeded or was markedly different than her handling of other similar calls and situations", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action[,]\u201d Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension, 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir.2001), some district courts have generally concluded that \u201ca passage of two months between the protected activity and the adverse employment action seems to be the dividing line.\u201d Cunningham v. Consol. Edison Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3522, 2006 WL 842914, at *19, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22482, at *55-56 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2006) (collecting cases). However, because the Second Circuit has found periods well beyond two months to be sufficient to suggest a causal relationship under certain circumstances, courts must carefully consider the time lapse in light of the entire record. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Holdings: 0: holding eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship 1: holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury 2: holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation 3: holding that a close temporal proximity between a public employees speech and a defendants actions suggested a causal relationship 4: holding in the context of a title vii retaliation claim that a twoyear gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the claimed retaliatory act proves fatal to plaintiffs assertion that there is a causal connection", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Its proceedings are not adversary in nature, but rather consist of inquiries conducted by laymen without resort to the technicalities of trial procedure\u201d). 21 We have held, however, that \u201cthe grand jury may request advice and that the prosecutor is authorized to explain matters of law.\u201d Sheriff v. Keeney, 106 Nev. 213, 218, 791 P.2d 55, 58 (1990). 22 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Nev. Const. art. 1, \u00a7 8. 23 See Gordon v. Ponticello, 110 Nev. 1015, 1017-19, 879 P.2d 741, 743 (1994) (stating that discovery does not fall within the scope of rights afforded to persons under grand jury investigation); Bright, 108 Nev. at 502, 835 P.2d at 785 (declining to extend the right to counsel to indigent grand jury targets). 24 Accord State v. Augustin M., 68 P.3d 182, 187-88 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) Holdings: 0: holding that new mexicos rule that the state must present known evidence that directly negates a targets guilt does not extend to instructions respecting possible defenses 1: holding that new evidence must be evidence that is not merely cumulative 2: holding that rule b attachment does not extend to afteracquired property 3: holding that the evidence did not present the proof necessary to warrant the findings of guilt and disbarment 4: holding that plaintiff must present such evidence", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Stanton-Negley asserts that if DPW had provided adequate and timely notice of this Project requirement, Stanton-Negley would have obtained the required accreditation and submitted a bid in response to RFP No. 31-06. Thus, according to Stanton-Neg-ley, DPW\u2019s failure to make a timely disclosure of the accreditation requirement violated due process by depriving Stanton-Negley\u2019s owners of the ability to conduct their business and profession in the manner they had established and with patients they had served prior to the issuance of RFP No. 31-06 and the Project it seeks to implement. We disagree. ' Contrary to Stanton-Negley\u2019s position, it has no protected property right to full participation in the MA Program. Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Houstoun, 998 F.Supp. 522 (E.D.Pa.1997) (<HOLDING>). Further, Stanton-Negley has no protected Holdings: 0: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause 1: holding that an agreement on the one side to sell and on the other to buy does not constitute a conspiracy even if the buyer intends to resell the drugs so long as the buyer and seller do not have an agreement to further distribute the drugs 2: holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure 3: holding that the kersey rule applies in a case involving an attorneys addiction to prescription drugs legally obtained 4: holding that an agreement between the commonwealth and a provider of prescription drugs for the medicaid program does not involve the extreme dependence necessary to support a due process claim", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "past persecution at the hands of their mother, who abused and subsequently abandoned them. While we are sympathetic to the cruel treatment endured by petitioners, such treatment does not constitute past persecution \u201con account of\u2019 a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.13(b)(1). Petitioners allege that they are \u201cchildren of the Gomez-Romero Family,\u201d a \u201cparticular social group\u201d entitled to protection under the Act. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1158(b)(l)(B)(i). While we agree that kinship ties may constitute a \u201cparticular social group,\u201d Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir.2009), the domestic abuse suffered by petitioners was not on account of this status. Rather, petitioners were abused because of their exposure to a violent, unstable person. Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the mother\u2019s abuse was not limited to Holdings: 0: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 1: holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution 2: holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution 3: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment 4: holding that personal disputes do not constitute persecution", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "755 F.2d 158, 163, 225 USPQ 34, 38 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 963, 1 USPQ2d 1196, 1201 (Fed.Cir.1986) (excusing failure to make express findings as to the level of ordinary skill where there is no showing that the court\u2019s failure to make such a finding influenced the ultimate determination). In this case, Okajima stated during the final hearing that there was no dispute that the level of skill was high. Where the parties agree that the level of skill in the art is high, any finding by the Board that the proper level of skill is less than that urged by the parties would only reinforce the Board\u2019s conclusion of nonobviousness. See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574, 230 USPQ 81, 88 (Fed.Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we find no harm under the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 1: recognizing that particular findings as to level of skill do not influence the ultimate determination under  103 where there is a determination that an invention would have been nonobvious to those of extraordinary skill 2: holding that this court should review de novo ultimate determination of reasonableness of search under fourth amendment 3: holding that courts may decline to make a constitutional determination at the first stage of the qualified immunity inquiry where that determination would be based on an interpretation of uncertain state law 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to Kelley, in print and in the telephone conversation, were related to a contemplated judicial proceeding. Bleisch in his deposition and Dolcefino in his affidavit affirmatively and clearly stated that if the controller\u2019s office persisted in denying access to KTRK, legal proceedings to gain access were contemplated. Thus, the statements are absolutely privileged. Where, as here, communications are protected by the absolute privilege, those communications may not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made. See Thomas, 940 S.W.2d at 342-43. It follows that when a statement is so protected, publication of the statement does not defeat the privilege. Id. at 344. Acc , Inc., 838 F.2d 1287, 1302 (D.C.Circ.1988) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there can be no claim against a Holdings: 0: holding prepublication discussions between libel counsel and reporters as fitting squarely within the scope of the privilege as defined in upjohn  1: holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents 2: holding that where the basis of state claims for medical malpractice relates to the administration of plan benefits those claims fall squarely within the scope of erisa 3: recognizing the distinction between a landowner and a possessor as defined by  328e of the restatement 4: holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "led to counts one through three and \u201cmost of the money went to Pessar.\u201d Our precedent is clear that \u201c[e]quity may require a defendant to restore his victims to the status quo where the loss suffered is greater than the defendant\u2019s unjust enrichment.\u201d Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931; see also Commerce Planet, slip op. at 10-11, \u2014 Fed.Appx. at \u2014(explaining that there is \u201cno support in our case law\u201d for .the proposition that a restitution award \u201cmust be limited to the unjust gains each defendant personally received\u201d). Moreover, as described above, Gordon had control over and approved the marketing materials used, and it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to hold Gordon and his entities jointly and severally liable for the full amount. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 931-32 & n. 1 (<HOLDING>). Lastly, Gordon challenges the time period, Holdings: 0: holding that the individual defendants were acting as principals andor officers of the corporation and therefore there was no third party present to interfere in the relationship to which their corporation was a party 1: holding that there was no abuse of discretion where the district court found an individual stefanehik and the corporation he solely owned beringer corporation jointly and severally liable for the full amount of sales made despite other defendants settling where stefanehik and beringer were the driving force behind the marketing scheme 2: holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity 3: holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed 4: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "were discriminatory do not pass muster under Harris. The record reflects that McCaw made several accommodations, accompanied by certain quid-pro-quo requests, to Kwiatek once it learned that Kwiatek\u2019s HIV condition could require continual absences. Although Kwiatek argues that he felt he was generally treated differently than other employees with chronic and debilitating medical conditions, he presented no objective evidence of an abusive or hostile work environment. Moreover, there was no evidence that McCaw\u2019s requests unreasonably interfered with his job performance, nor that the terms or conditions of Kwiatek\u2019s employment materially changed as a result of its actions. As such, his claim must fail. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d 925, 938-39 (N.D.Ill.1998) (<HOLDING>); Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d 658, Holdings: 0: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 1: holding that mere reprimand even if it does not result in actual dismissal can constitute adverse employment action 2: holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se 3: holding a mere warning that termination is possible does not per se constitute adverse employment action 4: holding that where an employee was transferred to a new job site over 120 miles away that transfer while not per se an adverse employment action was an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in determining whether an adverse employment action occurred", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(App.1979)); Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 188 Ariz. 499, 503, 937 P.2d 689, 693 (App.1997), vacated on other grounds by Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 300-01, 955 P.2d 534, 537-38 (1998). 4 . From the context, we presume this to have referred to department reports or other departmental records. 5 . To the extent that a custodian's mistake might inform the promptness of the disclosure (and thus the wrongfulness of the denial), we agree with courts interpreting FOIA that the denial would not be wrongful only if the custodian made reasonable efforts and acted in good faith. See, e.g., Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 545 F.Supp. 1229, 1237 (N.D.Ill.1982) (<HOLDING>) (Emphasis added.). Custodial inattentiveness Holdings: 0: holding that when a plaintiff has no pending foia request with an agency and has not averred that he intends to make foia requests to the agency in the future any claim of future injury is simply too speculative and remote to give him standing 1: holding in a case where there was no assertion that the custodian was lying or that she was negligent that a custodian did not improperly withhold a book that was mislaid and stating that no improper withholding within the meaning of the foia occurs when an agency fails to locate documents within the ten day time limit  if the agency has made reasonable efforts to locate the documents and if its failure to do so has been in good faith 2: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 3: holding an agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist 4: holding that it was appropriate for the district court to refer to the documents attached to the motion to dismiss since the documents were referred to in the complaint", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ex. 16. Specifically, the letter states, \u201cEnclosed, please find copies of documents from [the plaintiff] that relate to her EEO investigation\u201d and then lists the enclosed documents. Id. The letter does not mention discrimination or harassment. Therefore, the June 2007 letter is not a protected activity. See Paquin, 119 F.3d at 31; see also Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir.2007) (requiring specific references to alleged acts of discrimination). Moving to whether the agency\u2019s action following the November 2006 letter was materially adverse, the defendant claims that proposed removals do not qualify as materially adverse actions. Def.\u2019s Reply at 21. Proposed removals, however, are exactly the kind of acts which the statute covers. See Powell, 390 F.Supp.2d at 9 (<HOLDING>); Willingham v. Gonzales, 391 F.Supp.2d 52, 59 Holdings: 0: holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed 1: holding that statutory damages were appropriate for each discrete violation of that states deceptive trade practices act 2: holding in the context of a title yii claim that discrete acts such as termination  or refusals to hire are separate retaliatory adverse employment decisions that each constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  3: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute 4: holding that a proposed termination is the very type of discrete act   identified  as separate actionable unlawful employment practices", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "period of disability income received in 1997 before or after the period of disability. We also hold that the commission erred to the extent that it may have included business profits rather than wages or their equivalent in its calculation of claimant\u2019s pre- or post-injury wage. The propriety of including all net income of a sole proprietorship in the average weekly wage calculation, without differentiating between wages and scrutinized] to determine if the profits are the functional equivalent of wages.\u201d Hotaling v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 153 Vt. 581, 572 A.2d 1351, 1354 (1990) (citing 2 Arthur Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019Compensation Law % 60.12(e)); see The Washington Post, 675 A.2d at 42; cf. Pishotta v. Pishotta Tile & Marble, Inc., 613 So.2d 1373, 1375-76 (Fla.Ct.App.1993) (<HOLDING>). New York courts hold that \u201c \u2018where a Holdings: 0: holding that corporate profits may be considered personal earnings of sole shareholder to extent they are fairly attributable to management andor labor of sole shareholder rather than labor of others or mere return on capital 1: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 2: holding that state court with jurisdiction over  301 claim should have applied federal labor law rather than state contract law 3: holding a state court tort action for retaliatory discharge removable because it arose under  301 of the labor management relations act rather than illinois state law 4: holding that labor management relations act  303 which authorizes recovery of damages for employers injured by an unfair labor practice does not provide authorization for awarding attorneys fees for board proceedings", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "A Defendant\u2019s first contention is that a reasonable jury could have found that he negligently caused Russell\u2019s death while acting in self-defense. He argues that an involuntary manslaughter instruction was warranted because he attempted to use nondeadly force, but did so in a criminally negligent manner and death resulted. See United States v. Begay, 833 F.2d 900, 901 (10th Cir.1987). As discussed in the preceding section, a rational jury could have believed Arvin\u2019s actions were in self-defense. This court has recognized that involuntary manslaughter \u201ccan occur in circumstances that would support a defense of self defense.\u201d Begay, 833 F.2d at 901 (quoting United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir.1983)); see also United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 555 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Iron Shield, 697 F.2d 845, Holdings: 0: holding that when selfdefense is carried out with excessive force a defendant would be guilty of manslaughter 1: holding that trial court should instruct the jury that if they had any reasonable doubt as to whether unlawful killing was murder or manslaughter it was jurys duty to convict defendant of the lesser offense manslaughter 2: holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental 3: holding that this instruction is appropriately given when there is both evidence of selfdefense and evidence that the defendant provoked the aggression from which he was defending himself 4: recognizing that a defendant may commit involuntary manslaughter if he acts in selfdefense but is criminally negligent in doing so", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(5th Cir.1974). In order to show that a homestead has been abandoned, there must be a strong showing that the debtor did not intend to return to the residence. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1992). A debtor that leaves his home for financial, health, or family reasons does not abandon the homestead. In re Imprasert, 86 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1988). Temporary absences from the homestead residence for reasons of busine olding that where property was occupied as residence of the bankrupts on the day they filed bankruptcy, it was entitled to a homestead exemption, even though the bankrupts intended to, and did, leave that house permanently on the following day) (citing Beensen v. Burgess, 218 So.2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); In re Beebe, 224 B.R. 817 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1998)) (<HOLDING>). In the present instance, Debtor admitted that Holdings: 0: holding even though debtor would have been entitled to iowa homestead exemption but for former spouses iowa code section 59821 lien debtor could not avoid the lien because it attached to the homestead prior to or simultaneously with debtors acquisition of the interest in the homestead 1: holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title 2: holding that debtors did not abandon homestead and lose benefits of homestead exemption simply because they had left property with no intention of returning in order to move into rental housing closer to debtorhusbands new job 3: holding that the general homestead exemption may not be invoked to defeat claims against the holder for taxes and assessments against the homestead property 4: holding that the general rule is that temporary absence from the premises will not itself cause an abandonment of the homestead but to retain the homestead exemption one leaving the homestead must in good faith intend to return albeit the intent to return need not be at any particular time in the future", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "occurred after his alleged onset date of disability. 9 . The information on the check-list form was for purposes of determining Phillips\u2019 eligibility for state medical welfare benefits, not DIB or SSI. A finding of disability under the Act is a legal determination to be made by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). The opinion expressed by checking a box on a form is conclusoty in nature. Indeed, Dr. Falatyn did not cite to any specific work restrictions resulting from Phillips' impairments that would have prevented him from performing all work activity. Under the Commissioner\u2019s regulations, this kind of conclusory report is not entitled to significant weight. 20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.1527(d)(2)(ii), 416.927(d)(2)(ii); see also Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1965 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 10 . The check-list form also contained boxes Holdings: 0: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 1: holding recoupment statute itself served as a form of notice 2: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 3: holding that a form report that requires a physician only to check a box or fillin blanks is not substantial evidence by itself 4: holding that form 4340 is probative evidence in and of itself and shows in the absence of contrary evidence that notices and assessments were properly made", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Accordingly, because the Department did not provide a meaningful opportunity for comment, and did not solicit or receive relevant comments regarding the substance or merits of either set of regulations, we have no difficulty in concluding that the Department \u201cignored important aspects of the problem.\u201d Kempthorne, 473 F.3d at 103. Therefore, we hold that the Department\u2019s reinstatement of the 1987 regulations was arbitrary and capricious in that the Department\u2019s action did not follow procedures required by law. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706(2); see also Mack Trucks, 682 F.3d at 95-96 (vacating agency interim rule when good cause exception did not apply, and APA notice and comment procedures were not followed); Buschmann, 676 F.2d at 358 (same); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 144-46 (1st Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). VI. Under the terms of the 2009 Notice and Holdings: 0: holding that an extension of time in which to serve process may be granted despite the absence of good cause 1: holding that notice of foreclosure that failed to provide a reinstatement balance was not defective in the absence of harm caused by the omission 2: holding that proper service of new notice of deficiency and new notices of levy moots question as to whether prior actions were procedurally defective 3: holding invalid procedurally defective interim regulations that were issued without notice and comment and in the absence of good cause 4: holding tax foreclosure invalid without adequate notice", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of plaintiffs discrimination claim was inappropriate given that the CBA \u201cneither created the right [plaintiff] asserts nor can it remove or alter that right\u201d); Daniels v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 789 F.Supp.2d 161, 164-165 (D.D.C.2011) (concluding that plaintiffs DCHRA discrimination and retaliation claims were not preempted because plaintiffs claims did not require interpretation of the CBA, and were \u201cbased on rights created by DCHRA and not rights created by the CBA\u201d). ' However, where the rights are created by the CBA, or involve negotiable state duties \u201caround which parties may contract,\u201d Section 301 will preempt the claim. Humble, 305 F.3d at 1007 n. 3; see also, Int\u2019l Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 861-62, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 217-18, 105 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by  301 1: holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring section 301 lawsuit to enforce seniority rights under cba 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was owed wages following his discharge was preempted because this right was created by a cba provision stating that an employee who is discharged shall be paid immediately 3: holding that an employees retaliation claim was not preempted by section 301 because he was exercising his rights under the states antidiscrimination laws and the terms of the cba were at most relevant background for the employees termination 4: holding that plaintiffs negligence claim was preempted by section 301 because employers duty to provide a safe workplace was expressly created by the cba", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "are not subject to dismissal, even though those of the Relator are. However, that fact does not render our consideration of this motion premature. \u201cIntervention by the United States into a qui tam suit does not automatically endow the court with subject matter jurisdiction over both the claims by the United States and by the relator.\u201d United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int\u2019l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 798 (10th Cir.2002); see also Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting a relator\u2019s attempt \u201cto end-run the \u2018original source\u2019 inquiry by arguing that the United States\u2019 intervention in the action cured any jurisdictional defect\u201d); Eitel v. United States, 242 F.3d 381 (Table), 2000 WL 1529237, at *2 (9th Cir.2000) (unpublished disposition) (<HOLDING>). Thus, despite the Government\u2019s notice of its Holdings: 0: holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate 1: holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate 2: holding that whether or not the government proceeds with this action eitel cannot because he is not an original source 3: holding that section 853n6a is likely never to apply to proceeds of the crime given that the proceeds cannot exist before commission of the crime 4: holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "DNA expert goes to weight of evidence, not its admissibility; even if error rate of expert\u2019s proficiency tests presented challenge to reliability of polymerase chain reaction analysis, that argument would not result in exclusion of PCR evidence, as error rate would only be one factor considered in determining admissibility); Keen v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 795, 485 S.E.2d 659 (1997)(concluding that even if the proficiency test results of expert had been admitted and could have been used by Keen to establish state laboratory had previously made erroneous findings, this information would not have affected admissibility of the DNA evidence, but rather, would have only affected the weight the fact finder accorded the DNA evidence); State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996)(<HOLDING>); State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash.2d 879, 846 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that laboratory error is a matter of weight and not admissibility under frye v united states 293 f 1013 dccir1923 under rule of evidence 702 if lab error or error rates are so serious that results are not helpful to the jury the trial court may in its discretion rule the evidence inadmissible 1: holding that federal rule of evidence 702 superceded the frye standard of admissibility of scientific evidence and that under rule 702 the district court had to determine that proffered expert testimony was both reliable and relevant 2: holding that rule 702 admissibility determinations are reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard 3: holding that even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence we will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice and that the error was harmless 4: holding under former rule 52a appellant must object to alleged error in the trial court or such error is waived", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "against the unknown aggressor, particularly if they resemble highwaymen in ski masks. Second, permitting the police to attempt an unannounced forcible entry subverts the interest in protecting private property. Finally, attempting entry without warning precludes the officers\u2019 ability to recognize possible mistakes in identity or location of the suspect or the place to be searched. Therefore, our previous analysis in Fike no longer serves as the basis for assessing attempted forcible entries under the knock-and-announce rule. Rather, the reasonableness test outlined by the Supreme Court in Richards applies with equal force to attempts at forcible entry as it does to the actual breaking and entering of a person\u2019s home. See also United States v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765, 766 (3rd Cir.1968) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McCloud, 127 F.3d 1284, 1289 Holdings: 0: holding that the insertion of a key into the door of a car to see if it fit constituted the beginning of a search because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 1: holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful 2: holding that mere insertion of key was not a search or at least not an unreasonable search protected by the fourth amendment 3: holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house 4: holding that insertion of a crowbar into the door of a suspects house by officers before they announced their presence constitutes an unreasonable search", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "have retained wide discretion to fashion equitable remedies in situations in which legal remedies are insufficient. Therefore, I cannot agree with defendant\u2019s argument that section 8371 im-permissibly delegates public policy to \u201cindividual courts on an ad hoc basis.\u201d C. The Application of the Seventh Amendment to Section 8371 Claims Brought in Federal Court The Seventh Amendment provides that \u201c[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.\u201d The Seventh Amendment is inapplicable to state trials. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F.Supp. 1025, 1027 (1972) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding right to be fundamental 1: holding that courts may only review claims for fundamental miscarriage of justice 2: holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process 3: recognizing that the accuseds right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system 4: holding the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment extends the right to jury trial to defendants in serious criminal cases in state courts", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the law to the undisputed facts. In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex.1998) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. Mandamus is generally proper if a trial court acts without jurisdiction. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846 (citing In re Sw. Bell, 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex.2000); In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex.1998)). The existence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Barnes, 127 S.W.3d at 846. Despite the general requirement that a party seeking relief by mandamus must establish he has no adequate remedy by appeal, such is not the case when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. In re Office of Attorney Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>); see In re Oates, 104 S.W.3d 571, 575 Holdings: 0: holding that a party who is erroneously deprived of the benefits of an arbitration contract under the federal arbitration act is without adequate remedy by appeal and entitled to mandamus relief 1: holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy because the trial courts issuance of temporary orders is not subject to interlocutory appeal 2: holding that upon commencement of the election process mandamus will not lie to prevent the inclusion of a candidate on the official ballot because by that time the case has become moot 3: holding mandamus will lie to prevent trial court from exercising jurisdiction it does not have even if there is adequate remedy by appeal 4: holding that mandamus will issue to reverse a trial courts ruling on a discovery issue only 1 where there is a showing that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion and 2 where the aggrieved party does not have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal the petitioner has an affirmative burden to prove the existence of each of these conditions", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "damages was displaced by federal statutes, including the CWA.\u201d The Court rejected this argument indicating \u201cnothing in the statutory text points to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action.\u201d In Part IV, to which Justice Stevens specifically dissented, the Court, citing Miles, reiterated that admiralty courts should look to legislative enactments for policy guidance, but where Congress had not specifically acted, the Court had responsibility to fashion controlling rules and remedies in maritime law: To the extent that Justice STEVENS suggests that the very subject of remedies should be treated as congressional in light of the number of statutes dealing with 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (<HOLDING>). And for the very reason that our exercise of Holdings: 0: recognizing action for wrongful death based on unseaworthiness 1: recognizing cause of action 2: holding that a cause of action for wrongful death is an asset of an estate 3: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge 4: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to those packages\u201d). The bill of lading made out by Tropical states the following: marks & numbers quantity description of goods gross weight As Addr. 1 x 40\u2019 Stc. 39 Big Pack Containing 24207 27,908 units boy\u2019s pants As Addr. 1 x 40\u2019 Stc. 17 Big Pack Containing 10552 13,719 Units Boy\u2019s Pants The customs declaration form made out by Fishman includes all the same information but also indicates the value of the items being shipped. Neither form refers to the number of dozens of pants being shipped. Fishman contends that the cargo manifest and reembarque are the relevant documents to be examined as they were prepared by Fishman and were simply miscopied from Fishman\u2019s form to the bill of lading. See In re Belize Trading, Ltd. v. Sun Ins. Co. of New York, 993 F.2d 790, 792 (11th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the reembarque states, although Holdings: 0: holding that a judgment is construed like other written documents and that the intent of the court is determined by viewing the document as a whole 1: holding that in determining motion to dismiss on basis of res judicata the court could take judicial notice of all of the documents which are part of the record before it as well as the documents contained in the record before the state court without having to convert the motion to one for summary judgment 2: holding that when the bill of lading and the shipping documents do not conform the bill is construed as having reflected the number of packages designated in the shipping invoices and as such be in conformity with cogsa 3: holding that purchaser of vehicle was required to arbitrate her claims even though seller did not sign bill of sale containing arbitration clause when seller accepted and acted upon bill of sale by contemporaneously executing retail installment contract 4: holding that specific guarantees in the bill of rights have penumbras one of which is the right of privacy", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "arguing that plaintiffs do not ascribe any economic significance to the eight county area. They argue that plaintiffs\u2019 experts reach contradictory conclusions and have not made findings supporting the alleged eight county geographic market. Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that the alleged antitrust violation, injury and damage occurred in the eight county area and that defendants and their co-conspirators have market power in this area. The court of appeals has approved geographic markets consisting of multiple counties in antitrust cases involving the provision of health care. See Blue Cross, 65 F.3d at 1411 (noting that either the individual counties or a group of counties where defendants operate would be an appropriate geographic market); Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1284-85 (<HOLDING>). Whether plaintiffs\u2019 expert reports or other Holdings: 0: recognizing that what is a reasonable area is a factual matter to be determined in each noncompete case 1: recognizing the uncertain state of federal law in this area 2: holding physician in action based on illegal cavity search to standard of a reasonable physician 3: recognizing that a geographic market is hard to define but approving a three county area based on defendants service area and physician and patient preference for nearby hospitals 4: holding that a plaintiff physician alleging race and national origin discrimination was not required to pursue his claims initially with the phc because the hospitals basis for revoking his privileges was sexual harassment allegations and not patient care deficiencies", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "sense and meaning, as a \u2018gift,\u2019 an allocation or appropriation of something of value, without consideration to a \u2018person, association or public or private corporation.\u2019 \u201d Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. at 28, 303 P.2d at 926-27. The Attorney General of New Mexico has identified two components prohibited by the Anti-Donation Clause: (i) \u201cthe state may not make any donation to or in aid of any private corporation;\u201d and (ii) the state is prohibited against \u201clending or pledging of the state\u2019s or municipality\u2019s credit.\u201d N.M. Attorney General Opinion No. 85-27 at 3,1985 WL 204889 (October 22,1985). New Mexico courts, and the New Mexico Attorney General\u2019s Office, have generally, in analyzing the state\u2019s Anti-Donation Clause, scrutinized contracts for consideration. 314 P.2d at 720 (<HOLDING>); Hutcheson v. Atherton, 44 N.M. at 144, 99 Holdings: 0: holding that legislative diminishment of tax obligation constituted an unconstitutional subsidy to the liquor industry in violation of the antidonation clause 1: holding an action for postpetition breach of an agreement to purchase property to be a core proceeding 2: holding that an appropriation to pay states share of emergency feed certificates issued to livestock owners for the purchase of hay was an unconstitutional subsidy of the livestock industry 3: holding husbands early retirement subsidy was not marital property as a vested right but an option contingent upon his continued employment and eventual qualification for the subsidy in nine years based upon value of the pension frozen at the time of dissolution 4: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to have occurred. It is therefore difficult to know exactly what effects such a tumor could produce. The district court thus had to make a difficult finding based on conflicting evidence regarding a rare tumor. The only undisputed facts were that the tumor existed during Stevens\u2019s employment with the company, and that Stevens\u2019s. symptoms subsided after the tumor was removed. After a review of' the record, we are not left \u201cwith a definite and firm conviction\u201d that the district court made a mistake. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the tumor caused Stevens\u2019s headaches and personality changes from which- he suffered during his employment. Cf. Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109, 80 S.Ct. 173, 175, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959) (<HOLDING>). B. The company must provide maintenance and Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: holding that the incontestability provisions of the policy did not cause a preexisting illness to be covered because the illness first manifested itself before the policy became effective 2: holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause 3: holding plaintiffs counsels illness constitutes good cause 4: holding that a jury may draw an inference as to the cause of an illness despite the lack of unanimity among experts as to the cause", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "knotted in a manner indicating that they had been used to package crack cocaine. Moreover, Moore had come running from an apartment in which there had be .1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1124, 119 S.Ct. 1781, 143 L.Ed.2d 809 (1999) (upholding a Terry frisk of the driver of a car stopped for speeding because the stop occurred late at night, the car had stopped abruptly, there were multiple people in the car, and there had been a commotion among the other occupants of the car); United States v. Villanueva, 15 F.3d 197, 198-99 (1st Cir.1994) (upholding a daytime Terry frisk of an individual who had engaged in disorderly conduct, such as yelling obscenities and banging on train windows, at a subway station known for volatile conduct); United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court expressed skepticism that Holdings: 0: holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop an occupant of a parked car based on his presence late at night in an area known for drug activity his leaning over the car console with a faint light and his attempt to hide something upon seeing a police officer 1: holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers 2: recognizing that emergency lights convey a signal that an officer approaching a car at night presents no threat to the occupant of the car 3: holding that no seizure occurred when an officer approached a parked car and initially asked the occupant where his gun was after seeing an empty holster on the seat 4: holding that police officer could reasonably have impounded defendants vehicle either because there was no known individual immediately available to take custody of the car or because the car could have constituted a nuisance in the area in which it was parked", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "three offenses on September 26, 2003, during a single criminal episode. The trial court sentenced Mr. Perez to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the home invasion robbery and the armed burglary and to another concurrent term of fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment for the false impersonation offense. Although it may have little practical effect, we must reverse the judgment and sentence for armed burglary because it either violates double jeopardy under article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution, or contravenes section 775.021(4)09, Florida Statutes (2003). It has been held that convictions arising from a single episode for home invasion robbery and burglary violate either double jeopardy or section 775.021(4)(b)(3). See, e.g., Mendez v. State, 798 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>); Barboza v. State, 786 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA Holdings: 0: holding that the state conceded that appellants convictions for both home invasion robbery and burglary with an assault were improper 1: holding convictions for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery and home invasion robbery violated double jeopardy and section 7750214b because burglary of a dwelling was subsumed by the home invasion robbery offense 2: holding that the defendants homeinvasion robbery conviction violated double jeopardy because it arose from the same incident as the defendants burglary with an assault or battery conviction 3: holding that the double jeopardy clause was not violated by two convictions arising from the same criminal episode because the crimes of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools each had an element the other did not and were thus separate crimes 4: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sought blood tests to establish his paternity of a child born while the mother of the child was married to another man. While holding that it was necessary for the trial court to consider the impact of a paternity action on the child before the paternity proceedings, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned: \u201cChild development experts widely stress the importance of stability and predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parent figure is not the natural parent. .... A paternity suit, by its very nature, threatens the stability of the child\u2019s world. We are concerned that the best interests of the child standard, too broadly interpreted, could become a blanket license for any person to disrupt long-fostered family relationships by claiming to be the (A.D.1991) (<HOLDING>); Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 661 Holdings: 0: holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity 1: holding that the trial court erred by not considering whether ordering blood tests to disestablish paternity was in the best interest of the child 2: holding that husband who was excluded from paternity of children and could not intervene in a paternity action to obtain custody would be able to bring an independent action per tql 3: holding that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interest of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of paternity 4: holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and specific. Id. Federal courts have found that indirect evidence is not substantial and specific where no evidence beyond what is produced to satisfy the plaintiffs prima facie case is produced. See Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996) (finding indirect evidence insufficient where no evidence beyond that produced for the prima facie case was presented); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir.1995) (finding indirect evidence insufficient where no evidence beyond that produced for the prima facie case was presented). \u201c[C]ourts only require an employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial or even baseless.\u201d Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Respondents rely on Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in failing to consider all of the employers proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for the plaintiffs termination 1: holding that in producing nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged action the employer is not obligated to support these reasons with objective evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard 2: holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 3: holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "[the federal controlled substance statute], which requires nothing more specific than an intent to distribute a controlled substance.\u201d); United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2002) (\u201c[A] defendant can be convicted [of possessing a controlled substance] if he believes he has some controlled substance in his possession.\u201d) (quotation omitted); United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 458 (3d Cir.2001) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that the Government must show that the defendant knew that the substance in which he trafficked was a controlled substance.\u201d); United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 830 (7th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe government need only prove that the defendant was aware that some controlled substance was involved.\u201d); United States v. Sheppard, 219 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted); United States v. Holdings: 0: holding that the government need not prove that the defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance to establish mens rea knowledge of drugs illegality is sufficient 1: holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance 2: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea 3: holding that possession of a controlled substance is a crime only if the defendant knowingly possesses the substance and has knowledge of the nature of that substance 4: holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "618, 564 N.E.2d 1280, 1290-92 (1990). 35 . Id., 151 Ill.Dec. 618, 564 N.E.2d at 1292-93. 36 . Koenig v. McCarthy Const. Co., 344 Ill.App. 93, 100 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1951). 37 . 1999 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 91-524 (S.B.458) (West) (Public Act 91-524, Medical Practice\u2014 Automatic External Defibrillator Act). 38 . TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001). 39 . Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223 Ill.2d 318, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d 246, 252-55 (2006). 40 . 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). 41 . 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/4 (1998). 42 . Allegis Realty Investors, 307 Ill.Dec. 592, 860 N.E.2d at 253. 43 . Id. 44 . The Illinois Good Samaritan Act also provides an exemption from civil liability for those using AE p.2d 802 (N.D.Ill.2005) (<HOLDING>). In Muno v. Condell Medical Center, 383 Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor 1: holding that evidence of prior similar act was not relevant for the purpose of proving doctors negligence in performing operation at issue on particular occasion 2: holding that the samaritan act does not immunize doctors from suit when they are performing their normal job functions 3: holding that qualified immunity extends to government officials performing discretionary functions 4: holding advice of counsel does not per se immunize a person from a malicious prosecution suit", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "informant\u2019s information was corroborated by his personal observations and corroborated by the personal observations of officers Tate and Deer. The controlled buy was corroborated by the participation and observation of officers Tate and Deer: Sergeant Deer searched the informant and his vehicle for any illegal contraband or monies; the informant was given money to make the controlled buy; Tate and Deer followed the informant to a location near Morgan\u2019s residence; and, Tate and Deer observed the informant walk into the residence, stay approximately two minutes, and return with drugs. Sergeant Deer\u2019s account of the drug buy, alone, was sufficient to establish probable cause to search Morgan\u2019s home for drugs and other contraband. See Langford v. State, 332 Ark. 54, 962 S.W.2d 358 (1998) (<HOLDING>). We do not find the fact that the officers did Holdings: 0: holding that an officers account of a controlled buy made by an informant was by itself sufficient to es tablish probable cause for issuance of a search warrant 1: holding that a totality of circumstances standard was proper for determining probable cause for issuance of a search warrant based on information from an informant 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that a controlled buy at a particular home provided probable cause for the search of that residence 4: holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or other supporting evidence with the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA finding that he had not satisfied any. However, even construing broadly Liu\u2019s pro se brief, see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006), we cannot find that Liu has challenged the BIA\u2019s findings before this Court. Accordingly, we deem any argument based on ineffective assistance of counsel waived. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n. 1, 545 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005). Furthermore, because each of these findings is an independent ground upon which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, the waiver of arguments challeng ing these findings is dispositive of Liu\u2019s petition for review. See Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); see also 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring Holdings: 0: recognizing that while slavish adherence to matter of lozada is not required when an alien does not comply with those requirements in any respect the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is forfeited 1: holding that failing to substantially comply with the matter of lozada requirements in a motion to reopen before the bia forfeits an ineffective assistance claim in this court 2: holding that the petitioner was not entitled to claim ineffective assistance because she did not comply with the lozada requirements and made no effort to explain her lack of compliance 3: holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue 4: holding that the petitioners failure to comply with the lozada requirements results in a forfei ture of his ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claim", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\"show cause\u201d is not defined in our rules, of course, but it has long been employed to denote an order, usually summary, providing notice 'of a hearing. The kind of hearing, its form and procedural requisites, will depend on the questions to be addressed and is not determined merely by the .\"show cause\u201d label. Wilcher v. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173 (Ky.App.1978). 18 . While it is well established that individual government officials may be held in criminal' contempt for willfully violating a court order, Commonwealth ex rel. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res: & Envtl. Prot. v. Williams, 536 S.W.2d 474 (Ky.1976) (citing Wallace v. Sowards, 313 Ky. 360, 231 S.W.2d 10 (1950)), entity liability.is not so clear. Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (<HOLDING>); and 'see Stuart P. Green, The Criminal Holdings: 0: holding that a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 1: holding that municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 usc  1983 in part because a municipality  can have no malice independent of the malice of its officials damages awarded for punitive purposes therefore are not sensibly assessed against the governmental entity itself 2: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under  1988 3: holding that in employment discrimination cases falling under 42 usc  1983 municipalities are not subject to punitive damages for the actions of government officials 4: holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities in actions brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "conduct of the parties to the joint venture: \u201cWe have long held that concerted activity does not turn simply on whether the parties involved are legally distinct- entities. Instead, we have eschewed formalistic distinctions in favor of a functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate.\u201d 560 U.S. at 191, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say that in looking at how the parties actually operate, \u201cwe have repeatedly found instances in which members of a legally single entity violated \u00a7 1 when the entity was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.\u201d Id. (citing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 87 S.Ct. 1847, 18 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1967) (<HOLDING>)). The stated intent on the part of the Holdings: 0: holding that a party waived the right to allege contrary facts on appeal eg that defendant was not an agent or instrumentality of the mexican government for sovereign immunity purposes where the party alleged that the defendant was an agent or instrumentality in its complaint 1: holding that sealy was not a single entity but instead an instrumentality of the individual parties 2: holding that an action naming a state entity as a defendant did not constitute an action against the state because the state entity was sued in its capacity as receiver 3: holding that connecticut courts look to the identity or instrumentality test to determine whether one corporate entity can properly be held responsible for the obligations of another corporate entity 4: holding that an entity majorityowned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is itself an agency or instrumentality of that foreign state under the fsia", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "issue in Faretta, however, was whether the Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a criminal defendant, which is an entirely different issue. 4 This problem does not exist under federal law because the long-standing right of self-representation in federal courts is codified at 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1654 (1982), which provides that \u201c[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . 5 We recognize, of course, that commensurate with Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), a state is forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment from forcing a lawyer upon a criminal defendant. Meads, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree with the to reverse this case. In the first place, neither Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (<HOLDING>), nor Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Holdings: 0: recognizing that when a defendant voluntarily intelligently and unequivocally elects to proceed without counsel under the sixth amendment a court cannot force the defendant to accept counsel against his or her will 1: holding that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of selfrepresentation and that he may proceed to represent himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so 2: holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection 3: holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel 4: holding petitioner cannot claim he was denied right to assistance of counsel when he knowingly and voluntarily decided to represent himself", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiffs still believed the fees being charged were too high. From July 1, 1997 until the agreement terminated in late 1999, Plaintiffs paid the higher fees s ere decided unilaterall ment may be amended only in writing, by the agreement of the parties.\u201d The Agreement does not require that amendments be signed. See T.R. Mills Contractors, Inc. v. WRH Enters., LLC, 93 S.W.3d 861, 865-66 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (a written agreement does not have to be signed to be binding). BCBST memorialized the terms in writing and sent the proposed written amendment to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs paid the amounts specified by the proposed written amendment but refused to sign it. The two requisites of amendment under the Agreement were met: written terms and the agreement of the parties to amend. See id. (<HOLDING>). Although a signed writing is a superior way Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is signed by one party but not the other the manifestation of consent by the nonsigning party is sufficient to bind that party 1: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it 2: holding that validity of contract may be established by one or more writings signed by party to be charged 3: holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation 4: holding that parol evidence is admissible to show that an individual who signed a contract but is not named in the body is a party to the contract", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007). 2 . In this application, Mr. Ciocchetti asserts that his attorneys were ineffective not only for failure to competently cross-examine Mr. Ferguson, but also for \"fail[ure] to investigate the facts and interview witnesses who would have verified\u201d his account. Aplt. Combined Opening Br. & COA Appl. at 17. Beyond this cursory reference, however, Mr. Ciocchetti makes no effort to develop his failure-to-investigate claim, and, therefore, we will not address it further. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2007) (\"[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant\u2019s opening brief.\u201d); see also Mathews v. McKune, 133 Fed.Appx. 512, 514 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Mr. Ciocchetti faults the district court Holdings: 0: holding that the court has discretion not to consider an issue abandoned on appeal 1: recognizing that the appellants claim on appeal had been abandoned because although his motion for a coa  briefly asserted the claim he did not brief the issue 2: holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal 3: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned 4: holding that petitioners claim asserted in a subsequent brief was not waived due to omission from the coa application", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(taking judicial notice of prior litigation filings, press releases, articles and financial publications); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F.Supp.2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (publicly available analysts\u2019 reports). Public documents issued by government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (\u201cFDA\u201d) may also be considered. See, e.g., Noble Asset Mgmt. v. Allos Therapeutics, Inc., No. 04-CV-1030 (RPM), 2005 WL 4161977, at *2 (D.Colo. Oct. 20, 2005) (denying motion to strike FDA guidance documents, reasoning that such public documents are related to FDA\u2019s \u201cprocess for reviewing new drug applications and that process is central to an evaluation of the claims made in this case.\u201d); DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1218 (S.D.Cal.2001) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 32 Fed.Appx. 260 (9th Cir.2002). The Holdings: 0: holding that documents integral to the complaint are properly considered on a motion to dismiss 1: recognizing that on motion to dismiss a court may properly consider transcript of fda advisory committee meeting 2: recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document that is referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiffs claims", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of alimony, maintenance, or support.\u201d The argument is unpersuasive as an initial matter because nothing in the language of section 523(a)(5) indicates that the dis-chargeability of an obligation turns on state laws regulating alimony and support. Had Congress intended. state law to be determinative, it likely would have stated that intent expressly. See Harrell, 754 F.2d at 904 (\u201cIf Congress had intended dischargeability to be determined by whether an obligation could be imposed under state law, it might have addressed dischargeability in those terms.\u201d). In fact, as indicated above, the legislative history of section 523(a)(5) demonstrates that Congress determined that state support laws should not be determinative of whether a particular obligation is dischargeable. Cf. id. at 905 (<HOLDING>); Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1315-17 (holding that a Holdings: 0: holding that derivative actions do not require the support of a majority of shareholders or even all of the minority shareholders 1: holding that a statute that lowered the age of majority to 18 did not have retroactive effect on the plaintiffs lawsuit when the applicable statute of limitations was shortened because it was tied to the age of majority 2: holding that support does not encompass miscellaneous expenses 3: holding that a promise to pay postmajority educational expenses was nondischargeable support even though the relevant states law does not require such support past the age of majority 4: holding that an agreement to pay sons college education expenses was nondischargeable support even though arkansas law does not require payment of such expenses", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "loss of ability to meet any of these basic work-related activities would severely limit the potential occupational base. This, in turn, would justify a finding of disability.... SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857 (S.S.A.), at *4. In implementing the five-step sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ is under an affirmative duty to adequately develop the medical record. See 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 416.912(d) (stating that the SSA will make reasonable efforts to obtain a complete medical history from treating sources); see also Tejada, 167 F.3d at 774. The ALJ is thus \u201cobligated to explore the facts by obtaining relevant medical records and asking questions ... to assist the claimant in developing her case.\u201d Jones v. Apfel, 66 F.Supp.2d 518, 538 (S.D.N.Y.1999); see also Perez, 77 F.3d at 47 (<HOLDING>). This duty becomes even more paramount when, Holdings: 0: holding that there may be an obligation to defend under an insurance policy even though there is no obligation to indemnify 1: holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct  2: holding that an alj cannot discredit lay testimony solely because it is not supported by medical evidence in the record 3: holding it is error for an alj to fail to consider factors relevant to the pain analysis which are supported by the record 4: holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The Supreme Court held in Buckley that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune when he allegedly fabricated evidence during the investigation by retaining a dubious expert witness. Id. at 273-75, 113 S.Ct. 2606. The Court reasoned that \u201c[t]here is a difference between the advocate\u2019s role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, ... and the detective\u2019s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested....\u201d Id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (citations omitted). Because the prosecutor\u2019s conduct in Buckley fell within the latter category, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity. See also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, the District Attorney Holdings: 0: holding that a police officer who secures an arrest warrant without probable cause cannot assert an absolute immunity defense 1: holding that qualified immunity applies only if an officer had arguable probable cause to arrest 2: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 3: holding that a prosecutors preparation and filing of an information and a motion for an arrest warrant are protected by absolute immunity 4: holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of trust,\u201d Partnership Agreement Article 7.2, and the lack of any duty on the part of the limited partners to make further contributions to the partnership. The evidence does not support Travers\u2019 argument that the partnership was voluntarily dissolved. On the contrary, the evidence presented demonstrates that Travers, by joining with his wife to buy the note and to cause the foreclosure sale of the property, dissolved the partnership in contravention of his duties under the partnership agreement. See Partnership Agreement, Article VII, \u00b6 2. He did not have authority to buy the partnership property pursuant to the partnership agreement, his actions constituting self dealing divesting the partnership of its only significant asset. Virginia Code \u00a7 50-21; Klotz v. Klotz, 202 Va. 393 (1961) (<HOLDING>); Lindsay v. Bevins, 204 Va. 74, 77 (1963) Holdings: 0: holding that partners have a fiduciary relationship and are held to high standards of integrity in their dealings with each other 1: holding that a partner owes a duty to all other partners to exercise the utmost good faith fairness and loyalty 2: holding that the relationship of partners is of a fiduciary character and imposes upon them the obligation to exercise good faith and integrity in their dealings 3: holding general fiduciary duties of confidence trust loyalty and good faith insufficient to establish the necessary fiduciary relationship for purposes of  523a4 4: holding that partners may not agree to eliminate the fiduciary character of their relationship", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00b6 10 The testimony of Dr. Stahl in this case was much less compelling than the evidence excluded in Hays. Nonetheless, Dr. Stahl\u2019s testimony had some relevance. We cannot ascertain the weight the court placed on Dr. Stahl\u2019s testimony due to the court\u2019s limited findings. Therefore, we cannot gauge the degree, if any, to which Father was disadvantaged by this testimony. We note, however, that Father chose not to seek a continuance to depose Dr. Stahl. Moreover, the timing of the disclosure was not entirely Mother\u2019s fault, but was due, in part, to the late date on which the parties received the custody evaluation. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the family court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Stahl to testify. II. Adequacy of Findings of Fac 0 P.3d 775, 780 (App. 2003) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 13 As in the aforementioned eases, the Holdings: 0: recognizing appellate courts must not make fact findings 1: holding that the lower courts findings were insufficient as a matter of law and remanding for the court to make the findings required under ars  25403 2: holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence 3: holding that objections are required to challenge magistrate judges findings as well as magistrates failure to make additional findings 4: holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "evidence were introduced or victim was asked about it, we don\u2019t have any way to resolve that event or to give any meaningful way for the jury to evaluate the event without having witnesses to either corroborate or impeach victim\u2019s statements.\u201d In the end, the court expressed its view that asking the victim about the California incident \u201cwould not be helpful to the jury\u201d and it precluded defendant from questioning her about that incident or introducing other evidence about it. That ruling was not an abuse of discretion. A trial court has authority to preclude this type of cross-examination on allegedly false prior accusations when it reasonably determines that exploration of the previous incident would essentially require an unhelpful trial within a trial. See Arellano, 149 Or App at 91 (<HOLDING>); LeClair, 83 Or App at 131 (noting that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that risk of unfair prejudice is diminished in bench trial 1: recognizing that proof of extreme delay establishes prejudice 2: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 3: recognizing that a delay in proceedings to explore a collateral matter can create a risk of prejudice 4: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "161 L.Ed.2d 181 (2005). While other portions of \u00a7 1591 have been challenged on vagueness grounds, the question of \u00a7 1591(d)\u2019s facial validity has not been considered by federal courts. See United States v. Clinton, CR 12-40018-01-KES, 2012 WL 5195987 (D.S.D. Oct. 19, 2012). Defendant contends that he could not know what actions could expose him to criminal liability under the statute. It is true that \u00a7 1591 lacks the heightened \u201ccorruptly\u201d mens rea of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1503, the general obstruction of justice statute, and that \u201ccriminal offenses requiring no mens rea have a \u2018generally disfavored status.\u2019\u201d Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893) (<HOLDING>). In the context of a vagueness challenge, this Holdings: 0: holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice the court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice  1: holding under predecessor to  1503 that a person is not sufficiently charged with obstructing or impeding the due administration of justice in a court unless it ap pears that he knew or had notice that justice was being administered in such court 2: holding that trial court had discretion to relax the thirtyday rule in the interests of justice 3: holding that the court will not consider an issue not raised in the district court unless 1 it involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice 2 the party raising the issue had no opportunity to do so before the district court 3 the interest of substantial justice is at stake 4 the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or 5 the issue presents significant questions of general impact or great public concern 4: recognizing inherent power in the courts to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being impaired or destroyed", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "faith in the performance of contracts.\u2019 \u201d Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 660 (Tenn. 2013) (quoting Wallace v. Nat\u2019l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1996)). \u201cAs a result of this covenant, each contracting party promises to per form its part of the contract in good faith and, in return, expects the other party to do the. same.\u201d Goot v. Metro. Gov\u2019t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. M2003-02013-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3031638, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005). \u201cTo avoid the imposition o A.2d 1121, 1132 (2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant with unilateral pricing authority under contract because of potential for evidence of lack of good faith); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Emp\u2019s Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Alaska 1993) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Ironwood Country Club, 233 Holdings: 0: holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract 1: holding that unilateral right to select independent counsel is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 2: holding that negligence alone is not sufficient to constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to insureds 3: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract 4: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and battery occurs \u201cwhen a person is placed in imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact and there is an actual use of force.\u201d Cohen v. Davis, 926 F.Supp. 399, 402 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (citing 6 N.Y. Jur.2d \u00a7 1). Plaintiff has established that he was in \u201cimminent apprehension\u201d that the officers would eng entional. However, where there has been a lawful arrest, intentional contact with the arrested person does not constitute assault and battery, provided such force is reasonable. See, e.g., Lorensen v. State, 249 A.D.2d 762, 671 N.Y.S.2d 790 (3d Dep\u2019t 1998) (upholding a finding that force used during a lawful arrest was \u201cno more than necessary\u201d in light of the circumstances); Wyllie v. District Atty., of County of Kings, 2 A.D.3d 714, 770 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep\u2019t 1996) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, when \u201can arrest is determined to Holdings: 0: holding alvarez and garza were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their affirmative defense of limitations when they did not negate the discovery rule in their summary judgment motions 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment 3: holding that state defendants demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment on the second assault and battery cause of action by demonstrating the reasonableness of their conduct in arresting and transporting the plaintiff 4: recognizing that when a cause of action is reduced to a judgment the cause of action is merged into the judgment and thereafter only an action on the judgment exists", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "SSA, Plaintiffs have, as a matter of law, failed to establish any of the above elements\u2014ie., an injury in fact, likelihood of future injury, traceability, or redressability. The Court does not agree. On the first element, ie., injury in fact, the Court acknowledges that Judge Patel\u2019s prior orders focused on Plaintiffs\u2019 emotional distress. See Davis Docket No. 26 (Order at 11) (citing Situ v. Leavitt, No. C06-2841 TEH, 2006 WL 3734373, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 18, 2006)); Doe Docket No. 26 (Order at 17) (citing the same). Con trary to what SSA suggests, many courts have found that emotional distress may constitute an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing. See, e.g., Soobzokov v. Holder, No. 10-6260(DRD), 2011 WL 2293853, at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65007, at *11-12 (D.N.J. June 7, 2011) (<HOLDING>); Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff has satisfied the elements of standing because he alleges to have personally suffered emotionally as a result of defendants failure to vigorously investigate and prosecute several suspects for the murder of his father and his request for damages and an independent inquiry into defendants investigation will likely redress his suffering 1: holding that police chiefs son who alleged that he was denied an interview for a position because his father had criticized the local officials did not have standing to assert the first amendment rights of his father 2: holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights 3: holding child is entitled to know and be supported financially and emotionally by his or her biological father 4: holding that plaintiff had cared for his father who suffered severe depression after murder of his daughter within meaning of fmla interim regulation because inter alia he discussed with his father grief associated with murder and provided reassuring physical presence to his father", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "inland wetlands agencies have not been found to be quasi-municipal entities. See Denehy v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm\u2019n, No. CV940704881 S, 1994 WL 247903, *2 (ConmSuper. May 27, 1994) (unpublished) (finding in an action relating to an administrative appeal that, \u201cThe Agency is not a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation so as to allow service upon its presiding officer or managing agent\u201d). The court does pause, however, in light of a recent case decided by another court in this district. In Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Town of Durham, No. 3:08-CV-520, 2011 WL 4572025 (D.Conn. Sept. 30, 2011), the court held that a municipal planning and zoning commission and a municipal zoning board of appeals were proper defendants in a section 1983 action. Arrigoni, 2011 WL 4572025 at *8 (<HOLDING>). The court in Arrigoni relied on a Connecticut Holdings: 0: holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans 1: holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress 2: holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law 3: holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed 4: holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "order, or judgment, or more than two years after the date a disability is removed); see also Tex. Estates Code \u00a7\u00a7 55.251, 202.203, 1056.101; cf. id. \u00a7 256.204 (limiting will contest to two years or two years after discovering fraud or forgery). These express references to statutes of limitations for bills of review reflect legislative concern for the orderly administration of estates and finality of judgments and are consistent with the \u201cstrong public interest in according finality to probate proceedings,\u201d which has been afforded great weight in our precedent. Little, 943 S.W.2d at 418-21 (concluding that the discovery rule does not apply to adoptees\u2019 belated inheritance claims despite the inherent difficulty of promptly asserting such claims); see Frost Nat\u2019l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 497 (<HOLDING>). Construing section 31 as prescribing a Holdings: 0: holding that the discovery rule does not apply to  bill of review claims to set aside probate judgments 1: holding that texass probate statute does not affect whether the probate exception to federal jurisdiction applies to a case 2: holding that courts review judgments not statements in opinions 3: holding that probate exception does not apply where plaintiffs assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty seek in personam jurisdiction over defendants and do not seek to probate or annul a will 4: holding rule does not apply to satisfied conciliationcourt judgments", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "makes clear that the negligence claim is premised on precisely the same allegations of material misrepresentations regarding the source of investment advice in connection with the purchase and sale of securities, including that plaintiffs were injured when defendants \u201cdid not use the recommendations of Alex. Brown as a basis for making the recommendations to plaintiffs,\u201d \u201crecommended ... securities ... for purchase or sale ... based on what was good for Seaboard and themselves, and without regard to what was good for plaintiffs,\u201d and that management fostered a \u201ctotal disregard for the recommendations that were being made by Alex. Brown\u201d in Seaboard\u2019s provision of investment advice. It is therefore preempted by SLUSA. See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299-300; cf. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we hold that all Holdings: 0: holding that misrepresentation of credit terms of margin account however satisfied in connection with language of rule 10b5 1: holding defendant sold investment contracts when it substituted new investors money for real investment return on old investors funds 2: holding that the defendant was nondisehargeable where the plaintiff estab lished a violation of oklahoma securities laws by showing that defendants were in possession of funds that belonged to other investors 3: holding that the in connection with requirement of rule 10b5 was satisfied where investors were injured as investors through respondents deceptions and the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coineided 4: holding that morrison precludes securities claims brought by us investors who purchase securities on a foreign exchange even where those securities are also listed on a us exchange", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the district court did not impermissibly delegate its authority to establish a repayment plan to the IRS. The district court clearly stated at the resentencing hearing that it: anticipate^] a payment plan being submitted to it within 30 days of the defendant\u2019s beginning of supervised release that would set forth the nature of the regular payments, not only during supervised release, but for the period within which those payments can be demanded and accepted and paid. Resentencing Tr. at 29. Here, the district court delegated the establishment of an initial payment plan to the IRS, which the district court would then approve or reject upon submission. Our precedents make clear that this is an acceptable procedure. See Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 360 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). May does not fare any better with his Holdings: 0: holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution    the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error 1: holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount 2: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 3: holding that the court erred in failing to inform the defendant that it could impose restitution but that the error did not affect the defendants substantial rights because the court informed the defendant that it could impose a maximum fine of an amount higher than the restitution amount imposed 4: holding that a sentencing court does not abrogate its judicial authority when it delegates the setting of a restitutionpayment schedule  provided that the court first establishes the amount of restitution", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his prior customers.\u201d). When the intangible asset of good will is sold along with the tangible assets of a business, the purchaser acquires the right to expect that the firm\u2019s established customers will continue to patronize the business. The essence of the transaction [of the sale of good will] is, in effect, an attempt to transfer the loyalties of the business\u2019 customers from the seller, who cultivated and created them, to the new proprietor. Mohawk, 52 N.Y.2d at 285, 419 N.E.2d at 329, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 651 (internal citations omitted). This duty of the seller not to solicit customers does not, however, include an obligation not to accept such of his former customers as may choose to follow him to his new employment. See id., 52 N.Y.2d at 287, 419 N.E.2d at 330, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (<HOLDING>). The New York Court of Appeals has drawn an Holdings: 0: holding that a company who purchased computer parts to use in its computers is a consumer 1: holding that customers of registered representative were customers of memberfirm 2: holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller 3: holding that the seller of a business implicitly transferred a property right in the firms good will to the buyer and that the seller could not then impair that right by actively soliciting the customers of his former business 4: recognizing that the seller may accept the patronage of those customers who were actively dealing with the purchased company on the date of the sale if such customers choose to leave the purchased company without prompting from the seller", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "employees provided by the defendant general employer, a crane rental service company). \u00b6 38 Finally, no case in Arizona applying the lent employee doctrine mandates that a special employer must have had workers\u2019 compensation coverage in place to receive tort immunity. Instead, the special employer is liable to an injured employee for workers\u2019 compensation regardless of whether the special employer had coverage in place at the time of the employee\u2019s injury. See Nation, 145 Ariz. at 420, 701 P.2d at 1228 (concluding that the plaintiff had the right to recover workers\u2019 compensation benefits from the defendant special employer if she applied for such benefits); see also Porteadores Del Noroeste S.A. De C.V. v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 234 Ariz. 53, 59-60, \u00b6 21, 316 P.3d 1241, 1247-48 (App.2014) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, even if an employer does not Holdings: 0: recognizing a tort action when employee was dismissed for filing a workers compensation claim 1: holding that plaintiffs decedent became special employee of separately incorporated subsidiary after general employer parent corporation lent his services to subsidiary under circumstances that satisfied special employment factors 2: recognizing that a foreign company as a special employer under the lent employee doctrine was subject to arizonas workers compensation statutes for injuries sustained by an employee 3: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation 4: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "review is pending, there is \u201cno good reason to hold the findings and sentence of the court-martial are impaired by the discharge.\u201d United States v. Speller, 8 USCMA 363, 368, 24 CMR 173, 178, (1957). Similarly, the power of review authorities over the court-martial is unaffected by the administrative discharge. See United States v. Woods, 26 MJ 372 (CMA 1988); United States v. Jackson, 3 MJ 153 (CMA 1977); United States v. Entner, 15 USCMA 564, 36 CMR 62 (1965); United States v. Speller, supra; United States v. Sippel, 4 USCMA 50, 15 CMR 50 (1954). Moreover, the administrative discharge does not negate the responsibility of the convening authority to act on the findings and sentence; nor does it restrict his power to do so. See generally Speller, supra at 365-66, 24 CMR at 175-76 (<HOLDING>). As indicated earlier, the convening authority Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: recognizing private right of action 2: holding that where the action was filed as a class action and a consent decree was entered into entry of the consent decree was sufficient certification of the action as a class action under rule 23 3: recognizing validity of convening authoritys action where accused was released from active duty and transferred to reserves after courtmartial but before the convening authoritys action 4: recognizing the cause of action", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the case. See Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654; In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d at 564. Thus, with each of the options in section 52.02(a), except the option of taking the child to a designated juvenile processing office, the officer\u2019s involvement in the case ceases. Baptist Vie Le, 993 S.W.2d at 654; see In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d at 564. When police officers fail to comply with the requirements of Family Code section 52.02(a), 52.12, and 52.025, governing the taking of a child into custody and the taking of the statement of a child in a juvenile processing office, a statement obtained from a juvenile by the investigating officer may violate his rights as a juvenile under the Family Code and thus be inadmissible at trial. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. \u00a7 54.03(e); In re U.G., 128 S.W.3d at 799 (<HOLDING>). This is so even if the statement would Holdings: 0: recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings 1: holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles 2: holding statement inadmissible when instead of following section 5202 officers took juvenile first to police station where they obtained signed written statement from him before taking him to appropriate juvenile detention center 3: holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts 4: holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the doctrine of res judicata. Fundamental to a claim of res judicata in an administrative context are the requirements that the administrative agency was acting in a \u201cjudicial capacity\u201d and that the parties had an \u201copportunity to litigate\u201d their claims. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). Plaintiff has not satisfied either requirement. Plaintiff has not demonstrated, through case law or facts, that the HCFA contracting officers in 1994 were acting in a judicial capacity when they made their decision in February 1994. Nor has Data shown that there was an adversarial proceeding between HCFA and Data that resulted in the issuance of the 1994 memorandum. See Roxco, Ltd. v. United States, 60 Fed.Cl. 39, 45 (2004) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court finds that the Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment 1: recognizing that res judicata does not apply unless the facts and evidence necessary to maintain suit are the same in both actions 2: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award 3: holding that res judicata does not bar those claims that arose after the original pleading is filed in the earlier proceeding 4: holding that res judicata does not apply where the contracting officer did not act in a judicial capacity and there was no adversarial proceeding between the government and roxco", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "instructions to determine the amount of attorneys\u2019 fees incurred by Cimco in enforcing its contract with Bartush.\u201d We note that Cimco put on evidence of attorneys\u2019 fees at trial, but Cimco\u2019s attorneys\u2019 fees question was conditionally submitted upon a \"yes\u201d answer to question 1, a finding that Bartush breached first in question 2, and a \"no\u201d answer to question 4, Because the jury found Cimco breached first in question 2, it did not answer Cimco's attorneys\u2019 fees question. Cimco did not object to the conditional submission of its attorneys\u2019 fees question; consequently, Cimco has failed to preserve any error from the jury\u2019s failure to answer its attorneys\u2019 fees question. See, e.g., Envtl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 631 (Tex. App.\u2014 Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); Hunter v. Carter, 476 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. Holdings: 0: holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question 1: holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions 2: holding party that failed to object to instruction conditioning submission of a jurys question on its answer to a question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question 3: holding appellant could not complain of jurys failure to answer question because the charge instructed the jury not to do so based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction 4: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "showing \u201cthat there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party\u2019s case.\u201d Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the 'moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party \u201cmust do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.\u201d Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Only genuine disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Arpin v. Santa Clam Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). A genuine issue of material fact must be more Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment is unwarranted if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party 1: holding that an issue is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party 2: holding that the nonmoving party must present specific evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor 3: recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party 4: holding that dispute regarding material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "which he used during his cross-examination of the witnesses. Resp\u2019t Mem. at 6 (citing Petitioner\u2019s Affidavit in Support of 2007 C.P.L. \u00a7 440.10 Motion to Vacate; Petitioner\u2019s Statement of Facts; Petitioner\u2019s Memorandum of Law at 3,4; and Petitioner\u2019s Exhibits B, D & E, attached as App. PP to Resp\u2019t Ans.). Furthermore, as Respondent points out, Concepcion acknowledged in one of his pleadings filed in this case that he had heard the audiotape when his attorney visited him at the prison. The audiotape of the witness conversation therefore cannot be considered \u201cnewly discovered\u201d evidence for purposes of an actual-innocence tolling exception to AED-PA\u2019s statute of limitations (assuming that such an exception exists). See, e.g., United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112, 122 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Phillips, No. 04 Civ.4653 DAB Holdings: 0: holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence 1: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial 2: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted 3: holding that to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence the defendant must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the defendant 4: holding that unavailable evidence may constitute newly discovered evidence if the failure to learn of the evidence did not result from the defendants lack of due diligence", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "defendant\u2019s jury waiver was discussed in open court as required. Most significantly, the transcript of proceedings reveals that there was no discussion of defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to a jury. Instead, the record reveals only that defendant\u2019s trial counsel scheduled a bench trial in September 2004 and the trial court referenced defendant\u2019s signed jury waiver immediately before proceeding to the bench trial. Contrary to the State\u2019s assertions, these two instances are insufficient to constitute a discussion of defendant\u2019s waiver of his right to a jury trial in open court. Furthermore, although defendant signed a jury waiver, the existence of a written jury waiver is not dispositive of the issue of whether that waiver is valid. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 269-70; Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 284 (<HOLDING>). In this case, where there was no discussion Holdings: 0: holding prelitigation contractual jury waivers unenforceable 1: holding that written jury waivers alone cannot validly waive a defendants right to a jury trial 2: holding that a federal criminal defendant may waive jury trial without advice of counsel 3: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 4: holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in effect, it is unrelated to the range of the defendant's punishments. Unlike parole, probation, or the length of imprisonment, the requirement to register as a sex offender is beyond the control of the trial court. The judge has no discretion whatsoever in determining whether the defendant will have to comply with registration statutes; instead, it is a legal obligation, predetermined by the legislature, placed on those convicted of particular crimes and is an automatic operation of statute. Similar to the consequence of losing one's driver's license or the right to possess a firearm, the registration requirement is intended to act not as a criminal punishment but as a prophylactic civil remedy. See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 Holdings: 0: holding that alaskas registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpunitive 1: holding that an additional remedy does not constitute an additional requirement 2: holding that a hearing would serve no purpose because the registration act and notification law subject all sex offenders as defined by the registration act to the registration and notification provisions and law enforcement authorities have no discretion to determine which offenders would be exposed to public dissemination 3: holding that the postmark on the registration application was the determining factor when a registration is subsequently approved 4: holding copyright statutes registration requirement a nonjurisdictional condition although previously held to be jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3(A)(3); Judicial Council Order at 2. Judge McBryde does not, so far as we can determine, ever challenge this basic notion anymore than the plaintiff in Lyons claimed a right to engage in the sort of conduct that (he said) commonly led to police use of chokeholds. Indeed at oral argument counsel for Judge McBryde specifically acknowledged that at least some of the conduct \u201ccould be considered inappropriate.\u201d See Oral Arg. Tr. at 80-81. With this decision\u2019s confirmation of the Judicial Council\u2019s authority to sanction Judge McBryde for consistent failure to adhere to this norm, we think the risk of recurrence fairly slight. We recognize that docket limitations can be a very serious matter. See Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). But here the two restrictions on Judge Holdings: 0: holding that presumption that respondent exercised undue influence by preparing will that left all of the decedents property to him was amply rebutted by evidence that decedent had made an earlier will ineffective because not witnessed leaving all her property to him and had written him a letter stating that she was leaving all her property to him 1: holding that plaintiffs tenured public employment is not a fundamental property interest entitled to substantive due process protection  thereby joining the great majority of courts of appeals that have addressed this issue and citing cases 2: holding a tenured state employee has a property right to continued employment and must be accorded due process before serious disciplinary sanctions 3: holding that the defendants property interest requires a preseizure hearing 4: holding that depriving a tenured professor of all teaching and research responsibilities affected a property interest sufficiently to entitle him to some kind of a hearing", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "were not against Deitz personally. Because sanctions were not awarded on those grounds, we remand the case so that the trial court can consider an award of sanctions on these grounds. C. Calculation of Sanctions The appellees\u2019 motion for sanctions was made not against Harris but against Deitz, his client. The first time anyone asked for sanctions against Harris was on the morning of the sanctions hearing when appellees\u2019 counsel, in oral argument, made such a request. A part of the sanctions leveled against Harris was for opposing sanctions. Such an award was improper. It cannot be said that Harris lacked substantial justification in opposing sanctions against his client, Deitz, when he successfully opposed them. See U.S. Health, Inc. v. State, 87 Md.App. 116, 132, 589 A.2d 485 (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 324 Md. 69, 595 A.2d 482 Holdings: 0: holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in awarding opposing counsels attorneys fees and expenses as sanctions without affording the sanctioned party the right to examine question or provide argument against the claimed fees and expenses 1: holding attorney fees may be allowed for expenses incurred for default 2: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 3: holding that rule 1341 does not provide for expenses incurred in asserting the claim for sanctions under the rule except perhaps to the extent that the offending party resists the claim for counsel fees without substantial justification for doing so 4: holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that SEIU has abandoned this claim. Additionally, the preliminary injunction was issued by the district court pursuant to section 301(a). Thus, our resolution of the jurisdictional issue has relevance to the ongoing litigation. Moreover, and essential to our determination here, in the preliminary injunction the district court explicitly preserved a portion of the TRO as still effective after issuance of the injunction. The preliminary injunction states, \u201call defendants in this action remain subject to paragraph three of the TRO and subsequent orders regarding the imaging of electronic devices.\u201d (Order Granting In Part Mot. For Prelim. Inj. at 17). Thus it seems the TRO has not expired and remains enforceable. Compare Am. Tunaboat Ass\u2019n v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>), with Negrete, 523 F.3d at 1098 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that where a noncompetition clause in a contract had expired by its own terms the plaintiffs appeal from the district courts denial of the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction enforcing the clause was moot 1: holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case 2: holding plaintiffs appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction moot where defendants directive no longer in effect 3: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction 4: holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, p. 2 (4th ed.1971). Wrongful injunction falls within this concept of civil wrong. The duty to avoid the harms caused to a defendant by an inappropriate injunction is perhaps best explained as a special duty created when the government establishes a special relationship with a person by bringing suit against that person. See Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla.1985); Simpson v. City of Miami, 700 So.2d 87 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Hartley v. Floyd, 512 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Although we conclude that the claim is in the nature of strict liability, we also conclude that wrongful injunction is a \u201cwrongful act\u201d for purposes of the waiver in section 768.28. See Schick v. Florida Dep\u2019t of Agric., 504 So.2d 1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). Once it is decided that the duty exists in Holdings: 0: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 1: holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official 2: holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government 3: holding that sovereign immunity barred a wrongful death claim against the board and stating that the only question is whether the boards sovereign immunity protection was waived emphasis added 4: holding inverse condemnation action not barred by sovereign immunity", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "numbness in both legs after he injured himself getting out of a car. His condition improved significantly after physical therapy, which helped him to walk more easily and increased his spinal flexibility. Yet, he did not regain full sensation below the knees. By the end of 2012, Gibbens reported during an examination that he was \u201cdoing well\u201d and never experienced pain beyond five or six on a scale of ten. Our review of this mixed evidence is not intended to minimize Gibbens\u2019s ordeal. The mere presence of \u201cperiodic improvements and cessation of treatment\u201d cannot support an ALJ\u2019s decision to discount the severity of a claimant\u2019s medical condition when the ALJ fails to consider other record evidence of declining health. Gentry v. Comm\u2019r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 723-24 (6th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). However, that is not the circumstance in the Holdings: 0: holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record 1: holding that evidence relied on by alj was insufficient to undermine pain allegations where medical records were replete with claimants reports of pain and of prescriptions 2: holding that the alj erred by discounting claimants impairments on the basis that she ceased certain treatments where her decision to go without those prescriptions was driven by serious side effects of her medication rather than recovery 3: holding that lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony but is a factor that an alj may consider 4: holding that evidence that patient who had a history of not taking medication and who murdered husband during a period when she was off of her medication and delusional tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to patient or others", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the problems here in Wash-ington D.C., in New York, in Detroit where I grew up, can be traced right back to [drug trafficking].\u201d In Defendants\u2019 view, the prosecutor perceived the jury \u201cmight be [uninterested in Colombia\u2019s drug problems,\u201d Defendants Br. 48, which led him to improperly tie the Colombian drug trade to the American drug problem, inviting the jury to act as the \u201ccommunity conscience.\u201d To be sure, a suggestion that the jury act as the \u201ccommunity conscience\u201d can constitute error. In United States v. Hawkins, our circuit warned it is improper to \u201csubstitute emotion for evidence by equating, directly or by innuendo, a verdict of guilty to a blow against the drug problem.\u201d 595 F.2d 751, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). This caution derives from Viereck v. United Holdings: 0: holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined 1: holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal 2: holding an appeal to the jury to act as the community conscience is improper when it is calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors 3: holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed 4: holding that a court may consider a theory raised for the first time in a posttrial brief unless it is precluded by the pleadings or it prejudices the opposing party", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "liability on those who caused toxic tort injuries and those who released hazardous substances into the environment if their responsibility was equal to or greater than fifty percent. Tex Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code \u00a7 33.013(c). In such cases, liability was not limited by proportionate responsibility. In 2003, the Legislature revisited that exclusion and repealed it in its entirety. Now, defen dants found liable for these tortious acts are subject to the general proportionate responsibility scheme. The Legislature seemed intent on creating a general scheme of proportionate responsibility for tort claims, subject to specific statutory exclusions. Finally, our controlling interpretation of that statutory scheme has remained in place since our 1993 decision in Smith v. Sewell. 858 S.W.2d at 856 (<HOLDING>). In the thirteen years since Se-well was Holdings: 0: holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant 1: holding that federal comparative negligence principles prevailed over state comparative negligence principles on the basis that admiralty is not merely a basis of jurisdiction but instead it is a body of substantive principles as well 2: holding that liability under  1983 requires a causal link to and direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights 3: holding that application of the principles of comparative responsibility to causes of action brought under the dram shop act establishes a consistent and equitable approach to the issue of dramshop liability generally and first party dramshop liability specifically 4: holding itca does not create new causes of action but creates acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a dispositional review hearing could not be combined with a termination of parental rights proceeding because doing so \"would bypass the steps established by the Legislature for final determination of a child's status.\" Id. at 816. AE. addresses a situation where the parents did not yet have the opportunity to fulfill the service plan, and thus, a termination hearing at the same time as the permanency hearing was inappropriate. See id. However, here, the juvenile court did not conduct a disposi-tional hearing and a termination hearing at the same time-it held a permanency hearing and a termination hearing concurrently. Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 78-8a-312(6)(c)(8upp.2000) explicitly allows termination and permanency hearings to be combined. Cf. In re KM., 965 P.2d 576, 582 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (<HOLDING>). C. Ruling Regarding Permission to Medicate Holdings: 0: holding that  2253 analysis may be done at the time the claim for relief is determined 1: holding proper for permanency plan to be determined at dispositional hearing 2: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 3: holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action 4: holding that where perception of bias arose during the hearing then it was proper for counsel to move for disqualification at the hearing and then to later reduce motion to writing to be in compliance with rule", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the agreement rather than on the judgment.\u201d Indeed, the instant Separation Agreement provides that \"this Agreement shall independently remain in full force and effect, and shall survive any decree, order, or judgment hereafter entered and shall forever be binding and conclusive upon the parties.\u201d Thus, under settled Virginia law, Hildebrand may properly sue under the Separation Agreement given that it was not merged in the Final Decree of Divorce. Id. 15 . As noted supra, both Hildebrand and Iron Works are citizens of Virginia, while Lewis is a citizen of Florida. 16 . It is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, either by the parties or by the court sua sponte. See Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted). 17 . In this regard, it Holdings: 0: holding that state law claims cannot pend from a federal one over which the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 1: recognizing that a federal court is obliged to dismiss a case whenever it appears the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 2: holding that when an appellate court determines that it lacks jurisdiction the only thing it can do is dismiss the appeal 3: recognizing that there are nonconstitutional grounds on which we may dismiss a suit before considering the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction and concluding that the court could dismiss for failure to satisfy the demand pleading requirement of rule 231 before addressing subject matter jurisdiction 4: holding that a federal court is obliged to determine its own jurisdiction for each case", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the judiciary * * In re Request for Advisory Opinion from House of Representatives (Coastal Resources Management Council), 961 A.2d 930, 933 (R.I.2008). Just as \u201cthe separation of powers amendments di 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (\u201cTo ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence * * *\u201d) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974)). The Court, the board, and lawyers licensed to practice in Rhode Island, as officers of the Court, including Disciplinary Counsel, may all properly exercise the judiciary\u2019s inherent subpoena power. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 644, 105 S.Ct. 2874 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, respondent\u2019s contention that this Holdings: 0: holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect 1: holding that information contained in affidavits and depositions submitted as attachments to a memorandum were properly before the trial court and appellate court for purposes of a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 3: recognizing that as an officer of the court a lawyer can cause persons to drop their private affairs and be called as witnesses in court and for depositions and other pretrial processes although subject to the ultimate control of the court 4: holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), found that the plaintiffs are entitled to be made whole and, therefore, compensatory damages are appropriate forms of relief. See 503 U.S. at 69, 112 S.Ct. 1028. That case, however, did not reverse long-standing judicial attitudes regarding emotional distress damages awards in contract cases. The compensatory damages that Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch. found appropriate do not include extraordinary damages, such as punitive awards and emotional distress damages. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. at 188, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (\u201c[I]t must be concluded that Title VI funding recipients have not, merely by accepting funds, implicitly consented to liability for punitive damages.\u201d); Bradford v. Iron County C-4 Sch. Dist., 1984 WL 1443, at *7 (E.D.Mo.1984)(<HOLDING>). Even if the Court were to assume that Holdings: 0: holding in wrongful pregnancy suit that expenses of raising and educating child were not recoverable elements of damages but emotional distress was recoverable element 1: holding damages for emotional distress are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract whether express or implied in the absence of a showing that the parties contemplated such damages at the time the contract was made 2: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute 3: holding that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under section 504 4: holding emotional distress damages for a willful violation of the automatic stay were recoverable against the social security administration", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\"if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.\u201d PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 14 . In applying the \"fundamental fairness\u201d standard to evaluate foreign judicial systems under section 4(b)(1), our sister circuits have consistently recognized that constitutional due-process standards are more demanding. See Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (interpreting the predecessor to section 4(b)(1) of Illinois\u2019s UFCMJRA as employing an \"international concept of due process\u201d that was \"less demanding\u201d than \"the complex concept that has emerged from American case law\u201d); DeJoria v. Maghreb Petroleum Expl., S.A., 804 F.3d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>); Society of Lloyd\u2019s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, Holdings: 0: recognizing that under the predecessor to section 4b1 of texass ufcmjra the foreign judicial system must only be fundamentally fair and need not comply with the traditional rigors of american due process citations alterations and internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that under ada discrimination need not be the sole reason for the adverse employment decision but must actually play a role in the employers decision making process and have a determinative influence on the outcome citation internal quotation marks and alterations omitted 2: holding that to establish a violation of due process an alien must show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present her claims internal quotation marks omitted 3: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: recognizing that party is not permitted to use the accident of a remand to raise an issue that it could just as well have raised in the first appeal internal quotation marks and alterations omitted", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "occurred on or about June 19, 2006, (# 5, Ex. A), and the Complaint was not filed until July 27, 2009. (# 1-2 at 1). This is over three years. TILA has a one-year statute of limitations for damages actions. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1640(e) (\u201cAny action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.\u201d). The remedy of rescission is available for three years, see 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1635(f), but even then only where a borrower is willing and able to tender the balance on the promissory note, see Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir.2003); LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.1976), which clearly is not kers, Inc., 552 F.Supp.2d 191 (D.P.R.2007) (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs obtained their loan in order Holdings: 0: holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover 1: holding that  10113aa does not alter the requirement that the property in question be real property in order for the antimodification provision to apply 2: holding that the tila rescission remedy did apply where borrowers encumbered a second property in order to obtain financing for the first property 3: holding that overvaluation penalty did not apply where the taxpayers conceded other grounds of adjustment in the notice of deficiency including that they lacked a profit objective that the property at issue was not qualifying property and that the property was not placed in service 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "fails the first step of this inquiry, while his procedural due process claim fails the second. Substantive Due Process Leal alleged that his right to substantive due process was violated by the conduct of the Internal Affairs investigators and the composition of the Disciplinary Review Board that recommended indefinite suspension. However, an inadequate or invalid investigation is insufficient to state a civil rights claim unless another recognized constitutional right is involved. See, e.g., Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1079 (8\u215b Cir. 1996). And Leal\u2019s complaint regarding the composition of the Disciplinary Review Board rests upon the incorrect assumption that he was entitled to an impartial decisionmaker. See Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715-718 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold Leal\u2019s substantive due Holdings: 0: holding that a limited pretermination hearing was sufficient where it was followed by a more comprehensive posttermination hearing 1: holding that due process does not require the state to provide an impartial decisionmaker at the pretermination hearing where posttermination remedies are available 2: holding a due process claim failed because the plaintiff did not seek to require a witnessess attendance at a posttermination grievance hearing and was not inhibited or restricted from doing so 3: holding that procedures that were available to the employees after the implementation of the rif guideline provided such protection of their rights that the absence of a pretermination hearing alone was not violative of due process 4: holding that a pretermination hearing need not be in front of a neutral decisionmaker so long as the state affords plaintiff subsequent to his termination a full adversarial hearing before a neutral adjudicator", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), and we have repeatedly emphasized that equitable tolling is not available to \u201cthose who sleep on them rights,\u201d see, e.g., Covey v. Ark. River Co., 865 F.2d 660, 662 (5th Cir.1989). Giving Wickware all benefit of the doubt, equitable tolling still would not help him. Even if we fictionally extend the benefit of \u00a7 2244(d)(2) to his improperly filed petition and discount the entire period of time from Wickware\u2019s original filing of his state habeas application on August 29, 2003, and the TCCA\u2019s ruling on the merits of Wickware\u2019s second application on April 4, 2007, Wickware would fail to meet the AEDPA time limits. Wickware\u2019s conviction became final for AEDPA purposes on Decembe , 599 (5th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Webb v. Dretke, 165 Fed.Appx. 375, 376 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that petition was properly filed even though the state court denied it as procedurally barred because the petition was delivered to and accepted by the state court 1: holding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed his habeas petition more than two months late 2: holding that trial court erred in granting petition for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with case plan when case plan was not filed and approved by the court until seven months after petition for termination was filed 3: holding that petitioner was dili gent for equitable tolling purposes where petitioner filed state petition two months after conviction was final and filed federal petition seven days after discovering state had denied petition on the merits 4: holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "120 S.Ct. 2446. In this case the Commonwealth is only imposing a procedural, formal requirement on the structure of an organization. The statute neither requires nor even suggests any forced association of gun owners with anyone of differing views. Furthermore, as the Commonwealth points out, requiring a club to obtain a license in order to enjoy a narrow range of privileges relating to large capacity weapons does not \u201cimplicate any constitutionally protected right of association because it does not involve ... protected associative activity.\u201d Like an ordinance restricting attendance at certain dance halls to persons of a certain age, this regulation simply does not implicate the First Amendment. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs are not being forced to join Holdings: 0: holding that raising chickens is not an expressive act for the purposes of the first amendment 1: holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president 2: holding that where the first amendment does not protect a certain activity there can be no first amendment right of association to engage in that activity 3: recognizing that the first amendment protects the expressive activities associated with the voterregistration process 4: holding that the dancing regulated by the municipal ordinance simply does not involve the sort of expressive association that the first amendment has been held to protect", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "anything other than happenstance, unfortunately. ... [Tjhere is no evidence, nothing to suggest that this was a first-degree murder and this was somehow premeditated. 7 . Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). 8 . White v. United States, 425 A.2d 616, 618 (D.C.1980). 9 . Louis v. United States, 862 A.2d 925, 928-29 (D.C.2004). 10 . See Perrow v. United States, 947 A.2d 54, 55-56 (D.C.2008) (noting that \"the trial judge is 'in the best position to determine whether the government presented an argument that, perhaps subtly, exceeded the bounds of the agreement\u2019 \u201d) (quoting United States v. Pollard, 295 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 19, 959 F.2d 1011, 1023 (1992)). 11 . Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, -, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1432-33, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (<HOLDING>). 12 .Id. at 1429 (internal quotation marks and Holdings: 0: holding that a forfeited claim of governmental failure to fulfill its obligations under a plea agreement is subject to the requirements of plain error review 1: holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing 2: holding that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 3: holding prevonn that plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context 4: holding plain error analysis is the proper standard for review of forfeited error in the rule 11 context", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provided for significantly broadened access to public records.\u201d); Levy v. Senate of Pa., 619 Pa. 586, 618, 65 A.3d 361, 381 (2013) (\u201c[T]he enactment of the RTKL in 2008 was a dramatic expansion of the public\u2019s access to government documents.\u201d). According to Requesters, \u201c[i]t is .-impossible to square the Commonwealth Court\u2019s discarding of Lukes with the conclusion of SWB Yankees that the RTKL expands access to public records and with [SWB Yankees\u2019] favorable treatment of Lukes.\u201d Brief, for Appellants at 20. Requesters also depict the majority decision of the Commonwealth Court as a departure from a long line of decisions of this Court, such as Sapp Roofing Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers\u2019 International Association, Local Union No. 12, 552 Pa. 105, 109, 713 A.2d 627, 629 (1998) (plurality) (<HOLDING>). Requesters note that, in other geographic Holdings: 0: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 1: recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies 2: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 3: holding that payroll records of a private roofing contractor in the custody of a local agency were public records because they evidenced a disbursement by a governmental unit 4: holding that records in the possession of a party with whom an agency has contracted to perform a governmental function on behalf of the agency are presumptively public records subject to public access so long as the record a directly relates to the governmental function and b is not exempt under the rtkl", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "magnified in the prison context. Jolly, 923 F.Supp. at 949. Thus, Kassen held that where prison physicians exercise governmental discretion, they are entitled to official immunity. Id. at 949-50; Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 10-11. On the other hand, the court concluded that where state-employed physicians exercise purely medical discretion (as in the diagnosis and treatment of patients), the purpose of official immunity no longer applies. See Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 10-11. A physician\u2019s exercise of purely medical discretion thus does not warrant official immunity. In 2003, the Texas Legislature superseded Kassen by extending official immunity to all employees acting within the scope of their employment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. \u00a7 101.106 (West 2013); see Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381-85 (<HOLDING>). Prior to its abrogation, several commentators Holdings: 0: recognizing abrogation 1: recognizing statutory abrogation of rule of liberality in workers compensation claims 2: recognizing abrogation of kassen 3: recognizing the abrogation of both dunett and bundles 4: recognizing abrogation of fought v unum life ins co of am 379 f3d 997 1005 10th cir2004", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "respect to crimes where physical force is not a required element of the offense, the courts have also focused on whether lack of consent on the part of the victim was a required element. In Sutherland, the Second Circuit ). Thus, the Connecticut Legislature has made the determination, as expressed in Conn. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 53a-71, that children under the age of sixteen are not adults capable of making an intelligent choice in matters relating to sex. See State v. Jason B, 248 Conn. at 571, 729 A.2d 760. In analogous cases involving child victims who are incapable of giving their consent to the sexual activity involved, courts have found a substantial risk that physical force will be used against these children to ensure their compliance. See United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d 812, Holdings: 0: holding that under iowa code  7098 the offense of lascivious acts with a child was a crime of violence because it involved a substantial risk that physical force would be used against the child victim in the course of committing the offense 1: holding that a conviction for sexual assault of a child under nebrevstat  28320011 was a crime of violence because this type of contact between parties of differing physical and emotional maturity carries a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense 2: holding that a conviction under utah code ann  7654041 for sexual abuse of a child was a crime of violence under  16b based upon a common sense view of the sexual abuse statute in combination with the legal determination that children are incapable of consent which suggests that when an older person attempts to sexually touch a child under the age of fourteen there is always a substantial risk that physical force will be used to ensure the childs compliance 3: holding that attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen is a crime of viqlenee 4: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\u2019 \u201d See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1553 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). In addition, the doctrine \u201crequires every court to follow the decisions of courts that are higher in the judicial hierarchy.\u201d Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int\u2019l Assoc., 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir.1993), aff'd in part and rev\u2019d in part, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat\u2019l Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir.1994) (en banc). Because the bankruptcy court did not depart from one of its own rulings or the ruling of a higher court in the same case, the doctrine of the law of the case arguably does not apply here. Cf. Been v. O.K Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217, 1224-25 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The BAP concluded, however, that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that ruling of one trial judge does not preclude another trial judge reconsidering interlocutory ruling 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in reconsidering a prior interlocutory ruling 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling whether to proceed with a declaratory judgment action 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of wrongful means); Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., No. 60045, 2005 WL 4441899, at *7 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Dec. 19, 2005) (\u201c[T]he complaint contains nothing indicating the ... defendants acted beyond mere self-interest or other economic considerations. This is insufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations.\u201d). Plaintiffs Complaint, which merely alleges that the various interlocked companies in the Shell family preferred to purchase from each other rather than from outside companies, does not offer an exam- pie of \u201cegregious\u201d conduct \u201cso \u2018culpable\u2019 ... that it could be the basis for a claim of tortious interference with economic relations.\u201d Carvel II, 818 N.E.2d at 1103-04; see also Masefield AG, 2006 WL 346178, at *9 (<HOLDING>); Advanced Global Tech., 836 N.Y.S.2d at 811 Holdings: 0: holding that conclusory allegations that defendant used coercive business practices to intentionally interfere with business relations was insufficient to state a claim 1: holding that plaintiffs allegations that defendant engaged in coercive business practices without justification entirely out of malice and without normal economic selfinterest were conclusory and thus insufficient to state a claim 2: recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with anothers business relations 3: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 4: holding that with respect to tortious interference recognized standards of business ethics and business customs and practices are pertinent", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "provision of \u00a7 903, and so is an exception to it. The terms of \u00a7 903 clarify that the remedies of \u201c[t]his chapter\u201d (i.e., Chapter 9) do not alter the ordinary powers that states have over their municipalities. This provision, together with \u00a7 904, \u201ccarries] forward doctrines of federal common law that had governed municipal insolvency before the first federal act, as well as the constitutional principle against federal interference in state and local governance.\u201d McConnell & Picker, 60 U. Chi. L.Rev. at 462-63 (footnote omitted). \u201cThe effect is to preserve the power of political authorities to set their own domestic spending priorities, without restraint from the bankruptcy court.\u201d Id.; cf. City of East St. Louis v. United States, 110 U.S. 321, 324, 4 S.Ct. 21, 28 L.Ed. 162 (1884) (<HOLDING>). Relying on the context of \u00a7 903, the Holdings: 0: holding that the right to control the means by which the work is accomplished is clearly the most significant test of the employment relationship and observing that many of the other factors enumerated in the restatement second are merely evidentiary indicia of the right to control 1: holding that the right to control is measured by considering 1 the independent nature of the workers business 2 the workers obligation to furnish necessary tools supplies and materials to perform the job 3 the workers right to control the progress of the work except as to the final results 4 the time for which the worker is employed and 5 the method of payment whether by unit of time or by the job 2: holding that no court has the right to control the discretion of municipal authorities as to what expenditures are proper and necessary for the municipal administration 3: holding authority to control limits duty to control 4: holding that the county has no control over a prosecutors nonsalary expenditures that do not exceed his budget because it would be incongruous to permit county government to control the operations and functions of the prosecutor a constitutional officer entrusted with awesome duties of vast importance to the public ", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Congress intended by adding the mandatory language combined with the 'exceptional circumstances' standard for reopening under [the amended statute], while leaving intact the permissive language and less stringent 'reasonable cause' standard for avoiding in absentia deportation under \u00a7 1252(b)\u201d); Iris Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting New Section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 30 San Diego L. Rev. 75, 150 (1993) (\"In the context of a deportation hearing under [the Act], both 'reasonable cause\u2019 and \u2018exceptional circumstances' excuse nonappearance at a hearing\u201d). 6 . Such evidence should be presented to the IJ prior to the entrance of the order so that the IJ is given the opportunity to refrain from proceeding in absentia. Typically evidence of this nat Holdings: 0: holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he is eligible for relief from deportation constitutes due process violation where alien establishes prejudice 1: holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he was eligible for relief from deportation constitutes a due process violation if alien establishes prejudice 2: holding that alien demonstrated deportation proceedings were fundamentally unfair when alien was deprived effective assistance of counsel 3: recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable 4: holding that reasonable cause did not justify reopening deportation proceedings when the alien appeared thirty minutes late for the hearing because the alien and his attorney crossed signals about where to meet", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "including law enforcement and the State of Illinois Department of Insurance....\u201d (R. 51, Superseding Indictment, Count One \u00b6 5.) The indictment further alleges that Segal \u201cknew and believed that NNIB\u2019s PFTA was not operated properly and according to the requirements of the law and the Code....\u201d (Id.) By implication, then, the Government pleads that Segal knew he was violating a legal duty, satisfying one definition of \u201cwillful.\u201d See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141-42, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). Furthermore, we note that in denying motions to dismiss indictments or in affirming these denials, courts have held that \u00a7 2(b)\u2019s \u201cwillfully\u201d language need not be plead explicitly in the indictment. See United States v. Krogstad, 576 F.2d 22, 28-29 (3d Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Grubb, 469 F.Supp. 991, Holdings: 0: holding that although the indictment did not track the exact language of the statute the indictment when read as a whole sufficiently stated facts which support every element of the crime charged and apprised defendant of the specific charge against him 1: holding that  willfulness need not be expressly stated in the indictment charging a violation of 18 usc s 2 where the indictment simply stated that the defendant caused a false audit report to be submitted and did not specify a charge under  2a or  2b 2: holding that because the bank had no duty to report defendants structured transactions these transactions did not constitute material facts within the meaning of 18 usc  1001 consequently defendant may not be held criminally liable under 18 usc  2b for causing the bank to fail to disclose a material fact 3: recognizing that the government need only prove that crime occurred reasonably near the date stated in the indictment 4: holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "brought by companies operating in municipalities); Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391-92, 114 S.Ct. at 1682-83 (invalidating town waste processing ordinance in suit by local waste processor against town); Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 346, 116 S.Ct. at 861 (striking down North Carolina tax in suit by North Carolina company); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188, 114 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 129 L.Ed.2d 157 (1994) (striking down Massachusetts milk pricing order in suit by Massachusetts-licensed milk dealers); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 367-68, 112 S.Ct. at 2027-28 (striking down Michigan waste import restrictions in suit by Michigan landfill operator); S. Waste Sys., 420 F.3d at 1291-92 (upholding waste processing ordinance on merits in suit by in-state company); Leib, 558 F.3d at 1311 (<HOLDING>). In addition, as noted above, the dormant Holdings: 0: holding that state restrictions on electronic license plates might constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce so the claim fell within the zone of interests protected by the dormant commerce clause 1: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce 2: holding that state regulations of intrastate wildlife are within dormant commerce clause 3: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 4: holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "little evidence in order to overcome an employer\u2019s motion for summary judgment\u201d because \u201cthe ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a searching inquiry\u2014 one that is most appropriately conducted by a factfinder, upon a full record.\u201d Davis, 520 F.3d at 1089 (quotation marks omit ted); see also McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir.2004) (\u201cIn evaluating motions for summary judgment in the context of employment discrimination, we have emphasized the importance of zealously guarding an employee\u2019s right to a full trial, since discrimination claims are frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.\u201d); Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>) (second alteration in original) (quotation Holdings: 0: holding that very little  evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employers motive any indication of discriminatory motive  may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a factfinder 1: holding that motive is circumstantial evidence of intent 2: holding extrinsic evidence of defendants motive to possess gun inadmissible where defendant did not contest the issue of motive 3: holding that defendants alleged motive to enhance its ability to raise cash under a 80 million credit facility agreement  is a sufficient motive to raise an inference of fraudulent intent 4: holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "size and complexity with the South Wing project. A contracting officer who must exercise some level of discretion to determine a contractor\u2019s responsibility should be encouraged to base this exercise of discretion on objective, identifiable factors. Doing so does not make those factors special standards. Grimberg argues alternatively that if the eleven Comparison Chart criteria are not special standards, then the solicitation\u2019s requirement that bidders submit three projects \u201cof the size and complexity\u201d of the South Wing project is improper because it is not specific and fails to put contractors on notice of what exactly was required. A valid special standard must be specific, objective, and mandatory. See In re Weldtest, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-216747.2, 84-2 CPD \u00b6 612 (1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Watch Security, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. Holdings: 0: holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available 1: holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person 2: holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment 3: holding that chilling effect claim must still be rooted in specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm to convey standing 4: holding that a solicitation provision stating that a bidder may be required to prove that they have experience in comparable work was permissive and not sufficiently specific nor objective to be a special standard", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Woolston, 453 N.E.2d at 968. It is for the trial court to determine whether the juror is biased for or against the defendant. Id. Only if the defendant was placed in substantial peril will we find an abuse of discretion. Id. A. Juror Jester Alvies contends that Jester should have been removed and replaced with an alternate juror because her father-in-law is a second cousin of one of the victims. In response, the State directs us to subsection (a)(4) of the statute concerning relatives within the fifth degree of the defendant or victim. We agree with the State that Alvies cannot establish that Jester is related to the victim within the fifth degree and, thus, is not entitled to have her removed for cause under that section. See Whicker v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>). As Alvies points out, however, the basis of Holdings: 0: holding juror who was aunt of defendants mothers nephews wife was not related within fifth degree and thus should not have been removed for cause under indcode  353715a4 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing a juror for cause 2: holding judge in bank robbery prosecution did not abuse discretion in refusing to excuse juror whose wife was bank employee or juror whose daughter had been victim of bank robbery 3: holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated 4: holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges  is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the contents of its own policy ... In addition, notice of facts which would cause a reasonable person to inquire further im poses a duty of investigation upon the insurer, and failure to investigate constitutes a waiver of all powers or privileges which a reasonable search would have uncovered. Steptore, 643 So.2d at 1216. If a policy requires an insurer to defend a claim, then the insurer must do so, even if it ultimately may not be liable under the policy. Peavey Company v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir.1992). An insurer can supply its insured with a defense and simultaneously contest its obligation to provide coverage by reserving its right to refuse coverage in a timely manner. Id. An insurer that tardily reserves its rights waives defenses to coverage. Id. at 1175-76 (<HOLDING>). a. The Johnson Lawsuit It is undisputed that Holdings: 0: holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after  it was informed of the occurrence 1: holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation 2: holding that insurer that waited five months after being informed of occurrence and two months after being informed of suit against insured to deliver reservation of rights letter waived its noncoverage defense 3: holding that an insured waited unreasonably long in first notifying an insurer of a lawsuit five months after its filing 4: holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "As previously noted, the parties dispute when Tri-Etch alerted Cincinnati of Young\u2019s death and the resulting lawsuit. Cincinnati asks us to find Tri-Etch\u2019s notice unreasonably late as a matter of law and affirm the trial court\u2019s summary judgment order on this basis. However, regardless of when Cincinnati received notice of Young\u2019s death and the Estate\u2019s lawsuit, Cincinnati has always contended that Young\u2019s death was not an \u201coccurrence\u201d entitled to coverage under its policies. Thus, we first must discern whether Cincinnati can show that it was prejudiced by Tri-Etch\u2019s allegedly faulty notice. In Miller v. Dilts, our Supreme Court held that an insurer may not avoid liability under a policy\u2019s cooperation and notice clauses unless the insured\u2019s noncompliance with tho 2d 430, 435 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We will assume for the sake of the argument Holdings: 0: holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage 1: holding that an immaterial breach does not deprive the insurer of the benefit of the bargain and thus cannot relieve the insurer of the contractual coverage obligation 2: holding that under montana common law an insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith in denying a claim if the insurer had a reasonable basis for contesting the claim 3: holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage 4: holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "beneficiary of the contract, not one who is benefitted only incidentally by the performance of the contract. MCI Telecomms., 995 S.W.2d at 651; Brunswick Corp. v. Bush, 829 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (explaining that \u201conly donee and creditor beneficiaries have enforceable rights\u201d). A donee beneficiary is a party to whom the performance promised will, when rendered, come to him as a pure donation; a creditor beneficiary is one to whom the performance promised will come in satisfaction of a legal duty owed to him by the promisee. MCI Telecomms., 995 S.W.2d at 651. This legal duty may include indebtedness, contractual obligations, or other legally enforceable commitments owed to the third party. Id.; see also Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Tex.2002) (<HOLDING>). B. Application of the Law to the Present Holdings: 0: holding that a husband unlawfully attempted to name a beneficiary other than his daughter who was the irrevocable beneficiary pursuant to a separation agreement in a divorce decree 1: holding that the defendants mother validly consented to a search of a motor home parked in the driveway of her house when the motor home was connected by an electrical cord to her house the mother was observed entering the motor home repeatedly and the mother apparently had supervisory authority over two teenage girls who were inside the motor home because it was reasonable to conclude that the mother had common authority over the motor home sufficient to give valid consent 2: holding mother qualified as thirdparty beneficiary to daughter and soninlaws agreement incident to divorce because it provided for repayment to mother of a specific amount of money from the proceeds of the sale of the couples home 3: holding that the asserted right of the insureds child based on his agreement with his mother during their divorce to name the child as his fegli beneficiary was preempted by feglia 4: holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and (2) \u201cwhere the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary\u2019s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.\u201d Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. 453; see also Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1364. A careful study of Supreme Court precedent, as well as that of the regional circuits, however, reveals that equitable tolling is available in a variety of circumstances, including when a party has been mentally incapacitated. The Supreme Court has yet to address whether mental illness can justify equitable tolling. In Irwin, an employment discrimination case, petitioner claimed that the 30-day period prescribed in 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-16(c) should be tolled because his attorney was out of the country and did not, therefore, personally receive the relevant n 1177, 1180 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Holdings: 0: recognizing attorneys mental illness as grounds for relief under rule 60b6 1: holding that attorneys mental illness may justify equitable tolling 2: holding that 29 cfr  1614105a1 is subject to equitable tolling based on mental illness 3: holding that where client was abandoned by attorney due to attorneys mental illness equitable tolling may be appropriate 4: holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to establish prima facie case of control); id. at 340 (\u201cAlthough there is ample evidence of the [family] corporations having many dealings with each another, there is no evidence in the record of [the parent] exercising any control over [the subsidiary].\u201d). Indeed, it would be surprising if a wholly-owned subsidiary did not act for its parent\u2019s benefit. In order to establish jurisdiction over Ipsen or Ipsen Pharma as a result of Biomeasure\u2019s contacts with Louisiana, which is what plaintiffs are attempting to do, plaintiffs must demonstrate \u201csomething beyond the subsidiary\u2019s mere presence within the bosom of the corporate family.\u201d Dickson, 179 F.3d at 338. Specifically, plaintiffs must prevail under the factors set forth in Dickson. See 179 F.3d at 339; see also Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1095 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs have failed to do so, and Holdings: 0: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent consolidated its profits and losses with that of its whollyowned subsidiary in presenting parents financial reports to shareholders that subsidiary was considered a division of parent and that subsidiary accounted for 60 of parents and subsidiarys combined operations 1: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 2: holding that parent is liable for acts of subsidiary under agency theory only if parent dominates subsidiary parent of whollyowned subsidiary that had seats on board took part in financing and approved major policy decisions was not liable because parent did not have daytoday control 3: holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities 4: recognizing separate corporate identity of parent despite evidence that parent was alterego of its subsidiary and was being sued for acts of its subsidiary", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "disturb any of these Family Court rulings. He has not applied for a vacatur of the temporary custody order or the placement of the child in his temporary custody. Instead, Plaintiff only seeks specified monetary damages, see id. \u00b6\u00b6 739-42, and injunctive relief holding that various sections and procedures of the N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law unconstitutional prospectively, see id. \u00b6\u00b6 451-464, 728-29. Consequently, the Court follows the Second Circuit\u2019s reasoning in McNamara and Green and finds that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to Plaintiffs claims that only seek monetary damages or prospective injunctive relief and do not seek to overturn a child custody award. See also Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Dep\u2019t of Children and Family Servs., No. 06-3312, 2007 WL 2050840, at *3 (6th Cir. July 16, 2007) (<HOLDING>). III. Domestic Relations Exception Several Holdings: 0: holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine 1: holding rookerfeldman doctrine inapplicable to claims that do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case 2: holding rookerfeldman doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of west virginia state bar 3: holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims that were or should have been central to the state court decision 4: holding that rookerfeldman does not bar plaintiff claims that do not focus on the outcome of state court custody proceedings or other wise request reversal of a juvenile court decision", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on Defendant's proposed final instruction number six, as I said before, I think, a, there are ... there is more than one explanation about why the dura on the left side would not have been seen. Transcript at 1815-1822. Ray argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his instruction on the State's failure to produce evidence. We find Nettles v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind.1991), instructive. In Nettles, the defendant argued that the State failed to preserve potentially useful evide acted in bad faith, we cannot say that the tendered instruction was not misleading. A trial court may properly refuse misleading and confusing instructions tendered by a party. Pub. Serv. Ind., Inc. v. Nichols, 494 N.E.2d 349, 357 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), reh'g denied. Th (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). However, the tendered instruction does not Holdings: 0: holding that an agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistencies in the record unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so 1: holding that an agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so 2: holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so 3: holding that the agency need not credit an applicants explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable factfinder to do so 4: holding whether these explanations are reasonable or not depends upon matters that the jury must decide including witness eredibility", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "limitations period during the pendency of the original action when the original action was dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. Mississippi courts have never addressed this question per se. \u00b6 27. Specifically, Benny cites, among others, King v. Lujan, 98 N.M. 179, 646 P.2d 1243 (1982), and Sluka v. Herman, 229 Neb. 200, 425 N.W.2d 891 (1988). In King, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that \u201c[ajfter a consideration of the purpose and policies underlying Rule 41, we adopt the view that even though the filing of a suit ordinarily tolls the applicable limitations period, when an action is dismissed without prejudice because of a failure to prosecute, the interruption is considered as never having occurred.\u201d King, 646 P.2d at 1244-45. Th D.La.1977) (applying Louisiana law) (<HOLDING>); Barrentine v. Vulcan Materials Co., 216 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause 1: holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed 2: holding that filing of suit ordinarily interrupts the running of prescription but when the action is dismissed without prejudice because of plaintiffs failure to prosecute the interruption in the running of the statute is considered as never having occurred 3: holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 4: holding that the initial filing of a suit later voluntarily dismissed is not the effective date of a second suit because a voluntary dismissal does not toll or affect in any way the continuous running of the applicable statutory time period", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to App. C, amend. 706; see also id. amend. 713; Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed.Reg. 28571-28572 (2007). We acknowledge that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.10 can be read to permit a reduced sentence only where the defendant\u2019s pre-departure sentencing range is found within the crack cocaine guidelines. However, \u201cthe meaning of language is inherently contextual [and] the [Supreme] Court has always reserved lenity for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute\u2019s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.\u201d United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir.2000) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Here, we conclude that there is ambiguity as Holdings: 0: holding that the rule of lenity applies only if the provision being construed is still ambiguous after the application of normal rules of construction 1: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 2: recognizing that the rule of lenity applies only after courts exhaust all other evidence of congressional meaning 3: holding in sentencing guidelines context that the rule of lenity requires that we construe ambiguous terms in favor of the accused 4: holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The State has refused to disavow enforcement of the statute and is, in fact, vigorously defending the legality of the statute in the present action. In addition, albeit for public or non-consensual conduct, there have been prosecutions under Arkansas\u2019s sodomy statute as recently as 1988. See, e.g., Young v. State, 296 Ark. 394, 757 S.W.2d 544 (1988)(conviction for nonconsensual sodomy under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-122); United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983) (conviction under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-122 for consensual conduct in a public restroom). In addition, our sodomy statute has been used outside the criminal context in ways harmful to those who engage in same-sex conduct prohibited by the statute. See, e.g., Stowe v. Bowlin, 259 Ark. 221, 531 S.W.2d 955 (1976) (<HOLDING>); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 730 Holdings: 0: holding that court should have allowed appellant to impeach appellees credibility as a witness by referencing appellees admitted engagement in sodomy 1: holding that the need to impeach credibility correspondingly increases as the importance of the witness credibility and testimony escalates 2: recognizing that statements in appellees brief can constitute judicial admissions 3: holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility 4: holding that summary convictions of crimes involving dishonesty could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Code (UCC) as adopted by Virginia: \u201cInstrument\u201d means a negotiable instrument as defined in \u00a7 8.3A-104, Title 8.8A or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.... Va.Code \u00a7 8.9 \u2014 105(l)(i). It is undisputed that the CD is neither a \u201cnegotiable instrument\u201d nor a security agreement nor a lease. See id. The only question is whether the CD is a writing evidencing a right to the payment of money \u201cwhich is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.\u201d M The bankruptcy court concluded that (1) although t 490 S.E.2d 334, 338-39 (W.Va.1997) (<HOLDING>). Almost every court to face the issue has Holdings: 0: recognizing the majority rule 1: holding that certificates of deposit are instruments not general intangibles even if the certificate is labeled nontransferable 2: holding that certificates of deposit are instruments and noting that the majority of jurisdictions agree 3: recognizing that majority of jurisdictions hold that the burden of proving an easement is on the party claiming such right and must be established by clear and convincing proof 4: holding that nonnegotiable certificates of deposit are instruments within the meaning of ucc article 9 even if transferability is severely restricted", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "119 N.M. 743, 751, 895 P.2d 265, 273 (Ct.App. 1995) (Hartz, J., concurring) (stating that some authorities question whether statutory redemption laws encourage higher bidding at foreclosure sales). In considering a clash of interests, the court can consider \u201coverriding equitable considerations.\u201d HSBC Bank, 2005-NMCA-138, \u00b6 10, 138 N.M. 665, 125 P.3d 644. {9} The question before us is whether the holder of a junior mortgage who forecloses its mortgage remains a \u201cjunior mortgagee\u201d under Section 39-5-18(A), thereby entitling it to redeem. No New Mexico case addresses this question. At least one New Mexico case appears to assume that a junior mortgagee who has foreclosed his mortgage has a right to redeem. See Springer Corp. v. Kirkeby-Natus, 80 N.M. 206, 210, 453 P.2d 376, 380 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Other eases note that junior mortgagees and Holdings: 0: holding that in a case in which an omitted junior mortgagee foreclosed its mortgage the junior mortgagee had the absolute right to redeem from the senior mortgagee who had purchased the property at a sale following foreclosure of the senior mortgage 1: holding that the junior mortgagee had no right title or interest in the real estate after the sale was confirmed in the purchaser who became title owner 2: holding that the mortgagee had no right to rents under its assignment of rents during the redemption period because it purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt at its foreclosure sale 3: holding extension of senior mortgage resulted in loss of priority because intervening mortgagee had agreed to be subordinated on the assumption the senior mortgage would be fully satisfied on the initial due date 4: holding that despite foreclosure judgment providing that the holder of a junior mortgage had no interest in or lien on or claim to said premises the lack of foreclosure sale meant that the junior mortgage was not extinguished", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "separable from it. Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie\u2019s Costume Co., 891 F.2d at 455 (observing that garments\u2019 decorative elements are \u201cparticularly unlikely to meet [the] test\u201d of conceptual separability.) No different conclusion is warranted by \u00a7 101\u2019s definition of a \u201cuseful article\u201d as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function \u201cthat is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.\u201d Although Jovani argues that a decoration on a dress necessarily \u201cportrays the appearance\u201d of the dress and, therefore, is outside the scope of usefulness, we have construed this statutory phrase more narrowly to identify only a small category of items whose sole usefulness resides in their appearance. See Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); accord Chosun Int\u2019l Inc. v. Chrisha Holdings: 0: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 1: holding that lack of standing cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time by an appellate court on its own motion 2: holding that taxidermy mannequin for fish skins has function of portraying its own appearance and therefore may be copyrighted 3: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function 4: holding that appellate court may judicially notice its own records", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "their arguments to the jury.\u201d State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967). Further, the control of counsel\u2019s arguments \u201cmust be left largely to the discretion of the trial judge,\u201d State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979), because the trial judge \u2018sees what is done, and hears what is said. He is cognizant of all the surrounding circumstances, and is a better judge of the lati tude that ought to be allowed to counsel in the argument of any particular case.\u2019 State v. Thompson, 278 N.C. 277, supporting the jury\u2019s verdict notwithstanding improper characterizations regarding the veracity of witnesses\u2019 statements has been sufficient in some cases to prevent the imposition of a new trial. See e.g. State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 444 S.E.2d 879 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Thompson, 278 N.C. at 277, 179 S.E.2d at 315 Holdings: 0: holding that it is improper for a prosecutor to assume the existence of prejudicial facts not in evidence 1: holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument 2: holding that even if the statements were improperly admitted any error was harmless since there was overwhelming evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy 3: holding that statements to the jury made by the prosecutor asserting that a defense witness was lying was improper but considering all the facts and circumstances revealed in the record which showed overwhelming evidence against the defendant such statements did not constitute a prejudicial error 4: holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "v. Chambers County Comm\u2019n, 514 U.S. 35, 49-51, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995); Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 51-52 (1st Cir.2004). The Secretary offers no developed argumentation on this point and, as matters stand, we believe that this case is not a credible candidate for the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction. 4 . The Secretary makes a fifth argument: that the relief ordered by the district court requires Puerto Rican officials to act in contravention of local law. The district court refused to address this argument on the ground that the Secretary did not sufficiently specify the nature of the alleged violations. That ruling is supportable, and it precludes reliance on the argument here. See Teamsters Union v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In all events, the Secretary's appellate Holdings: 0: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding arguments not raised on appeal waived 2: holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal 3: holding that arguments not squarely raised in the trial court cannot be advanced on appeal 4: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "resolutions to the CORC within four days to account for prison officials\u2019 hypothetical non-implementation of a favorable IGP disposition would be impracticable and un-doubtably burdensome on the CORC and the IGP. Indeed, it would be counterintui-tive to require inmates who win during the grievance process to appeal their victories. See Sutton v. Wright, 265 F.Supp.2d 292, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (\u201cIf a prisoner had to grieve non-compliance with favorable decisions under the PLRA, prison officials could keep prisoners out of court indefinitely by saying \u2018yes\u2019 to their grievances and 'no\u2019 in practice.\u201d) (citing Kaplan, 2000 WL 959728, at *3). Here, Abney repeatedly obtained favorable rulings on his grievances through the IGP. He adequately pleads that defendants never implemented the 01) (<HOLDING>); Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an available remedy under  1997e 1: holding that inmate plaintiff satisfied  1997ea where he attempted to exhaust all available administrative remedies but was prevented from doing so by prison personnel 2: recognizing that officials failure timely to respond to grievance could be basis for prisoner to show he exhausted available administrative remedies 3: holding remedy not available to prisoner where officials purportedly prevented plaintiff from employing the prisons administrative remedies 4: holding remedies not available to prisoner where officials failed to respond to his grievance during time period required by regulations", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and therefore, would benefit from a judgment in this action, is within the complete control of the defendant. In May, 1995, the Commissioner claimed that a search of her records was being conducted to identify all potential class members, but that she would need at least another six months to complete the process. Six months have expired and no information has been filed with the Court in connection with the number of existing and potential class members. Although the Andres bear the burden of proving that the requirements for class certification have been met, this Court will not require the Andres to demonstrate the number of class members with live claims before deciding to certify the class. See Ventura v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 125 F.R.D. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F.Supp. 1164, 1169 Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiffs lack of knowledge regarding the number of affected persons does not bar class certification when defendant has the means to identify those persons at will 1: holding that states are persons but conceding that this change was not envisioned as broadening the class of persons who could be held liable under the act 2: holding that bond protecting those persons who do work or furnish materials did not protect bank lending money to contractor for payment to those persons 3: holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification 4: holding lay persons performing tasks relating to real estate transactions were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and explaining it is the duty of the court to protect the public from the activity of those who because of lack of professional skills may cause injury whether they are members of the bar or persons never qualified for or admitted to the bar quotation marks and citation omitted", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a new trial is warranted only if the false testimony was material to the jury\u2019s verdict, leaving the trial court with a firm belief that, but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. See id. at 299-302. The district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that t hapovalov\u2019s mendacity, it was similarly cumulative of his numerous lies disclosed at trial. Indeed, that trial evidence as to deceit and fraud was sufficiently extensive to allow Karlov\u2019s counsel to secure admissions from Shapovalov that he had \u201clied repeatedly, over and over again\u201d and \u201cled a life committing a lot of crimes.\u201d Tr. 1287; see id. at 1475 (arguing in summation that record showed Shapovalov to be \u201cpathological liar\u201d); United States v. White, 972 F.2d at 21 (<HOLDING>). In urging otherwise, Karlov submits that Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 1: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error 2: holding evidence that witness lied on stand cumulative where witness was aggressively crossexamined by the defendants lawyer who relentlessly attacked witnesss credibility called him a liar and emphasized his lack of veracity in the past 3: holding that new evidence impeaching credibility of governments key witness was cumulative of other evidence of witness criminal activity 4: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the witnesses reported that a revolver was used. Trial counsel questioned Sergeant Nieto on the possibility of the revolver being fake, and Sergeant Nie-to responded that he \u201cwould think that someone would know a real gun from a fake gun.\u201d Testimony from a complainant in close proximity to a weapon, describing it as a \u201cgun,\u201d a \u201crevolver,\u201d and a \u201cpistol,\u201d is sufficient to prove the use of a deadly weapon. Wright v. State, 591 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). It is true that courts have held that testimony regarding the use of a \u201cgun\u201d may be insufficient to support a finding of use and exhibition of a deadly weapon when the case presents separate evidence indicating the use of a toy gun. See Pena Cortez v. State, 732 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Here, there was testimony that described the Holdings: 0: holding that testimony regarding a little pistol defendant carried was inadmissible where nothing in the record linked the little pistol to the gun used in the crimes charged 1: holding that evidence was sufficient to prove defendant constructively possessed the gun where although defendant denied ownership of the gun it was found near a knife of which defendant claimed ownership and where defendant was aware of the presence of the gun 2: holding that if a person threatens to shoot another with  a chocolate candy pistol there is no ability to commit  any injury with it on the person of another 3: holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept 4: holding that testimony regarding use of pistol was insufficient where it was uncontroverted that pistol was toy gun", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "hearing. II. In reaching this holding, the Court is aware that several other courts, including district courts in this Circuit, have interpreted \u00a7 7 as giving arbitrators powers beyond the reading provided by this Court. But the courts that have given the statute a broader reading are not binding on this Court. See, e.g., Fox v. Acadia St. Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir.1991) (\u201cA district court is not bound by another district court\u2019s decision, or even an opinion by another judge of the same district court.\u201d). The Court is unpersuaded by the reasoning expanding an arbitrator\u2019s power to permit pre-hearing discovery from non-parties. Simply put, they do not base their analysis on the text of \u00a7 7, but rather on its supposed implications. See, e.g., In re Security, 228 F.3d at 870-71 (<HOLDING>). It becomes necessary to rely on such Holdings: 0: holding that the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized but rather includes the power to take actions without which the power of recognition might be thwarted 1: holding that implicit in the arbitrators power to subpoena relevant documents at hearing is the power to order prehearing discovery 2: recognizing the subpoena power of the judiciary 3: holding that the issuing court necessarily has the power to enforce a protective order it issued at any point it is in effect even after entry of a final judgment and courts enjoy the inherent power to modify any discovery related orders postjudgment 4: holding that the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "more so when, as here, the manufacturer affirmatively and successfully limits the market of its product to professionals. In such a case, the manufacturer should not be burdened with the often difficult task of providing instructions on how to properly perform the basic operation. Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814, 821 (1982). See also, Parker v. Schmiede Machine and Tool Corp., 445 Fed.Appx. 231, 234 (11th Cir.2011) (explaining that under Georgia law, the sophisticated user or learned intermediary doctrine relieves a manufacturer of liability for failure to warn where members of the profession to whom the product is sold are generally aware of hazards known to the trade); Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490, 495 (11th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc. v. Calgon Holdings: 0: holding that helicopter manufacturer had no duty under georgia law to warn pilot that loss of lubrication to gearshaft could result in engine failure where pilot knew that maintenance of an oil lubricated engine required lubrication to engine 1: holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it 2: holding all that is required to impose a duty to warn is that the defendant knew or should have known of a specific threat made to harm a specific person 3: holding that a failure to warn was not a policy judgment 4: holding that oil suppliers had no duty to warn of danger to commercial customer whose negligence or oversight resulted in explosion that injured its employee", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 2000aa-7(a). 10 . Although not material to the analysis here, it is worth noting that one circuit has held that the government may use grand jury subpoenas to obtain documentary materials, but not work product materials. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 341 (6th Cir.2001). 11 .The PPA also includes a provision allowing government officials to use search and seizure in cases where there is a valid concern that \"the giving of notice pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum would result in the destruction, alteration, or concealment of such materials.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000aa(b)(3). This exception does not apply to work product materials. 12 . The Supreme Court has endorsed the use of video footage on summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 13 . In her sworn declaration, Sennett states Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals should not have relied on   visible fiction it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape 1: holding that appellate court should have viewed facts of highspeed police chase in the light depicted by a videotape of the events 2: holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government 3: holding that questions of reasonableness depend upon the facts and circumstances  the total atmosphere of the case citation omitted  which must be viewed in the light of established fourth amendment principles 4: holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for a writ of certiorari passed without Spencer requesting Supreme Court review. See United States v. Burch, 202 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir.2000). Because, according to the district court, Spencer\u2019s conviction became final on November 9, 2006, he had until November 9, 2007 to file his \u00a7 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255(f)(1). As Spencer did not file that motion until December 10, 2007, the district court concluded the motion was untimely unless Spencer was entitled to have the limitations period equitably tolled. Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir.2000). Because Spencer had failed to demonstrate he had diligently pursued the claims in his \u00a7 2255 motion, the district court exercised its discretion and denied equitable tolling. Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The granting of a COA is a jurisdictional Holdings: 0: holding that equitable tolling is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence 1: holding that equitable tolling is only available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 2: holding that lack of knowledge of state court decision may provide basis for equitable tolling when prisoner acts diligently 3: holding that ejquitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence 4: holding that equitable tolling under  2255 would be allowed if at all only for extraordinary circumstances", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and second disability hearings in this case effectively establish the transferability of Lamorey\u2019s receptionist skills to an alternative position, such as information clerk, that would not require frequent and repetitious use of her hands and fingers, which was the crucial physical limitation precluding Lamorey from returning to her past work. See generally Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir.2002). This testimony was essentially unchallenged at the hearings, and Lamorey fails to show that anything further would be gained by a remand. Cf. Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d at 386-87 (concluding that remand for step five determination was appropriate where the record was incomplete because the ALJ failed to call a vocational expert); Williams v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); of also Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d at 135 Holdings: 0: holding that remand is the appropriate remedy where inter alia the board has incorrectly applied the law 1: holding that a sentence four remand under 42 usc  405g is a final appealable decision and that a party who wins a remand under sentence four is a prevailing party for purposes of the eaja 2: holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation 3: holding that remand was the appropriate remedy when an erroneous step four determination has precluded any analysis under step five 4: holding that dismissal is not appropriate when that step could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "49 . See, e.g., Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 (9th Cir.1996); Feld, 203 B.R. at 367; See also American Express Travel Related Serv. Co, v. Christensen (In re Christensen), 193 B.R. 863, 866 (N.D.Ill.1996); Chevy Chase Bank, FSB (In re Briese), 196 B.R. 440, 448 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1996). Contra Feld, at 367 n. 1 Walters), 208 B.R. 651, 654-55 (W.D.La.1997); FCC Nat\u2019l Bank v. Etto (In re Etto), 210 B.R. 734, 739-40 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1997); AT&T Universal Card Serv. Corp. v. Akdogan (In re Akdogan), 204 B.R. 90, 97 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1997) (stating that a creditor must do a credit check or some other circumstances must exist to prove it did not extend credit blindly); Bank One Columbus, N.A. v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel), 202 B.R. 74, 78 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1996) (<HOLDING>); AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Richards (In re Holdings: 0: holding that  523a2a requires justifiable but not reasonable reliance 1: holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance 2: holding that a creditor cannot sit back and do nothing and still meet the standard for justifiable reliance when it had an opportunity to make an adequate examination and investigation 3: holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance 4: holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 132(e). Requirement that Withholding Obligation be Precise and Non-Speculative Since \u201cthe employer is in a secondary position as to liability for any tax of the employee, it is a matter of obvious concern that ... the employer\u2019s obligation to withhold be precise and not speculative.\u201d Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 31, 98 S.Ct. 917, 923, 55 L.Ed.2d 82 (1978). A duty to withhold income taxes on payments made to its employees should not be imposed retroactively on an employer unless there was adequate notice (from the relevant statutes, regulations, and IRS pronouncements) to the employer at the time of the payments that such a withholding obligation existed. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 920, 442 F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (1971) (<HOLDING>). See also Hotel Conquistador, Inc. v. United Holdings: 0: holding that the employer was not required to withhold or pay fica and futa taxes in 1971 with respect to the free meals it furnished its employees because the employer could not have told from the relevant statutes and regulations that the free meals were remuneration and thus wages 1: holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under  301 of the lmra because absent an express contractual provision there is no prohibition against an employer moving its operations to another state 2: holding that the employer was not required to withhold income tax from its payments of moving expenses to its existing employees where the state of the law in 1961 gave the employer no reason to suspect that such payments constituted wages 3: holding that no liberty interest was implicated where the public reason for employees dismissal was that their services did not meet the expectations of the public employer 4: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "award of the prize is determined by chance. K.S.A. 21-4302(b); State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 254 Kan. 632, 644, 867 P.2d 1034 (1994). It is undisputed that the first two elements are present. The only issue in this case is whether Kandu Challenge is a game of chance. The district court applied a \u201c 'dominant factor \u201d test to answer this question. The source of this test in Kansas is Games Management, Inc. v. Owens, 233 Kan. 444, 662 P.2d 260 (1983). In Games, our Supreme Court held that under the facts of the case, certain video poker games were not prohibited gambling devices. 233 Kan. at 448-49. After resolving this main issue, the court also examined the State\u2019s argument th\u00e1t the winners of the video poker games were determined by chance. 194 Neb. 715, 717, 235 N.W.2d 398 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Three Kings does not directly challenge the Holdings: 0: holding that the first amendment protects communicative aspects of video games 1: holding that while broadcasts of basketball games are copyrightable the scores of basketball games represent purely factual information which any patron of an nba game could acquire from the arena as such the underlying games are not copyrightable 2: holding that poker and bridge are predominately games of chance 3: holding that broadcasts of national basketball association games are copyrightable but that the games themselves are not copyrightable as such copyright preemption did not apply 4: holding that the video games at issue are expressive and qualify as speech for purposes of the first amendment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in checking on the welfare of someone who is not responsive to knocks on a window is high, as he could have been ill and in need of medical assistance, or he could have been intoxicated and about to drive off in the vehicle, which was running. Officer Ayler did not use any force with Cruz-Salazar and, in fact, unsuccessfully attempted to get him a ride home rather than arrest him. And Officer Ayler had no other means of making contact with Cruz-Salazar to check his welfare, as Cruz-Salazar was nonresponsive to his initial attempts at contact without opening the truck door. [16] We hold that Officer Ayler\u2019s conduct did not violate Cruz-Salazar\u2019s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g., Szabo v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 512, 470 S.W.3d 696 (2015) (<HOLDING>). For these same reasons, we hold that Officer Holdings: 0: holding investigative stop based on officers observation of defendant apparently asleep in legally parked car was improper 1: holding officers conduct appropriate under community caretaking function and no fourth amendment violation where officer opened car door to wake defendant after observing him either unconscious or sound asleep in drivers seat of running vehicle and did not respond to knocks on the window 2: holding that officers encounter with defendant a frontseat passenger in a car stopped for speeding evolved into investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when defendant refused to give officer his name and officer walked around to passengers door positioned himself there and called for backup when he did not know whether defendant had been wearing his seat belt while the car was in motion any reasonable person would believe they were not free to leave when officer positioned himself outside their car door and called for backup 3: holding a car was broken into or entered when defendant reached in through the open window of a car 4: holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his fourth amendment rights by requiring him to get back in his car before questioning him", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Hector Estuardo Zavala Archila (\u201cZavala\u201d) is a native and citizen of Guatemala. Zavala appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals\u2019 (\u201cBIA\u201d) denial of his application for suspension of deportation. While we lack jurisdiction over the BIA\u2019s discretionary determinations, we have jurisdiction over Zavala\u2019s due process challenge to the BIA\u2019s failure to fully and properly consider the evidence supporting a finding of extreme hardship. See Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We grant the petition and remand to the BIA Holdings: 0: recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims 1: recognizing that failure to exhaust an issue before the bia strips us of jurisdiction 2: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 3: holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira 4: holding over", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "contained in his plea agreement. This court closely scrutinizes the Rule 11 colloquy and has emphasized that an appropriately conducted guilty plea proceeding raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir.1992). Felder\u2019s challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing is not supported by the record. Accordingly, we conclude the district court conducted a proper Rule 11 hearing. Felder has also appealed the district court\u2019s denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence. Because Felder has failed to raise any arguments in his brief regarding the denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence, the review of that issue is waived. See Canady v. Crestar Mortgage Corp., 109 F.3d 969, 973-74 (4th Cir.l997)(<HOLDING>). Next, Felder asserts his indictment was Holdings: 0: holding that issues not briefed are deemed abandoned 1: holding that generally arguments not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned or waived 2: holding issues raised in notice of appeal but not briefed are deemed waived 3: holding that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned 4: recognizing that arguments not briefed on appeal are waived", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(Ind.App.1999) (recognizing that child has right to have his parents present during custodial interrogation); State v. Walker, 352 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1984) (statute implicitly requires that, after notification of parents, police wait before interrogation to allow parents time to come to station and consult with child); M.A.C. v. Harrison County Family Court, 566 So.2d 472 (Miss.1990) (hold ing that deliberate exclusion of parents from child\u2019s interrogation renders statements inadmissible); Ezell v. State, 489 P.2d 781, 783-84 (OMa.Crim.App.1971) (finding that neither mother nor legal guardian of juvenile defendant was \u201ccapable of protecting defendant\u2019s constitutional rights,\u201d thereby rendering juvenile\u2019s confession inadmissible); Edward C. v. Collings, 193 Mont 426, 632 P.2d 325 (1981) (<HOLDING>); In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114 (N.D.1978) Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles may not waive counsel unless parent or guardian also waives that right 1: holding relation back permitted where a complaint misnamed a parent as guardian rather than the child by and through the parent as guardian 2: recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings 3: holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights 4: holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Therefore, our determination is limited to whether MCD is bound by the arbitration agreement as a third-party beneficiary or under a theory of estoppel. Third-Party Beneficiary Courts treat arbitration agreements as other contracts in applying the legal rules to interpret them. In re Olshan Foundation Repair, Co. LLC, 328 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex.2010). \u201cThe goal is to discern the true intentions of the parties, as the FAA\u2019s primary purpose is to ensure private agreements to arbitrate and enforce according to their terms, no more, no less.\u201d Id. A third-party beneficiary to a contract can compel or be compelled to arbitrate under an arbitration provision in a contract. See In re NEXT Fin. Group Inc., 271 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex.2008) (<HOLDING>). Generally, however, \u201cthere is a presumption Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff could not prevail as a thirdparty beneficiary where contract was not valid 1: holding that the governments cooperation with a thirdparty is not sufficient to establish a thirdparty beneficiary relationship 2: holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply 3: recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary 4: holding employer thirdparty beneficiary could compel arbitration", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "value of the profit, including reasonable overhead, the lessor would have made from full performance ... together with any incidental damages ... due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of distribution.\u201d 7 . Other \"tests\u201d have been adopted. For example, in Sunrick v. Pacific Foods of Oregon, 2004 WL 1124495 (D.Or.2004), the District Court for the District of Oregon held that \"[a]s an alleged lost volume seller, Pacific therefore bears the burden of establishing that its production capacity was such that, if Sunrich had not breached the Packing Agreement, Pacific would have been able to meet Sunrich\u2019s requirements, as well as the needs of alternative buyers.\u201d See also Van Ness Motors v. Vikram, 221 N.J.Super. 543, 535 A.2d 510, 511 (A.D.1987) (<HOLDING>); Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that purchaser could rescind contract where seller failed to disclose a fact  the flooding of the subject real estate  that seller knew purchaser would regard as material 1: holding that a nondealer seller of a car had no duty either to install seatbelts or to warn of them absence to purchaser 2: holding that a person who obtains drugs from a seller is not an accomplice of the seller 3: recognizing that most other jurisdictions have held that to qualify as a lost volume seller under section 27082 the seller needs to show only that it could have supplied both the breaching purchaser and the resale purchaser 4: holding that under mississippi law a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice unless there is actual notice or circumstances which would put a purchaser on inquiry notice", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090, 126 S.Ct. 1026, 163 L.Ed.2d 854 (2006). An officer may therefore be liable under \u00a7 1983 \u201c \u2018for the natural consequences of his actions.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)). This includes liability for acts giving rise to the ultimate harm, even if the harm is executed by someone else. Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm\u2019n, 501 F.3d 592, 609 (6th Cir.2007) (\u201cEven if an intervening third party is the immediate trigger for the plaintiffs injury, the defendant may still be proximately liable, provided that the third party\u2019s actions were foreseeable.\u201d), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 813, 129 S.Ct. 44, 172 L.Ed.2d 21 (2008); see also Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 281-82 (6th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 311-12 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that for a retaliation claim to be viable a prisoner must allege inter alia that a state actor took adverse action against him because of his protected conduct 1: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 2: holding state actor could be liable for retaliation for making false statements to plaintiffs employer causing her to be fired 3: holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials 4: holding that various law enforcement personnel and judges were victims of the crime of making false statements to a government agency for purposes of  3a12a where the defendant made false statements about the officials to the irs causing the irs to investigate the officials certainly had the effect of making these individuals the defendants victims", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "did make minimal effort to find jobs during the illness and in the period soon after her death. 42 . In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir.2005). 43 . At trial, the testimony centered almost exclusively on the \"ICRP\u201d rather than the \"IBR.\u201d However, based upon the information contained in the affidavit contained in Exhibit AA, it appears as though the program that was actually being discussed was the IBR, based upon ECMC\u2019s counsel's assertions that the payments would be limited to 15% of Debtor\u2019s income that exceeded 150% of the federal poverty line. In any event, Debtor did not indicate a willingness to enter into either of these programs, and his reasons for refusing to do so would apply equally under either program. 44 . Cf. In re Woody, 494 F.3d 939, 954 (10th Cir.2007) Holdings: 0: holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan 1: holding admittedly in a heal loan context that congress did not intend to allow a debtor who spent decades not making loan payments even after working full time for several years to receive a discharge because his health begins to fail as he approaches retirement age 2: holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan 3: holding that debtor did not satisfy the third prong because she did not seek out loan consolidation options even though she made several payments on her student loan debt 4: holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that he was credible and that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution because of his past political activities in Serbia. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of review \u201cBecause the BIA adopted the IJ\u2019s decision with additional commentary, we review the decision of the IJ, as supplemented by the BIA, as the final administrative order.\u201d Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir.2007). Questions of law involving immigration proceedings are reviewed de novo. Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407, 409 (6th Cir.2004). We will not disturb the IJ\u2019s factual findings, or a determination that the petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, if substantial evidence supports such rulings. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Under this standard, we will not reverse a Holdings: 0: holding that a district courts ruling may be upheld on an alternative ground supported by the record 1: holding that the trial courts factual findings related to alimony will be upheld on appeal if supported by   any evidence   2: holding that a factfinders rulings will be upheld if supported by reasonable substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole 3: holding a determination regarding eligibility for asylum is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole 4: holding that a finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole if it would have been possible for a reasonable jury to reach the boards conclusion", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "201 F.R.D. at 294. Accordingly, as the Court may reasonably infer that the 378 consumers are similarly situated, the Court finds that Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1)\u2019s numerosity requirement has been met. 2. Commonality \u201cTo satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), there must be \u2018a showing that common issues of fact or law exist and that they affect all class members.\u2019\u201d Kowalski, 2012 WL 1097350, at *13 (quoting Leone v. Ashwood Fin., Inc., 257 F.R.D. 343, 351 (E.D.N.Y.2009)). However, the individual circumstances of the class members can differ without precluding class certification, so long as \u201cthe common questions are at the core of the cause of action alleged.\u201d Vengurlekar v. Silverline Techs., Ltd., 220 F.R.D. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y.2003); see also Kowalski, 2012 WL 1097350, at *13 (<HOLDING>) (citations and internal quotation marks Holdings: 0: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 1: holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate payment and therefore such claims are not within the jurisdiction of the court 2: holding that the commonality standard does not mandate that the claims of the lead plaintiff be identical to those of all other plaintiffs but does require that plaintiffs identify some unifying thread among the members claims that warrants class treatment 3: holding that it is not necessary that all putative class members share identical claims 4: holding that the pslra does not mandate nor does it suggest that a court approved lead plaintiff must republish a notice of the purported class after an amended complaint is filed in cases where amended complaints encompassed the same claims and securities but different class periods courts have generally found that the efficiency of republication outweighs the marginal fairness gains of notifying class members of an extended class period ", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "possesses no inherent power to impose sanctions, and that any such power must be expressly delegated by statute. For example, in Great Am. Banks, Inc. v. Division of Admin. Hearings, Dep\u2019t of Admin., 412 So.2d 373 (Fla.1st DCA 1981), this court held that a hearing officer had no statutory authori ty to impose sanctions upon a party for the failure to make discovery, and that Section 120.58(3), Florida Statutes, as it then existed, provided the exclusive method of enforcing a discovery order, i.e., by filing a petition for enforcement in the circuit court. We further stated that to the extent that the agency\u2019s rules providing for sanctions conflicted with section 120.58(3), they were invalid. Accord Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth. v. Tampa Heart Inst., 472 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). In 1984 the legislature amended section Holdings: 0: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 1: holding that an administrative agency is not subject to a contempt proceeding for failure to comply with an order 2: holding that any person who receives written notice of an agency decision that does or may determine substantial interests and who fails to file a written request for a hearing within 21 days waives the right to request a hearing quoting florida administrative code rule 281061114 3: holding that florida administrative code rule 285211 which purported to allow an agency or hearing officer to dismiss a proceeding or enter a default as a sanction for failure to comply with a procedural order was invalid 4: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the applicability of Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), were fully briefed by both parties and properly before the court for review. 121 The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that an appellant's opening brief include \"[a] statement of the issues presented for review,\" Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(5), and arguments containing the contentions and reasons for each issue presented, see id. 24(a)(9). In addition, the reply brief of an appellant \"shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.\" Id. 24(c). 122 The appellee's brief, or opposing brief, must include the same elements as the appellant's brief. See id. 24(b). However, an appel Cir.1968) (noting that appellant had option to answer new issue raised in appe 2d 1278, 1280 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Newsome v. North Carolina State Bd. of Holdings: 0: holding that an argument raised only in fact section of opening brief and in reply brief is not properly raised 1: holding an appellant may not use the reply brief to argue issues not argued in the initial brief 2: holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived 3: holding that if an appellee raises an argument not addressed by the appellant in its opening brief the appellant may reply  citation omitted 4: holding that an argument is not preserved unless a party raises it in its opening brief", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "regarding workers' compensation benefits, in turn promoting litigation and unduly delaying receipt of any benefits. See Tenorio v. State, 931 P.2d 234, 240 (Wyo.1997) (expressing concern that application of collateral estoppel to permanent disabi 54, \"4 (N.H.2001) (declining to apply issue preclusion where agency awarded benefits for temporary disability but made no finding as to permanent disability); Appeal of Hooker, 142 N.H. 40, 694 A.2d 984, 986-88 (1997) (finding collateral estoppel inapplicable even where alleged injury giving rise to both proceedings is the same and allegedly flows from same work-related injury because issue of causation determined in TTD hearing is different from issue of causation relevant to subsequent medical benefits hearing); Tenorio, 931 P.2d at 240 (<HOLDING>). Because an employer always risks an award of Holdings: 0: holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury 1: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act 2: recognizing the inherent policy problems associated with applying issue preclusion to permanent disability proceedings and construing wyomings workers compensation act as inconsistent with the doctrine in that context 3: holding that the parties choiceoflaw agreement as relating to workers compensation was appropriately avoided where it offended state public policy as reflected in express provisions of the pennsylvania workers compensation act 4: holding without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel that the plaintiff who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ada", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "expectation of privacy test has been consistently employed by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 38, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); Carter, 119 S.Ct. at 473. However, the places in which individuals have been deemed to have a justifiable expectation of privacy have become fewer than suggested by the expansive language of Katz quoted earlier. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352, 88 S.Ct. 507. In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that passengers did n r.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15, Holdings: 0: recognizing reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent located on public campgrounds such that warrantless arrest of inhabitant requires exigent circumstances 1: holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth 2: holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in his tent pitched on public campground 3: holding defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood sample drawn by hospital 4: holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profession____ The proof is overwhelming that New York sought not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a much-needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront, and for the effectuation of that scheme it became important whether individuals had previously been convicted of a felony. 363 U.S. at 160, 80 S.Ct. at 1155. As defendants point out, other statutes that imposed restrictions on convicted felons after the fact also have survived ex post facto challenges. See, e.g., Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493-96 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447-48 Holdings: 0: holding a fiveyear old drug conviction is probative of a defendants state of mind in a drug conspiracy case 1: holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade 2: holding that provisions of generic drug enforcement act debarring convicted felons from participating in generic drug industry are remedial and not punitive 3: holding a branded drug and its generic version to be a plausible relevant market 4: holding that when a district court determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant convicted of participating in a drugtrafficking conspiracy the court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug amounts attributable to or foreseeable by that defendant", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "irrelevant which of these two models is more elegant from a conceptual standpoint. What is important \u2014 indeed, determinative \u2014 for our inquiry is which of the two each state has adopted. Pennsylvania's high court unambiguously has held that Pennsylvania law supports no cause of action for increased risk of cancer or for present emotional distress arising from the fear of cancer. Thus, the court's statement about medical monitoring damages is best viewed as the authorization of a distinct cause of action for medical monitoring expenses. Reading the opinion otherwise would defy its plain language regarding Pennsylvania's nonrecognition of increased risk and emotional distress causes of action. 75 . See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 28, 29-31 (Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), review dismissed, 162 Ariz. 186, 781 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that damages resulting from directors misconduct destroying the value of the corporate stock does not qualify as a direct or personal injuiy to a shareholder and will not support a tort action 1: holding that not all adverse action taken against a public employee in retaliation for exercising first amendment rights is sufficient to support a cause of action under  1983 2: recognizing cause of action 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that subclinical asbestosrelated injuiy is not sufficient to support cause of action", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "an interest in filing a motion for summary judgment, but apparently chose not to file a motion because it was untimely. Upon a review of defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs\u2019 response, and in view of the absence of any material facts in dispute, we granted plaintiffs leave to file a motion for summary judgment as to liability only. See Open Inns v. Chester County Sheriff s Department, Civ. No. 97-4822 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 22, 1998). 18 . Defendants LaRose, Clemens, and Freas all argue that they are protected by qualified immunity. As noted above, Sheriff Erling has been sued only in his official capacity. Thus, the suit against him is essentially a suit against the county. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 1: holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state 2: holding that an official capacity suit should be treated as a suit against the entity 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "database has been exempted pursuant to exemption (j)(2). See Cunningham Decl. \u00b6\u00b6 21-22. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with my colleague\u2019s reasoning in Gordon, and finds that the documents identified in the email archive were properly withheld as this database is not a \u201csystem of records\u201d within the meaning of the Privacy Act and is therefore not subject to the disclosure provisions therein. See Gordon, 118 F.Supp.3d at 291, 2015 WL 4602588, at *9; 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552a(a)(5) (defining \u201csystem of records\u201d as \u201ca group of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual\u201d); see also Mobley v. CIA, 924 F.Supp.2d 24, 56 (D.D.C.2013) .(<HOLDING>). In sum, I conclude that defendant met its Holdings: 0: holding that users have reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages despite advance warning that the messages could be read 1: holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage 2: holding that daily reports prepared by agency investigator were not records within a system of records since they were retrievable by the investigators identifier and not accessed by plaintiffs name 3: holding that a database of email messages is not a system of records under the privacy act because it is not indexed by personal identifier 4: holding that it is not", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Jones indicated that Jones had no facial hair. According to Jones, the photo taken from the motel depicts him as having a \"dark mustache and goatee.\u201d Appellant's Brief at 45. However, the small amount of facial hair Jones had in this picture is not clearly visible, and is at most a few days' growth. The photo taken of Jones upon his arrest does more clearly show that Jones had a short goatee. Also, although we can find no indication of Jones\u2019s actual height in the record, Jones insinuates that he is taller than Khan and Patel's description of approximately six feet. Nevertheless, such small discrepancies do not persuade us that Khan and Patel did not have an independent basis for their in-court identification of Jones. See Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 502 (Ind.1990) (<HOLDING>); Little v. State, 475 N.E.2d 677, 683 Holdings: 0: holding that a victims outofcourt identification was sufficient to support adjudication 1: holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same 2: holding that jury may consider victims mental capacity in determining whether defendant acted with victims knowledge and consent 3: holding admissible testimony of the victims daughter regarding a telephone call from the defendant to the victim hours before the victims death and the victims emotions following the telephone call where defendant claimed accident 4: holding that victims had an independent basis for incourt identification of the defendant despite a three to fourinch discrepancy in their descriptions of the defendants height where the defendants appearance roughly corresponded with the victims initial descriptions", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of summary judgment, we will affirm the district court\u2019s decision \u201cwhen the \u2022 record shows that there is .no; genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is .entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), \u00b6 8 On appeal, McCamey claims that the district court erred in determining that the 2013 charges were not barred by the statute of limitations. McCamey does not specifically address the district court\u2019s determination that the claim was precluded' by section 78B-9-106(l)(c) of the PCRA, See Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 78B-9-106(1)(c) (Lexis-Nexis 2012). The district court stated, that in an October 2014 letter that was attached to the petition, \u201cMcCamey brought his concern regarding the statute of limitations defense pp.1998) (<HOLDING>). \u25a0 \u00b6 10. The district court next \u25a0 addressed Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant must have knowledge of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea in order for a plea to be voluntary and knowing 1: holding that time limits in title vii are not jurisdictional but are instead like statutes of limitations 2: holding that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary and must be a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available to a defendant 3: holding statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a voluntary plea of guilty 4: holding that criminal statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional but are a bar to prosecution which can be waived by a knowing and voluntary guilty plea", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that 1119-20 (9th Cir.2004) (rejecting as insufficient documents that \u201cmerely recite[d] the statutory section and title\u201d without detailing the facts to which defendant pled); Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir.2007) (noting, in a related context, that the documents in the record must establish that the defendant \u201cnecessarily admitted\u201d the elements of the qualifying offense); Cisneros-Perez v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 386, 391 (9th Cir.2006), as amended (concluding that the prior conviction was not established under the modified categorical approach where the judgment record did not establish that \u201cthe defendant\u201d necessarily pleaded ... to the allegations in the original complaint) (emphasis added); Rebilas v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 783, 787 (9th Cir.2008), as amended (<HOLDING>); Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1022, Holdings: 0: holding modified categorical approach unavailable where the statute of conviction was missing an element of the generic definition 1: holding that courts may consider a plea agreement and other documents contained in the record of conviction when applying the modified categorical approach 2: holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime 3: holding that a conviction under a divisible statute could not qualify as acca burglary pursuant to the modified categorical approach when there were no shepard documents to show that the crime of conviction was generic burglary 4: holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "held that a minor\u2019s cause of action against a defendant, who was added two years after the original complaint was filed, was not barred by the statute of limitations, even though the minor\u2019s legal guardian timely filed the original complaint. Brooks v. Gunn, 667 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984). The court explained that because the minor was still under the disability of minority under Tennessee Code An notated section 28-1-106, \u201cthe statute of limitations in a situation [such] as this has not begun to run against the minor. If the statut 185 (1976) (adopting majority rule that appointment of guardian does not commence running of statute of limitations tolled on account of infancy or incompetence); Tzolov v. Int\u2019l Jet Leasing, Inc., 232 Cal.App.3d 117, 283 Cal.Rptr. 314, 317 (1991) (<HOLDING>); Morgan v. Amerada Hess Corp., 357 So.2d 1040, Holdings: 0: holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations 1: recognizing that the person appointed as a guardian ad litem may not have interest adverse to those of the ward 2: holding that tolling statute applicable to incompetent plaintiffs continues in effect in spite of appointment of guardian ad litem 3: holding that washingtons statute tolls the statute of limitations for a legally incompetent person notwithstanding the appointment of a guardian this is so because the right to the tolling statute vests in the incompetent person not in the guardian from this premise it follows that the guardians subsequent actions on the incompetent persons behalf should have no additional effect upon the statute of limitations unless they result in res judicata 4: recognizing that upon request a district court may remove the guardian ad litem andor  appoint another guardian ad litem to protect the childrens interests", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of sole issue on appeal). Second, the government contends that Windland waived de novo review of the legal issue in this appeal by failing to object to the Magistrate Judge\u2019s report and recommendation on the specific basis of the 160/161 day distinction. Again, although Windland could have been more specific, he did object to the Magistrate\u2019s conclusion that his \u00a7 2254 petition was time-barred; as part of that objection, he also argued that the limitations period should have been tolled while his state action was pending. This objection alerted the district court to the pertinent issue in this appeal, namely that the Magistrate improperly found Windland\u2019s \u00a7 2254 petition time-barred due to an erroneous tolling calculation. See United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 673 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the district court independently Holdings: 0: holding that in order to preserve the issue a party must object to inconsistent verdicts prior to judgment being entered 1: holding that litigant must object at trial to preserve error for review 2: holding that to preserve an issue a party must object with sufficient specificity to allow the trial court to address it 3: holding that defendant must object at trial to preserve as applied challenge for appeal 4: holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on appeal is to decide the case -within the framework of the issues raised by the parties.\u201d). \u201c[I]n the absence of the most cogent circumstances, we do not create issues....\u201d Id. at 78 n. 4 (collecting cases). True, we have previously recognized that we will address issues that are \u201cincident to\u201d a determination of other issues properly presented. See Messina v. Iowa Dep\u2019t of Job Serv., 341 N.W.2d 52, 58, 61 (Iowa 1983) (addressing issue of whether plaintiff had contractually waived his First Amendment rights when defendant had not raised that issue before the district court and holding \u201cthe waiver issue may be determined as an incident to the expressed issue\u201d); Presbytery of Se. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 282, 234 (Iowa 1975); see also State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 382-83 (Iowa 2014) (<HOLDING>). However, this exception to our error Holdings: 0: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals 1: holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal 2: holding that the alc may not rule upon a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a regulation or statute but may rule upon an asapplied challenge 3: holding constitutional challenge to section 93991 raised for the first time on appeal was barred 4: recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on the grounds that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to find them in contempt, and because they were not properly served with the order to show cause. We find that the juvenile court was authorized to hold petitioners in contempt. See, e.g., In re Elrod, 455 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Husky v. Safer, 419 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, we determine that the trial court erred in denying petitioners\u2019 motion to quash a writ of bodily attachment, because the record does not demonstrate that they were properly served. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.150(c)(2). Petitioners\u2019 appearance at the hearing to contest jurisdiction and object based on lack of service of process did not waive service. See Caldwell v. Caldwell, 921 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). The petition for writ of certiorari is Holdings: 0: holding that one of the effects of submitting to the courts jurisdiction by making a general appearance is that a party waives any objection to service of process 1: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 2: holding that actual notice of lawsuit is no substitute for substantial compliance with frcp 4d1 requiring service on person of defendant on suitable resident at defendants dwelling or on defendants agent a  judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is void and may be set aside at any time pursuant to fedrcivp 60b4 personal jurisdiction is established either by proper service of process or by the defendants waiver of any defect in the service of process 3: holding that a party loses its right to contest default final judgment on grounds of defective service of process by entering general appearance unless it also contests service of process or raises issue of personal jurisdiction 4: recognizing texas procedural rules and due process dictate judgment may not be rendered unless defendant was served waived service or made general appearance", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the asserted duty of confidentiality are determined by a legal source external to the tort claim itself[,]\u201d Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527, 534 (1985) (en banc); and \u201cits breach is actionable only if it is wrongful, that is to say, without justificat ecognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege under which a patient may \u201cprevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient\u2019s physical, mental or emotional condition ... among the patient, the patient\u2019s physician or psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist____\u201d Rule 11-504(B), NMRA 1997; see also Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15, 116 S.Ct. at 1931 (<HOLDING>). In the context of the criminal justice Holdings: 0: recognizing privilege 1: recognizing a federal mediation privilege 2: recognizing a federal psychotherapy privilege 3: recognizing privilege under federal rules 4: holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "information released to the public in official court records.\u201d Id. at 496, 95 S.Ct. 1029. While acknowledging that in limited circumstances, a court might restrict the information available to the public to protect important interests, the Court concluded that \u201c[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.\u201d Id.; see also Okla. Publ\u2019g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310, 97 S.Ct. 1045, 51 L.Ed.2d 355 (1977) (\u201c[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact open to the public.\u201d); cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Nebraska Press further reinforced these Holdings: 0: holding that the imposition of damages on a newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim lawfully obtained from a publicly released police report in violation of a florida statute and the newspapers own internal policy violated the first amendment 1: holding that an action brought in the name of a person adjudicated as incapacitated instead of in the name of her guardian cannot be corrected as a misnomer 2: holding that first amendment precluded damages action brought by rape victim against newspaper for publishing victims name when name was obtained from publicly released police report 3: holding that amendment to indictment to reflect actual name of victim is allowable 4: recognizing as a matter of federal law that an action to redress injuries to a corporation cannot be maintained by a shareholder in his own name but must be brought in the name of the corporation", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "we could exercise pendent jurisdiction, we would decline to do so here. Given that the FAA allows intermediate appeals over any denial of a request for a stay, some possibility exists that defendants might make far-fetched or premature stay requests to delay litigation. See Arthur Andersen LLP, 556 U.S. at 634, 129 S.Ct. 1896 (Souter, J., dissenting). Where, as here, we find a request premature, granting pendent appellate jurisdiction over other issues might encourage litigants to make meritless requests for stays as a means to challenge other non-appealable decisions. 3 . Again, it matters that neither Taylor nor those who have joined her thus far have agreed to arbitrate. If Taylor had, this would change things. See Reyna v. Int\u2019l Bank of Commerce, 839 F.3d 373, 373 (5th Cir. 2016) (<HOLDING>). If that were the case, Pilot could actually Holdings: 0: recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement 1: holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration 2: holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act 3: holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived 4: holding that the district court erred in refusing to compel named plaintiff to arbitration because it wanted to consider the enforceability his arbitration agreement after receiving opt ins", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "So.2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Peters v. State, 658 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Provided the charging instrument which we do not have in our record properly charged the firearm or weapon, the judgment in this ease mistakenly concludes that this homicide is a first-degree felony punishable by life. Young\u2019s conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm did not qualify for habitual offender treatment under the version of the statute applicable to him at that time. A habitual offender sentence is illegal for purposes of a motion to correct an illegal sentence if the terms or conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are impermissible as a matter of law. See Judge v. State, 596 So.2d 73, 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); see also Nathan v. State, 689 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>). We direct the trial court to resentence Young Holdings: 0: holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time 1: holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation 2: holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony 3: holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute 4: holding that incorrect determination that life felony was a firstdegree felony punishable by life resulting in improper habitual offender sentence was subject to correction in a rule 3800 proceeding", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claim until forced to surrender by the legal artillery of his adversaries. Mr. deLone also argues that the Third Circuit decision in Dykes did not quite render his ease frivolous because he immediately sought review of the decision from the United States Supreme Court. Again, Mr. de-Lone is mistaken in his view of the law. At the time that the Third Circuit\u2019s decision in Dykes was announced, it became the law of the Circuit, and Mr. deLone was bound by its terms unless and until it was overturned by the Supreme Court. Allegheny General Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir.1979)(stating that Third Circuit decisions are binding on \u201call inferior courts and litigants in the Third Judicial Circuit\u201d); Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C.Cir.1992)(<HOLDING>). In the absence of a stay, seeking Holdings: 0: holding that we must follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the supreme court quotation marks omitted 1: recognizing that a later en banc court may overrule an earlier en banc opinion 2: holding that circuit court decisions bind circuit unless and until overturned by the court en banc or by higher authority 3: holding ajbsent en banc reconsideration we are bound by prior decisions of this circuit 4: holding that decision of this court unless or until overturned by this court en banc the  federal circuit or the supreme court is a decision of the court on the date it is issued any rulings interpretations or conclusions of law contained in such a decision are authoritative and binding as of the date the decision is issued and are to be considered and when applicable are to be followed by va agencies of original jurisdiction the board and the secretary in adjudicating and resolving claims", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the PRC process before challenging an adverse ruling in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.\u201d Foster I at *5. The Postal Reform Act of 1970, under which the initial version of \u00a7 3662 was enacted, established the Postal Rate Commission to hear all claims involving postal rates and services. See 39 U.S.C. \u00a7 3662 (repealed 2006). The district court noted that courts have regularly held that early versions of \u00a7 3662 conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the Postal Rate Commission to hear these claims, despite its permissive language. Foster I at *4 (citing LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir.2006); Bovard v. U.S. Post Office, No. 94-6360, 47 F.3d 1178, 1995 WL 74678, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995); Azzolina v. U.S. Postal S 1 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Delaware Valley Floral Group v. Shaw Rose Holdings: 0: holding under third circuit law that the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion 1: holding that denial of joinder motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion 2: holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion 3: holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit 4: holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. 2 . The State did not request, and the trial court did not give, an instruction stating that the defendant could be found guilty of aggravated battery by reason of using the tile or concrete floor as a deadly weapon. Id..; see \u00a7 784.045(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. 3 . No argument has been made that it was impermissible to instruct on aggravated battery as a lesser included offense of manslaughter. \u201cLesser included offenses are determined on the elements of the offenses, not on the penalties attached.\u201d Carle v. State, 983 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Sanders v. State, 944 So.2d 203 (Fla.2006)); see also Michaels v. Swanson, 403 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) Holdings: 0: holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested 1: holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter 2: holding that where evidence was sufficient for attempted murder it was necessarily sufficient for aggravated assault which is a lesser included offense 3: holding that the defendant who was charged with felony murder was not entitled to a lesser included instruction on manslaughter because manslaughter is neither a lesser included offense nor an inferior degree crime with respect to felony murder 4: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "third-party pleadings are considered without regard to their truth or falsity, and the insurer cannot contradict them with extrinsic evidence. See id. at 864. \u201cThe rationale behind the eight-corners rule is to require insurers to defend the insured against all claims, \u2022 even those without merit.\u201d Id. XL cites no authority to suggest that the rule applies to a duty to advance defense expenses. See Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s of London, 600 F.3d 562, 574 '(5th Cir.2010) (\u201c[N]o Texas state court has applied the rule to a case, like the present one, involving a duty to advance defense costs.\u201d). Regardless, the rationale for the rule does not apply when an insured seeks to establish coverage under an interrelated-claims provision,. See Weimgarten, 343 S.W.3d at 865 (<HOLDING>). Burks is not trying to contradict any Holdings: 0: recognizing a limited exception to the eightcorners rule for a pure coverage question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying thirdparty claim and the extrinsic evidence goes strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the thirdparty claimants pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim 1: holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage 2: holding that the court cannot examine the underlying merits of the claims in determining whether to certify a class 3: holding that a denial of qualified immunity on the law is collateral to the merits of the underlying action and is therefore considered final for appellate purposes 4: holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and false representations. But Paulson himself admitted at his deposition that Shi-rey and Ford were just doing their job during the investigations and no personal grudges or vendettas were involved. He acknowledged there was no evidence that Shirey handled the investigation in such a way as to intentionally harm him. We agree with the district court that Paulson did not provide evidence showing there was a factual issue as t e legislature cannot create a transitory cause of action and confine its enforcement to its own courts. State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 498, 168 N.W. 589, 591 (1918). To determine whether a claim is local or transitory, courts will examine the nature of the claim. Wilson v. Celestial Greetings, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 759, 760-61 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). The types of cases which are transitory and Holdings: 0: holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract 1: holding that stockholder agreement is an executory contract 2: holding that delaware statute providing dissenting stockholder in delaware corporation with right of appraisal which is essentially a contract claim with terms supplied by delaware law was local action enforceable only in the delaware court of chancery 3: holding that a consent judgment is essentially a contract 4: recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and is protected from discrimination in connection with such decisions under Title VII and the ADEA.\u201d) superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108-09 (2nd Cir.2013); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 320 (3rd Cir.2008) (\u201cThe failure to renew an employment arrangement, whether, afiwill or, for a limited period of time, is an employment action, and an employer violates Title VII if it takes an adverse employment action for a reason prohibited by Title VII.... \u201d); Jadwin v. Cnty. of Kern, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1171 (E.D.Cal.2009) (\u201cThe non-renewal of Plaintiffs contract can qualify as an adverse employment action.\u201d); Hernandez-Mejias v. Gen. Elec., 428 F.Supp.2d 4, 8 (D.P.R.2005) (<HOLDING>); Kabes v. Sch. Dist. of River Falls, 387 Holdings: 0: holding in title vii case that plaintiff demonstrated adverse employment action in school districts decision not to renew principals contract for the following year but offering principal a demotion 1: holding that failure to renew contract was adverse employment action 2: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action 3: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 4: holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the absence of legislative intent to protect the Clerks was evidenced by the fact that the legislature granted a private remedy only to those with an interest in property under section 382.365(3), and that the recording fees the Clerks seek to recover are not mentioned in the recording statutes but rather are contained in an entirely different chapter. Id. The Clerks counter that multiple parties can be intended beneficiaries of a statutory provision, citing State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky.1988). Their reliance on Reeder is misplaced. Reeder simply reinforces the basic principle that to sue under section 446.070 for a statutory violation, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons the legislature intended to protect. See 763 S.W.2d at 118 (<HOLDING>). As already discussed, the recording statutes Holdings: 0: holding that although allegations were not specific as to what property was damaged they could be fairly read to include property covered by the insurance policy 1: holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply 2: holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code 3: holding that standing to sue under a contract requires plaintiff to be in privity or be an intended thirdparty beneficiary 4: holding that a homeowner could sue under section 446070 because as the beneficiary of the insurance claim filed by the driver who damaged his property in an accident the homeowner belonged to the class intended to be protected by the insurance code which did not otherwise provide a remedy for thirdparty claimants such as the homeowner", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "companies related to \"illegal conduct\" or to a \"public offense,\" as the magistrate's warrant did, is the substantive equivalent of finding that the companies were permeated with fraud. 124 Moreover, Norris points to no authority for the proposition that a magistrate must explicitly state that a business is permeated with fraud in order to issue an \"all records\" search warrant. An \"all ree ords\" search warrant issued by a magistrate is valid if the supporting affidavit relied upon by the magistrate includes allegations sufficient to establish probable cause that the busin\u00e9\u00e9s to be searched was permeated with fraud. Oloyede, 982 F.2d at 141. We therefore hold that requiring a magistrate to use the phrase \"permeated with fraud\" would be \"unreasonably 'hypertechnical' \" CJ id. at 140-41 (<HOLDING>). 125 Because the magistrate found probable Holdings: 0: holding that a statement that the affiant is senior vicepresident and secretary of a corporation asserting a special appearance is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the corporations contacts with texas 1: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account 2: holding it would be unreasonably hypertechnical to require an affiant to specifically claim that the business was permeated with fraud 3: holding that an arbitration clause was not unconscionable because it did not unreasonably favor the defendants 4: holding warrant not undermined and affiant did not act in bad faith where affiant relied upon erroneous statements made by third party", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in which the Supreme Court stated that the Barker test, originally developed to determine when the United States has denied a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), also \u201cprovides an appropriate framework for determining whether [a delay between entrance of a protective order and final determination of forfeiture] violate[s] the due process right to be heard at a meaningful time.\" $8,850.00, 461 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. at 2012. She claims that with this statement, the Supreme Court recognized that any person whose property is restrained under \u00a7 853(e) is entitled to a post-restraint adversarial hearing under the Due Process Clause. See also United States v. Crozier, 111 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We note that these \"supporting\u201d cases were Holdings: 0: holding school boards are persons within the meaning of the fifth amendment due process clause 1: holding on the facts of the case that the fifth amendment due process clause required a postrestraint hearing for a criminal defendant and a third party whose property was restrained under  853e 2: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 3: holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution 4: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the entire Avoidance Order was conditioned upon the Debtors completing their Chapter 13 plan and receiving a discharge, but Provision C plainly states that \u201c[i]n the event the Debtors fail to complete their Chapter 13 Plan and receive their discharge, the Mclnnises\u2019 lien shall remain unaffected as to Section 506(a) and (d) of the Bankruptcy Code by this order.\u201d (emphasis added). Provision C only limits the \u00a7 506 Avoidance, and Mclnnis\u2019s argument that the \u00a7 522 Avoidance is now ineffective fails. The Second Avoidance Motion only seeks avoidance under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(f), and the Avoidance Order did not similarly condition the \u00a7 522 Avoidance upon the Debtors completing their Chapter 13 plan and receiving a discharge. Cf. In re Allen, 217 B.R. 945, 948-49 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1998) (<HOLDING>). Collateral Estoppel Inapplicable to Issues Holdings: 0: holding that debtor could not avoid a judicial lien where after accounting for unavoidable liens and mortgages he had no equity in the property and therefore no interest on which to avoid the judicial lien 1: holding that a debtors ability to utilize  522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge   2: holding that chapter 20 debtor could not avoid lien because of ineligibility for discharge 3: holding state courts authority under iowa code section 59821 not the lien created there under prevented debtor from claiming the iowa homestead exemption and therefore the debtor could not avoid the lien because the lien did not impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled but for the lien 4: holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of  522f", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Navarro-Flores of his right to consular notification. Nevertheless, as Navarro-Flores acknowledges, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has resolved the question whether the Vienna Convention confers individually enforceable rights upon a defendant. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006) (declining \u201cto resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals enforceable rights\u201d); Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1024 n. 11 (10th Cir.2007) (expressing \u201cserious doubts\u201d the Vienna Convention grants individually enforceable rights). The courts of appeal that have affirmatively passed upon the issue, moreover, reach differing conclusions. Compare Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 1: holding that the mere delivery of documents  does not confer jurisdiction 2: holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services 3: holding that a waiver of right to appeal contained in a plea agreement is enforceable 4: holding the vienna convention does not confer a privately enforceable right to be notified", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "lack of Article III jurisdiction, practical effects notwithstanding. \u201c[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary\u2019s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.\u201d DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). The limitations imposed by Article III may not be sw\u00e9pt aside for \u201cthe sake of convenience and efficiency.\u201d Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997). Because the majority ignores these fundamental limits to our Constitutional authority, I dissent. 1 . The Appointments Clause states: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent . Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772-74, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Neither Richard Cordray nor the Bureau Holdings: 0: holding that the government has standing to appeal a district courts dismissal of an fca qui tam action over the governments objection even though the government did not formally intervene in the action 1: holding that private individuals can assert the federal governments interests in a qui tam suit because they have their own pecuniary interest as partial assignees of the governments pecuniary claim 2: holding a judgment aggrieves a party if it directly affects some pecuniary or property interest that the party possesses 3: holding that when the government acts to enforce public rights the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts 4: recognizing that where fca forfeitures were allowed for numerous projects on which no actual pecuniary loss had been incurred the governments injuries of course included not merely the amount of the fraud itself but also ancillary costs such as the costs of detection and investigation that routinely attend the governments efforts to root out deceptive practices directed at the public purse", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the .active pursuit requirement is especially important as to not eviscerate the exclusionary rule); United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir.1995) (stating that the court \u201chas never applied the inevitable discovery exception so as to excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant where the police had probable cause but simply did not attempt to obtain a search warrant,\u201d because to hold otherwise \u201cwould completely obviate the warrant requirement\u201d) (citing United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986)); United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (1st Cir.1986) (recognizing that active pursuit may be necessary in certain situations to satisfy the test of inevitability and independence); United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). However, even the federal courts that would Holdings: 0: holding that the prosecution must establish a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means that the leads making the discovery inevitable were possessed by the police prior to the misconduct and that the police were actively pursuing the alternate line of investigation prior to the misconduct 1: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial 2: holding that the core inquiry is whether the police would have discovered the evidence if the misconduct had not occurred 3: holding that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine as that doctrine requires the state to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the police ultimately would have discovered the evidence independently of the improper police conduct by means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure  quoting craig v state 510 so2d 857 863 fla1987 4: holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "flight from an arresting officer within the definition of \u201cresistance by force\u201d would enlarge the realm of criminally-punishable actions without doing much to advance the goals of protecting police. The dangers of proscribing conduct too broadly for purposes of resisting arrest have been recognized by the drafters of Model Penal Code. The draft Code suggests that the crime of resisting arrest should only apply to conduct where the individual being arrested \u201ccreates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.\u201d Model Penal Code \u00a7 242.2. The accompanying commentary reads as follows: \u201cThe effect of this language is to exempt from criminal liab 928 N.E.2d 317, 320 (2010) (<HOLDING>). These cases demonstrate that ordinarily mere Holdings: 0: holding fleeing police officers in a vehicle was a violent felony under the acca 1: holding that police officers who engaged in a dangerous highspeed chase of a fleeing suspect were immune from suit 2: holding a police officer who was pursuing a fleeing suspect was immune from his torts when he ran a red light and collided with plaintiffs vehicle 3: holding officers may seize any contraband that a fleeing suspect discards during flight because the suspect has abandoned the property 4: holding that a fleeing suspect created a substantial risk of bodily injury to officers when he ran from officers and scaled a fence abutting the precipice of a canal in dim light", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "must terminate with the trust.\u201d Brief of Appellant at 18. Plaintiff recognizes that the district court relied on Pennsylvania bankruptcy cases contrary to her position, but argues that the courts that decided those cases \u201cfailed to consider that they were expanding the scope of spendthrift protection beyond that provided for by state law.\u201d Brief of Appellant at 22. The district court explained that the apparent split of authority does not support the bankruptcy court\u2019s conclusion that the principal here is unprotected because Pennsylvania law alone controls this case. As the district court recognized, Pennsylvania law protects remainder interests in the corpus of a trust if the spendthrift provision of the trust instrument so provides. See Clark, 411 Pa. at 256, 191 A.2d at 420 (<HOLDING>); In re Blanchard, 201 B.R. at 126 (applying Holdings: 0: holding that attempted conveyance of remainder interest in a trust was invalid because the spendthrift provision prohibited beneficiary from making any binding commitment of principal or income during the life of the trust 1: holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust 2: holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust 3: holding that creditors of a trust beneficiary were prohibited from intervening in an action involving a dispute between the trustee and a beneficiary concerning distribution of the trust corpus 4: holding that a spendthrift clause in a trust did not preclude accrued income from being paid to a beneficiarys personal representatives", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court found that the award of attorneys\u2019 fees constitutes a judgment under the statute rather than a penalty, because the award was intended \u201cto compensate his adversary for the damage inflicted on him in compelling him to incur expenses in support of a just claim.\u201d Id. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). In drawing the distinction, the court noted that the proper inquiry \u201cwhether a judgment is \u2018a f\u00edne or other penalty\u2019 depends on whether its purpose is remedial in nature, affording a private remedy to an injured person, or penal in nature, punishing an offense against the public justice.\u201d Id. at 323 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A v. Hoffman, 665 F.Supp. 73, 75-76 (D.Mass.1987)); see also Spann v. Compania Mexicana Radiodifusora Fronteriza, S. A., 131 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir.1942) (<HOLDING>). As in Desjardins Ducharme, the awarding of Holdings: 0: recognizing that an award of temporary attorneys fees and costs is based on an assessment of need and ability to pay as well as the reasonableness of the fees and costs 1: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 2: holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees 3: holding parties agreement provided clear contractual justification for the award of costs and expenses including attorneys fees to the prevailing party 4: holding that costs including attorneys fees imposed by a mexican court did not constitute a penalty", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 110.05 (3d ed.1997). The court must take all allegations in the complaint as true, unless contradicted by the defendants\u2019 affidavits. See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d \u00a7 1352 (1990 & Supp.1999). When an allegation is so challenged \u201c[a] court may examine facts outside the complaint to determine whether venue is proper. The court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff.\u201d Id. (citations omitted). If the defendants prevail on their Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court has the power to dismiss or transfer the case to any district in which it could have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1406(a); see also Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). III. Standing Defendants argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court 1: holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court 2: holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion 3: holding that whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate lies within the sound discretion of the district court 4: holding that the decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not bedisturbed absent an abuse of discretion", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with bench trials. Because the plaintiffs raised the issue in their pretrial submissions and because the court believes the correct question here is whether the evidence presented at trial establishes that the defendant S.R.O.s are entitled to qualified immunity, it rejects the defendant S.R.O.S argument that the plaintiffs abandoned the issue. 37 . Citing Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2002); Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 852-53 (4th Cir.2001); LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir.2000); Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir.1994). 38 . Citing Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir.2001); Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir.200 0, 276, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686, 106 S.Ct. 3159 Holdings: 0: holding that the board of education violated a school teachers first amendment rights by dismissing him because he had criticized the board in a letter to the local newspaper 1: holding that a principal did not impinge students first amendment rights by censoring articles in a high school newspaper 2: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students 3: holding that a teacher was unjustified in censoring an article in the school newspaper because it was inconceivable that the use of the word damn one time in the article would have caused material and substantial interference with school activities 4: holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "221-22, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952). In Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69, 772, we added an additional consideration to the Frye analysis in deciding that testimony developed through the aid of hypnosis was inadmissible. Although citing the Frye general acceptance standard, our primary concern in Mack was with the unreliability of memories produced while under hypnosis. See Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768-69. As a result, the test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence in Minnesota developed into the two-prong Frye-Mack standard. First, a novel scientific technique must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and second, the particular evidence derived from that test must have a foundation that is scientifically reliable. See State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.1985) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, Holdings: 0: holding that calculations done by applying product rule were generally accepted in relevant scientific community 1: holding under the restrictive frye test that pcrstr testing is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 2: holding that product rule method of dna statistical evidence is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community 3: holding that graphology is accorded a low measure of scientific reliability in predicting character or state of mind and is not generally accepted in the scientific fields of psychology and psychiatry 4: holding that expert opinion based on scientific technique is inadmissible unless technique is generally accepted as reliable in relevant scientific community", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was within the seope of Dr. Faust's protec-tible interest. Id. However, we concluded that the portion of the covenant prohibiting Dr. Norlund from acting as an opto-metric liaison or medical optometrist with any ophthalmologist in specified counties was overbroad because that provision was beyond the seope of Dr. Faust's protectible in venant's provision that a radio dise jockey would \"not engage in activities\" at certain radio stations listed in the covenant was over-broad because it would have prevented the employee from being employed in any capacity by any radio station listed in the covenant and \"extended far beyond\" the former employer's legitimate interest in the employee as an on-air personality); Burk v. Heritage Food Serv. Equip., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 803, 812 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (<HOLDING>); Frederick v. Prof'l Bldg. Maint. Indus. Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that any acts in which employee engaged with intent to woo plaintiffs wife away from him during business meetings and trips simply had no connection to business of employer 1: holding that the covenants clause prohibiting the employee from being employed  with any corporation  which competes with or otherwise engages in any business of the employer was overbroad because it prohibited the employee from working for a competitor in any capacity 2: holding that monitoring telephone calls is in the ordinary course of business where the employer has reason to suspect an employee of disclosing confidential information to business competitor 3: holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer  or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer 4: holding that injunction prohibiting doctor from seeing any patients from medical practice that formerly employed him as provided for in covenant not to compete was not overbroad and should not have been limited to only those patients he treated while employed by practice", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "garage is part of the home. The former Fifth Circuit has held the same. In United States v. Sokolow, the former Fifth Circuit held that a police officer\u2019s warrantless search of the defendant\u2019s garage to record the serial numbers of air-conditioning units the officer suspected were stolen violated the Fourth Amendment. 450 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1971). Applying the same legal analysis as it would had the officer entered any other part of the defendant\u2019s home without a warrant, the court held that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry of the garage because the air-conditioning units could not have been disposed of easily and other officers were maintaining surveillance on the premises. Id.; see also Kauz v. United States, 95 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir.1938) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, it is undisputed that Holdings: 0: holding that a drugdetection dog sniff outside a garage door at a home was not a search under the fourth amendment 1: holding that a dog sniff outside the defendants door in his apartment building was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment so long as the police were lawfully present in the hallway when the search occurred 2: holding that a warrantless search of garbage located within the curtilage of the defendants home violated his fourth amendment rights 3: holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation 4: holding that a warrantless search of a garage that was part of the same building as the defendants living quarters violated the fourth amendment", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "nothing to segregate. Indeed, finding of fact 13 indicates that the trial court believed that some fees were reasonable and necessary. See Finding of Fact 13 (stating \u201cthe majority of those fees [requested by Ah\u2019 Routing] were not related to the defense of [the Theft Act] claim\u201d). Further, if the trial court had decided that \u201c$0\u201d was a reasonable and necessary fee for the trial work regardless of the segregation issue, it would not have stated in conclusion of law 7 that the only reason for an appeal as to attorney\u2019s fees is the segregation issue. Under Texas law, if the trial court and a party seeking attorney\u2019s fees disagree over the applicability o erman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 268 (Tex.2004); Gill Sav. Ass\u2019n v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (<HOLDING>), modified on other grounds, 797 S.W.2d 31 Holdings: 0: holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims 1: holding claimant did not have to segregate fees between fraud and contract claims because both claims were based on the same set of facts and circumstances 2: holding that successful swornaccount plaintiff did not have to segregate its attorneys fees for prosecuting its claim from its fees for defending a dtpa counterclaim because the claims arose out of the same transaction and were so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entailed proof or denial of essentially the same facts 3: holding that court may not accept claims of fraud based on speculation 4: holding that because plaintiffs claims were presented as a single claim based on the same facts and based on the same alleged damages multiple awards would be duplicative", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that he validly waived his Miranda rights because he was not aware of the nature of the constitutional rights he was abandoning. Specifically, Garibay contends that he did not understand Agent Burke\u2019s recitation of his rights in English because his primary language is Spanish and he has a low verbal IQ. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving that Garibay knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168, 107 S.Ct. at 522. In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, we consider, as one factor, any language difficulties encountered by the defendant during custodial interrogation. See United States v. Heredia-Fernandez, 756 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). In finding that Garibay was proficient in Holdings: 0: holding miranda inapplicable because defendant not in custody 1: recognizing that defendant may waive miranda rights 2: holding that smith who was 15 years old could waive his miranda rights and his right to have an attorney or parent present during questioning by police 3: holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda  rights in a free and aware manner 4: holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "avoidance proceedings with respect to the Debtor's prepetition transfers to his family. After it became clear that the amount of the allowed claims exceeded the Debtor\u2019s ability to fund the plan, the Debtor acquiesced to reconversion of the case to chapter 7. However, the fact that the rehabilitation effort was unsuccessful does not dictate the conclusion that the attempt was made in bad faith. 13 . At the hearing, the Debtor testified that his income is consistent with the disclosures in Amended Schedule I. However, I find that the Debtor understated his expenses in Amended Schedule J and that his monthly living expenses for himself and his dependent family members exceed the disclosed household monthly income of $2,245.00. 14 . In re Hall, 15 B.R. 913, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 1981) (<HOLDING>) (cited with approval in In re Ditter, 13 Holdings: 0: holding the plain legal prejudice test applies to voluntary dismissal under the code 1: holding appeal improper since the dismissal was voluntary 2: holding that a plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice constituted a final order that was appealable 3: holding that a voluntary dismissal moots a case 4: holding that 12 os  100 applies to cases where dismissal was voluntary and without prejudice", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "de novo on appeal. See Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. at 97, 555 S.E.2d at 297. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to be free from \u201cunreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. This protection is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961). The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures applies to seizures of the person, includ was a suspicious person described as a Hispanic male. There was no approximate age, height, weight or other physical characteristics given as part of the description, nor was there a description of any specific clothing worn by the suspicious person. Cf. State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 703-04, 454 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1995) (<HOLDING>); State v. Jordan, 120 N.C. App. 364, 367-68, Holdings: 0: holding reasonable suspicion is based on totality of circumstances 1: holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion included a description of a suspicious person with a lot of hair a gold watch and large frame glasses 2: holding that inquiry notice exists where a reasonable investor of ordinary intelligence would have discovered the suspicious information and recognized it as suspicious 3: holding that passenger conduct can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion 4: holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "insurance plans.\u201d See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, 7 (April 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/ sites/defauli/files/45231-ACA_Estimates. pdf. The CBO report, however, addresses the Transitional Reinsurance Program only in passing, and even then \u2014 with an eye toward, the program\u2019s revenue estimates and effects on insurance premiums \u2014 not on whether governmental plans qualify as \u201cgroup health plans,\u201d In fact, the CBO report .never states that the reinsurance contribution does not also fall on non-Federal governmental plans. And in any event,-the CBO does not and cannot authoritatively interpret federal statutes. See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir.2005) (Easterbrook, J.) (<HOLDING>). 2. \u201cGovernmental Plans\u201d Constitute a Type of Holdings: 0: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 1: holding that evidence that the petitioner had a political opinion that he expressed it to his persecutors and that they threatened him only after he expressed his opinion compelled the conclusion that the threats were connected to his political opinion and not only to his failure to provide money in response to demands from the persecutors that predated his expression of his political opinion 2: holding that a prqvision from the electronic communications privacy act applied to the states irrespective of cbo opinion to the contrary although the congressional budget office expressed an opinion that the 1986 law would not impose new costs on states this view  on which congress did not vote and the president did not sign  cannot alter the meaning of enacted statutes 3: recognizing that an agency cannot impose additional conditions on the united states consent to be sued unless congress expressly delegates this authority 4: holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Reversed and remanded for a new trial. LEVINE, J., and GREENHAWT, SUSAN F., Associate Judge, concur. 1 . \"Larry\u201d was not called as a witness by either party. [2] 2. For the purposes of paragraph (b), the term \u201cchild molestation\u201d includes lewd or lascivious offenses committed upon or in the presence of persons less than 16 years of age. \u00a7 90.404(2)(b)2. 3 . We note that the remoteness factor would be less significant when the sexual abuse is generational or intrafamilial, and if the prior incidents were similar to the current act. See State v. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 1974) (concluding intrafamilial nature of pri- or abuse coupled with similarity of the prior acts rendered six- and ten-year-old incidents admissible); Bryson v. State, 210 Ga.App. 642, 437 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1993) (<HOLDING>); State v. Cichon, 458 N.W.2d 730, 734 Holdings: 0: holding that a petitioner had not been prejudiced by his counsels failure to present child abuse evidence and noting that several decades had elapsed between the murder and the abuse 1: holding thirtyoneyear lapse between abuse of daughter and granddaughter did not render prior abuse evidence inadmissible per se 2: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 3: holding that the fouching for the purposes of abuse language in section 1834014 means touching for the purposes of sexual abuse not abuse in general 4: holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "occurred). 22 . See Leighton, 1990 WL 84704, at *2-3; In re Beatrice Companies, Inc., 1987 WL 36708, at *2-3. 23 . As noted by the dissenting justice, the Defendants objected to Lapiner\u2019s intervention based on his failure to own Isrameo stock at the time of the wrongdoing alleged in the derivative action, but the Defendants did not object to the trial court\u2019s consideration of Lapiner\u2019s objections. 24 . See Tex. Bus. Orgs.Code Ann. \u00a7 21.552. 25 . See Tex. Ass\u2019n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993) (stating that standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and that lack of standing may be raised for the first time on appeal); Schwartzott v. Etheridge Property Management, 403 S.W.3d 488, 498 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Trojacek v. Estate of Kveton, No. Holdings: 0: holding that lack of justiciable interest resulted in lack of standing to pursue claim and that lack of standing deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to act 1: recognizing fundamental error as an exception to the general rule of preservation 2: recognizing exception to preservation rules for fundamental error that is highly prejudicial 3: holding that if these preservation requirements are met any error in the denial of a challenge for cause is reversible error 4: holding that preservation of error in the trial court is not necessary as to lack of standing", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "policy not to fire employees except for good cause. Plaintiff bases his implied contract claim solely on evidence that the drug policy was posted, that he probably read it, that IBP restricted itself by the policy, and that IBP led employees to believe that it does not fire them except for cause. IBP argues that plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence of contractual negotiations or other circumstances which would tend to make clear the intent of the parties to change the at-will nature of the employment relationship. According to IBP, the fact that IBP unilaterally adopted a drug/alcohol policy and has a general practice of adhering to it does not transform the policy into a binding contract of employment. E.g., Berry v. General Motors Corp., 838 F.Supp. 1479, 1492 (D.Kan.1993) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir.1995). In Holdings: 0: recognizing distinct difference between policy which given employer might adopt and sincerely intend to follow and normally does follow and binding contractual duty 1: recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel 2: holding that failure to follow mandatory provision of statute renders the act void whereas failure to follow directory provision does not 3: recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions 4: holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings.\u201d Gibb v. Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). Statements of counsel at oral argument raising new facts not alleged in the pleadings constitute \u201cmatters outside the pleadings\u201d and, if considered by the district court, require treatment of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Smith v. Local No. 25, Sheet Metal Workers International Ass\u2019n, 500 F.2d 741, 744 (5th Cir.1974) (treating a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order as automatically converted into summary judgment because district court relied on materials outside the pleadings, including oral argument); Judge v. Johnston Warren Lines, Inc. [Ltd.], 205 F.Supp. 700, 702 (D.Mass.1962) (<HOLDING>). Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc. 187 Holdings: 0: holding that a rule 12b6 motion is only converted to a motion for summary judgment when a court accepts and considers matters outside of the pleadings 1: holding that where a court considering a rule 12b6 motion relies on matters outside the pleading the motion must be treated as a rule 56 motion for summary judgment 2: holding that a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss should be treated as a motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs counsel relied upon facts outside the four corners of the complaint during oral argument of the motion 3: holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment 4: holding that by considering matters outside of the pleadings the trial court converted a rule 12b6 motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "minimize liability. Indeed, defense counsel would be remiss not to demand that the plaintiff waive statutory attorney\u2019s fees. A lawyer who proposes to have his client pay more than is necessary to end litigation has failed to fulfill his fundamental duty zealously to represent the best interests of his client. Because waiver of fees does not affect the plaintiff, a settlement offer is not made less attractive to the plaintiff if it includes a demand that statutory fees be waived. Thus, in the future, we must expect settlement offers routinely to contain demands for waivers of statutory fees. The cumulative effect this practice will have on the civil rights bar is evident. It does not denigrate the high ideals that motivate many civil rights practitione Co., 338 U. S. 263, 266 (1949) (<HOLDING>); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427, 434-438 (1953) Holdings: 0: recognizing that  1404a allows for the transfer of federal employers liability act suits 1: holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable 2: holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act 3: holding venue provision of federal employers liability act nonwaivable 4: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 109-10 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The appellant must first demonstrate trial counsel\u2019s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). He must then show that \u201cbut for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Id. McCallum claims his counsel\u2019s performance was deficient because he failed to object properly to the admission of evidence regarding McCallum\u2019s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to admissible evidence. See Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). We have determined this evidence was Holdings: 0: holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to object to prosecutors comments cognizable in postconviction motion since court unable to review on appeal because trial counsel failed to preserve error 1: holding that to demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel petition must establish that the alleged error was prejudicial in fact 2: holding that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object during trial appellant must show trial court would have committed error in overruling objection 3: holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "forfeiture was not received. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 983(e). This is the exclusive remedy after pursuing the administrative path for setting aside a forfeiture decision by the Office of the Solicitor. Id. In this case, the district court properly held that plaintiffs\u2019 CAFRA claim is barred from judicial review. Plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures. Plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission. These petitions were reviewed by the Office of the Solicitor and denied. Because plaintiffs chose to pursue administrative remedies, they waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. See 50 C.F.R. \u00a7 12.24(a) (expressly providing that remedies are exclusive); Malladi Drugs, 552 F.3d at 889 (<HOLDING>); Cole v. United States (In re $844,520), 136 Holdings: 0: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 1: holding that the remedies are exclusive 2: holding plaintiffs were not foreclosed from pursuing ucc remedies outside of written warranty because warranty notice provision did not specify that the remedies provided were exclusive of any other remedy 3: holding that remedies provided in the bankruptcy code for enforcing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are not exclusive 4: holding that the act provides the exclusive procedures and remedies for common law causes of action based on allegations of deception fraud and misrepresentation", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "we cannot say that \u00a7 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) has a \u201cplain meaning\u201d that mandates a resource-first approach. The MCCA does not set out a definition of income as that term is used in subsection (e)(2)(c). Further, unlike the district court, we do not read subsections (b), (d)(e) and'(f) as imparting a plain meaning that prohibits the transfer of income pre-eligibility, such that transferred income cannot be included in the community spouse\u2019s income as that term is used in subsection (e)(2)(C). Instead, we believe that subsection (e)(2)(C)\u2019s reference to \u201cincome\u201d is ambiguous at best. Indeed, the differing views of the various courts and agencies that have interpreted subsection (e)(2)(C) provide a strong indication that the subsection is ambiguous. Compare, e.g., Gruber, 647 N.E.2d at 861 (<HOLDING>), and Kimnach, 645 N.E.2d at 825 (same), with Holdings: 0: holding that mcca mandates resourcefirst ap proach in implementing subsection e2c 1: holding that to sustain a conviction under subsection 1a of oregons seconddegree assault statute the state needs to prove only that defendant was aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct and that his conduct in fact caused the victim serious physical injury 2: holding that subsection 13la does not apply if the information is not of a personal nature 3: holding that a court should be more hesitant in accepting ab2 suit which contains significant individual issues than it would under subsection 23b3 4: holding that  1226e does not purport to foreclose challenges to  1226c itself as opposed to decisions implementing that subsection", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "available utilities and absence of nearby off-site amenities also contributed to his conclusion of the inappropriateness of this site for Mount Laurel II development. Distance from water and sewerage connections, or lack of frontage on a public street, or location in the conservation area individually is not enough to preclude the granting of a compliance remedy. However, the High Debi Hills tract is a full mile away from the nearest existing water and sewer point of connection. The method of access over the 500 foot distance separating the tract from Campgaw Road is uncertain. And, most importantly, Court ordered Mount Laurel II development should be located in growth areas, not conservation districts. See Orgo Farms and Greenhouses v. Colts Neck Tp., 192 N.J.Super. 599 (Law Div.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, substantial compliance can be achieved Holdings: 0: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 1: recognizing that what is a reasonable area is a factual matter to be determined in each noncompete case 2: holding that a matter of law that is assumed but not discussed is not authoritative 3: holding that the availability of the icrp is but one factor to be considered in determining undue hardship but it is not determinative 4: holding availability of a builders remedy in a limited growth area is not foreclosed as a matter of law but will be sparingly granted", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which may result in any discharge into navigable waters,\u201d a state certificate must be obtained. 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341(a)(1). The primary issue is whether the reference to \u201cany discharge into navigable waters\u201d under \u00a7 401 is limited to point sources. \u201cPoint source\u201d is defined under the CWA as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. \u00a7 1362(14). The term \u201cdischarge,\u201d when used without qualification in the CWA, includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a disc .Wyo.1990) (<HOLDING>); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California St. Bd. Holdings: 0: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent 1: holding that the word void is not sufficient 2: holding that the word includes instead of means indicates that what follows is a nonexclusive list that can be enlarged 3: holding the word carry includes the carrying of a firearm in a vehicle 4: holding that the use of the word or in a statute indicates that any of the listed alternative methods will suffice", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00b6 67), regularly evaluates the performance of agency nurses, PI. Statement \u00b6 28; Def. Counterstatement \u00b6 28, and could prohibit an agency nurse from continuing to work at Bellevue if it believed she had committed a major violation of some rule or if it was otherwise dissatisfied with the nurse\u2019s performance, Def. Counterstatement \u00b6\u00b6 29, 70. From all the foregoing, it is obvious that no evidentiary dispute remains that is material to the determination here in issue but that, rather, consideration of the undisputed \u201ccircumstances of the whole activity viewed in light of economic reality\u201d demonstrates that Bellevue exercised functional control over plaintiff and was her joint employer. Cf. Amamare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611 F.Supp. 344, 349 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (<HOLDING>). Defendants\u2019 fallback arguments are that, even Holdings: 0: holding that there is no individual liability under title vii 1: holding that under title vii a temporary employee was employed by both her temp agency and the business at which she worked on a temporary basis 2: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding that disclosure was required where the current employer permitted the paralegal to work on the same litigation she had worked for at her prior firm even after becoming aware that she had previously worked on the case", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "records should be treated as testimonial. A reliability-based approach to public records is harmonious with both the purpose of the Confrontation Clause right and the modern realities associated with proving the content of routinely maintained motor vehicle records. C. Conclusion [\u00b6 26] We thus conclude that our decision in Tayman remains valid precedent and should control our decision in this case. As in Tayman, the Secretary of State\u2019s certificate authenticated and summarized routine motor vehicle records that were not primarily maintained for use as evidence in criminal prosecutions. Further, the certificat 41-42 (1st Cir.2006) (concluding that warrants of deportation were nontestimonial hearsay); see also United States v. Ballesteros-Selinger, 454 F.3d 973, 975 (9th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Valdez-Maltos, 443 F.3d 910, Holdings: 0: holding that a deportation proceeding commenced after an order to show cause issued 1: holding that a warrant issued by a judge lacking authority violated defendants fourth amendment rights 2: holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only  with the existence of the alleged oral contract 3: holding that a memorandum of oral decision issued by an immigration judge at a deportation hearing was nontestimonial 4: holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches) * * *.\u201d 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure \u00a7 2.3(f) at 412 (1987). Thirdly, it appears that defendant was using his residence also as a commercial outlet for drugs and that his customers typically walked near the garbage on the way to the back entrance, facts that further suggest a diminished expectation of privacy by petitioner in the area where the garbage was placed. In Dunn, the Court stated that it was \u201cespecially significant\u201d that the police possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home but was being used in the unlawful manufacture of elicit drugs. 107 S.Ct. at 1139-1140; cf., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, \u2014 U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (<HOLDING>). All these factors combine to persuade us that Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of aerial surveillance using sophisticated equipment the open areas of an industrial or business complex are not analogous to the curtilage of a dwelling but falls somewhere between open fields and curtilage 1: holding canine sniff of an unattended vehicle parked outside the curtilage of defendants home was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment 2: holding that a warrantless search of garbage located within the curtilage of the defendants home violated his fourth amendment rights 3: holding that aerial observation of a greenhouse within the curtilage from a helicopter passing at an altitude of four hundred feet did not violate owners reasonable expectation of privacy 4: holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage located outside curtilage of home", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "As noted in the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court has jurisdiction to hear motions \u201cto compel [the] return of property obtained by an illegal search and seizure.\u201d Fed. R.Crim.P. 41(e) advisory committee\u2019s note. Moreover, the Third Circuit has found that its district courts have jurisdiction over third party motions for the return of property, see United States v. Frank, 763 F.2d 551, 552 (3d Cir.1985) (stating that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain a third party motion to determine who had entitlement to evidence after the criminal prosecution concluded), and that such jurisdiction exists even after the termination of the criminal proceedings, see United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bein, 214 F.3d at 411 (finding that \u201c[a] Holdings: 0: holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date 1: holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under  2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider 2: holding that rule 41e motion for return of seized property is treated as a civil equitable proceeding when criminal proceedings against moving party are not yet pending 3: holding that a district court has jurisdiction to consider  a rule 41e motion  filed after criminal proceedings had been completed 4: holding that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a rule 41e motion for the return of property before a criminal prosecution has begun believing such a motion to be in effect a civil action", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the district court. Barnard\u2019s psychological problems were not diagnosed until five years after the date last insured. Barnard also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting a treating physician\u2019s conclusions drawn nine months after the date last insured. We disagree. An ALJ should ordinarily give great weight to a treating physician\u2019s findings in disability cases. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2001)). When these findings conflict with the opinion of other doctors, however, the ALJ may reject the testimony so long as he provides \u201cspecific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.\u201d See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) ; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The ALJ pointed to inconsistencies in the Holdings: 0: holding that the alj must make findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of a treating physician 1: holding that where a treating physicians opinion is contradicted by a consulting physician the alj must explain on the record the reasons for rejecting the opinion of the treating physician 2: holding that clear and convincing reasons are not required to reject contradicted conclusions of a treating physician 3: holding that errors such as failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting a claimants subjective complaints rejecting a treating physicians opinion in favor of a nontreating physicians opinion without providing clear and convincing reasons and erring in assessing the claimants residual functioning capacity are fundamental 4: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a plan to \u201cmodify the rights of holders of secured claims.\u201d A hen is a property right, see Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 328-29, 113 S.Ct. at 2109-10, and the obvious implication of Nobelman \u2014 an implication made express in Justice Stevens\u2019 concurrence \u2014 is that hen-stripping is permissible except in the case of home mortgages in Chapter 13, see id. at 332, 113 S.Ct. at 2111 (Stevens, J., concurring). Section 1227(c) also has a hen-stripping effect, vesting property in the debtor \u201cfree and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan\u201d unless the plan or the order confirming the plan specifies otherwise. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(c) (1994). The FSA was undoubtedly \u201cprovided for by the plan,\u201d and a hen is a \u201cclaim or interest.\u201d See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84, 111 S.Ct. at 2154 (<HOLDING>); 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 101(37) (1994) (defining \u201clien\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that a claim is not moot where there is a viable damages claim 1: holding that an embezzlement claim is not a personal injury tort claim 2: holding claim is cognizable 3: holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim 4: holding that an in rem hen is a claim", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Requiring Indemnification Before Access to Public Streets and Sidewalks Is Unconstitutional On appeal Plain Dealer also challenges the constitutionality of Section 901.-181(c)(5) of the Lakewood Codified Ordinance requiring that \u201cpermittees\u201d indemnify and insure the City as a condition to gaining access to its public streets and sidewalks. We believe this provision also violates the First Amendment. The district court held that since the City is liable under Ohio Revised Code Section 723.01 for the failure to maintain the streets, sidewalks, and publicways, it should not be exposed to additional liability without indemnification by any private commercial use on such City owned property. The district court cites Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Dickerhoof v. City of Canton, 6 Ohio St.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing a claim of sovereign immunity raises a jurisdictional defense 1: holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine 2: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action 3: holding that the sovereign immunity defense may be raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that the alien tort statute itself is not a waiver of sovereign immunity", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "prosequi the case, which motion was granted. The defendant challenged the decision, and the Court observed that the \u201cexpress language of the statute commits a finding of good cause to the discretion of the trial court.\u201d Id. Noting that the basis for the motion was, in part, the failure of the Commonwealth to adequately prepare its case, the Court stated that, where such lack of preparation was coupled with factors beyond the Commonwealth\u2019s control, it \u201cdoes not demonstrate bad faith on the Commonwealth\u2019s part. Nor does the decision of the Commonwealth to seek a nolle prosequi rise to the level of oppressive tactics amounting to prosecutorial misconduct in this instance.\u201d (emphasis added). Id. at 584, 520 S.E.2d at 830, see United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1988) (<HOLDING>). These Virginia cases make clear that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that fundamental consideration in assessing the propriety of a prosecutors motion to dismiss is whether the motion is made in good faith 1: holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss 2: recognizing that a clients interest in delay itself is not entitled to weight in assessing the propriety of a lawyers tactics on behalf of the client 3: holding that the trial court did not violate due process in considering the defendants motion to dismiss because the defendant had corrected its error in not serving its motion to dismiss on the plaintiff and because the plaintiff had received adequate time to consider and respond to the arguments made in the motion 4: holding that presumption is applicable in motion to dismiss context", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that the appellant was being advised to limit his strenuous activity. Finally, the appellant\u2019s argument that, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 4.21, he \u201cis not required to demonstrate that he meets all criteria for the next higher rating\u201d lacks merit. Reply Br. at 3. He asserts that he \u201cunquestionably satisfies two of the three criteria for the 40-percent rating.\u201d Id. at 3. In light of the conjunctive \u201cand\u201d in the criteria for a 40% disability rating under DC 7913, all criteria must be met to establish entitlement to a 40% rating. See, e.g., Watson v. Dep\u2019t of the Navy, 262 F.3d 1292, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2001) (noting that inclusion of conjunctive \u201cand\u201d clearly indicates that all three criteria in 5 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 831.902 and 842.802 must be demonstrated); Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 379, 385 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Malone v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 539 (1997) Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory criteria for designation of an area of critical state concern  are constitutionally defective because they reposit in an agency the fundamental legislative task of determining which geo graphic areas and resources are in greatest need of protection 1: holding that criteria expressed in the conjunctive are connected by and 2: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 3: holding that views expressed by other courts on the merits and in particular a string of losses together with the actual merits of the governments litigating position are central to issue of whether position was substantially justified 4: recognizing that russell rejected a remedy that was neither expressed nor implied in the plan but that plaintiff claimed was implicit in the erisa statute ", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "after hearing testimony from K.J. and K.S.'s mother. As a result of this violation of probation, on June 18, 2003, the juvenile court granted wardship of K.S. to the- DOC for a recommended period of six months. K.S. now appeals. Analysis K.S.'s argument is that the juvenile court never. properly obtained jurisdiction during the entirety of these proceedings because it failed to strictly follow the statutory prerequisites for obtaining jurisdiction at the time of the original delinquency filing in May 2002. . Indiana courts have held for many years that strict compliance with the statutory prerequisites for obtaining jurisdiction at the commencement of delinquency proceedings is required of juvenile courts. See, eg., Shupe v. Bell, 127 Ind.App. 292, 300-01, 141 N.RE.2d 351, 355 (1957) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). The statutes governing the Holdings: 0: holding that judicial review is not available of the governments certification under 18 usc  5032  as required to initiate a juvenile delinquency proceeding that inter alia an appropriate court of a state  does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles 1: holding juvenile court under statutes then in effect could not acquire jurisdiction in delinquency proceeding in the absence of a delinquency petition filed by the probation officer under an order of the court authorizing the same 2: holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause 3: holding that youth in juvenile delinquency proceeding was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of restitution under ors 419c450 4: holding that the order of the juvenile court authorizing the filing of a delinquency petition is one of the essential documents needed when considering a challenge to juvenile jurisdiction", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "saving it for when new counsel began representing Lance, was appropriate, because this form of Sixth Amendment claim does not involve the potential conflict of interest inherent where a lawyer accuses himself or herself of having made unprofessional choices. See id. at 87, n. 13 (noting, but declining to address, the possibility that a trial court\u2019s denial of expert funds might raise Sixth Amendment concerns, in addition to due process concerns, that could be considered on direct appeal); Strickland, supra, 466 U. S. at 686 (noting that there are Sixth Amendment claims regarding governmental interference with the right to counsel that are distinct from claims regarding trial counsel\u2019s own deficient performance). Compare Glover v. State, 266 Ga. 183, 183-185 (2) (465 SE2d 659) (1996) (<HOLDING>). Having been timely raised, the claim was Holdings: 0: holding that a claim including a constitutional claim must have been asserted to the trial court to be raised on appeal 1: holding that a claim alleging that trial counsel himself or herself acted outside of the bounds of professional competence must be raised at the earliest practicable moment 2: holding that the defense of lack of venue must be made at the earliest opportunity to plead or it is waived 3: recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding 4: holding that a disqualification motion must be sought at the earliest possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The government insists that the U.S. Attorney\u2019s mere certification that the evidence is substantial proof of a material fact is sufficient to establish our jurisdiction. However, we \u201crequire[] more than the prosecutor\u2019s bare certification that the conditions enumerated in section 3731 exist.\u201d Adrian, 978 F.2d at 490. Rather, \u201cbefore we may assume jurisdiction, the government must demonstrate that the evidence ... [is] substantial proof of a fact material to the prosecution.\u201d Id. at 491 (emphasis added); see also id. at 490 (rejecting government\u2019s argument that \u00a7 3731 \u201cpermits an appeal whenever the government certifies to the district court that the evidence is \u2018substantial proof of a material fact,\u2019 regardless of the truth of that certification\u201d); see also Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1150 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in order to satisfy its Holdings: 0: holding as a matter of law that when condition precedent clear on the face of the insurance policy had not been met before insolvency trustee had no cause of action because none had accrued before bankruptcy 1: holding that the objection had been sufficiently timely when the defense waited until the governments rebuttal to object to a statement made during the governments closing statement 2: holding that any right claimant might have had to receive certain information prior to statutes amendment was not vested because his lawsuit had not been resolved 3: holding  3731 not satisfied as to certain counts notwithstanding the governments protests to the contrary because substantial proof of material fact condition had not been met 4: holding that the governments argument that the iad did not apply because the prisoner had not been assigned to a permanent facility was not persuasive in light of the supreme courts holding in bozeman", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "otherwise time-barred proceedings when \u201ca litigant\u2019s failure to meet a legally mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant\u2019s control.\u201d Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, 209 F.3d 552, 560-61 (6th Cir.2000). \u201cAlthough equitable tolling is used sparingly by federal courts,\u201d this court does grant such relief in appropriate circum stances. Johnson v. Hudson, 421 Fed.Appx. 568, 571 (6th Cir.2011). \u201c[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.\u201d Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (internal quotations omitted); see also Hall v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d 745, 749-50 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). In determining whether a petitioner meets Holdings: 0: holding that denial of an independent chemical test after defendant refused to submit to a policeadministered test did not violate due process 1: holding that jurisdiction exists if either the pluralitys test or kennedys test is met 2: holding that a defendants right to an independent blood alcohol test means the right to a test that is not subject to government manipulation 3: holding that holland test did not subsume but replaced prior equitabletolling test from andrews v orr 851 f2d 146 151 6th cir1988 4: recognizing that other courts have found the type of test reliable but finding that this particular urinalysis test was unreliable since the lab did not perform a backup test or identify lab test results and state left questions about how probationers diabetes affected the results", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1325(a) (the protection of automatic stay is not listed as a requirement for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan). The plain language of \u00a7 1325(a) mandates confirmation if Debtors meet the nine requirements set forth therein. Congress did not mandate the dismissal of a case or the denial of confirmation if the automatic stay terminated prior to confirmation pursuant to \u00a7 362(c)(3) or (4) and therefore the Court finds that the termination of the automatic stay does not necessarily deprive a debtor of the right to continue under Chapter 13, obtain confirmation of a plan, and ultimately obtain a discharge if the debtor complies with the terms of the plan. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In addition to the ability of a debt- or to Holdings: 0: holding that circuit courts failure to apply statute according to its clear and unambiguous terms amounted to failure to apply clearly established law 1: holding that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors of a corporation  2: recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms 3: holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning 4: holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "real party in interest in [the Contract Action] wherein the Debtor is r \u00a7 8127(a) is relevant. See Clark v. Rameker, \u2014 U.S.\u2014, 134 S.Ct. 2242, 2244 n. 1, 189 L.Ed.2d 157 (2014) (\"Under [11 U.S.C.] \u00a7 522, debtors may elect to claim exemptions either under federal law, see \u00a7 522(b)(2), or state law, see \u00a7 522(b)(3).\u201d); cf. Bosack, 454 B.R. at 630, 633-35 (considering whether commissions earned pre-petition were exempt under \u00a7 8127(a) where the debt- or \"elected to take the exemptions available to him under 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 522(b)(3), that is essentially Pennsylvania state exemptions and the property that he owns with his nondebtor wife as a tenant by the entirety\u201d). The Court also notes it is not at all clear Segal's interpretation of Pennsylvania law is correct. See Bosack, 454 B.R. at 633 (<HOLDING>). 19 . Segal also argues the Bankruptcy Court Holdings: 0: holding  8127a has no application when an individual works for another as an independent contractor because in such event the person or entity for whom such individual works is not indeed cannot be such individuals employer 1: recognizing such an exception 2: holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within  1141a 3: holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act 4: holding that fca retaliation claim must fail as against defendants sued in their individual capacities because such individuals were not employers", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a fee award in this case on the basis of the lodestar approach is what amount, if any, should be excluded because Isacs was dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction and Standard Tallow prevailed on a summary judgment motion. It is well-established that hours expended with respect to defendants who have been dismissed from an action are generally not compensable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1990); see also Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1044 (3d Cir.1996) (stating that a court must deduct hours spent on claims that are \u201cdistinct in all respects from\u201d the successful claims); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1214 (3d Cir.1978); Hall v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 943 F.Supp. 536, 542 (E.D.Pa.1996) (<HOLDING>); Finch v. Hercules Inc., 941 F.Supp. 1395, Holdings: 0: holding that a court must deduct time exclusively devoted to the defendants without liability 1: holding that liability under  2966 cannot attach without first finding employer liability for discrimination under nyhrl 2: holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision 3: holding that like other affirmative defenses to liability immunity from liability must be pleaded or else it is waived 4: holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a grudge against Bous-man or someone who provided the information in exchange for some concession on charges pending against the informant. The question that now arises is what effect the State\u2019s failure to comply with section 810.5(4) has on the nontestimonial identification order. We think the omission of any facts from which the court could assess the informant\u2019s credibility and the reliability of the informant\u2019s information precluded issuance of the order for statutory and constitutional reasons. The statutory requirement that the affidavit \u201cshall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant\u2019s reliability\u201d and \u201cthe means by which the information was obtained\u201d is mandatory. Iowa Code \u00a7 810.5(4); see State v. Iowa Dist Ct. for Black Hawk County, 472 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 1991) (<HOLDING>). This requirement ensures that a Holdings: 0: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 1: holding that use of the word shall in search warrant statute imposed a duty that was obligatory not optional 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 4: holding that because evidence supporting search warrant was illegally obtained evidence recovered by executing warrant was fruit of the illegal search", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "we accept the designation of K.S.A. \u00a7 79-3321 as a criminal statute. Because Stephan was acting to enforce a criminal law under a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction, we believe that Stephan possessed jurisdiction to execute the warrants at Kaul\u2019s store. A further distinction with Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville is that those cases involved a state\u2019s attempt to tax an Indian tribe, while in the present case the state asserted authority to tax an individual who is not a member of the tribe where her store is located. The Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between Indians and nonmember Indians in several contexts, and has for most practical purposes treated nonmember Indians in the same manner as non-Indians. See, for example, Colville, 447 U.S. at 161, 100 S.Ct. at 2085 (<HOLDING>); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688, 110 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation 1: recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes  to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians 2: holding over 3: holding that states taxing jurisdiction over nonmember indians is equivalent to states taxing jurisdiction over nonindians 4: holding federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to try nonindians for offenses committed in indian country had implicitly preempted tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonindians", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "findings. Furthermore, although Jin\u2019s brief identifies the requirements for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as described in In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), there is no assertion or evidence suggesting that Jin complied with these requirements. Jin has also failed to show any error in the agency\u2019s determination that she did not prove past persecution or a probability of future harm as required for withholding of removal or CAT relief. The record establishes that Jin assisted a North Korean refugee, was detained for 15 days, and fined 4,000 RMB. At no time was Jin physically harmed or threatened by authorities. These allegations are insufficient to establish past persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Ivanishvili v. U.S. DOJ, 433 F.3d 332, 341 Holdings: 0: holding that where no factual dispute is raised no hearing is required 1: holding that plaintiff had no claim under fmla because she had suffered no diminution in income and incurred no costs as a result of alleged violation 2: holding that petitioner had established persecution even though he had not been physically harmed and received only an indirect threat relayed by a neighbor 3: holding that plaintiff had no standing because he had no intention of seeking further medical advice or treatment from defendant 4: holding that petitioner failed to establish persecution where he suffered only minor bruising from an altercation with family planning officials which required no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical effect", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "compensate one for the time value of money.\u201d). 170 . We have addressed the costs of delay only in the context of a judgment, rather than a sanctions award, holding in Shaw that a government entity with sovereign immunity cannot be held liable for \"claims grounded on the belated receipt of funds, even when characterized as compensation for delay.\u201d 478 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2957. Although we have not addressed a court\u2019s sanction award for the costs of delay, the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have in awarding fees under Rule 11 and other statutory provisions for fees. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court held that when awarding attorne (1994) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 81 L.Ed.2d 1, 496 N.W.2d 459, 467 (1993) Holdings: 0: holding that fdic is immune against interest 1: holding that titere is a significant distinction between fdic in its corporate capacity and its receivership capacity where fdic acts as a receiver it is not immune from prejudgment interest 2: holding that a receiver was immune from a suit alleging defamation conversion and embezzlement arising out of the course of administering the receivership 3: holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity 4: holding that the acts of a corporate officer done in his or her official capacity are acts of the corporation", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and unambiguously sets forth an agreement requiring the congregation and its members to submit \u201ccontroversies] thereafter arising\u201d between them to binding arbitration before a Beth Din of Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The absence of the word \u201carbitration\u201d from Article II, Section 12 is of no legal significance. See McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir.1988) (stating that the absence of the word \u201carbitration\u201d in a contract is \u201cirrelevant\u201d under the federal arbitration act where the parties clearly intend to submit disputes to their chosen instrument for definitive resolution); Powderly v. Metrabyte Corp., 866 F.Supp. 39, 42 (D.Mass.1994) (same). See generally Hercules & Co. v. Beltway Carpet Serv., Inc., 592 A.2d 1069, 1072-73 (D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>). Nor is there a requirement in the District of Holdings: 0: holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts 1: holding that the california false claims act cfca is pattemed on similar federal legislation and in construing the cfca it is appropriate to look to precedent construing the equivalent federal false claims act 2: holding that federal court decisions construing and applying the federal arbitration act may be regarded as persuasive authority in construing and applying corresponding provisions of our local arbitration act 3: holding that an aaa arbitration was a private proceeding and therefore that a decision by the arbitrator pursuant to the federal arbitration act did not constitute state action 4: holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.\u2019 \u201d Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. at 451, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988) (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (Douglas, J., concurring)); Roy, 476 U.S. at 700, 106 S.Ct. 2147. Contrary to the Borough\u2019s position, however, the principle of Lukumi and Fraternal Order of Police-that government cannot discriminate between religiously motivated conduct and comparable secularly motivated conduct in a manner that devalues religious reasons for acting-applies not only when a coercive law or regulation prohibits religious conduct, but also when government denies religious adherents access to publicly available money or property. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (<HOLDING>); Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 753-54 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that free exercise clause prohibits state from devaluing religious reasons for seeking unemployment benefits 1: holding  1001 prosecution for false statements in unemployment benefits not precluded by unemployment benefits statute specifically addressing topic 2: holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered  religious exercise 3: holding that religionneutral law that is generally applicable does not violate free exercise clause despite incidental effect on religious practice 4: recognizing a religious institutions right to free exercise of religion", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1983) (\u201cCash basis taxpayers are required to include items of income in the taxable year in which such item is actually or constructively received.\u201d) (citations omitted). Thus, by \u201cmatching\u201d the time at which India Music could deduct its accounts payable owed to HRI with the time at which HRI could include those payments as income, the Commissioner\u2019s \u00a7 267(a)(2) disallowance effectively changed India Music\u2019s accounting method for its account payable deduction in the 2004 taxable year from an accrual basis to a cash basis. That is, the Commissioner effected a change in India Music\u2019s treatment of a material item in 2004 by postponing the proper time for taking its account payable deduction. See Summit Sheet Metal Co., T.C. Memo 1996-563, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1606, 1996 WL 740748, at *11 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the disallowance constituted a Holdings: 0: holding a 12b5 defense is waived if it is not made in a rule 12 motion or if it is not included in a responsive pleading 1: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 2: holding that it is not 3: holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it   4: holding that an item is material  if the time for including it in income or deducting it is at issue", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "merits or his affirmative defense of insanity in these cireumstances. The Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury requires \"criminal convie-tions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the erime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.\" People v. Hill, 934 P.2d 821, 827 (Colo.1997) (quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995)). However, a judgment of NGRI does not constitute a conviction; rather, it operates as an acquittal of the charged offenses. See Jacobs v. Carmel, 869 P.2d 207, 209 (Colo.1994) (stating that a person committed after a finding of insanity \"will not actually have been convicted of the crime charged\"); see also Parks v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 202, 503 P.2d 1029, 1033 (1972) (<HOLDING>). \u20ac 19 Prior to the change in procedure under Holdings: 0: holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge 1: holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense 2: holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity 3: recognizing a criminal defendants right to present a complete defense 4: holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in light of the Matter of Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151. On the second evaluation of Petitioners\u2019 claim, the BIA held that \u201cthe Immigration Judge followed the framework of Matter of Y-L-, supra, to determine that the respondents knowingly made frivolous asylum applications.\u201d We agree. The IJ was not required to hold another hearing on remand, as the record was sufficiently developed to apply Matter of Y-L- to the facts of the case. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying either of Petitioners\u2019 requests to reopen. Hamazaspyan v. Holder, 590 F.3d 744, 747 (9th Cir.2009). Under an abuse of discretion standard, Petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions warranting reopening. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (citing to Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. Holdings: 0: holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result 1: holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody 2: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim 3: holding that the alien in that case had not established such circumstances 4: holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "disciplinary adjudication and expunge his record if he suffers no harm from the procedural error. Elkin, 969 F.2d at 54. Allowing a federal court to impose such sanctions would undermine the public interest in the proper enforcement of prison disciplinary rules and, therefore, is not justified. Id. Here, the Petitioner fails to identify how he was prejudiced in his ability to provide a defense by the alleged failure to receive advance written notice of the charges. Thus, he has failed to show that he was denied due process. Second, even if Plaintiff received no due process protections prior to his placement in DC custody, he can show no violation because he received regular periodic reviews by the Program Review Committee (PRC). See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Specifically, DC-ADM 801 concerning inmate Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires that a hearing be held within a reasonable time after confinement to administrative segregation and finding that five days plainly satisfied this requirement 1: holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate 2: holding that periodic review by prc of status of prisoner held in administrative confinement for eight years afforded all due process to which inmate was entitled 3: holding that a prisoner is entitled to due process prior to being transferred to a mental hospital 4: holding that punitive conditions of pretrial confinement implicate due process", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "13 New Jersey courts have used res gestae as an evidentiary doctrine since 1819. See Ogden v. Gibbons, 5 N.J.L. 612, 631-32 (Sup.Ct.1819) (admitting hearsay evidence as res gestae of charged trespass because evidence was necessary to establish motive); Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 695, 758 (Sup.Ct.1819) (explaining res gestae as exception to rule against hearsay). 14 Res gestae also has been cited as the explanation for admitting relevant evidence. See, e.g., State v. Deegan, 133 N.J.L. 263, 44 A.2d 104 (E. & A.1945) (permitting photographs of decedent and family to be admitted as res gestae); State v. Weiner, 101 N.J.L. 46, 49, 127 A. 582 (Sup.Ct.1925) (admitting as res gestae evidence of skid marks at accident scene); State v. Hill, 65 N.J.L. 626, 632, 47 A. 814 (E. & A.1900) (<HOLDING>). 15 See Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 166, 801 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible 1: holding that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary judgment if the same evidence would be admissible in another form at trial 2: holding that evidence in an inadmissible form may be considered at the summary judgment stage as long as the evidence is submitted in an admissible form at trial 3: holding that coats presence in room at time of murder would be admissible as res gestae 4: recognizing that a 11 evidence must be relevant to be admissible", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "very issue, but the district court denied that intervention. Enterprise chose not to appeal that decision. Thus, the validity of Landmark's prejudgment attachment never was in issue in the Landmark lawsuit. 2 . We have no doubt that the validity of Landmark's prejudgment attachment would be an issue in a priority dispute between Landmark and Enterprise. Nevertheless, neither the Enterprise lawsuit nor the Landmark lawsuit is a priority dispute involving the validity of a prejudgment attachment. 3 . Landmark opposed the district court's consolidation below. Landmark, however, could not appeal the consolidation because the district court held in favor of Landmark on the merits. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Brashear Freight Lines, 306 U.S. 204, 206, 59 S.Ct. 480, 481, 83 L.Ed. 608 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Landmark, however, has raised this issue as a Holdings: 0: holding neither party was prevailing party where appeal and crossappeal were dismissed 1: holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action 2: holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal 3: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 4: holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "580, 587 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). A conclusory statement is one that does not provide the underlying facts to support the conclusion. Paragon Gen. Contractors, 227 S.W.3d at 883; Rizkallah, 952 S.W.2d at 587. A conclusory statement can be either a legal conclusion or factual conclusion. See Rizkallah, 952 S.W.2d at 587. Harrison\u2019s averments arguably concerned only two of the representations on which Methodist relied to support its breaeh-of-warranty action: \u201cZurich had experienced and expert personnel to handle all claims\u201d; and \u201cZurich would provide a customized claims program that would control Methodist\u2019s loss costs.\u201d Even if Harrison\u2019s affidavit was some evidence Zurich breached these warranties, his aver-m s \u201copinion.\u201d See Ryland Group, Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 122 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Harrison\u2019s averments were Holdings: 0: holding that interested partys affidavit opposed to motion for summary judgment and governments deposition to explore facts asserted in affidavit do not constitute distinct proceedings 1: holding that facts alleged in an employees affidavit were insufficient to raise an issue of fact for the purposes of defeating a summary judgment where the affidavit contradicted the employees earlier deposition statements 2: holding that affidavit in support of summary judgment may not be based upon factual conclusion or conclusions of law 3: recognizing that an interested witnesss affidavit reciting he estimates or believes cer tain facts to be true will not support summary judgment 4: holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the examiner conducted a physical examination of Mr. Johnson; reviewed the claims file and medical records to include x-rays taken in 1977, 1993, 1999, and 2004; opined that Mr. Johnson\u2019s developmental abnormalities did not undergo any degenerative change between 1977 and 2004; opined that there were no other abnormalities other than his longstanding developmental abnormalities (which would also negate the question of any \u201csuperimposed\u201d disability); and opined that Mr. Johnson\u2019s current back disability was not related to his eligible service. In sum, the record reflects that the July 2005 VA medical examiner based his opinion on Mr. Johnson\u2019s history and his medical records, and the examiner explained the basis for his opinion. See D\u2019Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 97, 104 (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 121, Holdings: 0: holding that review of medical history during an examination assisted doctors medical conclusions 1: holding that experts medical opinion constituted no evidence because it was based upon speculation and surmise rather than reasonable medical probability 2: holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid 3: holding that a medical opinion is adequate where it is based upon the veterans medical history examinations and the also describes the disability in sufficient detail 4: holding that the mother can be deemed to have waived the physicianpatient privilege only with respect to the medical history and records pertaining to the period when the plaintiff was in utero during which time there could be no severance of the infants prenatal history from his mothers medical history", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "cases involving the custody, care, and control of children is divided between the District Court and Probate Court. Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. \u00a7 103 (2015), the District Court has \u201coriginal\u201d jurisdiction over cases involving parental rights, but the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint guardians for minors pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. \u00a7 5-102(a) (2015). More and more frequently, family litigation causes these two court systems to exercise concurrent jurisdiction, and the \u201cmarriage\u201d caused by this concurrent jurisdiction is very rocky. Although 19-A M.R.S. \u00a7 1654 (2015) confers on the Probate Court concurrent jurisdiction to award parental rights and responsibilities \u201c[i]f the father and mother of a minor child are living apart,\u201d see Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, \u00b6 7, 797 A.2d 1265 (<HOLDING>), in actuality, the Probate Courts deal with Holdings: 0: holding in termination of parental rights case that trial court erred in taking judicial notice of evidence before him in guardianship hearing in same case 1: recognizing that the probate court may determine issues of parental rights and responsibilities as they relate to the guardianship proceeding in which they arose 2: recognizing that a court is not limited in what it may consider in determining whether parental rights should be terminated 3: recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights 4: holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the burden of proving the mitigating role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 939. \u201cA trial court\u2019s choice between \u2018two permissible views of the evidence\u2019 is the very essence of the clear error standard of review.\u201d Id. at 945. The district court does not need to make specific subsidiary factual findings, and, as long as the record supports the decision and the district court resolves any disputed factual issues, a final determination is sufficient. Id. at 939-40. The burden is on the defendant to offer evidence at sentencing on an issue that would reduce his offense level, and if he fails to do so, and other evidence does not demonstrate entitlement, we will affirm the district court finding. See United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 3B1.2, the district court Holdings: 0: holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility 1: holding that defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he failed to fully account for the proceeds of his crime and attempted to delay a longscheduled hearing based on an incredible claim of innocence 2: holding defendant failed to meet burden for acceptance of responsibility reduction where he objected in the psi but only made arguments at sentencing without offering evidence 3: holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted 4: holding that because the defendant did not object to the factual recitations in the psi he effectively admitted the facts in the psi", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by an alien against whom deportation proceedings are pending: \u201cno person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final finding of deportability pursuant to a warrant of arrest ...; and no petition for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1429 (emphasis added). INS argues that under the revised naturalization scheme, section 1429 operates to divest district courts of the jurisdiction section 1421(c) provides to review administrative denials of naturalization applications: This is somewhat of a novel issue, and the few courts that have addressed the question have disagreed. Compare Mosleh v. Strapp, 992 F.Supp. 874, 876 (N.D.Tex.1998) (<HOLDING>) with Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F.Supp.2d 581, Holdings: 0: holding agency action is final where there are no deportation proceedings pending in which the decision might be reopened or challenged 1: holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case 2: holding that section 1429 does not divest district court of jurisdiction when deportation proceedings are pending 3: holding that district courts lack jurisdiction to review denied applications when deportation proceedings are pending 4: holding the district court did not have jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment of status where removal proceedings are pending", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The three-judge panel found that, in addition to complying with federal and state law, the General Assembly desired to create districts \u201cmore competitive for\u201d the majority party. The panel noted the \u201cundisputed\u201d fact that in North Carolina \u201cracial identification correlates highly with political affiliation.\u201d The desire to create districts more competitive for the majority party had to occur within the requirements of the state constitution\u2019s Whole County Provision. Thus, while the three-judge panel noted the General Assembly\u2019s desire \u201cto equalize population among the districts,\u201d for state redistricting purposes, this finding must be viewed in the context of the Whole County Provision, which recognizes political subdivisions. See Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 366, 562 S.E.2d at 386 (<HOLDING>). In light of the Whole County Provision, Holdings: 0: holding that despite district courts restriction on crossexamination of government witness concerning the sentencing benefits he would earn through testifying for the government it did not violate defendants confrontation rights because of defense counsels effective impeachment of the government witnesses credibility and sentence reduction 1: holding that amtrak is an agency of the government  for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government 2: recognizing the importance of the county to our system of government and that it is through counties mainly that the powers of government reach and operate directly upon the people quoting white v commrs of chowan cty 90 nc 437 438 1884 3: holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted 4: recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(2001). 1 16 To the contrary, D-Mil cites Williams v. Cont'l Constr., Corp., 1984 OK 887, 34 P.2d 254 and title 52, sections 2 , 3 , 7 , and 26 , of the Oklahoma Statutes, contending that, under Williams, because it has complied with Oklahoma's general corporation laws and accepted the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's rules, regulations and applicable statutes, D-Mil is entitled to exercise eminent domain across Landowner's land to market gas from a well it operates. And, no statute requires D-Mil to be specifically designated as or become a \"pipeline company.\" We disagree. 17 D-Mil correctly notes that a pipeline company is not expressly required to be named as such. See eg. Mo.-Kan.-Tex.R. Co. v. State, 1985 OK 108, 11 85, 712 P.2d 40, 46; French v. Ayres, 1949 OK 88, 207 P.2d 308 (<HOLDING>). Under title 52, a company's business name is Holdings: 0: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 1: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 2: holding that directors of a whollyowned corporation could consider the interests of the parent company as well as the interests of their corporation because there was only one substantive interest to be protected 3: holding public service corporation obligated to furnish service to each patron at same price charged to other patrons for substantially similar service 4: recognizing a pipeline company as a public service corporation even though it was not expressly named as such", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "conferred upon the commissioners court by law. Commissioners Court of Titus County, 940 S.W.2d at 80; Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479. Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the district court\u2019s jurisdiction includes appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the county commissioners court, and that jurisdiction can only be invoked under the circumstances just described. The issue squarely before us is how that jurisdiction is invoked. Invoking the Distr ex.App.-E1 Paso 1993, no writ) (noting that a formal action or suit must be filed in order for district court to exercise its superviso ry control over the commissioners court); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Liberty-Danville Fresh Water Supply District No. 1, 506 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>); J.R. Phillips Investment Company v. Road Holdings: 0: holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district courts supervisory control over the commissioners court 1: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts 2: recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders 3: holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff 4: holding that the supervisory control of the district court may be exercised through its equitable jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and dissenting). However, Tenn. R.App. P. 13(b) recognizes that exceptions can be made in appropriate circumstances. A challenge to the validity of a contract based on public policy grounds is one such exception. One authoritative text has recognized that the issue of whether a contract is contrary to public policy is an issue that trial and appellate courts may raise sua sponte. 15 Grace McLane Giesel, Corbin on Contracts \u00a7 79.6, at 27, 32 (rev. ed. 2003) (\u201cCorbin on Contracts \u201d); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ch. 8, topic 1, at 5 (1981). We have also previously reached the same conclusion. Reaves Lumber Co. v. Cain-Hurley Lumber Co., 152 Tenn. 339, 344, 279 S.W. 257, 258 (1926) (quoting Cary-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 92 Tenn. 587, 594, 22 S.W. 743, 745 (1893) (<HOLDING>)). We take no issue with the intermediate Holdings: 0: holding that courts are not bound to decide any particular jurisdictional question before any other 1: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties 2: holding that we will not grant relief unless the indictment is so obviously defective as not to charge the offense alleged by any reasonable construction 3: recognizing that courts will not add terms to a contract about which the contract is silent 4: holding that the courts will deny any relief upon any illegal contract  whenever the illegality is made to appear", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Such That Plaintiffs Action is Not Barred The amendments which the Kentucky legislature made to the blue sky statute on June 21, 2001, do not alter the conclusion that plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations found in the blue sky statute. The plaintiff argues that, even if the three year statute of limitations found in Kentucky\u2019s blue sky statute is applicable to the present action, the June 21, 2001, amendments to the blue sky law extend the statute of limitations so that this action was not untimely filed. In the June 21, 2001, amendments, the legislature changed the timing of when an action under the blue sky statute accrues from the date of the contract of sale to a discovery rule. Cf Cali-Ken Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 815 F.Supp. 216, 219 (W.D.Ky.1993) (<HOLDING>). The new discovery rule provides that \u201c[n]o Holdings: 0: holding that the time of accrual under the thenexisting version of kentuckys blue sky statute was the date of sale because the legislature had intentionally omitted a discovery rule 1: holding that discovery accrual rule applies to causes of action under michigan law for fraud 2: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law 3: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 4: holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(2005). Here, two issues affect which version of the statute is applied. First, we determine whether the district court correctly used the version of the statute in effect on the commencement date of White\u2019s action rather than the version in effect on her injury date. Second, we consider whether N.D.C.C. \u00a7 28-01-46 should be applied retroactively. A [\u00b6 9] The district court applied the version of N.D.C.C. \u00a7 28-01-46 in ef- feet on the commencement date of White\u2019s action. The court relied upon Larson, stating: \u201c[In Larson t]here was no reference to the date or time of the alleged negligent act, but rather, the Supreme Court referred to the date the action was commenced. \u201cHere, this action was commenced in February of 2006. The applicable statute in effect in February of 2006 was t ) (<HOLDING>). [\u00b6 11] Unless amendments to N.D.C.C. \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding the correct date to use when determining the controlling statute is date upon which the claim arose 1: holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations 2: holding the petition date is the appropriate date to value the collateral when the debtors intend to remain in the home 3: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 4: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conviction had not been included in his criminal history, he would have been in criminal history category II instead of category III. Id. Robinson claimed in his \u00a7 2255 petition that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to what he alleges was double counting in his sentence calculation that was contrary to U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4A1.2(a)(l). The district court ruled that the difference in the sentence Robinson would have received in category II was not significant enough to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal we determined that the maximum difference of 32 months between category II and category III failed to meet the constitutional standard of prejudice. Both we and the district court were in error. See Glover, 121 S .Ct. at 701 (<HOLDING>). Because both the district court and we Holdings: 0: holding petitioner has the burden of proof under the strickland test 1: holding that there is no baseline or quantifiable increase in a defendants sentence that must be shown to establish prejudice under strickland 2: holding that in defining the reasonable probability language in strickland with more precision substantial possibility describes the prejudice standard in strickland 3: holding that any reduction in sentence constitutes substantial prejudice for purposes of strickland analysis 4: holding that it is error to engraft onto the prejudice branch of the strickland test a requirement that any increase in a sentence must meet a standard of significance", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "argues that the district court already had adjusted his punishment by sentencing him under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2A2.1 (first degree murder) instead of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2A2.2 (aggravated assault). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides that a district court may depart from the sentencing range set by the Sentencing Guidelines only when it finds that \u201cthere exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3558(b). Here, the district court departed upward because criminal history category VI, which requires only 13 criminal history points, did not adequately reflect Defendant\u2019s 25 criminal history points. United States v. Osborne, 948 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Review of a sentence that departs from the Holdings: 0: holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history 2: holding that 24 criminal history points was so high that even placement in category vi did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendants criminal past 3: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category 4: holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "491, 495 (Ind.1990), reh\u2019g denied. Newspaper articles are, by their very nature, hearsay and for that reason are seldom proper evidence to prove any fact except the bare fact of their publication. Feliciano v. State, 467 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ind. 1984). Therefore, the trial court erred when it admitted the newspaper article into evidence. However, we hold that the error was harmless. Here, Moore\u2019s own testimony indicated that he had been employed within the last two years. Further, during his testimony, Moore invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to answer additional questions. From Moore\u2019s refusal to testify, the court could properly have drawn an adverse inference regarding his financial ability to comply with the support order. See Gash v. Kohm, 476 N.E.2d 910, 913 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied. Due to the Holdings: 0: holding that the privilege against selfincrimination does not prohibit the trier of fact in a civil case from drawing adverse inferences from a witness refusal to testify 1: holding that the fifth amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them 2: holding that although witness may invoke right against selfincrimination in civil proceeding district court may make negative inferences from invocation of right 3: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "A. The City is not indirectly liable for Terry\u2019s and Silverman\u2019s conduct. This case requires us to accommodate the Supreme Court\u2019s mandate in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that federal courts use traditional agency principles when deciding hostile environment sexual harassment cases, but simultaneously \u201cplace some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.\u201d 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Because the Eleventh and all other circuits employ agency principles in the realm of hostile environment sexual harassment, this opinion utilizes the language of traditional agency case law. Under this approach, direct liability and indirect liability are distinct concepts and form the only possible ba (10th Cir.1987)(<HOLDING>); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding in accordance with the restatement that a master may be subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment if the servants conduct violated a nondelegable duty of the master or the servant purported to act on behalf of the principal there was reliance upon the apparent authority or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relationship 1: holding that existence of deliberate and informed consent turns on whether it is understood between the employee and his employers that he is to remain in the allegiance of the first employer  or is to be employed in the business and subject to the direction of the temporary employer 2: holding that employer liability could arise under the principles of restatement  2192 if 1 the employer was negligent or reckless or 2 the employee relied on the supervisors apparent authority or 3 the supervisor was aided in his harassment by the existence of the agency relationship 3: recognizing the continuing validity of negligence as a separate basis for employer liability in action in which employee alleged supervisor harassment 4: holding that the plaintiff must establish that a supervisors harassment was within the scope of his employment and that the employer failed to respond adequately and effectively when it learned of the harassment", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "See Nev. Stat. Rev. \u00a7\u00a7 34.800(2) (laches) & 34.810(2) (abuse of writ). We have held that sections 34.800 and 34.810 constitute \u201cindependent and adequate state grounds,\u201d which bar federal habeas review, Moran v. McDaniel, 80 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir.1996) (\u00a7 34.800); Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir.2003) (\u00a7 34.810), and Davis has not demonstrated that we should reach a different result here. Davis cannot invoke ineffective assistance of counsel as a defense to procedural default, because he failed to raise this defense in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986). Thus, Davis was not entitled to challenge the procedural default in an evidentiar stitutional jurisprudence. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not violate Davis\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing that the right to be present can be waived in noncapital felony federal cases 1: recognizing constitutional right to be present when sentence is imposed 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials 3: holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire 4: holding that defendants in noncapital trials have no constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in a separate penalty proceeding", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "final when the mandate issued from the supreme court affirming the judgment on May 24, 1999, and that the two-year time limitation of rule 3.850(b) began to run at that time, thus rendering his January 4, 2002, motion untimely. Snipes argues that the time limitation of the rule did not commence until this court\u2019s affirmance of his sentence on remand became final on January 16, 2001. The unequivocal language of rule 3.850(b) supports Snipes\u2019 contention: A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case.... (Emphasis added.) See also Oliver v. State, 734 So.2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (<HOLDING>). We also note the well-established principle Holdings: 0: recognizing an exception to the twoyear time bar imposed on rule 3850 claims when the claim asserted is based on facts that were unknown to the movant and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence 1: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 2: holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final 3: holding that a court may not change the term of sentence by subsequent amendment after the sentence becomes final 4: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "there would be no openings \u2014 did not render her search unreasonable. Second, the fact that, once employed by Rite-Aid, Jewell failed to leverage up into a full-time job was not unreasonable, either. It is not surprising that her interim employment \u2014 the only job she found\u2014 made it difficult to find a different full-time job. Though her burden to find meaningful employment did not suddenly evaporate when she took on part-time work, all that is required is a reasonable effort to search. Jewell satisfied that standard here. See Lundy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 627, 629-30 (4th Cir.1988). Third, although Jewell \u201cwillfully\u201d left her job at Rite-Aid, an unlawfully laid-off employee is not required to accept or remain in less desirable working conditions. See Westin, 758 F.2d at 1129-30 (<HOLDING>). For Jewell to have stayed with Rite-Aid after Holdings: 0: holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer 1: holding that the fact that a waitress quit a comparable job did not toll her backpay liability where the sinks at the new job backed up and flooded when it rained 2: holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits 3: holding that a change in job duties was not an adverse employment action where the new job duties did not constitute qualitatively inferior work requiring any less skill or knowledge 4: holding that where the employer discontinues a specially created job the employer must offer another suitable job to the claimant or continue total disability payments", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "comments and one arguably racial remark over the course of the plaintiffs eight years of employment did not constitute pervasive conduct.\u201d Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir.1997). By our count, Ms. Hernandez presented evidence of at least a dozen racially offensive comments and jokes over the fourteen months Mr. Lillis supervised her in food services. But \u201cthe word \u2018pervasive\u2019 is not a counting measure\u201d and the \u201ctrier of fact utilizes a broader contextual analysis.\u201d Herrera, 474 F.3d at 680 n. 3. Considering the frequency, content, and context of the derogatory statements, we conclude that Ms. Hernandez established a genuinely disputed issue of fact as to the pervasiveness of the harassment in her work environment. See Smith, 129 F.3d at 1415 (<HOLDING>). The district court, citing Ford v. West, 222 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that a similar position existed after his termination 1: holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned 2: holding that the evidence presented at a factfinding hearing was sufficient to support the chins finding 3: holding evidence of six sexually derogatory statements over twentythree months some repeated frequently sufficient to support a finding of pervasive harassment 4: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for permanent residence. \u00a7 1255(i)(2). An applicant for adjustment of status under \u00a7 1255(f) must establish that he is not inadmissible under any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or that he is eligible for a waiver of any applicable ground of inadmissibility. Sattani, 749 F.3d at 371. The INA provides that an alien is ineligible to receive an immigrant visa and is inadmissible if he was unlawfully in this country for more than one year and then \u201centers or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted.\u201d INA \u00a7 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)). Such aliens are not entitled to an adjustment of status. Mortera-Cruz v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 256 (5th Cir.2005); see also In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 371 (BIA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Verdugo\u2019s assertion that the IJ incorrectly Holdings: 0: holding that a legal determination regarding an aliens eligibility for adjustment of status was not barred by the statute 1: holding that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the apa to review the denial of an aliens application for adjustment of status where the alien is in removal proceedings 2: recognizing that an alien is ineligible for relief under  212c if he was not actually admissible at the time he received an adjustment of status 3: holding ineligible for adjustment of status alien who was inadmissible due to reentry after prior removal 4: holding that aliens inadmissible under  1182a 9c i i are ineligible for adjustment of status under  1255f", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and by rendering a take-nothing judgment in favor of Coastal. Francis contends that disregarding the verdict conflicts with the court\u2019s footnote recited above, that \u201cthere is some evidence\u201d that Coastal was negligent and proximately caused Francis\u2019s injuries. Francis\u2019s arguments propose that he may still recover against Coastal under the common law, beyond chapter 95, and thus challenge the trial court\u2019s conclusion that chapter 95 preempts all common-law negligence claims against Coastal under the circumstances of this case and is, therefore, Francis\u2019s exclusive remedy against Coastal. We agree with the trial court that chapter 95 controls this case, is Francis\u2019s exclusive remedy against Coastal, and precludes common-law negligence liability in Coastal. See Fisher, 16 S.W.3d at 201 (<HOLDING>); see also Dyall v. Simpson Pasadena Paper Co., Holdings: 0: holding that chapter 95 controlled liability for injuries arising from failure to provide a safe workplace 1: recognizing a state law tort claim for negligence arising under a duty to provide a safe work environment 2: holding first that injuries sustained during contact sports were foreseeable then deciding that public policy insulated the defendant from liability for those injuries 3: holding that employer has nondelegable duty to provide safe workplace 4: holding that passenger cannot maintain action for breach of implied warranty to provide safe passage", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "went on to state: We do not want to pretend that the line between action and inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit. Id. at 618-619; see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221 (7th Cir.1988) (\u201cWhen the state puts a person in danger, the Due Process Clause requires the state to protect him to the extent of ameliorating the incremental risk. When a state cuts off sources of private aid, it must provide replacement protection.\u201d); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 382 (7th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Bowers, which hinted at the analysis that the Holdings: 0: holding that police officers charge to protect the public differentiated them from the public 1: holding that wisconsin violated equal protection rights of handicapped children by denying them an education at public expense 2: holding a county police civil service board violated officers due process rights by failing to follow its own procedures in their termination proceedings 3: holding inmates in segregation unit without charges being filed against them and without informing them of reasons for such confinement violated inmates due process rights 4: holding that due process clause was violated where police officers  abandoned children and left them in a healthendangering situation  after having arrested their custodian and thereby deprived them of adult protection", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the plant site. Acting under CERCLA, the EPA imposed administrative liability, not only on the polluters, but on the insured auto dealerships who had sold the pollutants to the polluters. Id. at 1518. The pollution exclusion contained in the policy at issue in Industrial Indemnity was identical to the one at issue in the present case. The Honorable William Terrell Hodges, United States District Judge, in reviewing issues nearly identical to those raised in this case, held that \u201csudden has a temporal meaning to it as well as a sense of the unexpected.\u201d 731 F.Supp. at 1520 (citing C.L. Hauthaway & Sons v. American Motorists Ins., 712 F.Supp. 265, 268 (D.Mass.1989) (ordinary and common usage of term \u201csudden\u201d includes temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptne ., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Applying the definition of \u201csudden and Holdings: 0: holding that a single thunderstorm was a sudden and dangerous occurrence 1: holding that negligent construction is not sudden unexpected or unanticipated and does not constitute an accident 2: holding that the indictment was sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement since it alleged that the defendants conduct occurred over a period of eight years 3: holding that more than a year between the protected activity and the discharge is not close enough to support the causal connection requirement 4: holding that the phrase sudden and accidental is not a synonym for unexpected and unintended and that the discharge of coal dust over an eight year period was not sudden", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "BIA\u2019s factfinding. The very heart of Petitioners\u2019 claim, that the BIA\u2019s analysis regarding their fears for their daughter\u2019s safety was not \u201cdetailed\u201d and failed to \u201cadequately\u201d address the issue, is fundamentally an objection to a factual determination by the BIA and the relative evidentiary weight the agency gave to competing considerations. In fact, the BIA directly addressed Petitioners\u2019 fears for Tashfia\u2019s safety and found that the IJ had \u201cproperly considered the relevant factors in the aggregate,\u201d including consideration of Petitioners\u2019 \u201ctestimony that they believed their daughter might be kidnapped in Bangladesh, as one of the potential hardship factors.\u201d We have repeatedly held that \u201c[cjloaking [a factual claim] in the garb of legal error does not alter its nature.\u201d Id. at 73 (<HOLDING>); see also Rashad v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1, 5 Holdings: 0: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim 1: holding that plaintiff stated eighth amendment claim where he alleged exposure to ets causing aggravation of chronic asthma 2: holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte 3: holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities 4: holding petitioners claim was factual in nature where he alleged the bia had failed to accord sufficient weight to the seriousness of his sons asthma", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "response to the jury\u2019s question. See also State v. Humphrey, 13 N.C. App. 138, 142, 184 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1971) (jury charge \u201cmust be considered as a whole, . . . with the presumption that the jury did not overlook any portion of it and if, when so construed, it presents the law fairly and correctly, there is no ground for reversal\u201d). Defendant also contends that the court\u2019s answer did not contain any reference to the State\u2019s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant could not have believed D.N.K. had authority to consent to his entry into her home. As the Court emphasized the State\u2019s burden of proof elsewhere in the jury instructions, the failure to re-emphasize that burden here was not error. See State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 163-64, 604 S.E.2d 886, 906 (2004) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79, 126 Holdings: 0: holding that the state must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that a challenged jury instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof when the trial court elsewhere instructed the jury that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal 4: holding that if any evidence raising the issue of selfdefense is adduced  the jury must be instructed that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the selfdefense claim does not accord with the facts", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "duties \u201cif the person ... interferes with a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.\u201d Tex. Pen. Code Ann. \u00a7 38.15(a)(1). Even if Meek was not obligated to take appellant into custody, he was acting within his discretionary authority to do so when he arrested appellant for not wearing a seatbelt. It is a violation of the Transportation Code to drive while not wearing a seatbelt. Tex TRAnsp. Code Ann. \u00a7 545.413 (Vernon 1999). The Transportation Code further provides that \u201cany peace officer may arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation of this subtitle.\u201d Tex. TRAnsp. Code Ann. \u00a7 543.001 (Vernon 1999); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (<HOLDING>). It is uncontested that appellant was not Holdings: 0: holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest 1: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law 2: holding that fourth amendment not violated when officer makes custodial arrest for driving without a seatbelt 3: holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment 4: holding that arrest in backyard violated fourth amendment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "claims is not at issue in this appeal. 3 . The latter basis for dismissal served to dismiss Zeek\u2019s ADEA claim as well. Also, none of the plaintiffs filed any charge with the EEOC at any time against GM. Accordingly, the district court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 ADEA claims against GM on this basis rather than on the ground of timeliness. 4 . The district court may have erred in dismissing plaintiffs' \u00a7 301 action on the basis of the Release under Rule 12. The defendants attached a copy of the Release to their motion to dismiss, but the plaintiffs had not referred to the Release in their complaint. A motion to dismiss relying on a paper outside the pleadings is generally permissible only where the complaint refers to that paper. Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. Holdings: 0: recognizing dismissal as proper when based on those exhibits submitted by a defendant which can properly be considered as incorporated by reference into the complaint 1: holding that in considering a rule 12b6 motion a court may only rely on the complaint its proper attachments documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 2: recognizing that a court is permitted to rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice 3: holding that a court may rely on documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial notice in deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 4: holding that a court in deciding a rule 12b6 motion may consider a document that is incorporated by reference into the complaint", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "because of her disability, and because of the disproportion in the parties\u2019 earning potential. Robert argued that he was entitled to a disproportionate share of the parties\u2019 estate because of the fraud committed by Elaine and her fault in the termination of their marriage. The record demonstrates, however, that the trial court\u2019s disposition of the parties\u2019 estate was not nearly as unequal as Elaine suggests. Each party was awarded the car that was in his or her possession. Elaine was able to keep all of the items that she removed from the house, including the disputed antique china cabinet, and she was able to keep half of the money that was in their joint account at the time that they separated. She was required to return to Robert the flat screen television that he won thro 93 (1888) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The trial court\u2019s findings of fact did Holdings: 0: holding that first husband had no knowledge of his exwifes second marriage until four days before the second marriage was annulled so he was not inconvenienced and alimony was reinstated 1: holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage 2: holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage 3: holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of  an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred 4: recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the back door the causes of action that would not benefit from the delayed discovery doctrine under Davis. It is unlikely that the supreme court narrowed the delayed discovery doctrine in Davis on November 7, 2002, only to have it subsumed by equitable estoppel on November 27, 2002 in S.A.P. 8 . In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964), Justice Stewart wrote in a concurring opinion: I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [hard core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. 9 . See, e.g., Jaszay v. H.B. Corp., 598 So.2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (<HOLDING>); Glantzis v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 573 Holdings: 0: holding nursing home estopped from raising statute of limitations defense when it stipulated to sixtyday extension of presuit screening period 1: holding that employer was estopped to assert a statute of limitations defense where the insurer had arranged to have the claimant examined by one of its physicians after the statute of limitations had run 2: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 3: holding that defendants may be estopped from raising defense of statute of limitations even though equitable estoppel is not listed in fla stat  95051 4: holding that when the department of insurance acknowledged that it had received an accident report of a claim within the statute of limitations  it was thereafter estopped after the expiration of the statute of limitations to deny receipt of the claim", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "federal courts that have encountered the FEGLIA preemption issue. Ms. Maretta cites a number of federal decisions that she claims stand for the proposition that FEGLIA preempts state laws providing for constructive trusts and other equitable remedies. In each of these federal cases, however, the plaintiffs asserted their entitlement to the decedent\u2019s FEGLI proceeds through a divorce decree or separation agreement that required the insured to maintain his or her FEGLI policy for their benefit. These courts, employing the Ridgway rationale, held that the divorce decrees at issue directly conflicted with the FEGLIA provision granting an insured the absolute right to designate any beneficiaiy that he or she chooses. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a divorce decree which obligated the divorcing husband to name the children of his first marriage as the irrevocable beneficiaries of an insurance policy precluded him from naming his new wife as a beneficiary entitled to a portion of the insurance benefits 1: holding that the asserted right of the insureds child based on his agreement with his mother during their divorce to name the child as his fegli beneficiary was preempted by feglia 2: holding that feglia preempted a state divorce decree which ordered the insured to maintain his fegli policy for the benefit of his children from his first marriage 3: holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree 4: recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for student\u2019s agreement to successfully complete degree requirement, abide by school\u2019s guidelines, and pay tuition, court stated student had to prove existence of contract containing terms upon which she based her suit). The First Court of Appeals held that a school\u2019s catalog constitutes a written contract between the educational institution and the student, where entrance is had under its terms. See University of Tex. H atalog contained express language that \u201c[t]he provisions of this catalog do not constitute a contract, express or implied, between any applicant, student, or faculty member and The University of Texas at Arlington or The University of Texas System,\u201d negating inference of intent by school to be bound its terms, no contract existed); Eiland, 764 S.W.2d at 838 (<HOLDING>). The Laws contend they have tendered Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant 1: holding that where catalog contained express notice that the provisions of this catalog are subject to change without notice and do not constitute an irrevocable contract between any student  and the university of texas medical school at galveston no enforceable contract existed because express language negated any intent by school to be bound 2: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable 3: holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter 4: holding that putting implied restrictions on an employmentatwill contract would be inconsistent with the express terms of the contract which allowed for termination at any time", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Crowder v. Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir.1993) (citing Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n. v. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983)). As such, \u201cthe government may restrict access to limited public fora by content-neutral conditions for the time, place, and manner of access, all of which must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.\u201d Id. (citing Peory, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948). There is a significant governmental interest in conducting orderly, efficient meetings of public bodies. Jones, 888 F.2d at 1332. One recognized way to conduct orderly, efficient meetings under Jones is for public bodies, such as a city council, to confine their meetings to specified subject matter. Id. at 1333 (<HOLDING>); see also Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Holdings: 0: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 1: holding that bond and miller did not apply because the plaintiff was appointed to the city council by the mayor rather than elected by the public 2: holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary 3: holding that removing a speaker from a city council meeting rather than allowing that person to speak during the public comment section of the meeting constituted a unconstitutional restriction on speech 4: holding that the removal of a public speaker by the mayor at a city commission meeting was not a first amendment violation and thus permissible because to deny the presiding officer the authority to regulate irrelevant debate and disruptive behavior at a public meeting  would cause such meetings to drag on interminably and deny others the opportunity to voice their opinions", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821-23, 105 S.Ct. 2965). 48 . See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir.1996) (\"A requirement that a court know which law will apply before making a predominance determination is especially important when there may be differences in state law.\u201d); In re Baycol Products Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 197, 207, 211-12 (D.Minn.2003) (addressing the choice-of-law issue as it pertains to Rule 23(b)(3), and pointing out the how the differences in state law preclude the formation of a medical monitoring class under 23(b)(2)); In re Propulsid, 208 F.R.D. at 145 (addressing the choice-of-law as its own factor, and then applying it to the proposed 23(b)(2) class); In re Paxil Litigation, 212 F.R.D. 539, 544-45 (C.D.Cal. 2003) (<HOLDING>). 49 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires the Holdings: 0: recognizing that the number of class representatives is not significant under rule 23a 1: holding that choiceoflaw issues prevented a manageable class under rule 23a 2: holding that the plaintiffs had not offered sufficient evidence that their claims met the requirements of rule 23a 3: holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims 4: holding that a proposed class of 40 was a sufficiently large group to satisfy rule 23a", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not when the action for fraud was or should have been discovered. Boyle v. GMC, [468 Mich. 226] 661 N.W.2d 557, 558, 559-60 (Mich.2003). Although Khadher was not harmed until September 1, 2007, when the interest rate first changed, his cause of action accrued at closing on July 23, 2004. Consequently, the action expired on July 23, 2010. Khadher also asserts that Trott\u2019s attorneys\u2019 defrauded him by double charging him for attorney\u2019s fees. The May 23, 2011 letter, however, identifies one charge for legal fees and the other for legal costs. Under the terms of the Mortgage, PNC can collect reasonable attorney\u2019s fees and costs incurred in pursuing remedies caused by the borrower\u2019s default. See United Growth Corp. v. Kelly Mortgage & Inv. Co., 86 Mich.App. 82, 272 N.W.2d 340, 344 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Khader does not allege that the fees were Holdings: 0: holding that ic  7910 specifically excludes attorney fees from the scope of power given to the arbitrator to award expenses and fees incurred during arbitration 1: holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid 2: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 3: holding that unit owner was liable for reasonable attorney fees incurred in imposing lien for unpaid association fees 4: holding attorney fees may be allowed for expenses incurred for default", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "judgment with respect to Cerezo\u2019s Title VII and Law 100 hostile work environment claims is DENIED. Finally, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Cerezo had obtained proper authorization for his extended vacation period, and, therefore, whether Ferrovial had just cause to terminate his employment. Ferrovial\u2019s motion for summary judgment with respect to Cerezo\u2019s Law 80 claim is therefore DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . Defendant failed to file a reply to plaintiffs opposing statement of uncontested material facts contained in Docket No. 15-1. Because the additional facts alleged in plaintiff's opposition were supported by citations to appropriate record materials, see Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int\u2019l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686 (1st Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>), those facts are deemed admitted by defendant Holdings: 0: holding that unsworn statements signed under penalty of peijury can be used to oppose a motion for summary judgment 1: holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment 2: holding that a signed but unsworn letter which is not otherwise authenticated is hearsay and should not be considered as evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 3: holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof 4: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is no longer available. We held that the claimant\u2019s quitting his job due to lack of transportation did not justify reinstatement of his benefits because his loss of earning power was unrelated to his disability. In Beattie, the claimant sustained a disabling work-related injury. Subsequently, his benefits were suspended when the claimant returned to work as a church minister for another employer without a wage loss. However, the claimant became uncomfortable with the position and, eventually, quit because of stress and interpersonal problems. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that he was not entitled to reinstatement of total disability benefits. 12 . When an employer that seeks to modify a claimant\u2019s benefits ref ard of Review, 59 Pa.Cmwlth. 627, 430 A.2d 722 (1981) (<HOLDING>). In other words, by instituting the transfer Holdings: 0: holding that a job offer which required a claimant to make a daily round trip commute of 232 miles was unreasonable even though the claimant would be provided with a motel room because this would require the claimant to be away from home at least four nights a week 1: holding trial court order denying states petition for an order of public use and necessity for good cause appearing did not constitute a finding of fact or a conclusion of law 2: holding that claimant must show good cause for failure to submit evidence to alj and appeals council 3: holding that claimant did not establish good cause by showing he was unable to comprehend the determination 4: holding that the necessity either to relocate or commute 80100 miles each way daily constituted good cause for the claimant to decline reassignment", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "unauthenticated, and failed to identify the authors. Id. Those weaknesses do not exist in Zhang\u2019s affidavits. Nevertheless, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to fully credit this evidence. Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir.2005) (noting that only corroboration was a letter from a family member who did not witness incident and who was not subject to cross examination). Moreover, even if the affidavits could be credited, they are insufficient to establish changed country conditions in China. The affidavits\u2019 largely anecdotal descriptions of religious persecution do not demonstrate that conditions had worsened in China for Christians since the time of Zhang\u2019s merits hearing in 2001. See Shardar v. Att\u2019y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we agree that the documentary Holdings: 0: holding that an asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of persecution 1: holding that to qualify for asylum the fear of future persecution must be based on reasonably specific information showing a real threat to individual persecution not mere assertions of fear of possible persecution or speculative conclusions quoting mapouya 487 f3d at 412 2: holding that to show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution an applicant must establish that he would be singled out for persecution or that there was a pattern or practice of persecution of similarlysituated individuals 3: holding that to establish asylum eligibility based on future persecution an applicant must show that he or she subjectively fears persecution and that this fear is objectively reasonable 4: holding that alien must show that he faces a particularized threat of persecution", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "judge continued the polling, and when all of the other jurors responded that they found the defendant guilty, the judge returned to questioning the first juror, who eventually changed her verdict. We held that \u201cto continue the poll in the absence of ... a request [by defense counsel] is error.\u201d 273 A.2d at 845. Finally, in Kendall the first juror revealed during a poll that she had found the defendant not guilty on one of the seven counts at issue. The judge clarified that he was asking about the first co C.1983) (affirming a conviction because \u201cunspoken communicative factors play[ed] a large role\u201d in understanding what a juror meant when she said, \u201cGuilty, I guess\u201d); Ellis v. United States, 395 A.2d 404, 408 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2830, 61 L.Ed.2d 280 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Those cases are distinguishable on their Holdings: 0: holding that it was not reversible error to continue polling the remaining jurors on all counts when the disputed count was later dismissed 1: holding that to compare severity of sentences the proper procedure is first to disregard the sentence originally imposed on the dismissed count and then compare the total remaining sentence imposed on the remaining counts with the petitioners present position 2: holding that states appeal of trial courts dismissal of first count in a four count indictment under cj  12302cl was not ripe until final judgment on the remaining counts pled in the guilty plea and noting that upon imposition of the sentences on the remaining counts the situation  was ripe for the state to appeal or to perfect its earlier attempt to appeal 3: holding that severance was not required when a defendant was charged with five counts of forcible rape two counts of felonious restraint three counts of kidnapping two counts of armed criminal action two counts of forcible sodomy one count of second degree assault one count of first degree robbery and one count of stealing 4: holding that issues underlying all counts were sufficiently intertwined that the separate appeal of the summary judgment counts would complicate the trial of the remaining counts", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on a motion for summary disposition. Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 486 Mich 311, 317; 783 NW2d 695 (2010). In addition, the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Eggleston v Bio-Med Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003). The proper interpretation of a contract is also a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW 2d 23 (2005). III. ANALYSIS A. POLICIES AS CONTRACTS Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an applicable statute ance policy is not mandated by statute, the rights and limitations of the coverage are entirely contractual and construed without reference to the statute. See Rory, 473 Mich at 465-466 (<HOLDING>). In addition, because insurance policies are Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage 1: holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage 2: holding directors and officers liability policy was property of the estate because the estate was worth more with indemnification coverage than without the coverage 3: holding that because uninsuredmotorist coverage is optional and not mandated by statute the rights and limitations of such coverage are purely contractual and construed without reference to the nofault act 4: holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by license plate holders such as the one on which plaintiff bruised his knee. \u201cReasonable care is determined in light of whether or not a particular danger was foreseeable.\u201d Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 826 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 117, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963)). In Syverson, we allowed a negligence claim to go forward because the employer had received complaints about the alleged hazard and another employee had suffered injury in the past. 19 F.3d at 827. In this case, plaintiff adduced no evidence indicating that CSXT knew or should have known that license plate holders posed a risk to workers or even that one was affixed to the vehicle in question. See Higgins v. Metro-North R.R., 318 F.3d 422, 427 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 85 Holdings: 0: holding that where plaintiff fails to raise issue of timeliness of departments hearing at administrative level the issue is waived on appeal 1: holding that plaintiff who fails to demonstrate employers awareness of any particular threat posed by circumstance at issue cannot prove negligence 2: recognizing the general principle that a party who fails to address an issue has conceded the issue 3: holding that employer is entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff fails to provide evidence necessary to prove at trial that there is disproportionate impact of employers policy on black employees 4: holding issue not properly before the appellate court where appellant fails to demonstrate where in the record an issue was raised in the district court", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(1) drinking alcoholic beverages during pregnancy can lead to fetal alcohol syndrome, a condition characterized by mental retardation, prenatal and postnatal growth deficiencies, and facial anomalies; (2) a pregnant woman\u2019s failure to obtain prenatal care or proper nutrition also can affect the status of the newborn child; (3) poor nutrition can cause a variety of birth defects: insufficient prenatal intake of vitamin A can cause eye abnormalities and impaired vision; insufficient doses of vitamin C \u00f3r riboflavin can cause premature births; (4) poor prenatal care can lead to insufficient or excessive weight gain, which also- affects the fetus; and (5) some research has suggested that consuming caffeine during pregnancy contributes to low birth weight. Id. One court outside of ou 91) (<HOLDING>); People v. Hardy, 188 Mich.App. 305, 469 Holdings: 0: holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy 1: holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse 2: holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy 3: holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was factually sufficient to support termination 4: holding evidence that mother allowed child to remain in home in which there was violent conduct as evidenced by fathers physical abuse of mother during her pregnancy was legally sufficient to support termination", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "appear in their pleadings in the record before us. 20 . Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4590i, \u00a7 1.03(a)(4) (\u201c \u2018Health care liability claim' means a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant\u2019s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.\u201d) (repealed 2003) (current version at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code \u00a7 74.001(a)(13)); Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 849-54 (Tex.2005); Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 885 n. 10 (Tex.1999). 21 . Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 849 (<HOLDING>). 22 . Garland Cmty. Hosp. v. Rose, 156 S.W.3d Holdings: 0: holding that claim that hospital provided inadequate supervision leading to patients sexual assault by another patient constituted health care liability claim 1: holding that claim against nursing home regarding patients death from spider bite fell within the statutory definition of a health care liability claim 2: holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided 3: holding that negligent supervision is inseparable from the use of the motor vehicle 4: holding that a negligent misrepresentation claim brought by an independent third party health care provider was not preempted by erisa", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "202 (1986). 87 . Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. 88 . Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1987); Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). 89 . Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 953 (5th Cir.1998) (citing 44 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 61.4(b), 61.13(d)). 90 . Id. at 954; Wright v. Allstate Insurance Co., 415 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir.2005). 91 . Richardson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 279 Fed.Appx. 295, 298 (5th Cir.2008) (citing 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(l) art. VII(R)). 92 . Copeland v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2004 WL 325577 (E.D.La. Feb. 18, 2004) citing Gowland, 143 F.3d at 954. 93 .Kidd v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 392 Fed.Appx. 241, 244 (5th Cir.2010) (citing Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Fid. Nat\u2019l Ins. Co., 542 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>)); 44 C.F.R. \u00a7 61, app. (A)(1), arts. VII(J), Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested 1: holding that an injured former employees lawsuit was not barred by res judicata where he never authorized the union to represent his interest in a previous lawsuit over the same benefits 2: holding that despite assurances from the insurance company that the insured could file the pol after femas deadline the insured could not collect because the insured was responsible for timely filing 3: holding that the insured could not maintain a lawsuit for additional federal benefits because he had not submitted a sworn proof of loss 4: holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Individual Defendants acted outside the scope of authority because the Complaint alleges wrongful actions,\u201d id. at 395, and that Lockamy and Wood were \u201cnot entitled to sovereign immunity because they were merely employees of SCTC and were not \u2018tribal officials,\u2019 \u201d id. at 397. II Two issues are presented for our resolution on appeal: (1) whether the district court correctly concluded that SCTC was entitled to tribal immunity; and (2) whether the court correctly concluded that the Individual Defendants were also entitled to the protection of tribal immunity. SCTC\u2019s Immunity from Suit Indian tribes are \u201cdomestic dependent nations\u201d with sovereignty over their members and terr Ed.2d 119 (2007); Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 320 (10th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). While the Supreme Court has expressed Holdings: 0: holding that a casino that functioned as an arm of the tribe enjoyed tribal immunity 1: holding that the tribes housing authority was exempt from the adea a general statute because the tribal entity was not just a business but also functioned as an arm of tribal government by providing housing to tribe members 2: holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe 3: recognizing that tribal sovereign immunity extends to agencies and subdivisions of the tribe 4: holding that an inn which was a subentity of the tribe rather than a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal immunity", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the Developer stating that since the moratorium, the Developer \u201chas been effectively forced to leave its ... property economically idle.\u201d The affidavit appears to be based on consultation with land-use experts, but does not explain who they are, what they considered, or what then-opinions are, and the affidavit also appears to admit that agricultural use of the property is possible, but denies that it is \u201ceconomically viable.\u201d In our view, this self-serving affidavit without any explanation of the underlying factual basis for its conclusions does not serve to create a material issue of fact that \u201call reasonable beneficial use\u201d of the property has been deprived by the County\u2019s actions. See Galvan v. City of Albuquerque, 85 N.M. 42, 44-45, 508 P.2d 1339, 1341-42 (Ct.App.1973) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, summary judgment was properly Holdings: 0: holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment 1: holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusoiy facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that summits adoption of the facts set forth in mitchells brief was admissible 3: holding that affidavits must set forth facts admissible in evidence and explain its conclusions 4: holding affidavits must include competent evidence and affidavits are not competent if they fail to show a basis for actual person knowledge or if they state conclusions without the support of evidentiary facts", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "activities that Congress may regulate as part of its commerce power: First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce____ Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may only come from intrastate activities .... Finally, Congress\u2019 commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (internal citations omitted). As in Lopez, the first and second categories are not relevant to defendant\u2019s constitutional challenge to the statute. See id. at 559, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (<HOLDING>). The prohibition on violence for the purpose Holdings: 0: holding the first two categories inapplicable 1: holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing 2: holding frady inapplicable 3: holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer 4: recognizing first two exceptions", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "remedies should be excused because he was transferred to another facility. Lindsey does not contend that there were any problems at the new facility that prevented him from filing grievances regarding the incident at the Coastal Bend Detention Center and has not alleged how his transfer otherwise impeded his ability to file a grievance within the required time period. See Dillon, 596 F.3d at 267-68. He furthermore has not shown that he should be excused from exhaustion because he was denied access to an adequate law library. He does not set forth any specific legal materials that were withheld or articulate how a deficient law library or lack of legal resources prevented him from filing a timely grievance. Cf Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Lindsey did not properly exhaust Holdings: 0: holding that an actual injury consists of some specific instance in which an inmate was actually denied access to the courts 1: holding that denial of access to carbon paper and reproduction equipment and denial of facetoface access to other inmates did not deprive an inmate of his right of access to the courts 2: holding that inmates must demonstrate an actual injury 3: recognizing that prisoner alleging inadequate access to courts must show how inadequate access caused actual injury 4: holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must show an actual injury", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as a trust account is necessary to promote the ends of justice. We find particular support for our holding in the rule stated in Turcotte v. Trevino, 499 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref\u2019d n.r.e.), on remand, 544 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1976), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 564 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.1978). In that case, the Texas Court of Appeals wrote: \u201cWhere one having the right to accept or reject a transaction takes and retains benefits thereunder, he ordinarily ratifies the transaction, is bound by it, and cannot avoid its obligation or effect by taking a position inconsistent with it at a later time.\u201d 499 S.W.2d at 712. Although the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Turcotte\u2022 decision, it left this basic rule intact. See Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d at 685-86 (<HOLDING>). We believe appellant\u2019s actions fall within Holdings: 0: holding that it is a fundamental rule of law that a person cannot take any beneficial interest under a transaction and then adopt a position even if well founded that would defeat the transaction 1: recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step 2: holding that a transaction disregarded for lack of economic substance  a nonvaluationrelated ground  nevertheless may be subject to a valuation misstatement penalty because a transaction that lacks economic substance generally reflects an arrangement in which the basis of the property was misvalued in the context of the transaction and that congress intended to penalize such transactions 3: holding that the transaction must be fair and equitable and in good faith 4: recognizing that a transaction that lacks economic substance generally reflects an arrangement in which the basis of the property was misvalued in the context of the transaction", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 644, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1948)); see also Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1563 (11th Cir.1988) (explaining grant or denial of equitable relief lies in the discretion of the district court). Mandamus, which is an extreme form of equitable relief, \u201cis a writ designed to require an official to perform an act required by law.\u201d See Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 904 F.2d 585, 587 (11th Cir.1990). Although the writ of mandamus was abolished by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b), federal courts \u201cmay issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1651 (2000); see also Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1385 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to their powers under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion 1: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances 2: recognizing the writ of mandamus may issue to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the failure to carry out a ministerial task 3: recognizing that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is itself generally a matter of discretion 4: recognizing that laches is a proper ground for refusing to issue a writ of mandamus", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in order to obtain or thwart collateral litigation matters, like those contained in motions for discovery sanctions, motions for protective orders, or motions for sanctions under Rule 1-341.\u201d Id. As did the Folder court, we too have reviewed the text of Rule 2\u2014313 (f) and the pertinent meeting minutes of the Rules Committee. We conclude, as did that court, that a decision dispositive of a claim or defense is one intrinsic to the underlying action. Further, the decision must \u201cactually and formally dispose of the claim or defense,\u201d Shelton v. Kirson, 119 Md.App. 325, 330, 705 A.2d 25, 27 (1998). An order denying a motion to quash a subpoena issued by the Commission is not such a decision. See Unnamed Attorney v. Attorney Grievance Comm\u2019n, 303 Md. 473, 480-81, 494 A.2d 940, 943-44 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the court\u2019s denial of the motion to Holdings: 0: holding that in a noncore proceeding a bankruptcy court may enter final orders with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding 1: holding that a notice of appeal filed in an adversary proceeding could not appeal the main proceeding 2: holding the state may appeal orders of dismissal that have the same effect as orders quashing an information 3: recognizing that notwithstanding the finality of such orders for appeal purposes the underlying investigative proceeding persists 4: holding that finality must be determined in light of the unique nature of bankruptcy procedure and not with blind adherence to the rules of finality", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Moore also took steps to try 5 F.2d at 550; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS \u00a7 237). To the contrary, Morganti readily conceded that it always maintained sufficient funding for critical path work and that there was never a time when it lacked sufficient funding to proceed. Mr. Menefee, Morganti\u2019s contract administrator, testified that Morganti never allowed its difficulties with getting money for CPC\u2019s and modifications to affect critical path work, and that Morganti always provided funding necessary to pay the subcontractors. In fact, Morganti conceded on summary judgment that the FBOP\u2019s payment errors never delayed Morganti. Thus, money was not the source of its inability to complete the contract work on time. D.W. Sandau Dredging, 96-1 BCA \u00b6 28,064, at 140,161-62, 1995 WL 739023 (<HOLDING>). Morganti argues that its ability to perform Holdings: 0: holding that performance may be valid acceptance 1: holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination 2: holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party 3: holding that continued performance is relevant to materiality where contractors performance failures were not caused by financial situation 4: holding that complete performance of contract constituted acceptance", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was no appeal here \u2014 interlocutory or otherwise \u2014 relating to the district court\u2019s declaration of mistrial. Therefore, \"the action occasioning retrial\u201d must be the declaration of mistrial itself. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir.) (noting that, where no party appealed declaration of mistrial, \"there is no dispute that following the mistrial ..., the government had seventy days in which to retry the defendant\u201d), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1002, 115 S.Ct. 515, 130 L.Ed.2d 422 (1994). 4 . Compare United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that \"[t]he length of an exclusion for complexity must be ... limited in time\u201d), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1671, 134 L.Ed.2d 776 (1996), and United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) with United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, Holdings: 0: holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time 1: holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation 2: holding that an ends of justice continuance may be appropriate where the case is unusual or complex 3: holding that a seven week suspension of the speedy trial clock was warranted under the ends of justice provision where the chief prosecutor was ill and new assistant prosecutors required time to prepare for trial 4: holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Id. We agree with the reasoning in these cases. We thus hold that wills should be construed by the law as it existed when the testator died, thereby excluding adopted children as beneficiaries unless the will indicates an intent to include adopted children. In the instant case, the probate court determined that Jenkins did not intend to include his daughters\u2019 adopted children as beneficiaries of his testamentary trust. In making its determination, the probate court considered the law as it existed in 1944, when Jenkins executed his will. At that time, Colorado law presumed that adopted children were not included as beneficiaries unless the testator expressly included the term \u201cadopted children\u201d in the will. See Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P.2d 472 (1945) (<HOLDING>). The law presumes that Jenkins knew the law in Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child 1: holding that when a testator makes provision for a child or children of another person an adopted child of the other person is not included unless other language in the will makes it clear that the adopted child was intended to be included 2: holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute 3: holding that the trial court had erred in imposing an obligation to pay child support when clear and convincing evidence established that the husband was not the father of the child 4: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\"include but not limited to\u201d and \"etc.\u201d (Def. Opp. at 8:15-9:3; Aug.2000 Mot. at 3:11-16, 8:8-9:11). Defendants\u2019 final argument that the Government was not misled by the non-inclusion of I & M does not impact whether the statement was, nevertheless, false. Rather, if true, this factor would go towards the materiality of the statement or damages. Thus, this argument will be discussed later in section II.D.3 of this Order. 20 . To the extent that Plaintiff bases her claim on 31 U.S.C. \u00a7 3729(a)(2), it should be noted that there is a \"double falsehood\u201d requirement. See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 2003 WL 22048255, *1 (D.Mass. Aug. 22, 2003); see also United States ex rel. Bustamante v. United Way/Crusade of Mercy, Inc., 2000 WL 690250, *4 (N.D.Ill. May 24, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in addition to the elements of a prima Holdings: 0: holding that the elements of a claim under  3729a2 are 1 that the defendant made used or caused to be made or used a record or statement to get a claim against the united states paid or approved 2 the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent and 3 the defendant knew that the record or statement and the claim were false or fraudulent emphasis added 1: holding that both lanham act false advertising claim and a false advertising claim made under section 349 or section 350 require a showing that the advertisement was false or misleading 2: holding that for a section 10b violation the sec must prove that the defendant in connection with the purchase or sale of securities made a materially false statement or omitted a material fact with scienter and that the plaintiffs reliance on the defendants action caused injury to the plaintiff 3: holding that a conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or false statement may be used to impeach the credibility of a defendant who chooses to testify 4: holding that a statement is not prepared in anticipation of litigation unless either the defendant had retained counsel or plaintiffs counsel had notified the defendant or his insurer of his retention before the statement was made emphasis added", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of use of the parish properties to determine whether they qualify for tax exemptions under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, and contends that the properties here were insufficiently used for religious worship or religious purposes by the Archdiocese to permit such exemptions. The Archdiocese asserts that such an examination by the court would amount to an impermissible intrusion into the religious activities of the Roman Catholic Church, and thus would violate the Church\u2019s First Amendment protections under the United States Constitution and similar protections under the New Jersey Constitution. N.J. Const., art. I H1\u00cd 3 and 4. I. Inquiry Into Religious Use In determining whether a religious organization is entitled to a tax exemption for its property, the courts in New Jerse 92, 437 A.2d 1291 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 also Holdings: 0: holding that denial of tax exemption for vacant lot held by church for no current purpose or any future exempt purpose did not violate first amendment 1: holding that requiring church to make contributions to workers compensation fund opposed by such church did not violate first amendment 2: holding that denial of tax exemption for part of church property that was not necessary for occupancy and enjoyment of church did not violate first amendment 3: holding that irs examination of corporate minute books of a church to determine whether it qualified for tax exemption was not unconstitutional interference with religious affairs of the church under the first amendment 4: holding that tax exemption for church property does not violate establishment clause", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "state rebuts the defendant\u2019s claim by showing no government inducement. 7 . See e.g., Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646,48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); State v. Keating, 551 S.W.2d 589, 592-93 (Mo. banc 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071, 98 S.Ct. 1255, 55 L.Ed.2d 775 (1978). 8 . See United States v. Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044, 1047-48 n. 3 (5th Cir.1980) (uncontradicted testimony of both defendant and unwitting government agent that the agent pressured de fendant into making bribery payments was insufficient to establish entrapment as a matter of law since \u201cthe jury could have rejected their testimony\u201d). 9 . But cf. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373, 78 S.Ct. 819, 821, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958) (<HOLDING>). DONNELLY, Judge, dissenting. In State v. Holdings: 0: holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense 1: holding that if the undisputed testimony of the prosecutions witnesses establishes or corroborates an entrapment defense entrapment is established as a matter of law 2: holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established 3: holding that we must sustain legal sufficiency or noevidence challenge if record shows that evidence conclusively establishes opposite of vital fact and matter is established as matter of law if reasonable people could not differ as to conclusion to be drawn from evidence 4: recognizing that in any criminal trial the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is central", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2104, 85 L.Ed.2d at 466. The Benchimol Court declined to impose an implied obligation to enthusiastically advocate for the recommended sentence under the federal plea bargain rule. Id. at 455, 105 S.Ct. at 2105, 85 L.Ed.2d at 466 (\"But our view of Rule 11 ([c]) is that it speaks in terms of what the parties in fact agree to, and does not suggest that such implied-in-law terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals have any place under the Rule.\"). By contrast, long after Benchimol was decided in 1985, we reiterated the prosecutor\u2019s obligation under Iowa law is to not only recite the recommended sentence but also indicate that it is \" 'worthy of the court\u2019s acceptance.\u2019 \u201d Bearse, 748 N.W.2d at 216 (quoting Horness, 600 N.W.2d at 299-300 (<HOLDING>)). The Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure Holdings: 0: recognizing that the nature of the therapistpatient relationship gives rise to a duty  to refrain from  causing emotional or mental harm to the patient 1: recognizing prosecutors implicit obligation to refrain from suggesting more severe sentencing alternatives 2: recognizing a previous reprimand was an aggravating circumstance warranting more severe discipline 3: holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors 4: holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Persons at 1091; Stephanie I. Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally III in Negligence Actions, 93 Yale L.J. 153, 157-58, 169 (1983). 18 Ellis, Tort Responsibility of Mentally Disabled Persons at 1084-85; Splane, Tort Liability of the Mentally III at 156 n.20. 19 In Payne v. Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 264, 270, 260 N.W.2d 386 (1977), the court said: It was not too long ago that hospitals for the mentally ill were known as asylums for the insane. Emphasis was (S.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 412 S.E.2d 417 (S.C. 1991) (observing that for subjective standard to apply, the plaintiffs mental capacity must be diminished to a degree that makes the plaintiff totally unable to appreciate danger); Galindo v. TMT Transp., Inc., 733 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (<HOLDING>); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Appleton, Holdings: 0: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness 1: holding that an injured plaintiff with a diminished mental capacity that does not amount to total insanity can be found contributorily negligent but nonetheless should be held to a subjective standard of care 2: holding that standard of care need not be listed separately in report when same standard applies to each health care provider 3: holding employers to an ordinary prudence standard of care 4: holding that ordinary standard of care determines whether a mentally disabled plaintiff can be contributorily negligent", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "195 Cal. App.4th 414, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 616, 618 (Cal.App.2011), Division 3 of California\u2019s Fourth District Court of Appeal, agreed with Mendez and disagreed with Ramirez, stating that it \u201cperceive[d] no sound basis to distinguish Graham\u2019s reasoning where a term of years beyond the juvenile\u2019s life expectancy is tantamount to an LWOP term.\u201d The California Supreme Court recently granted review of these decisions. See People v. Caballero, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 250 P.3d 179 (2011), People v. Ramirez, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 255 P.3d 948 (2011), and People v. Nunez, 128 Cal. Rptr.3d 274, 255 P.3d 951 (2011). Unlike California, Georgia courts are, so far, consistent in their view that Graham is not implicated in a term-of-years sentence. See Adams v. State, 288 Ga. 695, 707 S.E.2d 359 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Middleton v. State, 313 Ga.App. 193, 721 Holdings: 0: holding that stiffer penalties for cocaine base transactions are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and therefore do not violate eighth amendment 1: holding that probation is not a sentence 2: holding that sentence of mandatory twentyfive years followed by life on probation for aggravated molestation of a fouryearold child does not implicate categorical eighth amendment restriction under graham nor is it grossly disproportionate for particular crime 3: holding that the eighth amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime 4: holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of 210 months\u2019 imprisonment. Under the post -Booker advisory guideline regime, the district court must still consider the applicable guideline range of 188\u2014 235 months, but it may vary from the range if it concludes reasonably that factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a) warrant a different sentence. Even under the mandatory guidelines, however, the district court was able to consider the \u00a7 3553(a) factors in determining where within the mandatory range Brooks should be sentenced. That the court elected a sentence of 210 months from within the range of 188 to 235 months gives us confidence that the added flexibility of the post-Booker regime would not have led the district court to impose a more favorable sentence. See United States v. Perez-Ramirez, 415 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Brooks has not raised any argument, after Holdings: 0: holding that even without booker constitutional error in the district courts application of the guidelines there could be nonconstitutional error where the court applied the guidelines in a mandatory fashion 1: holding that because the district court did not fully use its discretion to depart from the guidelines when determining the proper range or in imposing the term of sentence sentence was 2 months above sentencingrange minimum any booker error was harmless 2: holding that where district court left unused some of its discretion to impose a more favorable sentence nonconstitutional booker error was harmless 3: holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless 4: holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "a remand\u2014 will the employer finally be able to argue to this Court that the full commission correctly held Bone\u2019s claim was not compensable back in June of 2008. Because I believe the issue of compensability was finally decided by the full commission and the circuit court, sitting in an appellate capacity, could not thwart further appellate review by ordering a remand, I would find the order appealable under section 1-23-390. See Mungo, 383 S.C. at 278, 678 S.E.2d at 829 (\u201cAlthough the circuit court remanded the issue of the precise damages to be awarded to Claimant, the single commissioner would have no choice but to award some damages to Claimant. Accordingly, the circuit court\u2019s order constitutes a final decision and is appealable.\u201d); Brown, 366 S.C. at 387-88, 622 S.E.2d at 551 (<HOLDING>). Nothing in Charlotte-Meeklenburg impacts this Holdings: 0: holding circuit courts order that apportionment was required was final and appealable even though the court remanded for a determination of the amount of apportionment due 1: holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order 2: holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment 3: holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages 4: holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "for Indemnity. H. Economic Loss Doctrine Defendant argues that an essential element of each of Plaintiffs tort-based causes of action is an injury or damage proximately caused by Defendant\u2019s tortious conduct. Defendant asserts that for each tort-based cause of action, the economic loss rule bars recovery because Plaintiff has not put forth evidence showing tangible, physical injury to the Wellfield. Under Ohio law, the economic loss rule \u201cprevents recovery in tort of damages for purely economic losses. The well-established general rule is that a plaintiff who has suffered only economic loss due to another\u2019s negligence has not been injured in a manner which is legally cognizable or compensable.\u201d Ashtabula River Corp. Grp. II v. Conrail, Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 981, 987 (N.D.Ohio 2008) (<HOLDING>). In other words, \u201cindirect economic damages Holdings: 0: holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed 1: holding plaintiffs public nuisance claim was barred by the economic loss rule because it wasnt actually a landowner of the site and thus there was no allegation of harm to any property 2: holding that economic loss rule barred claim for breach of fiduciary duty where plaintiffs claim arose solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the parties 3: holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property  damage claims 4: holding there was no claim and no basis for a claim of surprise concerning allegation of a former conviction", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "However, the cases plaintiffs point us to do not support their argument on appeal. First, in most of these cases, the Circuit Courts were focused on the effect of Lingle on their Takings Clause precedent, not their substantive due process case law. See, e.g., Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1277-82 (Fed. Cir.2009) (discussing how the Agins inquiry is now obsolete after Lingle and examining Lingle\u2019s effect on regulatory takings cases). Second, the Circuit Courts that did find Lingle affected their substantive due process jurisprudence had earlier precedent holding that all property rights-based substantive due process claims were preempted or supplanted by the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 852 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty., Holdings: 0: holding that a foreign citizen with no substantial connections to the us has no claim under the fifth amendments takings clause 1: recognizing  1983 substantive due process claim 2: holding that prior circuit precedent that the fifth amendments takings clause subsumes or preempts substantive due process claims was undermined by lingle 3: holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed 4: holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "incriminating. Id. at 36, 120 S.Ct. 2037. In that case, the production itself communicated a \u201cstatement[ ] of fact\u201d; it proved that the documents existed, were authentic, and were in the custody of the producer. Id. at 36,120 S.Ct. 2037 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There, the Supreme Court held that the physical production was a violation of the Fifth Amendment because the preparation of the produced documents was the only means through which the government obtained the evidence which led to the indictment. Id. at 42-43,120 S.Ct. 2037. This case, however, is more akin to the physical trait cases. Tattoos which are openly visible on the body are physical traits, as are voice, appearance, and handwriting. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1815-16 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant need not take the stand to be able to show the jury the tattoos on his hands which were an openly visible physical characteristic 1: holding that an officer stopped the defendant when he ordered the defendant to take his hand out of his pocket 2: holding that the jury need not be specifically instructed to find whether there is a connection between the defendant the weapon and the crime 3: holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy 4: holding that confession was coerced because it was prompted by a credible threat of physical violence where official told defendant that defendant was in danger of physical harm at hands of other inmates and offered to protect defendant in exchange for a confession", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "since Elkin lacked standing to file a complaint for support, this action must be dismissed. Accordingly, we remand this action to the trial court directing that the order of support be vacated and the complaint for support be dismissed on the basis of lack of standing. We further direct that Mother be reimbursed any monies paid as a result of the existing support order. \u00b6 12 We further note that even though Mother has the parental duty of supporting her child \u201cuntil [her] child reaches 18 or graduates from high school, whichever event occurs later,\u201d Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 529, 616 A.2d 628, 633 (1992), she does not have to be subjected to her child dictating how or to whom the support should be allocated. See Oeler by Gross v. Oeler, 527 Pa. 532, 534-36, 594 A.2d 649, 650 (1991) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 13 In the present case, it is clear from Holdings: 0: holding that trial court properly terminated fathers obligation to support his seventeenyearold daughter who refused to live with father but instead chose to reside in her own apartment after her mother moved out of state where daughter offered no justifiable reason for not living with her father daughter only contended that her stepmother was too neat for her and that she wanted to live closer to her friends 1: holding that certifications of parent and child regarding her desire to live with her father were sufficient to warrant a plenary hearing 2: holding that daughter had no express authority to sign arbitration agreement for mother where no power of attorney and daughter did not discuss signing the agreement with her mother 3: holding that the applicant was entitled to asylum based on her fear that her daughter will be forced to undergo female genital mutilation because her fear of  being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter is wellfounded 4: holding that the natural father who was incarcerated failed without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with his daughter and noting that he called his daughter once and that he did not attempt mail communication with her despite his awareness that the adoptive parents were represented by counsel and therefore he could have initiated contact through their counsel or the court to communicate with her", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "liens on all three tracts. They then brought suit for breach of contract against PSL and foreclosure against Enterprise Bank. The master did not rule on the claims against PSL but entered money judgments against Enterprise Bank. We hold the master had no authority to enter money judgments in the respondents\u2019 foreclosure actions against Enterprise Bank. The procedures for enforcing a mechanic\u2019s lien are provided by statute, see S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 29-5-10 to -440 (2007 & Supp.2013), and \u201cmust be strictly followed.\u201d Cohen\u2019s Drywall Co. v. Sea Spray Homes, LLC, 374 S.C. 195, 199, 648 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2007). A court cannot depart from the plain language of the statute when enforcing a mechanic\u2019s lien. See Zepsa Constr., Inc v. Randazzo, 357 S.C. 32, 38, 591 S.E.2d 29, 32 (Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>); Shelley Constr. Co. v. Sea Garden Homes, Holdings: 0: holding a party was limited to recovery provided for by the strict terms of the mechanics lien statute 1: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond 2: recognizing that it has long been the rule that a mechanics lien claim may be waived 3: holding that recovery is limited to actual compensatory damages 4: holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court had no jurisdiction. 22 . See, e.g., Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1999); McMaster v. United States, 177 F.3d 936, 939-40 (11th Cir.1999); Cadorette v. United States, 988 F.2d 215, 223 (1st Cir.1993). Leisnoi\u2019s holding that \u201ca third party\u2019s claim of an interest of the United States can suffice if it clouds the plaintiff's title\u201d is inapplicable here because the Levee District asserts its own title interest; it is not asserting a title interest on behalf of the United States. 170 F.3d at 1192. 23 . - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2199, 183 L.Ed.2d 211 (2012). 24 . 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 702. 25 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2409a(a)i 26 . Patchak, 132 S.Ct. at 2205. 27 . Id. at 2210. 28 . Id. at 2207 (internal quotations omitted). 29 . See also Block, 461 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. 1811 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants dominion control and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found emphasis added 1: holding that trespass to try title is the method for determining title to  real property 2: holding that congress intended the qta to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the united states title to real property emphasis added 3: holding that the only method by which an adverse possessor may convey the title asserted by adverse possession is to describe in the instrument of conveyance by means minimally acceptable for conveyancing of realty that which is intended to be conveyed 4: holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court held that, \u201c[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The issue of retroactivity turns on whether the rule is considered procedural or substantive. While substantive rules are automatically applied retroactively, holdings dictating methods of criminal procedure, such as the Apprendi holding, are presumptively non-retroactive. See Rosario v. United States, No. 00 Civ. 9695, 2001 WL 1006641, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.30, 2001); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619-20, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (<HOLDING>). A majority of the courts that have considered Holdings: 0: holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive 1: holding that procedural rules are presumptively nonretroactive 2: holding that belowguidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable 3: holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature 4: holding that sentences within the guideline range are presumptively reasonable", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (<HOLDING>). He adds that \u201cproperty exceeding $20\u201d is an Holdings: 0: holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum 2: holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine 3: holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "argues that the district court correctly determined from the record that postoperative negligence had not been raised at the trial level, i.e., that the theory of postoperative negligence was neither pled in the complaint nor tried by consent, and, consequently, Aills\u2019 closing argument concerning postoperative negligence was improper. The district court found the statement made by Dr. Boemi\u2019s counsel during the sidebar conference \u201cthat opposing counsel\u2019s remarks were improper because of the absence of any basis in the record \u2018that postoperative care was negligent\u2019 and \u2018that it would have made a difference,\u2019 \u201d 990 So.2d at 544, to have sufficiently asserted the legal grounds for his objection with the specificity required by law. We rlando v. Birmingham, 539 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). Here, Dr. Boemi\u2019s objection did not Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties 1: holding an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court to be preserved for appellate review 2: holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review 3: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 4: holding that an issue was not preserved for appellate review because appellants trial objection does not comport with the issue he raised on appeal", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u2014 the \u201csubject to\u201d language. In giving deference to the Secretary\u2019s position, the Court held: The Secretary\u2019s approach rejects a wooden requirement of actual deductions, but in their absence it requires a clear and particularized policy \u2014 one which \u201ceffectively communicates\u201d that deductions will be made under specified circumstances. This avoids the imposition of massive and unanticipated overtime liability ... in situations in which a vague or broadly worded policy is nominally applicable to a whole range of personnel but is not \u201csignificantly likely\u201d to be invoked against salaried employees. Id. at 910. The instant case presents an issue that has not been addressed by the Second Ci L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(<HOLDING>), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition Holdings: 0: holding that an initial denial of leave did not constitute materially adverse action because the plaintiff was ultimately allowed to take the leave without any other consequence to her 1: holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employees status 2: holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview 3: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 4: holding that the employees reference to his mental condition did not constitute the requisite notice of an intent to invoke fmla leave", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974, 96 S.Ct. 2173, 48 L.Ed.2d 798 (1976). See also Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1251-52 (4th Cir.1985) (applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to a Section 1985 conspiracy alleging violation of plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment and due process rights). See also Doherty, 728 F.2d at 339-40 (applying the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine to a Section 1985(2) case alleging a corporate conspiracy to coerce plaintiff-employee to enter nolo contendere plea to federal bribery charges). For public policy reasons, however, the First and Third Circuits have refused to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to Section 1985 cases alleging conspiracies to discriminate on the basis of race or sex. See Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Third Circuit rejected the Holdings: 0: holding the logic of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in antitrust cases does not warrant its extension to civil rights cases 1: recognizing that the preponderance of the evidence is the quantum of proof in civil cases 2: holding that the workproduct doctrine applies in criminal cases because its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital than its role in civil cases 3: holding that the 1992 amendment to article 5 of the maryland declaration of rights permits a six person jury in all cases except criminal cases 4: holding that 60day time limit for notice of appeal in civil cases not 10day limit in criminal cases applies to  2255 proceedings", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that \"[t]he Supreme Court's analysis of the justifications for access to the criminal courtroom apply as well to the civil trial.\u201d Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir.1983) (vacating the lower court's order to seal certain F.T.C. documents filed in the court\u2019s record during a preen-forcement challenge to proposed changes in cigarette testing) (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (noting that historically civil trials have been presumptively open, but declining to decide whether they enjoy a First Amendment right of access because the issue was not before the Court)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984). See, e.g., Smith v. United States Dist. Court, 956 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). 23 . Code of Student Conduct, Miami Holdings: 0: holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case 1: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings 2: holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings 3: holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings 4: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition....\u201d Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for \"the United States District Courts, Rule 4. III. DISCUSSION Defendant requests that the Court reconsider his sentence of 46 months incarceration in light of the fact that the Court sentenced Alicia Gaytan to 38 months of incarceration for related charges. The Court finds that Defendant\u2019s request shall be denied for the reasons described herein. Courts have consistently held that the mere fact that a codefendant receives a lesser sentence than defendant is not a basis for granting relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255. See generally, e.g., Hilbrich v. United States, 371 F.2d 826 (7th Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>); Montalvo v. United States, 174 F.Supp.2d 10, Holdings: 0: holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion 1: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant 2: holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him 3: holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced 4: holding that when the defendant admitted that he pleaded guilty for reasons other than to have the judge who took his plea sentence him the defendant could properly be sentenced by a different judge", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "second-category Lopez power. Marek, 238 F.3d at 318 (footnote omitted) (quoting Photogrammetric Data Services, 103 F.Supp.2d at 882). Other courts have reached similar conclusions, upholding convictions based upon criminal statutes which serve to protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce even though the specific conduct involved arose from intrastate activities. For example, in United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir.1996), the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of a police officer under the Travel Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1952(a) (West 2000), premised upon extortion activity in which the officer escorted his victim, a man he had arrested, to an automatic teller machine to withdraw money in return for being released from custody. Because an interstate networ 9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants stipulation that the gun had moved in interstate commerce was sufficient evidence to support his conviction under 18 usc  922g1 1: holding that because cellular telephones and cellphone id numbers are instrumentalities of interstate commerce protectable under the second category of lopez no further inquiry was necessary to sustain conviction under 18 usca  1029a west 2000 2: holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act 3: holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce 4: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "significantly, whether or not the Justice Department can be said to have been authorized to represent STS residents, this Court finds that the Justice Department did not adequately represent such residents. A finding of inadequate representation is required based upon the above discussion of the limited causes of action and types of relief available to and pursued by the Justice Department in United States v. Connecticut. Since the Justice Department did not seek all of the types of relief which plaintiffs seek in this case, it follows directly that the Justice Department\u2019s representation was inadequate from a res judicata perspective, and that the plaintiffs are therefore not in privity with the United States. See Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 981, 93 S.Ct. 1893, Holdings: 0: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 1: holding that six employees bringing suit under title vii were not in privity with the united states which had brought a previous suit against the same employer because the employees sought a type of relief which the united states had not sought 2: holding that in statute authorizing suits against united states limits time period in which such suits may be brought united states retains its sovereign immunity as to any suits brought outside of that time period therefore court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over suit against united states that is barred by statute of limitations 3: holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law 4: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "taken away by government regulation\u201d) (quoting Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 58 Haw. 432, 571 P.2d 328, 329 (1977)); Life of the Land, Inc. v. City Council of City & County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 390, 606 P.2d 866, 902 (1980) (\"The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on a change of position on the part of a land developer by substantial expenditure of money in connection with his project in reliance, not solely on existing zoning laws or on good faith expectancy that his development will be permitted, but on official assurance on which he has a right to rely that his project has met zoning requirements, that necessary approvals will be forthcoming in due course, and he may safely proceed with the project.\u201d); Denning v. County of Maui, 52 Haw. 653, 485 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 11 . See Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 1: holding that a person has standing to bring suit under the civil rights act if she or he can show that she or he was punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities 2: holding that an individual can waive any process to which he or she has a right 3: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 4: holding that a zoning estoppel plaintiff must show that he or she has been given assurances of some form by the county that his or her proposed construction met zoning requirements and that he or she had a right lo rely on such assurances", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (finding that a prosecutor\u2019s appearance at a probable cause hearing is \u201cconnected with the initiation and conduct of a prosecution, particularly where the hearing occurs after arrest ...\u201d (emphasis added)); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994) (\u201cAccording to the complaint, the interrogation and payments took place early in the investigation, while the prosecutors were just beginning to piece events together. Thus there cannot be absolute immunity.\u201d); Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362, 368 (7th Cir.1992) (finding that because the alleged prosecutorial acts took place after conviction, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity); White, 369 Ill.App.3d. at 772, 308 Ill.Dec. 518, 861 N.E.2d 1083 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the temporal remoteness of the Holdings: 0: holding that the timing of the alleged actions of the prosecutor supported the courts conclusion that the prosecutors actions were associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process instead of the investigatory phase because the conduct occurred one month before plaintiffs trial and more than five years after the grand jury indicted plaintiff 1: holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase 2: holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase 3: holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury 4: holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that bar does not extend to his requests for withholding of removal or CAT protection. We conclude, however, that because the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, Aung did not meet his burden of establishing his eligibility for these forms of relief. See Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2004) (reviewing an adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence). There was an inconsistency in Aung\u2019s testimony regarding the date he joined the National League for Democracy (\u201cNLD\u201d) and there was an inconsistency as to whether Aung participated in NLD political activities during his foreign business travels. Because Aung claimed persecution based on his political beliefs, these inconsistencies go to the heart of his claim. See id. (<HOLDING>). PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. ** This Holdings: 0: holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum 1: holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination 2: holding that in the absence of an adverse credibility determination the court must accept petitioners testimony as true 3: holding that the ijs adverse credibility determination must be upheld so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the claim of persecution emphasis added 4: holding that the reviewing court must accept the adverse credibility finding so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the petitioners claim of persecution internal quotation marks omitted first alteration in original", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "decision on the basis that \u201cno evidence was presented\u201d by means of which the director could have found that the employee was physically capable of cutting cores on June 18,1993. With this conclusion and the inherent requirement it weaves into an otherwise. unambiguous statute, we disagree. Had the Legislature deemed it necessary to insert into the statute a requirement that an employer present expert medical testimony that at the precise time an offer of light-duty work is tendered by the employer the employee was physically capable of performing that assignment, the Legislature could have done so. Our careful review of the statutory language and our prior decisions in interpretation thereof reveal no such rigid requirement. See Worcester Textile v. McIntosh, 593 A.2d 70, 73 (R.I.1991) (<HOLDING>). Although we agree that there was not an Holdings: 0: holding that under the first amendment speech can be pursuant to a public employees official job duties even though it is not required by or included in the employees job description or in response to a request by the employer 1: holding an employee must be able to perform essential job functions at the time of termination 2: recognizing that medical evidence need not address employees physical capability to perform the particular job offered but rather the capacity of that employee for workrelated activity 3: holding that an administrator need not address each piece of evidence 4: holding that under pwdcra the inability to perform a particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation instead the impairment must significantly restrict an individuals ability to perform at least a wide range of jobs", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to appeal on August 30, 2005. The petitioner\u2019s conviction ther to file his habeas petition. The petitioner filed his habeas petition on June 23, 2008, within that time frame. But to toll the one-year habeas statute, a post-conviction motion must be \u201cproperly filed,\u201d see 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2244(d)(2), and the respondent contends that the petitioner\u2019s application for leave to appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of the post-conviction motion was not properly filed because it was not submitted within 21 days. However, the petitioner filed a delayed application within the time allowed by the state court rules. See Mich. Ct. R. 7.205(F). In Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780 (6th Cir.2003), the Sixth Circuit, applying Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-21, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (<HOLDING>), held that the gap between the trial court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that if a state court grants leave to pursue an out of time appeal the proper period of exclusion for  2244d purposes is all time between the filing of the request to excuse the default and the state courts decision on the merits if it elects to excuse the default 1: holding that the tolling provision in  2244d2 covers the time between a lower state courts decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court 2: holding that the other collateral review provision of  2244d2 encompasses federal review 3: holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted 4: holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "became the only state that requires preser vation of a second breath sample. Because only one state requires this, according to the State, only one manufacturer makes the instrument that captures and preserves a breath sample, and only one company makes the silica gel tubes used for capturing samples. The State also asserts that the second breath sample requirement has prevented New Hampshire \u201cfrom staying current with emerging technology,\u201d such as models that test each of a subject\u2019s breath samples with two different technologies. For all of these reasons, the State contends that requiring the capture and preservation of a suspect\u2019s breath sample for independent testing is no longer required by due process. See Moss v. Superior Court, 857 P.2d 400, 404-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (<HOLDING>), review denied, 868 P.2d 318 (Ariz. 1994). We Holdings: 0: holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court 1: holding that jury trial in civil cases is not so fundamental to the american system of justice as to be required of state courts by due process 2: holding that when neither the petitioners state court briefs nor the state courts decision made any reference to any federal constitutional claim or cited any federal constitutional cases the lack of fundamental error found by the state court was a lack of fundamental error under arizonas state constitution 3: holding that to declare a denial of due process we must find a denial of fundamental fairness 4: holding that because of the reliability and accuracy of the model used by the state to test breath samples neither due process nor fundamental fairness required the state to provide defendants with breath samples", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of twenty years. Given the district court\u2019s recognition of Barrientos-Maldonado\u2019s \u201cvery serious\u201d criminal history, his sentence of fifty-seven months, which is at the low end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, is not unreasonable. Barrientos-Maldonado also challenges his sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, arguing that any fact beyond the mere fact of conviction that justifies increased punishment under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1326(b)(2) must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim is precluded by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), and United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.2000). Contrary to Barrientos-Maldonado\u2019s challenges, Almendarez-Torres remains good law. See Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d at 414 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject BarrientosMaldonado\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that almendareztorres remains the law after apprendi 1: holding that almendareztorres is dispositive in rejecting a sixth amendment apprendi challenge to an 8 usc  1326b2 sentence enhancement 2: holding that apprendi carved out an exception for prior convictions that specifically preserved the holding of almendareztorres 3: holding that almendareztorres was not overruled by apprendi 4: holding that almendareztorres remains good law after apprendi", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "open terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the custom of such transactions.\u201d Id. (citing Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass\u2019n of America, 670 F.Supp. at 499-503). 2 . In Jackson, the Supreme Court rejected the Board\u2019s argument that Jackson could not state a claim for retaliation under Title IX because he is an \"indirect victim,\u201d i.e. the high school females at the Birmingham public schools were the actual victims. Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1507. The Court explained that \"[t]he statute is broadly worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation must also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the original complaint.\u201d Id. The Court noted, however, that if the statute's wording tracked Title VII, then the Court would have accepted the Board's position. See id. (<HOLDING>). Retaliation under Title VII is made unlawful Holdings: 0: recognizing that 42 usc  2000e2a1 provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate because of such individuals race color etc 1: holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc  1983 2: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to  706 of title vii 42 usc  2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc  1981 3: holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc  1983 4: recognizing that title iii enforcement statute 42 usc  12188 which incorporates the remedies of 42 usc  2000a3a does not include money damages", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the defendant in view of ... its financial condition.\u201d Fifth, the instruction told the jury that in fixing punitive damages, it could consider the \u201cnature of defendant\u2019s conduct\u201d and \u201cplaintiffs actual damages.\u201d Haslip recognized the \u201cplaintiffs actual damages\u201d as an important constitutional factor with respect to punitive damages. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-81, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1601-02, 134 L.Ed.2d 809, 829-30 (1996) (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. at 1046, 113 L.Ed.2d at 23). In addition, separate instructions defined \u201cwillful and wanton conduct\u201d and \u201cpreponderance of clear, convincing, and satisf aslip holding and therefore has demonstrated no constitutional or legal error. State ex rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898, 904 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>); Olson v. Nieman\u2019s, Ltd., 579 N.W.2d 299, 316 Holdings: 0: holding we review claim construction de novo on appeal 1: holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo 2: holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo 3: holding that we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo 4: holding that we review constitutional challenges de novo", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and, further, that the incidents in Varon\u2019s claim were isolated and indiscriminate and did not rise to the level of persecution. We agree. We first note that while the 1996 detention and the 2001 telephone threats were on account of Varon\u2019s political opinion, it is less clear whether the 1999 Molotov cock tail incident and the 2002 detention in the forest likewise were motivated by Varon\u2019s actual or imputed political opinion. With respect to the bombing, Var\u00f3n merely speculates that the bomb was thrown at him by a member of the FER and concedes that he was unable to identify who threw the bomb. Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion that the bombing was connected to his political activity. See Silva v. United States Att\u2019y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As to the kidnapping in 2000, Varon\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that where petitioner testified she did not know who fired shots at her ear or why the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the shooting was based on her political opinion 1: holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony purposes where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her social security disability benefits but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not stay in bed all day as she claimed 2: holding that debtor who was separated from her husband and who testified that she would only return to the marital home if her husband vacated the house or died or if she was required to care for him or her adult son there or if the couple reconciled was an abandonment of the marital home as her homestead 3: holding that the elevenyearold victims twentyonemonth delay in reporting her grandfathers inappropriate sexual conduct was adequately explained where the child testified that she did not tell anyone about the incident because her grandfather told her not to tell she did not think anybody was going to believe her and she felt scared and threatened by the defendant 4: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "her primary or secondary attachment figure was abruptly and inappropriately removed from her life. This potential psychological damage was the only alleged incidence of abuse, abandonment or neglect presented at the hearing. After considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court found no legal basis to conclude that depriving M.N.B. of contact with Appellant, someone to whom the child has no legal connection, constitutes the level of abuse needed to support a finding of a dependency. We agree with the trial court that a parent\u2019s decision to deprive a child of contact with someone who has no legal custody or visitation rights vis-\u00e1-vis the child is an inadequate ground upon which to base an adjudication of dependency. Cf. Clock v. Clock, 649 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. A.W., 519 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 2d DCA Holdings: 0: holding the mere act of relocating or separating a child from familiar surroundings by an otherwise fit and proper custodial parent against the childs wishes does not constitute abuse under the statutory definition and therefore does not render the child dependent 1: holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc  523a5 2: holding any person who has supplied necessities to a child may sue and recover from the childs parent for value of the supplies or services furnished to the child 3: holding that abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of the childs home supports conclusion that childs surroundings endanger his physical or emotional wellbeing 4: holding that juvenile court that determined child was not dependent had no jurisdiction to thereafter determine custody of child", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "8 S.W.3d at 638. 14 . See id. at 639. 15 . See Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993); City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.App.\u2014Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed). 16 . See Curbo v. State, 998 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1999, no pet. h.); Little-Tex Insulation Co. v. General Servs. Comm\u2019n, 997 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 1999, pet. filed); C Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 554.002(a), 554.0035. 27 . Id. \u00a7 554.001(4) (emphasis added). 28 . See Thompson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 789 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.1990). 29 . See Bennack Flying Serv., Inc. v. Balboa, 997 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism\u2019d w.o.j.); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72, 86 (Tex.App.\u2014El Paso 1998, pet. denied). 30 . See Curbo, 998 S.W.2d at 344 (<HOLDING>). 31 . See Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Holdings: 0: holding that there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to a grievance procedure 1: holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure 2: holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed 3: holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim 4: holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by Fort Worth officials. The court presumes good faith on the part of the procurement officers at the Corps\u2019 Baltimore District Office, absent proof to the contrary. See T & M Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed.Cir.1999) (\u201c[G]overnment officials are presumed to act in good faith, and \u2018it requires ... proof to induce a court to abandon the presumption of good faith.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 192, 198, 543 F.2d 1298 (1976))). While that presumption may have been shaken by the whistleblower letter related to the actions of the Fort Worth District Office, nothing indicates that officials of the Baltimore District Office have been tainted in the same way. See Chapman Law Firm Co. v. Greenleaf Constr. Co., 490 F.3d 934, 940 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Given the removal of authority from the Fort Holdings: 0: holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith 1: holding that if corrective action is reasonable the court is required to assume that the government will carry out the corrective action in good faith 2: holding failure to take action may have some bearing on good faith 3: holding that this court is required to assume that the jury followed the limiting instructions given by the district court 4: holding that beneficiaries of an alleged will may recover reasonable expenses and attorneys fees when defending a will in good faith", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "No. 146, Ex. C. While the obituary states that Jeanne Decker was defendant John Nelson Decker\u2019s wife of fifty-one years, it establishes nothing more than that. See id. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish that Jeanne Decker was a representative of the estate of her late husband John Nelson Decker or that he had an estate. 2. \u201cSuccessors\u201d Under Rule 25(a), a \u201csuccessor\u201d of the deceased party is also a proper party for substitution. A successor of the deceased party is a \u201cdistributee\u201d of the decedent\u2019s estate if the decedent\u2019s estate has been distributed at the time the motion for substitution has been made. Gronowicz v. Leonard, 109 F.R.D. 624, 626 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (citations omitted); see e.g., Hardy v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 842 F.Supp. 713, 716-717 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>). a. Mary Beth Ciaschi Pethybridge As Holdings: 0: recognizing a fallacy that the wife has  an estate or interest in the husbands lands in his lifetime as she can mortgage as her separate property   1: holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts 2: holding that the deceased defendant trustees wife was a representative of her husbands estate and a proper party for substitution purposes where the wife was the primary distributee of her deceased husbands estate 3: holding that proper forum for debtor to challenge actions of coexecutor of debtors deceased husbands estate was state probate court not bankruptcy court 4: holding the family court properly awarded a wife attorneys fees incurred as the result of her husbands contempt", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "license, noting that the license ordinance \u201chas no .provisions, explicit or implicit, for sentencing\u201d and \u201cin simple and direct, terms, authorizes the city to put out of \u2022 business those businesses used for illegal or immoral purposes\u201d). The court need not decide the issue based on the denial alone, however, because ATM challenges not only the Council\u2019s denial of its license, but also the pre-denial operation of the ordinance itself. ATM has presented sufficient evidence for the court to conclude (at least for a determination of standing) that operation of the ordinance impermissibly and indefinitely delayed ATM\u2019s ability to engage in activity presumptively protected by the First Amendment. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. 2796; Gayesty Theatres, Inc., 719 F.2d at 1552 (<HOLDING>); City of Daleville, Ala., 695 F.Supp. at 1171. Holdings: 0: holding that legislative immunity is not forfeited simply because the activities if unprotected might violate a plaintiffs first amendment rights 1: recognizing the preliminary issue in a first amendment challenge is whether the speech at issue is protected or unprotected 2: holding in a case addressing the revocation of an adult theaters business license that while the citycould prevent the viewing of an obscene videotape it cannot constitutionally pierce the first amendment shield and bar  presumptively protected expression based only on prior unprotected conduct 3: holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct 4: holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trial court allowed Tucker to read the victim\u2019s statement into the record and certified Tucker as \u201can expert in Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner.\u201d {54} We hold that the victim\u2019s statement to the SANE practitioner is testimonial because it falls into the third category of evidence labeled testimonial by Crawford, \u201cstatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.\u201d 541 U.S. at 52,124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {55} We first note that the fact that the SANE practitioner is not a government official does not preclude statements given to her from being testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or.2004) (en bane) (<HOLDING>). However, many cases involving statements Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err in precluding crossexamination of police officer as to statements made during an internal police investigation because the purpose for which such testimony was sought was pure speculation which has no support in the record 1: holding victims statement testimonial where it was elicited in response to structured police questioning pursuant to a police investigation 2: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 3: holding that accusers 911 call initial statement to police upon their arrival at the crime scene and statements made to police a short time later were testimonial 4: holding statements made to a social worker to be testimonial because she was acting as a proxy for the police", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "definition of \u201cfrivolous\u201d in interpreting its own postconviction act. See People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209-12 (2009) (concluding that a petition can be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit \u201conly if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact\u201d). The definitions in Rickert, Neitzke, and Hodges closely track the plain and ordinary meaning of the term \u201cfrivolous.\u201d See Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 913 (2002) (defining \u201cfrivolous\u201d as \u201cof little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact \u201d) (emphasis added). Indeed, those definitions are also consistent with the way we have defined the term \u201cfrivolous\u201d in other contexts. See, e.g., Bond v. Comm\u2019r of Revenue, 691 N.W.2d 831, 839 (Minn.2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we conclude that a petition is Holdings: 0: holding that second state petition for postconviction relief that was dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit was properly filed 1: holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee 2: holding return filled with zeros despite w2 showing considerable income was substantially incorrect or frivolous 3: holding that a plaintiff had no injury in fact and consequently no standing when it had no enforceable contract right against the defendant 4: holding that the taxpayer filed a frivolous return because it had no basis in law or fact", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u2014 affects the FDIC\u2019s ability to function as receiver in the case. The \u201cdisposition of a failed [bank\u2019s] assets ... is one of the quintessential statutory powers of the [FDIC] as a receiver.\u201d Pyramid Constr. Co. v. Wind River Petroleum, Inc., 866 F.Supp. 513, 517 (D.Utah 1994). If an asset sold to a third-party purchaser is subject to dilution in a later judicial proceeding, there would be a substantial chilling effect upon the receiver\u2019s ability to perform its statutory functions. In Pyramid, the court rejected the argument that \u00a7 1821(j) did not apply because a plaintiff sought relief against the receiver\u2019s successor. The plaintiffs argument in Pyramid sounded much like Dittmer\u2019s here \u2014 because the receiver had alread 4, 1993 WL 149084, at *2 (N.D.Cal. April 30, 1993) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Of the many cases Dittmer cites in support of Holdings: 0: recognizing claim against bank receiver 1: holding that the antiinjunction act barred the court from enjoining eviction proceedings in the suffolk county district court fifth district because the court had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs claims under the real estate settlement procedures act 2: holding that a failure to comply with the foreclosure statutes invalidates a foreclosure sale 3: holding that a bank receiver by filing a claim permits challenge to the secured portion of its claim 4: holding that  1821 barred a claim to enjoin a bank and its trustee from conducting a foreclosure sale because enjoining these parties indirectly enjoins the receiver which a district court has no power to do", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "evidence linking any of the 54 nonparty victims to Nevada, but neither did the evidence establish that none of the victims were Nevada residents. This gap in the evidence was critical because the jury heard plaintiffs\u2019 counsel assert that Nevada residents purchased Ford truck models affected by the rollaway problem in disproportionate numbers. Thus, jury members may have assumed that at least some of the 54 nonparty victims lived in Nevada. To remedy the due process violation, we may either remand for a new trial on punitive damages or \u201cchange ... the level of the punitive damages award.\u201d Williams, 127 S.Ct. at 1065. We conclude that a new trial on punitive damages is the proper remedy. See Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors\u2019 Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1027 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). On remand, the district court must explain to Holdings: 0: holding that remittitur is not designed to compensate for excessive verdicts in cases where jury is improperly instructed 1: holding that in excessive force cases the threshold question for the court is whether the officers conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right 2: recognizing that the district court could merge duplicative convictions after the jury verdicts are recorded 3: recognizing validity of these rules and noting that their principal purpose is to prevent fishing expeditions in search of information with which to impeach jury verdicts 4: holding that the sixth amendments right to trial by jury was not violated by eleventoone and tentotwo guilty verdicts in state noncapital cases", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not contest the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.\u201d Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975) (internal citations omitted). The only element in dispute in the instant case is the last element \u2014 defendant argues that the arrest was privileged as a matter of law because it was supported by probable cause. Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d. Cir.2002) (\u201cA \u00a7 1983 claim of false arrest based on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures may not be maintained if there was probable cause for the arrest\u201d); see also Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Cameron v. Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 387 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 1: holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest 2: holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause 3: holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity 4: holding that existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest  quoting bernard v united states 25 f3d 98 102 2d cir 1994", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with, an offense like that at issue in the case; or, as a result of having been a victim of, a witness to, or charged with a crime, could not be fair and impartial to both sides. 2 . The court also asked two-part questions about whether the panel members: were acquainted with other panel members; were currently studying or had previously studied law; had previously served as jurors; had previously served as grand jurors; or were currently or previously involved in crime prevention groups. 3 . Cf. Butler v. City of Camden, 352 F.3d 811, 816 (3d Cir.2003) (noting that the Third Circuit has \"found error and reversed in cases where the district court barred all inquiry into a relevant subject matter designed to elicit a disqualifying prejudice\u201d). 4 . See Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d at 84-85 (<HOLDING>). 5 . In the interim between Swain and Holdings: 0: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government  1: holding that the sca violates the fourth amendment to the extent that it allows government agents to obtain the contents of emails without a warrant 2: holding where 1 the government provided the defendant with all the necessary drugmaking materials 2 the government provided instructions on how to make the drugs and 3 the defendant sought out the materials and help from the undercover government agents the case set the outer limits to which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes but the governments conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation 3: holding that criminal defendants are entitled to obtain for impeachment purposes statements made by government witnesses to government agents that relate to the subject matter of the witnesses direct testimony 4: holding that whether error in failing to ask a question about bias in favor of law enforcement testimony requires reversal hinges on such factors as the importance of the government agents testimony to the case as a whole the extent to which the question concerning the venire persons attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions  the extent to which the credibility of the government agentwitness is put into issue and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by nonagent witnesses internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "whether Essie can make a pri-ma facie case of discrimination. The burden would then shift to Goodman to demonstrate a \u201cneutral explanation\u201d for employing two of his three allocated peremptory challenges to exclude members of the black race. We agree with Essie that her decedent, Jones, would have been entitled to the benefit of Edmonson. Because the rule enunciated in that case involves the extension of a federal right, we believe its fruits are mandated by the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). The question of re-troactivity of Supreme Court decisions wherein a new rule is announced has had a somewhat varied past. Cf., e.g. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding no retroactive application 1: holding mcnally not to be retroactive in habeas corpus proceeding reversed on appeal 2: holding the rule of griffith v kentucky 479 us 314 107 sct 708 93 led2d 649 1987 does not require retroactive application to convictions challenged on habeas corpus 3: holding retroactive application 4: holding on the basis of melendezdiaz v massachusetts  us  129 sct 2527 174 led2d 314 2009 that a certificate of norecord is testimonial", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Grenvik, we may not presume that he was represented. Defendant misperceives the nature of a \u201csilent\u201d record. In each of the cases in which we or the Supreme Court have held that the defendant made a prima facie showing from a silent record, a record of the prior proceeding existed but either made no reference to an attorney or contained documents on which spaces for the name of the defendant\u2019s attorney were left blank. See, e.g., Grenvik, 291 Or at 102; Riggins, 180 Or App at 532; State v. Manfredonia, 105 Or App 537, 539, 805 P2d 738 (1991). In other words, the record existed, but its silence on the subject of the defendant\u2019s representation constituted circumstantial evidence from which the court could infer that the defendant was unrepresented. See Manfredonia, 105 Or App at 540 (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, the record of proceedings in Holdings: 0: holding that there is an inference from the existence of a blank for the name of defendants lawyer and from the absence of any evidence to the contrary that defendant was not represented by counsel 1: holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty 2: holding that where the record shows defendant was represented by counsel and the conviction is valid on its face the defendant is precluded from attempting to undermine the validity of that conviction by collateral attack 3: holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity 4: holding that defendant was denied counsel even though his lawyer asked another defendants lawyer to take notes or whatever in the defendants lawyers temporary absence", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conducts a lawful traffic stop and has been told by a reliable informant that the driver of the stopped vehicle is transporting a stash of illegal drugs, the officer has a reasonable fear that a passenger in the vehicle is armed and dangerous if that passenger disobeys the officer\u2019s command to keep his hands in plain view and instead reaches back toward his waistband in a motion that is consistent with an attempt to retrieve a weapon. See United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C.Cir.2001) (\u201c[E]ven though a single factor might not itself be sufficiently probative of wrongdoing to give rise to a reasonable suspicion [justifying a Teiry stop], the combination of several factors \u2014 especially when viewed through the eyes of an experienced officer \u2014 may.\u201d); see also id. at 61-62 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the District Court properly denied Holdings: 0: holding that passenger conduct can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion 1: recognizing a defendants giving of evasive answers when asked what he was doing in the area as a factor establishing reasonable suspicion 2: recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion 3: holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 4: holding that a nervous and possibly furtive demeanor was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "4) that Petitioners were treated differently than others; and 5) that the Commission abused its discretion by finding no mitigating circumstances. Because we conclude that the Commission\u2019s proceedings unconstitutionally commingled prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, we do not discuss Petitioners\u2019 other arguments. Discussion Our Supreme Court in Lyness v. State Board of Medicine, 529 Pa. 535, 605 A.2d 1204 (1992), held that a violation of due process occurs when an administrative board, which initiates a professional licensing prosecution, issues the ultimate adjudication in the case. Due process protection is not limited to the revocation of professional occupational licenses. See e.g. Brewster v. Department of Transportation, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 277, 503 A.2d 497 (1986) (<HOLDING>). In determining what process is due, the Holdings: 0: holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity 1: holding that age disclosed on a drivers license constituted an admission where the party swore to the truth of the statements made in the license application 2: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 3: recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution 4: holding that the commonwealth cannot revoke a drivers license without due process required by the constitution", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "were neglected and placed them in the temporary custody of CCDCFS. The subsequent motion filed by CCDCFS was a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody, filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413 and 2151.414. Such proceedings are governed by Juv.R. 34, which specifically provides that: {\u00b6 58} \u201c \u2018Hearings to determine whether temporary orders regarding custody should be modified to orders for permanent custody shall be considered dispositional hearings and need not be bifurcated.\u2019 Juv.R. 34(1). {\u00b6 59} \u201cBecause the hearing regarding the motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody was a dispositional hearing, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, Juv.R. 29 did not apply.\u201d Id. at \u00b6 6-9. See also In re Lakes, 149 Ohio App.3d 128, 2002-Ohio-3917, 776 N.E.2d 510, at \u00b6 34 (<HOLDING>). {\u00b6 60} In the instant case, Juv.R. 29(D) was Holdings: 0: holding the trial court was not required to engage in a colloquy with a parent in an rc 2151414 proceeding    such as that required by juvr 29 at adjudicatory hearings 1: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 2: holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion 3: holding that trial court could take judicial notice of the contents of the court files to the extent it considered previous court orders evidence admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule and testimony and evidence admitted at any previous adjudicatory proceedings such as when the children were determined to be dependent 4: holding that consistent with due process telephone hearings may be conducted to resolve interstate unemployment compensation claims because abolition of such hearings would not materially reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations and such hearings are a reasonable means of conserving fiscal and administrative resources", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "uniformly rejected attempts to abrogate pursuant to other Article I powers. See Fed. Mar. Comm\u2019n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749-50, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (\u201cCongress, pursuant to its Article I powers, cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity ....\u201d); Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (\u201cCongress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States\u2019 Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.\u201d); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (\u201cCongress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States\u2019 sovereign immunity.\u201d); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) (<HOLDING>); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65, 72, 116 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the patent clause of article i 1: holding that congress could abrogate the eleventh amendment pursuant to the commerce clause 2: holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity 3: holding that congress did not properly abrogate states eleventh amendment immunity from suits under the patent act 4: holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under  5 of the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on Virginia\u2019s recognized list. d. Specific Facts Can Give Rise to a Special Relationship As mentioned supra, the absence of one of the enumerated special relationships recognized by the Virginia Supreme Court does not end the analysis. \u201c[PJarents, students, and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from foreseeable harm.\u201d Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 610 (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983)). Even without recognizing one of the special relationships alleged by Doe, the particular facts alleged in a case can give rise to a special relationship. Id. at 609; see also Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 107, 540 S.E.2d at 139 (<HOLDING>). For instance, in Burdette v. Marks, the Holdings: 0: recognizing special circumstances exception 1: holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school 2: holding that a special relationship may arise from the factual circumstances of a particular case 3: holding that a duty of care may arise out of a contractual relationship between two parties 4: recognizing the existence of the special relationship", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "arbitration those judicial remedies that the drafting party with superior bargaining power is likely to need, while providing no such exemption for the non-drafting party with inferior bargaining power. See Rivera v. American General Financial Services, Inc., 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6\u00b6 53-54, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d at 818-19; Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, \u00b6 32, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d at 907-10. By contrast, an arbitration agreement that contains a bilateral carve-out that explicitly excludes from mandatory arbitration a certain set of claims is not substantively unconscionable, even if the party with superior bargaining power is more likely to assert the excluded claims in a judicial forum. See Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2016-NMSC-035, \u00b6 21, 385 P.3d at 624 (<HOLDING>). Hatton marshals three arguments for Holdings: 0: holding that an arbitration agreement between a lender and a borrower that included a bilateral exception for claims less than 10000 was not substantively unconscionable even if one party is substantively more likely to bring small claims actions   1: holding that based upon the facts presented the arbitration provisions restricting or banning class actions are substantively unconscionable 2: holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement 3: holding unconscionable arbitration provision that applied to all claims brought by borrower in reverse mortgage contract but not claims brought by the drafting party the lender 4: holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "prosecution has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that Scheetz\u2019s continued representation will cause him to be an unsworn witness that will impair the fact finding process or prejudice the prosecution. 2. Prosecution rebuttal witness Melton also challenges Judge Scoles\u2019s conclusion that Scheetz must be disqualified from representing Melton because he may be called as a prosecution rebuttal witness. The applicable Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct provides: Rule 32:3.7. Lawyer as witness (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) disqualifica 888, 891-92 (2005) (<HOLDING>); Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., 356 Ark. 617, 158 Holdings: 0: holding that disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in state law must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party 1: holding that evidence that defendant plaintiffs former client consistently failed to pay other lawyers was relevant to prove the element of intent to defraud 2: holding that jurisdiction exists for determining if disputed facts are material 3: holding under georgia rule of professional conduct 37a that party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts 4: holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness where the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and where there is no other evidence available to prove those facts", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and the creditor is free to foreclose upon the case\u2019s conclusion without violating the discharge injunction. Johnson, 501 U.S. at 84, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (\u201c[A] bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim-namely, an action against the debtor in personam\u2014 while leaving intact another \u2014 namely, an action against the debtor in rem.\u201d). Any deficiency that remains after the creditor forecloses on its liens and sells the property continues to exist, but is an uncollectible debt. Thus, following the discharge, the debt becomes nonrecourse debt. Id. at 86, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (\u201cInsofar as the mortgage interest that passes through a Chapt ll.2008) (finding discharge a necessary prerequisite to permanency of lien avoidance); In re Lilly, 378 B.R. 232, 236-37 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2007) (<HOLDING>). The court respectfully declines to reach the Holdings: 0: holding that where there was no value in the collateral to secure the claim after application of section 506a creditor did not hold a secured claim and therefore lacked basis for asserting rights under 11 usc  1325a5 1: holding that by virtue of section 1325a5 holder of secured claim retains the lien until the underlying debt is paid in full 2: holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 3: holding that operation of state law requiring lien holder to renew lien in state court was not stayed by section 362 because extension  simply allows the holder of a valid lien to maintain the status quo  a policy not adverse to bankruptcy law but rather in complete harmony with it 4: holding that the lien bond releases the property from the lien but the lien is then secured by the bond", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the stop of Johnson\u2019s vehicle had not been converted to an impoundment, the mobility requirement of the automobile exception was satisfied. In conclusion, the searching officers had probable cause to believe that defendant\u2019s backpack contained evidence of a crime, and the vehicle in which it was found was mobile when stopped. Therefore, the search was justified by the automobile exception. Affirmed. 1 Defendant does not appeal from two additional convictions for manufacture of a controlled substance and two further convictions for possession of a controlled substance. 2 Defendant does not contend that, because he had no interest in the vehicle, there was insufficient evidence to connect him with the contraband in the trunk. Cf. State v. Herrin, 323 Or 188, 194, 915 P2d 953 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 Therefore, cases addressing the mobility of Holdings: 0: holding that officers lacked objective probable cause to search the defendants car and belongings where drug paraphernalia was found in possession of passengers with no interest in the vehicle and there was no reason to believe that either passenger had additional property with her 1: holding that defendants suspect activity in the trunk and passenger compartment of his car immediately after he engaged in an apparent drug sale established probable cause to search the vehicle for drugs and drug money 2: holding that the officers examination revealed that there was probable cause to believe that the property was stolen 3: holding that officers had objective probable cause to search the pocket of a jacket found on the seat of the defendants truck where the discovery of marijuana in two different locations in the truck combined with the defendants possession of marijuana reasonably led officers to believe that other caches would be found elsewhere in the vehicle 4: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The E/C also argues that the JCC erred by reserving jurisdiction on \u201cclaims\u201d for workers\u2019 compensation benefits that were not listed on any petition for benefits (PFB) filed by the injured employee (Claimant). We affirm the rejection of the partial affirmative defense without comment, but modify the order on appeal by striking the reservation of jurisdiction over any claims that were not the subject of a pending PFB at the time of the final hearing. This court has previously held that a JCC may properly reserve jurisdiction over PFBs that have been filed, but not mediated, because mediation is mandatory under section 440.25(2), Florida Statutes; such unmediated claims are not procedurally ripe for adjudication. Parodi v. Fl. Contracting Co., Inc., 16 So.3d 958, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Ake v. U.S. Sugar Corp., 112 So.3d Holdings: 0: holding jcc properly reserved jurisdiction on unmediated pfbs 1: holding that the district court properly predicated jurisdiction on  1361 2: holding order in dependency proceeding was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and support issues 3: holding order was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and child support issues 4: holding jcc has subject matter jurisdiction over discovery requests filed by injured worker who is pursuing benefits even before pfb is filed", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "it was made. When Lucas pled guilty, this court\u2019s decisions required the district court rather than the jury to determine the quantity of drugs for which a defendant was responsible under 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1). United States v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 247-48 (6th Cir.1996) (explaining that \u201cthe determination of the quantity of drugs involved is not an element of the offense\u201d and that the sentencing judge, not the jury, must decide this issue). Although Lucas\u2019s indictment t \u201chad earlier announced the principle underlying the Apprendi rule in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999),\u201d United States v. Flowal, 234 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2000), but Jones\u2019s explicit holding was based on statutory construction. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (<HOLDING>). The Court\u2019s statement that \u201cunder the Due Holdings: 0: holding that a similar statute created separate offenses 1: holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive 2: holding that a complaint filed within three years of an accident complied with the michigan court rules and was not barred by the statute of limitations even though service was made more than three years after the accident 3: holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive 4: holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "all four were involved in a single conspiracy. The idea that a conspiracy can exist solely because two people deal with the same middleman, but act independently, was previously rejected in United States v. Durades, 607 F.2d 818, 819-20 (9th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe government succeeded in proving that Lugo was the hub of the two separate conspiracies but failed to show that there was some kind of rim binding the spokes.\u201d). In this case, the only connection between Nye and Jimenez that the government proved was that they both sold to Herrera and Theodoratos. The government failed to show \u201csome kind of rim binding\u201d Nye to Jimenez. Id. It did not show that Nye was aware Jimenez was dealing with Herrera, let alone that Nye ever received any benefit from those dealings. See Duran, 189 F.3d at 1081 (<HOLDING>). Thus, as Herrera claims, the government did Holdings: 0: holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy 1: holding that a conspiracy claim must contain supportive factual allegations describing the general composition of the conspiracy some or all of its broad objectives and the defendants general role in the conspiracy 2: holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators 3: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 4: holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "fair opportunity to obtain the assistance of counsel of his choice to prepare and conduct his defense,\u201d that \"constitutional mandate is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair or reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel, and so long as there is no arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel.\" United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir.1969). The record shows that Jackson had ample opportunity to retain counsel of his choice, and the District Court's refusal to further postpone his trial date was not arbitrary. 3 . Some cases add a requirement to the first prong o'f the test that the purpose is \"at issue,\u201d though others have not incorporated this requirement. Compare United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal action at issue must be authorized 1: holding that deposition testimony offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case must reveal that the witness is competent to testify as to the matters at issue 2: holding that evidence must be offered for a proper nonpropensity purpose that is at issue in the case 3: holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission  that is at issue in  the case 4: recognizing that other crimes evidence may be admissible if offered for any nonpropensity purpose and identifying the need to provide necessary background information about the relationships among the players as a proper purpose", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1112, 1119 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201cIf a prisoner challenges a single hearing as constitutionally defective, he must first exhaust state habeas remedies.\u201d); Alexander v. Ware, 714 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir.1983) (\"If a prisoner challenges a 'single allegedly defective [disciplinary] hearing,\u2019 he attacks, in essence, the fact and duration of his custody.\u2019\u2019). In such cases, we have required prisoners to exhaust the TDCJ grievance procedures. See Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir.1980) (\"[A] federal court may not grant ha-beas corpus relief to a petitioner who has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies, including an appeal to the Director of Corrections.\u201d), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085, 101 S.Ct. 873, 66 L.Ed.2d 810 (1981); Lerma v. Estelle, 585 F.2d 1297, 1299 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848, 100 S.Ct. 95, 62 Holdings: 0: holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely 1: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 2: holding that a texas prisoner who had not exhausted his clearly available administrative remedies was properly denied habeas relief in the district court 3: holding that the prisoner has the burden of demonstrating he has exhausted his administrative remedies in his complaint 4: holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for her obedience, they would protect her from physical and emotional injury. This count of the plaintiffs revised complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations since the alleged act of Watchtower that disfellowshipped her can be considered as the date the breach of the implied agreement occurred, which is less than six years from the date this action was instituted. The defendants also argue that the first amendment prohibits this court from considering the breach of contract claim, since, to determine this claim, the court necessarily would become involved in an \u201cexcessive entanglement\u201d with religion. The first amendment does not bar application of a secular standard to certain tortious conduct in a chinch setting. See Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn. App. 759, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Holdings: 0: holding that claim of breach of fiduciary duty can be resolved under connecticut law 1: recognizing respondeat superior liability 2: holding that respondeat superior claim against institutional defendant for tort committed by defendant priest can be resolved under connecticut law without resorting to ecclesiastical standards of church doctrine 3: holding that first amendment barred child victim of sexual abuse by priest from bringing breach of fiduciary duty claim against priest church official and church 4: holding that the liability reform act preempted in part the common law doctrine of respondeat superior", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of scale in operating the fund as it grows larger; 4) comparative fee structures; 5) fallout benefits, i.e., indirect profits to the adviser attributable in some way to the existence of the fund; and 6) the independence and conscientiousness of the directors. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir.1989) (citing Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929-30.) At the pleading stage, a complaint must state more than a legal conclusion that a fee is excessive in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See Levy v. Alliance Capital Management L.P., No. 97-Civ-4672, 1998 WL 744005, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.26, 1998) (dismissing \u00a7 36(b) claim against investment adviser because plaintiff failed to allege why a new advisory agreement\u2019s fees were excessive); Strougo I, 964 F.Supp. at 805 (<HOLDING>); Wexler v. Equitable Management Corp., No. Holdings: 0: holding that eaja fees may be awarded for fee litigation without a separate finding that the government was not substantially justified in its position as to the fee litigation as the single finding that the governments position lacks substantial justification  operates as a onetime threshold for fee eligibility  and presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action 1: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee  2: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied 3: holding that the allegation that the investment advisers fee increased substantially as a result of a funds rights offering to existing shareholders does not support an excessive fee claim under section 36b although it might under section 36a 4: holding that petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies for review of his fee agreement because the ssa notified petitioner he could obtain his fee by filing a fee petition", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that the appellant might speak untruthfully in response. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993). In our review, we look to whether the circumstances of the promise would reasonably induce a defendant to admit to a crime he did not commit. Sossamon v. State, 816 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. State, 994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). 2. Analysis Appellant argues that the condition of his d mination of credibility and demeanor, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the conditions of Appellant\u2019s detention did not render his videotaped statement involuntary. See Bell v. State, 169 S.W.3d 384, 391-92 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also argues that his oral Holdings: 0: holding eight hours of questioning while in handcuffs and leg shackles did not render confession involuntary where appellant never indicated he did not want to answer any more questions or wanted to speak to attorney and never requested food water or bathroom breaks 1: holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him 2: holding that defendants request to speak to his parents was not an invocation of the right to remain silent because defendant never gave the police any indication that he wanted to stop talking only indicating he wanted to take a break from the interrogation to speak with his parents 3: holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary 4: holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "may have been actionable under the 1933 Act is an academic question. As noted earlier, Plaintiffs bring no claim under the 1933 Act. Plaintiffs make these allegations to provide support for their claim that Defendants engaged in an ongoing, consistent scheme of depressing revenue predictions to achieve quick and sustained growth in share prices. 186 .Salinger, 972 F.Supp. at 229. 187 . See Exs. A-G to First Boyle Decl. 188 . See Ex. B to First Boyle Decl. 189 . See Exs. A-B, D-G to Issuer Opp.; Exs. A-E to 12/9/03 Declaration of John Boyle (\"Second Boyle Decl.\u201d). 190 . See Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 42; Ezra Charitable Trust v. Frontier Ins. Group, Inc., No 00-5361, 2002 WL 87723 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.23, 2002), aff'd, LC Capital Partners v. Frontier Ins. Group. Inc., 318 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 191 .See Ex. H to First Boyle Decl. 192 . See Holdings: 0: holding that failure to disclose that the defendant was involved on both the sellers and buyers side of transactions constitutes a concealment of a material fact sufficient to support a charge of fraud 1: holding no due process violation where the state took one position regarding the credibility of a witness during the trial against defendant and changed its position in a subsequent trial of another defendant involved in the underlying crime 2: holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it 3: holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense 4: holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "See Def.\u2019s Opp\u2019n at 11. Consequently, Monster contends that Zuckman\u2019s claims for injunctive relief satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. See id. The parties dispute whether the cost of relief should be measured from the perspective of the plaintiff or defendant. Whatever perspective is used, they also disagree as to how the cost should be apportioned here given the claims on behalf of the general public. The Court need not resolve these issues, however, because Monster\u2019s claims about the costs are too speculative to serve as the basis for determining the amount in controversy. Courts have found that general assertions that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed $75,000 are too speculative to establish diversity jurisdiction. See Nat\u2019l Consumers League, 680 F.Supp.2d at 140 (<HOLDING>); Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 Holdings: 0: holding that where plaintiff has set forth in the complaint a specific request for damages and attorneys fees that on its face is an amount less than the jurisdictional minimum the defendant must prove to a legal certainty that plaintiffs claim must exceed 75000 1: holding that the stipulation included in the plaintiffs petitionthat the maximum amount of damages sought or that would be accepted wpuld not exceed 75000 exclusive of costs and interest bound the plaintiff and was sufficient to defeat diversity jurisdiction 2: holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer 3: holding that in order to establish standing the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling must not be too speculative 4: holding that defendants claim that the cost of injunctive relief would exceed 75000 was too speculative", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "stay (to the extent it was applicable), and the Debtor\u2014 whose Chapter 13 case had no filed claims \u2014 filed a motion to allow a late proof of claim on behalf of an unsecured creditor. All arguments and submissions concerning these matters have been considered by the court, and the issues are ripe for decision. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Creditor is the holder of a deed of trust on the Debtor\u2019s principal residence, which secures a note on which the Debtor owes about $114,040. The Debtor\u2019s payments on the note were in arrears, and the Creditor conducted a foreclosure sale on December 29, 2005. The foreclosure sale was conducted in accordance with West Virginia law, and the Debtor\u2019s real property was sold to Gracie Mews, LLC (\u201cGrade Mews\u201d) for $130 997) (<HOLDING>); In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 751 Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors were entitled to cure the mortgage arrearage through their chapter 13 plan because the creditors failure to record the sale deed prior to the bankruptcy filing rendered the sale incomplete under state law 1: holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court 2: recognizing the language of  1322c1 as a minimum floor in cutting off the debtors right to cure and permitting the debtor to cure until the deed was delivered to the successful bidder which would complete the sale under new jersey law 3: holding that the debtors could cure their arrearage until the expiration of the 10day upset bid period which would render the foreclosure sale complete under north carolina law 4: holding that the debtors could cure the default until the delivery of a sheriffs deed to the successful purchaser rendering the sale complete under new jersey state law", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "P. J. Husband appeals from a judgment modifying a 1997 dissolution judgment that awarded spousal support to wife by extending its duration for an indefinite period of time. ORS 107.135 (2001). We conclude that the trial court lacked authority to order indefinite support under the circumstances of this case and reverse. The 1997 judgment provided that husband\u2019s spousal support obligation would end on November 30, 2002. The parties agree that husband paid the final support installment required by the 1997 judgment on October 15, 2002, and that, 9), rev den, 288 Or 335 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Wife argues, notwithstanding the provisions Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award 1: holding that the trial court was without authority to modify a spousal support obligation when the modification proceeding was initiated ten years after the obligation to pay spousal support under the dissolution judgment had been terminated by order 2: holding that there is no spousal exception to the statute 3: holding that the trial court lacked authority to renew spousal support payments pursuant to a motion that was filed after the expiration of time during which spousal support was required to be paid under the original judgment 4: holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "employee generally will not support a claim of wrongful discharge under Alabama law. See Mack, 929 So.2d at 483-85; Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So.2d 979, 981 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). And Plaintiffs failure to allege facts showing that he had an employment contract or any other basis for a legitimate expectation of continued employment as required to establish a federal due process claim under \u00a7 1983 also calls for the dismissal of any parallel due process claim arising state law. See Jefferson County v. Braswell, 407 So.2d 115, 122 (Ala.1981) (\u201cWe consider our analysis of the ... due process issues under the United States Constitution equally applicable to those same issues under the Alabama Constitution.\u201d); Alabama State Personnel Bd. v. Garner, 4 So.3d 545, 550 n. 2 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). IV. Demand for Attorney\u2019s Fees Hannah\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution 1: holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution 2: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution 3: recognizing that the due process guaranteed under the alabama constitution is coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the united states constitution 4: holding parents custodial rights are a fundamental interest guaranteed due process protection", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Plaintiff did not, including training and recruiting, and the hospital changed from an ongoing enterprise with approximately 700 employees during Casanova\u2019s tenure to a winding-down enterprise with approximately 300 employees during Plaintiffs tenure. 3. Summary judgment was proper on Plaintiffs retaliation claim because, on the facts deemed true, Plaintiff did not complain of discrimination when she requested a higher salary, and she did not suffer an adverse employment action. See Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Further, even if Plaintiff had made out a Holdings: 0: holding that a temporal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action may in some cases be sufficient to create an inference of retaliation 1: holding that the fact that employer had knowledge of the employees protected activity was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation where the timing of the discharge was not proximate to the protected activity 2: holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two 3: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 4: holding that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding her retaliation claim because she failed to offer any evidence of a causal relationship between her involvement in protected activity and the adverse employment action", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "some tension among the different circuits as to the interaction between sections 107 and 113.\u201d United States v. Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d 1100, 1103 n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1999). For example, courts are split on the question of who may bring a CERCLA \u00a7 107 cost-recovery action, and more specifically, whether a PRP is entitled to bring a CERCLA \u00a7 107 cost-recovery action. We have held that a private PRP who incurs response costs may not bring a cost-recovery action under CERCLA \u00a7 107, and instead may only bring a claim for contribution under CERCLA \u00a7 113(f). Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1301. We have not yet considered, however, whether a government PRP such as a municipality that similarly incurs response costs may bring a cost-recovery action under CERCLA \u00a7 107. Compare Hunter, 70 F.Supp.2d at 1108 (<HOLDING>), with City of Fresno, 1995 WL 641983, at **2-5 Holdings: 0: holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation 1: recognizing that joint and several liability of  107 seems unfair but the solution is found in apportionment and contribution 2: holding that where none of the events for accrual of a  113f1 contribution claim can arise because a prp has incurred response costs based on its agreement to remediate in accordance with a state agencys administrative order the relevant period of limitations and accrual is provided in  113g2 the court found that under such circumstances the contribution action becomes the initial action for cost recovery under cercla  107 thus bringing such action within  113g2 applicable to initial actions for recovery of the costs referred to in  107 3: holding that the government prp may bring a costrecovery action pursuant to cercla  107 thereby imposing joint and several liability on the defendant prp 4: holding that a statute imposing joint and several liability on a vehicle owner for a minors conduct while driving the vehicle with permission imputed financial liability rather than fault to the vehicles owner", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u2014 \u2022 and the majority errs in dismissing it. III. The majority notes that \u201clower courts have issued conflicting and confusing opinions\u201d under Elrod and Branti (internal quotation mark omitted). At least some of these inconsistencies can be laid at the feet of courts, like today\u2019s majority, that are simply antagonistic to the Supreme Court\u2019s Elrod-Branti jurisprudence. Even if inferior courts believe that Supreme Court holdings are ill-advised, they are not at liberty to ignore those holdings. Time and again, inferior federal courts have sought to circumvent the Elrod-Branti jurisprudence by refusing to apply it to decisions regarding promotions, transfers, or dealings with independent contractors. See, e.g., O\u2019Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 47 F.3d 883 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.1986) (en Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively 1: holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review 2: holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel 3: holding elrodbranti does not apply to independent contractors 4: holding that title ii does not apply to the states", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "opinions.... \u201d We have no trouble concluding that Rule 703 encompasses hearsay statements in a context such as the instant one, where the government expert specifically testified that his opinion was based on his experience and expertise, in conjunction with the information he received from a DEA intelligence agent and Bermudan authorities, and that such sources of information were regularly relied upon in valuating narcotics. See also 2A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 455 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that \u201cexpert testimony, based in part upon reports of others that are not in evidence but of a sort the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession, are [sic] admissible\u201d); cf. United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Further, even before the enactment of Federal Holdings: 0: holding where defense counsel argued that the prosecution had not presented the testimony of a law enforcement agent because it would have been favorable to the accused the prosecutor properly argued in rebuttal that clark could have called the agent as a witness on his own 1: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 2: holding that the employer was not the insurers agent 3: holding that expert testimony by an atf agent based partly on his own analysis but verified by consultation with an atf technical specialist was properly admitted under rule 703 where the agent testified that the consultation was of the kind regularlyrelied upon by experts in his field 4: holding that party was an agent under the plain terms of his contracts", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "therewith on a particular occasion.\" CRE 608(a), on the other hand, provides a limited exception that permits evidence of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness only after that character has been attacked: The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 115 This state's case law disfavors comments by one witness about another witness's truthfulness. See, e.g., People v. Gaff-ney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>); Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 341 Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court erred by admitting a doctors testimony that a child victims description of a sexual crime was very believable 1: holding that the trial court erred by permitting testimony regarding uncharged acts of sexual misconduct by the defendant and that a substantial likelihood existed that the forbidden inference contributed to the verdict given that the only evidence of each instance of child molestation came from the victims 2: holding that trial court erred but harmlessly by admitting into evidence for all purposes chart summarizing officers testimony 3: holding that the trial court had erred by excluding the expert testimony of a doctor 4: holding trial court was proper in admitting a doctors testimony that a delay between the occurrence of an incident of child sexual abuse and the childs revelation of the incident was the usual pattern of conduct for victims of child sexual abuse", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1593 for considerable, involuntary time and expense resulting from the need to respond to frivolous and unauthorized actions of the Defendant in the mis-enforcement of the internal revenue laws of the federal United States. Id. at \u00b6 6.3.1. See also Brief, at pp. 15-17 (further detailing the \u201cHistory of of Interaction With Defendant(s) and Their Employer\u201d). Under similar facts, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Atkinson v. O\u2019Neill, 867 F.2d 589, 590 (10th Cir.1989), that \u201c[w]hen an action is one against named individual defendants, but the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the United States, the action is in fact one against the United States.\u201d Accord Burgos v. Milton, 709 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). Insofar as the Petition may be read to assert Holdings: 0: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 1: holding that despite plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy they did not suggest that any of the acts committed by individual defendants occurred in the united states 2: holding that ajlthough the  action is nominally one against individual defendants the acts complained of consist of actions taken by defendants in their official capacity as agents of the united states and that under such circumstances the action is in fact one against the united states 3: holding that plaintiffs in the absence of a contrary expression from congress  shall have an action under ftca against the united states as well as a bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights 4: holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "2008 WL 5392320, 208 Haw. LEXIS 304 (2008); Gore v. Indiana Ins. Co., 376 Ill.App.3d 282, 315 Ill.Dec. 156, 876 N.E.2d 156, 165-66 (2007) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to bring declaratory judgment action because statute at issue did not confer private right of action); Nichols v. Kansas PAC, 270 Kan. 37, 11 P.3d 1134, 1146-47 (2000) (refusing to grant declaratory relief under consumer fraud statute because it contained no private right of action); Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 916 (Minn.Ct.App.2003) (stating that where \u201cthere was no private right to enforce\u201d the statute, the \u201cUniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot create a cause of action that does not otherwise exist\u201d); Delgado v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 66 A.D. 3d 607, 888 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (2009) (<HOLDING>). See also Boston Med. Ctr. v. Sec\u2019y of the Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners did not possess a private right of action for injunctive and declaratory relief sought because only the citys housing official could enforce the citys housing maintenance code 1: holding that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available to private litigants under the fdcpa 2: holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc  1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action 3: holding that a prisoners transfer mooted claims for declaratory and injunctive relief 4: recognizing private right of action", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and prior confrontations they had had.\u201d 3 . The State argues that the prosecutor's statement that Appellant provoked the fight by calling the deceased and his family \u201cniggas\u201d was a reasonable inference from Officer Pate's testimony that Appellant admitted he had used racial slurs when he first spoke to the deceased. I cannot agree. First, Officer Pate did not testify that \"niggas\u201d was the racial slur Appellant used. Unfortunately, many ethnophaulisms exist but most people consider this one exceptionally offensive and inflammatory. Appellant\u2019s concession that he used racial slurs does not support an inference that he used this particular one. Second, neither Officer Pat .-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref'd) (same); Jimenez v. State, 298 S.W.3d 203, 214 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. ref\u2019d) (<HOLDING>); see Rogers v. State, 725 S.W.2d 350, 358 Holdings: 0: recognizing emergency exception 1: recognizing the public interest exception 2: recognizing exception under state constitution 3: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 4: recognizing exception", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "even though the store benefitted from the advertising, the court found this did not rise to the level of consideration. Id. In State v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., the Court of Civil Appeals contrasted Brice with Cole and found no consideration where a filling station paid for bingo cards but gave them away free to any and all persons who came to their stations to request them, and a local TV station broadcast games in which bingo cards were used with winners being awarded cash prizes. 386 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1964). Some jurisdictions outside of the State of Texas have held that requiring a person to actually go to the location of the sweepstakes sponsor in order to participate constitutes consideration. See Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487, 496 (1955)(<HOLDING>); Knox Indus. Corp. v. State ex rel. Scanland, Holdings: 0: holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer 1: holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer 2: holding that consideration exists where a customer is burdened by having to visit the store where the coupons are being offered 3: holding that negligence of a store customer in failing to perceive a strip of black substance was a question for the jury 4: holding that grocery store did not have duty to foresee and protect customer from rowdy children", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "even though the store benefitted from the advertising, the court found this did not rise to the level of consideration. Id. In State v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., the Court of Civil Appeals contrasted Brice with Cole and found no consideration where a filling station paid for bingo cards but gave them away free to any and all persons who came to their stations to request them, and a local TV station broadcast games in which bingo cards were used with winners being awarded cash prizes. 386 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1964). Some jurisdictions outside of the State of Texas have held that requiring a person to actually go to the location of the sweepstakes sponsor in order to participate constitutes consideration. See Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 399, 117 A.2d 487, 496 (1955)(<HOLDING>); Knox Indus. Corp. v. State ex rel. Scanland, Holdings: 0: holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer 1: holding that murder committed by customer was not foreseeable result of excessive sale of alcohol to customer 2: holding that consideration exists where a customer is burdened by having to visit the store where the coupons are being offered 3: holding that negligence of a store customer in failing to perceive a strip of black substance was a question for the jury 4: holding that grocery store did not have duty to foresee and protect customer from rowdy children", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "individuals are cooperating with law enforcement authorities.\u201d (Id.) As a general proposition, courts have repeatedly recognized that materials, including even judicial documents which are presumptively accessible, can be kept from the public if their dissemination might \u201cadversely affect law enforcement interests.\u201d Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050; see also Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (noting that the \u201cdanger of impairing law enforcement\u201d may be a countervailing factor outweighing the qualified right of access); Madoff, 626 F.Supp.2d at 427 (rejecting press access to emails sent by victims in a major fraud case, because \u201cdisclosing the details of the Government\u2019s efforts to obtain evidence will undoubtedly hamper the investigation\u201d); United States v. Park, 619 F.Supp.2d 89, 94 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, where public disclosure of certain Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to intervene to assert the publics first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is proper 1: holding that the privacy interests of the employee police officers did not exceed the publics right to know 2: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 3: holding that court may seal documents if publics right of access is outweighed by competing interests 4: holding that the need to maintain the secrecy of the governments investigation outweighed the publics right of access to sentencing documents", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "For example, the Commission at one point says that it will \u201crequire the pipelines to show why their existing tariffs should not be considered unjust and unreasonable,\u201d Order No. 637-A at 31,591, and that \u201cindividual pipelines [will have] an opportunity to demonstrate that their own circumstances justify deviation from the general conclusion that segmentation is appropriate,\u201d FERC Br. at 101. INGAA\u2019s suspicion is also fueled by the fact that on several previous occasions the Commission had impermissibly blurred the distinction between \u00a7 4 and \u00a7 5, see Western Res., 9 F.3d at 1578 (\u201cWe now make it an even six\u201d times that the Commission failed to respect this distinction), or tried to use another section of the NGA to \u201ctrump\u201d its \u00a7 5 obligations, see Pub. Serv. Comm\u2019n, 866 F.2d at 491 (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, the orders contain some express Holdings: 0: holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness 1: holding that  16 of the nga which grants the commission the right to require filings needed to exercise its powers under the nga did not permit ferc to require a company to make periodic  4 refilings 2: holding that on remand ferc had the authority to order  recoupment of losses caused by its errors 3: holding that section 211103 grants a party to an action under the open meetings act the right to trial by jury 4: holding that statute grants the commission the authority to request that the parties present adequate evidence  ", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "His hands, everything, was shaking.\" Haley's mouth was dry and he was licking his lips, stuttering, shuffling his feet, and nervously pacing in circles. Daniel was also extremely nervous and exhibited a facial twitch and shaking hands and neither Dunlap nor Daniels knew their point of destination. Miller informed Haley that he was free to leave and asked him if he had any drugs or anything illegal in the vehicle, and Haley responded, \"No. You want to check it out?\" Haley asked the officer, \"would you want to look at the bags or something?\" Lastly, when Haley removed the bags from the trunk of nt officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.1997); see also People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1379 (Colo.1989) (<HOLDING>). Here, that objectively reasonable suspicion Holdings: 0: holding experts experience knowledge and training is considered in determining reliability 1: holding that a defendants actions while appearing innocent to a casual observer assume added significance when considered in the context of a police officers training and experience in drug enforcement 2: recognizing that officers are entitled to rely on training and experience in forming belief that drug transaction has occurred 3: holding that a police officers opinion that a defendant was most definitely engaged in drug dealing was not proper lay testimony because it was based on the officers specialized training in narcotics and extensive experience in methamphetamine cases 4: holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and \u201cdecreased short term survival\u201d is, in effect, a loss of chance instruction and contrary to Indiana law. We agree. We first note that this instruction again correctly states the \u00a7 323 standard of proximate causation. However, this instruction erroneously defines the \u201charm\u201d as the loss of a chance of survival. This instruction effectively combines the loss of chance doctrine and the \u00a7 323 standard. However, these options are alternative and incompatible approaches for imposing liability in cases such as this. The supreme court in Mayhue clearly adopted the \u00a7 323 approach in this class of cases while rejecting the loss of chance doctrine. See Mayhue 653 N ed from Cummings\u2019s claim for pain and suffering. See Kolkman v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 511 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied. Therefore, we Holdings: 0: holding that as a general rule a claim for spousal loss of consortium requires proof of a tortious act that caused the claimants spouse personal injury 1: holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium can proceed even where the injured spouse was contributorily negligent 2: recognizing that loss of consortium is a right of action separate from that of the spouse 3: holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium 4: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "noting that the additional materials provided \"are submitted only to assist the Court in exercising its discretion in ruling on the Motion to Strike under Rule 14(a).\" Third-Party Defendants\u2019 Brief at 9 n. 9. PFM argues that it is really a motion for summary judgment. Since the court is not considering the materials outside the pleadings, the motion should be regarded as one to dismiss. 5 . The Court also declined in both cases to create an implied right to contribution under federal common law. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 98, 101 S.Ct. at 1584; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 646, 101 S.Ct. at 2069. 6 . This conclusion is inconsistent with this court\u2019s earlier decision in Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 4-81-394, slip op. at 12 (D.Minn. July 27, 1984) (<HOLDING>). The issue of contribution was not fully Holdings: 0: recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor 1: recognizing contribution in the appropriate case 2: recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware 3: recognizing right of guarantor to contribution against coguarantors 4: recognizing a right to contribution", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the difference between it and the previous provisions in Section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. There is no question that the language has changed. The significance of this change in concept clearly indicates that the reliance of the Debtor on the case of In re Edgar, supra, is misplaced. The Edgar decision involved the interpretation of Section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, and the present controversy is governed by Section 541(a)(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the decision in Edgar no longer represents the controlling law under the Code. In re Kragness, 58 B.R. 939 (Bankr.D.Or.1986); In re Hersloff, 147 B.R. 262 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1992); In re Gower, 184 B.R. 163 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995). In its reasoning, the Kragness Court cites In re Hecht, 54 B.R. 379 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Holdings: 0: holding that payments made to a debtor from inter vivos trusts within 180 days of filing the petition are not interests by way of bequest devise or inheritance and are not part of the bankruptcy estate 1: holding inheritance received by debtor more than 180 days after filing but before conversion is property of chapter 7 estate 2: holding noncompete payments were not exempt from the debt ors bankruptcy estate as earnings from postpetition services under  541a6 because the noncompete agreement was inextricably intertwined with the debtors sale of stock that was an includable bankruptcy asset that predated debtors bankruptcy petition 3: holding that income payment debtor received from spendthrift trusts or was entitled to receive by terms of the trusts within 180 days of filing of debtors bankruptcy petition constituted bequests and became property of debt ors estate under  541a5a 4: holding that distributions from an inter vivos trust do not qualify as bequests and  541a5a does not operate to bring such distributions into the bankruptcy estate", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "she argues that that affidavit demonstrates that Mandeville\u2019s testimony regarding DMV complaints about Bucci is not worthy of belief. It is important to note, however, that San Bento said in his affidavit that he did not recall making any complaints about Bucci and that he found her to be \u201cprofessional, efficient and competent.\u201d But Mandeville never said that it had been San Bento who had made a complaint to her about Bucci. Indeed, other employees from the DMV, or employees from motor-vehicle departments from other states, may well have complained about Bucci\u2019s performance. When a plaintiff attempts to counter a claim by an employer that it fired an employee for poor performance, it is simply not sufficient for a plaintiff to present evidence that her performance wa (7th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Further, the policy states that there are Holdings: 0: holding that inconsistency in employers reasons for the termination is an indication of pretext 1: holding that the statement in the employers progressive discipline policy that in situations where employee behavior warrants immediate termination the stages of this process do not need to be followed granted the employer unbounded discretion to discharge employees without following the guidelines 2: holding failure to follow progressive discipline does not demonstrate pretext when use of the policy is entirely discretionary 3: holding no pretext for not following progressive discipline where policy contemplated immediate termination for certain offenses 4: holding failure to follow progressive discipline policy does not constitute pretext when employer reserves right to fire atwill employees without notice", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "disparity exists between the parties, such that one party may be inhibited from preparing or presenting a claim, the trial court should liberally exercise its discretion so as to remove that inhibition and assist the needy party\u201d). In this case, an allowance of attorney fees against an intervening third party, particularly when incurred in a collateral proceeding to enforce a judgment, would do nothing to advance the statutory purpose of equalizing the economic resources between the divorcing parties. {20} We acknowledge that divorce actions may sometimes include parties, other than husband and wife, who join in the action because they assert a right or interest in the subject of the dissolution proceedings. See Greathouse v. Greathouse, 64 N.M. 21, 23, 322 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1958) (<HOLDING>); Ruybalid v. Segura, 107 N.M. 660, 663, 763 Holdings: 0: holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties 1: holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party 2: recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract 3: holding that a plaintiff must allege either an interference with specific third parties or an identifiable class of third persons 4: recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at the time of leasing, and of the continuing supervision of the federal agencies involved over future activities, the agency\u2019s decision in this case that the lease issuance itself was not a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment was not unreasonable. Id. at 624 (emphasis added). Park County has been overruled to the extent it held that a reasonableness standard of review should be used when reviewing an agency\u2019s decision to not prepare an EIS. In Marsh, 490 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1851, the Court held that an agency\u2019s decision to not prepare an EIS or to not supplement an existing EIS should only be reversed when it is arbitrary and capricious. See also Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 972-73 (10th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, according to Pen-naco, Park Holdings: 0: holding that where the murder and robbery occurred in one county but the plan was hatched in another county and the body was subsequently returned to that other county both counties had jurisdiction to try the appellant 1: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 2: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  3: recognizing park county was overruled in part by marsh 4: holding county clerk sued in official capacity was entitled to the immunity the county enjoyed", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "noted, the misrepresentations were actionable \u201cbecause they caused him to enter into an agreement whereby he made an unfavorable purchase\u201d and, thus, the claims related to the agreement. Id. The allegations in this case are analogous as Plaintiffs allege that Defendants\u2019 misrepresentations caused Plaintiffs to sign up for HighBeam\u2019s free trial, which necessitated agreeing to the clickwrap agreement. If Plaintiffs had not entered into the Agreement, they would not have sustained any losses. The cases Plaintiffs rely on in which courts held that forum selection clauses did not apply arose from factual scenarios that are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. See Bay State Anesthesia Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., No. CIV.A. 02-11174RWZ, 2002 WL 31761286, at *1 (D.Mass. Dec. 6, 2002) (<HOLDING>); Pixel Enhancement Labs., Inc. v. McGee, No. Holdings: 0: holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract 1: holding that the plaintiffs claims arose from a certain contract because the subject matter of the plaintiffs suit was intertwined with requirements referred to in the contract 2: holding that the plaintiffs claims fell outside the scope of the forum selection clause because they were either not related to the contract such as claims that the defendants made disparaging and untrue statements to plaintiffs customers  or concerned conduct that occurred after the contract was terminated 3: holding that the forum selection clause at issue encompassed both contract and tort claims 4: holding that claims were not related to a license agreement which contained a forum selection clause in part because the bulk of the claims were against a defendant who was not a party to the agreement for breaches of employment contracts which did not contain forum selection clauses and for disclosure of trade secrets", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at 324 (noting that \u201cmaterially adverse employment action requires more than trivial, subjectively perceived incon verbenees.\u201d (citations omitted)). Rather, although the demotion was intended to be temporary, in light of the fact that months went by without Sensing being scheduled for work or contacted regarding the IME that could allow her to return to work, we hold that Sensing has adduced sufficient facts to establish that Outback\u2019s actions were nevertheless \u201cmaterially adverse.\u201d Id.; Gu v. Boston Police Dept., 312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir.2002) (listing \u201cdemotions [and] disadvantageous transfers or assignments\u201d as examples of \u201cmaterial changes\u201d in working conditions); see also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71-73, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Finally, having concluded that a reasonable Holdings: 0: holding that assignment of unfavorable class schedules did not constitute an adverse employment action absent evidence of materially adverse consequences 1: holding that suspension with pay was not adverse employment action 2: holding that potentially indefinite suspension of employee from work without pay could constitute materially adverse employment action even where employer awards full backpay for the entire period and that reassignment of responsibilities could constitute materially adverse employment action even absent demotion 3: holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case 4: holding that investigatory suspension with pay was not adverse employment action", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "waterways.\u201d It is well established that \u201c \u2018an expert\u2019s opinion is of no greater probative value than the soundness of his reasons given therefor will warrant.\u2019 \u201d Surkovich v. Doub, 258 Md. 263, 272, 265 A.2d 447, 451 (1970) (quoting Miller v. Abrahams, 239 Md. 263, 273, 211 A.2d 309, 314 (1965)). An expert opinion \u201cderives its probative force from the facts on which it is predicated, and these must be legally sufficient to sustain the opinion of the expert.\u201d State Health Dep\u2019t v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 520, 209 A.2d 555, 559 (1965). See also Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 682 A.2d 248 (1996) (expert testimony by police officer that he was able to identify crack cocaine by touch was nothing more than a conclusion); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 625 A.2d 1005 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Wood v. Toyota Motor Corp., 134 Md.App. 512, Holdings: 0: holding that animal studies can be a proper foundation for an experts opinion but that those opinions must be sufficiently supported by the animal studies on which they purport to rely 1: holding that a reliable differential diagnosis alone may provide a valid foundation for a causation opinion even when no epidemiological studies peerreviewed published studies animal studies or laboratory data are offered in support of the opinion 2: holding inadmissible auto reconstruction experts opinion that height of bumper on truck was unreasonably dangerous where height complied with industry standards and no scientific studies or emerging consensus supported opinion 3: holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion 4: holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Dominican court did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the Dominican divorce. The Dominican court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because neither Dubie nor Sylvie was a resident or domiciliary of the Dominican Republic at the time the Dominican court granted the Dominican Decree. Hence, the Dominican Decree supposedly dissolving the marriage between Du-bie and Sylvie is void ab initio. Geraldine also claims that the Dominican Decree is not entitled to comity, recognition, or enforcement in Hawai'i. She argues that \u201ca foreign \u2018ex parte\u2019 divorce for cause between pe a trial court did not err by refusing to recognize Egyptian divorce decree where neither party was domiciled in Egypt at time decree was issued); Sargent v. Sargent, 225 Pa.Super. 1, 307 A.2d 353, 356 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Clark v. Clark, 192 So.2d 594, 596-97 Holdings: 0: recognizing that an effective waiver is not an absolute bar to appellate review 1: holding that an absolute prerequisite to judicial recognition of an outofstate divorce is that the plaintiff must have resided in the  country for a minimum period of residency and the residency be accompanied by domiciliary intent  2: holding that the plaintiff established a right to a slogan based on evidence of public recognition of its use by the plaintiff 3: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity 4: holding any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rule on at least four occasions since Beam was decided. In Beam/Harper, the Supreme Court rejected the analysis of Sunburst/Chevron in retroactivity determinations for federal constitutional rulings, but the Court did not formally overrule those cases. Nor did the Court suggest that the principles underlying Sunburst/Chevron were unsound for purposes of state court retroactivity analysis. Therefore, I am satisfied that we remain bound by the holding in Mendes. Finally, I also disagree with the majority\u2019s application of the Mendes factors. First, both parties in this case relied exclusively, and justifiably, on the rule established in Adams. Retroactive application of Carl II would undermine the reliance and expectations of the parties. See French, supra note 3, 658 A.2d at 1031-32 (<HOLDING>). Second, because the previous law concerning Holdings: 0: holding that bradley governs whether a statute is to be applied prospectively or retroactively 1: holding that new rule applied purely prospectively primarily because of reliance factor 2: holding that even when legislature only sought to clarify a statutory ambiguity by defining a term the amendment applied prospectively because the clarified intent was not clearly expressed in original version of the statute 3: holding interest rate and conversion factor for future years constant in application of 13313 rule and applying the rule only prospectively 4: holding that reasonable reliance upon the old rule is an important factor supporting prospective application of the new rule", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to the arbitration clause is preempted by the Communications Act, the issue of unconscio-nability is not even in play. Moreover, while on appeal Boomer perfunctorily states in a footnote that Ting collaterally estops AT & T from arguing that the Communications Act preempts his state law challenges to the arbitration clause, he fails to support this position with any legal analysis or citation. Therefore he has waived that argument. Rekhi v. Wildwood Indust., Inc., 61 F.3d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir.1995). Finally, even had Boomer not waived this argument, because the issue of preemption involves a pure question of law and because Ting is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, we would still conclude that Ting has no preclusive effect. See, e.g., Chicago Truck Drivers, 125 F.3d at 532-33 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted). 11 . In Ting, Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when an issue of ultimate fact has necessarily been determined by a valid final judgment 1: holding that collateral estoppel did not bar the defendant from relitigating a pure question of law and noting that that is especially true when the issue is of general interest and has not been resolved by the highest appellate court that can resolve it 2: holding that the court will not consider an issue not raised in the district court unless 1 it involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice 2 the party raising the issue had no opportunity to do so before the district court 3 the interest of substantial justice is at stake 4 the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or 5 the issue presents significant questions of general impact or great public concern 3: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 4: holding that the defendant though not a party to the prior litigation could assert collateral estoppel defensively to preclude the plaintiff from relitigating factual issues that the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "faith, excused the wrong two alternates. Because of this mistake, the two alternates from the bottom of the list \u2014 that is, the two alternates who should have been excused pursuant to Rule 6(f) \u2014 were allowed to stay and serve on the grand jury panel. Under these circumstances, these two alternates should be deemed de facto grand jurors; their participation on the grand jury panel does not invalidate the acts of that panel. Conclus at 193. 4 . Id. 5 . See Supreme Court Order No. 1115. 6 . 783 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Alaska App.1989). 7 . See id. at 1177-78. 8 . See Bobby v. State, 950 P.2d 135, 138 (Alaska App.1997) (the superior court's factual determinations will stand unless the defendant shows them to be clearly erroneous). 9 . See Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138, 148-49 (Alaska 1977) (<HOLDING>); Peterson v. State, 562 P.2d 1350, 1366 Holdings: 0: holding right of accused to trial by impartial jury justified postverdict protection of jurors from harassment and did not violate first amendment 1: holding that a criminal defendants right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by article 1 section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution 2: holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict 3: holding that the defendants right to an impartial jury was not impaired when there was no common thread or similarity among the group of excluded jurors 4: holding that a defendants claim that a jury was not impartial must focus on the jurors who ultimately sat", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cThe most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.\u201d). Courts typically do not disturb a lead plaintiffs choice of counsel unless doing so is necessary to protect the interests of the class. See Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 733 (9th Cir.2002) (\u201c[T]he district court must approve the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel, but Congress gave the lead plaintiff, and not the court, the power to select a lawyer for the class.\u201d). The presumption that a lead plaintiff fulfills the typicality and adequacy requirements can be rebutted by a showing that the plaintiff is in fact not adequate or will be subject to unique defenses. See, e.g., See In re Network Assoc., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1029 (N.D.Cal.1999) (<HOLDING>). 1. The Pension Fund Group The Pension Fund Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud 1: holding that under oklahoma law a bad faith claim  premised on inadequate investigation must be supported by a showing that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough investigation would have produced relevant information 2: holding that a government employee has a privacy interest in any file that reports on an investigation that could lead to the employees discipline or censure 3: holding that the sixth circuit like most circuits has not recognized a substantive due process claim based on an inadequate investigation 4: holding presumptive lead plaintiff inadequate due to unrelated fraud investigation", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Pursuant to appellee\u2019s proper confession of error, the final order on appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to hold an evi-dentiary hearing on appellant\u2019s motion to vacate. See Johnson v. State, Dep\u2019t of Revenue ex rel. Lamontagne, 973 So.2d 1236, 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). ROWE, MAKAR, and KELSEY, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that absent record refutation of allega tions in the motion for relief from judgment allegations which if proven would establish that the judgment is void the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that a default judgment was not void because the bankruptcy court that entered the judgment had proper jurisdiction over the party seeking relief 2: holding void judgment must be vacated 3: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 4: holding that a court considering a request for an evidentiary hearing must take into account the deferential standards of  2254d and a hearing is not required if the record refutes the applicants factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "what their public officers are doing in the discharge of public duties against the interest of the general public in having the business of government carried on efficiently and without undue interference. Stone, at 681. The Alaska court was quick to point out that this balance does not interfere with any preference for disclosure established by its public records act because the burden is still on the agency to show that the public interest weighs on the side of nondisclosure. Anchorage Daily News, at 591. While we recognize that the public has some degree of interest in disclosure of the evaluations of prosecutors, in light of the potential harm disclosure could cause, we hold that legitimate public concern is lacking in this case. Cf. Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Disclosure could harm the public interest in Holdings: 0: holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure  contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant 1: holding that public interest based only on a general notion of public servant accountability does not necessarily require disclosure 2: recognizing the public interest exception 3: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 4: holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government ", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because he has alleged a sincerely held religious belief, so his Free Exercise Clause challenge thus turns on whether the State\u2019s interest in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Potential legal liability may constitute a legitimate penological interest under Turner. See Acorn Inv., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 887 F.2d 219, 226 (9th Cir.1989) (indicating that compliance with an ordinance constitutes a \u201clegitimate interest\u201d); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 486 (5th Cir.2004)' (noting that the threat of legal liability stemming from prison escapes gave the state a legitimate penological interest in restricting prisoner access to off-site medical care); cf. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1399 n. 7 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). As we discuss in Part V.C, there is a Holdings: 0: holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant 1: holding that exculpatory clause in health club membership did not exculpate the facility from liability for a personal injury stemming from the facilitys negligence because the clause did not use the term negligence fault or equivalents 2: holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff 3: holding that the state did not have a legitimate penological interest stemming from potential legal liability in part because the grounds for liability were farfetched 4: holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "argument. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 626(e)(2), the statute of limitations may be tolled up to one year for the period during which the EEOC attempts compliance with the ADEA\u2019s requirements through conciliation. Therefore, together with the extension for willful violations, conciliation may extend the statute of limitations for a total of four years. O\u2019Rourke v. Continental Casualty Co., 983 F.2d 94, 95 (7th Cir.1993). The conciliation period begins, thereby tolling the filing period, when the EEOC issues a letter of violation. E.E.O.C. v. Barrett, Haentjens & Co., 705 F.Supp. 1065, 1069 (M.D.Pa.1988) (citing the Congressional and Administrative News); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School, 91 C 4674, 1993 WL 106523, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 24, 1993) (<HOLDING>); but see Equal Employment Opportunity Holdings: 0: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling 1: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 2: holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling 3: holding that failure of eeoc to transmit charge to phrc within limitations period was subject to equitable tolling where plaintiff requested crossfiling in the cover letter attached to the eeoc charge on the first page of the charge itself and on an official form used by the eeoc for requests for dualfiling 4: holding that eeoc phone calls served to commence the tolling period", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "directs us is an amended complaint (the \u201cSecond\u201d complaint) that Lynchval filed sometime after the original complaint and sometime before the SASC. This complaint contains the new allegations present in the SASC. But Winklevoss has no proof that it tendered this complaint to Federal, or that Federal knew about it through other means. Moreover, just as the SASC does not \u201cclarify\u201d the original complaint, the Second complaint (which mirrors the SASC in all relevant respects) likewise fails to \u201cclarify\u201d the original complaint. These facts render Winklevoss\u2019 cited authority inapposite. Those cases all involved vague complaints that were clarified by later fact discovery, or that, liberally construed, held the potential for coverage from the very beginning. See Travelers, 974 F.2d at 829 (<HOLDING>); Kufalk, 636 F.Supp. at 311-12 (complaint\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that unintended damage to a pipeline caused by the defective coating supplied by insureds subsidiary was caused by an occurrence within the meaning of the liability policy 1: holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool 2: holding that the complaints allegations that the lithograde polystyrene sheets supplied by penda were unusable and unacceptable could be read to claim property injury in light of deposition testimony that plaintiff sought compensation for damages caused by the defective sheets 3: holding that a  1983 claim for damages was not prohibited by claim preclusion because the plaintiff could not have sought damages in his prior article 78 proceeding arising out of the same facts 4: recognizing cause of action for products liability in the absence of privity of contract in light of the foreseeable risk of harm caused by defective automobiles", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "through the courts. {13} Finding that the issue was adequately preserved also complies with the New Mexico appellate courts\u2019 approach to \u201cconstrue the rules of appellate procedure liberally so that causes on appeal may be determined on their merits.\u201d Danzer v. Prof'l Insurors, Inc., 101 N.M. 178, 180, 679 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1984), (cited with approval in Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 2002-NMSC-021, \u00b6 10, 132 N.M. 401, 49 P.3d 662 (2002)). {14} Finally, and alternatively, the Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically authorize this Court, at our discretion, to review an issue that was not properly preserved if the issue is of \u201cgeneral public interest.\u201d Rule 12-216(B); see also Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 111 N.M. 536, 539, 807 P.2d 234, 237 (Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 96 N.M. 65, 67, Holdings: 0: holding that when an agency fails to follow the proper procedure under the illinois administrative procedure act for the adoption of rules the rule is invalid 1: holding that the rules governing pleading in a workmens compensation case do not mirror the pennsylvania rules of civil procedure and that pleadings in compensation cases should be liberally construed 2: holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement 3: holding that question involving procedure required of workers compensation agency to promulgate valid rules was of general public interest 4: recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "his arrest. Likewise, I agree with Justice Woodall\u2019s rejection of the reliance in the main opinion upon the fact of a subsequent indictment as prima facie evidence of probable cause for an antecedent arrest. As the court in Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 307 n. 13 (6th Cir.2005), recently noted: \u201c[N]either the Supreme Court, nor this court, has ever held that a subsequent grand jury indictment can establish probable cause for an earlier arrest. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960) (evaluating probable cause based on the circumstances at the time of arrest despite the fact that the defendant was later indicted by a federal grand jury); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 374 Holdings: 0: holding that the dismissal of an indictment did not negate the presumption of probable cause 1: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 2: holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest 3: holding that in the absence of a prior indictment probable cause for arrest is determined by the facts in the sworn complaint 4: holding that there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because the facts of the case amounted to a contract dispute", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over\u201d the gun. See Hadley, 431 F.3d at 507. Because we conclude that the foregoing evidence was sufficient to support the jury\u2019s guilty verdict, we need not resolve the question of whether Newsom\u2019s failure to stop the vehicle promptly, his furnishing of false identification, and his evasiveness in responding to the officer\u2019s questions could also support his conviction. D. Propriety of Newsom\u2019s sentence Newsom was sentenced in December of 2004, a month before Booker was decided. He argues, and the government concedes, that this court\u2019s post-Booker cases require us to vacate his sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 529 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). No such evidence has been presented in this Holdings: 0: holding that the mandatory nature of the united states sentencing guidelines resulted in violations of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial and rendering the guidelines advisory 1: recognizing that under the booker remedial regime  the guidelines are no longer mandatory but are only advisory 2: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory 3: holding that the fact that a sentence imposed under the prebooker mandatory guideline regime was at the bottom of the mandatory range is not enough to create a reasonable probability that the defendant would have received a different sentence upon resentencing under an advisory guidelines system 4: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir.1998). 2 . On April 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed another action against various government employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. See Complaint, Bussie v. Government Accountability Office, No. 14-CV-2665 (E.D.N.Y.2014). By Memorandum and Order dated May 23, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered Plaintiff to pay the $400 filing fee in order to proceed with that action. 3 . Plaintiff is advised that even a fee-paid pro se complaint may be dismissed sua sponte if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or if the complaint is frivolous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir.2000) Holdings: 0: recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff 1: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived 2: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 3: holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure 4: holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.1981) (\"Even where certain matters are clearly within the protected sphere of legitimate public interest, some private facts about an individual may lie outside that sphere.... Because each member of our society at some time engages in an activity that fairly could be characterized as a matter of legitimate public concern, to permit that activity to open the door to the exposure of any truthful secret about that person would render meaningless the tort of public disclosure of private facts.\"); Doe v. Gangland Prods., Inc., 730 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir.2013) (\"'The newsworthiness inquiry focuses on the particular fact at issue that was disclosed, not on the general topic of the publication.\"); Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1212 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). 34 The Virgil court ultimately concluded that Holdings: 0: holding that there must be a legitimate and substantial goal of the measure in question 1: holding that every private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful newsworthy publication must have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest emphasis omitted 2: recognizing that some police records must remain secret and free from public inspection as a matter of public policy 3: holding that parties to contract intend every clause to have some effect 4: holding that speech addressing a private interest within a letter containing matters of public interest was protected and noting that we have emphasized that speech of public importance is only transformed into a matter of private concern when it is motivated solely by the speakers personal interests quotations omitted", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 7201 because there is no affirmative act of evasion or an intent to evade the payment of taxes. Yet, the drug dealer could be prosecuted under \u00a7 7206(5) for lying about the \"source of funds\u201d because that statute punishes any person who falsifies any document relating to the financial condition of the taxpayer submitted in connection with an offer-in-compromise. See Tr. of 9/17/10 Hr\u2019g at 47-48. 7 . See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (\u201cThis Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecutes [sic] under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.\u201d); United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 45-46, 73 S.Ct. 77, 97 L.Ed. 61 (1952) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 342-43 Holdings: 0: holding that false statements are constitutionally protected 1: holding state actor could be liable for retaliation for making false statements to plaintiffs employer causing her to be fired 2: holding that defendant could be charged for making false statements to treasury officials under the tax evasion statute or the statute prohibiting false statements to government officials 3: holding that an attorney who made false representations to a court did not violate okla rpc 33 because that rule addresses professional misconduct as an advocate for making false statements to a tribunal not false statements by a lawyer as a witness 4: holding that various law enforcement personnel and judges were victims of the crime of making false statements to a government agency for purposes of  3a12a where the defendant made false statements about the officials to the irs causing the irs to investigate the officials certainly had the effect of making these individuals the defendants victims", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "P. 26.02(1) placed the initial burden on the Boyd parties to establish that the requested documents contained information relevant to (1) Comdata\u2019s obligations under the Marketing Services Agreement, (2) Comdata\u2019s representations that induced the Boyd parties to approve the assignment of the contracts to Comdata and to sign the Guaranty Agreement, and (3) the Boyd parties\u2019 obligations under the Guaranty Agreement. The Boyd parties have not carried this burden. The rights and obligations of the parties to a written contract are governed by the terms of the contract, Hillsboro Plaza Enters, v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993), not by the parties\u2019 statements during their negotiations or drafts of the final contract. Faithful v. Gardner, 799 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>); GRW Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 797 S.W.2d 606, Holdings: 0: recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing 1: holding that the existence of a written contract gives rise to the presumption that the parties have reduced their prior agreements to writing 2: holding that failure to appoint second counsel under section 3005 gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice 3: holding that the rules of contract law are applicable to plea agreements 4: holding that the existence of a valid contract bars the imposition of a constructive trust because quasicontractual claims such an unjust enrichment are not permitted if a written contract between the parties governs the subject matter of their dispute", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "decision to address that question. DISCUSSION Applicable Legal Standard Debtors seek approval of all aspects of the merger under Section 363, which provides, in relevant part, that \u201c[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.\u201d 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 363(b)(1). Although Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code does not set forth a standard for determining when it is appropriate for a court to authorize the sale, disposition, or other use of a debtor\u2019s assets, courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere have required that it be based upon the sound business judgment of the debtor. See Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 973 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. Holdings: 0: holding that there is no rational reason for the retroactive application of 80173 and the prospective application of 833 1: holding retroactive application 2: holding that a judge reviewing a section 363b application must find from the evidence presented a good business reason to grant such application 3: holding no retroactive application 4: recognizing that application of section 507a7 should be coincidental with application of section 523a5 because of identical language in the two statutes", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argues that special circumstances are established in this case by evidence that Ms. Patterson knew that Marquette had the shotgun and knew that he had made a statement about shooting the police. Thus, Finley argues, Ms. Patterson must have known that harm to Finley was imminent. For one to have a duty to warn, however, one must have a reasonable opportunity to warn. See Richard C. Tinney, Liability to Police\u2014Owner or Occupant, 30 A.L.R.4th 81, 97 (1984) (citing Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn.1979)). Finley offered evidence that Ms. Patterson, although she was over 80 years holding homeowners not liable to member of police SWAT team who was shot by the homeowners\u2019 son while the officer responded in his professional capacity); Chapman v. Craig, 431 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 1988) (<HOLDING>); Hannah v. Jensen, 298 N.W.2d 52 (Minn.1980) Holdings: 0: holding a landlord liable for injuries sustained in the laundry room of an apartment complex 1: holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer 2: holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident 3: holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest 4: holding that injuries sustained when a bouncer grabbed a bar patron in a  bear hug  to stop a fight did not arise out of the originating fight", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ink addressing each other\u2019s contentions, but the dispute about the supplemental affidavit is immaterial to the resolution of this appeal. Even if the second affidavit was legally defective (because it was unsworn and uncertified), the return of service and original affidavit Relational offered were sufficient to discharge its prima facie burden. To make a prima facie showing, the movant must simply produce a return of service identifying the recipient and noting when and where service occurred, thereby providing enough detail so the opposing party knows what evidence he must rebut. See Homer, 415 F.3d at 754 (suggesting a bare-bones return of service lacking an address or a receiving individual might be insufficient to discharge the prima facie burden); cf. Robinson, 223 F.3d at 451-53 (<HOLDING>). Relational\u2019s original return of service and Holdings: 0: holding that an affidavit did not provide probable cause sufficient to validate a warrant where the affidavit stated an incorrect date uncontradicted by any other specific fact in the affidavit 1: recognizing that a default judgment based on improper service is void 2: holding that it was improper for the court to grant a default judgment where the process server stated in his affidavit that he served an unidentified individual 3: holding that an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is not served at least one day before the hearing is barred by the civil practice act from consideration as evidence unless the record discloses the trial court in the exercise of its discretion has allowed the affidavit to be served and considered 4: holding that an individual who is not served cannot be at fault or negligent in allowing a default judgment to be rendered", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "States ex rel. Sanders v. East Ala. Healthcare Auth., 953 F.Supp. 1404, 1413 (M.D.Ala.1996). Even after having given due weight to the liberal requirements of notice pleading discussed above, the court finds that Morrow\u2019s pleading of fraudulent concealment is inadequate. Morrow\u2019s allegation consists of one sentence and provides no \u201cdetails of the defendant\u2019s allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in them.\u201d Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 568 (11th Cir.1994) (finding claim that made only general, conclusory allegations of fraud to be inadequate). Some further level of precision, other than a blunderbuss allegation, is necessary. See, e.g., Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Morrow does not assert that her Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint satisfied rule 9b because it identified the misrepresentations at issue the specific dates on which they were made and the specific persons responsible for making them 1: holding that a plaintiff satisfied rule 9b by pleading which machines were the subject of alleged fraudulent transactions and the nature and subject of the alleged misrepresentations 2: holding that although plaintiff did not list dates places or times of fraudulent acts he nonetheless adequately satisfied the requirements of rule 9b by incorporating into the complaint a list identifying with great specificity the pieces of machinery that were the subject of the alleged fraud 3: holding that documents affixed to complaint that contained alleged misrepresentations satisfied rule 9b 4: recognizing that where fraud counts incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs of complaint an examination of the entire complaint is necessary to determine if pleading requirements of rule 9b are satisfied", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Mindful of these words, it should be noted that the application of the federal common law developed by the district court in the context of the instant case would not impose any conflicting or undue burdens on plans or plan sponsors. As the ensuing discussion shows, however, the district court has presented a persuasive argument as to why the doctrine of substantial compliance may significantly impact the purposes of ERISA and thus, merit the development of federal common law. 23 . In Singer, we went on to say that the prediction that \"use of preempted state commonlaw doctrines to shape a federal common law of ERISA would frustrate Congress's goal of uniformity is unfounded.\u201d Singer, 964 F.2d at 1453. 24 .Citing Wilkie v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 382, 197 S.E. 375 (1938) (<HOLDING>), and York v. Summer, 195 S.C. 413, 11 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an insured has substantially complied with the change of beneficiary provisions of a life insurance policy when he has done all that he could to comply with the provisions 1: holding that the claimant committed willful misconduct when she did not return to work at the end of her leave and did not comply with her employers notification policy 2: holding that regardless of the subjective belief of the insured the record established a basis to believe that the insured had committed an act that could give rise to a claim under the policy 3: holding that insured had not substantially complied with the policys change of beneficiary provisions when the hospitalized insured was physically unable to leave her bed and was unable to retrieve the policy from her lock box at the bank to return to the company for endorsement as required by the terms of the policy 4: holding that insured substantially complied with the manner of changing the beneficiary as required by the policy", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1. 36 . See Guard v. P & R Enterprises, Inc., 631 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Alaska 1981). 37 . City of Whittier v. Whittier Fuel & Marine Corp., 577 P.2d 216, 223 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Or. 182, 229 P.2d 255, 263 (1951)), disapproved of on other grounds by Native Alaskan Reclamation & Pest Control, Inc. v. United Bank Alaska, 685 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1984). 38 . 631 P.2d at 1072 (first citing Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61, 64-65 (1st Cir. 1953); Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1977); El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261 N.W.2d 358, 364 (1978)\u201c; then citing Gen. Elec. Supply Co. v. Mt. Wheeler Power, Inc., 94 Nev. 766, 587 P.2d 1312, 1313 (1978)); see also Sisters of Providence in Wash., 81 P.3d at 1007 (<HOLDING>), 39 . Guard, 631 P.2d at 1072 n.4 (citing Holdings: 0: holding that expert testimony accompanied by the testimony of two doctors with similar practices and defendants preliminary revenue estimates supported a finding of lost profits 1: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 2: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 3: holding on similar facts that the evidence supported a finding that the plaintiffs subpoenaed testimony was spoken as a private citizen 4: holding expert testimony remedies speculation by the court", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) (\u201cA party ... shall be treated as the prevailing party if the liability of the taxpayer pursuant to the judgment in the proceeding ... is equal to or less than the liability of the taxpayer which would have been so determined if the United States had accepted a 'qualified offer of the party!.]\u201d). This statute does not require any minimum amount or define the parameters of a \u201creasonable\u201d offer, nor does it require that an offer be for a certain percentage of the taxpayer\u2019s purported liability. See I.R.C. \u00a7 7430(e)(4)(E)(i). Indeed, the Government has offered no amount with respect to I.R.C \u00a7 7430, \u201cfees are incurred when there is a legal obligation to pay them.\u201d Estate of Palumbo, 675 F.3d at 239-40; see also Morrison v. Comm\u2019r, 565 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). In this case, BASR \u201cincurred\u201d litigation Holdings: 0: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed 1: holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees 2: recognizing that the party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving entitlement to those fees 3: holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees 4: holding that taxpayer incurs attorney fees if he assumes either 1 a noncontingent obligation to repay the fees advanced on his behalf at some later time or 2 a contingent obligation to repay the fees in the event of their eventual recovery", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and impeachment material. Judge Tatel authored section I and sections II.D, II.E, II.F, and II.G- on limits on cross-examination, admission of audiotapes, testimony of Detective Rawls, and proof of age. 2 . The government attributed the murder only to White, Hughes and Ballard. Because Ballard pled guilty in the middle of trial, it might seem that the back-up \"clear and convincing\" finding as to White and Hughes would moot the standard of proof issue. But defendants challenge the court's finding on a factual basis, and it is appropriate for us, in conducting that review, to be clear on the standard that the district court was to apply. Our review of the district court's factual finding, of course, is for clear error. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 3 . To the extent that Thevis endorses Holdings: 0: holding that because of the factbound nature of the inquiry determination of voluntariness of consent to search is reviewed for clear error 1: recognizing that the ultimate question of the voluntariness of consent is one of law 2: holding that findings of fact are reviewed for clear error 3: holding that the evidence raised the issue of voluntariness of consent even though the officers comments were in response to an inquiry by the suspect 4: holding that a district courts determination as to the applicability of a privilege is reviewed for clear error", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "under the ordinance.\u201d Nevertheless, she claims that her expressive interests were restricted because some people who had been given a notice of trespass could not attend a rally she held on Church Street to oppose the ordinance. Appellants cite the United States Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision, McCullen v. Coakley, _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014), as evidence that Ms. Baird has standing to challenge the ordinance. McCullen dealt with a Massachusetts statute that made it a crime to knowingly stand within thirty-five feet of an entrance or driveway to a reproductive health care facility. Id. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2525. The Court ruled that the law expressly \u201crestricts access to traditional public fora and is therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny.\u201d Id. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 252 5) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 16. Appellants next assert that Mr. Carter Holdings: 0: holding that defendant could not assert statutory affirmative defense enacted three years after claim accrued because such would affect vested rights and substantive law 1: holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area 2: holding that contraceptive providers could assert rights of patients in part because patients rights would otherwise be diluted 3: holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party 4: holding that it is well settled that while one tenant in common may acquire homestead rights in the common property the rights so acquired are not superior to the rights and remedies of the other joint owners he can acquire no such rights as will prejudice or in anywise interfere with the rights of the other tenants in common", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "definition of moral turpitude should be for our purposes, it should be clear that its application as an aggravating factor should occur only where the facts warrant our strongest condemnation. In addition, if fraud is a touchstone, it indicates that a finding of moral turpitude requires this Court to look beyond the sanctionable conduct itself and examine, as well, the intent underlying the behavior in question. \u00b6 26. In line with that principle, this Court has said that a finding of moral turpitude requires a determination of \u201cwhether a judge\u2019s conduct crosses the line from simple negligence or mistake, to willful conduct which takes advantage of a judge\u2019s position for greed or other inappropriate motives.\u201d Miss. Comm\u2019n on Judicial Performance v. Gordon, 955 So.2d 300, 305 (Miss.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, heightened sanctions may be appropriate Holdings: 0: recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude 1: holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude 2: holding that fixing tickets by passing them to the inactive files without requiring the defendants to appear in court and over the objections of the issuing officer constituted moral turpitude 3: recognizing that misdemeanor of passing bad checks totaling 250 constituted crime of moral turpitude 4: holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "consent must be clearly, unequivocally expressed. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360-61. Waivers are narrowly construed and almost never implied. Further, a State\u2019s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of its immunity in federal courts. See, e.g., Florida Dept, of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Assoc., 450 U.S. 147, 150, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034-35, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (per curiam); Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464-65, 65 S.Ct. at 350-51; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S.Ct. 873, 877, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944). [I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts____ [A] c . 58, 64-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308-10, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Section 1983 provides a federal forum to Holdings: 0: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983 1: holding that the eleventh amendment protects both states and state officials acting in their official capacity from suits brought pursuant to 42 usc  1983 2: holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 3: holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages 4: holding that under authority of will v michigan dept of state police 491 us 58 71 109 sct 2304 105 led2d 45 1989 neither the state nor state public service commission officials acting in their official capacities are persons subject to suit under  1983", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "order issued in Dormescar TV. 11 . Dormescar did not argue to the IJ or the Board that because he was convicted of counterfeiting in 2007 but was not deemed admitted until the Board issued its September 9, 2008 order, he had not been \"convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission.\u201d 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). Because Dormescar did not raise that issue before the IJ or the Board, we cannot and do not consider it here. See Sundar v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir.2003) (\"[W]e lack jurisdiction to consider claims that have not been raised before the BIA.\u201d). Nor did he raise the issue before this Court, which is another reason we do not consider it. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (11th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 Holdings: 0: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding arguments not raised on appeal waived 2: holding that an issue not raised on appeal is waived 3: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal 4: holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "raised by the district court is the dispositive question of the ease. B. Attenuation Analysis \u201cUnder the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, all evidence derived from the exploitation of an illegal search or seizure must be suppressed, unless the government shows that there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to refute the inference that the evidence was a product of the constitutional violation.\u201d United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 597-603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)). A failure to knock and announce, leading to an unconstitutional arrest and search, may, if not too attenuated, require suppression of evidence. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968) (<HOLDING>). In resolving attenuation questions, this Holdings: 0: holding that evidence seized pursuant to a warrant based on materially false and misleading information is inadmissible at trial 1: holding that confronting a defendant with unlawfully seized evidence renders a subsequent statement involuntary and therefore inadmissible 2: holding that a warrant lacking a description of items to be seized was not facially invalid and finding in the alternative that even if the warrant were found to be deficient the seized evidence was admissible under the good faith exception 3: holding 15 to 20 seconds was reasonable amount of time for state police officers to wait before entering an apartment to execute a search warrant for drugs after knocking and announcing their presence 4: holding under  3901 that because officers entered without knocking and announcing the subsequent arrest was invalid and the evidence seized inadmissible", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "wholesale prices, noting that such a rate \u201cis simple to apply, and avoids the need to allocate costs among services.\u201d Local Competition Order \u00b6 916. The NCUC set AT & T North Carolina\u2019s discount rate at 21.5% for the residential services at issue here on December 23, 1996. In other words, if AT & T North Carolina sells a service to its residential retail customers for $100 a month, it must sell the same service to dPi and other resellers for $78.50. When AT & T North Carolina offers promotions to attract potential retail customers, and those promotions are available at retail for more than 90 days, AT & T North Carolina must also offer a promotional benefit to resellers, like dPi, who purchase services subject to the promotion. 47 C.F.R. \u00a7 51.613(a)(2); Sanford, 494 F.3d at 442 (<HOLDING>). When these promotions take the form of a Holdings: 0: recognizing that 90 per hour is a reasonable rate for a paralegal 1: holding that promotional offerings that exceed 90 days have the effect of changing the actual retail rate to which a wholesale requirement or discount must be applied 2: holding that sjince the consumer cannot obtain the right to occupy the room without paying the retail room rate charged by the otc that retail rate is the taxable amount or rent  where rent means the consideration received for occupancy valued in money 3: holding that the rent charged is the amount that a hotel room occupant paid to the otc not the negotiated wholesale rate 4: holding that with respect to the eaja the local or national market rate for legal services cannot be a special factor used to increase the rate beyond the statutory rate", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rule 42(b)(1) and 42(b)(2) certification. LSRC cannot\u2014having failed to move for a continuance, having agreed for the trial court to consider certification under rule 42(b)(1) and 42(b)(2) if LSRC were allowed to file a brief addressing those issues within two weeks of receiving a transcript of the class certification hearing, and having filed such a brief-now assert that the trial court erred by considering certification under rule 42(b)(1) and 42(b)(2). See In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (\u201cThe invited error doctrine applies to situations where a party requests the court to make a specific ruling, then complains of that ruling on appeal.\u201d); Keith v. Keith, 221 S.W.3d 156, 164 (Tex. App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We hold that LSRC waived its complaint that Holdings: 0: holding a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal 1: holding that a party may not raise a claim on appeal that was not presented to the trial court 2: holding that party who asked trial court to take certain action could not complain on appeal that action was wrong 3: recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court 4: holding that a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "J. The defendant, Richard Jackson, appeals from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 based on the trial court\u2019s determination that the motion was untimely. ' Because the record before this Court demonstrates that the motion was timely filed within the two-year time limit provided by rule 3.850 based on the \u201cmailbox rule,\u201d we reverse the order denying the defendant\u2019s motion for postconviction relief and remand for consideration on the merits. See Griffin v. Sistuenck, 816 So.2d 600, 601 (Fla.2002) (\u201cUnder the mailbox rule, a notice' is deemed filed when it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.\u201d); Haag v. State, 591 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992) (<HOLDING>); Lawson v. State, 107 So.3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that under the mailbox rule the date that a motion is placed into the hands of prison officials for filing is the date that the motion is considered filed 1: holding that under the mailbox rule a pro se inmates document is deemed filed at the moment in time when the inmate loses control over the document by entrusting its further delivery or processing which is usually when the inmate places the document in the hands of prison officials 2: holding the separate document rule violated when the alleged judgment was included with the memorandum and order of the court 3: holding that the date of filing is the time at which a pro se prisoner entrusts the document to prison officials for delivery 4: holding that in connection with a motion to dismiss the court may consider a document not attached to the pleadings where the plaintiffs claim depends on the contents of a document the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "character. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a)(1). The district court was within its statutory authority to sentence him to any term between ten years (120 months) and his natural life. 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(b). It sentenced him to a term of 180 months \u2014 a term within the lower half of his Guidelines sentence range. In fact, the court was not prohibited by the applicable Guidelines from sentencing to a term less than 180 months. Nothing in the record establishes a reasonable probability that, had the court considered the guidelines range as advisory rather than mandatory and taken into account any otherwise unconsidered \u00a7 3553 factors, it would have imposed a lesser sentence. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1302; compare United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1332-33, manuscript op. at 15 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Because appellant failed to establish Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory 1: holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines 2: holding that the sentencing courts expressions that the lowest sentence within the guidelines was too se vere was sufficient to show that the lower court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had not felt bound by the guidelines thus satisfying plain errors third prong 3: holding that when the trial court sentenced the defendant to prison under the belief that the lowest permissible sentence was a prison term but the lowest permissible sentence under a corrected scoresheet would be a nonprison sanction the court could not say that the same sentence would have been imposed had the trial court had the correct information 4: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": ". CAC \u00b6 59. 63 . See In re Ibis Tech. Sec. Litig. 422 F.Supp.2d 294, 313 n. 19 (D.Mass.2006) (citing In re Int\u2019l Bus. Mach. Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cA defendant, however, is liable only for those statements made during the class period.\u201d)). The court also discards Defendant Tobin\u2019s April 11, 2001, statement on identical grounds. 64 . CAC \u00b6 68 65 . Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., intended to provide shareholders with an avenue for relief against executives for alleged illegal practices or corporate mismanagement....\" Id. at 586 (quoting Galati v. Commerce Bancorp, Inc., No. 04-3252, 2005 WL 3797764, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov.7, 2005) (unpublished)); 77 . See Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 F.Supp. 241, 249 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (internal quotations omitted) (<HOLDING>). In that case, the Defendants were indicted, Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to anticipate future events did not constitute securities fraud 1: holding that the juvenile defendants who voluntarily left their homes in the middle of night to ride to the police department in patrol cars and who were told they were not under arrest were not in custody 2: holding that defendants were not in control and therefore were not supervisors and not subject to liability under  1983 3: holding that allegations that defendants designed and implemented improper accounting practices failed to state claim for securities fraud in absence of allegations of particular facts demonstrating how defendants knew of scheme at time they made their statements of compliance that they knew the financial statements overrepresented the companys true earnings or that they were aware of a gaap violation 4: holding in securities fraud case that defendants who were the subject of criminal investigation were not bound to predict the likelihood that they would be indicted but were required to disclose material facts that would potentially endanger the companys future financial performance", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "provided to Medved for editorial purposes. See Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 518. As for Myskina\u2019s other common law claims, it is settled that the only judicially recognized relief in New York for violations of a right to privacy or publicity are the protections afforded against the commercial misappropriation of a person\u2019s name or picture, as set forth in Sections 50 and 51. There is no independent common law cause of action in the right to privacy or publicity. See e.g., Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.1990) (\u201cNew York courts have indicated clearly that the Civil Rights Law preempts any common law right of publicity action. ...\u201d); Arrington, 55 N.Y.2d at 439, 449 N.Y.S.2d 941, 434 N.E.2d 1319; Grodin v. Liberty Cable, 244 A.D.2d 153, 154, 664 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1st Dep\u2019t 1997) (<HOLDING>). Under New York law, common law unjust Holdings: 0: holding that a preliminary injunction was a reasonable means of preserving the status quo and was of the same character as the ultimate relief sought when a few but not all of the causes of action in the complaint were of an equitable nature including causes of action for unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust 1: holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment 2: holding that where a prior agreement fixed the salary of the plaintiff plaintiff could not seek to recover for his services on a theory of unjust enrichment 3: holding that it was error not to dismiss plaintiffs causes of action for negligence and unjust enrichment there being no commonlaw right of privacy in new york where the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the unauthorized reuse of his image and voice in a television commercial 4: holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 155 (1979). 32 . Id. at cmt. b. See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ch. 6, introductory note at 379 (\u201cWhere, however, because of a mistake of both parties as to expression the writing fails to express an agreement that they have reached previously, the appropriate relief ordinarily takes the form of reformation of the writing to make it conform to their intention.\u201d). 33 . Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 158(2). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, ch. 6, introductory note at 381 (\"The rules governing [mistake] have traditionally been marked by flexibility and have conferred considerable discretion on the court.\u201d). 34 . Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 158 cmt. c. 35 . See, e.g., Ellingstad v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 979 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Alaska 1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 837 n. Holdings: 0: holding that contract terms themselves will be controlling when they establish the parties common meaning so that a reasonable person in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language 1: holding that parties to contract have an implied obligation to put forth a good faith effort to fulfill the conditions of the contract 2: recognizing that courts will not add terms to a contract about which the contract is silent 3: holding for purposes of contract clause analysis a statute can be said to impair a contract when it alters the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties 4: holding that where contract silent court may supply reasonable term to fulfill parties expectations", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "PER CURIAM. Grant Leon Turner appeals his convictions and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and retaliating against a witness, victim or informant. On appeal, he argues that (1) the district court erred in publishing to the jury a transcript of a recording admitted into evidence and (2) the district court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), by sentencing him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e) (1994) even though the issue of his prior convictions was not submitted to the jury. We ons that qualify the defendant for an armed career criminal sentence need not be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We decline Turner\u2019s invitation to reconsider Holdings: 0: holding that where a sentence was enhanced under 18 usc  924e for prior convictions absent statutory language authorizing collateral attacks defendant could not challenge prior conviction except for gideon error 1: holding that apprendi did not affect enhanced sentence under  924e 2: holding that use under  924e requires active employment 3: holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e 4: holding apprendi is not retroactive", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Lester and had received an automobile ride to her house in the mid-morning of the day of the murder; on the way, he purchased a bottle of wine. Late in the afternoon, Reid was observed walking from the direction of Lester\u2019s house, drunk and covered in blood. The blood on Reid\u2019s clothing was later determined to be consistent with Lester\u2019s DNA. Reid\u2019s fingerprints were found in blood on the telephone in Lester\u2019s bedroom, his saliva was found on a cigarette butt left in the room, and his handwriting was found on pieces of paper in the house. Reid, who claimed to have no memory of Lester\u2019s murder, subsequently entered an Alford plea to one count each of capital murder, attempted rape, and attempted robbery. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (<HOLDING>). After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge Holdings: 0: holding that district courts failure to advise defendant of right to plead not guilty and right against selfincrimination were implicit in the courts discussion of the rights he would lose if he pleaded guilty 1: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder 2: holding that the applicant had not demonstrated the government was unable or unwilling to control the perpetrators where he contended that the police failed to investigate his reports but admitted that he did not give the police the names of any suspects because he did not know any specific names and his wife testified that the police investigated the complaints but were ultimately unable to solve the crimes 3: holding that a request for an instruction on entrapment should be refused even if there is evidence to support the defense if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constituting the crime that is charged 4: holding that a defendant may plead guilty even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "legal remedy. Riverwoods, L.L.C. v. County of Charleston, 349 S.C. 378, 563 S.E.2d 651 (2002); City of Rock Hill v. Thompson, 349 S.C. 197, 563 S.E.2d 101 (2002); Exparte Littlefield, 343 S.C. 212, 540 S.E.2d 81 (2000); Redmond v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. No. 4, 314 S.C. 431, 445 S.E.2d 441 (1994). Upon the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Clerk of Court should verify the document contains a case caption, a proper county designation, and the signature of the filing party, and should forward a copy of the petition to the Attorney General\u2019s Office. S.C. Clerk of Court Manual \u00a7 6.24. Because petitioner failed to name the Clerk of Court as a party or serve his petition for a writ of mandamus on her, he may not seek mandamus relief as to her. Thompson, supra (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the 2004 habeas petition became Holdings: 0: holding the completely fully fairly element is met if the party against whom preclusion is sought had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue 1: holding party seeking disqualification waives attorneyclient privilege as to the court so the court may assess the contents of allegedly confidential information and the party may present the information either in a hearing out of the presence of the party against whom confidentiality is to be protected or in camera inspection 2: holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought 3: holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it 4: holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "but the plaintiffs have alleged no facts that would bring their claim within the exception. See id. (describing a \u201climited exception to the general rule\u201d where employees of a corporate employer have an independent personal stake and \u201cstand to benefit from conspiring with the corporation to restrain trade\u201d). Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint fails to state a claim under \u00a7 1. Section 13a, which is a section of the Robinson-Patman Act, prohibits the sale of goods \u201cat unreasonably low prices for the pui\u2019pose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 13a. However, plaintiffs may not bring a civil claim under \u00a7 13a because it is reserved for criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice. See Safeway Stores v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389, 389-90, 78 S.Ct. 358, 2 L.Ed.2d 350 (1958) (<HOLDING>); Thomas V. Vakerics, Antitrust Basics \u00a7 8.10 Holdings: 0: recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations 1: holding that no civil action exists for sales at unreasonably low prices under  13a 2: holding that no private right of action exists 3: holding that a private right of action exists 4: holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Second, the court found that the \u201cmovement\u201d heard in the mobile home during the raid provided an exigent circumstance that justified the officers\u2019 forcible entry. In contrast to the panel opinion, I find these \u201cattenuation\u201d questions to be the dispositive issues before this court, but, on the facts presented, conclude that the district court erred in its determination. As the panel is in agreement that there was a constitutional violation from the officers\u2019 attempt at entry, the predicate for the district court\u2019s reasonableness argument falls away. The district court held that \u201cif the attempt is never significant, the forty-five second period between announcement and actual entry is plainly reasonable under Jones.\u201d See United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In other words, if there was no Holdings: 0: holding that after properly knocking and announcing officers need only wait fifteen to twenty seconds before entering 1: holding that reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to wait indefinitely for the plaintiffs medical conditions to be corrected 2: holding that an officers decision to shoot within a reaction time of 272 seconds was reasonable even if hindsight showed that the officer could have escaped unharmed 3: holding that an employer need not wait indefinitely for  medical conditions to be corrected 4: holding that the statements of a scared to death declarant whispering help me to police officers twenty hours after being assaulted were excited utterances", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "489, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Airborne argues that, as a courier service, its activities are analogous to those of the U.S. Postal Service, and that the court\u2019s inquiry should, therefore, focus on the same considerations that would apply in determining whether immunity is available to the government mail service. Airborne, however, is not being sued in this case for its activities in delivering mail. Rather, plaintiffs have sued Airborne for being a private actor enlisted by law enforcement to make an allegedly unlawful arrest. It is this latter, functional description of Airborne\u2019s role in the circumstances that precipitated this action that defines the relevant class of private actors for the purposes of determining whether qualified immunity is available to Airborne. Cf. id. (<HOLDING>). Although it is presumably common place for Holdings: 0: holding in  1983 action against board of directors of state racing commission that availability of qualified immunity would be determined on basis of board members status as corporate officers not their status as parties engaged in horse racing 1: holding that where approval of the board of directors was not formally requested a demand would have been futile for it could hardly be expected that if approval of the board of directors were sought defendant who controlled 50 of the board would have authorized the action against himself 2: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board 3: recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing 4: holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The Appellants contend that the accident report was not listed as an exhibit because the Appellee had admitted liability. The accident report became imperative only as rebuttal to the Appellee\u2019s claims of insignificant damage resulting from the accident. Under these circumstances, and consistent with our conclusions regarding the severity of the lower court\u2019s sanction for discovery violations on the issue of introduction of medical bills, we conclude that the trial court also abused its discretion and committed reversible error by excluding the accident report. The report was of \u201ca critical nature, so that there is no reasonable assurance that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been admitted.\u201d Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion Based upon the foregoing, we Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was harmless error 1: holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error 2: holding in all cases that where the evidence of guilt was sufficient any error in the exclusion of lastminute evidence and testimony was harmless error 3: holding that accident report was necessary to presentation of case and exclusion was in error 4: holding exclusion was not ambiguous", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on the part of D & J to use electricity safely and that this independent duty arises out of the agreement to purchase the electricity. We view this testimony as describing nothing more than the general duty that every member of society owes to every other member \u2014 the duty not to harm him through tortious acts. Such a general duty does not support a right of indemnity in a case where the would-be indemnitor is an \u201cemployer\u201d covered by the workmen\u2019s compensation law. Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 534 F.2d 775, 783 (8th Cir.1976) (quoting Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Grolier, Inc., 501 F.2d 434, 438 (8th Cir.1974)). The testimony does not describe a duty that is of a \u201cspecific, defined nature\u201d which would support a claim of indemnity against an employer. See Hysell, 534 F.2d at 782 (<HOLDING>); see also Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Holdings: 0: holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties 1: holding that such a duty exists 2: holding that the failure to act in good faith  does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract 3: holding that jailers had no independent duty to investigate 4: holding that an employer through its employees did not breach an independent duty to power company not to come in contact with power companys transmission lines because such a duty is a general duty not an independent one", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(1983). \u201cIf the statute contains an express preemption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress\u2019 preemptive intent,\u201d CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The ICCTA, effective January 1, 1996, abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission and created the Surface Transportation Board. 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 10101 et seq. Section 10501(b) provides: \u201c(b) The jurisdiction of the [Surface Transportation] Board over\u2014 \u201c(1) transportation by rail earners, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other o , 297 F.Supp.2d 326, 334 (D.Maine 2003)(<HOLDING>); Guckenberg v. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd., 178 Holdings: 0: holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with respect to operation of side track 1: holding that the iccta preempted statelaw nuisance claim with regard to railway traffic 2: holding that the iccta preempted statelaw negligence and nuisance claims intended to interfere with railroads operation of switchyard 3: holding that the iccta preempted statelaw tortiousinterference claim 4: holding that the iccta preempted statelaw claims alleging tortious interference and seeking punitive damages", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that \u201c[i]f these two elements were deemed sufficient to constitute the enumerated offense of kidnapping, then dissimilar state kidnapping offenses would be treated identically for purposes of the [crime of violence] enhancement,\u201d which \u201cwould be inconsistent with the Sentencing Guideline\u2019s goals of uniformity and predictability.\u201d Id.' \u201cA two-element definition of kidnapping would sweep more broadly than the generic, contemporary meaning of the crime.\u201d Id. In order -to qualify as an enumerated offense of kidnapping, the statute must contain \u201c[additional aggravating elements, such as the second and fourth elements identified in Gonzalez-Ramirez, or the specified purpose requirements of the MPC definition.\u201d Id.; accord United States v. Najera-Mendoza, 683 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). As previously set forth, the Florida statute Holdings: 0: holding on plainerror review an oklahoma statute for assault and battery was equivalent to the enumerated offense 1: holding that various versions of the statute qualify as an exemption 3 statute 2: holding that the oklahoma wiretap statute like the federal statute authorizes wiretaps within the territorial jurisdiction where the contents were first heard 3: holding that attempted burglary is a violent felony under the armed career criminal act because like the enumerated crimes it creates significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury emphasis added 4: holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "function, its proper course was to require an additional labeling statement. But, as explained below, this argument is rejected because the agency can only require additional labeling when an intended use \u201cis not identified in the proposed labeling,\u201d 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360c(i)(l)(E), whereas here the agency found the CS device to have a new intended use identified in the proposed labeling. 8 . Ivy suggests that the FDA should have limited itself only to the Indications for Use, \"which is the only document that is actually attached to the substantial equivalence detenmination.\u201d (Dkt. No. 62, at 43). But the company failed to address Supreme Court precedent contradicting this argument and cited by the agency. See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349, 69 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed. 52 (1948) (<HOLDING>). 9 . Ivy claims that Dr. Shuren came to his Holdings: 0: holding that when an agency is charged with administering a statute part of the authority it receives is the power to give reasonable content to the statutes textual ambiguities 1: holding that a substantive due process challenge is unavailable where there is an explicit textual source of constitutional protection 2: holding that it is not 3: holding no physical attachment one to the other is necessaryf it is the textual relationship that is significant 4: holding that for material accompanying a device no physical attachment is necessary it is the textual relationship that is significant", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and accuracy of official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that they be treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification. The trial judge admitted the passports, over Kea\u2019s objection, holding that he did not accept the passports as official documents of the United States or a foreign government, but as notations concerning arrivals and departures. However, the notations of arrivals and departures were purportedly made by an agent of the Turkish government. The stamps should have been accompanied by a final certificate in accordance with Mississippi Rule of Evidence 902(3). See Overseas Trust Bank Ltd. v. Poon, 181 A.D.2d 762, 763, 581 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1992) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 16. The passports should not have been Holdings: 0: holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed 1: holding that a passport is not competent evidence to prove the defendant was not in thailand absent proof by thai authorities that if the defendant had entered or exited thailand an entry would have been placed on his passport 2: holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served 3: holding that it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to admit the passport as evidence that defendant could not have been served with process in new york because she had been in hong kong the defendant offered no attestation or testimonial authentication by the hong kong authorities who had affixed the stamps on her passport 4: holding that default judgment could not be rendered after the defendant had served plaintiff with a copy of a motion to dismiss that had not then been filed", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that betokens a significant deprivation of freedom, \u201csuch that [an] innocent person could reasonably have believed that he [or she] was not free to go and that he [or she] was being taken into custody indefinitely,\u201d Kraus v. County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir.1986). See also Delmondo, 54 Haw. at 557, 512 P.2d at 554 (observing that officer \u201ctook custody of the defendant and his cohort by obliging them to leave the toilet stall, stand against a wall, and generally to remain subject to his directions\u201d and holding that \u201c[t]his type of action, despite the absence of the magic words (\u2018I place you under arrest\u2019 etc.), is an arrest, where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go\u201d); State v. Crowder, 1 Haw.App. 60, 64-65, 613 P.2d 909, 912-13 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Cf. State v. Groves, 65 Haw. 104, 649 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him 1: holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station 2: holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave 3: holding that defendant was arrested  when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there 4: holding that defendant was in custody when police questioned him in his bedroom late at night", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See also Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). 23 . The Court and the parties agree that this Court lacks jurisdiction under section 1442 pertinent part: \"A 'governmental unit' includes the following: United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States ... a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government....\" Id. 29 . Cal. Gov\u2019t Code \u00a7 16271(d). 30 . See Jared Eigerman, \"California Counties: Second-Rate Localities or Ready-Made Regional Governments?,\u201d 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 621, 670 (1999) (\"Eigerman, California Counties\u201d) (\"Califo de Fajardo v. Mora, 805 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); In re Sampson, 17 B.R. 528, 531 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the regulatory scheme created by the ina is so pervasive as to be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration 1: holding that a commission is a body with special and limited power and it can only exercise the power expressly or impliedly granted to it and any reasonable doubt of existence of any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof 2: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power 3: holding that the states allegation that the congressional act at issue that went beyond the power of congress and impinged on that of the state  did not suffice as a basis for invoking an exercise of judicial power 4: holding that a breach of contract action by the department of health for the commonwealth of puerto rico did not qualify as an exercise of police or regulatory power even if related to the departments general regulatory power", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "whether or not there was an unlawful warrantless entry into Cummings\u2019 home, but this allegation was not raised in the counts recited in the complaint, and this Court sees no need to expand upon issues which were not raised. On appeal, Defendants cite to the magistrate judge\u2019s statement and argue that this Court should not entertain on appeal Cummings\u2019 claim for unlawful entry. We disagree. As an initial matter, the magistrate judge\u2019s decision not to address the claim is irrelevant to the question of whether this Court may address it on appeal. We apply a \u201ccourse of the proceedings\u201d test to determine whether defendants in a \u00a7 1983 action have received notice of the plaintiffs claims where the complaint is ambiguous. Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Here, regardless of the fact that Cummings Holdings: 0: holding a complaint against a public official or employee must explicitly state it as being brought against the person in the persons individual capacity or else the complaint will be construed as suing the person only in the persons official capacity 1: holding that a plaintiff who wishes to sue a state official in his personal capacity must so specify in her complaint so that if a plaintiffs complaint is silent about the capacity in which she is suing the defendant we interpret the complaint as including only officialcapacity claims 2: recognizing that when a state employee is sued in his official capacity the state is the real party in interest and as a result the eleventh amendment is implicated 3: holding that a state officer sued in his individual capacity may be held personally liable for damages under 42 usc  1983 based upon actions taken in his official capacity 4: holding that failure to explicitly state in complaint whether a defendant is being sued in his or her individual capacity is not fatal if the course of the proceedings otherwise indicate that the defendant received sufficient notice", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "suits for the purpose of finality and appealability. We first adopted this rule in Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.1976), when we held that, because the claims resolved by the district court and those remaining in that court had been severed pursuant to Rule 21, that court\u2019s judgment was \u201cfinal and properly appealable.\u201d Id. at 17. This rule enjoys continued vitality. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, Inc., 209 F.3d 1008, 1014 n. 8 (7th Cir.2000) (\u201cIf the district court severed [the claims against the successor corporation] under Rule 21, then it created two separate actions, each capable of reaching final judgment and being appealed.\u201d). The district court clearly and unambiguously classified its severance order as one \u201cpursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.\u201d R.168 at 1, 7 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because \u201cthe district court Holdings: 0: holding that the separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to establish jurisdiction 1: holding that because the trials of the individual claims may expose issues of systemic violation that would cause the district court to reconsider its decision to dismiss plaintiffs claims against the state defendants in their entirety severance under rule 21 was inappropriate instead construing the district courts order as an order for separate trials under rule 42b such that the individual claims may not be appealed until a final judgment has been rendered in the entire action 2: holding the indemnification claims to be severable under rule 21 from the primary liability inquiry 3: holding that because they are distinct and separate it had broad discretion  under rule 21 to sever the plaintiffs claims against riverboat from what remained of the plaintiffs claims against showboat 4: holding that a refusal to separate out time spent on distinct claims is within the trial courts discretion if the claims are so factually imbricated  as to make separate treatment of the constituent attorney time inappropriate", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "some ambiguity in the cases discussed above concerning exactly what m\u00fcst be \u201cdealt with\u201d by a Chapt\u00e9r 11 plan under section 1141(c). The Penrod court suggests that the hen that is to be voided must be dealt with. It states: \u201c[U]nless the plan of reorganization, or the order confirming the plan, says that a hen is preserved, it is extinguished by the confirmation. This is provided, we emphasize, that the holder of the hen participated in the reorganization. If he did not, his lien, would not be \u2018property dealt with by the plan,\u2019 and so the section would not apply.\u201d Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463 (emphasis added). Penrod has been interpreted to require that the lien itself be dealt with in the plan. See 260 Gregory LLC v. Black Hawk/Central City Sanitation Dist., 77 P.3d 841, 845 (Colo.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Coffin v. Malvern Fed. Savings Bank, 189 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that a plan provision stating that the summary plan description and summaries of material modifications  are hereby incorporated by reference and constitute a part of the plan acted to incorporate into the plan a limitations provision found only in the summary plan description 1: holding that because the spd at issue stated that it is made part of the group policy its terms were sufficient to find that the plan conferred discretion on the plan administrator 2: holding that the lien at issue was not extinguished by silence in the plan as to its survival unless it is dealt with by the plan by a provision for the payment of or securing of the claim 3: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 4: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the privilege [against self-incrimination] and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.' It is through immunity statutes supplanting the privilege that Legislatures have attempted to ease such tensions.\" Attorney General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 444 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1982) (citation omitted). 6 . 3 Whinery, supra note 4, \u00a7 43.56; see also City of Hollywood v. Washington, 384 So.2d 1315, 1319 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (\"Immunity from prosecution is a creature of statute.\"). Professor Whinery cites Texas as an example of a jurisdic tion where immunity is not statutory; instead, it is \"derived from the so-called inherent power of prosecuting attorneys.\" 3 Whinery, supra note 4, \u00a7 43.56 & n. 6. 7 . Accord Hunter v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 24, 31, 72 P.2d 399, 402 (1937) (<HOLDING>); Eden v. State, 54 Okl.Cr. 265, 267, 21 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 1: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 2: holding that before immunity under the provision at okla const art ii  27 can be given a witness such witness must have testified under an agreement made with the prosecuting attorney approved by the court or such witness must have claimed the privilege of silence which was by the court denied and such witness must have been compelled by the court to so testify  3: holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary 4: recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Board found to be- \u2014 \u2022 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law; and (4) in the case of a finding of material fact made in reaching a decision in a case before the Department with respect to benefits under laws administered by the Secretary, hold unlawful and set aside such finding if the finding is clearly erroneous. (b) In making the determinations under subsection (a) of this section, the Court shall take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. (c) In no event shall findings of fact made by the Se (<HOLDING>); Akles v. Derwinski 1 Vet.App. 118, 121 Holdings: 0: holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board 1: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 2: holding that va must follow its own regulations 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that the board is not free to ignore its own regulations", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "as the \u201cstigma or disability\u201d test, \u201ca protectable liberty interest is implicated if the government alters the employee\u2019s status and such a change \u2018foreclose^] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities by either (a) automatically excluding him from a definite range of employment opportunities with the government or (b) broadly precluding him from continuing his chosen career.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting M.K. 196 F.Supp.2d at 15) (citing O\u2019Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1140). If the plaintiff proves that \u201cthe government has infringed upon [his] protected liberty interest under either test, the person has a due process, right to notice and an opportunity to refute the charges against him and to clear his name.\u201d Id. (citing Doe v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1102 (D.C.Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>)). As this Court previously held when it Holdings: 0: holding that statutory impediment to employment caused by inclusion on state child abuse registry implicates liberty interest 1: holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment 2: holding that because a fifth amendment liberty interest claim implicates an interest in ones postemployment reputation rather than any right to continued employment the wellsettled remedy is a nameclearing hearing 3: holding that spouses homestead interest was not abandoned because right to possession continued 4: holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "apparent lack of candor it reflects. 21 . Indeed, even Judge Smith is forced to examine the strength of the federal interest here in explaining why abstention was proper. In his opinion, Judge Smith, agrees that the comparative weight of the federal interest here does not support a finding of preemption. Nevertheless, he concludes that the district court should have abstained even though, given the required preemption analysis, there was nothing left to abstain from. 22 . First, there was a pending administrative enforcement proceeding before the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, for which New Jersey law provides Hi Tech with a right to a hearing and a right to judicial review. N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 52:14B-1 to 52:14B-24; Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Second, \"there is a well-recognized Holdings: 0: holding that judicial review of final agency action under the administrative procedure act  provides the proper procedure to challenge the sufficiency of an eis 1: holding that similar proceedings under the new jersey administrative procedure act are clearly judicial in nature and therefore meet the first part of the younger  test 2: holding that judicial review of decisions of military correction boards is review of the administrative record conducted under the administrative procedure act 3: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey 4: holding purposeful and deliberate omission on enactment of new jersey sales and use tax of exemption found in new york counterpart act which served as the model for new jersey act", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court upheld the trial court\u2019s decision to refrain from delivering the instruction requested by the defendant and to utilize the pattern jury instructions concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence and the necessity for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime charged before returning a guilty verdict on the grounds that the instructions actually delivered by the trial court adequately informed the jury about the factors that should be considered in evaluating the credibility of eyewitness identification testimony. Id. at 753, 412 S.E.2d at 49. An examination of the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Green and Dodd, coupled with our similar decision in State v. Summey, 109 N.C. App. 518, 525-26, 428 S.E.2d 245, 249-50 (1993) (<HOLDING>), reveals that this Court and the Supreme Court Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony 1: holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification 2: holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification 3: holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant 4: holding that trial court did not err", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 794, and the Court looks to the statute for jurisdiction over Kinneary\u2019s claim. Ridge contends that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for a private right of action against the United States when it acts in its capacity as a regulator. Although the Second Circuit has not yet addressed this particular issue, several of its sister circuits have found that no such private right of action exists under the Rehabilitation Act. See Cousins v. Secretary of United States DOT, 880 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.1989) (finding that the Rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the federal government acting in its role as a regulator); see also Clark v. Skinner, 937 F.2d 123 (4th Cir.1991) (same); Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees with the rationale expressed Holdings: 0: holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of transportation where the apa provides an adequate remedy 1: holding that the rehabilitation act does not create a private right of action against the secretary of education acting in his role as an administrator 2: holding rehabilitation act applicable 3: recognizing private right of action 4: holding that section 4625bc does not create a private right of action for money damages", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Appellant raises two issues on appeal, only one of which merits discussion. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in entering judgment and sentence on both the offense of DUI manslaughter and the offense of driving while license suspended and carelessly or negligently causing the death of another human being, claiming that the legislature did not intend to punish a single death under two different statutes. We agree. In Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1985), the supreme court indicated that, before the courts would be obligated to convict and sentence for two crimes arising from a single death, the legislature would need to express a clear intent to treat the two crimes as two separate offenses. Houser, 474 So.2d at 1196-1197 (<HOLDING>). Since the advent of Houser, the legislature Holdings: 0: recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes 1: holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay 2: holding that for purposes of double jeopardy analysis firstdegree felony murder and aggravated manslaughter are degree variants or aggravated forms of the core offense of homicide 3: holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge 4: holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Rolm from selling those parts to an ISO, and (4) Rolm forbid Rolm Resale from selling parts to an ISO. As for forbidding customers from reselling ordered parts, ISO II expressly found this conduct unilateral. See ISO II, 203 F.3d at 1324, 1329 (noting that Xerox employed a scheme insuring that parts were not resold or otherwise used in machines not owned by the entity ordering the part, but nonetheless finding that the scheme did not run afoul of Xerox\u2019s unilateral right not to deal patented and copyrighted works). Likewise, a manufacturer imposing upon a distributor a policy circumscribing with whom that distributor may deal is not involved in a concerted action for purposes of antitrust law. See Tarrant Service Agency, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 12 F.3d 609, 617 (6th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1221, 114 S.Ct. 2709, Holdings: 0: holding that xeroxs policy of prohibiting its majorityowned european affiliate from selling parts was within scope of intellectual property grant 1: holding that a general contractors right to forbid the work from being performed in a dangerous manner and the fact that he would have stopped the work and required protective equipment had he seen the employee of the independent contractor not using such equipment merely showed the possibility of control not actual control 2: holding that manufacturer of hvac equipment acted unilaterally where it prohibited independentlyowned and companyowned distributors of its parts from selling to independent repair companies 3: holding in a case of first impression that an insurers provision to repair or replace a vehicle or its parts with like kind and quality requires that the insurer pay for diminution in value 4: holding that a contract was implied where the special employer allowed the claimant to come onto its premises use its equipment and participate in its show under its direction", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by guards concerning the security status of prisoners are not statements designed to elicit an incriminating response. Id. Compton\u2019s question was reasonable and relevant to maintaining order in the prison and protecting Kemp. Similarly, Kemp\u2019s statements to Jackson were the product of ordinary, everyday interaction between guard and prisoner. Because Kemp was not interrogated by Compton and Jackson, the admission of his statements did not violate Miranda and his rights under art. 2, \u00a7 24 of the Arizona Constitution. Kemp\u2019s assertion that his Sixth Amendment Massiah rights were violated fails for the same reason his Miranda claim fails: the guards did not seek to elicit incriminating evidence from him. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2630, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Kemp\u2019s admissions therefore were properly Holdings: 0: holding that an interrogation occurs when there is express questioning or any words or actions on the part of the police other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect 1: holding that merely because questioning was designed to produce incriminating responses took place at the police station and occurred only after the defendant was identified as a suspect did not trigger miranda 2: holding that a comment made by one police officer to another in the presence of the accused expressing concern that handicapped children might come across a shotgun is not a statement designed to elicit an incriminating response 3: recognizing routine booking question exception observing that the underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses and holding that where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of miranda   citations omitted 4: holding that the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action beyond merely listening that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "464 So.2d 1189, 1191 (Fla.1985), the subordinate factors in complex areas such as taxation should be left to the appropriate agency having expertise and flexibility. Otherwise, the legislature would be forced to remain in perpetual session and devote a large portion of its time to regulation. Id. In re Advisory Opinion, 509 So.2d at 311-12. In other words, subordinate functions like those at issue here \u201cmay be transferred by the legislature to permit administration of legislative policy by an agency with the expertise and flexibility needed to deal with complex and fluid conditions.\u201d Microtel, 464 So.2d at 1191. Establishing the subject alternative cost recovery mechanisms is simply not a \u201cfundamental legislative task\u201d like the one at issue in Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d at 919 (<HOLDING>). In sum, we find that section 366.93 is not Holdings: 0: recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state 1: holding that when congress has implicitly delegated legislative authority to an agency a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 2: holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law 3: holding that when there are conflicting expert reports an agencys determination is due deferenceespecially in areas of agency expertise 4: holding that the statutory criteria for designation of an area of critical state concern  are constitutionally defective because they reposit in an agency the fundamental legislative task of determining which geo graphic areas and resources are in greatest need of protection", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Twin City merely asserts that \u201cSun\u2019s proposed lower level depositions will reveal what Twin City already knows \u2014 Sun\u2019s executives played an integral and unique role in the settlement process, and their depositions cannot be avoided.\u201d [DE 210, p. 7]. Twin City also fails to carry its burden of showing that the information it seeks to ob tain through deposing Leder and Krouse cannot be obtained from any other source. In certain cases, even when a high-ranking official of a corporation does have direct knowledge of the facts, it is inappropriate to compel his or her deposition without first deposing lesser-ranking employees who have more direct knowledge of the facts at issue. Stelor Productions, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-80387-CIV, 2008 WL 4218107, at *4 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 15, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Twin City has not yet deposed any other Holdings: 0: holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments 1: holding that although plaintiff claimed that googles two top executives did have direct unique and personal knowledge of the facts at issue it made sense to require plaintiff to seek the information from other sources first 2: holding that the plaintiff was precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal 3: holding that the failure of an affidavit to be made on personal knowledge or specify how the affiant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted is a defect in substance and need not be objected to at trial to be a ground for reversal 4: holding that a plaintiff does not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to accrue", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which concerns use of rights-of-way for utilities, allows a municipality to impose an occupancy fee on the use of its rights-of-way. Reasoning that the legislature had not given authority to a county to impose such a fee, the trial court concluded that Broward County lacked such authority. It also found that under state law, the county is preempted from imposing such a fee. Upon finding the county\u2019s annual occupancy fee invalid, the trial court declared the entire ordinance void and unenforceable. Broward County argues that because it is a charter county it is vested with municipal powers. It thus has authority to charge telecommunications companies for use of their rights-of-way and such authority was not preempted by state law. We agree. See Palm Beach County, 819 So.2d at 877-78 (<HOLDING>). Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial Holdings: 0: holding that state law fraud on the fda claims were impliedly preempted by the food drug and cosmetic act 1: holding the state law claims were not preempted 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that a charter county may assess a fee pursuant to florida statute section 3374013 and is not expressly or impliedly preempted by federal or state law 4: recognizing that section 76872 is substantive law even though the state statute was preempted by federal civil rights law", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R.App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . We ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal of a complaint without prejudice. But we have jurisdiction here because the district court dismissed the entire action, not just the complaint. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Corp., 531 F.3d 1282, 1296 n. 15 (10th Cir.2008) Holdings: 0: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 1: holding dismissal without prejudice to refile a facially sufficient motion is a nonappealable nonfinal order 2: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 3: holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order 4: holding that the dismissal of a complaint ordinarily is a nonfinal nonappealable order since amendment generally is available while dismissal of the entire action ordinarily is final", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "date of injury, employees who continue to be exposed to hazardous occupational noise are not obligated to give notice prior to filing a claim petition, while employees who cease to be exposed must give notice within 120 days of cessation of the exposure. While Crompton argues that this result is without foundation in reason or law, the Court notes that Socha II is a plurality opinion with limited prece-dential value as only three of six participating justices agreed that Section 306(c)(8)(ix) should determine the date of injury for purposes of Section 311\u2019s notice requirement. In Socha I, however, this Court specifically rejected the argument that Section 306(c)(8)(ix) should determine the date of injury in hearing loss cases for purposes of the notice requirements. See Socha I (<HOLDING>). It is noteworthy that although a majority of Holdings: 0: holding that the states personal injury statutes of limitation should be applied for claims under section 1983 1: holding that alien need not receive actual notice for due process requirements to be satisfied 2: holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied 3: holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a 4: holding that definition of date of injury in section 306c8ix is intended to be utilized for calculating benefits not for determining whether section 311 notice requirements were satisfied", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the stop under the reasonableness standard. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Under Terry v. Ohio, the determination of whether an investigative detention is reasonable is a two-pronged inquiry: whether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This determination is a factual one and is made and reviewed by considering the totality of the circumstances existing throughout the detention. Loesch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); 523789, at *1, 4 (TexApp.-Austin Dec. 6, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). In the Hartman case, an officer stopped Holdings: 0: holding fiveto fifteenminute delay in dwi investigation primarily so that another officer could bring a video camera to the scene was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes 1: holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer even though officer who initiated the stop was qualified to perform dwi investigation was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer brought greater expertise to scene and could complete dwi investigation more rapidly 2: holding approximately twentyminute delay in dwi investigation primarily to await arrival of dwi enforcement officer was reasonable because delay furthered reasonable law enforcement purposes 3: holding delay in dwi investigation primarily for arrival of rookie officer for purpose of training was reasonable because delay furthered legitimate law enforcement purposes 4: holding that delay while awaiting arrival of dwi enforcement officer was for legitimate law enforcement purposes because dwi officer was more experienced and could complete dwi investigation faster", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "445 (2007). Even assuming the District Court erred procedurally when it applied the downward departure to the 262- to 327-month range instead of to the statutory maximum, see U.S.S.G. \u00a7 5G1.1 & cmt., its arguably erroneous calculation would be \u201cprecisely the kind of \u2018garden variety\u2019 claim of error contemplated by [an] appellate waiver,\u201d United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 141-42 (3d Cir.2013) (quotation marks omitted). See United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 931 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[A]llow[ing] alleged errors in computing a defendant\u2019s sentence to render a waiver unlawful would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive.\u201d (second alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 283-84 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Holdings: 0: holding we would find an abuse of discretion if the district court had granted the downward adjustment 1: holding that a defendant who denied involvement of codefendant during codefendants trial had intentionally misled law enforcement officers and should not receive a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility 2: holding that adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is appropriate where the district court rebuffed a defendants attempts to plead guilty 3: holding that a defendant should not receive an acceptance of responsibility adjustment when there is contradicting obstructive conduct 4: holding that there was no miscarriage of justice where the defendant claimed that the government abused its discretion by refusing to request a threelevel downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant a finding that a breach of the peace is imminent or the public safety is threatened.\u201d Ecker, 311 So.2d at 109 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). See also Williams v. State, 674 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). \u201cMoreover, failure to provide identification is not an element of the charged offense. While the statute gives the suspect an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct, the criminal conduct must be completed prior to any action by police officers.\u201d E.B. v. State, 537 So.2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (citations omitted). See also R.D.W. v. State, 659 So.2d 1193 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)(<HOLDING>). In the present case, assuming that sitting Holdings: 0: holding that a domestic relationship must exist as part of the facts giving rise to the predicate offense but it need not be an element of the prior offense 1: holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt 2: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense 3: holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense 4: holding that offense of loitering and prowling must be completed prior to any police action", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "events of the distant past. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (\u201cLoss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown\u201d). The Supreme Court, however, has stressed that \u201cif witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.\u201d Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Francis has not argued, nor has he suggested, that his defense has been prejudiced in any way. There is no evidence any of his potential witnesses died, suffered memory loss, or are otherwise unavailable to testify. Accordingly, the Court finds that Francis has failed to demonstrate that the delay in this case impaired his ability to defend himself in this criminal proceeding. See United States v. Cain, 671 F.3d 271, 297 (2d Cir. 2012) (opining that preju (8th Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). The delay between Francis\u2019 arrest and the Holdings: 0: holding that a twoyear postindictment delay presumptively prejudicial 1: holding that a sixyear delay caused by negligence weighed heavily against the government 2: holding threeyear delay without mitigating circumstances was unreasonable 3: holding that the delay is presumptively prejudicial does not necessarily mean the first factor weighs against the state but requires further consideration of the extent of the delay beyond this period 4: holding threeyear delay between indictment and arraignment caused by the serious negligence of the government presumptively prejudicial", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the suit clearly manifest the proper alignment of the dispute\u201d). 20 . Put another way, the requisite antagonism between the stockholder and the management of a corporation is present \"where the dominant officers and directors are guilty of fraud or misdeeds.\u201d Smith, 354 U.S. at 95, 77 S.Ct. 1112. 21 . Specifically, the Separation Agreement provides, in pertinent part, that \"Wife grants Husband an irrevocable proxy for all of her shares in the Gyms which proxy shall provide him with full irrevocable management authority-\u201d 22 . In support of her position, Hildebrand argues unpersuasively that the corporation was deadlocked at the time the complaint was filed, and thus, that the requisite antagonism is not present. See, e.g., Duffey v. Wheeler, 820 F.2d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Gibson, 780 F.Supp. at 375 (recognizing that Holdings: 0: recognizing that when the corporations management or its shareholders are deadlocked with respect to a particular issue courts have realigned such corporations as party plaintiffs 1: holding that a corporations principal place of business for determining diversity jurisdiction under 28 usc  1332c1 is the nerve center meaning the corporations headquarters or the place where a corporations officers direct control and coordinate the corporations activities 2: holding that while a state statute granted a foreign corporation the rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations it did not transform such corporations into domestic or resident corporations 3: recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations 4: recognizing a cause of action against a corporations directors brought by a creditor for the fraudulent misrepresentation of the corporations financial condition", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "even date, this Court grants the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 1 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(6) reads in relevant part: \"(a) A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- ... (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to ano his injuries. The Debtor states the amount of the Claim representing lost wages and medical bills to be approximately $6,352.76. At the hearing, Debtor\u2019s counsel conceded that the Claim included about $2,000.00 in damages the Act would not cover, namely Gomes\u2019 pain and suffering. 6 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1738 provides in pertinent part that judicial \"proceedings of any court of any ... State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United State 131, 136 (9th Cir. BAP 2000); (<HOLDING>); Harry Ritchie's Jewelers, Inc. v. Chlebowski Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant acknowledged awareness of the consequences of his plea agreement counsels erroneous explanation of the consequences was not prejudicial 1: holding not only that court had no obligation to predict consequences but also that court could not have predicted consequences 2: holding that an attorney is required to advise a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea and will not be found ineffective for failing to advise of collateral consequences of the plea 3: recognizing that any witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if he so desires and is not under or subject to legal process 4: holding that unless the actor desires to cause consequences of his act or  believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it  he has not committed a wilful and malicious injury as defined under  523a6 citing to restatement second of torts  8a 1964 internal citations omitted", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "whether a claimant\u2019s injury arose out of employment). An injury that occurs after the employment relationship ends, however, is generally not compensable under the NUA. See Law Offices of Barry Levinson v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 184 P.3d 378 (2008). Other courts have recognized exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., Peterson v. Moran, 245 P.2d 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (reversing a tort judgment for an employee who was assaulted as he left the workplace immediately after being discharged); Ardoin v. Cleco Power, L.L.C., 38 So. 3d 264, 266 (La. 2010) (providing that an employee is within the course and scope of employment if his \u201cinjury occurs during the reasonable period of time for winding up his affairs\u201d); Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel & Wire Co., 134 N.E. 385, 386-87 (Mass. 1922) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 17 N.W.2d 913, Holdings: 0: holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment 1: holding that a sexual assault on a female employee was of a personal nature and not directed against the employee as part of the employment relationship 2: holding that an assault that occurred immediately after the employee was discharged was in the course of the employment 3: holding that an obstructionofjustice enhancement was appropriate based on the defendants assault on a witness after trial and rejecting the defendants argument that because the assault occurred after trial it could not impact the prosecution of his case 4: holding that injury incurred when employee returned to retrieve paycheck six days after employment had been terminated occurred in course of employment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Legislature when that intent is clear. State v. D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A.2d 217. By holding that Chapter 91\u2019s appeal-preclusion provision does not apply to non-income-producing properties, we give effect to the statute\u2019s clear language. We recognize, however, that the Legislature may hereafter amend the statute to provide practical consequences to non-responding owners of non-income-producing properties. Finally, we note that a property owner, when failing to respond to a Chapter 91 request, runs the risk that the property will ultimately be found to be income-producing. In such a case, the taxpayer\u2019s appeal would properly be limited under Ocean Pines, supra, 112 N.J. at 11, 547 A.2d 691. See Alfred Conhagen, Inc. v. S. Plainfield Boro., 16 N.J. Tax 470, 474 (App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 74, 697 A.2d 546 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was limited to ocean pines reasonableness hearing when plaintiffs property had formerly been incomeproducing and plaintiff had failed to respond to a chapter 91 request notifying the assessor of the change in his propertys status 1: holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits 2: holding that the ada plaintiff was unable to perform essential functions of job when the plaintiffs psychotherapist had told the employer that the plaintiff was unable to work in any position when the plaintiff did not disagree with that point and when the plaintiff in response to a request for admission conceded that she was no longer able to work 3: holding that because plaintiff could not establish which portions of the tapes had been played in court plaintiff failed to meet his burden 4: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that it could not be held liable in negligence because plaintiff was seeking solely economic damages. Defendant argued that the Moorman doctrine, as articulated in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982), precludes recovery of such economic damages under a tort theory. Plaintiff responded that the implied warranty of habitability has never been limited to only builder-vendors, and that the policies underlying the warranty apply equally well to builders. Plaintiff further argued that the \u201csudden or dangerous occurrence\u201d exception to the Moorman doctrine applies in this case because the water damage to the building resulted from the September 2008 storms, relying on Mars, Inc. v. Heritage Builders of Effingham, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d 346 (4th Dist. 2002) (<HOLDING>). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to Holdings: 0: holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy 1: holding that a single thunderstorm was a sudden and dangerous occurrence 2: holding the payment of benefits at the occurrence of a single event an indicium of lack of an administrative scheme 3: holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after  it was informed of the occurrence 4: holding that the phrase sudden and accidental is not a synonym for unexpected and unintended and that the discharge of coal dust over an eight year period was not sudden", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and parliament of England in lands under tide waters, and that the owner of land bounded by a navigable river within the ebb and flow of the tide had no private title or right in the shore below high-water mark ...\u201d Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 20-21, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894). As stated above, Plaintiff admitted at trial that the State did not grant any rights or property to any previous owner of the 175 Ellis Street property. Furthermore, Plaintiffs own expert witness testified that errors in deeds are common, and that some of Plaintiffs own deeds contained errors. In light of the fact that no external proof exists that the foreshore was granted to the Plaintiff, I find that title to the 175 Ellis Street foreshore remains in the State. C. Proof of Ownership of the Fo 1895) (<HOLDING>); see also Evans v. City of Johnstown, 96 Holdings: 0: recognizing private right of action 1: holding that the involvement of the police in executing the courtordered search without more does not convert the private defendants abuse of state law into conduct attributable to the state for purposes of  1983 liability and because yanaki and moss allege nothing more than private misuse of state laws their compliant fails to satisfy the first part of the color of law test 2: holding that grants from parliament and the crown for purely private purposes are ineffective 3: holding that the conclusion is inevitable that the parliament and the crown together were not competent to grant to a private corporation for private purposes the seacoast around the island below the shore line without violating established principles of law 4: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "courts applying Johnson provide some direction. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cireuit held that an officer's single question about the possession of firearms or drugs \"did not render the traffic stop [for a minor infraction] an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.\" United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 496 (6th Cir.2010). The Court reasoned that \"[It cannot be said that this single question ... constituted a definitive abandonment of the prosecution of the traffic stop in favor of a sustained investigation into drug or firearm offenses. Nor did this single question, taking [only] seconds, constitute the bulk of the interaction....\" Id. at 495 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Dixie, 382 Fed.Appx. 517, 519-20 (7th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 132 Similarly, the United States Court of Holdings: 0: holding that the delay of approximately two minutes that occurred prior to the police officer developing reasonable suspicion to further investigate the defendants identity was de minimis and did not unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop 1: holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver 2: holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under fourth amendment when officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in scope to the reasons that justified the initial traffic stop 3: holding that a threeminute delay between the completion of a traffic citation and the retrieval of a drug dog did not impermissibly extend the detention at a traffic stop 4: holding that an officers single unrelated question regarding weapons that took only seconds did not unreasonably extend traffic stop", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and remanded for resentencing on his remaining convictions. See United States v. Argento, No. 95-50337, 1996 WL 471358 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1996) (unpublished memorandum disposition). Subsequently, Argento filed this \u00a7 2255 motion, contending that he received constitutionally deficient counsel at re-sentencing because counsel failed to request a downward departure based on his post-sentence rehabilitation. It appears that despite United States v. Gomez-Padilla, 972 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.1992), post-offense rehabilitation could arguably have formed a permissible basis for a downward departure at the time of Argento\u2019s re-sentencing in April 1997 because it was not a prohibited factor under the Sentencing Guidelines. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (<HOLDING>). On the record before us, therefore, we are Holdings: 0: holding that despite the defendants status as the sole supporter of his wife and three children the district court erred when it gave a downward departure for familial obligations because departure downward in sentencing is not justified for family reasons except in unusual circumstances 1: holding same rule applied and required resentencing within the guidelines when trial judge failed to supply written reasons for downward departure 2: holding that only factors specifically prohibited by the sentencing guidelines cannot form the basis for a downward departure 3: holding that a district courts statement that there was no basis for a downward departure did not indicate that it believed it lacked authority 4: holding that defendants diminished capacity while grounds for departure from the guidelines sentencing range is not grounds for departure below the minimum sentence set by congress", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Association.... \u201d (Doc. 18-12 at 20.) The AAA rules provide that \u201c[pjarties to an arbitration under these rules shall be deemed to have consented that judgment upon the arbitration award may be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction thereof.\u201d R-48(c), AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures (available at www.adr.org) (last visited April 30, 2013). Based on these provisions, the parties agreed that \u2014 upon a timely application \u2014 a judgment of the court can be entered on the November 16, 2012 arbitration award. Defendant has timely applied. Unless plaintiff demonstrates that the award should be vacated, the court must affirm the award and enter judgment accordingly. 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 9; see also Youngs v. Am. Nutrition, Inc., 537 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff argues that the award should be Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proving a violation of the idea lies on the party seeking relief during the administrative process 1: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees 2: holding that the burden rests upon the party seeking benefits to prove the injury sustained was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and the rule of liberal construction is not a substitute for the claimants burden of establishing his claim by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments 4: holding the appellate court must presume adequate evidence to support the award when appellant sought to vacate the award based on gross mistake with no transcript of the arbitration proceedings", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Solanki does not challenge this aspect of the IJ\u2019s ruling; therefore, we do not address it. 5 . Because we will deny the petition on other grounds, we assume without deciding that Solanki\u2019s injuries resulting from the robberies, along with the threat to his life, were sufficiently severe to constitute persecution. However, we note that this Court has previously held that \"[s]imple robbery, in isolation, while unfortunate and troubling, does not seem to [constitute persecution].... [T]wo isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by unknown assailants, which resulted only in the theft of some personal property and a minor injury, is not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution.\u201d Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.2005); see also DeSouza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.1993)(<HOLDING>). 6 . We further note that even if Solanki had Holdings: 0: holding that the robberies of patel a kenyan citizen of indian descent by kenyans of african descent were simply indicative of resentment towards patel due to his wealth as the immigration judge found the incidents of robbery are attributable to class tensions and patels affluence rather than to persecution 1: holding that plaintiff who alleged discrimination on the basis of his mexicanamerican descent had stated a valid claim under section 1981 2: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment 3: holding that private racial discrimination and harassment of a kenyan citizen of indian descent does not establish persecution 4: holding by implication that plaintiff a brownskinned person of east indian descent had stated a proper claim under section 1981", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. \u00a7 704. 7 . Burley was awarded WC benefits pursuant to section 306. (Burley's brief at 8.) 8 . The word fault, as used in this section, \u201cconnotes an act to which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming or culpability attaches. To find 'fault,' there must be some finding by the [UC] referee or Unemployment Compensation Board of Review concerning claimant\u2019s state of mind.\u201d Teitell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 406, 546 A.2d 706, 710 (1988) (citations omitted). 9 . Although this issue is not before us, it is probable that Burley is not at fault. See Celia v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 34 Pa.Cmwlth. 532, 383 A.2d 1318 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Burley would not be hable to repay the Holdings: 0: holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability 1: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault 2: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits 3: holding plaintiff not at fault in accepting a lump sum social security benefit a second time observing that the agencys fault finding might be appropriate if plaintiff were an accountant 4: holding pursuant to former title 39 that termination for fault did not constitute grounds for discontinuing benefits", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 228 (Fla.1991) (stating that \u201cpattern of striking black venire members need not be demonstrated before a trial court\u2019s duty to conduct an inquiry into the State\u2019s reasons for the excusal of the minority member is triggered\u201d). The failure to conduct a Neil inquiry is reversible error requiring remand for a new trial. See Johans, 613 So.2d at 1322. Thus, we reverse Vasquez\u2019s convictions for grand theft and obtaining a vehicle with intent to defraud and remand for a new trial. We also agree with Vasquez\u2019s argument that concurrent convictions are prohibited for grand theft of the Tahoe and obtaining the Tahoe with intent to defraud based on the same transaction. See State v. Thompson, 607 So.2d 422 (Fla.1992), adopting, 585 So.2d 492 (Fla. 5th DCA1991) (<HOLDING>); State v. McDonald, 690 So.2d 1317 (Fla. 2d Holdings: 0: holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance 1: holding that the legislature amended section 8120142d florida statutes now renumbered as section 8120143c in 1992 to omit habitual offender penalties for the crime of felony petit theft 2: holding that section 893131 of the florida statutes is  a controlled substance offense under ussg  4b12b 3: holding that section 7750214b2 florida statutes 1993 prohibited conviction for fraud by person authorized to provide goods or services and grand theft based on the same facts 4: holding that section 7750214b florida statutes 1989 barred concurrent prosecution for fraudulent sale of a counterfeit controlled substance and felony petit theft based on the same transaction", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1812, 140 L.Ed.2d 950 (1998). Second, even assuming that the differences between New York City\u2019s school system and those in other jurisdictions were immaterial, plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence to show that the legislature\u2019s disparate treatment lacked a rational basis. The state legislature is presumed to act constitutionally, and it is a plaintiffs burden to prove otherwise. See Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 147 (2d Cir.1985); cf. New York State Club Ass\u2019n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Members of City Council of Los Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff must show that a statute  could never be applied in a valid manner  to prevail in a facial attack on its validity 1: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim 2: holding that to prevail under  2254 a petitioner must show that the state court applied strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner 3: holding petitioner must show prejudice to prevail on due process claim 4: holding that plaintiff could not prevail as a thirdparty beneficiary where contract was not valid", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "addition, the City\u2019s zoning ordinance does not affect existing adult use establishments, as Plaintiffs current business is not considered an adult use and Le Sex Shoppe, the only present adult business in the City, is not required to relocate. Thus, the City\u2019s ordinance is different from those invalidated because they fail to provide a reasonable opportunity for adult businesses to operate. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n. 35, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2453 n. 35, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (upholding adult business zoning ordinances in part because the district court found that \u2018\u201c[t]he Ordinances do not affect the operation of existing establishments but only the location of new ones.\u2019 \u201d); Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance 1: holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law 2: holding certain plaintiffs did not have standing to attack ordinance governing sexually oriented businesses where the record did not reveal that any one of these plaintiffs was subject to the ordinance even though the city attorney conceded at oral argument before the supreme court that one or two of them had had their licenses denied under the ordinance 3: holding that ordinance concentrating adult businesses in one area with 1000 foot separation requirement violated first amendment because ordinance would force the only existing adult theater in the city to close at its present location with no definite prospect of a place to relocate 4: holding that a city could not apply its rent control ordinance in conflict with tribal ordinance to nonindians on reservation trust land", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to a wholesaler/distributor who then packs them with goods; 4. sold in an environment of sale that features the goods packed in the jar and not the jar itself; 5. used to commercially convey foodstuffs, beverages, oils, meat extracts, etc.; 6. capable of being used in the hot packing process; and 7. recognized in the trade as used primarily to pack and convey goods to a consumer who then discards the container after this initial use. T.D. 96-7, 30 Customs Bulletin at 32-33, 61 Fed. Reg. at 224. The Government urges that HQRL 962378 \u201ccomplied with the standards set forth\u201d in T.D. 96-7, and is therefore entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (Def.\u2019s Post Trial Mem. at 10); see Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). In Rocknel, the Court of Appeals for the Holdings: 0: holding that the directors litigating position was not entitled to chevron deference but did warrant skidmore respect on certain issues where the arguments were persuasive and the agencys manual and practice had for some time consistently advanced a reasonable position 1: holding skidmore deference is appropriate where customs classification decision revealed customs thorough analysis 2: holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference 3: holding that deference to an agency interpretation is not appropriate where a statute is administered by more than one agency 4: holding that while legislative findings are due deference that cannot foreclose a courts constitutional analysis", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in the military). Finally, the Defendant cites United States v. Stromick, 710 F.Supp. 613 (D.Md.1989), and Schwab, 724 F.Supp. at 511, in support of his Application for Expungement. In Stromick, the court recognized that a petitioner whose conviction had been set aside might be entitled to ex-pungement if he could demonstrate the denial of \u201cspecific job opportunities.\u201d Stromick, 710 F.Supp. at 614. Subsequently, in Schiuab, the court cited Strom-ick for the proposition that the denial of employment opportunities may warrant expungement. As the government properly notes, however, the Schwab court\u2019s reliance upon Stromick appears to be misplaced, because the conviction at issue in Schwab had not been set aside. See United States v. Gillock, 771 F.Supp. 904, 908 (W.D.Tenn.1991) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the Court finds the Holdings: 0: recognizing fundamental distinction between firstparty and thirdparty situations and imposing fiduciary duty upon insurer to protect its insureds interest in thirdparty situations 1: recognizing the distinction between stromick and schwab and also noting that the examples of potential grounds for expungement stated in stromick are theoretical examples of situations that were never applied 2: recognizing this distinction 3: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel 4: holding the regulations enumerated examples are nonexclusive and merely illustrative of situations where redcircling is appropriate", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "strain, or terror in anticipation of being shot as evidenced by her efforts to force the truck off the road and run from Kopsho. The fact that the ag-gravator was not ultimately proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider the factor. Henry v. State, 649 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla.1994) (citing Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 231 (Fla.1991)). The trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on HAC. Proportionality To ensure uniformity of sentencing in death pen olding death penalty proportionate after finding the HAC aggravating factor and one statutory mitigator of significant weight, no significant history of prior criminal conduct, and eight nonstatu-tory mitigating factors); Zakrzewski, 717 So.2d 488 (<HOLDING>); Lemon v. State, 456 So.2d 885, 888 (Fla.1984) Holdings: 0: holding death sentence proportionate where defendant murdered wife and children and trial court found three aggravators previous capital felony ccp and hac and two statutory mitigators extreme disturbance and no prior criminal history 1: holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac 2: holding death penalty proportionate where the trial court found ccp and three other aggravators and twentynine nonstatutory mitigators 3: holding death sentence proportionate where defendant murdered exgirlfriends daughter and court upheld four aggravating circumstances ccp hac murder committed while engaged in a kidnapping and previous capital felony and four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances mental illness at time of crime good father would die in prison if given life sentence and no disciplinary problems in prison 4: holding the death sentence proportional for the sexual battery beating and strangulation of victim where there were three statutory aggravators hac pecuniary gain and sexual battery and both statutory mental mitigators", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "concerning liability and not be required to incur all of the expenses of litigation to conclusion before being entitled to seek subrogation. To hold otherwise would be to discourage settlements and to promote litigation, a concept which should be discouraged by the courts. We believe it is not inappropriate to hold that one who is sued for alleged negligence and who, in an effort to save his property, including the expenditure of attorney\u2019s fees, enters into a reasonable settlement is not a volunteer and is entitled to seek reimbursement under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 588 So.2d 909, 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Rawson v. City of Omaha, 212 Neb. 159, 322 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1982)); see also Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat\u2019l Bank, 792 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). To argue that it should not be barred from Holdings: 0: holding that a grant of equitable relief requires diligence by the claimant 1: recognizing equitable subrogation 2: holding that under the doctrine of equitable subrogation equity will grant relief where a mortgage is satisfied by mistake and no rights of third parties have intervened if the mistaken action was reasonable 3: holding the doctrine applied in a case of mistake 4: recognizing the equitable maxim that once equity has jurisdiction it will grant complete relief", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for example, the plaintiffs\u2019 property had been subjected to frequent overflights by B-36 jets from a nearby military installation for several years. The plaintiffs conceded that those flights substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property, and also conceded that any takings claim based on those flights was thus barred under the six-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs further argued, however, that the introduction of B-52s and KC-135s on the base, and their frequent low-altitude flights over the property, resulted in a second taking. The Court of Claims agreed, holding that overflights by the larger and substantially louder B-52s and KC-135s rendered the plaintiffs\u2019 property uninhabitable. See also Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88, 101 (Ct.Cl.1981) (<HOLDING>); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640, 642 Holdings: 0: holding that the introduction of new aircraft and them use for field mirror landing practice resulted in the taking of a second avigation easement 1: holding that the introduction of larger heavier noisier aircraft can constitute a fifth amendment taking of an additional easement even though the new aircraft do not violate the boundaries of the initial easement 2: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 3: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 4: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with the standard of care in order to be granted summary judgment, they have met that burden controlling. The defendants put on evidence from a number of experienced biking participants that this race was carefully run in accordance with the standard of care they have come to expect in mountain-bike races. Once the testimony of plaintiffs\u2019 expert Sean Collinsworth is excluded, as we hold later was appropriate, plaintiffs put on no conflicting evidence from any witness qualified to articulate a proper standard of care for a mountain bike race. Further, under Utah law, it would probably be unnecessaiy for defendants to present expert testimony to establish compliance with the standard of care in this case. Compare Collins v. Utah State Dev. Ctr., 992 P.2d 492, 494-95 (Utah Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>), and Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 Holdings: 0: holding that expert testimony was not necessary in case involving claim that a center working with the developmentally disabled was negligent for allowing a resident to ride a swing without any safety devices designed to ensure that she would not fall off 1: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 2: holding that expert testimony is unnecessary where the case is not a case in which lay jurors would be unable to grasp the issues without expert assistance 3: holding that expert testimony was not necessary in a case involving allegations that a senior living center was negligent for failing to install a fire sprinkler system 4: holding that plaintiff was not required to produce expert testimony to establish a claim that the vessels lack of railings or other safety devices rendered it unseaworthy", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "child where the \u201cparent has voluntarily permitted the child to remain continuously in the custody of others in their home, and has,taken little interest in it, thereby substituting such others in his own place, so that they stand in loco parentis to the child, and continuing this condition of affairs for so long a time that the love and affection of the child and the foster parents have become mutually engaged, to the extent that a severance of this relationship would tear the heart of the child, and mar his happiness\u201d). On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has held that a state law inadequately protected a parent\u2019s due-process interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his child. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. Holdings: 0: holding that due process allows parental rights to be terminated only upon clear and convincing evidence of unfitness 1: holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard 2: holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights 3: holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "who had previously violated section 1012.315, there is nothing demonstrating an intent to retroactively strip teachers of their certification for having previously committed and disclosed violations of section 1012.315. Id. With respect to the second prong, the Commission\u2019s retroactive application of section 1012.795(l)(n) is unconstitutional. Even where the Legislature has expressly stated that a statute will apply retroactively, reviewing courts must reject such an application if the statute impairs a vested right, creates a new obligation, or imposes a new penalty. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.1995); see also Metro. Dade County, 737 So.2d at 499 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)) (<HOLDING>). Here, it is undisputed that, at the time Mr. Holdings: 0: recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary 1: holding retroactive application 2: holding that when an agency changes its policy with retroactive effect a reviewing court must determine the reasonableness of the new interpretation and whether application of the new policy to a party who relied on the old is so unfair as to be arbitrary and capricious 3: holding the central focus of an inquiry into the retroactive application of the statute is whether doing so attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment 4: holding no retroactive application", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Moreover, the evidence shows that solicitation of the towers was part of that effort and that, \u201cbut for\u201d the RICO conspiracy, Cianci and Corrente would not have acquired any interest in the $250,000 collected from the towers. Consequently, their interests in that sum are subject to forfeiture under subsection (a)(1). B. Forfeiture Under \u00a7 1968(a)(2) Subsection (a)(2) provides for forfeiture of a defendant\u2019s \u201cinterest in ... any enterprise\u201d that the defendant \u201cestablished, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1963(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The forfeiture provision of (a)(2)(A) is especially severe because it makes a defendant\u2019s entire interest in an enterprise subject to forfeiture. Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1211-12 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, unlike (a)(1), it does not Holdings: 0: holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 1: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 2: holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 3: holding that rule of proportionality applies only under a1 and what is now a2d 4: holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of whether the County also possesses statutory authority to condemn the same property. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals insofar as it held that CDOT lacked statutory authority to condemn the disputed parcels pursuant to section 43-1-208(3), and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. II. Analysis We have long held that in Colorado the power of eminent domain lies dormant in the state until the legislature speaks. Potashnik v. Pub. Serv. Co., 126 Colo. 98, 101, 247 P.2d 137, 138 (1952). Accordingly, a party may not condemn private property without demonstrating that the taking has been statutorily authorized, either expressly or implicitly. See State Dep\u2019t of Highways v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 789 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Colo.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in order for the Petitioners to condemn Holdings: 0: holding that the department of highways did not have statutory authority to condemn a private way of necessity over railroad tracks on behalf of a landlocked ranch operator 1: recognizing a selfevaluative privilege to railroad companys investigation of an accident in light of the publics stake in the improvement of railroad safety 2: holding that department does not have independent authority to impose device in absence of court order 3: holding that director of police department does not have final policymaking authority in miamidade county despite having some discretionary authority 4: holding over", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Hall and explained that Hall\u2019s conduct in committing murder \u2014 his lack of emotion, connection to drug trafficking and willingness to kill for hire \u2014 justified such a severe punishment. Even if the offense level in \u00a7 2A1.1(a) does not fit every murder, Hall has not shown that it fails to fit this murder. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying upon the base offense level in \u00a7 2A1.1(a) to determine Hall\u2019s appropriate sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . Both the probation office and the district court applied the 2007 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual to determine Hall\u2019s advisory sentencing range. 2 . The other circuits addressing this question have done so with similar results. See United States v. Bauer, 626 F.3d 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rogers, 521 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that  5g13c applied because the defendants case involved multiple undischarged terms of imprisonment only one of which was used to enhance his instant sentence 1: holding that because the defendant was not imprisoned  incarcerated in a penal institution  when he was sentenced  he was not subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment and could not invoke  5g13 2: holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of  5g13b  is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing 3: holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  4: holding that  5gl3b does not apply when the undischarged term of imprisonment results from multiple offenses only some of which were taken into account in determining the defendants offense level", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court has done, is to sanction arbitrary sentencing, and to make anything but perfunctory appellate review of sentencing impossible. The only way, therefore, to expand the scope of allowable discretion while maintaining a functional capital punishment system is to circumscribe the substance and procedure of appellate review. See id. at 127; Special Project, \u201cCapital Punishm lackmun, J., dissenting) (\u201cThe Court\u2019s conclusion that we should allow the State to adopt capital punishment schemes that depend on appellate factfinding because \u2018it is by no means apparent that appellate factfinding will always be inadequate\u2019 ... turns on its head the heightened concern with reliability ...\u201d required in capital punishment cases); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985) (<HOLDING>); id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 444, 88 L.Ed.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide 1: holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper 2: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence 3: holding that imposition of a habitual offender sentence on remand after the trial courts pronouncement of a nonhabitual sentence in the original proceeding does not violate double jeopardy 4: holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "while student disciplinary proceedings may resemble a criminal trial in some limited respects and while certain university rule and regulation violations may also constitute criminal behavior, student disciplinary proceedings do not present matters for adjudication by a court of law. See First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, 784 F.2d 467, 471-77 (3d Cir.1986) (en banc) (denying right of access to judicial disciplinary proceedings and records unless the records subsequently are filed in a court of law); Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928-29 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that settlement agreements and arbitrations are private documents subject to a right of access only when filed in the court record); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 162-63 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we decline to evaluate student Holdings: 0: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 1: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 2: holding that there is no first amendment right of access to presentence reports 3: holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions 4: holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Discrimination) (July 22, 2008))). We consider this argument, too, although the EEOC\u2019s Compliance Manual \u201cis not entitled to special deference.\u201d EEOC v. TriCore Reference Labs., 849 F,3d 929, 939 (10th Cir. 2017). 7 . Sturgill held that \"[w]hat is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances and therefore might, or might not, require elimination of a particular, fact-specific conflict.\u201d 512 F.3d at 1030. The First Circuit has cited Sturgill and this standard. See Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). In addition, the Fourth Circuit, as previously mentioned, has rejected the \"elimination\u201d standard. See Firestone Fibers & Textiles, 515 F.3d at 313. 8 . See also Baker v. Home Depot, Inc., 445 F.3d 541, 547-48 (2d Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>); Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1379 (6th Cir.) (same); Holdings: 0: holding scheduling employee for later shift on sunday so he could attend church did not eliminate conflict with his second religious practice of not working at all on sunday his sabbath 1: holding that irs examination of corporate minute books of a church to determine whether it qualified for tax exemption was not unconstitutional interference with religious affairs of the church under the first amendment 2: holding that denial of inmates request for bread and peanut butter so that he could prepare his sunday meals in his cell on saturday  thereby avoiding preparing food or benefitting from the preparation of food by others on the sabbath  violated prisoners free exercise rights 3: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live 4: holding that denial of tax exemption for part of church property that was not necessary for occupancy and enjoyment of church did not violate first amendment", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "no evidence of fingerprints linked him to the firearm; and appellant testified he leaned forward in his seat to buckle his seatbelt. Although these are circumstances that do not link appellant to the weapon, other circumstances show that he knowingly possessed the firearm. The firearm was located within inches of appellant\u2019s legs, in easy reach, in a place where he was seen reaching as he leaned forward in the seat. The gesture appeared to the officers as though appellant was putting something beneath the seat. The officers stated that appellant was nervous and seemed as though he wanted to flee from the officers. These circumstances are sufficient for the jury to infer that appellant knowingly possessed the firearm that was found near his feet. See Hernandez, 538 S.W.2d at 131 (<HOLDING>). Appellant contends the determination that the Holdings: 0: holding that absence of certain affirmative links is not evidence of appellants innocence to be weighed against the evidence tending to connect appellant to the contraband 1: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence 2: holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available 3: holding that the type of evidence which has been admitted as material as tending to prove a reasonable probability of change includes    the actual amendment of the ordinance subsequent to the taking 4: holding that on appeal an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight the courts duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "or state law or regulation\u201d under \u00a7 40:2175.6(H). See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 153, 87 S.Ct. 1507; see also Texas, 497 F.3d at 499 (\u201cIf [plaintiff] cannot challenge the [procedures [at issue] in this lawsuit, [it] is forced to choose one of two undesirable options: participate in an allegedly invalid process that eliminates a [previously available] procedural safeguard ..., or eschew the process with the hope of invalidating it in the future[] ____\u201d). Pre-enforcement facial challenges seeking declaratory and injunctive relief have long proceeded as an accepted means for abortion providers and their patients to challenge the constitutionality of regulations touching on the abortion right. See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609\u2014 10, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Pre-enforcement review prevents potentially Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum 1: holding that  851 factfinding falls within the prior conviction exception set out in apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 490 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 2: holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 3: holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 4: recognizing the validity of preenforcement facial attacks in only a few settings including abortion based on the strength of specific reasons weighty enough to overcome the supreme courts wellfounded reticence to entertain such attacks generally citing stenberg v carhart 530 us 914 938946 120 sct 2597 147 led2d 743 2000", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "under a \u201ccontract of employment, or a collective bargaining agreement, an agreement has yet been made to arbitrate the dispute.\u201d Id. at 885. The court stated that to \u201cdecide otherwise, we would have to hold that Gilmer has no effect at all and that [Gardner-Denver ] is still the law that statutory claims cannot be the subject of required arbitration.\u201d Id. at 882. 2. Plaintiffs ADEA and ADA Claims are not Barred by the CBA Defendants argue that Plaintiffs federal statutory claims are barred by the mandatory arbitration clause of the CBA. Defendants contend that the \u201cGilmer and Austin decisions represent the current thinking on the arbitration of statutory claims.\u201d (Defs. Reply p. 5). In opposition to Defendants\u2019 motion, Plaintiff cites Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d at 354 (<HOLDING>). Defendants dismiss Gardner-Denver and Pryner Holdings: 0: holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights 1: holding that arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreement is not res judicata and cannot collaterally estop a civil rights claim 2: holding that the claim accrued after the employer denied a request for arbitration as untimely under the collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that agreements other than fullfledged collective bargaining agreements may be contracts within the meaning of  301 4: holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fluid in the bucket could not emit an odor without being triggered, and the truck occupants had no reason to use ether at that point because they lacked anhydrous ammonia \u2014 an essential ingredient in the methamphetamine manufacturing process \u2014 and ether would be used only after the ammonia. Wilson also argues that even if he or VanHouden had sprayed the aerosol cans in the car for no reason, the truck\u2019s windows had been open so the odor would have dissipated before the deputy could possibly have smelled it. While Wilson\u2019s assertions would lend plausibility to a finding that the deputy did not smell ether, they do not suffice to convince us that the district court\u2019s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. Moreover, we do not agree that the odor of ether was the Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The deputy\u2019s request to move the vest was Holdings: 0: holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle 1: holding that the court of appeals properly concluded that the odor of marijuana emanating from defendants vehicle constituted probable cause to search the vehicle 2: holding that the smell of marijuana gave the police probable cause to search the vehicle 3: holding that although pcp has no odor because streetlevel pcp is mixed with other substances that have a distinct odor an officers recognition of that odor was sufficient to establish probable cause 4: holding that the odor of marijuana gave officers probable cause to believe members of a group possessed marijuana and therefore a search of each person present was proper", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "probable cause to arrest in light of whether the facts proved a crime as defined by state law). \u201cTo determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide \u2018whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer, amount to\u2019 probable cause.\u201d Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. at 1661). \u201cIf an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.\u201d Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (<HOLDING>), quoted with approval in Joyce v. Holdings: 0: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 1: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law 2: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law 3: holding that fourth amendment not violated when officer makes custodial arrest for driving without a seatbelt 4: holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to an evidentiary error under KRE 103(e)). Reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court remanded for reinstatement of the sentences on grounds that the unpreserved Apprendi error did not meet the requirements for plain error.] While the language of RCr 10.26 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) differ substantially, and recognizing that this Court is not obligated to follow Cotton, we nevertheless believe it to be a valuable guide in the application of our palpable error rule. To discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court must plumb the depths of the proceeding, as was done in Cotton, to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable. Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 3-4. See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky.2009) (<HOLDING>) the error was clear or plain under existing Holdings: 0: holding that palpable error relief is not available unless three conditions are present 1 1: holding that equitable relief under rico is available only to the government 2: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa 3: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 4: holding that relief under rule 60b6 is not available unless the other clauses 1 through 5 are inapplicable", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "following provision: [I]f [Husband] increases his VA Benefits and it reduces his Military Retirement, that this election by [Husband] shall not affect [Wife\u2019s] right to a monthly sum equal to [Wife\u2019s] portion of [Husband\u2019s] disposable retired pay as provided for herein and reduction to the Military Retirement Pension now due and owing as a result of the election of [Husband] to receive the VA benefits, shall not reduce [Wife\u2019s] monthly sum as-set forth herein. The Trial Court also provided that it would retain \u201cjurisdiction to supervise and enforce\u201d the payment of retirement pay and benefits. \u00b6 4 Husband filed a motion for new trial on November 18, 2002, alleging that the Trial Court\u2019s order is contrary to law because the decree (1) unlawfully provides that Wife will be entitle n.2001) (<HOLDING>). \u00b69 In Troxell v. Troxell, 2001 OK CIV APP 96, Holdings: 0: holding debtor could not discharge that portion of his monthly army retirement benefits awarded to his wife pursuant to a divorce decree 1: holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits 2: holding that the trial court had authority to enforce a marital property settlement agreement that had not been incorporated into the parties final divorce decree 3: holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce 4: holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "test. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. And it is that balancing test that controls the outcome of this case. This test weighs the need to immediately apprehend the suspect against the risk posed to the public by continuing the pursuit. See id. On the need side of the ledger, courts consider \u201cthe urgency of the circumstances requiring police intervention.\u201d Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. Courts evaluate the urgency of the circumstances by considering \u201cfactors such as the seriousness of the crime or accident to which the officer responds, whether the officer\u2019s immediate presence is necessary to prevent injury or loss of life or to apprehend a suspect, and what alternative courses of action, if any, are available to achieve a comparable result.\u201d Id.; see also Clark, 38 S.W.3d at 582 (<HOLDING>). On the risk side of the ledger, courts Holdings: 0: holding that rule 4k2 does apply to admiralty cases 1: recognizing same factors 2: holding wadewitz factors apply to police pursuit cases 3: holding that the exception does not apply to osha inspection cases 4: holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "if they did not prevail at arbitration); Daugherty v. Encana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., No. 10-cv-02272-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 2791338, at *11 (D. Colo. July 15, 2011) (\u201cPlaintiffs\u2019 affidavits make plain they have no financial ability to pay [defendant\u2019s] attorneys\u2019 fees were Defendant to prevail before the arbitrator.\u201d). In contrast here, defendants have not conceded that the fees and costs associated with arbitration prevent plaintiffs from vindicating their rights, and plaintiffs have provided no evidence for the court to make that finding. Without this information, plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to show that the fee-shifting provision renders the arbitration agreement prohibitively expensive. See Marzano v. Proficio Mortg. Ventures, LLC, 942 F.Supp.2d 781, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (<HOLDING>); see also Perkins v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. Holdings: 0: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs 1: holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative 2: holding that plaintiff failed to carry his burden to show that arbitration was cost prohibitive because he has provided no evidence of the specific costs or arbitration fees or his financial inability to afford  them 3: holding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that the arbitration agreement prevented them from vindicating their statutory rights because they did not file affidavits or assert in their briefs that the costs were prohibitively expensive instead plaintiffs provided only the barest assertions that the fees and costs clause  makes the arbitration provision unconscionable 4: holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "defendant responded to an officer\u2019s request to look in his bag with \u201c[Yjou\u2019ve got the badge, I guess you can\u201d (alteration in original)), it has also found that assuming the pat-down position can be evidence of consent. United States v. Chambers, 646 Fed.Appx. 445, 448 (2016); see also Drayton, 536 U.S. at 199, 122 S.Ct. 2105 (silently lifting hands was considered consent to a pat-down); United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (raising one\u2019s arms at a request to pat down demonstrated nonverbal consent), cited in United States v. Anderson, 983 F.2d 1069, 1993 WL 2302, at *7 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision). We have also found that consent can be given without speaking a word. See United States v. Ortiz, 455 Fed.Appx. 669, 671-72 (6th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). Because \u201cthe question of voluntariness Holdings: 0: holding that ojffer and acceptance exist when the parties mutually express assent 1: holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent 2: holding that stepping back gesturing and opening the door wider  unambiguously conveyed assent to officers request to enter 3: holding that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel 4: holding mutual assent in contract law is elementary and it must be expressed by the parties", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and actions after all foster involvement ended and legal adoption was final. Second, neither Romero, nor any other New Mexico case, can be read as interpreting Section 41-4-6 so broadly as to intend the building waiver to apply to a private home when an adoption is final. The circumstances of Romero are not similar to those in the present ease. Romero involved a waste transfer facility operated by Valencia County. 2003-NMCA-019, \u00b6 1, 133 N.M. 214, 62 P.3d 305. This Court held that the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim based on the Court\u2019s interpretation of \u201coperation or maintenance\u201d in Section 41-4-6 as \u201cinelud[ing] negligence in failing to correct a dangerous condition created when the property was constructed o Dep\u2019t, 184 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1165 (D.N.M.2001) (<HOLDING>); M.D.R., 114 N.M. at 191, 836 P.2d at 110 Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in separating negligent entrustment and negligence claims for trial 1: holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims 2: holding that section 41  16 does not grant a waiver for claims of negligent supervision 3: holding that the plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are governed by opla 4: holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "unit of prosecution each individual injury that the defendant recklessly caused, even if the injuries were caused by only a single act.\u201d We disagree. The plain language of the statute establishes that the legislature has criminalized the act of recklessly causing bodily injury \u2014 not each individual injury. Cf. State v. Greene, 137 N.H. 126, 128 (1993) (explaining that the elements of knowing simple assault are twofold: \u201cthe culpable mental state of knowingly and the proscribed conduct of unprivileged physical contact\u201d). Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments \u201cfor a single criminal act against a single victim, simply because the act results in multiple injuries.\u201d Com. v. Traylor, 34 N.E.3d 276, 284, 284-86 (Mass. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the legislature Holdings: 0: holding that virginia domestic assault and battery statute did not qualify 1: holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery 2: holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two 3: holding that unit of prosecution for statute prohibiting assault and battery upon a child was not injuries resulting from proscribed conduct 4: holding on plainerror review an oklahoma statute for assault and battery was equivalent to the enumerated offense", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with the unsuccessful claim also aided the work done on the merits of the successful claim.\u201d Schwarz, 73 F.3d at 903 (alterations omitted) (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 747 (9th Cir.1989)). Once separated, any work performed on claims unrelated to winning claims is not compensable. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Under the two-step analysis set forth in Hensley, this fee reduction is not warranted. These services were related to the core claim on which Plaintiff prevailed. See Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1147 (\u201cClaims are \u2018unrelated\u2019 if they are entirely \u2018distinct and separate\u2019 from the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed.\u201d) (citing Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir.1995)); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). It was reasonable for Plaintiff to seek a Holdings: 0: holding that certain police stops of limited duration that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation are legal 1: holding that  362k claims are core 2: holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract 3: holding that where claims  involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories  and the plaintiff obtained only partial or limited success the court may reduce the lodestar amount if it believes that amount is excessive in relation to the plaintiffs relief emphasis added 4: holding that claims are related if they involve a common core of facts or they are based on related legal theories", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "officer has a particularized and objective basis for sus easonable suspicion to detain the mailed package. B \u201c[E]ven if the initial seizure of a mailed package is based on reasonable suspicion, a prolonged detention is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\u201d Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1212. The relevant time period is that between the initial detention and that at which probable cause is developed because \u201c[p]robable cause is sufficient to support the subsequent detention of the package.\u201d United States v. Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1160 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007). We have upheld as reasonable a five-day delay arising because of the difficulty of travel for canines in Alaska. Aldaz, 921 F.2d at 231; see also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1212 (holding Holdings: 0: holding reasonable twentynine hour delay 1: holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay 2: holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable 3: holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay 4: holding reasonable sixday delay", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the privilege would result in \u201cautomatic entry of summary judgment.\u201d Id. (quoting Pervis, 901 F.2d at 947). In this case, Mr. Martin asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to testify in his deposition in response to probative evidence offered against him. The court stresses that the criminal charges against Mr. Martin were dismissed, and therefore, he currently is not the subject of a criminal prosecution for alleged illicit drug activities. As a result, the court may draw an adverse inference against Mr. Martin concerning responses in which he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Two Parcels of Real Property, 868 F.Supp. at 311 (citing A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 629 n. 4); Premises Located at Route 13, 946 F.2d at 756; Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318-19, 96 S.Ct. at 1558 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the court infers that Mr. Martin\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify 1: holding that the fifth amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them 2: holding that the privilege against selfincrimination does not prohibit the trier of fact in a civil case from drawing adverse inferences from a witness refusal to testify 3: holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to proceed pro se resulted in a challenging situation for the trial court. It is clear to this Court that the trial court had the duty to question the witnesses as it did-in order to extract/clarify information it needed to make a decision as to the best interests of the child. We see no evidence of bias. In any event, grandparents, as the complaining party, have not met their burden of establishing that the' judge\u2019s questioning constituted \u201can abuse of discretion, resulting in discernible prejudice, capricious disbelief, or prejudgment.\u201d See Mansour, at 446. \u00b6 33 Grandparents\u2019 arguments as to the court limiting their testimony and interrupting their closing arguments are utterly undeveloped and we will therefore not address them. See Shepp v. Shepp, 821 A.2d 635, 639 (Pa.Super.2003) (<HOLDING>). We simply note that we are able to discern no Holdings: 0: holding the appellant was deemed to have abandoned an issue for which he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority 1: holding that a failure to advance any argument or cite any supporting authority on a subject enables us to deem the issue waived 2: holding that an argument that fails to cite to supporting authority in support of claim presents nothing for review 3: holding that an appellant waived a claim where he failed to cite any legal authority in support of an argument in his appellate brief 4: holding an argument waived for failure to cite authority", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court lacks jurisdiction to review this claim. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED. 1 . Toledo\u2019s conviction was vacated approximately seven months after the BIA\u2019s decision, and approximately four months after the expi ration of the period for filing a motion to reopen. 2 . In fact, the BIA has shown a willingness to sua sponte reopen cases where there is evidence that an immigrant\u2019s conviction was vacated for substantive or procedural defects. In re Noel, 2007 WL 2197540, *1 (BIA Jun 29, 2007) (using its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings where the immigrant presented evidence indicating that his conviction was vacated, in part, due to an alleged defect in the proceedings related to his plea bargain.); In re Bworna, 2007 WL 1520877, *1 (BIA May 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>); In re Sorokin, 2007 WL 1520791, *1 (BIA May Holdings: 0: holding that an immigration judges failure to advise the respondent of the availability of free legal services and to ascertain that the respondent has received a list of such programs invalidates a subsequently entered removal order 1: holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening 2: holding that once a petitioners prior removal order has been reinstated he no longer qualifies for any relief under the ina regardless of whether his application was filed before or after the reinstatement decision was made 3: holding that the failure to attach a custody order was not reversible error because there was no showing of prejudice where the respondents were aware of the childs placement the petition noted that custody of the child was given by prior orders the respondent admitted that the child was in the legal custody of the buncombe county department of social services and the respondents were present at pretermination hearings in which custody was granted to petitioner and hearings in which visitation options were discussed and determined 4: holding that an interim decision of a court in the resident country was determinative  as to whether respondents action represented a wrongful removal because it granted respondent the right to remove the child from germany in the circumstances presented", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "more tha\u00f1 a patent upon the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that a transformation of an abstract idea to a patent-eligible application of the idea requires more than simply reciting the idea followed by \u201capply it.\u201d Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294). In that regard, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that \u201c[fjor the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this analysis, it must involve more than the performance of \u2018well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.\u2019.\u201d Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347-48 (quoting Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359) (alterations in original); see also Mortgage Grader, 811 F.3d at 1324-25 (<HOLDING>); Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278 (\u201cTo salvage Holdings: 0: holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement 1: recognizing that substantial numbers usually satisfy the numerosity requirement 2: holding that generic computer components such as an interface network and database  do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement 3: recognizing that churches satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of 844i 4: holding that petitioners allegation that it is the owner of adjoining property does not satisfy the pleading requirement", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a dismissal was warranted. Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court\u2019s judgment. 1 . As the parties are familiar with the procedural history of this case, we will only summarize those facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 2 . Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., E.D. Pa. 74-cv-01345. 3 . Although the partial grant of summary judgment was a non-final order, see Fed. R. Civil P. 54(b), a final judgment has since been entered and the Court now has jurisdiction over both appeals. 4 . Bullock\u2019s assertion that these claims were merely an amendment to her first complaint does not save the claims from untimeliness. See Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Also, we decline to address Bullock\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only 1: recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss 2: holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired 3: recognizing that statute of limitations is applied on claimbyclaim basis 4: holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "As noted, in the present action Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. Although the IDEA allows courts to grant \u201csuch relief as the court determines is appropriate,\u201d 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii), ordinarily monetary damages are not available under that statute. As this court noted in Mountain View-Los Altos Union High Sch. Dist. v. Sharron B. H., 709 F.2d 28 which is not \u201crelief that is available under\u201d the IDEA, and because all educational issues already have been resolved to the parties\u2019 mutual satisfaction through the IEP process, Plaintiff is not \u201cseeking relief that is also available\u201d under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1415(0.\u2019 That being so, under the plain words of the statute, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. See W.B. v. Matulo, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In arguing to the contrary, Defendants rely Holdings: 0: recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea 1: holding that damages are not relief that is available under the idea 2: holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process 3: holding that by its terms the idea does not require exhaustion where the relief sought is unavailable in an administrative proceeding under the idea monetary damages are not available so exhaustion is not required 4: holding that exhaustion is not required for plaintiffs seeking money damages because damages are unavailable through the administrative process and because all other relief available to the plaintiffs under the idea had already been provided through a settlement agreement", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "answer questions. Agent Overton, who read Rodriguez his rights, testified: \u201c[Rodriguez] was coherent, sitting up facing me. He spoke and interacted. He seemed normal.\u201d Rodriguez\u2019s own witness, the physician assistant who examined him just after he spoke with the border agents, testified that his withdrawal could only have been \u201cmild or moderate\u201d and that the Rodriguez was \u201calert [and] oriented\u201d at the time of the exam. Further, our case law supports the finding that individuals going through heroin withdrawal can voluntarily and intelligently waive their Miranda rights. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 208 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir.2000) (\u201cNor did Defendant\u2019s symptoms of heroin withdrawal render his statements involuntary.\u201d); United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). On this record, the district court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence at trial showed hart was aware that what he was doing was wrong 1: holding that even though defendant began to display physical signs of withdrawal his waiver was voluntary because he remained coherent and responsive was aware of what was going on and told the  agents that he was able to continue with questioning 2: holding that trial court did not err in admitting statements made two hours after defendants blood alcohol level was 026 when trial court found that during questioning the defendant was coherent and that his answers  were extremely reasonable responsive and appropriate  3: holding that defendants prior arrests were insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel even though he told dea officers that he understood his rights 4: holding that a defendants statement made outside of police custody was voluntary because he was awake and relatively coherent during the questioning despite painful injuries", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Shawn James Woodall appeals pro se from the district court\u2019s order revoking supervised release. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See United States v. Palomba, 182 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that a defendant lacks standing to challenge a completed sentence); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 14, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (<HOLDING>). The government\u2019s motion to dismiss this Holdings: 0: holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings 1: holding that there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation 2: holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences 3: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation 4: holding that the collateral consequences of a parole revocation were insufficient to create a case or controversy after the petitioner was released", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Javier Ochoa-Gaytan appeals his 63-month sentence imposed on remand for resentencing after his jury trial conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3742 and U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, and we affirm. Ochoa-Gaytan contends that the district court improperly enhanced his sentence on the basis of a prior aggravated felony conviction that was neither admitted or charged in the indictment, nor proven be yond a reasonable doubt. These arguments are foreclosed by United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 284 F.3d 411, 414-15 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 966, 121 S.Ct. 1503, Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 1: holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 2: holding that almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998 in which supreme court held it unnecessary to prove prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt is narrow exception to apprendi 3: holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum 4: holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "347-48 (W.D.Tex.1997) (addressing 5 C.F.R. \u00a7 2635.805); Dean, 151 F.R.D. at 86-87 (same); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 737 F.Supp. 399, 404-05 (E.D.Mich.1989) (addressing the Ethics in Government Act); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 189 F.R.D. 512, 514 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (addressing Touhy regulations pursuant to 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 301); Romero, 153 F.R.D. at 651 (addressing 32 C.F.R. \u00a7 516.42, the predecessor to 32 C.F.R. \u00a7 516.49); Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 66, 69-71 (D.D.C.1998) (addressing 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 301, and finding that \u201cneither the federal Housekeeping Statute nor the Touhy decision authorizes a federal agency to withhold documents or testimony from a federal court\u201d); McElya v. Sterling Med., Inc., 129 F.R.D. 510, 514-15 (W.D.Tenn.1990) (<HOLDING>). C. The Federal Regulations at Issue Do Not Holdings: 0: holding that subsequently enacted federal statutes trump the rules of civil procedure 1: holding that 5 usc  301 does not grant authority to assert an evidentiary privilege not recognized by the federal rules of civil procedure or the law of evidence 2: holding that the court had the discretion to grant the summary judgment motion based on the fact that it was unopposed by plaintiff during the time allowed by the rules of civil procedure 3: holding that in federal cases partys right to assert a privilege is dictated by federal law 4: recognizing privilege under federal rules", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sale. He was also required to tender a deposit at some point to prove his good faith bid on the property. However, we read no requirement that the purchaser was to tender this deposit immediately after the hammer falls closing the sale. This provision says nothing of the timing requirements for a sale. In fact, the exact timing of a judicial sale is not set by statute; rather, under the direction of a master or other appropriate court officer, the sale is conducted on the day of sale between \u201celeven and five o\u2019clock.\u201d S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 15-39-690 (1977); Rule 71(b), SCRCP. However, the officer may prevent sales before they start by giving notice that the sales for that d\u00e1y have been closed. S.C.Code Ann. \u00a7 15-39-690 (1977); see also Pickett v. Pickett, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 470 (1836) (<HOLDING>). When, as in the case at hand, the foreclosing Holdings: 0: holding that the confirmation statute does not inhibit subsequent sale under power of property other than the property which at a former sale under power had failed to bring the amount of the debt  1: holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover 2: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 3: holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property 4: holding subsequent sale of property after sheriff announced he would sell no more property that day was void", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "awarded the defendant its attorney\u2019s fees based on the failure of the EEOC to conciliate a pattern and practice claim. Id. at 288. We vacated the award of attorney\u2019s fees holding that the EEOC could have reasonably believed that its efforts to conciliate were sufficient. Although we clarified that we were not deciding whether the EEOC in fact conciliated the claim, we acknowledged case law that had held \u201cin a class action suit, the EEOC is not required to provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant.\u201d Id. at 289 (quoting EEOC v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876 F.2d 16 (3d Cir.1989)) (alteration omitted). Our view is also consistent with the rulings of our sister circuits. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876 F.2d at 17 (per Holdings: 0: holding requirement nonjurisdictional and remanding for a possible eeoc waiver of that requirement 1: holding that eeoc satisfied its presuit requirement to attempt to conciliate class claims by providing notice to cintas that it was investigating classwide instances of discrimination 2: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 3: holding that rule 23a requirements must be satisfied as if class were to litigate its claims 4: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "sufficient to refute the Washington Supreme Court\u2019s conclusion that the Act is civil, and to require the release of all those confined under its authority.\u201d). In Seling, the Supreme Court assumed the statute in question was civil, and expressed no opinion as to how allegations that conditions of confinement \u201care too restrictive, that the conditions are incompatible with treatment, and that the system is designed to result in indefinite confinement ... would bear on a court determining in the first instance whether [a state\u2019s] confinement scheme is civil.\u201d Seling, 531 U.S. at 262-63, 121 S.Ct. 727. Moreover, the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Seling was limit ed to an as-applied challenge to a civil commitment statute on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. Id. at 263, 121 S.Ct. 727 (<HOLDING>). At the center of Plaintiffs\u2019 challenge to the Holdings: 0: holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law 1: holding that ch 980 is not a punitive statute and violates neither the ex post facto nor double jeopardy clauses of the wisconsin and united states constitutions 2: holding that the supreme courts ex post facto precedents do not clearly establish that amended section 29336 violates the ex post facto clause 3: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 4: holding that respondent cannot obtain release through an asapplied challenge to the washington act on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds and finding an asapplied analysis to be unworkable in that context because sueh an analysis would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby prevent a final determination of the schemes validity under the double jeopardy and ex post facto clauses", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the conduct which led to his conviction or previous extensions of his SAMs, such conduct might justify any future decision to impose new SAMs restrictions on Plaintiff, which would have nothing to do with the present lawsuit. Moreover, given that Defendants have apparently determined that Plaintiff sufficiently mitigated the reasons for his SAMs [Docket No. 121-2], it seems clear that Defendants could not reverse that determination at a later date based on past conduct and use it as an excuse to reimpose the prior SAMs designation. While they could impose a new SAMs designation for other legitimate reasons, e.g., new threats through the mail, such a determination would be unrelated to the original imposition of his SAMs and the annual reviews thereafter. See Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1291 (<HOLDING>). Further, I find that Plaintiffs case does not Holdings: 0: recognizing that dismissal is warranted only in extreme cases citation omitted 1: holding that prejudice may result when the alien is prevented from  reasonably presenting his or her case  citation omitted emphasis added 2: holding that injunctive relief is not moot based on voluntary cessation unless the defendant shows that it is absolutely clear his wrongful activities cannot reasonably be expected to recur 3: recognizing mootness if it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur citation omitted 4: recognizing that a judge is not absolutely immune from criminal liability", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on the remaining counts based on a higher base offense level than used in the original sentence after concluding that there was an error in the original sentencing. Smith, 103 F.3d at 535. Several courts considering resentencing after \u00a7 924(c) vacatur have reopened the sentences on the remaining counts and required consideration of not only changes which would increase the remaining sentence, but of the prisoner\u2019s new arguments for decreases in his sentence as well. See Easterling, 157 F.3d at 1225 (on resentencing, district court required to consider whether defendant should receive three-level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility available under current guidelines rather than two-level departure he originally received); United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Reyes v. United States, 944 F.Supp. 260 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court may consider evidence of a defendants postsentence rehabilitation and that such evidence may support a downward variance from the federal sentencing guidelines 1: holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation 2: holding that when a defendants sentence has been set aside on appeal a trial court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendants postsentencing rehabilitation 3: holding district courts may consider rehabilitation when deciding whether to impose a more lenient sentence at a defendants resentencing 4: holding that the district court had the discretion to grant a downward departure for postsentence rehabilitation", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee James Gressett, dismissing the Trustee\u2019s Texas law claim against Gressett for conspiring with Bradley to fraudulently transfer assets out of Bradley\u2019s estate. The district court held that the Trustee lacked standing to bring the civil conspiracy claim. Reviewing both the grant of summary judgment and the underlying legal issue of standing de novo, Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir.2007), we AFFIRM the district court\u2019s judgment for the following reasons: 1. It is well established that a trustee has no standing to bring tort claims that belong exclusively to creditors of the bankruptcy estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 433-34, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 1688, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>); In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., 522 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor 1: holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders 2: holding that employers have standing to sue 3: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "11 . 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3613(a), (f). 12 . These three exceptions deal with property exempted from levy by the Internal Revenue Code, property exempted under the Federal Debt Collection Act, and restrictions on the amount a judgment creditor may garnish under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3613(a)(l)-(3). 13 . Mem. and Order at 12. 14 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)) (internal quotations omitted). 15 . See United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir.2010) 0\u2018[T]he 'notwithstanding any other Federal law\u2019 clause signals a clear Congressional intent to override conflicting federal law\u201d) (<HOLDING>). 16 . Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that section 13c agreements do not override conflicting provisions of state law 1: holding language sufficient to override antialienation provisions of internal revenue code with respect to pension fund 2: holding that a courts power to allocate tax exemptions between parents must be exercised in accord with the internal revenue code 3: holding in the context of a plaintiffs suit to recover income taxes that congress has preserved the immunity of the united states from declaratory  relief with respect to all tax controversies except those pertaining to the classification of organizations under  501c of the internal revenue code 4: holding that the segregation of funds was not a prerequisite to the establishment of a statutory trust under the internal revenue code", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in this State, when construing statutes, we must presume that public interests are favored over private interests. See Tex. Gov\u2019t Code Ann. \u00a7 311.021(5); City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 396-97 (Tex.2009). It is in the public interest that the ad valorem tax be applied to property owners to compensate for a variety of benefits provided by local services such as fire and police protection, street lighting, roads and streets, and other incidents of a modern industrial infrastructure. Virginia Indonesia v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex.1995) (citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 289, 96 S.Ct. 535, 548, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976)); see also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., 447 U.S. 207, 228, 100 S.Ct. 2109, 2122, 65 L.Ed.2d 66 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, as the Supreme Court has held, Holdings: 0: recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case 1: holding that the state police is a state agency 2: holding that constitutional claim must be fairly presented to state court in order to satisfy exhaustion requirement 3: holding that both federal and state tax statutes are revenue production laws and not enacted for plaintiffs benefit 4: holding tax must be fairly related to services provided by state including police and fire protection and benefit of trained work force", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) and Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) require reconsideration of whether retaliation claims against state defendants are indeed barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kimel and Garrett held that particular laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age and disability, respectively, exceeded Congressional power under \u00a7 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore did not abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91, 120 S.Ct. 631 (addressing Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, 121 S.Ct. 955 (addressing Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act). But see Hason v. Medical Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167, 1170-1 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Following Kimel, Garrett, and other recent Holdings: 0: holding that despite garrett congress abrogated state sovereign immunity under title ii of americans with disabilities act 1: holding that congress had no power under article i to abrogate state sovereign immunity 2: holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act 3: holding in the context of an adea claim that an indian tribes sovereign immunity had not been abrogated by congress and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist 4: holding that unjustified segregation constitutes discrimination prohibited by the americans with disabilities act", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir.1996)). Absent direct participation, there must at least be a showing that the defendants \u201cacquiesced in some demonstrable way\u201d in the alleged violation. Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir.2003). Mr. Oakley contends that Bucheit and Knop were present at the meeting where Warden Cowan decided to inform the Deputy Director of the allegations and that, therefore, they \u201cacquiesced in the chain of events that led to Oakley\u2019s termination.\u201d Appellant\u2019s Br. at 8. However, Knop was following established department policy when he passed the allegations along to Warden Cowan, and Bucheit just happened to be in the room at the time. Cf. Conner v. Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-97 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Warden Cowan explained that department policy Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under  1983 1: holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong 2: holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful 3: holding a subordinate will be liable under  1983 for following a superiors orders if he knew or should have known his acts were violating plaintiffs constitutional rights 4: holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "S.W.3d 687, 709 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). 2 . GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex.2006). 3 . Doncaster v. Hernaiz, 161 S.W.3d 594, 606 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.). 4 . Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). 5 . Santa Fe Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Star Canyon Corp., 156 S.W.3d 630, 641 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.). 6 . Doncaster, 161 S.W.3d at 606. 7 . Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.1997) (quoting Tex Disciplinary R. Prof\u2019l Conduct 1.04(b), reprinted in Tex Gov\u2019t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A, State Bar Rules, art. X, \u00a7 9 (Vernon 2005 & Sup (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See Stover, 17 S.W.3d at 397-98. 13 . Holdings: 0: holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law 1: holding that section 721312 florida statutes provides for an award of appellate attorneys fees where the issue was the reasonableness of the fee awarded by the trial court 2: holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required 3: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 4: holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "after it leased the Railroad parcel. Thus, the district court\u2019s assumption of constant contamination over the entire period not only provides a reasonable basis to apportion liability, but, if anything, overestimates the contamination attributable to the Railroad parcel. Further, the district court\u2019s reliance on period of ownership finds support from the Restatement hypothetical discussed above. Just as it is reasonable to assume that each of the cattle caused an equal amount of harm even though some of the cattle may have done no harm to the land, it is also reasonable to assume that each year of ownership caused an equal amount of contamination, even though the contamination may have been worse in some years than in others. See also Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d at 903-04 (<HOLDING>); Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718 (noting Holdings: 0: holding that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant when the site of a copyright owners alleged injury is the location of the copyright owner 1: holding that leases between private renters of ci1yowned property were public records even though they were in the hands of one of the private partys attorneys 2: holding that municipal court records were admissible under  official records or public documents  exception 3: holding apportionment is possible among the sequential owners of a chromeplating site even though the records of the chromeplating activities were incomplete 4: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "retaliated against Plaintiff by failing to take him as a trainer. 2. Calling Out Protected Activity at Roll Call Plaintiff argues that Defendants retaliated against him for filing an EEOC complaint in September 2010 by \u201ccalling him out\u201d in front of others. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that, in October 2010, Lt. DeBoard told Plaintiff during roll call to \u201cStop whining about his post assignments\u201d and to \u201cStop snitching.\u201d Of course, Plaintiffs filing of the EEOC complaint constitutes protected activity. Further, the Court assumes that Plaintiffs filing of the EEOC complaint induced Lt. DeBoard to make said remarks. Still, a reasonable juror could not conclude that Lt. DeBoard\u2019s action was materially adverse. See, e.g., Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Cepada v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., 814 Holdings: 0: holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm  escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and  placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment 1: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 2: holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim 3: holding that a oneday time period between the employees complaint and her supervisors recommendation to fire her was sufficient 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the relevant statutes. A. Doctrine of Necessary Implication To begin, we note that \u201cnarrow construction is the rule in determining the scope of the condemnation power delegated pursuant to legislative enactment.\u201d Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519, 522 (Colo.1982) (finding that a federal oil and gas lessee could not condemn private property for private use as a right-of-way based on a condemnation statute which was silent as to whether federal oil and gas lessees could exercise the power granted therein). Because we construe the statute against the entity asserting the authority, we will not find an implied grant of the condemnation authority through \u201cvague or doubtful language.\u201d Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 272, 248 P.2d 732, 735 (1952) (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Mack v. Town of Craig, 68 Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury 2: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 3: holding that a municipality could not condemn private property under a statute granting certain enumerated parties the authority to condemn such lands where the statute did not include municipalities 4: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "certain or capable of being ascertained from the contract itself,\u201d Howell v. Allen & Co., 8 N.C. App. 287, 289, 174 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1970), \u201c[w]here the parties have attempted to put in writing an agreement fixing the rights and duties owing to each other, courts will not deny relief because of vagueness and uncertainty in the language used, if the intent of the parties can be ascertained.\u201d Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 379, 126 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962). For that reason, since \u201c[t]he law . . . does not favor the destruction of contracts on account of uncertainty,\u201d \u201ccourts should attempt to determine the intent of the parties from the language used, construed with reference to the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.\u201d Welsh v. Northern Telecom, S.E.2d 6, 8 (1992) (<HOLDING>), the parties did actually reach a complete Holdings: 0: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 1: recognizing that determination of appropriate sentence to be imposed should ordinarily be determined by the trial court on remand rather than at the appellate level 2: holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law 3: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 4: holding that a parents agreement to assist his children in obtaining a college education was unenforceable given the absence of any standard by which an appropriate level of assistance could be determined", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "way into immigration cases, and it is in this sense that we use the term in this opinion. 4 .Although INA \u00a7 242B(c)(3)(A), codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252b(c)(3)(A) (1994), has been repealed, Congress replaced the provision with one that is in all respects identical except that what formerly was called \"deportation\u201d is now referred to as \"removal.\u201d See INA \u00a7 240(b)(5)(C)(i), codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1229a (b)(5)(C)\u00ae. 5 . Former INA \u00a7 242B(f)(2), codified at 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252b(f)(2), provided: \"The term 'exceptional circumstances\u2019 refers to exceptional circumstances (such as serious illness of the alien or death of an immediate relative of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.\u201d 6 . Compare Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) with Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding that ina  242bc3a sets forth a mandatory and jurisdictional time bar 2: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 3: holding that ina  242bc3as time bar is not jurisdictional and thus subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the average layper son.\u201d Dominguez, 183 Cal.App.4th at 396, 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 739. Applying this standard, courts find limiting language to not be plain and clear where the provision is ambiguous, the provision uses complicated words not within the knowledge of average lay persons, or where the language is \u201cconfusing.\u201d Haynes, 32 Cal.4th at 1211, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 68, 89 P.3d 381 (finding exclusion not plain and clear because the exclusion used ambiguous terms that were not obvious on their face, involved cross-references between multiple definitions and documents not in the insured\u2019s possession, and used \u201cconfusing language surrounding and introducing the actual text of the\u201d exclusion); see also Ponder v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 145 Cal.App.3d 709, 723, 193 Cal.Rptr. 632 (1983) (<HOLDING>). However, if the limiting language \u201cclearly Holdings: 0: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 1: holding that clause excluding coverage for temporomandibular joint syndrome without a definition for that disease was not plain and clear because it is a technical medical term 2: holding that it is not 3: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 4: holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "specifically, \u201c[t]he focus of the \u2018wrongfulness\u2019 inquiry\u201d \u2014 as least in this Circuit \u2014 \u201cis whether, in hindsight in light of the ultimate decision on the merits after a full hearing, the injunction should not have issued in the first instance.\u201d Blumenthal, 910 F.2d at 1054 (emphasis added); see also Guzman v. Local 32B-32J, Serv. Emps. Int\u2019l Union, AFL-CIO, 72 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that liability on the injunction bond turns on \u201cthe ultimate issue of whether the enjoined party had the legal right to act as it wished\u201d). But see Global NAPs, 489 F.3d at 22 n. 6 (\u201cDissolution of an injunction is itself a final determination which permits a party to seek security posted with respect to the injunction.\u201d); Qualcomm, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 580, 583-84 (S.D.Cal.1998) (<HOLDING>). In fact, the Blumenthal Court explained, a Holdings: 0: holding that the dissolution of a tro constitutes a final judgment on the merits allowing recovery against the tro bond 1: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence 2: holding that dissolution of a tro after the plaintiff failed to carry its burden at the preliminary injunction hearing constituted a final decisions on the merits for purposes of the bond 3: holding that where defendant received temporary restraining order and had actual knowledge of hearing technical failure to include summons with tro did not deprive trial court of personal jurisdiction 4: holding that an appellate court may not consider an issue not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "another pre-1963 version of the statute. In State v. Gordineer, 229 Or 105, 109-10, 366 P2d 161 (1961), the court held that, where the statute provided that, \u201c[n]o person other than a parent, guardian, or other responsible relative, shall give any alcoholic liquor to any person under the age of 21 years,\u201d the \u201cgiv[ing]\u201d of alcohol to a minor could be accomplished in one of two ways: (1) \u201cby the giving of alcoholic liquor for immediate consumption by the minor such as a single or several drinks from the alcoholic liquor in the possession of another\u201d; or (2) \u201cby the giving of a quantity of liquor to the minor with intent that the possession of the liquor pass to the minor.\u201d (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 6 But see Fisher et al. v. City of Astoria, 126 Or 268, 282, 269 P 853 (1928) (<HOLDING>). 7 Similarly, in State v. Irving, 74 Or App Holdings: 0: holding the rule of ejusdem generis inapplicable to interpret the nonspecific term otherwise improve where the legislature had expressly defined the word improve 1: holding that for exception to apply procedure must not only improve accuracy but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding 2: recognizing the congressional policy in providing for a term of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty 3: holding that the term include but need not be limited to does not preclude the application of the ejusdem generis principle 4: holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "were disclosed. For example, records at Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino for 1999 indicated Clark and Hunter recorded winnings of over $75,000 each. While both individuals had significant losses as well, their winnings apparently exceeded their wagers by several thousands of dollars. 2 . Although Hunter originally did not appeal the federal district court decision against her, after the state district court ruled a notice to cure was required, Hunter made several motions in federal court requesting relief from the federal district court\u2019s decision against her. These attempts, and their appeals, ultimately proved unsuccessful. See Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468 (8th Cir.2004). 3 . The district court rejected Hunter's claim that the prior FED decisions by the district court (<HOLDING>) were binding on the parties in this action Holdings: 0: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 1: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city 2: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner 3: recognizing the language of  1322c1 as a minimum floor in cutting off the debtors right to cure and permitting the debtor to cure until the deed was delivered to the successful bidder which would complete the sale under new jersey law 4: holding the law required the dmmha to give a notice to cure", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the form of conducting presentations in the state to'obtain business and to report\u2019 their business activities were neither unilateral activities of.Hoagland or AFFT nor random and fortuitous. See id. at 153. Appellees agreed to attend the Texas meetings. See id. Hoagland presented evidence that appellees made representations during those meetings with regard to their qualifications that form the basis of. Hoagland\u2019s claims, i.e., that because of those representations, Hoagland entered into a business relationship with appellees, entered into the Operating Agreement and agreed to modify it, and agreed to take part-.in infomercials and other inedia events promoting the FairTax Campaign. See Max Protetch, Inc. v. Herrin, 340 S.W.3d 878, 886-87 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, appellees!, contacts were Holdings: 0: holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant 1: holding that when determining whether a nonresident defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with texas sufficient to support general jurisdiction courts examine the defendants contacts and forumrelated activities only up to the time that suit was filed 2: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 3: holding facetoface meeting in texas during which defendant made representations to plaintiff were purposeful contacts that formed a substantial portion of the core of the litigation 4: holding that the litigation privilege did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim where the accusatorial statements that led to the plaintiffs arrest were made before the charges against him were filed and were not made during and were unrelated to the judicial proceeding", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Greenheart purchased the property as an investment. Greenheart claims that the evidence fails to demonstrate that Greenheart intended to use the property for any commercial venture. Finally, Greenheart argues that the district court\u2019s reliance on how the Browns used their water rights in the past was erroneous because such uses did not bear on the actual land transaction between the Browns and Greenheart. The thrust of Greenheart\u2019s arguments invite this Court to revisit and re-decide factual determinations already made by the district court. This we will not do. We conclude the district court did not err when it found that Greenheart and the Browns entered into their agreement as a commercial transaction. The district court\u2019s finding that the Brown\u2019s sa .2d 201, 214 (Ct.App.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court\u2019s decisions are clear that Holdings: 0: holding that a previous decision assuming a malpractice action was a commercial transaction for the purpose of awarding attorney fees was not binding because the court in that case was not asked  to decide whether a malpractice action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters of the statute 1: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests 2: holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was for both a family retreat and for logging 3: holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property 4: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "one of his trial counsel as a witness, so the record is altogether silent about what the other trial counsel knew and did not know. And even as to the trial counsel who did testify at the hearing, Appellee never asked him what he knew, and what he did not know, about the testimony that family members might give. That trial counsel was unable to recall some details of his discussions with the family is unsurprising, considering that the hearing was held more than a decade after the trial, and it is unavailing to Appellee in any event. As noted earlier, a silent or ambiguous record is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of reasonable performance, and it is Appellee\u2019s burden to make a complete and clear record. See Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 566 (V) (A) (668 SE2d 651) (2008) (<HOLDING>); see also Chandler, 218 F3d at 1314, n. 15. Holdings: 0: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that even the demise of trial counsel does not relieve a claimant of his burden to prove an ineffective assistance claim 2: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel 3: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 4: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating changed circumstances that affect Billy\u2019s welfare. In part, he contends it would be \u201cagainst public policy\u201d to permit his deployment to \u201cnegatively affect [his] custody\u201d rights because our military personnel would be \u201cdiscouraged\u201d from service as a result. He further contends that without \u201cexpert or evaluator opinion on the matter,\u201d the judge properly denied defendant\u2019s request. The issue, however, is two-fold and sequential. Defendant must first make \u201ca prima facie showing ... that a genuine issue of fact exists bearing upon a critical question such as the best interests of the child[ ] ....\u201d Pfeiffer v. Ilson, 318 N.J.Super. 13, 14, 722 A.2d 966 (App.Div.1999). Once a prima facie showing is made, defenda 9 A.2d 178 (App.Div.1998) (<HOLDING>). We agree that but for plaintiffs impending Holdings: 0: holding that accident report was necessary to presentation of case and exclusion was in error 1: holding harmless the improper admission of a social workers hearsay testimony concerning a childs report of sexual abuse where the credibility of the childs testimony was supported by other witnesses 2: holding that a plenary hearing was necessary based upon mothers certification and school social workers report of childs behavioral problems 3: holding that a single father who relocated to care for an elevenyearold son with emotional and behavioral problems had a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving his employment 4: holding social workers report about plaintiffs statements was admissible through the combined effect of rules 801d2a and 8036", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1141, 1145 (5th Cir.1990). To the extent that a ruling was a reconsideration of a question of law, however, the standard of review is de novo. Tyler v. Union Oil Co., 304 F.3d 379, 405 (5th Cir.2002); Fletcher, 210 F.3d at 512. This Court reviews a district court\u2019s refusal to hold a party in civil contempt under the abuse of discretion standard. Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Mrs. Baird\u2019s Bakeries, 177 F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir.1999). III. The Union first disputes the district court\u2019s limitation of the arbitration awards to the period before the Union was decertified. When the NLRB decertified the Union on September 18, 2000, the CBA automatically terminated by operation of law. See Sheet Metal Workers\u2019 Int\u2019l Ass\u2019n. Local 206 v. West Coast Sheet Metal Co., 954 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Arbitration awards ordering reinstatement and Holdings: 0: holding that cba became void prospectively as of the decertification of the union 1: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 4: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are, however, a number of exceptions to this presumption of immunity. See Butler v. Sukhoi Co., 579 F.3d 1307, 1312-13 (11th Cir.2009). One such exception is the \u201ccommercial activity\u201d exception of Section 1610(a)(2), which provides an exception to the immunity of a foreign state\u2019s property from attachment or execution: The property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State ... if ... the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1610(a)(2). To execute judgment on a sovereign\u2019s property pursuant to the Section 1610( 32-33 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Before a court grants limited jurisdictional Holdings: 0: holding district courts order permitting general asset discovery prior to ruling on alleged exception to the fsia infringed on sovereign immunity 1: recognizing exception 2: recognizing the role of limited jurisdictional discovery to verify allegations of specific facts crucial to an immunity determination 3: recognizing the need for limited jurisdictional discovery to establish exception to the fsia 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "In support of this argument, it relies on the statement by the Court of Appeals that \u201cwhere the landlord changes the lock, or padlocks the door, there is an actual eviction.\u201d Barash, 26 N.Y.2d at 83, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 653, 256 N.E.2d at 710. After careful review of New York ease law in this area, the court rejects defendant\u2019s statement of the law and finds that in order for any action, including the changing of locks on a premise, to constitute an eviction there must be intent on the part of the landlord to keep the tenant out by reason of that action. The notion that merely changing the locks constitutes an eviction has been expressly rejected by the New York courts. Equitable Tower Assoc. v. El Paso Natural Gas, 134 Misc.2d 23, 24, 511 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Term 1st Dept.1986) (<HOLDING>); Breezy Point Cooperative v. Rockaway Point Holdings: 0: holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property 1: recognizing the general rule that the landlord is not liable for dangerous conditions existing once the tenant takes possession of the premises 2: holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant 3: holding that changing of locks did not constitute an eviction when tenant had moved out of the premises and landlord changed locks in order to conform the locks to a master key 4: holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u2018any individual,\u2019 courts long ago concluded that Title VII is directed at, and only protects, employees and potential employees.\u201d); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 54, 139 L.Ed.2d 19 (1997) (overruling previous case refusing to \u201crestrict[ ] the Act\u2019s protection to only former, present, and potential employees\u201d); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.1986) (interpreting identical \u201cany individual\u201d language in the ADEA to provide coverage \u201csolely in favor of a person who is an employee\u201d); but see Sibley Mem. Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973) (\u201cany individual\u201d not limited to \u201cemployees\u201d); but cf. Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp. of San Jose, 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). This limitation is necessary to further Holdings: 0: recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action 1: holding that the ada does not require an employer to hire an assistant to help a disabled employee fulfill his work responsibilities 2: recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: recognizing suit for discriminatory failure to hire when the defendant employer failed to hire another corporation as an independent contractor and a potential employee of the rejected corporation brought suit directly against the defendant employer", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "reflected in the non-economic damages \u201ccap\u201d was not so strong as to override lex loci delicti. Erie Insurance Exchange, 399 Md. at 628, 925 A.2d at 653. Because the Maryland General Assembly had not addressed specifically the issue of the applicability of the non-economic damages \u201ccap\u201d to claims for uninsured/underinsured motorist damages, and had not given \u201can unequivocal directive to the Maryland judiciary to apply the cap in these cases,\u201d we determined that lex loci delicti applied and that Maryland\u2019s public policy as reflected in the statutory \u201ccap\u201d was not \u201csufficiently strong to warrant overriding the rule of lex loci delicti.\u201d Erie Insurance Exchange, 399 Md. at 633-34, 925 A.2d at 657; see Black v. Leatherwood Motor Coach Corp., 92 Md.App. 27, 43, 606 A.2d 295, 302-03 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Anti-waiver provisions and explicit Holdings: 0: holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect 1: holding that noneconomic damages cap mandated by orrevstat  317101 is unconstitutional as applied to commonlaw negligence claims 2: holding that the existence of a cap on noneconomic damages was not of sufficient importance to override the principle of lex loci delicti 3: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages 4: recognizing principle", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "through a practice of discrimination. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 54. \u201cAlthough the court welcomes what it will term \u2018imaginative\u2019 lawyering from time to time, novel arguments must still be based on a firm theoretical framework and be supported by non-conclusory factual allegations suggestive of a plausible claim to relief to survive early dismissal.\u201d Febus-Cruz v. Sauri-Santiago, 652 F.Supp.2d 140, 152 (D.P.R.2009). Moreover, \u201cso long as [a plaintiffs] allegations of political discrimination fit within the contours of the First Amendment, they are, a fortiori, insufficient to ground a claim that the politically-inspired misconduct violated equal protection guarantees.\u201d Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d at 37 (citing Ruiz-Casillas v. Camacho-Morales, 415 F.3d 127, 134 (1st Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>)). In the case at hand, although the amended Holdings: 0: holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim 1: holding that because plaintiff failed to allege invidious discrimination based upon his membership in a protected class his equal protection claim failed at its inception 2: holding that an appellants equal protection claim which was premised on allegations of political discrimination flounders as it is a mere restatement of her failed first amendment claim 3: holding it appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss a discrimination claim where claim is not supported by factual allegations 4: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "percentage of fault. See Mich. Comp. Laws \u00a7 600.2957(1). The current version of \u00a7 600.2925d, which shields a settling defendant from claims for contribution, does not provide for pro tanto claim reduction because, as Michigan courts have held, the rationale for set-offs no longer applies under a system of several liability: \u201cThere would be no need for a setoff because the tortfeasor-defendant not involved in the settlement would necessarily be responsible for an amount of damages distinct from the settling defendant on the basis of allocation of fault.\u201d Markley v. Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc., 255 Mich.App. 245, 255, 660 N.W.2d 344 (2003). See also Wrobbel v. Int\u2019l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 07-10110, 2010 WL 940279, at *5 (E.D.Mich. March 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>). The Court concludes that the Papas and Holdings: 0: recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself 1: holding that under michigans reformed tortliability scheme the defendant union was not entitled to a setoff for a settlement received by plaintiff and holding that michigans allocation of fault scheme would permit the trier of fact to allocate fault regardless of whether all tortfeasors were parties to the proceeding 2: holding that  3240219b2 merely limits the liability of shortterm lessors the statute reduces responsibility for damages arising from the fault of others but preserves full liability for compensatory damages caused by ones own fault the statute merely caps the amount of damages for the vicarious liability of the lessor 3: holding plaintiff not at fault in accepting a lump sum social security benefit a second time observing that the agencys fault finding might be appropriate if plaintiff were an accountant 4: holding that the mere application for other benefits is not fault", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "premises liability law is establishing what duty a premises possessor owes to those who come onto his land.\u201d Hoffner, 492 Mich at 460. \u201cWith regard to invitees,[ ] a landowner owes a duty to use reasonable care to protect invitees from unreasonable risks of harm posed by dangerous conditions on the owner\u2019s land.\u201d Id. In the context of ice and snow, a premises owner has a duty to exercise reasonable care to diminish the hazards of ice and snow accumulation, requiring that reasonable measures be taken within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice and snow to diminish the hazard of injury to the invitee. [Id. at 464 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] However, a landowner\u2019s duty does not generally encompass defects that are \u201copen and ob 466 Mich 11, 16; 643 NW2d 212 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Cole v Henry Ford Health Sys, 497 Mich 881 Holdings: 0: holding that petitioners reliance on a case which concluded that a defendants right to a fair trial was violated was insufficient to place court on notice that petitioner was advancing a constitutional due process claim because the decision was based on state law 1: holding that frost and ice on a roof was an openandobvious hazard 2: holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned 3: holding that admission contained in an answer was binding despite the fact that it was made on information and belief 4: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "him to plead guilty in order that we not be prosecuted.\u201d The district court denied this motion on two grounds. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to criminal eases. Second, if construed as a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255, the same issues had been raised in the previous motion, which was then on appeal. The appeal from this order is before us as case number 92-50160. II. ANALYSIS A. The Second Appeal Andrade-Larrios\u2019s statement of issues and arguments does not address the district court\u2019s order denying his second motion, the one made while his appeal from the first order was pending. Accordingly, appellant waived his appeal of all the issues from the second order. See Fed.RApp.P. 28(a)(5); Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 416-17 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). B. Judge\u2019s Participation in Plea Bargaining Holdings: 0: holding that claims not raised in an appellants initial brief to our court are waived 1: holding that appellants brief satisfied rule 28a5 2: holding that issues not raised in an appellants initial brief are deemed abandoned 3: holding that issue first raised in appellees brief and then answered in appellants reply brief was properly raised for review 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the arrest was lawful, we stated: Read together, Payton and Oliver require that police obtain a warrant before entering either the home or its curtilage to make an arrest absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. Under Payton and Oliver, therefore, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, [the defendant]'s warrantless arrest, although not occurring in his home, was unlawful if his fenced-in backyard falls within the curtilage of his home. Id. at 183. We went on to conclude that the fenced-in backyard constituted curtilage of the home, thereby warranting the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless entry for arrest. Id. at 184. Other states and federal courts are in accord with this approach, holding that an arrest occurring outside of 81 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mierz, 866 P.2d 65, 70-71 (Wash. Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that where arrest was unlawful police officer committed a battery when he touched plaintiff during arrest 1: holding that arrest immediately out side of defendants house violated fourth amendment 2: holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful 3: holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house 4: holding that the protective sweep incident to the defendants arrest in front of his house on suspicion of murder was not justified because the evidence that an accomplice was involved in the murder did not equate to evidence that someone would be hiding out in the defendants house a month after the crime occurred and at the time of the arrest the officers were not chasing the defendant from a crime scene", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "unconstitutional behavior.\u201d Id. In this case, the Loys assert that Sexton exhibited active unconstitutional behavior by (1) ratifying Elliott\u2019s conduct, (2) inadequately training his deputies, and (3) establishing flawed policies. We disagree. First, the Loys contend that Sexton ratified Elliott\u2019s unconstituti re we held that a sheriff, sued in his official capacity, had \u201ca duty to both know and act,\u201d Sexton is being sued here in his individual capacity. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 1457 (finding M\u00e1rchese legahy in-apposite because defendants were only subject to liability in their individual capacities). Indeed, the Loys could not sue Sexton in his official capacity for money damages. See Will v. Mich. Dep\u2019t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 58 (1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Loys\u2019 claim against Sexton Holdings: 0: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under  1983 1: holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages 2: holding that neither a state agency nor its officials acting in their official capacities may be sued under section 1983 3: holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under  1983 4: holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under  1983", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagree ment.\u201d Harrington v. Richter, \u2014 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The Supreme Court has not held that a state or federal trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the Constitution. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (discussing joinder and severance in the context of Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 & n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (discussing misjoinder under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 Holdings: 0: holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment 1: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to rely on a defendants jurydemand where the defendant had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to make such a demand 2: holding that neither zafiro nor lane established a constitutional standard binding on the states 3: holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment 4: holding that we will not consider an argument of plain error where the defendant has neither mentioned the plainerror standard nor made any attempt to show how he can satisfy that standard", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "And most recently, in Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court again flatly rejected attempts to base the jury trial right on a sentencing code\u2019s structure, the historical discretion of courts in determining facts that underlie higher sentences, or the reliability of evidence to support increased penalties. 549 U.S. at 283-86, 290. These discredited rationales are the sole bases on which Thorne relies. After Cunningham, it is clear that the defendant\u2019s right to a jury trial rests on a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d that is not subject to policy concerns such as what the legislature intended or whether the evidence that the fact finder is to evaluate is particularly reliable. 549 U.S. at 283-86, 290; see also Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006) (<HOLDING>). \u00b687 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny Holdings: 0: holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements 1: holding there is no meaningful distinction between due course and due process 2: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction 3: holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing 4: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "de Ruiz v. U.S., 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1201-02 (M.D.Fla.2002) (concluding that aggravation of pre-exist-ing conditions, such as diabetes and asthma, is insufficient to satisfy impact rule), aff'd, 378 F.3d 1229, 1231 (11th Cir.2004). Here, the ailments complained of are headaches, diabetes, sleep apnea, stress, insomnia, anxiety, loss of appetite, hair loss, and bowel trouble, which are not the sort of the discernable physical injuries discussed in Champion and Zell. In addition, medical testimony discussing Mary Ann\u2019s injuries was equivocal, and no evidence was introduced linking Douglas\u2019s ailments to Appellant\u2019s acts. Cf. Zell, 665 So.2d at 1050 (noting plaintiff introduced medical testimony linking medical conditions to emotional distress), with Champion, 478 So.2d at 20 (<HOLDING>). We also conclude that Appellees failed to Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff established entitlement to relief without addressing whether plaintiffs death was medically attributable to emotional shock 1: holding plaintiff established entitlement to jury trial of legal claims brought under the phra 2: holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief 3: holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death 4: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and related Clausell\u2019s improbable story to police officers, the officers likely had sufficient probable cause to search the apartment. And yet, Clausell continued to provide further inconsistent statements to the police officers thereby bolstering a finding of probable cause to search the apartment. During their investigation, the police officers found a .22 caliber pistol with one spent round in the chamber wrapped in a towel inside a bucket located immediately outside Clausell\u2019s apartment. The police officers properly searched the area outside of Clausell\u2019s apartment as he possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of his apartment, particularly given that the bucket was apparently in plain view. See State v. Hubbell (1997), 286 Mont. 200, 210, 951 P.2d 971, 977 (<HOLDING>). \u00b623 Under these circumstances, the fact that Holdings: 0: holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to property leading up to and including the threshold of a residence therefore police officers were well within their authority to proceed on the open walkway to the front door where they saw evidence in plain view 1: holding based on steelman and johnson that evidence of the smell of marijuana emanating from a home a car with an open door and the keys in the ignition in front of the home and pry marks on the homes front door was not sufficient to justify a warrantless entry 2: holding that police officers sued in their official capacity are not liable for a violation of a privacy interest where the police department did not have a policy of deliberately failing to train its officers with respect to the confidentiality of records 3: holding a person at anothers residence solely for the purpose of engaging in drug related activity has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence 4: holding that a drug sniff outside the front door of the defendants residence was not a fourth amendment search because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy at the entrance to property that is open to the public including the front porch", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "been a basis for the preliminary injunction. C In sum, due to the jurisdictional and merits-based considerations discussed in detail above, the Association has failed to demonstrate even a fair chance of success on the likelihood of success prong as to any of the four claims. IV Turning briefly to the remaining prongs of the preliminary injunction test, even assuming that each of these prongs weighs in the Association\u2019s favor, it was an abuse of discretion for the preliminary injunction to be granted. Regardless whether the fair chance standard or a more demanding standard applies to the likelihood of success prong, the Association did not establish even a fair chance of success on the merits and, therefore, a preliminary injunction was not warranted. See Mikohn Gaming, 165 F.3d at 895 (<HOLDING>). We note, however, our disagreement with the Holdings: 0: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 1: holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success 2: holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest 3: holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm 4: holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of a crime need not be objected to or preserved for appeal in order to merit treatment by the appellate court, and may be ground for reversal. See Rule 12-216. {47} \u201cIn determining what is or is not an essential element of an offense, we begin with the language of the statute itself[.]\u201d Osborne, 111 N.M. at 657, 808 P.2d at 627. The murder statute, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-2-1 (1963) does not deal with the issue of more than one person contributing to the cause of death, and there is not the slightest suggestion that if there are multiple individuals responsible for the death that any of them is less guilty of the crime of murder. The additional, omitted instruction is therefore merely elaborative of the primary instruction. See State v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 458, 462, 601 P.2d 428, 432 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, it expands, rather than contracts, Holdings: 0: holding that failure to instruct on an essential element was harmless error because the element was so clearly established 1: holding that the failure to instruct on a definition or to amplify an element is not a failure to instruct on an essential element 2: recognizing that trial courts failure to instruct jury on element of offense is harmless when existence of element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence 3: holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial 4: holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecutive to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner. Florida law provides that a person convicted of a \u201cfelony of the second degree\u201d is punishable to \"a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.\u201d Fla. Stat. \u00a7 775.082(3)(c). 32 . Fla. Stat. \u00a7 945.091(4) provides: The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of his or her confinement or to return within the time prescribed to the place of confinement designated by the department shall be deemed as an escape from the custody of the department and shall be punishable as prescribed by law. 33 . In so holding, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. --\u25a0, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009) (<HOLDING>). We nonetheless find that decision inapposite. Holdings: 0: holding that failure to stop for a blue light is a violent felony under armed career criminal statute because it involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 1: holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act 2: holding that possession of sawedoff shotgun is violent felony as defined by armed career criminal act 3: holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act 4: holding that the illinois crime of failure to report for imprisonment is not a violent felony for purposes of the armed career criminal act", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.\"). 125 Furthermore, the statute at issue defines .\"sexual contact,\" not simply \"contact.\" It would be incongruous to say that such contact could occur without having a \"sexual element.\" In addition, the definition appears in a section under the broad heading \"Unlawful Sexual Behavior,\" for Part 4 of the statute. \u00a9 . 126 For all these reasons, we conclude that \"sexual\" modifies \"abuse\" in the definition of \"sexual contact\" contained in section 18-3-401(4). See United States v. De La Cruz-Garcia, 590 F.3d 1157, 1160 (10th Cir.2010) (noting that section 18-3-401(4) is limited to sexual acts); State v. Riolo, 50 Kan.App.2d 351, 330 P.3d 1120, 1124 (2014) (<HOLDING>). { 27 Having determined that there must be a Holdings: 0: holding that the fouching for the purposes of abuse language in section 1834014 means touching for the purposes of sexual abuse not abuse in general 1: holding evidence of outofstate instances of abuse admissible in child sexual abuse case to show intent opportunity and relationship between defendant and victim 2: holding that an abuse or molestation exclusion unambiguously covered claim of sexual touching even though terms abuse and molestation were not defined 3: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 4: holding that although there were six occurrences under the general liability policy there was only one sexual abuse occurrence where sexual abuse occurrence was defined as a single act or multiple continuous sporadic or related acts of sexual molestation or abuse caused by one perpetrator", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that Althen could be bypassed in this case, the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined the error was harmless. See Trial Court Decision, 100 Fed.Cl. at 451. The special master\u2019s finding that Petitioner had multiple sclerosis before receiving the vaccine means that Petitioner did not establish a \u201clogical sequence of cause and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for [his] injury\u201d as required by prong two of Althen. 418 F.3d at 1278. If a petitioner has a disorder before being vaccinated, the vaccine logically cannot have caused the disorder. Additionally, prong three of Althen requires a \u201cmedically-aceeptable temporal relationship\u201d between vaccination and onset of symptoms. Id. at 1281; de Bazan v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Petitioner\u2019s first episode of Holdings: 0: holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim 1: holding a petitioners causation claim may fail because disease onset occurs too early to be attributable to the vaccine 2: holding that the petitioners offer of proof was too tenuous to justify the desired inquiry 3: holding that five alleged incidents in four years were too few too separate in time and too mild  to create an abusive working environment 4: holding that attorneys admission to an element of the offense in the petitioners presence at a deportation hearing was binding on the petitioners", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as a matter of law. To secure summary judgment, City was required to establish both that there was no genuine issue in dispute to support its affirmative defense that the Agreement was void ab initio, and that there was no genuine issue in dispute to negate Lamar\u2019s affirmative avoidance of equitable estoppel. See id, at 381. As we explain, City sustained that burden. It is a long settled principle in Missouri that \u201c[cjities cannot be made liable, either on the theory of estoppel or implied contract, by reason of the accepting and using [of] the benefits derived from void contracts.\u201d Donovan, 175 S.W.2d at 881 (quoting Likes v. Rolla, 184 Mo. App. 296, 167 S.W. 645, 647 (1914)). Vain; and futile would Constitution and statutes and charter be, i 8 Mo. 978, 156 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1941) (<HOLDING>); St. Charles Cty., 184 S.W.3d at 167 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 1: holding notice of the defect actual or constructive and a failure to act on the part of the municipality to remedy the situation are prerequisites to recovery in an action involving a municipality 2: holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff 3: holding that under the implied covenant of good faith neither party to a contract shall do anything which has the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract 4: holding that where a city enters contract in excess of its statutory power the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the contract which has been performed by the other party does not make the municipality liable either on the theory of ratification estoppel or implied contract in order to do justice to the other party by paying the reasonable value of the property or services", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor.... 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1325(a). The hanging paragraph protects creditors possessing a \u201cpurchase money security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim\u201d from \u00a7 506(a) bifurcation and cramdown. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 1325(a). The parties agree the collateral in this case is a motor vehicle acquired for the personal use of the debtors and the motor vehicle was acquired within 910 days of the bankruptcy filing. The only issue in dispute is the extent to which Ford Motor Credit has a \u201cpurchas o.2008) (same), and In re Padgett, 389 B.R. 203, 211-12 (Bankr.D.Kan.2008) (same), rev\u2019d sub nom., AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Padgett (In re Padgett) 408 B.R. 374, 381-82 (10th Cir. BAP 2009), with In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr.D.Kan.2008) (<HOLDING>), and In re Austin, 381 B.R. 892, 897 Holdings: 0: holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing 1: holding bifurcation and cramdown are unavailable because negative equity is part of purchase money security interest 2: holding that a pledge is a sale and purchase of a security under  10b 3: holding that in georgia pursuant to  9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58 4: holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the district court\u2019s denial of its motion to dismiss on grounds of Alamo\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Martin argues that we are precluded from considering the merits of this issue because Alamo did not file a timely notice of appeal. We need not decide whether Alamo\u2019s notice of appeal was timely because Alamo inadequately briefed the issue and, thus, abandoned its Eleventh Amendment arguments. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 243 F.3d 936, 940 (5th Cir.2001) (dismissing appeal as abandoned because the Appellant failed to challenge the district court\u2019s application of the applicable test for Eleventh Amendment immunity); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., 985 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir.0993); L & A Contracting Co. v. Southern Concrete Servs., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir.1994)(<HOLDING>); Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (requiring Holdings: 0: holding appeal to be abandoned because appellant cited no authority in a onepage argument 1: holding the appellant was deemed to have abandoned an issue for which he failed to provide any argument or supporting authority 2: holding that an issue is waived where the defendant failed to develop an argument in his appellate brief and cited no authority 3: holding an issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority 4: holding that appellant abandoned argument by failing to argue it in body of brief", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(i.e., the principle and the methodology) on which the proffered DNA evidence is based \u2018relevant\u2019 to understanding the evidence or to determining a fact in issue? \u201cTrial courts should use the flexible Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1998)], analysis in making the \u2018reliability\u2019 (scientific validity) assessment. In making that assessment, the courts should employ the following factors: (1) testing; (2) peer review; (8) rate of error; and (4) general acceptance. \u201cTrial courts should make the \u2018relevance\u2019 assessment by addressing the \u2018fit\u2019 between what the scientific theory and technique are supposed to show and what must be shown to r 197 [ (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1062, 114 S.Ct. 734, 126 L.Ed.2d 697 (1994) ] (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the state of scientific Holdings: 0: holding that the existence and content of a police report are not properly the subject of judicial notice 1: holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice 2: holding that the reliability of the restriction fragment length polymorphism rflp procedure was subject to judicial notice 3: holding that reliability of the polymerase chain reaction pcr method of dna typing would be subject to judicial notice in future cases 4: recognizing that pleadings in the underlying case are subject to judicial notice by an appellate court", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for a debt- or\u2019s refusal to obey them. See \u00a7 1325(a); \u00a7 1307(c) (providing that the trustee or a party in interest may seek to dismiss a Chapter 13 case or convert it to Chapter 7 \u201cfor cause, including ... material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan\u201d); see also In re Talbot, 124 F.3d 1201, 1209 (10th Cir.1997) (\u201cUpon becoming final, the order confirming a chapter 13 plan represents a binding determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties as ordained by the plan.\u201d). Thus, interpreting the relevant statutory language according to its plain meaning, we easily conclude that the confirmation order in this case qualifies as a \u201clawful order of the court\u201d for purposes of \u00a7 727(a)(6)(A). See also In re Foster, 335 B.R. 709, 716 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.2006) (<HOLDING>). The Standiferds contend that this natural Holdings: 0: holding that representation as to financial solvency of partnership was statement of financial condition because it reflected overall economic condition of partnership 1: holding that the agency did not have an obligation to search for and produce the documents the plaintiff claimed entitlement to because the plaintiffs foia request gave no indication that she sought those particular documents 2: holding that  727a6a clearly includes orders requiring the debtor to produce documents relating to his or her financial condition 3: holding that evidence of a defendants financial condition is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages 4: holding that scope of discovery in tread separation case should include documents relating generally to the tread separation defect or problem because otherwise the defendant would not produce documents probative on the issues of notice defectiveness and dangerousness", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "It is not a limitation upon the right to seek another office. The incumbent of an office has the choice under the statute to retain it unmolested, or give it up and seek another.\u201d Id. at 239; see also Hill v. Galliher, 65 So. 3d 362, 377 (Ala. 2010) (upholding resign-to-run provision against challenge that it unconstitutionally added qualification to run for office, observing that it merely \u201cestablished requirements for retaining employment\u201d (quotation and emphasis omitted)); Holley v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 401, 406 (Fla. 1970) (rejecting claim that resign-to-run statute was unconstitutional qualification for office, ruling that it was merely limitation upon right to retain one office while seeking another). But see Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 413 S.E.2d 541, 544-45 (N.C. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, other jurisdictions construing similar Holdings: 0: holding  13981 constitutional under the commerce clause 1: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 2: holding that specific wording of constitutional qualifications clause invalidated resigntorun statute 3: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 4: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that failure to respond to the notice will result in a Notice to Appear in municipal court \u201cand you may be charged with a new offense.\u201d Moreover, the Ordinance expressly provides that \u201c[ujnder no circumstances may a person be imprisoned for such violation [of the Ordinance].... \u201d While the Ordinance does allow for additional prosecution for failure to appear at a scheduled hearing in municipal court, \u201cit is not duress to do, or threaten to do, what one has a right to do.\u201d Slone v. Purina Mills, Inc., 927 S.W.2d 358, 371 (Mo.App.W.D.1996). Ellisville is entitled to pursue legal action against an alleged violator if he or she fails to respond to a Notice to Appear in municipal court. See Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Missouri Bd. of Fund Com\u2019rs, 384 S.W.3d 238, 275 (Mo.App.W.D.2012) (<HOLDING>). Because the voluntary payment doctrine bars Holdings: 0: holding that the crime of knowingly and willfully threatening the president required only that the threat be made under circumstances where a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake duress or coercion 1: holding after long discussion of the various opinions in black that that case established that a defendant can be constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened 2: recognizing that missouri courts do not recognize the threat of legitimate legal process as duress because the party threatened is entitled to plead and prove that he is not liable 3: holding that bankruptcy is no exception to the due process principle that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party to or to which he has not been made a party by service of process internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that the district courts finding that an allegedly coercive threat did not specifically motivate the defendants confession where 1 there was no evidence that the threat was repeated at the police station 2 defendant offered no admissible evidence that the threat was the crucial factor motivating his confession and 3 he confessed immediately after the officer threatened to administer a gun residue test as opposed to confessing immediately after the allegedly coercive threat was made thus the gunresidue test was just as plausible a motivating factor for the confession as was the threat", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "USAMRIID, and the \u201ctunnel vision\u201d and lack of flexibility characteristic of some scientists. Similarly, in a memorandum to the Commander of the USAMRMC, in which Glenn gave his Review & Analysis of the USAMRMC, Glenn noted the \u201cproblem\u201d of the \u201caverage age going higher.\u201d He stated that \u201conly US-AMRIID cut below the authorization limit to hire back either younger or different technology skills.\u201d In appellants\u2019 view, these statements by Glenn, like those made by Franz, reveal a discriminatory animus against older employees and establish pretext. We disagree. \u25a0 First, we have consistently held, along with other circuits, that general or ambiguous remarks referring to the process of generational change create no triable issue of age discrimina tion. See, e.g., Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 511-12 (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, Holdings: 0: recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law  the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way 1: holding that the reference to needing younger blood was insufficiently probative of age bias 2: holding that a suretys standing to sue  comes from the fact that it is also subrogated to  the contractor 3: holding that the statement that there comes a time when we have to make way for younger people is insufficient to create any inference of age bias because it is a stray remark which merely reflects a fact of life 4: holding it is a question of fact", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "defects,\u201d specifically, defects in establishing citizenship for the purpose of establishing diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 223. See also Harmon v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir.1997) (citing with approval the reasoning in In re Allstate that \u201ca defendant\u2019s failure to allege citizenship as opposed to residency ... constituted a procedural defect\u201d). We agree with the Fifth Circuit\u2019s interpretation of \u00a7 1447(c) and construction of a party\u2019s failure to establish citizenship in its notice of removal as a procedural defect. \u201c[Wjhere subject matter jurisdiction exists and any procedural shortcomings may be cured by resort to \u00a7 1653, we can surmise no valid reason for the court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.\u201d In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 223. See also Ellenburg, 519 F.3d at 198 (<HOLDING>). Section 1653 provides that \u201c[d]efec-tive Holdings: 0: holding that district court has no jurisdiction to take further action where there was no remand order 1: holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal 2: holding that a remand order entered by a magistrate judge was beyond his statutory authority and concluding that review was proper because the court of appeals was not reviewing the merits of the remand order itself 3: holding remand orders not subsumed under statute barring review of remand orders based on defect in removal or on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be appealed pursuant to 28 usc  1291 4: holding that the district court cannot remand sua sponte for defects in removal procedure", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of habeas corpus is denied. III. Analysis of the Petition A. Inadequacy of court-appointed interpreter The Supreme Court has never decided what degree of interpretive assistance is constitutionally required for non-English speaking defendants. See United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 901 (2d Cir.1967) (noting lack of Supreme Court precedent); see also United States v. Johnson, 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has not even specifically found a constitutional right to any interpreter at all). The Second Circuit, however, has held that a non-English speaking defendant has a constitutional right to an interpreter. See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 387 (2d Cir.1970); see also United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Sin v. Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal 1: holding that a defendant whose fluency in english is so impaired that it interferes with his right to confrontation or his capacity as a witness to understand or respond to questions has a constitutional right to an interpreter 2: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 3: holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life 4: holding defendant had no constitutional right to a mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "places [a defendant convicted of conspiracy] on a fundamentally different plane\u201d than a defendant who has not been convicted of conspiracy. Harrisortr-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1523. An analysis of the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d of Sluder\u2019s and Saturday\u2019s loss enhancement underscores our point. Sluder\u2019s and Saturday\u2019s sentences, even after the loss enhancement, fall within the maximum sentence authorized for the crimes alleged in the indictment. The loss enhancement neither negates the presumption of innocence nor alters the burden of proof for wire fraud or conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Nor does it hold Sluder and Saturday responsible for any offenses for which they have not been convicted by a jury. Cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 2297-98, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009) (<HOLDING>). The loss enhancement is based on a conspiracy Holdings: 0: holding rla duty of fair representation claim preempts identical state law claims of fraud and deceit 1: holding hellorhighwater clause enforceable in the absence of fraud or deceit 2: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 3: holding intent as an element for disciplining an attorney for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation is proven by establishing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing 4: holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to \u201cissue a declaratory judgment in a criminal cause\u201d regarding appellant\u2019s status as sex offender, regardless of the decision in Doe I. Id. at 140, 20 A.3d 192. Although the Court in Doe I held that the 2009/2010 amendments had crossed the line from \u201ccivil regulation to an element of the punishment of offenders\u201d in the ex post facto context, that ruling did not transform the sex offender registration scheme into a sanction in the context of a criminal case. See Doe I, 430 Md. at 578, 62 A.3d 123 (McDonald, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Accordingly, registration remains a collateral consequence of criminal punishment, and thus appellant can seek removal from the sex offender registry only through a civil action for declaratory judgment. See Sinclair, 199 Md.App. at 137, 20 A.3d 192 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless of the merits of Holdings: 0: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits 3: holding that a complaint seeking declaratory judgment remains the procedure for obtaining under appropriate circumstances a ruling on the constitutionality of a statute the violation of which carries criminal sanctions 4: holding that filing of infringement action twelve days after complaint for declaratory judgment obviated the need for a declaratory judgment in this case", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "proceeded to a bench trial. The district court found Kooima guilty. Kooima appealed. We transferred the c\u00e1se to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. Kooi-ma sought further review, which we granted. III. Issues. The issue before the court is whether the investigatory stop of Kooima by the Rock Valley police violated his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. IV. Standard of Review. Kooima argues the district court should have granted his motion to suppress on state and federal constitutional grounds because the State deprived him of his right against unlawful searches and seizures. State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) (<HOLDING>). We review constitutional issues de novo. Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 1: holding that a defendants personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a  1983 complaint 2: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel 3: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 4: recognizing a motion to suppress based on the deprivation of the defendants constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "judge in your absence.\u201d Thompson signed his Notice to Appear despite this admonition and the fact that the form listed an address where he knew he could not be reached. We are left to wonder how Thompson expected the government to contact him regarding his pending removal hearing when the form he signed listed an incorrect address. The fact that the immigration official made the alleged error does not absolve Thompson. Thompson had both the opportunity to provide his current, correct address at the time he received the Notice to Appear an 11th Cir.2005) (noting that one \u201cwho has executed a written contract and is ignorant of its contents cannot set up that ignorance to avoid the obligation\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Even if Thompson were to argue that the Holdings: 0: holding that form 4790 is not an administrative rule but is merely incidental to the statute and regulations and therefore false statements on the form can lead to criminal prosecution 1: holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government did not constitute a trap for the unwary 2: holding that false statements are constitutionally protected 3: holding that a defendant who deliberately avoids reading the form he is signing cannot avoid criminal sanctions for any false statements contained therein 4: holding that spreading of deliberately false statements that employee in effect committed forgery constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999). No request for admonishment is necessary. Id. [cdiscussion Appellant objected to certain prosecu-torial comments made during the State\u2019s closing argument that challenged the veracity of both his and Ms. Hughes\u2019s testimony. The trial court overruled appellant\u2019s objection and also denied his subsequent request for a mistrial. Appellant acknowledges a lack of appellate decisions dealing with prosecuting attorneys\u2019 improper comments on the veracity of a witness or defendant. He cites Gates v. State, 338 Ark. 530, 2 S.W.3d 40 (1999) (finding that prosecutor\u2019s comment that appellant was guilty not grounds for mistrial; counsel failed to ask for a curative instruction after objection); Leach v. State, 38 Ark.App. 117, 831 S.W.2d 615 (1992) (<HOLDING>); and Harrison v. State, 276 Ark. 469, 637 Holdings: 0: holding that while the prosecutors question was improper in light of the overwhelming evidence there was no reversible error in the denial of defendants motion for mistrial 1: holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors 2: holding that a prosecutors argument about the special agents disincentive to lie was impermissible vouching 3: holding that while not reversible error a prosecutors vouching for a witness was improper and should be avoided on retrial 4: holding that prosecutors remark vouching for credibility of government agent was certainly improper", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to punitive damages under California law, a plaintiff must demonstrate \u201coppression, fraud, or malice.\u201d Cal. Civ.Code \u00a7 3294. By contrast, once a plaintiff has successfully met the \u201cdeliberate indifference\u201d standard under the Eighth Amendment \u2014 requiring that the conduct be \u201cwanton,\u201d Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) there is little more that such a plaintiff would need to prove to establish a convincing argument for an award of punitive damages. These significant differences in the potential liability faced by privately operated federal prisons are prime examples of the \u201cmarginal deter rence\u201d that Bivens offers. Thus, we do not find that this \u201cspecial factor\u201d counsels hesitation. (c) Asymmetrical Liabilit Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (<HOLDING>), and Holly, 434 F.3d at 294 (stating that Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery 2: holding that federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers emphases removed 3: recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights 4: recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "15 C.R.S. (1990); Orr, 753 P.2d at 1223; Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 106, 371 P.2d 775, 783-84 (1962); City of Colo. Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289, 294, 249 P.2d 151, 153 (1952). This protection extends not only to surface water users but to users of all water tributary to a natural stream, including appropriators of tributary underground water. See \u00a7\u00a7 37-92-102(l)(a), -103(11) (incorporating all waters of a natural stream in scope of Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, and including tributary underground water as a component of a natural stream); see also Danielson v. Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 757-58 (Colo.1981) (distinguishing tributary groundwater from designated groundwater); Safranek v. Town of Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 334, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (1951) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, this protection extends to Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption that all groundwater is tributary and subject to prior appropriation doctrine as part of the waters of the stream 1: recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed 2: holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters 3: holding that waters in utah are of two classes private and public and title to public waters is in the public all are equal owners that is have coequal rights therein 4: recognizing doctrine", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that [the opposite] approach permits a court to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court later finds to be perfectly enforceable.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448-49, 126 S.Ct. 1204). This' dilemma is resolved by allocating such decisions to arbitration in accordance with the liberal policy favoring arbitration. Id., K-Stemcell and Biostar have not raised a challenge to the agreement to arbitrate that is \u201cspecific to the arbitration clause itself\u2019. Because Biostar\u2019s and K-Stemcell\u2019s challenge to the motion to compel attacks the enforceability of the entire Agreement, the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator. See TMI, Inc. v. Brooks, 225 S.W.3d 783, 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we overrule Biostar\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing exception to general rule that disputes arising under contract with valid arbitration clause are referred to arbitrator 1: recognizing the existence of antagonistic defenses does not require severance unless defenses are actually irreconcilable 2: holding defenses concerning the contract as a whole must be referred to ah arbitrator while defenses to the arbitration provision itself are considered by the court 3: holding that whether in federal or state court a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole and not specifically to the arbitration clause within it must go to the arbitrator and not the court 4: holding under both florida law and faa that factual affirmative defenses are properly decided by the arbitrator rather than the court", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880). 18 . The phrase \"communication, exchanges, or conversations\u201d is a direct quote from Edwards (451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880); however, based on our contextual analysis of Hutchins, the conclusion that the CAAF drew (\"Edwards ... prohibits further 'communication, exchanges, or conversations that may ... lead to further interrogation\u2019 \u201d) appears to have its genesis in the following two sentences from Bradshaw: There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquires or s 10, 1112-13 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). 21 .The Government argues that even if the Holdings: 0: holding that following his invocation of counsel fbi agent handed mr comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon mr comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by mr comosona within the meaning of edwards 1: holding that following his invocation of counsel when mr mccree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say this constituted initiation under edwards 2: holding suspects contradictory answers on miranda waiver form that he would answer questions without an attorney and that he wanted to talk to a lawyer to be ambiguous 3: holding that defendants request to speak to his parents was not an invocation of the right to remain silent because defendant never gave the police any indication that he wanted to stop talking only indicating he wanted to take a break from the interrogation to speak with his parents 4: holding that the defendants conclusory assertion that he told his counsel he wanted to testify but that counsel failed to call him as witness was insufficient to require a hearing or a response from government but the defendant should have been allowed an opportunity to state his claim with greater specificity", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "support under section 14.05(a) must have been filed before the children reached eighteen years of age. Otherwise, relator argues, the 303rd Court did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion or sign the order extending the child support, and, therefore, the order is void. Relator cites Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex.1977), in which the supreme court held that modification of a divorce decree to include payments for a child who requires continuous care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and who is not able to support himself must be sought before the child turns eighteen. Thereafter, the court held, there is no pending order subject to modification. See also Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d 492, 494-95 (Tex.App. \u2014 Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Red and Attaway, however, dealt with Holdings: 0: recognizing that nonparent standing turns on the quality of the relationship between the nonparent and the child 1: holding that a judgment for attorneys fees may be rendered in the nature of child support regardless of whether the underlying action is one of enforcement or modification 2: holding that the modification order itself must be signed before the child turns eighteen 3: holding that the order on the wifes petition for modification of child support was a final order because it disposed of all the issues except for the ancillary issue of attorneys fees 4: holding that jurisdiction existed to enforce a consent order issued by the department despite a pending appeal before the board seeking modification", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "when he or she exercises \u201csupervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation\u201d while acting in the employer\u2019s interest. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing individual liability under the FLSA\u2019s analogous definition of an \u201cemployer\u201d). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting the FLSA\u2019s analogous employer provision, an individual supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining employee when the supervisor \u201cindependently exercise[s] control over the work situation.\u201d Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (<HOLDING>). Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. & Holdings: 0: holding meal periods compensable work under flsa if employees perform duties predominantly for the benefit of the employer 1: holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company 2: holding under flsa 3: holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa 4: holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the jury as to the law applicable to the case but was not related to the burden of proof, was cured by the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury correctly advising it of the applicable law. See Souvorin v. Lerich, 180 So.2d 180 (erroneous admission into evidence of county ordinance which effectively authorized the jury to conclude that the plaintiff, as a pedestrian, had the right-of-way was cured, inter alia, by court\u2019s instruction informing jury that \u201cthe right of pedestrians and motor ists in a public street are [sic] equal and reciprocal,\u201d id. at 182). The rule of Souvo-rin controls the present case. Affirmed. 1 . Defendant did not object on hearsay or other grounds. See Sikes v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 429 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 440 So.2d 353 (Fla.1983) (<HOLDING>). 2 . The trial court did instruct the jury Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the hearsay rule was harmless 1: holding florida drivers handbook hearsay and not within any recognized exception to hearsay rule 2: recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception 3: holding that victims statements were hearsay admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and constitutionally permissible under ohio v roberts citations omitted 4: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from September 4, 1998 to February 9, 2000. In addition, the plaintiff had been misled by the Clerk\u2019s Office into believing that he had done everything required of him. Scary had filed his complaint well before the 90-day deadline and was in active communication with Clerk\u2019s Office until he was told that his complaint would be heard, that there was no need to continue calling the court, and that he would be notified when a hearing date was set. Those statements do not amount to \u201cactive deception\u201d by the Clerk\u2019s Office, but they nevertheless had the effect of misleading the plaintiff, who, as a pro se plaintiff, can be expected to rely particularly heavily on the representations of court personnel. See Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983) (<HOLDING>). Given this, it was natural for Scary to Holdings: 0: holding that tolling the statute of limitations was appropriate when the eeoc acknowledged that it had advocated the mistaken interpretation relied upon by the plaintiff 1: holding that a pro se prisoners incarceration before the enactment of the aedpa and his lack of notice of the statute of limitations does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling 2: holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases 3: holding that equitable tolling was appropriate where a pro se plaintiff had relied on the representations of the court clerk 4: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "ed.1994) (\u201cto circulate (as a counterfeit note) continuing offenses, use of a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document does not by its nature involve ongoing perpetration that produces an ongoing threat of harm. There is nothing about the \u201cuse\u201d of an immigration document that denotes temporal longevity. As explained above, a person uses a counterfeit or fraudulently obtained immigration document when he employs the document for a purpose. This may take the form of employing the counterfeit or fraudulently obtained document to obtain employment, gain entry into the country, or obtain other rights and privileges that normally proceed from the employment of a valid immigration document. Cf. Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 335, 61 S.Ct. 599, 85 L.Ed. 862 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Any of these uses of a counterfeit or Holdings: 0: holding that apparel cleaners submission of false statements of their receipts a percentage of which were to be paid to the united states did not constitute false claims within the meaning of the federal false claims act 1: holding an initial four dollar fee allowing reentry during the course of the patrons stay permitted the use of a vehicle in the park and did not constitute a charge for the recreational use of the park 2: holding that a conviction obtained through the knowing reckless or negligent use of false testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury 3: holding that use by an american citizen of a passport obtained by false statements to facilitate reentry into the united states is a use within  2 of the passport title of the act of june 15 1917 40 stat 217 227 4: holding that standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the false claims act requires an injury to the united states", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "thereby giving the federal contract provisions clear authority.\u201d). Additionally, Representatives Cummings and Mica pointed out on the House floor that, with the goal of ensuring uniform provision of benefits to federal employees across the country, the amendment would fortify FEHBA\u2019s preemptive effect over local and state law. 144 Cong. Reo. H9354 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cummings); 143 Cong. Rec. H9916, H9917 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997) (statements of Reps. Mica and Cummings). Since the enactment of the 1998 amendment, three federal district courts have examined FEHBA\u2019s preemptive force. Two of these courts conclude that Congress intends for FEHBA to preempt state law completely, while the third holds that FEHBA lacks complete preemption. Carter, 61 F.Supp.2d at 1241 (<HOLDING>); Weathington, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1321 (rejecting Holdings: 0: holding that general maritime law preempts state law 1: holding fifra preempts no commonlaw claims 2: holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims 3: holding that article 2 of the ucc preempts common law claims 4: holding that fehba completely preempts", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "NCMEC as mandated by NDBCI. The NCMEC report was not offered as evidence at trial and not necessary to prove the jurisdictional element of the offense: But see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540 (affidavits were \u201cprepared specifically for use at petitioner\u2019s trial.\u201d) Agent Helderop testified that the labels affixed to the hard drives showed they were manufactured outside the United States. He also testified to a conversation with personnel at Maxell, the CDs\u2019 distributor, in completing his analysis of the materials. But an examination of the labels alone showed the interstate transportation of the hard drives. Thus, this evidence undermines Huether\u2019s contention that Agent Helderop\u2019s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 480 (8th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the district court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting gangrelated evidence 1: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony that defendants computer and flash drive were labeled as having been manufactured abroad to prove interstate commerce element 2: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 3: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert to testify as to the place of manufacture of weapon since his testimony could have been useful to the jury to determine whether the weapon had traveled in interstate commerce and court gave a limiting instruction", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "\u201cimplied duty that each party to a contract owes to its contracting partner.\u201d Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed.Cir.2005). This covenant applies to government contracts, as well as contracts between private parties. Id. The covenant \u201cincludes the duty not to interfere with the other party\u2019s performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the fruits of the contract.\u201d Id. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is assessed under a reasonableness standard and depends on the \u201cparticular contract, its context, and its surrounding circumstances.\u201d Commerce Int\u2019l Co. v. United States, 167 Ct.Cl. 529, 338 F.2d 81 (1964); see also Essex Electro Engineers, Inc., v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The record establishes that the equipment was Holdings: 0: holding that breach will depend on whether the government acted reasonably in the substance and pace of its responses 1: holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract 2: recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven 3: holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract 4: holding in the context of the major fraud act that determining when a scheme is executed will depend on factors including the goal of the plan its nature the benefits intended and whether the conduct created a new and independent financial risk", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of an appeal process. Further, Isley\u2019s actions, Ryder contends, should estop the Union from asserting the statute of limitations, i. The Statute of Limitations Was Not Tolled During Ryder\u2019s Contact With International Union Officials Having already decided that Ryder\u2019s so-called \u201cappeal\u201d to the International Union did not constitute an \u201cinternal appeal\u201d of the sort which can provide the basis for the non-accrual of a claim, the court rejects Ryder\u2019s concomitant theory that his hybrid Section 301 claim was tolled while he communicated with the International Union representative and the management of Philip Morris. It is true that pursuit of internal appeals can toll the statute of limitations. Frandsen v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 782 F.2d 674, 681 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); Walker v. Teamsters Local 71, 714 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that statute of limitations is tolled by pursuit of internal union remedies even where those remedies are ultimately determined to be futile 1: holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted 2: holding that the remedies are exclusive 3: holding that a party may gain judicial review without exhausting its administrative remedies where pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile where strict compliance would cause irreparable harm and where the applicable statute is alleged to be void on its face 4: holding that the statute of limitations on employees claim under 29 usc  411a is tolled by pursuit of internal union remedies despite fact that employee pursued such remedies for more than the four months required by statute", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "days and two weekend days. Appellant goes on to assert that, under the proper interpretation of rule 34.04, the three-day extension should have been added onto that prescribed period of seven calendar days, thus, making a total of ten calendar days. Appellant relies on Kenzie v. Dalco Corp., 309 Minn. 495, 245 N.W.2d 207 (1976), and In re Estate of Iofredo, 241 Minn. 335, 63 N.W.2d 19 (1954). This reliance, however, is misplaced. The findings in Kenzie and Iofre-do support the district court\u2019s findings, not appellant\u2019s interpretation. The court in Iof-redo did not exclude weekends in computing the time period; the court simply looked at the prescribed period and added three days. Iofiredo, 241 Minn, at 337-38, 63 N.W.2d at 21; see also Kenzie, 309 Minn, at 497, 245 N.W.2d at 208 (<HOLDING>). \u201cIn Minnesota, the practice is to combine the Holdings: 0: holding that demonstration of error does not necessarily entitle petitioners to a writ unless the standards for granting a writ have been met 1: holding writ was discharged because relator failed to serve writ within the 33 days prescribed by law 2: holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus 3: holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted 4: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "648-49, 5 P.3d 569, 570-71 (2000); 50A C.J.S. Judicial Sales \u00a7 87 (1997). 10 See Deal v. Baines, 110 Nev. 509, 513, 874 P.2d 775, 778 (1994). 11 NRCP 41(e) states, in pertinent part: Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced ... on motion of any party . . . after due notice to the parties, unless such action is brought to trial within 5 years after the plaintiff has filed the action, except where the parties have stipulated in writing that the time may be extended. 12 See Morgan v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 118 Nev. 315, 320, 43 P.3d 1036, 1039 (2002) (acknowledging only two circumstances in which the prescriptive period of NRCP 41(e) is tolled). 13 Cf. Goodwyn v. Carter, 555 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Notably, although there is no federal Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 1: holding that a garnishment proceeding could not proceed because the underlying judgment was null and void 2: recognizing that orders entered after the passage of the fiveyear deadline requiring automatic dismissal are null and void for lack of jurisdiction 3: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void 4: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in making procurement decisions.\u201d). 2. Judgment On Administrative Record. Rule 56.1 of the United States Court of Federal Claims provides that a motion for judgment on the administrative record will be treated under the same standard as Rule 56(a)-(b). See RCFC 56.1; see also Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2004) (\u201cjudgment on the administrative record is appropriate when there are no issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d). In reviewing agency procurement decisions, a motion for judgment on the Administrative Record is appropriate, because such decisions usually involve interpretation of regulations or contracts and present no disputed issues of material fact. Id. at 1352 (<HOLDING>). 3. For A Permanent Injunction. The standard Holdings: 0: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 1: holding that a probable cause determination is appropriate for summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and no credibility issues 2: holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law 3: holding it is a question of fact 4: holding that interpretation of contract documents regulations or a solicitation present no disputed issues of material fact and is a question of law", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "threatening nature is insufficient to establish a \u201cthreat of death,\u201d pointing to U.S.S.G, \u00a7 2B3.1, Application Note 6. The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the issue using the newer version \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) in United States v. Clark, 294 F.3d 791 (6th Cir.2002). In Clark, the Court held that \u201ca note stating T have a gun. Do what you are told and you wont [sic] get hurt,\u2019 unaccompanied by any gestures or display of a weapon would instill in a reasonable person a fear of death\u201d and, thus, would warrant the enhancement under \u00a7 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Id., at 795. Although the notes used here don\u2019t contain the admonition contained in the one used in Clark, other circuits have held that notes similar to the ones at issue here did constitute a \u201cthreat of death.\u201d See, e.g., Carbaugh, 141 F.3d at 794 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 880 Holdings: 0: holding that threat i have a gun and nothing to lose was not an express threat of death because there was not express mention of death and could also be interpreted to mean that robber was desperate and willing to turn alleged gun on himself 1: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death because a reasonable teller upon hearing the statement normally and reasonably would fear that his or her life is in danger 2: holding that the phrase i have a gun constitutes a threat of death under  2b31b2f 3: holding that i have a gun give me money may imply threat to use gun but was not an express threat of death 4: holding that the statement i have a gun is a threat of death", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "against him by executing promissory notes to the plaintiff payable only to the extent that his insurer paid on his claims. The court in Griffith held that the defendant was not, under those circumstances, legally obligated to pay the judgment, and, therefore, the insured was not required to provide coverage under the terms of the policy. The circuit court recognized that both Bendall and Griffith were \u201cpersuasive authority,\u201d but it declined to follow those cases. The circuit court stated: \u201cSince Bendall, numerous courts in other jurisdictions have held that an injured party\u2019s agreement not to collect a judgment against an insured does not necessarily nullify insurance coverage. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 547 So.2d 148[, 151] (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989)(<HOLDING>). See also Red Giant Oil Co. v. Lawlor, 528 Holdings: 0: holding r 4429a6 to be inapplicable to direct actions brought by the insured against the carrier to enforce coverage 1: holding that a plaintiffs agreement to collect only against a defendants insurance company was merely a covenant and did not constitute a release of the defendants from liability and stating that the defendant is still legally obligated to the injured party and the insurer still must make good on its contractual promise to pay 2: holding that where a duty to obtain specified insurance coverage exists a plaintiff must prove that the loss is one insured against in some policy 3: holding that an insurance company which chose not to defend its insured could not later deny coverage by asserting the legally obligated to pay provision in the policy after the insured reached a settlement where the injured party agreed to collect only against insurance proceeds 4: holding that a covenant not to execute on a judgment against an insured does not negate insurance coverage and stating that many courts including floridas look with disfavor on the idea that a covenant not to enforce against one party automatically releases that partys insurance carrier", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire,\u201d a plaintiff may only recover for acts of discrimination that occur within the statutory time period). Thus, because Plaintiff did not file her EEOC complaint until September 21, 2007, only Plaintiffs claims that U.S. Airways impermissibly denied her positions arising after November 26, 2006 are timely under the ADA. Although U.S. Airways correctly points out that Plaintiffs amended complaint does not identify those positions that she was denied between November 26, 2006 and the \u201cend of 2006,\u201d when Plaintiff was no longer considered employed by U.S. Airways, such facts may be adequately determined in the normal course of discovery and are not required in an initial pleading. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (<HOLDING>) With respect to employment discrimination Holdings: 0: holding that a complaint must contain only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face 1: holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief 2: holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim 3: holding that the defendants failed to establish an entitlement to dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint when the alleged fraud was immaterial to any issue that would ultimately be presented to the fact finder 4: holding that a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the apportionment of the nonretiring spouse effective if, as, and when the benefits are received by the retiring spouse. We approve this method of apportionment....\u201d Id. at 666 (emphasis added). The Cearley Court thus equated \u201cif and when\u201d the spouse retires with \u201cif, as, and when\u201d that spouse receives the benefits, which we have previously held is a term of art requiring valuation at receipt date. See Hurley, 960 S.W.2d at 289. We do the same and hold that \u201cIf and when [Edwin] retires and/or receives a pension ... [Gloria] shall receive fifty percent of the retirement benefit to [sic] which ... Edwin ... is entitled to receive\u201d requires valuation at the date of receipt. See Cearley, 544 S.W.2d at 666; Barnard v. Barnard, 863 S.W.2d 770, 773, 774 (Tex.App.\u2014Fort Worth 1993, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Berry \u2014 the first post-Tag-gart Holdings: 0: holding the following language unambiguously awarded a taggart fraction of benefits valued at receipt date one hundred sixtyeight 168 over the total number of months of actual service  at the time of his retirement divided by onehalf \u00bd 1: holding that a former spouse is a proportionate owner of the other spouses future military retirement pay and is thus entitled to onehalf of the percentage of such pay representing the number of military marriage years relative to the total length of military service 2: holding that the plaintiffs claim that he was wrongfully denied a promotion prior to his retirement accrued on the date that he was finally denied that promotion  the date of his retirement at the lower rank 3: holding former wifes cause of action accrued at the time of former husbands failure to pay her the portion of his retirement benefits to which she was entitled which was no earlier than the date of his actual retirement 4: holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "fiduciary under ERISA as a matter of law based on the sufficiency of the pleadings. Assuming, without deciding whether Hartford is a fiduciary, the Scotts\u2019 claim fails to state a cause of action under ERISA as a matter of law because damages are not available under ERISA. The causes of actions available to an ERISA participant are exclusively listed in 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1132(a). Assuming Hartford was an ERISA fiduciary, the Scott\u2019s allegations do not state a cause of action under ERISA because only equitable relief, as opposed to monetary damages, is available under ERISA. Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 959, 113 S.Ct. 2928, 124 L.Ed.2d 678 (1993). See also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-56, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2068, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (<HOLDING>). Unreimbursed medical expenses, mental anguish Holdings: 0: holding empkwers strictly liable for equitable damages and relief 1: holding damages do not constitute other equitable relief 2: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm 3: holding that money damages do not qualify as equitable relief within the meaning of  1132a3 4: holding that claims for equitable relief under  502a3 are only available when a plaintiff has no other relief under erisa", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Use, 18 A.L.R.3d 497, 531-32. B. 1. There are several mutually exclusive means of measuring damages for loss of use. They are: \u201c(1) the rental value or the amount that could have been realized by renting out the property; (2) the reasonable cost of renting a substitute; or (3) the ordinary profits that could have been made from the use of the property.\u201d Damages in Tort, supra at \u00a7 37.13[1], 73-74; see also Remedies, supra \u00a7 124, at 387-90. United did not rent a substitute. Therefore, option number two is inapplicable. The third option is usually only used to determine loss of use damages when a rental substitute is not available or when the kind of property damaged is not the type that is normally rented. Southern Crate & Veneer Co. v. McDowell, 163 Ga.App. 153, 293 S.E.2d 541 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Peterson v. Bochar, 193 Kan. 161, 392 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that an unestablished business may recover lost prospective profits 1: holding that the plaintiffs attempted to recover lost profits which under the facts of the case were consequential damages 2: holding that plaintiff whose truck was demolished in an accident could not recover lost profits unless he could show that he could not obtain a suitable substitute vehicle 3: holding that a business owners testimony was insufficient to establish lost profits where he was not able to specify which contracts they lost how many they lost how much profit they would have had from the contracts or who would have awarded them contracts and explaining that the plaintiffs could have supported their lost profits with testimony that they had lost out on specific contracts but failed to do so 4: holding that in an action to recover damages to a pulpwooder truck where there was testimony that pulpwood machinery could not be rented the jury was properly instructed as to lost profits", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "among other things.\u201d Dolce, supra, 383 N.J.Super. at 18, 890 A.2d 361 (citing Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545, 443 A.2d 1031). The critical evaluation required for emancipation determinations typically necessitates a plenary hearing, especially \u201cwhen the submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual disputef,]\u201d which the trial court must resolve. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105, 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007); see also Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J.Super. 15, 20, 910 A.2d 630 (App.Div.2006) (reversing motion on emancipation because the court \u201cfailed to recognize there were material facts in dispute and evidence beyond the motion papers necessary for resolution of the matter\u201d required a plenary hearing); Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322, 608 A.2d 225 (1992) (<HOLDING>). However, \u201c[a]s is particularly the case in Holdings: 0: holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues 1: holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits 2: holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate 3: holding that contested factual issues in  2255 cases must be decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing not affidavits 4: holding that defendant bears the burden of showing there are material facts in dispute and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises factual allegations that are sufficiently definite specific detailed and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in issue", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the second note. Id., 241 S.E.2d at 4-5. The court held that lack of confirmation of the sale under the first deed did not bar the action for the deficiency on the second note because they were separate transactions involving different properties. Id. 144 Ga.App. at 166, 241 S.E.2d at 5. In contrast, the deeds in the case at bar involve the same two properties. Defendant Yates argues that the fact that the 1986 Deed covers a tract in addition to the Tift County tracts makes this case analogous to those he cites in his brief. The 1986 Deed does cover one additional property, and if that additional property were still security for the 1986 Note, then the SBA would be free to foreclose on that property. See Salter v. Bank of Commerce, 189 Ga. 328, 332, 6 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1939) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, if the SBA had foreclosed on this Holdings: 0: holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale 1: holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property 2: holding that the confirmation statute does not inhibit subsequent sale under power of property other than the property which at a former sale under power had failed to bring the amount of the debt  3: holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien 4: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of notice in a \u201cmajor local newspaper\u201d). At the same time, it should not be defined so broadly as to include those who would lack any real interest in commenting on it. To require Aviall to solicit comments from such persons would be to impose the same type of rigid formality that the NCP seeks to avoid. See 55 Fed.Reg. at 8793-94. Similarly, Aviall need only contact those parties who might have a foreseeable interest in commenting on the response action. The NCP does not require, for example, that a private party publish nationwide notice of a response action merely because it is possible that an unknown person living in blic meeting held after plaintiff had already begun an \u201cearly and essential step\u201d in remediation process was not meaningful); Pierson Sand, 1996 WL 338624, at *3-*4 (<HOLDING>). It also typically requires that some type of Holdings: 0: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful and that the only public meetings held before remedial action were not meaningful because they did not discuss selection of remedy 1: holding that notice of judgment was insufficient 2: holding that public meetings held after implementation of final remedial action were not meaningful 3: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice 4: holding that public meetings were not meaningful where first was held without adequate notice and second was held after remedy was already selected by means of consent judgment", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "count, specifying the charge title, degree of offense, and maximum penalty defined by statute; (3) state general and specific conditions or sanctions; (4) make all findings of fact required by law; (5) state the date and time when issued and the county and court where issued; and (6) be signed by the court with the title of office. In N.C.\u2019s case, a copy of the written disposition was provided to N.C. and the other relevant parties. This disposition and its contents provided sufficient notice of the court\u2019s findings and the court\u2019s action. Furthermore, N.C. was provided an opportunity to challenge the disposition order under Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135. Therefore, we conclude that due process was adequately satisfied through the issuance of a written disposition CA 1994) (<HOLDING>); and L.M. v. State, 610 So.2d 1314, 1317 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that disposition order be remanded to the trial court for revision to conform to the trial courts oral pronouncement 1: holding that unsegregated attorneys fees must be remanded 2: holding that disposition order be vacated and the cause remanded for correction thereof 3: holding void judgment must be vacated 4: holding that where the trial courts determination that the defendant was mentally capable to proceed with trial was not supported by the evidence the verdict and judgment must be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings against the defendant", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "discretionary authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Split Pivot, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 987 F.Supp.2d 838, 882 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff\u2019d, No. 2014-1241, 585 Fed.Appx. 1011 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 8, 2014). In addition, the Court\u2019s resolution of Plaintiffs claim of infringement in Defendant\u2019s favor ensures that Defendant will not face any further claims that its accused process infringes the \u2019824 Patent. See Wells-Gardner Electronics Corp. v. C. Ceronix, Inc., No. 10-C-2536, 2011 WL 1467182, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing the court\u2019s finding of non-infringement as a basis for declining to consider a request for a declaration of invalidity); see also Phonometrics, 133 F.3d at 1468 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court declines to address Holdings: 0: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc  1367a 1: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 2: holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement 3: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 4: recognizing a district courts discretion to dismiss a counterclaim alleging that a patent is invalid where it finds no infringement", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1397, 173 L.Ed.2d 640 (2009). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determine whether \u201cany rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d United States v. Odom, 329 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir.2003). Sufficient evidence supports the jury\u2019s finding that Defendant\u2019s actions affected interstate commerce. He used a cell phone whose service provider is T-Mobile, a business in interstate commerce, to recruit the minor, manage her prostitution, and arrange her travel from Los Angeles to Seattle. He made numerous interstate calls using this phone. He used America Online instant messaging to coax the minor to work for him as a prostitute. See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Finally, he provided the minor with Durex Holdings: 0: recognizing probable cause as complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in new york internal quotation marks and brackets omitted 1: holding that the electronic submission of information across state lines qualifies as in or affecting interstate commerce internal quotation marks and brackets omitted 2: holding that if and when abuse does occur  it is well within the supervisory powers of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed out frivolous claims brackets and internal quotation marks omitted 3: recognizing that the nsa qualifies as a withholding statute under exemption 3 because it refers to particular types of matters that are to be withheld internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: holding that involuntary transport to a police station for questioning is sufficiently like arrest to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause internal quotation marks and brackets omitted", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "78 . Blake, 2010 WL 702958, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23014. 79 . Hansel, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54725; Thomas, 2006 WL 140558, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3266; Christy, 2010 WL 2977610, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71300; Farris, 2008 WL 1944131, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36937. 80 . R.R., 2010 Ark. App. 689, 2010 WL 4132867, 2010 Ark.App. LEXIS 738; B.W. v. State, 909 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind.App.2009); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 947 N.E.2d 9. 81 . Mudge, 79 A.D.3d 1395, 914 N.Y.S.2d 339. 82 . Nash, 317 Or. 354, 855 P.2d 1112. 83 . United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 252 (7th Cir.2011) (federal criminal enticement statute \u201ctargets the sexual grooming of minors as well as the actual sexual exploitation of them\u201d); Powell\u2019s Books v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1206, 1215 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Am. Booksellers Found., 202 F.Supp.2d at Holdings: 0: holding that the first charging phrase of section 505 is unconstitutionally vague as applied where it was not clear whether touching a minors genitals through her pants constituted sexual conduct as defined by the statute 1: holding that despite the fact that police conduct is governed by extensive regulations statutes and caselaw officers responding to dispatch or making an arrest are engaging in discretionary conduct because they are required to make splitsecond decisions based on incomplete information 2: recognizing that oregon criminal statutes were aimed at practices of luring and grooming that expose minors to sexually explicit materials in the hopes of lowering their inhibitions against engaging in sexual conduct but finding the statutes unconstitutional because they reach a significant amount of material that is not obscene as to minors 3: recognizing that federal circuits view discussions as a substantial step when they involve arrangements for meetings discussion of sexual acts to be performed during meeting or grooming whereby the defendant exposes the child to sexual material in an effort to lower the childs inhibitions toward later sexual activity 4: holding that plaintiffs had standing because they were directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints were directed", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with the plain language of the Guideline itself. See United States v. Tigney, 367 F.3d 200, 203 (4th Cir.2004) (rejecting a party\u2019s Guideline interpretation because it conflicted with the Guideline\u2019s plain language). This section of the Guidelines provides for a four-level enhancement to a defendant\u2019s offense level if his offense \u201csubstantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution.\u201d USSG \u00a7 2Bl.l(b)(14)(B)(i). The commentary to section 2B1.1 directs a district court to consider a list of four \u201cnon-exhaustive\u201d factors in determining whether the safety and soundness of a financial institution has been substantially jeopardized by the defendant\u2019s offense conduct. USSG \u00a7 2B1.1, cmt. n. 12(A)(i)-(iv). See United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 737 (4th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). The commentary does not require the Holdings: 0: holding that commentary in the guidelines manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline 1: holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding 2: recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative 3: holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains 4: holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); counsel now moves to withdraw that motion, and asks to continue this appeal as a non-Anders appeal or, alternatively, for remand in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We grant counsel\u2019s motion to withdraw her initial motion to withdraw, but otherwise deny her motion because any possible Booker argument fails. The record reveals that the district court properly calculated a sentencing range under advisory Guidelines and considered the sentencing factors in section 3553(a), and we conclude the sentence is not unreasonable. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756-57 (Guidelines are only advisory); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 (8th Cir.2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 266, Holdings: 0: holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines 1: holding a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 2: holding booker error is avoided when district court calculates proper guidelines sentencing range treats guidelines as advisory and imposes reasonable sentence 3: holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable 4: recognizing that booker error may occur even in the absence of judicial factfinding where district court treats guidelines as mandatory", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "whether the statements were voluntary within the meaning of - the fifth amendment.\u201d United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1518 (6th Cir.1988). Voluntariness, then is the touchstone for determining the validity of all consents to search, including those obtained after invocation by a suspect of rights that would automatically cut off interrogation. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (noting that \u201cthe Miranda presumption, though irre-buttable for purposes of the prosecution\u2019s case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently. tainted\u201d). Voluntariness must be determined by assessing the totality of the circumstances. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (internal citation omitted) (<HOLDING>). The factors used to determine the Holdings: 0: holding that once the defendant is before the court the court will not inquire into the circumstances surrounding his presence there 1: holding that to determine whether a statement was voluntary the court must consider the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation and decide  whether a defendants will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession 2: holding that courts may consider extrinsic evidence including the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract in order to determine whether a contractual ambiguity exists 3: holding that question is whether defendants will was overborne by police at the time of the confession 4: holding that a district court should decide a motion for expedited discovery on the entirety of the record to date and the reasonableness of the request in light of all the surrounding circumstances unless the circumstances are such that the notaro factors apply", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1291. We review de novo the district court\u2019s summary judgment, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Crespo\u2019s claim concem ing delay of an orthopedic consultation and medical care to treat his injured leg because Crespo failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the delay caused him harm. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). The district court correctly concluded that Crespo\u2019s contention that prison medical staff failed to provide him proper treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Crespo\u2019s remaining contentions are Holdings: 0: holding that deliberate indifference to prisoners medical needs is cruel and unusual punishment 1: holding that a difference of medical opinion was insufficient as a matter of law to establish deliberate indifference 2: holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference 3: holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs 4: holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. The State appeals from the imposition of a downward departure sentence in a case in which the defendant pled guilty to the offense of selling cocaine to a police officer. Because there were no valid reasons for departure, we reverse. See Atwaters v. State, 519 So.2d 611 (Fla.1988) (<HOLDING>); State v. Ford, 739 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA Holdings: 0: holding that the quantity of drugs involved in an offense does not support a downward departure because the legislature intended the quantity of drugs to be a determining factor in varying penalties 1: holding apprendi does not require proof of knowledge as to type or quantity of drugs 2: holding that the quantity of drugs may not be used to support a departure 3: holding the large quantity of drugs sufficient evidence of intent to distribute 4: holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "discretion to correct the error only if it \u201cseriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The elements of conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 371 are: (1) the existence of an agreement, (2) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agreement, and (3) an intent by the conspirators to agree to defraud the United States. United States v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 411 F.3d 502, 516 (4th Cir.2005). \u201cFraudulent intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence.\u201d United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir.1993). This is a so-called \u201cKlein conspiracy.\u201d See United States v. Klein, 124 F.Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y.1954) (<HOLDING>), aff\u2019d, 247 F.2d 908 (1957). Fuller argues Holdings: 0: recognizing a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive a class of persons of their fundamental rights under the laws of the united states 1: recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc  1983 and suits under united states constitution 2: recognizing under 18 usc  371 conspiracy to defraud united states by impeding functions of irs 3: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 4: holding that subversion of a federally coordinated program can constitute a conspiracy to defraud the united states even if no federal officials are participants in the conspiracy and federal fund allocation had not yet occurred when the conspiracy was in effect", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Courts have split regarding whether searches conducted for reasons other than institutional safety violate the Fourth Amendment. The Second Circuit has held that the Supreme Court\u2019s rationale in Hudson applies only to searches for institutional purposes, not to searches initiated by prosecutors outside the prison \u201csolely to obtain information for a superseding indictment.\u201d United States v. Cohen, 7 on decision holds more broadly that inmates per se lack any Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their cells and lockers. See United States v. Reece, 797 F.Supp. 843, 846 (D.Colo.1992) (concluding that a prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his cell, and lacks Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure); State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 367 S.E.2d 618, 621-22 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Betterley, 191 Wis.2d 407, Holdings: 0: holding contrary to the second districts reasoning in mccoy 639 so2d 163 that pretrial detainees lack any expectation of privacy so the fourth amendment does not protect them from cell searches 1: recognizing that a modern cell phone is a computer and not just another purse or address book so that the potential invasion of privacy in a search of a cell phone is greater than in a search of a container in a conventional sense 2: holding the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in his cell so the jailer had the right to inspect anything in his cell 3: holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone 4: recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or mistake as to (a) the origin, association or approval of the product with or by another, or (b) the characteristics of the goods or services; and (4) injure the plaintiff. Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir.2002), citing Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int\u2019l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir.1999). 1. Material false representations a. Literal Falsity In the false advertising arena, some courts have concluded that a showing that the challenged statement is likely to be found literally false is sufficient, on its own, to justify issuing the injunction. Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 946 F.Supp. 115, 120 (D.Mass.1996). See also Camel Hair and Cashmere Inst. of America, Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir.1986)(<HOLDING>); Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc. v. Wilson Holdings: 0: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court 1: holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction 2: holding that literally false finding in itself warranted the grant of the injunction sought 3: holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim 4: holding that where a district courts preliminary injunction preventing the appellant from terminating its agreement with the defendant had expired the appellants appeal of the district courts decision to grant that injunction was moot", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "time for real parties in interest to join, substitute, or ratify; explicitly rejecting the argument that plaintiff \u201cmust have had standing at the time an action was brought\u201d and that, consequently, \u201conly assignments made prior to the commencement of this suit can possibly establish that Individual Plaintiffs have standing to sue\u201d). Given this clear law, Whittington\u2019s only hope is to argue that there is something particular to non-dischargeability actions that would alter this usual practice. But contrary to his arguments, Bankruptcy Rule 4007 requires no special treatment in this respect. Missing the deadline for an objection to discharge is not a \u201cjurisdictional\u201d defect and may be waived if not timely made. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (<HOLDING>); id. at 448 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 906 (acknowledging Holdings: 0: recognizing that immunity may be waived 1: holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived 2: holding that a court may sua sponte dismiss pursuant to rule 41b for failure to comply with a court order 3: holding that notice to counsel may be waived 4: holding that failure to comply with bankruptcy rule 4004 may be waived", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Trust Co., 263 U. rights have been violated in the course of his present confinement, Gordon is required to exhaust state remedies before seeking redress in federal courts. See Montez, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir.2000) (\u201cA habeas petitioner is generally required to exhaust state remedies whether his action is brought under \u00a7 2241 or \u00a7 2254.\u201d) Gordon makes general claims that he has been threatened by state officials, retaliated against for pursuing legal redress of his grievances, and denied due process and equal protection in the proceedings regarding his children. Gordon does not, however, demonstrate that he has exhausted state remedies for these claims. Nor does he make any attempt to excuse his failure to exhaust. See, e.g., Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Gordon urges us to consider that the district Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims 1: holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement 2: recognizing that issue exhaustion requirement and requirement exhaustion of remedies are different 3: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 4: holding exhaustion requirement inapplicable when requiring exhaustion would be futile", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "261 S.W.3d at 894; McFarland, 293 S.W.3d at 763-64 (cases holding creditor could collect debt on account stated where, based on the series of transactions reflected on the account statements, creditor established that card holder agreed to the full amount shown on the statements and impliedly promised to pay the indebtedness). Further, because the evidence also showed that Eaves\u2019 account was purchased by Unifund Portfolio and that Unifund Portfolio assigned the rights to collect on the account to Unifund Partners, Eaves has not shown that Unifund Partners could not bring a cause of action on a stated account. Butler v. Hudson & Keyse, L.L.C., No. 14-07-00534-CV, 2009 WL 402329, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 19, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that an assignee of a debt can step into the shoes of the original creditor for purpose of  523a2a 1: holding assignee could collect debt on stated account 2: holding that attempt to collect a timebarred debt was permissible if litigation not threatened 3: holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa 4: holding that the act extends to claims by individuals against whom a debt collector has made purposeful targeted and directed attempts to collect a debt alleged to be owed by the plaintiffs", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a violation of the Fourth Amendment.\u201d Id. The court finds that under the facts as the Plaintiff has alleged them, the instant case is like the parked car that accidentally strikes a passerby. Because the Plaintiff has neither pleaded nor offered any evidence to prove that Defendant Inabinett\u2019s ramming was intentional, nor, according to the Plaintiff, was the action taken in an attempt to apprehend her, the Court finds that the accident does not amount to a seizure and, thus, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Estate of Story v. McDuffie County, Ga., 929 F.Supp. 1523 (S.D.Ga.1996) (finding no seizure because the Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to support their claim that the Officer intentionally forced them off the road); Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Holdings: 0: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 1: holding that passengers of automobiles that are pulled over by a police officer for a traffic stop are seized under the fourth amendment 2: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 3: holding police officer engaged in a high speed pursuit of a traffic offender had not seized the offender 4: holding that a vehicles passenger had been seized and was entitled to challenge the traffic stop", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 664, 667 (6th Cir.1987) (\u201cA defendant relying upon the argument that he has received a disproportionate sentence must establish more than the mere fact that other defendants have received less harsh sentences for similar crimes.\u201d). During oral argument before this court, a crucial issue surfaced as to wheth er the district court properly imposed a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. \u00a7 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. That enhancement, as we have already noted, raised the sentencing level to 43 and required a mandatory life sentence. A review of the record indicates that there is neither evidence nor any hearing supporting this enhancement and thus, this case must be remanded for re-sentencing. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 95, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (<HOLDING>). We review the evidence in the record Holdings: 0: holding that before a court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice the court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice  1: holding that enhancement for obstruction of justice which uses similar mandatory language must be applied where factual predicates are satisfied 2: holding that willful failure to appear at sentencing supported obstruction of justice enhancement 3: holding that district courts factual findings for purposes of obstruction enhancement are reviewed for clear error 4: holding that obstruction of justice enhancement was properly applied where the defendant provided materially false information to a magistrate judge", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and justifies a sentence from within the aggravated range. In addition, the trial court completed individual judgment and commitment forms specifying the relevant aggravators and mitigator for each conviction. These forms specifically indicated that \u201ceach and every aggravated factor in and of itself outweighs all the mitigating factors and justifies from within the aggravated range this sentence.\u201d Thus, the trial court here eliminated the need for any appellate \u201csecond guessing\u201d as to the weight it accorded each factor on each sentence, and it properly exercised discretion in \u201cdetermin[ing] that one factor in aggravation outweigh[ed] more than one factor in mitigation.\u201d Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 597, 300 S.E.2d at 697; see also State v. Daniels, 319 N.C. 452, 454, 355 S.E.2d 136, 137 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s argument fails. To Holdings: 0: holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion 1: holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion 2: holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion 3: holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court 4: holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Maria B. Martinez appeals from a final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of ALS IV, LLC (\u201cALS\u201d). We affirm- the final judgment of foreclosure, but reverse the award of attorney\u2019s fees because AlLS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the award. We reverse, and remand the attorney\u2019s fee order for additional findings, or an additional hearing, if necessary. See Rodriguez v. Campbell, 720 So.2d 266, 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>). Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Holdings: 0: holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the rowe factors reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorneys fees 1: holding that when the party seeking attorneys fees presents some competent substantial evidence supporting the fee yet fails to include some essential evidentiary support the appellate court will reverse and remand the order for additional findings 2: holding that appellate court should reverse and remand issue of attorneys fees where damages are reduced on appeal in a manner that could affect the determination of reasonable and necessary attorneys fees 3: holding that this court will reverse and remand when appellate review of a suppression order is hindered by the absence of factual findings 4: holding that when competent substantial evidence supports a trial courts ruling the appellate court will not secondguess the trial court", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "33.30.065(c) provides: A decision by the commissioner to designate a prisoner to serve a term of imprisonment or a period of temporary confinement, or a part of the term or period, by electronic monitoring does not create a liberty interest in that status for the prisoner. The prisoner may be returned to a correctional facility at the discretion of the commissioner. This statutory provision, although not determinative in our independent review, indicates that the legislature did not intend to create a liberty interest in participation in the electronic monitoring program. 42 . - Article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution identifies the principle of reformation as one basis of criminal administration. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 816 P.2d 134, 139-40 (Alaska 1991) (<HOLDING>); Rathke v. Corr. Corp. of Am., Inc., 153 P.3d Holdings: 0: holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship 1: holding that neither the due process clause nor florida statutes bestowed a liberty interest in prisoners position as a law clerk 2: recognizing that foster parents do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a continued relationship with their foster child 3: holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest 4: holding prisoners have protected liberty interest in continued participation in rehabilitation programs based on the reformation clause", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the goods does not necessarily mean they are no longer in interstate commerce. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. 332. If the stop represents \u201ca convenient intermediate step in the process of getting them to their final destinations, [the goods] remain \u2018in commerce\u2019 until they reach those points.\u201d Id. Goods picked up and delivered intrastate are considered to be in interstate commerce if they originated out of state and the intrastate part of the route is the final phase of an unmistakably interstate transport. See Siller v. L & F Distributors, Ltd., 109 F.3d 765, *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that \u201cplacing goods in a warehouse interrupts, but does not necessarily terminate the goods\u2019 interstate journey\u201d); Barefoot, 16 F.3d 1216, *3 (<HOLDING>); Merchants Fast Motor Lines v. I.C.C., 5 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the halt of shipments of unprocessed milk without processing or commingling did not remove the interstate character of the shipments 1: holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations 2: holding that interstate shipments to a warehousedistribution point through to samestate retail outlets retained their interstate character where the warehouse was merely a convenient instrumentality for the division of the shipments coming to it and the continuation of the movement of each part to the retail stores 3: holding shipments from a distribution point supplied by outofstate shipments made pursuant to preexisting orders were interstate in character 4: holding that warehouse distributions to companyowned stores constituted interstate commerce since inter alia the company knew at the time oufiofstate shipments to the warehouse commenced that the shipments were bound for its retail stores", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "judgment as a matter of law on the informed consent claim in this case because Garcia failed to adduce sufficient expert testimony to proceed upon his claim under HRS \u00a7 671-3(b)(5). Under this subsection, Garcia was required to establish that increased pain and a worsened condition were \u201crecognized material risks of serious complications\u201d associated with the back surgery performed. See Ngo, 136 Hawai'i at 67-68, 358 P.3d at 39-40. Although expert testimony is not required under HRS \u00a7 671-3(b), \u201cexpert testimony is typically necessary to establish the medical information statutorily required to be disclosed.\u201d Id. at 69, 358 P.3d at 41. In appropriate cases, a defendant physician, by his or her own testimony, may satisfy the plaintiffs evidentiary burden. See id. at 71, 358 P.3d at 43 (<HOLDING>); Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 487, 904 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions 1: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 2: holding expert testimony remedies speculation by the court 3: holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony 4: recognizing that plaintiffs counsel elicited valid expert testimony from the defendantphysician regarding recognized alternative treatments", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "an intoxicated motorist. 598 N.E.2d at 634 n. 2. Jerry contends that his case goes beyond Hawn and the cases cited therein because the pleadings show that Shannon entered into a joint agreement with Candice, and this agreement ultimately resulted in activity that caused his injuries. Thus, he argues that Shannon went beyond the gratuitous undertakings described above. First, we note that this is not a case where a person tried to prevent an intoxicated driver from driving; indeed, it is a case where a person assisted the intoxicated in driving. Second, we note that others have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to a party other than the one who injured the third party. See Cowart v. Grimaldi, 46 Conn.Supp. 248, 746 A.2d 833 (Conn.Super.1997) (<HOLDING>); see also, Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471, Holdings: 0: holding that a motion to strike was improper where defendant assisted a drunk minor in his negligence by driving the drunk minor to his car 1: holding that convenience stores sale of beer to eighteenyearold was not cause in fact of drunk drivers fatal car accident because sale was to passenger and not to driver 2: holding a reasonable officer could perceive a threat to his safety from a potentially drunk person acting erratically 3: holding that the statute and the rule give a person suspected of drunk driving a right to contact his attorney prior to deciding whether or not to take a breathalyzer examination 4: holding that south dakotas law requiring a person arrested for drunk driving to submit to a blood alcohol test or face having his refusal used against him did not violate the fifth amendment", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conduct) for evidentiary purposes to determine whether a person suffers from a mental abnormality ... and also poses a threat to the public.\u201d 521 U.S. at 370, 117 S.Ct. 2072. We are also unpersuaded by the proposition that a law like chapter 980 should be regarded as criminal for purposes of Public Law 280 because, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it, it is \u201cenveloped on both sides\u201d by criminal conduct. In re Burgess, 665 N.W.2d at 132. In fact, that is not necessarily the case. Although chapter 980 certainly applies to persons like Burgess who have been convicted of sexually violent offenses, it also applies to individuals who \u201cha[ve] been found not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental dis 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694(1983) (<HOLDING>). In the final analysis, if this case turned Holdings: 0: holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted 1: holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted 2: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted 3: holding that sentencing criminals in part based on criminal history is rationally related to a legitimate government interest 4: recognizing that the statutory scheme for commitment of insane criminals is  a regulatory prophylactic statute based on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating mental patients internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to look to post-death events, on the grounds that Jacobs involved a contingent claim. Id. at 1256. Since our decision in Propstra, we have not expressly departed from, nor expanded, our holding in that case. We have similarly not departed from our view of the distinction between certain and enforceable claims and contingent or disputed claims. For example, in Estate of Van Home, this court applied the holding in Propstra to value an undisputed and non-contingent pre-death spousal support order as of the date of the decedent\u2019s death. Estate of Van Horne, 720 F.2d at 1115-16. We, along with the tax court whose opinion we were reviewing, continued to distinguish certain and enforceable claims from disputed and contingent claims. Id.; Estate of Van Horne v. Comm\u2019r, 78 T.C. 728, 735 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in Estate of Van Home, we rejected Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel 1: recognizing distinction between sole power and sovereignty 2: recognizing distinction between a certain and enforceable claim and a potential unmatured contingent or contested claim 3: recognizing this distinction 4: recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in rule 11(e), good cause was shown. Subsection (F) requires a defendant to not only show that a trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11, but that this error affected the defendant's \"substantial rights.\" This heightened requirement clearly \"disapproves of a practice\" this court arguably has sanctioned before. Because the current standard fundamentally alters a defendant's rights, we decline to retroactively apply the current formulation of rule 11 to Mr. Lovell. 4. The Application of Harmless Error Review in Other Contexts Does Not Persuade Us to Extend Harmless Error Review to Rule 11(e) Violations 175 As a final argument, the State urges that \"even if the 2005 amendment [adding subsection (F)] does not apply to [Mr.] Lo-vell, this Court ... [should] apply harmless e 2) (<HOLDING>); State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned 1: holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness 2: holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative 3: holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction 4: holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "doc. no. 82, p. 5 (citing United States v. Stulock, 308 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir.2002))). However, as this opinion only briefly mentions the district court\u2019s definition of possession of child pornography, and does not discuss in any detail whether that definition was correct, see Stulock, 308 F.3d at 925, this opinion is not relevant to the Court\u2019s analysis above. 6 . For example, in United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.2002), the Tenth Circuit found that because defendant knew his internet browser stored temporary internet files, \"he knowingly acquired and possessed\u201d images of child pornography \"each time he intentionally sought out and viewed child pornography\u201d on the internet. Tucker, 305 F.3d at 1205. 7 . See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Although Defendant contends that this Holdings: 0: holding that to satisfy the element of specific intent to defraud needed to convict for mail fraud the government must show that the defendant knowingly made a material misrepresentation or knowingly omitted a material fact for the purpose of inducing the victim of the fraud to part with property or undertake some action that he would not otherwise do absent the misrepresentation or omission 1: holding that unless otherwise directed by the statute the term knowingly merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense 2: holding that inferred intent rule applies regardless of the age of the actor 3: holding that the scienter requirement extends to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the performers 4: holding that the term knowingly under  2252a applies to both the nature of the material and the age of the children depicted", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-38, 81 S.Ct. 523, 528-30, 5 L.Ed.2d 464, 470-71 (1961). Utilizing that conceptual basis, the first group of SLAPP statutes shares several essential features. They generally include a legislative declaration that a public participant who has exercised his or her free speech right, sometimes in a statutorily defined manner, enjoys immunity. See, e.g., Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(b)(1) (2009); Ga.Code Ann. \u00a7 9-11-11.1 (2009); R.I. Gen. Laws \u00a7 9-33-2(a) (2009); Tenn.Code Ann. \u00a7 4-21-1001, -1003(a) (2009). They often also declare that the protections will be limited to matters in which the speaker has not spoken in reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the assertions, see, e.g., 27 Pa. Cons.Stat. \u00a7 8302(b) (2008) (<HOLDING>), or has not \u201ccaused actual injury,\u201d Mass. Ann. Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a claim for money damages against the librarian of congress in his official capacity because immunity had not been waived and the exceptions to immunity did not apply 1: recognizing three exceptions to atwill doctrine 2: recognizing two exceptions to eleventh amendment bar 3: recognizing first two exceptions 4: recognizing exceptions to immunity", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "While some courts have condemned the \u201csit and squirm\u201d test, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly endorsed the role of observation in credibility determinations. Powers, 207 F.3d at 436. The ALJ\u2019s observation as to whether the claimant is suffering from pain consistent with his testimony is one of the factors that may contribute to a credibility determination. Id. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the facts and observations noted by the ALJ provide support for the ALJ\u2019s credibility determination. Thus, even if portions of the record support Ulloa\u2019s credibility, we cannot conclude that the ALJ\u2019s credibility determination was patently wrong. Accordingly, we will not remand on this basis. Powers, 207 F.3d at 435; see also, Edwards v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Holdings: 0: holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending 1: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 2: holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current 3: holding that in determining the propriety of summary judgment credibility determinations may not be made  4: recognizing that a reviewing court should not reconsider credibility determinations made by the alj as long as they find some support in the record", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[T]he sentencing court must consider the relevant factors and provide a reasoned and renewable basis for its decision to impose a fine.\u201d Id. at 968. In this case, the record makes clear that the district court spent considerable time properly considering the relevant factors. The court followed the PSR\u2019s factual findings, questioned Mr. Gellene concerning his current financial situation, and then asked Mr. Gellene and his attorney to meet over lunch with the probation officer who prepared the presentence report in order to provide to the court \u201ca little detail about where all this money went in the last six years.\u201d Sent. Tr. 69. The probation officer\u2019s notes from that discussion became a supplement to the PSR \u2014 a supplement created by both parties. See Bauer, 129 F.3d at 969 (<HOLDING>). The court reviewed the material and Holdings: 0: recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence 1: holding the trial courts subsequently corrected instruction that the jury must find the defendant personally committed the offenses in order to convict the defendant on those charges did not prejudice the defendant 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights 4: recognizing that the defendant approved the supplement to the psr", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "originally arose from the doctrine that consent to treatment is only meaningful if the patient understands the risks and alternatives of the treatment. This same term has been assigned to the doctrine which places a duty on physicians to disclose information as to the alternatives and risks of a particular treatment. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15. The doctrine of informed consent comes from the common law and stems from the fundamental notion of the right to bodily integrity: \"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body;...\" Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.1914), overruled on other grounds. See also In Matter of Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 68, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Consent to treatment is only meaningful if it Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to waive a jury trial 1: recognizing a right to contribution 2: recognizing private right of action 3: recognizing the right to selfdetermination 4: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Some of Cruikshank\u2019s objections on appeal appear meritorious, even though the record does not show they were presented to the trial court. For example, Cruikshank contends on appeal the trial court improperly excluded statements as hearsay when, in fact, they were not hearsay because the statements were admissions by a party opponent. But these complaints are not timely. \u201cAs a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that: (1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion....\u201d Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). We review the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 7 2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Brooks v. Sherry Lane Nat. Bank, 788 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that appellants waived any claim of error as to the portion of the lower courts ruling that they did not expressly challenge on appeal 1: holding that a party waived its objections on appeal to an affidavit presented in support of a motion for summary judgment by failing to raise its objections to the trial court 2: holding appellants failure to serve their notice of appeal of the circuit courts judgment within the statutory period necessitated dismissal of their appeal for want of jurisdiction 3: holding that appellants failure to obtain a ruling at the trial level even on a constitutional issue precluded review on appeal 4: holding that because appellants never requested opportunity to amend summary judgment responses appellants could not complain on appeal of trial courts ruling sustaining objections and special exceptions to their affidavit", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "relying on Rule 21, the Third Circuit has acknowledged that a portion of an action against certain defendants may be severed and transferred to another district. See Cottman, 36 F.3d at 296. In situations where the claims against one or more defendants are severed because of improper venue, a district court may then transfer the severed claims to another district pursuant to \u00a7 1404(a) or \u00a7 1406(a). See Cottman, 36 F.3d at 296; Carver v. Knox County, Tenn., 887 F.2d 1287, 1293 (6th Cir.1989) (severing certain claims and transferring to another district); City of Virginia Beach, Va. v. Roanoke River Basin Assoc., 776 F.2d 484, 489 (4th Cir.1985); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156, 103 S.Ct. 801, 74 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Wyndham Assocs., 398 F.2d at 618-19; Magee v. Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue 2: recognizing the cause of action 3: recognizing that venue defects as to a party whose portion of the action has been severed do not bar transfer of the remainder of the action 4: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "967. We now formally adopt a valuation on the Abbati test to guide a trial court\u2019s discretion in determining whether dismissal of charges is appropriate. {20} A majority of state courts grant discretion to a trial court to dismiss charges after successive retrials, citing principles such as \u201cfundamental fairness,\u201d \u201cfair play,\u201d and \u201csubstantial justice.\u201d See United States v. Ingram, 412 F.Supp. 384, 385 (D.C.1976) (considering dismissal a \u201cmatter of fair play\u201d); State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (1982) (deriving authority from principles of fundamental fairness); Sivels v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1197, 1201 (Ind.2001) (citing fundamental fairness and substantial justice); Abbati 493 A.2d at 517 (relying on fundamental fairness); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tenn.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Sauve, 164 Vt. 134, 666 A.2d 1164, Holdings: 0: holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality 1: holding that no deliberate prosecutorial misconduct existed after the first trial ended in a hung jury 2: holding trial court has inherent authority to terminate prosecution after mistrials when probability of another hung jury is great 3: recognizing that in the united states it has been held that a court has the inherent power to change venue without reliance on constitutional or statutory authority when necessary to assure a fair trial 4: recognizing a trial courts inherent authority to dismiss a cause of action with prejudice for violations of court orders", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "they are not offered by the parties.\u201d Presley, \u2014 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 724, 175 L.Ed.2d at 681. We distinguish, however, defense counsel\u2019s option to advocate a less restrictive alternative from defense counsel\u2019s failure to request a voir dire of the witness. We reject the Court of Special Appeals\u2019 assertion that Longus conceded to the State\u2019s proffer by failing to request a voir dire examination of the witness. Presenting evidence in support of the State\u2019s overriding interest in closure is the State\u2019s burden. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48,104 S.Ct. at 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. The defense is not required to ask the State to meet its burden, and the defense\u2019s failure to request a voir dire examination of the witness does not waive or reduce the State\u2019s burden. See Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 883-84 (<HOLDING>). Findings on the Record In this case, Longus Holdings: 0: holding that because the appellant did not present to the administrative agency the argument it raised before this court the issue was not preserved and holding that even if preserved the argument failed 1: recognizing that the specific argument regarding an issue must be made in the trial court to preserve that issue for appellate review 2: holding that although tinsley did not make a specific argument about overbreadth of the closure at trial objecting to the closure put the prosecutor and the trial court on notice of his basic claim that the order of exclusion was not justified and preserved the issue for review 3: holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them 4: holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Moore, who also sought to withdraw his guilty plea, Pro Se Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Doc. No. 119)\u2014and the Court granted the defendants\u2019 motions to withdraw their pleas on April 11, 2016. Orders that Defs.\u2019 Mots, to Withdraw Guilty Pleas are Granted (Doc. Nos. 134 and 135). At the defense\u2019s request, the Court also granted a continuance to prepare for trial, which then commenced on September 26, 2016. See Report of Speedy Trial Delay (Doc. No. 136); Min. Entry (Doc. No. 184). The delays in these proceedings are virtually all attributable to the defendants. The government never requested any continuances, with the sole exception of a joint request with Wilson for additional time to brief the Hodge issue. See Order Granting Extension of Time (Doc. No. 106). The defenda th Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>). The defense argues much of the delay was Holdings: 0: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 1: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 2: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea 3: holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea 4: holding that a criminal defendant must provide a fair and just reason to support withdrawal of his guilty plea even when that plea has not yet been accepted by the district court", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury[.]\u201d \u201cResults fair and just, within the meaning of G.S. 97-2[], consist of such \u2018average weekly wages\u2019 as will most nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for the injury, in the employment in which he was working at the time of his injury.\u201d Liles v. Electric Co., 244 N.C. 653, 660, 94 S.E.2d 790, 796 (1956) (emphasis omitted). In interpreting \u201caverage weekly wages\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(5), it is clear from our case law that a plaintiff cannot aggregate or combine his wages from more than one employment in calculating his compensation rate. See McAninch v. Buncombe County Schools, 347 N.C. 126, 134, 489 S.E.2d 375, 380 (1997) (<HOLDING>); see also Barnhardt v. Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, Holdings: 0: holding that inmates have no constitutionally protected interest in the wages earned while in prison 1: holding under indiana law that profits are not wages and neither is a fraction of profits wages and so a bonus that is based on the performance of a plant rather than on the time or determinable output of the employee is not wages either 2: holding that the definition of average weekly wages and the range of alternatives set forth in the five methods of computing such wages as specified in the first two paragraphs of ncgs  9725 do not allow the inclusion of wages or income earned in employment or work other than that in which the employee was injured 3: holding that a plaintiff cannot assert a statutory claim for wages under the labor law if he has no enforceable contractual right to those wages 4: holding that garnishment of wages is a deprivation", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "scholarship endowments for the benefit of students attending only DePaul, NIU, and Loyola, despite Vrba\u2019s intention expressed in article V(C)(2) that trust assets be used to award scholarships to students attending all universities, both public and private. We consider each of these arguments in turn. In response to National City\u2019s argument that the amendment improperly terminated the Scholarship Trust, the majority defendants do not appear to contest that they were without authority to terminate the Scholarship Trust prior to the 50-year term specified in article V(C)(3) of Vrba\u2019s will. Indeed, we note that our supreme court has previously held that trustees cannot utilize a general power of amendment to alter a fixed date of termination provided in a trust. See Olson, 399 Ill. at 242 (<HOLDING>). The majority defendants instead assert that Holdings: 0: holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made 1: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court 2: recognizing court has authority to modify agreement to cure any unreasonable provision as to duration or scope 3: holding that courts may not alter waive or amend the filing deadline 4: holding that a trust provision granting a trustee the power to alter amend or modify the trust agreement was never intended to confer authority to amend the trust agreement in so vital a part as to extend the period of its duration", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(emphasis added). 13 . The Court notes that plaintiff has adduced no evidence that his request for a three day overlap with a substitute teacher was ever communicated to the District. Plaintiffs evidence demonstrates only that his insurance provider, Madison National, received the request. Def.\u2019s Material Facts \u00b6 62. 14 . The fact that Holler responded to plaintiffs request for assistance with his needy students by offering to help plaintiff conduct visits with other teachers who had the same students is further evidence that the District understood plaintiff as requesting assistance due to the needs of his students, not his medical inability to manage them. Act claim, while not citing Soda); Rea-Car, Inc. v. PNM Const., Inc., No. 90-7540, 1991 WL 87215, at *2 (E.D.Pa. May 21, 1991) Holdings: 0: holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract 1: recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa 2: recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel 3: holding an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of equitable estoppel 4: holding that equitable estoppel is applicable to a suit under the miller act while not citing soda", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "months; and even after it took some action, Acosta continued to sexually harass Costilla into 1995? IV. Does official immunity bar Costilla\u2019s claims? V. Did the district court err when it granted the state summary judgment on Costilla\u2019s intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims? ANALYSIS I. The threshold issue presented by this case, and one of first impression in this court, is whether the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) allows an employee to bring an action against her employer for sexual harassment when the harassing party is a non-employee. The district court did not question the validity of the cause of action. We determine that the MHRA, under certain circumstances, requires an employer to protect its employees from non-employe 024, 1028 (D.Nev.1992) (<HOLDING>); Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 Holdings: 0: holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees 1: holding that an employer must remedy situation of sexual harassment 2: holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees 3: holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers 4: holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "did not wish to make a statement in his own behalf, and was sentenced to a term of 30 years to life imprisonment, the trial judge commenting that the crime was about as senseless and cold blooded as one can imagine. No question is now raised concerning the factual basis for the plea of guilty or the possibility of a defense. Defendant argues, relying primarily upon language in People v. Hessenauer (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 63, that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he was not again advised by the court at his sentencing hearing of his right to counsel. The appellate court, noting that the opinions of that court were in conflict, agreed. 98 Ill. App. 3d 71; compare People v. Taylor (4th Dist. 1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 987, and People v. Miles (5th Dist. 1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 131 (<HOLDING>), with People v. Kious (5th Dist. 1979), 77 Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel 1: holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver 2: holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage 3: holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage 4: holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Agreement subjected Dr. Wojewski to more control by RCRH than most doctors and perhaps rendered him the most controlled doctor in America. The district court rejected this argument based on Cilecek v. Inova Health System Services, 115 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir.1997), which states that \u201c[bjecause of the overarching demands of the medical profession, the tension in professional control between doctors and hospitals for medical services rendered at hospitals is not, we believe, a reliable indicator of whether the doctor is an employee or an independent contractor at the hospital.\u201d As noted by the district court and by appellees, several other circuits have held that a doctor who loses hospital privileges is an independent contractor. Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 190 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies 1: holding that surgeon with surgical privileges was not an employee of hospital and thus could not bring suit under either the age discrimination in employment act or title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 2: holding that physician was an independent contractor and thus could not sue hospital under title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 3: holding that physician with staff privileges is not an employee and thus cannot bring claim under title vii of 1964 civil rights act 4: holding that congress intended for idea to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions of statutes such as title vii of the civil rights act of 1964", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or former spouse can be as much for \u201csupport\u201d for dischargeability purposes under \u00a7 523(a)(5) as payments owing directly to a former spouse. Leibowitz v. County of Orange (In re Leibowitz), 217 F.3d 799, 803 (9th Cir.2000). Accord Falk & Siemer, LLP v. Maddigan (In re Maddigan), 312 F.3d 589, 593 (2d Cir.2002) (stating the fact that a debt is payable to a third party does not prevent classification of that debt as nondis-chargeable under \u00a7 523(a)(5)); Williams v. Kemp (In re Kemp), 232 F.3d 652, 653 (8th Cir.2000) (stating that it is the nature of the debt, not the identity of the payee, that determines the debt's nondischargeability under \u00a7 523(a)(5)); Miller v. Gentry (In re Miller), 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 916, 116 S.Ct. 305, 133 L.Ed.2d 210 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Long v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that courtappointed guardian ad litem for child in child custody dispute did not act under color of state law 1: holding that debts for a guardian ad litem and a psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 because the emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support rather than on the identity of the payee 2: holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 3: holding the district court properly allowed guardian ad litem fees to be taxed as costs 4: holding that legal fees for a childs guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding were clearly for the ehilds benefit and support and as such were nondischargeable under  523a5", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of his \u201ccharacter for truthfulness.\u201d See Rule 608(b) (permitting cross-examination on specific instances of misconduct \u201cif probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness\u201d). And the district court could have contained the prejudicial effect of the material, as well as any possible confusion of the issues, by limiting its introduction to the essential facts necessary to reveal Allen\u2019s character for truthfulness. Moreover, the material would not have been needlessly cumulative. The fact that Allen might have had a motive to testify against Kohring in order to gain leniency as to his corruption charges does not mean that evidence of a different bias or motive would be cumulative. See, e.g., Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 579 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 270, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (<HOLDING>)); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 702-03, 124 Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of judicial bias does not satisfy section 2244b2b because it does not add to or subtract from the evidence of  guilt 1: recognizing that the value of brady evidence must be evaluated in light of the other evidence admitted at trial 2: holding that some evidence of bias does not dimmish the value of other evidence describing a different source of bias 3: holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence 4: holding that evidence that defense witnesses were members of the same organization of tax protesters as defendant was properly admitted to show bias", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "also United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Moreover, \u201c[i]f the adverse party does not [file an opposition], summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that failure to timely oppose a motion for summary judgment, does not, in itself, justify entry of summary judgment against the party; therefore, a District Court is \u201cobliged to consider the motion on the merits, in light of the record as constituted, in order to determine whether judgment would be legally appropriate.\u201d Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991); see also Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). In the case of failure to oppose a motion for Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 1: holding that summary judgment motion itself must expressly present reasons entitling movant to summary judgment 2: holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law 3: holding that before granting an unopposed summary judgment motion the court must inquire whether the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate undisputed facts entitling it to summary judgment as a matter of law 4: recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "novo. See United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.1995). Whether the trial court\u2019s colloquy with the defendant satisfies the requirements of Rule 11 is also reviewed de novo. See United States v. Smith, 60 F.3d 595, 597 n. 1 (9th Cir.1995). Technical failure to comply with Rule 11 is not reversible error unless it affects the defendant\u2019s substantial rights. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h). The record demonstrates that the district court complied with Rule 11 in accepting Aguilar-Muniz\u2019s plea. The court advised Aguilar-Muniz of the elements of both charges against him. As to the charge of using a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy to manufacture drugs, the court advised Aguilar-Muniz of the definition of a conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 559-60 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The court informed Aguilar-Muniz of the Holdings: 0: holding that eonclusory allegations that plaintiffs were unaware of the conspiracy is insufficient 1: holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient 2: holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges 3: holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim 4: holding that cursoryrecitation of conspiracy charge without definition of the legal term is insufficient", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the club, an area over which Swordfish purportedly had no control, the majority avoids Appellant\u2019s argument that Swordfish had a duty to provide reasonable security measures in the common areas outside the nightclub, which were under Swordfish\u2019s control, and that the failure to do so allowed the assailant to return to the club and injure Appellant. That Appellant was shot inside the club relates to causation, which in my opinion, is not here a proper element of negligence on which to base summary judgment. I agree with Appellant that a commercial landlord, under circumstances here appearing, has a duty to reasonably protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts in areas under the landlord\u2019s control. Compare Cramer v. Balcor Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 312 S.C. 440, 441 S.E.2d 317 (1994) (<HOLDING>), with Bullard v. Ehrhardt, 283 S.C. 557, 559, Holdings: 0: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 1: holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 2: holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties 3: holding a business owes a duty to protect invitees from reasonably foreseeable harm by third persons 4: holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was under Mr. Wallace\u2019s management). Plaintiff does not deny making this request, although he stated that he did not even want to work in the same building as Mr. Wallace, because he still saw him daily, although Mr. Wallace did not speak to him. Def.\u2019s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 107, 110. Furthermore, it is undisputed that once Mr. Wallace was permanently transferred, plaintiff was brought back to the stock room to work, and plaintiffs temporary reassignment did not result in the lost of grade level or pay. Id. at 132; Def.\u2019s Mot., Ex. E, Gaskins\u2019 Decl. \u00b6 4. These circumstances do not permit the Court to conclude that plaintiffs temporary assignment to the building services department amounted to an adverse employment action. See Brodetski v. Duffey, 141 F.Supp.2d 35, 45 (D.D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). More significantly, Holdings: 0: holding in the only seventh circuit case addressing prejudice in the context of failure to notice that an employee was not prejudiced because she benefitted from a reduced schedule of leave for more than a yeara schedule she wanted to keep 1: holding that change in work schedule and assigning less desirable job duties did not constitute a tangible employment action 2: holding that change of schedule video surveillance and disciplinary warnings were not material adverse actions sufficient to sustain retaliation claim 3: holding that defendants decision to change the office schedule without allowing plaintiff leave to alter his personal schedule did not constitute an adverse action although plaintiff alleged that because of the schedule revisions he was forced to come in two hours early for his shift a mere inconvenience is not sufficiently adverse to sustain a prima facie case 4: holding that a change in work schedule and request that an employee perform two additional tasks did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a case like State v. Hampton, 152 Or App 742, 954 P2d 1267 (1998), in which a total delay of nearly two years consisted primarily of a 19-month delay that was caused entirely by the court\u2019s inattention to a motion that it had taken under advisement. Here, as in Myers, there was a continuing dialogue between the court and the parties \u2014 including numerous scheduling and status conferences \u2014 at least every five months, and, as set out above, much of the delay was the result of the kind of \u201croutine scheduling delays that are always present.\u201d Myers, 225 Or App at 677. However, under the \u201cSta was required where eight months of delay out of a total of 11.5 months attributable to the state was due to simple neglect); cf. State v. Doak, 235 Or App 351, 231 P3d 1181, rev den, 349 Or 171 (2010) (<HOLDING>); State v. Lee, 234 Or App 383, 391-92, 228 P3d Holdings: 0: holding that trial delay for dna testing was attributable to the state but was mere negligence 1: holding that dismissal was required where overall length of prosecution was 16 months state was responsible for 13 months of delay and six months of that delay was due to simple neglect 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant 3: holding that dismissal of indictment was abuse of discretion when delay attributable to the government was twelve months 4: holding that dismissal was not required where entire 13month delay attributable to state was reasonably explained", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "See Utah Code Ann, \u00a7 80-8-83(9) (LexisNex-is 2018) (allowing the court to \"make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties\"). Thus, the district court did not err when it failed to require a showing of material change in circumstances to alter the parties' parent-time arrangement,. {12 We next decide whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that exercising standard parent-time with Mother at her home in Moab was in the children's best interests. {13 The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that \"[t]rial courts have continuing jurisdiction to consider motions to modify dealing with ... visitation rights.\" Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980); see also Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 30-3-5(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (<HOLDING>). We also note that it \"is the trial court's Holdings: 0: holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child 1: holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child 2: holding judges and attorneys in eriminal contempt for permitting father to attack collaterally mothers eustody of child through sham child in need of services action 3: recognizing a district courts continuing jurisdiction over child eustody and child maintenance determinations 4: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "suffered a denial of equal pay with every check she received.\u201d); Ashley v. Boyle\u2019s Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc) (\"Ashley's Title VII pay claim is timely because she received allegedly discriminatory paychecks within 300 days prior to the filing of her administrative charge.\u201d) ng violations\u201d doctrine, variously defined, e.g., Calloway, 986 F.2d at 448-49; Cardenas, 269 F.3d at 258, while others expressly rejected that label, e.g., Gandy v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 24 F.3d 861, 864-65 (6th Cir.1994) (EPA claim). Some restricted the damages recoverable to the pay lost as a result of paychecks received within the timely-filing period, e.g., Brinkley-Obu, 36 F.3d at 346, n. 22; Ashley, 66 F.3d at 167-68, whil d Cir.1998) (unpublished table decision) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Moreover, the employee is limited to Holdings: 0: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 1: holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to suit alleging racial discrimination under 42 usc  1981 2: recognizing that under illinois law parties are free to contract for a time period within which a suit may be brought  which is less than the general statute of limitation period applicable to written contracts 3: holding in a  1981 case that under bazemore each discriminatory paycheck constituted a new violation for which suit could be brought within the statute of limitations period beginning with its occurrence 4: holding that under bazemore the continued application of a discriminatory compensation scheme is itself an actionable violation and that the plaintiffs could therefore be made whole for those paychecks received during the applicable limitations period", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the district court committed error because it failed to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. We also conclude that this error was \u201cplain,\u201d because \u201cthe application of an incorrect standard of proof to enhancements with disproportionate impact [is] error that is plain.\u201d Jordan, 256 F.3d at 930. Next, we must determine whether the error affected McLaughlin\u2019s substantial rights. \u201cThe error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). The PSR provided clear and convincing evidence supporting the enhancement for actual loss and the enhancement for a scheme involving more than minimal planning or a scheme to defraud more than one victim. See United States v. Romero-Rendon, 220 F.3d at 1163 & n. 4 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, no prejudice was suffered by these Holdings: 0: recognizing that the department is required to present clear and convincing evidence to support termination of a parents parental rights 1: holding that an admission from the promisor that he lacked intent to form a contract by his promise could provide clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff on a promissory fraud claim 2: holding that an uncontroverted psr alone can provide clear and convincing evidence to support a sentence enhancement 3: holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied 4: holding that fraud on the court must be supported by clear unequivocal and convincing evidence", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "would have been treated as final in federal practice and stating that \u201cthis Court is not compelled to apply a jurisdictional rule of the federal courts merely because the motion for a stay of [court] proceedings [pending arbitration] in this instance was filed pursuant to the [FAA]\u201d). Other similar decisions are: McClellan v. Barrath Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (applying Missouri law in holding order compelling arbitration unappealable because \u201c[although 9 U.S.C. \u00a7 2 creates substantive rights to be enforced in state courts, the procedural provisions of the [FAA] are not binding on state courts ... provided applicable state procedures do not defeat the rights granted by Congress\u201d); Bush v. Paragon Property, Inc., 165 Or.App. 700, 997 P.2d 882, 887-88 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, Holdings: 0: holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 1: holding order denying arbitration appealable under texas law and stating that although the faa also permits a party to appeal from an interlocutory order denying a request to compel arbitration federal procedure does not apply in texas courts even when texas courts apply the federal act footnote omitted 2: holding that faa does not require appellate review of order interlocutory under state law denying motion to compel arbitration and overruling prior decision finding such a requirement 3: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 4: holding that where appellants preliminary objections both in nature of demurrer and in nature of motion to compel arbitration were denied appellate review is limited to that portion of the courts order which denied the motion to compel arbitration the other issues are not ripe for review", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "principles may be applicable.\u201d Id. at 283-84, 103 S.Ct. 1081. The ACLU contends that cell tower dumps violate reasonable expectations of privacy \u201cbecause they involve just th[is] sort of \u2018dragnet type\u2019 surveillance of hundreds or thousands of innocent people.\u201d (Wessler 5/20/14 Letter at 13). I cannot agree that the Government\u2019s application here raises the spectre of \u201cwholesale surveillance\u201d suggested in Knotts and some of the cases following it. Such concerns center on the possibility of the Government tracking an individual\u2019s (or a number of individuals\u2019) every movement over a period of time. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (mentioning \u201ctwenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country\u201d); United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 191-92, 205 (3d Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>), vacated on grant of reh\u2019g en banc, 2013 WL Holdings: 0: holding that by enacting the more specific homicide by vehicle statute the legislature intended to preempt the subject matter of unintended homicides resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle 1: holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes 2: holding use of gps device to track suspect for 65 days was search 3: holding that delay of several hours after the vehicle was seized was reasonable 4: holding warrantless gps tracking of vehicle for several days generating highly accurate record of the trackers whereabouts throughout its period of operation unjustified", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen\u2019s compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 8116(c) (emphasis added). 11 . Section 8128(b) provides: The action of the Secretary or his designee in allowing or denying a payment under this subchapter is\u2014 (1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact; and (2) not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 8128(b). But cf. United States v. Sforza, 326 F.3d 107, 111-15 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). 12 . The Secretary must determine that the Holdings: 0: holding that disability benefits are not retirementtype benefits 1: holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits 2: holding that a state agency is not a person subject to suit under federal false claims act 3: holding that section 8128b does not deprive courts of jurisdiction over governments false claims act suit seeking recoupment of fraudulently obtained disability benefits 4: holding that the provisions of the false claims act allowing suit imposing liability on any person who presented false claims to the federal government did not allow suits against state governments", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Health Systems (1st Dist. 1996), 674 N.E.2d 888, 221 Ill. Dec. 94 (rejecting implied private action for patients' families under the Health Care Surrogate Act); Parra v. Tarasco, Inc. (1st Dist. 1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 819, 595 N.E.2d 1186, 172 Ill. Dec. 516 (rejecting implied private action under the Choke-Saving Methods Act); Davis v. Dunne (1st Dist. 1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 739, 545 N.E.2d 539, 136 Ill. Dec. 1015 (rejecting implied private action under the Civil Service Act); Lane v. Fabert (4th Dist. 1989) 178 Ill. App. 3d 698, 533 N.E.2d 546, 127 Ill. Dec. 674 (rejecting implied private action under the Pawnbrokers Act); Anzinger v. Illinois State Medical Inter-Ins Exchange (1st Dist. 1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 719, 494 N.E.2d 655, 98 Ill p. 3d 412, 484 N.E.2d 473, 91 Ill. Dec. 914 Holdings: 0: recognizing implied private action under the school code as to chapter 1 funds 1: recognizing implied private action under federal safety appliance act 2: recognizing implied private action under the xray retention act 3: recognizing implied private action under the plat act rejecting implied private action under the national flood insurance act of 1968 4: recognizing implied private action under the collection agency act", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "551, 570, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); \" 'Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes\"\" Wilhoite, 640 N.E.2d at 387. Donovan argues that Wilhoite is distinguishable, in that the patron in Wilkhoite simply wanted to shop at the mall, involving an activity and premises not subject to comprehensive regulations. According to Donovan, the common law has been supplanted in this instance, because in 1993 our Indiana Legislature chose to legalize and regulate riverboat gambling, a formerly-prohibited activity. \"Historically, the State of Indiana has prohibited gambling.\" Am. Legion Post No. 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1190, 1192 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (citing State v. Nixon, 270 Ind. 192, 384 N.E.2d 152 (1979) (<HOLDING>)), trams. denied. However, in 1988, the Indiana Holdings: 0: holding political discharges were unconstitutional 1: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 2: holding mere deviation unconstitutional 3: holding section 61137 unconstitutional on its face 4: holding that parimutuel wagering on horse races was unconstitutional", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Under section 353(1) of the PHS Act, an individual who is convicted of intentionally violating any CLIA requirements may be imprisoned or fined.\u201d). UMMC contends that since there is no proof of an intentional violation, plaintiffs\u2019 claim fails. Plaintiffs respond that the issue is not whether or not \u201cits supervisor ... intentionally violate[d] CLIA,\u201d but rather is whether plaintiffs\u2019 reporting \u201cof what may have been criminally illegal conduct\u201d was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate their employment. In fact, however, the issue is precisely that identified by defendant. The Fifth Circuit held in Wheeler v. BL Development Corp., that McArn applies only where the conduct reported is \u201cactually ... criminal in nature.\u201d 415 F.3d 399, 402-04 (5th Cir.2005). See id. at 404 (<HOLDING>). An employee\u2019s good faith effort in reporting Holdings: 0: holding that money seized from a bank account must be traceable to illegal activity in order to be subject to forfeiture even if account previously contained proceeds of illegal activity 1: holding that because the activity reported did not constitute any form of criminally illegal activity  mcarns narrow public policy exception is not applicable in this instance 2: holding that raising a complaint about a violation of an internal policy is not considered protected activity 3: holding that countersurveillance driving is a fact indicative of illegal activity 4: holding the right to record police activity on public property was not clearly established", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "waste and, indeed, South Dakota law even contemplates that regional waste disposal facilities mil accept waste from outside South Dakota. The Court notes that the referral process could not affect out-of-state waste entering any South Dakota waste disposal facility that disposed of up to 200,000 tons of waste annually because legislative approval is not required for such facilities. However, any facility which desired to dispose of over 200,000 tons of waste annually, whether that waste originated in South Dakota or outside th ainst interstate commerce in prae tical effect, the fact that the Referendum also precluded SDDS from disposing of instate garbage would not prevent the Referendum from being invalid. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc., \u2014 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2024-25 (<HOLDING>); Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc., 981 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that dormant commerce clause complaint by instate resident against municipality failed on merits because challenged rule regulated evenhandedly and did not burden interstate commerce 1: holding that merely because some instate outofcounty waste would also be discriminated against does not render the law valid under the commerce clause 2: holding that ordinance requiring all municipal solid waste generated within county to be delivered to a particular facility discriminated against interstate commerce 3: holding that an arkansas statute discriminated against interstate commerce by banning the importation of most outofstate waste even though a small amount of outofstate waste was allowed into arkansas under the statute 4: holding that a new jersey statute prohibiting the importation of waste materials into the state violated the negative commerce clause", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "supported in the record. See, e.g., Brown v. St. Louis Police Department, 691 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 1882, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983) (appellate court may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by the record). Despite Stafford\u2019s failure to formally plead a claim under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185, the district court interpreted the pleadings as clearly raising a \u201chybrid\u201d section 301 claim. Stafford concurred in the interpretation. See Stafford v. Ford Motor Company, No. 3-84-1239, slip op. at 4 n. 1 (D.Minn. April 4, 1985). The Supreme Court has held that the six month statute of limitations found in section 1 Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, 782 F.2d 674 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Prior to the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Holdings: 0: holding that hybrid section 301 action could not be maintained until plaintiff could fairly allege that the union refused to process his grievance 1: holding that timeliness of section 301 hybrid claim against union is measured from the date the internal union appeals procedure is exhausted or broken down 2: holding that a knew or should have known standard applies to triggering of statute of limitations for action against union in hybrid  301 action 3: holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction 4: holding that statute of limitations on section 301 claim runs from point internal union appeals process is exhausted", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "chapter 31, relating to sexual offenses], not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if: (1) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) the child either: (i) testifies at the proceeding; or (ii) is unavailable as a witness. 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5985.1(a). Here, where A.D. was unavailable for cross-examination, the TYHA would permit the admission of her out-of-court statements under the indicia of reliability standard. As set forth above, the United States Supreme Court rejected the indicia of reliability standard in Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (<HOLDING>). As required by Crawford, a Confrontation Holdings: 0: holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of  hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause 1: recognizing that admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation 2: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 3: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 4: holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "use of the money of others on the promise of profits.\u201d Howey, 328 U.S. at 299, 66 S.Ct. at 1103; Stone, 8 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Howey); Securities and Exchange Comm\u2019n v. R.G. Reynolds Enter., Inc., 952 F.2d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir.1991). Furthermore, in defining securities, substance governs form, and the substance of an investment contract is a security-like interest in a \u201ccommon enterprise\u201d that, through the efforts of the promoter or others, is expected to generate profits for the security holder, either for direct distribution or as an increase in the value of the investment. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99, 66 S.Ct. at 1102-03; United Housing Found, v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-53, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2060-61, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975); Rodriguez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 990 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). a. Investment of money Courts rarely tarry Holdings: 0: holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land 1: holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff 2: holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land 3: holding that even though the complaint sought money damages and land was actually recovered the attorneys lien attached to the land 4: holding that if respondents suit is one for permanent damages to the land the measure of damages is the decreased value of the land", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Minn.Stat. \u00a7 609.1095 (2000). Appellant argues that his prior felonies do not constitute a \u201cpattern of criminal conduct\u201d and that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him as a career offender. A pattern is the organizing principle or relationship binding certain things, in this case incidents of criminal conduct, together. Such a \u201cpattern of criminal conduct\u201d may be demonstrated by proof of criminal conduct similar, but not identical, in motive, purpose, results, participants, victims or other shared characteristics. State v. Gorman, 546 N.W.2d 5, 9 (Minn.1996). A pattern of property crimes can satisfy the statute and there is no time limit for which convictions may be used to show a pattern of criminal conduct. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 280 (Minn.1998) (<HOLDING>). Appellant\u2019s current conviction is for auto Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and felon in possession of a firearm helped support probable cause to search his motel room for evidence of burglary 1: holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon 2: holding that a defendant with prior felony convictions including possession of a dangerous weapon possession of a controlled substance receiving stolen property and attempted burglary was properly sentenced as a career offender 3: holding the imposition of a maximum sentence of life imprisonment was not excessive for conviction of possession of cocaine where defendant was adjudged to be a fourth felony offender with prior convictions for manslaughter two prior convictions for possession of cocaine and numerous arrests for drug offenses possession of a firearm by a felon aggravated battery and armed robbery 4: holding that employees convictions for burglary possession of controlled substance public intoxication possession of marijuana unlawful carrying of weapon and evading arrest did not make his sexual assault of child foreseeable", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "expense. See Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich 16, 47; 576 NW2d 641 (1998) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The result of the majority\u2019s decision is that the ability of private citizens to bring OMA complaints will, in all likelihood, be severely curtailed. To penalize private citizens and, consequently, t ; 593 NW2d 649 (1999) (expressly rejecting the notion that a failure to either grant injunctive relief or order future compliance with the OMA precludes an award of costs and attorney fees, reasoning that a finding that the OMA was violated constitutes declaratory relief, which is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to an award of costs and attorney fees under MCL 15.271(4)); Nicholas v Meridian Charter Twp Bd, 239 Mich App 525, 535; 609 NW2d 574 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Kitchen v Ferndale City Council, 253 Mich App Holdings: 0: holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment 1: holding that the absence of a formal injunction does not preclude the plaintiff from recovering costs and attorney fees under mcl 152714 2: holding that the legal remedy of declaratory relief is adequate to trigger an award of attorney fees and costs under mcl 152714 3: holding that a declaratory judgment entitles a plaintiff to actual attorney fees and costs under mcl 152714 despite the fact that the trial court found it unnecessary to grant an injunction given defendants decision to amend the notice provision after plaintiffs filed the present suit 4: holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "exception in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)(\u201cWe conclude, then, that a federal court\u2019s examination of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor. If the answer is no \u2014 as it will be most of the time \u2014 the sentencing court must determine whether the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances, takes the case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline.\u201d) Moreover, what little case law there is on the subject makes clear that district courts can depart downward on the basis of factors relating to immigration-related factors. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838 (7th Cir.1997)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Charry Cubillos, 91 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that deportable alien status is not a ground for departing downward 1: holding that the district court could consider increased sentence severity resulting from deportable alien status 2: holding that the district court cannot be faulted for failing sua sponte to also address whether the defendants deportable status would affect the severity of his sentence 3: holding that defendants status as a deportable alien could be considered by the district court at sentencing 4: holding that departure based on deportable alien status was prohibited", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "within three months to revoke the license. Although plaintiff\u2019s license was renewed during the pendency of the first proceeding before the ZBA, the mistaken issuance of a license in violation of an ordinance does not result in application of estoppel against the City. (See City of Chicago v. Unit One Corp. (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 242, 246, 578 N.E.2d 194, 197-98.) Moreover, since plaintiff was aware that his operation of the auto repair shop was in jeopardy when he received the renewal notice, he should have been on notice that the renewal was in error, or at least that it was contingent upon the ZBA\u2019s ruling. As the City points out, if it were estopped from enforcing the ordinance because of a mistakenly issued or renewed l 5 Ill. App. 3d 109, 111, 113, 282 N.E.2d 739, 740, 742 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, neither the oral assurances of a Holdings: 0: holding that allegations that the city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and stating in dicta that the decision would be the same even if the city had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith a badfaith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law 1: holding that because the board of aldermen only decided whether to grant a variance under the zoning ordinance the superior court erred by determining the question of the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance which was never raised or considered by the board of aldermen 2: holding seniorhousing zoning ordinance invalid as applied 3: holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance 4: holding that the city was not estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance when a zoning department employee mistakenly stamped the plaintiffs application for a license to operate a laundromat to indicate compliance with the ordinance", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in determining the preclusive effects of a state court judgment.\u201d Marrese v. Am. Acad, of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1332, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985) (cita tions omitted). Similarly, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires recognizing state courts to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment in accordance with the rendering state's preclusion law. Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). 81 .We have observed that Florida courts abide a similarly stringent actually decided requirement: [P]reclusive effect is not given to issues which could have, but may not have, been decided in an earlier lawsuit between the parties. See, e.g., Acadia Partners, L.P. v. Tompkins, 673 So.2d 487, 488-89 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.D.H., Inc., 397 So.2d Holdings: 0: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 1: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 2: holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts 3: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 4: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "amend the judgment, it stated: [Kleenco\u2019s counsel] has a point in that there are certain amount of expenses that should be deducted from the 5-50[sic]. This amount seems to be rather minuscule. The best this Court can estimate is approximately a dollar a day, or perhaps $30 at best. Viewing, however, that this is a fairly new vehicle, the use of its truck, United is only entitled to nominal loss of use damages because it failed to prove the associated costs which should have been deducted from the rental amount awarded. Ferreira, 44 Haw. at 576, 356 P.2d at 656 (\u201cTo authorize a recovery of more than nominal damages, facts must exist and be shown by the evidence which afford a basis for measuring the plaintiffs loss with reasonable certainty.\u201d); Omura, 78 Hawai'i at 418, 894 P.2d at 115 (<HOLDING>). V. Lastly, Kleenco contends that the court Holdings: 0: holding that when plaintiff has proven injury but has failed to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages 1: holding that the right to nominal damages was waived in a breach of duty action when plaintiff failed to raise the issue of nominal damages until after the verdict 2: holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them 3: holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal 4: holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.\u201d Id. In this consolidated appeal, Reberger disputes the validity of two of the three strikes relied upon by the district court, as well as the conclusion that he has not satisfactorily alleged that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291, and affirm. 1. The district court properly counted Reberger v. Offender Management Division, No. 3:12-cv-00293 as a strike, notwithstanding the fact that Reberger\u2019s appeal of Offender Management was still pending at the time the district court denied him IFP status. See Coleman v. Tollefson, \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1769, 1763, 191 L.Ed.2d 803 (2015) (<HOLDING>). 2. The district court properly counted Holdings: 0: holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case 1: holding that a prior dismissal on one of  1915gs enumerated grounds counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an ongoing appeal 2: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike 3: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 4: holding that a prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the practice of plea bargaining. Other Supreme Court cases sanction by implication a prosecutorial promise of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (concluding that court\u2019s refusal to allow defendant to question witness about dismissed charge violated Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) (affirming sentence due in part to defendant\u2019s refusal to cooperate with government in spite of being offered \u201cfavorable disposition of his case\u201d); id. at 568, 100 S.Ct. 1358 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressly upholding plea bargaining process); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Circuit courts have been more explicit in Holdings: 0: holding prosecutions failure to disclose promise of leniency to witness provided in exchange for that witnesss testimony violated due process 1: holding that the fact that a prosecutor afforded favorable treatment to a government witness standing alone does not establish the existence of an underlying promise of leniency in exchange for testimony 2: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 3: holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial 4: holding that prosecutions duty to present all material evidence to the jury was not fulfilled when it became known the government failed to disclose an alleged promise of leniency made to its key witness in return for his testimony", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "*3 (Ky.Ct.App. Aug. 5, 2011). Greywolf held that, to toll the statute, a defendant\u2019s concealment \u201cmust hide the plaintiffs cause of action in such a manner that it cannot be discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence.\u201d Ibid. The court held that media reports implicating the diocese put the plaintiff on constructive notice of its negligent hiring and entrustment, and that the plaintiff could not \u201cremain oblivious to a cause of action when information was available that it existed\u201d media reports are commonly held to end any period of fraudulent concealment. Ibid.; see also Moyers v. Roman Catholic Bishop, No. 2004-CA-001886-MR, 2005 WL 3116116, at *3 (Ky.Ct.App. Nov. 23, 2005); Azerot v. Roman Catholic Bishop, No. 2004-CA-000666-MR, 2005 WL 2899483, at *1 (Ky.Ct.App. Nov. 4, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Further retreating from per se findings of Holdings: 0: holding that private defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but remanding for a determination of whether they were liable as government actors 1: holding that evidence of the defendants intimate relationship with the victims as well as the similarity of the manner and time frame of the commission of the sexualabuse offenses established that evidence from each victim supported the trial courts denial of appellants motion to sever 2: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury 3: holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant 4: holding that sexualabuse victims were no longer entitled to tolling once widespread publicity revealed affiliations between the abuser and the organization they sought to hold liable", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "did not ask for any relief in regard to this matter in her answer brief, or within her pleadings at trial. The case of Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So.2d 819, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), involved a dissolution of marriage where the final judgment failed to explain the status of any medical insurance which may have been reasonably available for the child, as required by Florida statutes. In that situation, this court held that, although the trial court was not presented with the issue, the issue needed to be decided. \u2022 The case was remanded so that the trial court could inquire into the availability of medical insurance and allocate responsibility for the child\u2019s reasonable medical expenses between the two parties. See id. at 821; see also Zucker v. Zucker, 672 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, we must remand to the trial court Holdings: 0: holding that parents claims of outrage and negligent handling of a body were not subject to the medical malpractice statutes because hospital personnel did not engage in any medical skill or judgment in the disposition of the childs remains 1: holding that a state is required to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals 2: holding that state medical director of prison medical services corporation was not final policymaker 3: holding that charging fees for medical services did not violate the eighth amendment where prisoner did not allege denial of medical care 4: holding that remand was required due to fact that final judgment of dissolution did not contain any provision addressing status of any medical insurance for parties child or general responsibility for childs medical care", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1983 case that defendant\u2019s conduct violated his constitutional rights. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. at 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d at 439. Once it appeared that plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a facially-valid warrant, plaintiff also had the burden to satisfy the Franks standards for impeaching the documents underlying the warrant itself. State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d at 211 (defendants attempting to impeach search warrant affidavit \u201cfailed to sustain their burden of proof under Franks\u201d). The cases plaintiff has cited were concerned with the burden of proof on a different issue \u2014 a public official\u2019s \u201cdefense of good faith and probable cause\u201d which can give rise to qualified immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218-19, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 295-96 (1967) (<HOLDING>); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 176 Holdings: 0: holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest 3: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 4: holding that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a  1983 claim alleging false arrest", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "defense and/or indemnification for claims involving the conduct of law enforcement officers. Officer Gutierrez concedes that he is not a \u201claw enforcement officer\u201d within the meaning' of the TCA; however, he argues that he fits within another of the enumerated definitions of \u201cpublic employee.\u201d For the reasons that follow, while we agree that Officer Gutierrez is not a \u201claw enforcement officer\u201d within the meaning and definitions of the TCA, we disagree that he meets any alternate definition of a \u201cpublic employee.\u201d Officer Gutierrez Is Not a \u201cLaw Enforcement Officer\u201d of a \u201cGovernmental Entity .M. 47, 897 P.2d 234 (concluding that district attorneys and staff were not \u201claw enforcement officers\u2019\u2019); Dunn v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1993-NMCA-059, \u00b6 11, 116 N.M. 1, 859 P.2d 469 (<HOLDING>). {12} Here, Officer Gutierrez agrees that he Holdings: 0: holding that the decisions of administrative agencies of the state described by article vi section 29 of the constitution of new mexico include regulations adopted by a board emphasis added internal quotation marks and citations omitted 1: holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding the deprivation of the inmates property interest in his mail is not a cognizable constitutional injury given the availability of adequate state postdeprivation remedies under new york law internal quotation marks omitted 3: recognizing that the nsa qualifies as a withholding statute under exemption 3 because it refers to particular types of matters that are to be withheld internal quotation marks and citations omitted 4: holding that the director of the new mexico m otor v ehicle department who has statutory authority to make arrests was not a law enforcement officer because the vast majority of his time and effort are involved in administrative matters internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "States v. Simmons, 374 F.3d 313, 319 (5th Cir.2004). They are, however, entitled to a jury instruction that \u201ccorrectly reflect[s] the issues and the law.\u201d See United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 676 (5th Cir.1995). The instruction here did not meet that standard \u2014 the jury was left to decide the case bereft of a legal rule announced by the Supreme Court in a case that altered the landscape of federal tax prosecutions. Moreover, by including but failing to explain the full breadth of Cheek\u2019s good-faith defense, the district court\u2019s jury instruction risked implying \u2014 in direct conflict with Cheek \u2014 that the Montgomerys could not be acquitted on the basis of good faith unless their views were objectively reasonable. See United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1118 (11th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). That is because good faith is often equated Holdings: 0: holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced 1: holding that a jury instruction compromised the appellants goodfaith argument because it did not make clear that a goodfaith belief by the appellants that they were complying with the tax laws whether or not objectively reasonable negates the specific intent element 2: holding in a tax fraud case that a goodfaith instruction was unnecessary because the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on willfulness 3: holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction 4: holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Waterway, plaintiffs have not shown that they were aware of such a policy before they filed suit. Without such a showing, the existence of the policy is irrelevant. Unless plaintiffs refrained from suing based on their knowledge of the Corps\u2019 bank protection policy, the substance of the policy \u2014 or any fluctuations thereto \u2014 could not possibly be a justification for their delay in bringing suit. That is not to say, however, that plaintiffs\u2019 vague awareness of some nebulous Corps policy would automatically postpone the accrual of their claims. A promise of bank protection by the Corps would have to be specifically directed toward plaintiffs and sufficiently definite in detail to justify their failure to bring suit. See Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed.Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In any event, the court need not decide Holdings: 0: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim 1: holding that statute of limitations did not bar action where erosion process was gradual and government promised relief by enacting legislation authorizing construction of sand transfer plant 2: holding that the evidence was insufficient for the statute of limitations to bar recovery of a quantum meruit cause of action 3: holding that equitable estoppel may bar a partys assertion of a statute of limitations 4: holding that dismissal of prior action in louisiana federal court on the grounds of the statute of limitations bar subsequent action filed in minnesota federal district court", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Kawa must show \u201can invasion of a legally protected interest that is sufficiently concrete and particularized rather than abstract and indefinite.\u201d Ga. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.1999). \u201cThe interest must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right.\u201d Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 772, 120 S.Ct. at 1862. The allegations in Kawa\u2019s complaint do not state such a concrete and particularized injury. Although Kawa asserts it would have waited to research its ACA obligations, Kawa has not alleged that its ACA research is objectively worth less, or that Kawa has been actually harmed in a concrete way. See GrassRoots Recycling Network, Inc. v. E.P.A., 429 F.3d 1109, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, as set out in its complaint, Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 1: holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate 2: holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injury under the ucl fal and clra by asserting that the product they received was worth less than what they paid for it owing to defendants misleading labels 3: holding a plaintiff failed to show an actual injury to challenge an epa rule when the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased a piece of property or would have paid  less because the plaintiffs allegations showed only that the property was worth less to him not that the property was in fact worth less 4: holding the fourth element asks if but for the defendants actions the plaintiff would have been in a less harmful position", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and inadequate notice of claim was ineffective to toll the statute of limitations. [\u00b6 33] I do not disagree that this result can be perceived as harsh. The approach and analysis undertaken in the Edelman case arguably allows a more flexible and forgiving result. However, in Paradis, this Court had the opportunity to fashion a flexible and forgiving approach, but declined to do so. [\u00b6 34] If the Legislature had determined that the holding of Paradis was too harsh, it could have expressly uncoupled the notice and oath requirements when it amended the Act. See, e.g., Stockly v. Doil, 2005 ME 47, \u00b614, 870 A.2d 1208 (\u201cThe Legislature is presumed to be aware of the state of the law and decisions of this Court when it passes an act.\u201d); Taylor v. Town of Orono, 585 A.2d 807, 808-809 (Me.1991) (<HOLDING>); Townsend v. Me. Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 Holdings: 0: holding that defective notice can be excused if there is substantial compliance with the maine tort claims 1: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 2: holding that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirements of sdcl 3212 and 3 3: holding that waiver of federal tort claims act sovereign immunity is conditioned upon strict compliance with exhaustion requirement 4: holding that substantial compliance with notice is sufficient", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Trust Co., 220 F.Supp.2d 560, 564-65 (S.D.W.Va.2002) (compiling factors). The first factor, that of case-by-case analysis and employer discretion, favors the finding that the SAP is an ERISA plan. Before an employee will be paid severance benefits under the SAP, Defendant must determine, as to each employee, the employee\u2019s (1) reason for leaving the company (for cause or no cause, voluntarily or involuntarily); (2) employment status (full-time or part-time); (3) length of service in years; and (4) weekly pay. (Pl.\u2019s Mem. Law Opp\u2019n Mot. Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Make More Definite and Certain Ex. 1.) While most of these determinations require no managerial discretion, simply mathematical calculations, see, e.g., Tinoco v. Marine Chartering Co., 311 F.3d 617, 622 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>), courts across the country have held the Holdings: 0: holding calculating severance benefits based upon age years of service and pay required no discretion 1: holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive 2: holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract 3: holding that a plan providing severance pay for reduction in work force simply did not contemplate the effect of a sale of a business on the availability of severance pay 4: holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "proof under the Guidelines requires only that the government establish relevant conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Kroledge, 201 F.3d 900, 908-09 (7th Cir.2000), a standard that supports a rebutta-ble presumption that all sales during the conspiracy were affected by the illegal agreement. See SKW Metals II, 195 F.3d at 93-94. (Newman, J., concurring) (requiring defendant prove that one or more sales were not affected by the conspiracy). Courts frequently require defendants to prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Hunte, 196 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir.1999) (requiring defendant to prove basis for a downward departure by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Evidence of the \u201crare circumstance\u201d of a Holdings: 0: recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard 1: holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence 2: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that a defendant must prove an affirmative defense at sentencing stage by a preponderance of evidence 4: recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that Defendant suggests that the proceedings on remand constituted a separate case, we reject the argument. See State v. Belgarde, 62 Wash. App. 684, 815 P.2d 812, 816-17 (1991) (observing that a defendant\u2019s retrial, following reversal of an earlier conviction, constituted further proceedings in the same case as opposed to new proceedings or a new case). {18} Our reported decisions indicate that, in cases such as this where a new trial is conducted on remand, \u201cwhether the original judge would reasonably be expected ... to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings,\u201d is to be taken into consideration. State v. Ricky G., 110 N.M. 646, 649, 798 P.2d 596, 599 (Ct.App.1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); In re S.G., 91 P.3d 443, 447 Holdings: 0: holding that it was not reversible error to fail to answer the jurys question where the trial judge was presiding over closing arguments in a codefendants case when the question was asked and the jury reached a result before the judge could confer with the parties 1: holding that the judges stated belief that the defendant was guilty did not disqualify the judge from presiding on remand 2: holding that judge presiding at trial may not testify in that trial as witness 3: holding that trial judge was not required to rule on motion to disqualify which was never served on judge as required by florida rule of judicial administration 2330c 4: holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "respect to the adjudication, denial, or payment of benefit claims under (i) the Sunflower Self-Insured Medical Plan; (ii) any ERISA plan allegedly created by the Consent Judgment ...; or (iii) the NRECA Medical Plan from which Ms. Spires benefits were paid at the time this dispute arose\u201d (Doc. 48 at 22). Because the consent judgment is not a \"plan, fund, or program\u201d under ERISA, Spires\u2019 ERISA claim fails and the court expresses no opinion on whether NRECA was appropriately named as a defendant under ERISA. Likewise, the court's ruling also renders unnecessary any consideration of defendants' argument that Spires' ERISA claim is barred for failure to exhaust all of the administrative remedies available to her. See Held v. Mfrs. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1206 (10th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The fact that Spires did not rely on the Holdings: 0: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to  1983 1: holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under erisa 2: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action 3: holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit under foia 4: holding that exhaustion of administrative ie company or planprovided remedies is an implicit prerequisite to seeking judicial relief pursuant to erisa", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "decision to award child support, including the financial resources of the parents, the physical and emotional needs of the children, the educational needs of the parents and children, and any other factor that it finds relevant. See id. \u00a7 4106(f)(2); 15 V.S.A. \u00a7 659. Indeed, OCS may decline altogether to enforce a support obligation if, in its discretion, it determines that such an action would not be in the best interests of the affected child. See 33 V.S.A. \u00a7 4106(f)(2). Thus, OCS enforcement actions on behalf of ANFC recipients are broadly discretionary, and serve a variety of state policies and interests wholly apart from the collection of debts. Its duties, in sum, are uniquely governmental and find no private analog in our common law. See LaFond, 167 Vt. at 409, 708 A.2d at 920 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the action against OCS is barred Holdings: 0: holding that licensing and inspection of daycare facilities are inherently governmental functions which find no private analog or duty of care in our common law 1: recognizing private right of action 2: holding that duty of county and inspector under statute and ordinance to ensure safety of playground equipment at a daycare center was owed to public generally and could not be the basis for a negligence cause of action brought by a parent of an injured child 3: holding that absence of private analog to states licensing and regulation of daycare facilities barred negligence action 4: holding cause of action for negligence against manufacturer of defective buses was barred by the economic loss rule notwithstanding absence of privity", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "see also Kinnard v. United States, 313 F.3d 933, 935 (6th Cir.2002) (explaining that, when analyzing whether a defendant was prejudiced by his attorney\u2019s performance, \u201cit is necessary to determine if the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable; a court should not focus the analysis on the outcome\u201d) (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993)). Whether an error actually prejudiced a defendant is weighed against the \u201ctotality of the evidence before the judge or jury.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A verdict \u201conly weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.\u201d Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Odem v. Hopkins, 382 F.3d 846, 851-52 (8th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bavers, 787 F.2d 1022, 1030 Holdings: 0: holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt 1: holding stricklands prejudice prong was not met because of overwhelming evidence of guilt 2: holding the error harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt 3: holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt 4: holding that trial courts witness interrogation did not cause defendant prejudice when there was already overwhelming evidence showing defendants guilt", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(3) whether the loss was an \u201caccident\u201d is determined by the intent of the insured and Ludy did not intend to sustain the loss of its property, thus, the loss occurred as result of an accident on Ludy\u2019s part, and (4) the contract should be strictly construed against Florists since it failed to identify any covered causes of loss on the Causes of Loss Form. Doc. #45 (Ludy\u2019s Mem. Opp\u2019n) at 13-15; Doc. # 48 (Ludy\u2019s Mem. Supp.) at 8-10. c. Analysis The basic requirement for coverage under the Legal Liability form is that the insured sustain a loss as a result of \u201cdirect physical loss or damage.\u201d Neither party points to case law that either supports or contradicts the proposition that funds deposited into a bank account, such as th 5, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24183 (N.D.Ohio Oct. 19, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, funds deposited into a bank Holdings: 0: recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate 1: recognizing that property not subject to physical seizure such as mutual fund shares are intangible property 2: recognizing limited partnership interest as intangible personal property 3: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property 4: holding that property includes every intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "denied); Hotel Partners v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 847 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.App.\u2014Dallas 1993, writ denied); see generally Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1991) (noting that a trial court\u2019s findings of fact are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY\u2019S L.J. 351, 375-76 (1998). 4 . Adams v. H & H Meat Products, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 2001, no. pet. h.); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Wood Group Prod. Tech., 30 S.W.3d 5, 11 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). 5 . See Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 17.041-.093 (Vernon 1997). 6 . In addition to other, unspecified acts, a nonresident does business in this State if the nonresident: .\u2014Austin 1985, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Consol. Carpet Holdings: 0: holding that a texas court had personal jurisdiction over a kansas resident who after objecting to the texas courts jurisdiction filed a motion for attorneys fees 1: holding no jurisdiction over nonresident customer where contract was solicited negotiated and consummated in oklahoma for billboards to be built in texas and erected in oklahoma payments were made to texas and defendant would not earn a profit from texas and had no other contact with texas 2: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 3: holding that jurisdiction existed over two georgia residents who leased a machine from a texas resident because they 1 solicited and negotiated the lease agreement by two telephone calls to texas 2 sent correspondence and payments by mail to texas 3 paid for the transfer of the machine from texas and 4 caused their insurance agent to contact the texas resident in texas to arrange coverage for the machine 4: holding that jurisdiction existed over nonresident printing customer despite the fact that texas printer solicited the business in alabama and nonresident sent no personnel to texas because nonresident placed additional orders from which it expected to profit sent payments to texas sent and received printing materials to and from texas paid for shipping of printed goods from texas and sent payments to texas the transactions were governed by texas law and substantial part of performance occurred in texas", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "comment n. 3. Tucker argues that there was no evidence the gun was present during the controlled sales he made to the undercover officer and informant in the summer of 1999. Furthermore, he argues that the gun found in his apartment was not \u201cpresent\u201d in relation to the cocaine found in th cant amount of cash and a loaded gun in his bedroom as well as cocaine in the basement of his building. The fact that other tenants had access to the basement does not alter the result. Tucker admitted that the cocaine in the basement was his in pleading guilty to possessing the cocaine with intent to distribute it. The gun\u2019s location in Tucker\u2019s bedroom made it readily available to Tucker to protect his cash and the drugs in the basement. See id.; United States v. Paulino, 887 F.2d 358 (1st Cir.l989)(<HOLDING>). The two-level enhancement for possession of a Holdings: 0: holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed parolee concerning whereabouts of a gun in an apartment where parole officers had specific information from a third party that a gun was likely present in the apartment 1: holding that the fortress theory was applicable where it reasonably appeared that the gun was used to protect the drugs given that the drugs and firearm were found in the same location 2: holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where the gun cash and a drug ledger were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different apartment in the same building 3: holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found 4: holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "S.E.2d 376, 382 (2000) (\u201cHis photograph [from a police file] was used to prove identity, which is permissible under Rule 404(b).\u201d); State v. Johnson, 78 N.C. App. 68, 71, 337 S.E.2d 81, 83-84 (1985) (upholding admission of photographs of defendant standing next to marijuana plants as evidence of where defendant lived). Similarly, Cofield\u2019s testimony that he had seen defendant in an altercation establishes how Cofield was able to identify defendant. Defendant also challenges testimony by Townsend that she told defendant that he could visit her son at her house so long as he did not take anything. This testimony does not, however, refer to prior crimes, wrongs, or acts of defendant and, therefore, falls outside of the scope of Rule 404(b). Thibodeaux, 341 N.C. at 63, 459 S.E.2d at 508 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the officer\u2019s testimony regarding Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err in admitting testimony that defendant had indicated he might solve his financial difficulties by robbing a bank when the testimony at issue did not relate to any prior crime wrong or act of the defendant 1: holding that where defendant sought to exclude evidence prior to trial and again just prior to witnesss testimony at issue it was not necessary for defendant to object to testimony when it was actually put before jury 2: holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and the government both believed that the defendant was entering a guilty plea to a generically violent crime.\u201d). B. The Trial Court\u2019s Ruling on the Predicate Offense Here, with respect to the April 1999 conviction, Delgado was initially charged in December 1998 with Home Invasion in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, \u00a7 18C. However, the Fitchburg District Court amended the charge of Home Invasion to Breaking and Entering in the Night-Time with Intent to Commit a Felony. Delgado pled guilty to that amended charge in April 1999. It is well established in our precedent \u2014 and the parties do not disagree\u2014 that Mass. Gen. L. ch. 266, \u00a7 16 includes conduct that constitutes a crime of violence as well as conduct that does not. See United States v. Dueno, 171 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Harris, 964 F.2d at 1235 (reading \u00a7 16 in Holdings: 0: holding that  459 is categorically a crime of violence under guidelines  4b12a2 because the usual or ordinary firstdegree burglary in california involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical violence and injury to others 1: holding that theft from the person is not a crime of violence 2: holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg  4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another 3: holding that burglary of commercial building is crime of violence under guidelines 4: holding that  16 encompasses conduct that constitutes a crime of violence ie breaking into and entering a persons home see ussg  4b12a2 burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence and conduct that almost certainly does not ie breaking into and entering a vehicle ", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it is inconsistent with the public interest or detrimental to the common good.\u201d Vasquez, supra, 83 N.J. at 98, 415 A.2d 1156 (citation omitted). That is true whether the contract violates a statutory or common-law duty. The common law is not an inferior kind of law, as is suggested by the Court\u2019s opinion today. The Legislature may enact a statute that alters or overrides the common law, but until such time the common law holds no lesser status than a statute when it commands that a duty be obeyed. In the past, this Court has struck down exculpatory clauses that violated public policy, expressed either in the common law or a statute, particularly when there was inequality in bargaining power between the parties to the contract. See, e.g., Hojnowski, supra, 187 N.J. at 338, 901 A.2d 381 (<HOLDING>); Carvalho, supra, 143 N.J. at 569, 578-79, 675 Holdings: 0: holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution 1: holding that a parents execution of a preinjury release of a minors future tort claims arising out of the use of a commercial recreational facility is unenforceable 2: holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba 3: holding unenforceable parents execution of exculpatory agreement on behalf of child 4: recognizing that a sheriff as an executive officer of the state of alabama is immune under article i  14 of the alabama constitution from suit based on state law claims arising out of the execution of the duties of his office", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "suppressed if: (1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina; or (2) It is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provisions of this Chapter. In determining whether a violation is substantial, the court must consider all the circumstances, including: a. The importance of the particular interest violated; b. The extent of the deviation from lawful conduct; c. The extent to which the violation was willful; d. The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations of this Chapter. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-974 (2009). A review of the circumstances surrounding this action reveals that the detectives tricked and deceived Defendant about the nature of the crime for which he was 3, 471 (2002) (<HOLDING>); State v. Bailey, 145 N.C. App. 13, 19, 548 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant waived his right to selfrepresentation where he told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself and the public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of trial without objection 1: holding that bankruptcy is no exception to the due process principle that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party to or to which he has not been made a party by service of process internal quotation marks omitted 2: holding that trial court appropriately found that no promises or offers of reward were made where a defendant was told that if he wanted to help himself that he could help himself by cooperating internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that no improper promises were made where an interrogating officer told a defendant that i can tell you that a person who cooperates and shows remorse and is honest and has no criminal background when it goes to court has the best chance of getting the most leniency because he cooperated internal quotation marks omitted 4: holding that implicit threats or promises did not render a defendants statement involuntary when a review of the circumstances reveals that the defendants independent will was not overcome so as to induce a confession that he was not otherwise disposed to malee internal quotation marks omitted", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "discretion by failing to consider the criteria for parole set forth in the Parole Project Memorandum. Respondents maintain that the Parole Project Memorandum confers no substantive rights on detainees and does not have the force of law. It is well settled that an agency must follow its own internal procedures \u201c[wjhere the rights of individuals are affected\u201d, whether or not such procedures are formally promulgated and \u201ceven where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.\u201d Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 1074, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). The Second Circuit interprets Morton to require the INS to follow its own regulations when the \u201csubject regulations were for the alien\u2019s benefit.\u201d Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). It distinguishes cases where \u201cthe agency Holdings: 0: holding that instruction that defendant must have knowingly transported illegal alien sufficiently informed jury that the transportation must also be willful 1: holding that a defendants waiver of the right to testify must be knowing informed and intelligent 2: holding that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review but declining to enumerate which procedural errors are so fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial review 3: holding that an alien must be released unless the government demonstrates at a bond hearing that the alien poses a risk of flight or a risk of danger to the community 4: holding that the ins must adhere to the requirements of 8 cfr  24210 which governs the manner in which an alien must be informed of right to counsel at a deportation hearing", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "P. 769, 769 (1923). In this case, Lucero already has accepted payment for her compensatory damages by collecting on the line of credit established by Aladdin. Thus, Lucero has accepted the benefits of the judgment and has waived her right to appeal the compensatory damage award. Lucero argues that she has not waived her right to appeal because her acceptance of the line of credit fits within an exception to the general rule found in Fernandez: \u201c[W]here there is no possibility that the appeal may lead to a result whereby the appellant may recover less than has been received under the judgment appealed from, the right to appeal is unimpaired.\u201d 28 N.M. at 426, 213 P. at 769; see also First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Energy Equities Inc., 91 N.M. 11, 18, 569 P.2d 421, 428 (Ct.App.1977) (<HOLDING>). Lucero contends that her pain and suffering Holdings: 0: recognizing exception 1: recognizing such an exception 2: holding that appellant satisfied exception 3: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 4: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "another way, the purpose behind this constitutional provision is to ensure that both chambers of a legislature fulfill their duty to the citizenry of deliberating the merits of proposed legislation. We disagree with the petitioners\u2019 contention that the failure of the House to vote to approve the Senate\u2019s extension of its adjournment invalidated all legislation that was passed during the 2007 Extraordinary Session. State courts that, have faced similar challenges to the validity of laws passed by their respective legislative bodies, when one of the legislative chambers adjourned longer than permitted under the state\u2019s constitution, have rejected the notion that the laws passed by that legislative body are invalid. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 288 Ala. 89, 257 So.2d 336 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Wilson v. City of Fargo, 48 N.D. 447, 186 Holdings: 0: holding that when the plaintiffs child was examined only once by a physician and was not required to be absent from day care for more than three days he had no serious medical condition within the meaning of the fmla 1: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons 2: holding that the attempt to remove  a director by written consent of the board is invalid 3: holding that state senates attempt to adjourn for more than three days without obtaining the consent of the house resulted merely in the legislative session continuing 4: holding that proof of incapacitation for more than three days was required before plaintiff could qualify for fmla protection", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the contract without paying for the expenses that Coastal had incurred up to that point. This dispute is thus governed by local, not federal, law.\u201d Id. at 917. Lack of jurisdiction over a contract dispute can in no way create a lack of jurisdiction over a criminal matter in which federal statutes are implicated. Mem. & Order of March 25, 1998 at 3-4. Mrs. Koenig has presented nothing to cause the court to reconsider this ruling. Materiality Finally, Esther Koenig argues that the government failed to establish the materiality of the fraudulent statements. \u201cMateriality\u201d means the statements were capable of influencing the matter within the jurisdiction of HUD. See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 72-73 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988, 106 S.Ct. 396, 88 L.Ed.2d 348 (1985) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable jury could find that the Holdings: 0: holding that materiality is not an element of  1542 because any false statement is sufficient 1: holding that section 1001 controls over the limitations provision of the wrongful death statute 2: holding that materiality necessary element of section 1001 3: holding that materiality is an element of false statement prosecutions which must be submitted to the jury 4: holding that unlike  1001  1542 does not have a materiality requirement", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Hypersensitivity Adverse Events Following Administration of Heparin That Was Potentially Contaminated with Oversulfated Condroitin Sulfate in Early 2008, 19 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 921 (2010). 4 . Id. at 928. 5 . Although plaintiffs' experts rely on the cumulative evidence available, other courts have recognized the value of in vitro studies, ani mal studies, and case reports individually. See Bourne ex rel. Bourne v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 189 F.Supp.2d 482, 496 (S.D.W.Va.2002) (\"There can be no dispute that properly designed and conducted animal testing can yiel 3d 11, 24 (1st Cir.2011) (\"epidemiological studies are not per se required as a condition of admissibility regardless of context.\u201d); Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1336-37 (11th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing that while it is more difficult to show actual fear without a defendants testimony a jury can infer intent from the circumstantial evidence 1: holding that absence of epidemiological evidence not fatal but makes his task to show general causation more difficult 2: recognizing the jurys difficult task of separating substantive proof from impeachment evidence bearing solely on a wit nesss credibility 3: recognizing that proving a negative may be difficult 4: recognizing inherently difficult task of proving a negative", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "stated in \u201cRule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] mark[] a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.\u201d Id. at 67 a merger clause that precludes consideration of extrinsic terms. The oral agreement as to the five-year term does not violate the parol evidence rule because it is not inconsistent with any of the written terms contained in the letter agreement. Zinn v. Walker, 87 N.C.App. 325, 333, 361 S.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (merger clauses create a rebuttable presumption that the writing represents the final agreement between the parties); Hall v. Hotel L\u2019Europe, Inc., 69 N.C.App. 664, 666, 318 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Defendant also argues the Complaint fails to Holdings: 0: holding the parol evidence rule presumes finality with respect to the written terms of the agreement only and does not prevent consideration of parol evidence concerning the duration of contract 1: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties 2: holding that the parol evidence rule did not bar introduction of evidence of a subsequent oral contract concerning the brokers right to a commission and modifying the written agreement 3: holding that when a contract is partially parol and partially written parol evidence may prove the parol terms 4: holding that parol evidence can be presented when the terms of the agreement are ambiguous", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "property is conveyed to another purchaser before the injunction issues. See Samara Dev. Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So.2d 1097, 1101 (Fla.1990) (\u201cSpecific performance alone is not sufficient because the developer could sell the property to a third party in the interim, thereby nullifying the availability of specific performance.\u201d). In that situation, however, Florida law provides for more than specific performance, regardless of what the contract says about remedies. Under Florida law, notwithstanding any contractual limitation of remedies, when the seller frustrates the buyer\u2019s specific performance right by selling the property to someone else, the buyer may recover the seller\u2019s entire profit from the sale. See Seaside Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Edwards, 573 So.2d 142, 146-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Paradigm would not have been able to Holdings: 0: holding in an action brought by buyers for specific performance of a contract for the sale of stock that the judicial admission exception was not satisfied by the sellers deposition testimony admitting that after meeting with the buyer he shook the buyers hand and stated weve got a deal because the statement even when taken in context with the preceding negotiations described by the seller in his deposition established neither a quantity nor price for the stocks 1: holding that even though the contract limited the buyers remedies to specific performance or a refund of earnest money they were entitled to damages in the amount of the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property where the seller thwarted the buyers right to specific performance by selling the property to another at a higher price 2: holding damage award resulting from a breach of an agreement to purchase securities is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the asset at the time of the breach 3: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 4: holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "By contrast, when an accused in-fringer\u2019s post-filing conduct is reckless,a patentee can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an adequate remedy for combating post-filing willful infringement. A patentee who does not attempt to stop an accused infringer\u2019s activities in this manner should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on the in-fringer\u2019s post-filing conduct. Similarly, if a patentee attempts to secure injunc-tive relief but fails, it is likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374 (citations omitted). Robocast did not move for a preliminary injunction. Microsoft\u2019s defenses are reasonable. See Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Allowing a finding of willfulness based on Holdings: 0: holding that objective prong is generally not met where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement 1: holding that the objective prong for willful infringement is generally not met where an accused infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of infringement 2: holding that the objective prong of willfulness was not met where a defendants defenses were reasonable 3: holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury 4: holding stricklands prejudice prong was not met because of overwhelming evidence of guilt", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Nurses Mendez and Telles in Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine. Because Plaintiff has asserted claims against Defendant Hospital, the municipal entity, and Nurses Mendez and Telles, municipal officials in their official capacity, the Court will dismiss the official capacity claims as \u201credundant\u201d to the municipal-entity claims. See Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 373. C. Section 1983 Personal-Capacity Claims Against State Defendant Drs. Laks, Parsa, Solomin, Agui-la and Municipal Defendant Nurses Mendez, and Telles Qualified immunity applies with equal force to state and municipal officials. See Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that defendants employed by a state can invoke qualified immunity); Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 395 (5th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Qualified immunity shields state and Holdings: 0: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 1: holding trial court improperly granted dismissal on ground of immunity because the defendant had qualified statutory immunity rather than absolute immunity 2: holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted 3: recognizing that defendants employed by a municipality can invoke qualified immunity 4: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a vehicle that was next to two men engaged in a violent fight, so that the officer, who was acting alone, could \u201ccontrol the situation to protect his safety.\u201d 337 F.3d at 1288. \u00b6 18 Later, in United States v. Williams, 419 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir.2005), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise held that an officer could order a passenger who exited a lawfully stopped vehicle back into the vehicle. In doing so, the court acknowledged: Those circuits to address the issue post-Wilson have agreed that officers may detain passengers during a traffic stop, whether it is by ordering the passenger to remain inside the automobile or by ordering the passenger to get back into an automobile that he or she voluntarily exited. See, e.g., Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 53 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis in original); United States v. Holdings: 0: holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction 1: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop 2: holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous 3: holding that a passenger ordered by police to get back onto the vehicle that she voluntarily exited was not an unreasonable seizure because a police officer has the power to reasonably control the situation by requiring a passenger to remain in a vehicle during a traffic stop 4: holding that fourth amendment rights of a passenger of a legally stopped vehicle were not violated by police officers instruction that he remain inside the vehicle during traffic stop after passenger repeatedly tried to exit", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "it is distinguishable from the instant case. Noyola clearly refers to the Pickering balancing test which balances the employee\u2019s interest in free speech against the government as employer\u2019s interest in discipline and efficiency in the workplace. It is important to note that in Harris the Defendants did not effectively allege that Harris and Martin\u2019s speech disrupted the school environment or affected their work in any way. No balancing was required because one side of the scale sat empty. See Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 887 (5th Cir.1995) (\u201c[s]ince Sheriff Lopez has alleged no disruption of governmental functions as a result of Vojvodich\u2019s activities, we cannot hold he is entitled to qualified immunity\u201d); Boddie v. City of Columbus, Mississippi, 989 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 112-13 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that there is no mandatory order of decisionmaking in qualified immunity cases 1: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 2: holding qualified immunity unavailable because there was no government interest to balance 3: holding that government entities may not assert qualified immunity 4: holding qualified immunity defense unavailable to the united states in ftca action", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "taken from the premises, but could not be moved for closer examination.\u201d) Thus, to determine if the field test was a permissible warrantless search, we must determine if the officers could have lawfully seized the white powder residue contained in the plastic baggies. The \u201cplain view\u201d doctrine will justify a warrantless seizure if: (1) the officers lawfully entered the area where the items were located; (2) the items were in plain view; (3) the incriminating nature of the items was \u201cimmediately apparent\u201d; and (4) the officers had a lawful right of access to the items. Horton must consider the totality of the circumstances \u2014 including the officers\u2019 training and experience as well as their knowledge of the situation at hand. See United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1331, 127 Holdings: 0: holding that a probable cause determination must be viewed in light of the observations knowledge and training of the law enforcement officers involved in the warrantless search 1: holding that the question of whether the police had reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding warrantless search of defendants automobile four days after impoundment was permissible under requirements of fourth amendment and state constitution where officers had probable cause to search vehicle when it was impounded and that probable cause continued between the time of the impoundment and the search 4: holding that eyewitness accounts and an officers observations established probable cause", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). While admitting that the goal of the Confrontation Clause' is reliability of evidence, *\u2018[i]t commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.\u201d Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1370, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see also Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (summarizing the interaction of the Confrontation Clause and the Texas Rules of Evidence) (upholding Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex., Crim. App. 2000)). \u201c[S]tate and federal rulemak-ers have broad latitude under the Constitution to estab 12-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (<HOLDING>). Appellant, argues that his inability to copy Holdings: 0: holding in camera review by trial court to determine whether crime stoppers information contained brady information would meet the balance of defendants constitutional rights against the states interest in fostering law enforcement 1: holding that in a military criminal trial the governments use of classified information without permitting the defendant or his lawyers to view the information did not violate the defendants due process rights 2: holding actual possession of or access to information by the irs is not an absolute bar to enforcement of a summons for that information 3: holding that the information contained in the police files with regard to other possible suspects was not brady material 4: holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was neither made to nor addressed by Judge Coogler in Earnest. The question is seemingly answered against Andalusia and Hughes by the Eleventh Circuit in Fortson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 1157, 1159 (11th Cir.1985), where the Eleventh Circuit held: Plaintiffs action is not a \u201cdirect action\u201d within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 1332(c) ... That section was enacted by Congress in order to eliminate the basis for diversity jurisdiction in states that allow an injured third-party claimant to sue an insurance company for payment of a claim without joining the company\u2019s insured as a party, where the insured would be a nondiverse party, even though the party insurance company would otherwise by diverse. See Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Co., 489 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844, 95 S.Ct. 78, 42 Holdings: 0: holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso 1: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen 2: holding workers compensation insurer deemed by section 1332c to be citizen of state of which insured is citizen in suit brought by insureds injured employee 3: holding action by insured against his own insurer under uninsured motorist provisions of policy not a direct action within section 1332c proviso 4: holding that police may approach citizen and ask that he roll down the window as long as the officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the citizen may not leave", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "could conclude that the action was within the scope of the employment.\u201d Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C.1984). In this case, the facts establish as a matter of law that Sullivan was acting outside of the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. First, by driving under the influence of alcohol, Sullivan engaged in conduct far removed from \u201cthe kind he Court otherwise. Third, Sullivan admitted in a sworn statement that he was off duty and was driving home at the time of the accident. Under such circumstances, Sullivan\u2019s conduct could not be viewed by a reasonable finder of fact to have served the activities, interests, or objectives of the United States or of the District of Columbia. See Smith v. United States, 762 F.Supp. 1511, 1513 (D.D.C.1991) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 957 F.2d 912 (D.C.Cir.1992). See also Holdings: 0: holding as a matter of law that a police officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when assaulting an acquaintance of a woman he had detained 1: holding as a matter of law that an offduty government agent was not acting within the scope of his employment when he was driving home intoxicated after completing his tour of duty because on no basis would the court conclude that drinking and driving after work hours fell within the scope of the dea agents employment   2: holding that the employers party was a social event thus the employee was not acting within the scope of her employment when drinking at a party or when she was driving home afterwards 3: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 4: holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "couriers, required him to travel to Jamaica himself. Because the district court\u2019s relevancy determination was not \u201carbitrary or irrational,\u201d we find no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263 (2d Cir.1994). Also unavailing is Williams\u2019s assertion that the district court violated the law of the case by reconsidering, at the second trial several of the evidentiary rulings it had made at the first. Specifically, Williams challenges certain modifications by the district court of its prior rulings on evidence of other crimes and innocent trips to Jamaica. Assuming, without deciding, that the law of the case doctrine even applies to mere evidentiary rulings in a second trial of the same case, but see United States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (D.C.Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>), we find no abuse of discretion in the Holdings: 0: recognizing doctrine 1: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 2: holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi 3: holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation 4: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "genuinely disputes Koons\u2019s contention that Clarity\u2019s misconduct was sufficient to constitute an \u201cextraordinary circumstance,\u201d and I conclude that, as a matter of law, Clarity\u2019s misconduct was an \u201cextraordinary circumstance.\u201d Here, Clarity assured Koons on more than one occasion \u2014 in his March 30, 2012, letter and his June 15, 2012, letter \u2014 that he would make sure that her \u00a7 2255 Motion was timely filed, either by him or by Ms. Wingert. Indeed, in his June 15, 2012, letter, Clarity did not simply suggest that Koons find another attorney to file her \u00a7 2255 Motion, but stated that he had \u201cturned over [Koons\u2019s] file\u201d to Ms. Wingert and represented that Ms. Wingert \u201c[wa]s going to handle the file while [he] [was] gone.\u201d Petitioner\u2019s Appendix at 3-4 (Exhibit C). Cf. Martin, 408 F.3d at 1093 (<HOLDING>); and compare Muhammad, 735 F.3d at 816 (noting Holdings: 0: holding that equitable tolling may be available where the attorneys behavior was outrageous or the attorneys incompetence was extraordinary 1: holding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction for an attorneys repeated material misrepresentations 2: holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances 3: holding that an injunction is an extraordinary remedy 4: holding that an attorneys repeated lies and deceptions about the status of the prisoners case were extraordinary circumstances", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "sentence is illegal under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) , and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) , because the district court may have enhanced her sentence based on facts not found by a jury. Defendant\u2019s argument is patently without merit. A sentence is illegal if it \u201cis ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize.\u201d United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir.1997) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 739 n. 10 (10th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 967, 126 S.Ct. 495, Holdings: 0: recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum 1: holding that if a criminal defendant alleges that his sentence is illegal or exceeds statutory mandates this court will review the sentence even if the defendant failed to make a timely objection in the district court 2: holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable 3: holding term illegal sentence is reserved for instances where sentence exceeds statutory maximum 4: holding where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the guidelines sentence a substantialassistance downward departure begins at the mandatory minimum sentence", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "tolling. We consider each argument in turn. II The district court dismissed without discussion Johnson\u2019s \u00a7 1981 claim. Nevertheless, we may affirm the district court\u2019s determination on any ground supported by the record. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Vestar Dev. II v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir.2001)). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a \u201clack of a cognizable legal theory\u201d or \u201cthe absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.\u201d Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep\u2019t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988) (citation omitted). In reviewing the district court\u2019s decision, we view Johnson\u2019s complaint in the light most favorable to him, accepting all well- na Islands, 107 F.3d 1436, 1446-47 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, although Johnson\u2019s complaint alleges Holdings: 0: holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 1: holding that plaintiffs claim that she was filipino was a sufficient basis for  1981 relief 2: holding that  1981 was appropriate as a basis of a claim by nonjapanese employees of a japanese corporation 3: holding that american indian plaintiffs had appropriately pled a claim under section 1981 4: holding that the plaintiffs contention that she was shocked and upset after her unexpected termination was sufficient to survive motion to dismiss claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress nonetheless claim was dismissed for failure to show that conduct was outrageous", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "violations made to appropriate governmental bodies. Finally, the Board concluded that the Report did not constitute a \u201cdisloyal\u201d statement like that found to fall outside of the protection of \u00a7 7 in NLRB v. Local 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 74 S.Ct. 172, 98 L.Ed. 195 (1953). We cannot say that the Board erred in determining that preparation of the Report constituted \u00a7 7 activity. The record supports the Board\u2019s finding that the Report raised issues that related not only to patient welfare but to the working conditions of the employees; indeed, in the health care field such issues often appear to be inextricably intertwined. See, e. g., Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1976) (<HOLDING>); Reading Hospital and Medical Center, 226 NLRB Holdings: 0: holding that tort claims were arbitrable because they arose out of and were related to contract 1: holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff 2: holding that a nurse practitioners opinion constituted an acceptable medical source where the nurse worked closely under the supervision of the doctor such that the nurse was acting as an agent of the doctor 3: holding jury was warranted in finding hospital negligent in its selection and retention of a nurse after the nurse violated hospital rules and had been repeatedly reprimanded but not fired 4: holding protected a television interview in which a nurse complained of hospital staff shortages and suggested that they were related to low pay", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "running, jumping, and bending limitations, as well as his inability to work more than eight hours a day. Aside from this single reference to these restricted activities in his deposition, William has proffered no other evidence that his leg and foot movements were so severe as to limit a major life activity. The only activity that seems to be limited is his ability to run and play sports. We have no idea as to the extent to which his running and jumping are major life activities for William, nor is there any indication as to how substantially his participation in sports is affected. A single conelusory statement about an alleged substantial limitation is not enough to avoid summary judgment sought by the employer. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The only other activity that could possibly Holdings: 0: holding summary judgment for the employer was warranted because the only evidence in support of plaintiffs claims was solomons own testimony 1: holding that the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs deposition testimony was so contradictory of the statements contained in plaintiffs affidavit as to foreclose the affidavits use for summary judgment purposes 2: holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient 3: holding that plaintiffs knee injury was considered an impairment because it prevented poleclimbing 4: holding that a plaintiffs bare allegation of a walking impairment was not sufficient to avoid summary judgment because the plaintiffs deposition testimony provides little support for the claim that his impairment rises to the level of a disability", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that Denton \u201cmaintained a claim\u201d for the unlawful entry and search of his home. Denton moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We took Denton\u2019s motion with the case. II. ANALYSIS A. Fourth Amendment violation Rievley argues that the district court erred in denying him summary judgment on the claim that he arrested Denton inside his home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He claims that, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Denton, the arrest occurred outside of Denton\u2019s home. We lack jurisdiction to review the issue because the district court\u2019s decision to proceed to trial is not a \u201cfinal judgment\u201d but rather a ruling on \u201cevidence sufficiency.\u201d Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). B. Qualified immunity Rievley seeks to avoid Holdings: 0: holding that it may not 1: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 2: holding that a summary judgment order determining only a question of evidence sufficiency ie which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial is not immediately appealable 3: holding that a defendant entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district courts summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial 4: holding that a portion of a district courts summary judgment order that determines which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial is not appealable", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in existence after discharge in bankruptcy, although divested of its character as a personal obligation that is legally enforceable. See In re Cassi, 24 B.R. 619, 626 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1982). Thus, a bankruptcy does not discharge a debt for all purposes. Id. For example, a debt will continue to exist for the purpose of proceeding against the debtor in order to impose liability on accommodation parties. Id. A landlord can still avail itself of statutory remedies to recover possession of premises for nonpayment of rent. In re Hepburn, 27 B.R. at 136 (citing 1A Collier on Bankruptcy \u00a7 17.27, n. 4 (James W. Moore ed.,14th ed.1978)). In addition, the federal approach seems to enjoy substantial acceptance among the states. See, e.g., Stewart v. Underwood, 146 Ariz. 145, 704 P.2d 275, 278 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Hollanger v. Hollander Rice Farms, Inc., 445 Holdings: 0: holding that although the plan cannot discharge the debt  the claimant may otherwise subject the debt to the provisions of a confirmed plan 1: holding that extinguishment of the debt entitles the mortgagor to a surrender of the note and a discharge of the mortgage 2: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt 3: holding that effect of bankruptcy discharge under arizona law is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debtor 4: holding that bankruptcy discharge eliminates only a debtors personal liability and not the debt itself and that a bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and can bring a legal malpractice claim as trustee", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the right-of-way, a copy of the State\u2019s application and stipulation, and reference to a tribal resolution waiving payment for the land. The Red Lake Band General Council\u2019s unanimously approved resolution, dated April 1955, shows that the Red Lake Band considered the State\u2019s application for a right-of-way, consented to waive damages to tribal land in light of the benefit conferred by the road improvement, and required the State to pay damages to individual tribal members in exchange for the right-of-way. In September 2001, Kelly sued the Nords in Tribal Court, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in the accident. The non-Indian Nords filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The Tribal Court did not rule on the motion Holdings: 0: holding that a tribe had the inherent authority to prosecute a nonmember indian for assaulting a tribal member while on the reservation and that federal assault charges stemming from the same incident and filed after the nonmembers tribal assault conviction were based on a separate power source and therefore  did not violate the double jeopardy clause 1: holding that state could require indian tribe to affix tax stamps purchased from the state to individual packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the tribe and that state has power off the reservation to seize unstamped cigarettes as contraband 2: holding tribal courts may not entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways absent a statute or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the highway in question 3: holding that neither the tribe or its tribal court was necessary to the determination of the tribal courts jurisdiction given that the district courts judgment would be binding on the absent party and they did not have a legally protected interest at issue noting that the tribe was not a party to a relevant agreement or treaty with any party to the suit 4: holding that states have authority to tax sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the tribe", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "renders a board capable of defending the corporation in court. Id. Further, boards are able to purchase liability insurance. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-42. This purchase would waive the Board\u2019s immunity \u201cbut such immunity is waived only to the extent that said board of education is indemnified by insurance for such negligence or tort.\u201d Id. Despite their classification as a body corporate, courts have held that boards are generally immune from punitive damages. See Barrett v. Bd. of Educ. of Johnston Cty., N.C., 13 F.Supp.3d 502, 515 (E.D.N.C.2014) (determining that \u201c[n]o statutory exception permits an award against the Board ... so the Board is immune from punitive damages here\u201d); J.W. v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:11-CV707-D, 2012 WL 4425439, at *17 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2012) (<HOLDING>); N.C. Motorcoach Ass\u2019n v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Holdings: 0: holding that the board cannot be liable for punitive damages citations omitted 1: holding that absent explicit statutory authority a municipality cannot be held liable for punitive damages 2: holding a court may not award punitive damages 3: holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable 4: holding that punitive damages are not fines", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "district court did not err by enhancing Kelly\u2019s sentence for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. \u00a7 3C1.1. The district court heard testimony that several shipping labels for packages sent in the conspiracy were not found in the post office where Kelly worked, even though corresponding labels for those packages were found in another post office. Kelly also told a co-conspirator he destroyed shipping labels, and Kelly confirmed this statement when questioned by a postal inspector. Substantial evidence therefore supported the conclusion Kelly destroyed shipping labels after he knew about the postal investigation, and the district court did not clearly err in concluding an obstruction of justice enhancement was warranted. See United States v. Doe, 661 F.3d 550, 566 (11th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not err in denying a Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant 1: holding that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement under the  5k20 departure provision where an enhancement under the separate guidelines provision for restraining a victim during the course of an offense would have been appropriate 2: holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense 3: holding that the actual innocence exception applies to a sentencing enhancement in a noncapital sentence 4: holding enhancement applies when the obstructive conduct occurred during the course of the investigation prosecution or sentencing of the offense quotation omitted", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "appeal, we do not discuss them. 11 . BLM misses this point when it argues that it has no NEPA obligation because that statute contains no provision that makes explicit mention of \"wilderness characteristics.\u201d It is true that NEPA does not mention \"wilderness characteristics.\u201d It would be surprising if it did so. NEPA is designed to apply broadly, to all sorts of federal activities. It is not a laundry list of factors to be considered and could not be. Instead, the factors to be considered are derived from the statute the major federal action is implementing, as well as from the nature of the action itself. It is, consequently, not at all unusual to review EIS\u2019s with regard to consideration of factors not specifically mentioned in NEPA. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst., 442 F.3d at 1160-67 (<HOLDING>); Hells Canyon Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., Holdings: 0: holding that settlement notice that failed to detail a distribution plan was not inadequate 1: holding that bias decision was inadequate because it failed to offer even a cursory review of the record 2: holding after consideration of a single significance factor that an eis was required 3: holding that the rod and eis for a program were final agency action 4: holding an eis for a forest project inadequate because it failed properly to consider tree mortality", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "other than payees named in the statute, see the following post-BAPCPA decisions: In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 296 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2008)(stating that debtor\u2019s obligation to pay bank on second deed of trust obligation was nondischargeable debt owed to former spouse because if debtor failed to pay and former spouse paid, former spouse could then recover payment amount from debtor under hold harmless agreement); In re Poole, 383 B.R. at 313 (stating in dicta that debts owed to third parties that are in the nature of support may still be domestic support obligations if enforceable and recoverable by the spouse; however, the debt at issue was a property settlement obligation and not support debt). See also Kassicieh v. Battisti (In re Kassicieh), 425 B.R. 467, 476-77 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2010)(<HOLDING>)(citing Levin v. Greco, 415 B.R. 663, 666-67 Holdings: 0: holding that a creditor objecting to the dischargeability of a debt under  523a must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that debts for a guardian ad litem and a psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 because the emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support rather than on the identity of the payee 2: holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence 3: recognizing that several postbapcpa decisions have continued to hold that in analyzing the dischargeability of debts payable to a third party it is the nature of the debt rather than the identity of the creditor that controls 4: holding that the code excepts from discharge debts resulting from agreements by the debtor to hold the debtors spouse harmless on joint debts to the extent those debts are in the nature of alimony maintenance or support", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "held that \u201cin the circumstances (an essential qualification), there was also no excuse for the lawyer\u2019s failure to consult experts on hair, DNA, treadmarks, and footprints.\u201d Id. Miller therefore supports petitioner\u2019s contention that in some cases, experts are so crucial to the defense that a failure to seek their advice is unreasonable. Accord Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201cAlthough it may not be necessary in every instance to consult with or present the testimony of an expert, when the prosecutor\u2019s expert witness testifies about pivotal evidence or directly contradicts the defense theory, defense counsel\u2019s failure to present expert testimony on that matter may constitute deficient performance.\u201d) (citing Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1254-56 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>)). Two Second Circuit cases emphasize that Holdings: 0: holding frye test was not implicated by proposed testimony of employees expert that cause of birth defect of her son was exposure to toxic solvents 1: holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument 2: holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony 3: holding that counsel was deficient for failfing to consult or call an expert on the psychology of child sexual abuse or to educate himself sufficiently on the scientific issues 4: holding that counsel was deficient for failing to consult an expert and present expert testimony about the physiological effect of toxic chemical exposure on defendants brain", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of 87 months or less. See United States v. Roque, 421 F.3d 118, 121-23 (2d Cir.2005) (explaining that waivers of right to appeal sentence, entered into knowingly and voluntarily, are enforceable). Second, even if the waiver were ineffective, a district court\u2019s refusal to downwardly depart is not reviewable on appeal unless the case fits within certain narrow exceptions, none of which are present here. See United States v. D\u2019Oliveira, 402 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2005). Third, it was not unreasonable for the district court to impose the statutorily mandated minimum sentence of five years. See United States v. Fuller, 426 F.3d 556, 560 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[T]he proper standard of review for sentences is \u2018reasonableness.\u2019 \u201d); United States v. Sharpley, 399 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). For the first time on appeal, Martin asserts Holdings: 0: holding unconstitutional the mandatory application of the federal sentencing guidelines 1: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error 2: holding that a sentence based on a mandatory minimum was unaffected by amendment 706 to the sentencing guidelines 3: holding that the mere mandatory application of the guidelines  the district courts belief that it was required to impose a guidelines sentence  constitutes error 4: holding that the district courts use of the sentencing guidelines as a mandatory regime was harmless error because appellant could not receive a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum required by  2251d", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "licensed or registered professional in providing the professional services, including any error or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.\u201d Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code \u00a7 150.002(b). The purpose of the certificate of merit is to provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the plaintiffs claims against a licensed or registered professional are not frivolous. Dunham Eng\u2019g, 404 S.W.3d at 795-96; Morrison Seifert Murphy, Inc., 384 S.W.3d at 425. The plaintiffs failure to file the affidavit in an appropriate case \u201cshall result in dismissal of the complaint against the defendant\u201d and the dismissal may be with prejudice. Id. \u00a7 150.002(e); see Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 393 (<HOLDING>). 2. Plaintiffs\u2019 Wrongful Death Claims Are Not Holdings: 0: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: holding rule 15as attorneys certificate requirement is not jurisdictional 2: holding requirement nonjurisdictional and remanding for a possible eeoc waiver of that requirement 3: holding that certificate of merit is a mandatory but nonjurisdictional filing requirement 4: holding copyright statutes registration requirement a nonjurisdictional condition although previously held to be jurisdictional", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "entirely on Gallagher's holding that the State could use both the child declarant\u2019s live testimony and past statements. We agree and hold that the trial court did not err in admitting recorded statements to buttress T.S.\u2019s live testimony. \u00b6 17. Defendant argues, however, that the recorded statements were not admissible under Rule 804a, apparently believing that the rule requires that a witness to the statements testify to their content. In fact, the rule makes the statements admissible and does not impose any restriction on how they will be introduced. Thus, we have previously held that recorded statements made by a victim are admissible under Rule 804a. State v. LaBounty, 168 Vt. 129, 136-38, 761 A.2d 1, 6-8 (1998); see also State v. Blackburn, 162 Vt. 21, 25, 643 A.2d 224, 226 (1993) (<HOLDING>). In LaBounty, social workers tape-recorded Holdings: 0: holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify 1: holding that it was error to admit a videotaped interview of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse because the defendant was deprived of the right to crossexamine the child 2: holding that even if videotaped interview of child violated sparkmans constitutional right to confront this witness the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where appellant admitted engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with child among other evidence of direct accusation of criminal sexual conduct 3: holding that a videotaped interview between the child and an investigator was admissible 4: holding that since petitioner made specific request for counsel before interview policeinitiated interview was impermissible", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1688). Even then, there were no \"just compensation\u201d provisions, but the property could not be taken without the consent of the owner or the Legislature. Id. at 698. Vermont was the first state to require \"just compensation\u201d in its 1777 constitution. Id. at 701. 8 . Two judges dissented, pointing out that the Act's \"chief purposes\u201d was to promote tourism and to create an environmentally attractive \u201chabitat for indigenous flora and fauna,\u201d not to prevent harmful or noxious uses. \u2014 U.S. at \u2014 , 112 S.Ct. at 2890 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 396, 404 S.E.2d 895, 906 (1991)). 9 . Mugler was, in part, based on Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-81, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1871) (<HOLDING>). Its progeny included Reinman v. City of Holdings: 0: holding that a landowner could recover for placement of a median strip that could not have occurred but for the taking of the landowners property because the inquiry is how much has the particular public improvement decreased the fair market value of the property taking into consideration the use for which the land was taken and all the reasonably probable effects of its devotion to that use 1: holding that a taking occurred where flooding of the plaintiffs property amounted to an almost complete destruction of the value of the land 2: holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where california officials acting under the authority of a federal order occupied land 3: holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value 4: holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the second indictment. Again, Connie misses the mark. Any irregularity in an original indictment has no effect on a subsequent indictment. See id. (citing United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir.1973) (\u201c[a] federal grand jury may return a second indictment for the same offense when the first indictment has been dismissed or otherwise found defective\u201d)). C. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 201(c) George argues that his conviction should be vacated on the basis that law enforcement agents impermissibly promised witnesses leniency and paid their expenses in exchange for their testimony against him. George filed such a motion in the district court approximately five months after his trial, based on the Tenth Circuit\u2019s panel decision in United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>), vacated, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), Holdings: 0: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001 1: holding that a voluntary and knowing plea agreement is equivalent to a contract and the promises stated within must be fulfilled by the parties 2: holding a party breaches a plea agreement by acting in a manner not specifically prohibited by the agreement but still incompatible with explicit promises made in the agreement 3: holding that promises made in a plea agreement could violate 18 usc  201c 4: holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "required more than just consistency between her oral testimony and her written application. It required corroborative evidence for virtually every significant instance of persecution to which Petitioner testified. We now turn to her second argument regarding the BIA corroboration rule. If we agree with the BIA, we do not need to reach the first issue; we need only determine whether the BIA\u2019s corroboration requirement is correct. Petitioner asks this Court to adopt the Ninth Circuit\u2019s view on corroboration, which expressly rejects the BIA corroboration rule in cases in which testimony of an applicant is credible although it would permit the application of the rule where the applicant\u2019s credibility is questioned or adversely determined. See Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We are not persuaded by the Ninth Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that when the ij has reason to question an aliens credibility material and easily available corroboration may be required 1: recognizing that consistent detailed and credible testimony may be sufficient to carry the aliens burden 2: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction 3: holding that an aliens testimony if unrefuted and credible direct and specific is sufficient to establish the facts testified without the need for any corroboration 4: holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of an alleged party \u201cis a question of fact\u201d). The trial court correctly noted that the mere signing of an agreement as a corporate officer does not impose personal liability on that officer, citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Wilson, 210 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (\u201cIt has been established that the signature of a corporate officer placed under the name of the corporation and preceded by the word \u2018By\u2019 does not create personal liability.\u201d). Unlike the situation in Wilson in which the \u201cparties to the contract are clearly set out in the body of the contract,\u201d id., the agreement at issue states at the outset that it is \u201cbetween BugWare, Inc. ... and Michael J. Williams of Williams Environmental & Geological Services, LLC,\u201d thereby creati Inc., 763 So.2d 508, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) Holdings: 0: holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account 1: holding company president personally liable pursuant to language in contract stating that if companys net worth is reduced in excess of ten percent 10  then it is agreed that the company president shall guarantee the shortfall 2: holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company 3: holding company president personally liable after he gave a personal guarantee that 250000 will be paid 4: holding that president of company who breached fiduciary duty in purchasing stock was properly required to pay damages rather than transfer shares back to company", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the merits, rejecting the defendants\u2019 argument that those claims were jurisdictionally barred by the exclusivity provisions of ORS 34.020. Id. at 383. On appeal, we addressed the defendants\u2019 cross-assignment of error that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the state law claims for declaratory and related injunctive relief. We began by determining that the predicate disciplinary decision was quasi-judicial. Id. at 384. We then stated: \u201c[T]his case is not one in which review under ORS 34.010 to ORS 34.102 was unavailable had it been timely filed, or a case in which another specific statutory or a common-law remedy exists for which there is jurisdiction over the cause. See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or 414, 837 P2d 505 (1992), cert den 507 US 1017 (1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Ettner v. City of Medford, 155 Or Holdings: 0: holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 1: holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a commonlaw wrongful discharge claim 2: recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge 3: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties 4: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "form when it enacted \u00a7\u00a7 537.600 to 537.650, RSMo.1978. Section 537.600 \u201cexpressly waived immunity for (1) torts arising out of governmental operation of motor vehicles; and (2) dangerous condition S.W.2d 2, 11-12 (Mo.App.1983) (finding no dangerous condition in absence of security guard from his post in hospital parking lot where plaintiff was raped; no allegation of physical defect of property was made). In the second line of cases, Missouri courts began relaxing the physical defect standard holding that the physical deficiency in a public entity\u2019s property could constitute a dangerous condition if the dangerous condition was created by positioning various objects on the property and not by intrinsic defects in the property. See Alexander v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Mo. banc 1988) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 726 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that where notice of deficiency fails adequately to describe the basis on which the commissioner relies for his deficiency determination burden shifts to the commissioner to prove the accuracy of the deficiency determination 1: holding construction company had actual notice of dangerous condition that its employees created 2: holding that a second deficiency notice issued for a taxable year was valid where it determined a deficiency in a different type of tax than did the earlier deficiency notice 3: holding that contractor owed general negligence duty to thirdparty by dangerous condition contractor created on road 4: holding that the negligent placement of a folding room partition at the foot of a ladder on which plaintiff was working created a physical deficiency which constituted a dangerous condition", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Oklahoma could pay off whenever it wishes. See Glenpool, 861 F.2d at 1216. In addition to this argument, Logan-1 offers an alternative argument in support of its claimed \u00a7 1926(b) protection from competition. Logan-1 asserts that, even if its loans incorporating the \u00a7 1926(b) protection are contrary to Okla. Const, art. 5, \u00a7 51, Oklahoma recognizes exceptions to that state constitutional prohibition that would apply in this case. In Glenpool, for instance, this court noted that \u201cOklahoma case law contains clear reference to exemptions from article 5, \u00a7 51 on the basis of police power needed for the public interest, and on the basis of status as a state \u2018agency.\u2019 \u201d 861 F.2d at 1216 n. 2 (citations omitted); see also Kimery v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 622 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Okla.1980) (<HOLDING>); Estate of Cabelka ex rel. Cabelka v. Comanche Holdings: 0: holding that  841bls mandatory minimum provisions were rationally related to the objectives of protecting public health and welfare 1: holding that a police sergeants testimony in a class action discrimination lawsuit addressed a matter of public concern regardless of the specific content of the testimony or its impact on the outcome of the suit 2: holding the illinois statute unconstitutional as violating a special legislation proscription 3: holding in applying okla const art 5  51 that where a statute touches upon the public health and welfare the statute cannot be deemed unconstitutional class legislation even though a specific class of persons or businesses is singled out where the legislation in its impact is free of caprice and discrimination and is rationally related to the public good 4: holding that where an ambiguity exists in fact or by construction it is proper to consider the history of the legislation", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Shriner. Dale's case, likewise, is not about a routine arrest for driving under the influence. Alaska Statute 28.35.031(g) only authorizes law enforcement to obtain a blood sample in cireumstances that involve a motor-vehicle accident that causes death or serious physical injury. We believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Shriner made a strong argument for concluding that, when a case involves death or serious physical injury, exigent circumstances exist as a matter of law. Conclusion We accordingly conclude that Judge Smith correctly ruled that exigent cireumstances authorized the police to obtain a nonconsen-sual, warrantless sample of Dale's blood. Judge Smith did not err in denying Dale's motion to suppress. The ju 9 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See, e.g., People v. Shepherd, 906 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding that independent of the implied consent law the fourth amendment requires an arrestees consent to be voluntary to justify a warrantless blood draw 1: holding that the dissipation of alcohol from a persons blood stream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw 2: holding that blood alcohol dissipation was not sufficient by itself to create an exigent circumstances exception to virginia statutory requirement that the driver be arrested within three hours of the offense 3: holding that in drunkdriving investigations the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant 4: holding that warrantless blood draw did not violate the defendants constitutional rights and citing as only exigency the fact that alcohol in blood is quickly consumed and the evidence would be lost forever", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not err in granting the defendants\u2019 motion. C. Lastly, Kibwika contends that the district court erred in dismissing his state law claims. He argue, for the first time on appeal, that violations of the Florida Constitution and the Florida Model Jail Standards give rise to a \u00a7 1983 claim because the violations deprive him of liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in his complaint, Kibwika clearly invoked the court\u2019s \u201cpendent jurisdiction\u201d when asserting his state-law claims. Because Kibwika makes his \u00a7 1983 claim based on alleged state-law violations for the first time on appeal, we will not consider it absent special circumstances, which Kbwika does not allege exist in this case. See Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the district court properly Holdings: 0: recognizing its discretionary authority to depart from the general practice of refusing to consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal such as  where the interest of substantial justice is at stake  or  where the proper resolution is beyond doubt  1: holding that this court will not consider a theory or issue that was not pleaded or raised in the trial court 2: holding that the court will not consider an issue not raised in the district court unless 1 it involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice 2 the party raising the issue had no opportunity to do so before the district court 3 the interest of substantial justice is at stake 4 the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or 5 the issue presents significant questions of general impact or great public concern 3: holding that our court will not consider an issue of whether a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence if the issue was not raised in the lower court 4: recognizing the general rule that a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the mobile home. Grand Manor contracted with Better Cents to manufacture a mobile home for the Dykeses according to their specifications. Therefore, because it was foreseeable that the Dykes-es would be injured if Grand Manor negligently performed its contractual obligations, Grand Manor owed a duty to the Dykeses to manufacture the home with reasonable care. Grand Manor also argues that the Dykeses cannot recover against Grand Manor for negligent manufacture because, it says, the only \u201cinjury\u201d was to the mobile home itself. Grand Manor is correct in stating the rule of Alabama law that one cannot recover in tort for negligent manufacture of a product where the only injury is to the product itself. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 549 So.2d 44, 46 (Ala.1989) (<HOLDING>). Gra\u00f1d Manor asserts that the Dykeses made no Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith 1: holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion 2: holding that a summary judgment in favor of the manu facturer and the dealer was proper as to a van buyers negligentmanufacture claims because under alabama law one cannot recover in tort for damage to the product itself 3: holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege 4: holding that the time of discovery of fraud is not a proper matter for summary judgment", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "felony murder, the more likely he acted with reckless indifference to human life.\u201d). 18 . Tison, 481 U.S. at 148, 107 S.Ct. 1676. 19 . Id. at 157, 107 S.Ct. 1676. 20 . 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3596(a). 21 . Tex. Crim Proc. Code \u00a7 43.14 (Vernon 2005). 22 . Jones, 527 U.S. at 381, 119 S.Ct. 2090. 23 . Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). 24 . Id. See also Jones, 527 U.S. at 402, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (noting that an aggravating factor is unconstitutionally overbroad if a jury could consider it to apply to every defendant who is eligible for the death penalty). 25 . See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (noting that the underlying principle in making the cap at a victim vulnerability aggravator that provided that the adult victim was esp 4 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 37 . 428 U.S. 262, 277, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 Holdings: 0: holding that a statute must burden a substantial amount of protected speech to be unconstitutionally overbroad 1: holding that washingtons harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it covered constitutionally protected speech 2: holding with little discussion that the oklahoma future dangerousness aggravator was not applicable to every murderer and therefore was not unconstitutionally overbroad 3: holding new yorks disclosure law unconstitutionally overbroad 4: holding that shank possession combined with threats was sufficient to show future dangerousness under virginia law and therefore petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice for strickland purposes", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for injuries caused by defective repairs. Tuomey Regional mentions some of the above cases and argues they are distinguishable because in this case it is the independent-contractor physician \u2014 not the hospital \u2014 who controls a patient\u2019s medical treatment. Tuomey Regional also contends regulations promulgated by the state Department of Health and Environmental Control do not impose such a duty. We find Tuomey Regional\u2019s arguments unpersuasive. The cited cases clearly illustrate that a person or entity entrusted with important duties in certain circumstances may not assign those duties to someone else and then expect to walk away unscathed when things go wrong. A principle that applies in case (2000); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So.2d 55, 59 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (<HOLDING>); Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the special duty doctrine as an exception to the public duty doctrine was a concept distinct from immunity and did not serve to resurrect an otherwise immune claim 1: holding that jury should have been instructed on nondelegable duty doctrine as well as apparent agency doctrine when patient alleges malpractice by emergency room physician 2: recognizing doctrine 3: recognizing the doctrine of collateral estoppel in agency proceedings 4: holding that no structural error occurs where a jury is instructed on alternative theories of guilt and the defendant alleges that the jury relied on an invalid theory", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the House of Correction, in October 1997 while the harassment was ongoing. Feeney testified at trial that \u201cthere are some officers that are reluctant to report things, and when they do, they\u2019re evasive and vague in their reports.\u201d Baron\u2019s attorney then asked Feeney to read from his earlier deposition, in which the following exchange took place: Q: Are you aware of any code of silence between fellow officers reporting violations on each other? A: Yes. Q: What is it, the code of silence? A: Lack of reporting to protect each other. Q: When Officer Baron reported Sergeant Curtis, did he violate that? A: Yes. Feeney was then asked if there would be consequences if ah officer were to report another officer. He answered, \u201cThere could be.\u201d Cf. Sharp v. Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 935 (5th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Feeney also testified that Baron had Holdings: 0: recognizing that a code of silence can be perpetuated only if there is retaliation for violations of it 1: holding that there can be only one final appealable order 2: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 3: holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation 4: recognizing that code is speech", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "from liability for the alleged fabrication of evidence because they did not have probable cause to arrest or to initiate judicial proceedings. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2616. \u201cTheir mission at that time was entirely investigative in character. A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.\u201d Id. The Court emphasized that the alleged fabrication occurred before a grand jury was convened and that when the grand jury eventually was convened, \u201cits immediate purpose was to conduct a more thorough investigation of the crime \u2014 not to return an indictment against a suspect whom there was already probable cause to arrest.\u201d Id. The Court also held that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune from liability for maki ) (<HOLDING>). Valder, however, has not met his burden of Holdings: 0: holding the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury 1: holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for their knowing or inadvertent failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence 2: holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for withholding exculpatory evidence from grand jury 3: holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the  1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence 4: holding absolute immunity protects prosecutor from liability for failing to give defense counsel materially exculpatory evidence", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or the proffered extra-record evidence before the court.\u201d). The threshold showing made by the protestor must be \u201cstrong,\u201d Pitney Bowes Gov\u2019t Sols., Inc., 93 Fed.Cl. at 332, \u201cbased on hard evidence,\u201d Int\u2019l Res. Recovery, Inc., 61 Fed.Cl. at 43, and \u201cwell grounded,\u201d id. See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (remarking that \u201cthere must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before\u201d a court can permit \u201cthe administrative officials who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining their action\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977); Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>); Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. Holdings: 0: holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question seeking to determine bias or prejudice in favor of the victim because she was a nun 1: holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness 2: holding that the district court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to absent himself from the trial at which his identification would be an integral issue 3: holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow discovery on the issue of bias because there was no evidence in the administrative record showing bias and because allegations of error in the evaluation of proposals are insufficient to overcome the presumption that the contracting officer acted in good faith 4: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "these and other prosecutions where the only evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt is circumstantial. In addition to the infirmities in the substance of the \u201creasonable speculation\u201d rule, the panel\u2019s use of another circuit court\u2019s precedent to grant habeas relief is troubling given AEDPA\u2019s requirement that the state court\u2019s error be measured against \u201cclearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that if it has not recognized a particular circuit court legal standard, a state court\u2019s failure to follow that standard cannot compel the grant of habeas relief. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, \u2014 U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-77, 127 Holdings: 0: holding that federal habeas relief is unavailable based upon the application of a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this court 1: holding that federal habeas relief is not available to correct errors of state law 2: holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states 3: holding that when a state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established supreme court precedent this court must review de novo whether petitioner is entitled to habeas relief 4: holding that habeas is unavailable where the court of appeals could have heard the claims presented through another avenue of relief", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in light of Padilla ... the distinction in Pennsylvania between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally \u2018reasonable professional assistance\u2019 required under Strickland ... is appropriate?\" 8 . Certainly, there are numerous instances when the Pennsylvania appellate courts have found counsel to be ineffective under the ambit of Strickland. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 578 Pa. 587, 854 A.2d 489 (2004) (guilty plea counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a patently defective guilty plea colloquy); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 576 Pa. 332, 839 A.2d 245 (2003) (under Strickland, counsel's failure to meet in person with the defendant before trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. McClellan, 887 A.2d 291 (Pa.Super.2005) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Corley, 816 A.2d 1109 Holdings: 0: recognizing that strickland applies to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims 1: holding that the prejudice prong of strickland was not met in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutors misstatement of law where the trial court properly instructed the jury 2: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 3: holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal 4: holding that under the ambit of strickland counsel was ineffective in failing to provide in a timely manner the identity and opinion of an expert witness who tended to prove the defendants alibi defense", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Complaint in this Court. Defendant now moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (\u201cRule 12(b)(6)\u201d) as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For the reasons stated below, Defendant\u2019s motion is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The facts summarized below are taken primarily from the Complaint dated October 18, 2007, which the Court accepts as true for the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir.2001)). Falardo, who is disabled, was a police officer with the NYPD- from Jun 639 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y.1994); see also McDonough v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 12307, 2000 WL 1804137, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Board of Tr. of the Police Officer\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that claims to the vsf benefits under various theories were barred by the res judicata effect of the state court judgment in castellano iii 1: holding that the plaintiffs due process claims were completely barred by res judicata because the underlying factual predicate for each of these claims  is substantially identical to the allegations presented in state court 2: holding that lender liability claims are noncore and thus not barred by res judicata effect of bankruptcy proceedings 3: holding that plaintiffs could not relitigate their claim that they were entitled to vsf benefits and that while plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the foregoing actions they opted not to do so and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now 4: holding that the plaintiffs claims were barred by res judicata when the federal courts judgment was finalized by denial of his petition for certiorari", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which includes \u00a7 841 and its maximum lifetime term of supervised release for drug offenses. In addition, as the government contends, whether Mr. Handley faces a lifetime of supervised release depends on his own conduct and any future violations of the conditions of his supervised release. In other words, compliance is a means to avoid \u201cthe infinitely reoccurring prison and supervised release terms\u201d of which Mr. Handley comp 9th Cir.1997) (adopting reasoning drug offenses under \u00a7 841 are an exception to terms of supervised release listed in \u00a7 3583(b)); United States v. Eng, 14 F.3d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir.1994) (stating \u00a7 841(b)(1)(A), which deals with drug offenses, is exception to \u00a7 3583(b)); United States v. LeMay, 952 F.2d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1991) Holdings: 0: holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible 1: recognizing conflict 2: recognizing the conflict 3: holding phrase except as otherwise provided was added to  3583b so it would not conflict with the drug offenses in  841b1a 4: holding that drug offenses and taxevasion offenses were properly joined for trial because the likely source of income for which defendant had evaded taxes was drug distribution", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "encourages \"the reduction to writing of certain types of agreements which are particularly ephemeral of proof, or into which a party is particularly likely to enter in a thoughtless or perfunctory manner.\u201d Thompson v. Stuckey, 171 W.Va. 483, 485, 300 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1983). The statute provides that \"[n]o action shall be brought ... [u]pon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year; [ujnless the promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or ratification, 'or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or his agent.\u201d W. Va.Code \u00a7 55-1-1; see also Fry Racing Enters., Inc. v. Chapman, 201 W.Va. 391, 393, 497 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1997) (enforcement of oral contract barred by statute of frauds requirement 8, 365 at 667 (<HOLDING>). 20 . The City has not submitted this issue as Holdings: 0: holding that city is permitted to unilaterally modify its longheld policy concerning overtime pay provided it notifies its employees of the change 1: holding that an agreement was procedurally unconscionable because job applicants were not permitted to modify the agreements terms  they had to take the contract or leave it 2: holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract 3: holding that a court is without authority to modify its spousal support decree retroactively and relieve a party of the obligation to pay past due installments 4: holding that there is no common law duty of a carrier or its agents to advise an insured concerning the possible need for higher policy limits upon renewal of the policy absent a special relationship", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "115 S.Ct. 1624. This is not to say that the Supreme Court foreclosed all economic reasoning done in the aggregate. In fact, the Supreme Court made it clear that it was not adopting a \u201ccategorical rule against aggregating the effects of any non-economic activity.\u201d Id. at 613, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Instead, the Court noted that its precedent has upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity \u201conly where that activity is economic in nature.\u201d Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60, 115 S.Ct. 1624). The regulation at issue here is \u201ceconomic in nature.\u201d Section 3631 was passed as part of the Fair Housing Act, the Fair Housing Act applies to the housing market, and the housing market is both commercial and interstate. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 251 (8th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>); Seniors Civil Liberties Assoc., Inc. v. Kemp, Holdings: 0: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 1: holding that housing discrimination has a substantial effect on interstate commerce 2: holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce 3: holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce 4: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "voted to terminate him on March 11, 1994. Because there is no evidence showing a causal connection between plaintiffs purported protected activity and his termination, his claim of retaliatory discharge must fail. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576. To the extent plaintiff is attempting to allege that he was deprived of procedural due process, that claim must also fail. According to Mo. Ann. Stat \u00a7 79.240 (Vernon 1987), appointive officers of fourth-class cities such as Advance are terminable at will by the mayor acting with the consent of a majority of the aldermen or by two-thirds of the aider-men acting independently of the mayor. Because the Missouri courts have consistently referred to police 994); see also Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The uncontradicted evidence shows that the Holdings: 0: holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient 1: holding that a prima facie case of retaliation requires a causal link between the employees protected activity and the employers adverse employment action 2: holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights 3: holding that liability under  1983 can be established by showing that the defendants either personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiffs rights or caused such a deprivation to occur 4: holding that liability under  1983 requires a causal link to and direct responsibility for the deprivation of rights", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Way had a qualified defined contribution plan, when in fact it had a qualified defined benefit plan. At trial, one of the issues was whether the RBP's reference to a non-existent contribution plan renders the RBP meaningless. The district court ruled that the RBP is ambiguous on this point and made reference to extrinsic evidence in order to hold that the RBP intended to make reference to the United Way qualified defined benefit plan. We affirmed. See Aramony II, 191 F.3d at 150. 5 . We have characterized this rule of contractual construction as a \"guide[ ] to interpretation\u201d rather than a \u201drule[ ] requiring blind adherence\u201d where the specific term in question is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations. Burger King Corp. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 893 F.2d 525, 528 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, the specific terms are Holdings: 0: holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract 1: holding that contract terms were ambiguous where the specific term that appellant argued should control a more general term was itself susceptible of two reasonable interpretations 2: holding contract with ambiguous terms should not be dismissed on pleadings 3: recognizing that the term including is somewhat ambiguous 4: holding that a contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Service owned the parking lot where Dorosan\u2019s handgun was found, and its restrictions on guns stemmed from its constitutional authority as the property owner. See U.S. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 3 cl. 2; United States v. Gliatta, 580 F.2d 156, 160 (5th Cir.1978). This is not the unconstitutional exercise of police power that was the source of the ban addressed in Heller. See 128 S.Ct. at 2787-88 (noting the laws in question \u201cgenerally prohibited] the possession of handguns\u201d anywhere in the city). Moreover, the Postal Service used the parking lot for loading mail and staging its mail trucks. Given this usage of the parking lot by the Postal Service as a place of regular government business, it falls under the \u201csensitive places\u201d exception recognized by Heller. See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the Postal Service was not obligated Holdings: 0: holding that turner did not cast doubt on the courts previous holding that strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications in prisons 1: holding that evidence in first trial concerning firearms in which defendant was acquitted of drug and rico conspiracies could be used in second trial on firearms offenses because evidence was collateral to elements of offenses in second trial 2: holding that nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on  laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings  3: holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor 4: holding that cash is the type of loot that criminals seek to hide in secure places like their homes and items such as firearms are the types of evidence likely to be kept in a suspects residence", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "unavoidably unsafe product is whether the manufacturer provided an adequate warning. If accompanied by an adequate warning, a desirable but unsafe product is not unreasonably dangerous.\u201d Clark, 1999 WL 613316, at *4; see Graham, 666 F.Supp. at 1498 (\u201cThe comment thus recognizes that while some products are inherently dangerous, the user has a right to know of these inherent risks so that he can make an informed decision; in the absence of such warning, the product is deemed to be defective.\u201d). Generally, a manufacturer has a duty to warn of dangers that it either knew or should have known. Tipton v. Michelin Tire Co., 101 F.3d 1145, 1149-50 (6th Cir.1996); CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64, 79 (Ky.2010) (quoting Post v. Am. Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Ky.1968) (<HOLDING>)). In 2004, Kentucky formally adopted the Holdings: 0: holding that liability for a manufacturer follows only if it knew or should have known of the inherent dangerousness of the product and failed to accompany   it with the quantum of warning which would be calculated to adequately guard against the inherent danger  1: holding that the destruction of documents which the party knew or should have known would be relevant to a pending or potential lawsuit is sanctionable 2: holding that even if the industry and federal regulations evidenced an inherent danger and the defendant knew or should have realized that the device was or was likely to be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied there was a complete absence of evidence that the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff or its employees would not realize the danger 3: holding that the district court erred because it applied the enhancement without taking into account whether the defendant knew or should have known possession would be unlawful 4: holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "an adjudication, requires proof that a defendant is guilty of an act that occurred in the past. The Legislature\u2019s distinction between the proof required for a finding of guilt versus the proof required to find an adjudicated youthful offender non-amenable to treatment as a child is consistent with federal and state precedent. Compare id. with Kent, 383 U.S. at 547-48, 86 S.Ct. 1045. {35} We note that New Mexico courts have consistently held that the lack of a standard of proof for the amenability findings does not violate due process under the federal constitution. See State v. Doyal, 59 N.M. 454, 461-62, 286 P.2d 306, 311-12 (1955) (upholding law allowing any child charged with a felony to be prosecuted in district court); State v. Jimenez, 84 N.M. 335, 336, 503 P.2d 315, 316 (1972) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 91 N.M. 506, 509-10, 576 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding transfer statute constitutional and noting that revised statute gave greater guidance to trial courts in determining whether juvenile should be tried in adult court than statute upheld in doyal 1: holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute 2: holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction   3: holding that when the language of a statute is clear courts should not substitute their judgment for that of congress and should enforce the statute according to its terms 4: holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the 88R: \u201cThe role of all committees is advisory only. Final responsibility in selection rests with the Chancellor.\u201d Ex. M to Dean Decl. at \u00b61(4). Furthermore, while Russo was responsible only for Bronx High Schools, the 30R clearly requires the system of assignment to include \u201ccity-wide standards and procedures developed and promulgated by the Chancellor as minimum city-wide requirements ____\u201d Ex. L to Dean Decl. at \u00b6 11(C). Given this evidence, the Court finds that the Chancellor, not Ms. Russo, possessed final decisionmaking authority as a matter of New York law over the hiring of an AP for Smith High. Therefore, the Board cannot be liable for Russo\u2019s actions insofar as they relate to the promotion process. See Carrero v. New York City Housing Authority, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. City of New York, 1990 WL Holdings: 0: holding that a supervisor cannot be held personally liable for the unconstitutional conduct of a subordinate based on vicarious liability 1: holding that the delegation of discretionary authority to supervisors for discipline and promotion constituted a policy or practice sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement 2: holding that the housing authority could not be held liable for the allegedly discriminatory behavior of a supervisor because the supervisors alleged behavior was contrary to stated housing authority policy 3: holding that a supervisor who implemented a maternity leave policy that violated the terms of title vii could not be held individually liable 4: holding that absent explicit statutory authority a municipality cannot be held liable for punitive damages", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Union State Bank v. Galecki, Banking Comm\u2019r, 142 Wis.2d 118, 417 N.W.2d 60, 63 (App.1987)). Further, an agency may not only \u201creopen and reconsider its orders on particular problem ... but it may also adopt or entertain a different view of the law in subsequent cases.\u201d Union State Bank, 417 N.W.2d at 63 (citing Fond du Lac v. Dep\u2019t of Natural Resources, 45 Wis.2d 620, 173 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1970); State ex rel. Schleck v. Zoning Bd. of App., 254 Wis. 42, 35 N.W.2d 312, 313 (1948)). See also Nick v. State Hwy. Comm\u2019n, 21 Wis.2d 489, 124 N.W.2d 574, 577 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963, 84 S.Ct. 1125, 11 L.Ed.2d 981 (1964) (stating that an administrative agency is not bound by its prior determinations); Robertson Transp. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm\u2019n, 39 Wis.2d 653, 159 N.W.2d 636 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has Holdings: 0: holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable 1: holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence 2: holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable 3: holding that credibility determinations are for the jury 4: holding that inconsistencies in determinations arising by comparison are not proof of arbitrariness or eaprieiousness", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "comply with the procedural requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 governing the prosecution of indirect criminal contempts, as well as scrupulously afford the alleged contemnor the full panoply of constitutionally mandated protections applicable to criminal proceedings. See, e.g., International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, \u2014 U.S. -,-, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2556-2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673, 677 (Fla.1973). The supreme court subsequently observed that the power to punish for contempt exists independently of any statutory grant of authority as essential to the execution and maintenance of judicial authority. Ducksworth v. Boyer, 125 So.2d 844, 845 (Fla.1960); see also In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 568, 73 So. 362, 365 (1916) (<HOLDING>). The court later determined, in reliance on Holdings: 0: holding that a statutory limitation on punishment for indirect criminal contempt was unconstitutional as it offended the inherent authority of courts to punish such affronts 1: holding that this court has inherent as well as express statutory authority to punish for contempt 2: holding that it is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court 3: recognizing inherent power of supreme court independent of statutory authority to punish for contempt of court 4: holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "bound to construe his pleadings liberally; much less ought we to construe them in such a way as to construct for Elzy the case that he has not made. And even if we were to find that the mere mention in the \u00a7 2255 proceedings of trial counsel\u2019s failure to file an appeal was sufficient to raise an ineffective assistance claim, which the district court should have considered in order to determine whether it could proceed to the merits of Elzy\u2019s claim that the Government breached the plea agreement, we would be constrained to hold that Elzy has waived the issue on appeal because he neither mentioned it in his motion for a certificate of appealability nor raised it in his brief on appeal. In short, the failure of the district court to notice and hold an evidentiary hearing on an Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that in this case we are Holdings: 0: holding that a district court has the power to raise the aedpa limitations period sua sponte because the defense implicates values beyond the interests of the parties 1: holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket 2: holding that appellate court may raise issues of default sua sponte where necessary to protect inter alia the finality of federal criminal judgments 3: holding court may raise procedural default sua sponte if doing so will further the interests of judicial efficiency conservation of scarce judicial resources and orderly and prompt administration of justice 4: holding that because concerns of finality of criminal judgments judicial economy and orderly administration of justice substantially implicate important interests beyond those of the parties appellate court may raise frady defense sua sponte", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "certain additional criteria. \u00a7 39.6251(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). The administrative rule concerning section 39.6251 provides that \"[a] young adult is considered to have been living in licensed care on the date of his or her 18th birthday if the young adult was in the legal custody of the Depart-me\u00f1t on the date of his or her 18th birthday.\u201d' Fla. Admin... Code R. 65C-41.003 (2015). Thus, had the court placed R.J. in DCF\u2019s custody when it adjudicated him dependent, R.J. may have been eligible for extended licensed care. As a remand \u2018by the appellate court has the effect of restoring the case to the position it would have assumed absent the incorrect ruling, this case is not moot. See Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp. v. Sunshine Sec. & Detective Agency, Inc., 575 So.2d 179, 180 (Fla.1991) Holdings: 0: holding that the erroneous admission of dna evidence is never harmless 1: holding that the effect of a remand is to return this proceeding to the lower court as though the erroneous ruling never had been made 2: recognizing that an appeal has never been an evidentiary proceeding so appellate court will not consider evidence not presented to the lower tribunal because function of appellate court is to determine whether lower tribunal committed error based upon the issues and evidence before it 3: holding that an erroneous decision to exclude evidence is considered harmless unless the error had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves this court in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect 4: holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "I. Plaintiff first contends that the trial court\u2019s denial as a matter of law of an award of monetary damages for delay in compliance in an action for a writ of mandamus was in error. We disagree. The issue of whether damages may be awarded to a successful plaintiff in an action for mandamus is one of first impression before this Court and we therefore carefully review the development of this extraordinary remedy in reaching this conclusion. The writ of mandamus originated as a common law action. See Tucker v. Justices of Iredell, 46 N.C. 451, 459 (1854). At common law, the petitioner was not permitted to deny facts alleged in the return to a writ of mandamus, and if the return was sufficient in law, the matter was resolved without further proceedings. See Tucker, 46 N.C. at 459 (<HOLDING>). As the aggrieved party could not contradict Holdings: 0: recognizing that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is itself generally a matter of discretion 1: holding a writ of mandamus could not be traversed and if the matters set forth were sufficient in law the defendant has judgment to go without day 2: holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus 3: recognizing petitioner for writ of mandamus must demonstrate clear legal right to the act sought to be compelled and no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary cause of law and stating mandamus may not be issued to compel an officials discretionary acts 4: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 507, 79 S.Ct. 1400. Closer to the case at hand is United States v. Hayman, discussed at page 82 above, where a district court faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a habeas corpus case held a hearing without having the petitioner present, and then found that counsel had engaged in the conflicted representation with the knowledge and consent of the petitioner. The Supreme Court disapproved and reversed, holding that the district court \u201cdid not proceed in conformity with Section 2255 when it made findings on controverted issues of fact relating to respondent\u2019s own knowledge without notice to respondent and without his being present.\u201d Hayman, 342 U.S. at 220, 72 S.Ct. 263; see also, Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830 (1941) (<HOLDING>). Although, as the government argues, in Holdings: 0: holding that contested factual issues in  2255 cases must be decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing not affidavits 1: holding that issues raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings may be preserved for appeal 2: holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must be decided based on evidentiary hearings the only admissible procedure for resolving such issues 3: holding plenary hearings are required when there are contested issues of material fact on the basis of conflicting affidavits 4: holding that on a motion for summary judgment the court cannot try issues of fact it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "477 (2d Cir.1946) (Clark, J., dissenting) (\u201cIt is as though we found Shakespeare a plagiarist on the basis of his use of articles, pronouns, prepositions, and adjectives also used by others.\u201d); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir.2001) (\u201c[A] court is not to dissect the works at issue into separate components and compare only the copyrightable elements. To do so would ... result in almost nothing being copyrightable because original works broken down into their composite parts would usually be little more than basic unprotectible elements like letters, colors and symbols.\u201d) (internal citation omitted). The fact that each individual icon or feature on a screen cannot necessarily be copyrighted does not deny the screen itself, as re, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Feist Publ\u2019ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Holdings: 0: holding that a user interface here a screen display itself an audiovisual work may be entitled to copyright protection as a compilation 1: holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender 2: holding screen displays and inputoutput formats copyrightable and noting that their selection and arrangement contained enough originality under feist to warrant protection 3: holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently 4: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the act\u2019s criteria. Id. at 353, 117 S.Ct. 2072. We do not suggest that these procedures are a prerequisite to a First Amendment deprivation; Hendricks-style civil commitment presents a far greater deprivation of liberty than banning social networking. But Hendricks nevertheless illuminates the imprecision of the Indiana statute. Unlike the individualized assessment that ensured each respondent was \u201clikely\u201d to commit the redressa-ble evil, the Indiana legislature imprecisely used the sex offender registry as a universal proxy for those likely to solicit minors. There may well be an appropriate proxy, but the state has to provide some evidence, beyond conclusory assertions, to justify the regulation. This case also differs from our decision in Doe v. 123 S.Ct. 1160, 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir.2005) Holdings: 0: holding that the public disclosure provision of connecticuts sex offender registration law did not violate the due process clause 1: holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause 2: holding that since sex offender registration was not a direct consequence of the plea the failure to warn of such a requirement did not render the pleas unknowing or unintelligent 3: holding that nebraskas sex offender registration statute did not violate due process because it is reasonable to conclude that retroactive application of sora furthers the public safety purpose of the legislation 4: holding that doctrine does not violate due process", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "consistent herewith. SAWAYA, PALMER and MONACO, JJ., concur. 1 . On July 23, 1998, Barrow was sentenced to life imprisonment following his convictions, after jury trial, for attempted first-degree murder with a firearm, attempted carjacking while armed, two counts of carjacking while armed, felony causing bodily injury, aggravated assault, and burglary of a structure while, armed. His direct appeal was per curiam affirmed by this court. Barrow v. State, 736 So.2d 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Barrow filed the instant rule 3.850 motion on June 29, 2005, which is well over two years after his judgment and sentence became final on direct appeal. However, because the claim asserted by Barrow is based on newly discovered evidence, it is not procedurally barred. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1) (<HOLDING>). 2 . In addition to the above statement, the Holdings: 0: holding that rule 3850 motion was not time barred where the order did not place any time limitation on when the defendant would refile his rule 3850 motion 1: holding that cr 6002 allows appeals based upon claims of error that were unknown and could not have been known to the moving party by exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise presented to the court 2: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial 3: recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception 4: recognizing an exception to the twoyear time bar imposed on rule 3850 claims when the claim asserted is based on facts that were unknown to the movant and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "verdict on the theory presented at trial. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the State to determine if, when considered as a whole, a reasonable person could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Peck, 539 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1995); State v. Mulder, 313 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1981). A jury\u2019s verdict is binding unless there is no substantial evidence to sustain it. Peck, 539 N.W.2d at 172. D. Analysis of Prejudice Claim 1. Beseo\u2019s Authority The State charged Fenske with burglary under the first alternative of our burglary statute, entering an occupied structure not open to the public without right, license or privilege to do so. See Iowa Code \u00a7 713.1; see also State v. Dible, 538 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1995) (<HOLDING>); accord State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 761 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a court may look to the charging document in making a crime of violence determination but only where the statute provides disjunctive methods of committing the offense and the court needs to determine which of the statutory alternatives is involved in the particular case 1: recognizing different charging alternatives available under burglary statute 2: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 3: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 4: holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "district was platted and developed. In attempting to give effect to restrictive covenants, courts are not so much concerned with the grammatical rules or the strict letter of the words used as with arriving at the intention of the restrictor, if that can be gathered from the entire language of the instrument. Moreover, the language employed in stating the restriction is to be taken in its ordinary and generally understood or popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement, nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon. Covenants are to be construed with reference to the present and prospective use of property as well as to the specific language employed and upon the reading as a whole rat l App 3d 356; 445 NE2d 1193 (1983) (<HOLDING>); In re Wallace\u2019s Fourth Southmoor Addition to Holdings: 0: holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless 1: holding that the states rule dates the beginning of the discovery period only from the filing of the answer 2: holding that amendments of the restrictive covenants passed during the initial 20year term would not take effect until the beginning of the automatic 10year extension period 3: holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period 4: holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u00b6 21 The Arizona legislature has imposed upon convicted felons a standard for the restoration of the felon\u2019s civil rights that is, perhaps, more stringent than the standard imposed by other states in requiring a convicted felon to have all civil rights restored before the person may be eligible to register to vote and, consequently, eligible to serve as a petition circulator. See Jean Chung, The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer (June 2013), available at http://senteneingproject.org/doe/publications/ fd_Felony% 20Disen franchisement% 20Primer.pdf. It is the legislature\u2019s prerogative to impose strict requirements for petition circulators. See generally Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., \u2014 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2247, 2257-58, 186 L.Ed.2d 239 (2013) (<HOLDING>). And the legislature\u2019s decision as clearly Holdings: 0: holding courts have inherent power to compel discovery of the states evidence to protect a defendants due process rights 1: recognizing states have power to establish voting requirements 2: recognizing power of states to engage in some regulation of interstate commerce 3: holding that the federal power act did not evince an intent to permit states to prohibit export of hydroelectric power out of state 4: recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "11 . This history of the bill of attainder was set forth in a 1993 case from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, In re McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 604-606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 301, 126 L.Ed.2d 249 (1993) (noting that Thomas Jefferson had been involved in the passage of a bill of attainder in the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1778). McMullen reversed a District Court finding that the supplementary extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom constituted a bill of attainder as applied in the case of Mr. McMullen. The Second Circuit catalogued the dcvelopment of the prohibition against bills of attainder in the United States. For instance, the Court cited United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1078, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447-48, Holdings: 0: holding that the doctrine prohibits any act no matter what its form that applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment upon them without a judicial trial 1: holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence 2: holding that a courts refusal to recognize a group of individuals as a suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination 3: holding group published doctrine does not apply to  oral remarks of other individuals 4: holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "calm and relaxed so she could understand the Implied Consent. I read it to her when the time was right, so she could understand it; when she stopped crying. The officer read Naik the implied consent rights 18 minutes later, as soon as he felt that the scene was secured and Naik was calm enough to listen to her rights and to make a reasonable decision. After she consented, the State\u2019s breath test was given on site. Given the concerns of the arresting officer for the safety of himself and the passenger, the security of the roadway, the protection of Naik\u2019s purse and other valuables, and Naik\u2019s fragile emotional state, his 18-minute delay in reading Naik her implied consent rights was timely under the circumstances. See State v. Marks, 239 Ga. App. 448, 453-454 (2) (521 SE2d 257) (1999) (<HOLDING>); Mason v. State, 177 Ga. App. 184, 186 (2) Holdings: 0: holding that a 20 to 30 minute delay was warranted when the arresting officer was investigating the accident scene and dealing with the hazard created by the wrecked vehicle 1: holding that the defendant was guilty of leaving the scene because the injured party and a police officer were present at the scene within a reasonable time after the accident 2: holding that the consent of the driver was invalid when the officer knew that the passenger was the owner of the automobile 3: holding that exigency exists when time has elapsed while the driver is transported to the hospital and the investigating officer is detained at the accident scene 4: holding that the 16minute delay between the defendants arrest and the reading of the implied consent notice did not require suppression of the chemical test results when the arresting officer was dealing with a second intoxicated driver and investigating the accident scene", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and that the mother was unfit to have custody of the child. Those findings are essential to overcome the presumption in favor of parental custody in a child-custody case between a parent and a non-parent, see Ex parte Terry, 494 So.2d 628 (Ala.1986) (also holding that those facts must be proven by clear and convincing evidence), but those findings are not required in a dependency case. See O.L.D. v. J.C., 769 So.2d 299, 302 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (\u201cThis case is not simply a custody dispute between a parent and nonparent, but, rather, is a dependency case; therefore, Terry is not applicable.\u201d); J.P. v. S.S., 989 So.2d 591 (Ala.Civ.App.2008); and W.T.H. v. M.M.M. 915 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App.2005); see also K.B. v. Cleburne County Dep\u2019t of Human Res., 897 So.2d 379, 387 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the finding that the maternal Holdings: 0: recognizing the circuit split and applying the subjective standard as more stringent without deciding which standard applies 1: holding that terry  parental unfitness  standard is more stringent than the dependency best interests standard 2: holding that congress intended to adopt a standard more stringent than the prepslra second circuit standard 3: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 4: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "wireless service industry in the processing of requests, or to subject their request to any but the generally applicable time frames for zoning decisions. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (emphasis added). Indeed, as one court has noted, \u201c[t]here is nothing to suggest that Congress, by requiring action \u2018within a reasonable period of time,\u2019 intended to force local government procedures onto a rigid timetable .\u201d Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. City of Medina, 924 F.Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D.Wash.1996); see also Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 43 F.Supp.2d 534, 537 (E.D.Pa.1999) (interpreting the Telecommunications Act\u2019s rea-gonable-period-of-time requirement to be congruent with a state statute imposing a 60-day time limit); Flynn v. Burman, 30 F.Supp.2d 68, 74 (D.Mass.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, under the Telecommunications Act, state Holdings: 0: holding that a mere showing facilities were permitted in different locations within a district was not unreasonable discrimination under the telecommunications act as a matter of law 1: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 2: holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time 3: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 4: holding that a local commission had not failed to act on an application within time limit set by state law and consequently had not failed to act within a reasonable time under telecommunications act", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the child services agency, it was the man against whom the action was taken who sought to utilize the prior finding of paternity as a shield, arguing that principles of res judicata would prevent the disestablishment of paternity against one man and the establishment of paternity in another. As explained above, it is axiomatic that principles of res judicata attach only to the parties involved in the initial civil action; other parties, such as the child or another individual, are specifically not precluded by res judicata from subsequent litigation of the paternity issue. This is a universal holding embraced by this Court in syllabus point five of Benjamin P., as quoted above, and reviewing courts of other jurisdictions. See Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal.App.3d 271, 154 Cal.Rptr. 87 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Dep\u2019t of Health and Rehabilitative Services Holdings: 0: holding that husband who was excluded from paternity of children and could not intervene in a paternity action to obtain custody would be able to bring an independent action per tql 1: holding that adjudication of paternity in divorce decree is not binding on the child 2: holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child 3: holding that although a putative father had standing to bring a paternity action the action could not proceed and the blood tests could not be ordered unless the trial court determined that the paternity action would serve the best interest of the child 4: holding that child is not bound by paternity determination in marital dissolution action", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "prove inadequate, Warden v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74, \u00b6 16, 291 P.3d 30, 34. \u00b6 13 In criminal cases, this Court has found the normal appellate process to be inadequate where the prosecutor would be barred from retrial post-acquittal due to double jeopardy. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo.2011) (electing to exercise original jurisdiction to hear the prosecutor's interlocutory appeal because wrongful suppression of the evidence at issue would force the prosecutor to wait for post-acquittal relief, which would preclude retrial per double jeopardy). This Court has also held that the normal appellate process is inadequate in criminal cases where the jury's decision could render the pretrial issue moot. See, e.g., Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141-42 (Colo.2011) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 14 Exercise of our original jurisdiction is Holdings: 0: holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions 1: holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal 2: holding that the defendant had to appeal the trial courts pretrial determination that he failed to establish immunity under the makemyday statute before trial via car 21 because the issue became moot when the jury found that immunity did not exist beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that a challenged jury instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof when the trial court elsewhere instructed the jury that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "both supra, of a possible or plausible connection between the veteran\u2019s current condition and the in-service incurrence that he had experienced, and the Court thus holds that the veteran has submitted a well-grounded claim. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 518, 519 (1996) (medical opinion that \u201cstress of the war may have unleashed a process that was dormant and latent and it is possible that he would never in his life [have otherwise] developed convulsions\u201d sufficient to show \u201c \u2018possible\u2019 link between the seizure disorder and the headaches\u201d and to make claim well grounded); Molloy v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 513, 516 (1996) (stating that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as \u201ccould\u201d suffices for requirement of well-grounded claim); Watai v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 441, 443 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Robinette, 8 Vet.App. at 76 (\u201cthreshold of Holdings: 0: holding medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as possible suffices for that aspect of wellgroundedclaim requirements 1: holding that medical evidence as to nexus to service expressed as very well might have been although not conclusive suffices to well ground claim 2: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 3: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 4: recognizing that nurses statements regarding nexus were sufficient to make a claim well grounded", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Juan Esber Manzur, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court\u2019s order dismissing his civil rights action challenging the revocation of his medical license. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1291. We review de novo. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the action because absolute immunity bars Manzur\u2019s claims against the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners and its members. See Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Manzur\u2019s remaining contentions are Holdings: 0: holding that prosecutors have absolute immunity 1: recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board 2: recognizing absolute immunity for board members and the director of the mississippi state board of nursing 3: holding that the nevada state board of medical examiners and its members are functionally comparable to judges and prosecutors  and are entitled to absolute immunity for their quasijudicial acts 4: holding that all persons who are integral parts of the judicial process such as witnesses judges and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a resident of Minnesota, and, therefore, the affidavit in support of publication was \u201cmanifestly false.\u201d An affidavit must be supported by \u201cgood faith that [the defendant] cannot be found in the state.\u201d Van Rhee v. Dysert, 154 Minn. 32, 35, 191 N.W. 53, 54 (1922). A \u201cgood faith\u201d affidavit is required to show that the party and attorney used \u201cdue diligence in making a search for the defendant.\u201d Id. Whether a party\u2019s efforts at service were diligent is a question of fact. Duresky v. Hanson, 329 N.W.2d 44, 49 (Minn.1983). The steps necessary to constitute a diligent search can vary by case, but the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that he or she has reasonably attempted to find the defendant and has been unsuccessful. Id. at 49; see also Van Rhee, 154 Minn. at 35, 191 N.W. at 54 (<HOLDING>). Here, the record supports the district Holdings: 0: recognizing county officers as  those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions  1: holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest 2: holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county 3: holding that relief against county and state officers was barred by the eleventh amendment because the state funded and cooperated in operating the county program at issue 4: holding that a search was diligent when a plaintiff made repeated inquiries of numerous persons at places in the county in which the defendant was believed to reside sought information touching the whereabouts of the defendant from several county officers and various places of business and looked for financial records regarding the defendant and his heirs", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Handbook of Federal Indian Law \u00a7 7.04(l)(a), p. 613 & n. 11 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852-53, 105 S.Ct. 2447). Indeed, in every case cited by the parties, the court determined that the scope of tribal court authority, even where allegedly circumscribed by contract, raised a federal question under \u00a7 1331. See Gaming World Int\u2019l, Ltd. v. White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians, 317 F.3d 840, 848 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201c[A]n action filed in order to avoid tribal court jurisdiction necessarily asserts federal law. It is well established that the scope of tribal court jurisdiction is a matter of federal law.\u201d (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, Holdings: 0: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 1: holding that the federal district courts dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims arising from the same incident 2: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 3: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 4: holding in the context of dispute in which tribes adjudicative authority allegedly was limited by contract that federal courts have authority to determine as a matter arising under federal law the limits of a tribal courts jurisdiction and the fact that a plaintiffs claims are not premised on federal law does not alter this result quoting el paso natural gas co v neztsosie 526 us 473 483 119 sct 1430 143 led2d 635 1999", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934)) (alteration in Frazee)-, see also 26 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (noting: where, as here, the tax court employs before-and-after valuation, \u201cthe fair market value of the property before contribution of the conservation restriction must take into account not only the current use of the property but also an objective assessment of how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the restriction, would in fact be developed\u201d). Needless to say, finding a property\u2019s highest and best use is a critical aspect for determining its fair market value. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255, 54 S.Ct. 704 (<HOLDING>); Frazee, 98 T.C. at 563 (\u201cProperty should be Holdings: 0: holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue 1: holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition 2: holding that 19 usc  1677bf2 and 3 as well as the legislative history of the major input rule support commerces decision to use the highest of transfer price cop or market value to value the major inputs that the producer purchased from the affiliated supplier 3: holding highest and best use is to be considered to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value 4: holding that a landowner could recover for placement of a median strip that could not have occurred but for the taking of the landowners property because the inquiry is how much has the particular public improvement decreased the fair market value of the property taking into consideration the use for which the land was taken and all the reasonably probable effects of its devotion to that use", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to trial while related criminal charges were also pending against him. We find no constitutional violation and affirm. I. In June of 2004, the South Carolina Department of Social Services brought a removal action against Michelle Walter, Ricardo Pagan, and William Nelson alleging that Walter and Pagan left Jane Doe, a sixteen-year-old female, in the custody of Nelson, who sexually abused her and allowed her to smoke marijuana. At the family court probable cause hearing, Nelson appeared with counsel and raised concerns that he might not be able to testify due to pending criminal charges. The family court denied the request to hold the family intervention action in abeyance pending resolution of the criminal charges. A trial was held, and the family court found that Nelson (3rd Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Wimmer v. Lehman, 705 F.2d 1402, 1406-1407 Holdings: 0: holding that the final termination of the criminal proceedings occurred when criminal charges  were dismissed with prejudice rather than when the accused was released from prison pending a retrial 1: recognizing the inherent anxiety associated with pending criminal charges 2: holding there was no constitutional requirement that the administrative hearing be postponed pending disposition of the criminal charges 3: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction 4: holding that no liberty interest existed when plaintiff was kept in administrative confinement for two months pending the resolution of criminal charges arising from an altercation with a corrections officer", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Stacy, while not fully identified, was not an anonymous tipster as Defendant claims; rather, she was much closer to being a disinterested \"citizen-informant\" and, hence, more reliable. See Street, 2011 UT App 111, \u00b6\u00b6 10-11 251 P.3d 862. 117 While we conclude that the informant here was not anonymous, we also consider whether she had a sufficient basis of knowledge for reporting that the individuals parked in the green car behind her building were \"smoking drugs.\" See Saddler, 2004 UT 105, \u00b6 11, 104 P.3d 1265. We have observed that \"[mJembers of the general public have a common knowledge about whether a person is under the influence of alcohol.\" Street, 2011 UT App 111, \u00b6 13, 251 P.3d 862 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus 4, TOL N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y.App.Div.) (<HOLDING>), cert.. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 795, 711 NY.S.2d Holdings: 0: holding in the context of vehicular searches that the fact that cm agent familiar with the odor of marijuana smelled such an odor emanating from an automobile  alone was sufficient to constitute probable cause for a subsequent search for marijuana 1: holding that although pcp has no odor because streetlevel pcp is mixed with other substances that have a distinct odor an officers recognition of that odor was sufficient to establish probable cause 2: holding the odor of an etherlike substance in combination with other circumstances gave officers probable cause to search a vehicle 3: holding that because marijuana has a distinct smell the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage 4: holding that a smell associated with pcp was enough to establish probable cause", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as gatekeeper and provides some general standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.\u201d). In any event, expert testimony, whether experience based or strictly scientific, must be reliable. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, where the expert opinion is not a product of independent research unrelated to the current lawsuit, \u201cthe party proffering it must come forward with other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony,\u201d is reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cDaubert II\u201d) (Ninth Circuit opinion on remand from Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)); see also, Cabrera v. Cordis, 134 F.3d 1418, 1422-23 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Fed.R.Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes Holdings: 0: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive 1: holding expert testimony properly excluded under daubert where testimony was prepared solely for litigation lacked any supporting research and there was no showing of support for witness conclusions in peerreview articles or any outside research 2: holding any error in admitting testimony of expert witness was harmless because it was cumulative of same testimony given by six other expert witnesses who testified at trial 3: holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been 4: recognizing inherent methodological limitations in all socialscience research particularly sexualharassment research nevertheless holding such expert testimony admissible", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "motion for summary judgment. See Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir.2011). More critically, the record does reveal that the area of Harney\u2019s arrest was in an area shared by all of the tenants of the condominium building. Absent certain particular facts not alleged here, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of multiple dwelling buildings. See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767-68 (7th Cir.2007) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hallway of a duplex building); United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that tenants in a multi-family building lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of the building); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the fact that a gate barred \u2014 to Holdings: 0: recognizing record supported determination that defendant lacked expectation of privacy in house 1: holding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment bmldings common entrance 2: holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage located outside curtilage of home 3: holding that defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in common area of residential building 4: holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of a recent Supreme Court case is at stake. When this circumstance arises, it makes no sense to treat the timeframe as mandatory for one application but not another. That would result in two applications which are identical on the merits having opposite outcomes based on the date each application was filed. And the same would be true when a Court of Appeals certifies to the Supreme Court a question that would decide an application to file a second or successive motion. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 2341-42, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). In these cases, the unique procedural posture of an application might make it impractical to properly decide an issue in 30 days. In the same way, it makes no sense here to disp 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held Holdings: 0: holding that the rule announced in espinosa v florida 505 us 1079 112 sct 2926 120 led2d 854 1992 per curiam doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 1: holding that the rule announced in cage v louisiana 498 us 39 111 sct 328 112 led2d 339 1990 per curiam doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 2: holding that the rule announced in ring v arizona 536 us 584 122 sct 2428 153 led2d 556 2002 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 3: holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 4: holding that the rule announced in simmons v south carolina 512 us 154 114 sct 2187 129 led2d 133 1994 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "less than forty-five days before the runoff, and the transmittal of the SWAB alone fails to provide UOCAVA voters with the necessary candidate information to satisfy the purpose of UOCAVA. Thus, considering the above, the Court finds that the United States is entitled to the declaratory judgment it seeks. The Court also find that the presence of irreparable harm, necessary for the entry of a permanent injunction. Irreparable harm occurs when a UOCAVA voter is denied the right to receive a sufficient absentee ballot in accordance with the provisions of \u00a7 1973ff-l(a)(8). The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the right to vote is essential to the United States\u2019 form of government. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 10, 129 S.Ct. 1231, 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009) (<HOLDING>); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that the right to drive is not a fundamental right 1: holding right to be fundamental 2: holding that the right to vote is fundamental 3: holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under  101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "user to attach a card transfer device to the top pipette tip holder card and carry the transfer device using the user\u2019s thumb and forefinger. Meyst does not explain how a user can accomplish this task without grasping and holding the pipette holder card and transfer device from its center, which is impossible with the three hypothetical designs. Second, because all three alternatives have open sides, nothing prevents the stacked and nested pipette tip cards from slipping or tipping out of the container, particularly during card transfer. In sum, Meyst\u2019s hypothetical alternatives actually uncover the essential functional characteristics of the Continental design. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Continental has failed to provide evidence such that a reasonable jury co 1984) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Previous orders and motions referred to Holdings: 0: holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included 1: holding that there is no exception to rule 322c and that the limitations period is jurisdictional 2: holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment 3: holding statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and can be waived by a voluntary plea of guilty 4: holding that 10 day period under rule 59 is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the district court", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "necessary to establish a price discrimination claim under 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 13(a). Their complaint\u2019s \u201ccivil conspiracy\u201d claim does not mention price, let alone that different prices were charged to different SCTC customers\u2014but focuses instead on SCTC\u2019s \u201cavoiding state tobacco escrow payments and state taxes.\u201d See Complaint, ROA at 14-16; see also Cont'l Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 103 (10th Cir.1973) (defining \u201cprice discrimination\u201d as \u201cprice differentiation, or the charging of different prices to different customers for goods of like grade and quality\u201d). In addition, plaintiffs allege no facts regarding competition in their market or among SCTC\u2019s competitors. See Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 126 S.Ct. 860, 163 L.Ed.2d 663 (2006) (<HOLDING>); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Holdings: 0: holding that for a plaintiff to establish secondaryline competitive injury resulting from price discrimination injuring competition among the discriminating sellers customers the plaintiff must show actual competition with that sellers customers 1: holding that unfair practices under  202 are not confined to those where competitive injury has already resulted but includes those where there is a reasonable likelihood that the purpose will be achieved and that the result will be an undue restraint of competition 2: holding that though we do not have exclusive jurisdiction over unfair competition claims our own circuit law nonetheless determines when inequitable conduct also constitutes unfair competition 3: holding that the determinative question in applying common law tort of unfair competition is whether the tortfeasors practices are likely to mislead customers into believing that the product emanates from or has been endorsed by the claimant 4: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of this case. In Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 114 S.Ct. 60, 126 L.Ed.2d 30 (1993), the Tenth Circuit applied Cipollone in holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (\u201cFIFRA\u201d) pre-empted state common law as well as statutory law. Id. at 1179. FIFRA provided that states \u201cshall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from [the federal requirements.]\u201d 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 136v(b). The court held that \u201ca common law duty is no less a \u2018requirement\u2019 in the preemption scheme than a state statute imposing the same burden.\u201d Arkansas-Platte & Gulf, 981 F.2d at 1179. See also Kolich v. Sysco Corp., 825 F.Supp. 959 (D.Kan.1993) (<HOLDING>). The operative language used by APHIS is that Holdings: 0: holding fifra preempts implied warranty claims 1: holding that fifra preempts state law failure to warn claims 2: holding that fifra preempts breach of warranty claims based on labeling 3: holding fifra preempts no commonlaw claims 4: holding fifra preempts inadequate label claims but not claims for failure to warn through other channels", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "than material misstatements. Central Bank itself references all three subsections of the statute, and describes \u201cemploy[ment of] a manipulative device\u201d and \u201ccommit[ting] a manipulative or deceptive act,\u201d as primary violations. 511 U.S. at 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439. SEC v. Zandford, a more recent case, underscores the principle that \u201cthe statute should be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.\u201d 535 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 1899, 1903, 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). \u201cNeither the SEC nor [the Supreme] Court has ever held that there must be a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security in order to run afoul of the Act .... Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and cont 117 S.Ct. 2199, 138 L.Ed.2d 724 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Holdings: 0: holding that a person violates  10b and rule 10b5 when he misappropriates confidential information  in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information 1: holding that insider trading based on material nonpublic information qualifies as a deceptive device under  10b 2: holding that selling securities while secretly never intending to honor them is a  10b violation 3: holding that secretly using misappropriated confidential information for trading purposes to be  10b violation 4: holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "questions before the Court. McNary held the district court to have jurisdiction largely because no de novo review was available. Thus: the abuse-of-discretion standard of judicial review under \u00a7 210(e)(3)(B) would make no sense if we were to read the Reform Act as requiring constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures to be subject to its specialized review provision. Although the abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate for judicial review of an administrative adjudication of the facts of an individual application for SAW status, such a standard does not apply to constitutional or statutory claims, which are reviewed de novo by the courts. Id. at 493, 111 S.Ct. at 897; see also Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 56, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2495, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Rahim, 827 F.Supp. at 228; Wang v. Reno, 862 Holdings: 0: holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court 1: holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar 2: recognizing district court application of the same rule 3: holding similar language to mandate district court jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of a regulation without referring to or relying on the denial of any individual application 4: holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with respect to civil proceedings. The D.C. Circuit has neither recognized nor rejected that the First Amendment affords the public a right of access to civil proceedings. The government interprets the D.C. Circuit\u2019s silence as a denial of the right. Quoting Ctr. for Nat\u2019l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, the government argues that the D.C. Circuit has never \u201cindicated that it would apply the [First Amendment right-of-public-access] test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings.\u201d 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C.Cir.2003). In Ctr. for Nat\u2019l Sec. Studies, however, the third party was not seeking access to judicial records in civil proceedings; rather, it sought Department of Justice investigation information on individuals detained for immigration violations. 331 F.3d at 934-35 (<HOLDING>). The Court is unaware of any D.C. Circuit Holdings: 0: holding that the first amendment secures for the public and the press a right of access to civil proceedings 1: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents 2: recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents 3: holding that the first amendment right of public access does not extend to nonjudicial documents compiled during an executive branch investigation 4: holding that there is no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as a \u2018present sense impression\u2019 under Rule 803(1).\u201d Id. We explained that the victim\u2019s \u201c911 call was placed with sufficient contemporaneity to the underlying events to be admissible under Rule 803(1).\u201d Id. Specifically, we noted that the occupants of the apartment adjacent to the victim\u2019s apartment placed a 911 call prior to the victim\u2019s call, complaining about a disturbance in the victim\u2019s apartment. Id. The victim then placed her 911 call seven minutes later from a nearby store, stating that \u201c \u2018my husband just pulled a gun out on me.\u2019\u201d Id. (citation omitted). We pointed out that \u201c[o]ther courts have held in similar circumstances that statements on 911 tapes are admissible as a present sense impression.\u201d Id. (citing United States v. Mejia-Valez, 855 F.Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Campbell, 782 F.Supp. 1258, Holdings: 0: holding that evidence of recklessness by one officer in events leading up to shooting was immaterial in evaluating objective reasonableness of shooting officers decision to use deadly force in the situation he faced at time of shooting 1: holding statements on 911 tape admissible as present sense impression where call was made almost immediately after the defendant left the store after a shooting incident 2: holding statement made twentythree minutes after event admissible as a present sense impression 3: holding that under certain circumstances statements on a 911 tape may be admissible as a present sense impression 4: holding that tapes of two 911 calls the first 2 to 3 minutes after the shooting and the other approximately 16 minutes after shooting were sufficiently contemporaneous with the event and therefore admissible as present sense impressions", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "situated employees differently is an \u201caccepted consequence of the discretion granted\u201d to the City as an employer. Id. at 603, 128 S.Ct. 2146. Plaintiffs could have proceeded under a standard equal protection theory based on membership in a class. After all, CFD exempt employees are a readily discernible class, and the City adopted a blanket policy that denied this class the early retirement benefit. Plaintiffs do not oppose summary judgment on this basis, however. This suggests, perhaps, that plaintiffs did not believe that they had a basis to sustain their claim under the rational basis test. Indeed, other courts have found a rational basis for personnel decisions analogous to this one. See, e.g., Confederation of Police v. City of Chicago, 481 F.Supp. 566, 568 (N.D.Ill.1980) (<HOLDING>). Finally, in their response to.the summary Holdings: 0: holding that disclosure of grandjury testimony of city employees was proper because they cannot be expected to have any personal privacy interest in their duties as city employees 1: holding that the scope of a government employees first amendment rights depends on the balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees 2: holding even in context of employee manual that policy which included agreement to provide annual salary increase of five percent did not constitute contract between city and employees and distinction between atwill employees and public employees was not dispositive in this context 3: holding that probation department employees are not county employees 4: holding that the difference in compensation and benefit packages between police officers and other city government employees was justified by the functional differences between the employees and concluding that sjurely the court should not sit as a board of review for every decision of a state agency concerning employment conditions for different classes of government employees", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "negligence.\u201d One such case was Esposito: While operating a Century Village \u201ctrolley\u201d bus, Esposito struck and killed an elderly woman crossing in a pedestrian walkway. The victim, walking slowly with a four pronged cane, had stepped off the median and was struck by the center of the bus at about the halfway point in the crosswalk. There is evidence that Esposi-to had an unobstructed view with no distracting conditions_ Witnesses ... stated that the driver should have seen her crossing and had ample opportunity to stop. ... The crosswalk was ... heavily traveled. There is a pedestrian warning sign posted and pedestrians in the crosswalk have the right of way. The bus was in good working order. 642 So.2d at 26. Esposito\u2019s conviction for vehicular homicide was reversed. See W.E.B. (<HOLDING>). But see Hamilton v. State, 439 So.2d 238 Holdings: 0: holding that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence is not a crime of violence under begay 1: holding that under the particular facts alleged in the indictment vehicular homicide was a lesser offense included in the murder charge 2: recognizing that dui manslaughter and vehicular homicide are two separate crimes neither being a lesser included offense of the other but holding that a single death cannot support convictions for both crimes 3: holding that dwi manslaughter and vehicular homicide are different forms of the same offense 4: holding that speeding defendant who after drinking beer drove onto shoulder overcorreeted and caused fatal collision in oncoming drivers lane was not guilty of vehicular homicide", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "it so as to cause water to pool and form ice; and (4) failing to give notice of the hazardous icy walkway. Lloyd died (from unrelated causes) during the pendency of these proceedings, and the district court substituted Lloyd\u2019s estate. The parties tried the case to a jury, which found the city was not at fault. The district court overruled Hoskinson\u2019s motion for new trial. II. The issues. The plaintiffs contend the district court erred in concluding that the walkway in question is not a \u201csidewalk\u201d under Iowa Code section 364.12(2)(b) (Supp.1995). They also contend the district court erred in instructing the jury on municipal immunity under Iowa Code section 668.10. III. Scope of Review. The manner in which we review a denial of a motion for new trial dep , 106 A. 203, 203, 204 (1919) (<HOLDING>); Blackburn v. Dillon, 189 Tenn. 240, 241, 225 Holdings: 0: holding that in a city or town a sidewalk is that part of a street or highway that is intended or used by pedestrians 1: holding that sidewalk is that part of a street that has been set aside for use by pedestrians 2: holding the term sidewalk denotes that portion of the highway that is set apart by dedication ordinance or otherwise for the use of pedestrians 3: holding that sidewalk is used to designate a portion of highway that has been set aside for pedestrians as distinguished from that which is used by vehicles 4: holding that sidewalk is simply a part of the street set apart for pedestrians", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "has the burden to show why the defendant\u2019s voluntary absence at the trial after receiving actual notice of the trial date, time, and place, does not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be present. The State does not have the burden of proving that a defendant\u2019s absence is unjustified. To the contrary, a defendant has the burden of proving the absence was justified. Where, as here, the record reflects that a defendant was informed in court of the time and place of trial, and he or she fails to appear and also fails to file the appropriate motion challenging the waiver, the failure to make the appropriate motion before the trial court constitutes a second waiver pursuant to Rule 3:16(b). See State v. Butler, 278 N.J.Super. 93, 101, 650 A.2d 397 (App.Div.1994) (<HOLDING>). We also reject as impractical, the Appellate Holdings: 0: holding that another courts decision is a proper subject of judicial notice 1: holding that erisa creates no private right of action 2: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference 3: holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule 4: holding that absence following proper notice creates an inference of waiver", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CANCELLATION, or DELIVERY UP of agreements, securities, or deeds is sought....\u201d) (citing Bromley v. Holland, [1802] 7 Ves. Jun. 3(Ch.) at 1\u00bb (Eng.) (discussing equity jurisdiction in such cases)). Likewise, the relief requested is, in effect, equitable rescission. See Ballow Brasted O\u2019Brien & Rusin P.C. v. Logan, 435 F.3d 235, 240 (2d Cir.2006) (rescission is an equitable remedy); Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir.1967) (\u201c[I]t is clear that requests for ... rescission have traditionally been considered equitable in nature.\u201d); Mallory v. Citizens Util. Co., 342 F.2d 796, 797 (2d Cir.1965) (action for rescission is \u201ctriable by the court,\u201d not the jury); see also Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 284, 61 S.Ct. 229, 85 L.Ed. 189 (1940) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that a Holdings: 0: holding that rule 10b4 claims were not automatically assigned to purchasers of securities 1: holding that the wording of  10b making fraud in connection with purchase or sale of security a violation of the act is surely badly strained when construed to provide a cause of action not to purchasers or sellers of securities but to the world at large 2: holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5 3: holding that evidence was sufficient to support convictions for willfully engaging in fraudulent conduct in connection with sale of securities because kjnowledge that the act violates the securities laws  is not relevant 4: holding that the securities act authorizes purchasers to maintain a suit in equity to rescind a fraudulent sale and secure restitution of the consideration paid", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "failure to pay certain federal taxes, the Internal Revenue Service (\u201cIRS\u201d) applied the trust fund penalty, found in 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 6672, and assessed a penalty of $1,005,906.01 \u2014 including accrued interest as of September 10, 2007\u2014 against Johnson. The costs associated with each tax period are as follows: II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may grant summary judgment when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, in determining whether there is Holdings: 0: recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional 1: recognizing that cases have generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses 2: recognizing that trial judges have an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial 3: holding that affirmative defenses are waived if not pled 4: holding that the defendant could not raise affirmative defenses initially in its dispositive motion but remanding the case to the trial court to determine if leave to amend answer to incorporate affirmative defenses was appropriate so that the defendant could then properly raise those defenses in its dispositive motion", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "figure by restating the inventory to a FIFO basis. It had several reasons for not doing so: (1) Sieg\u2019s independent accountants had refused to certify Sieg\u2019s financial statements if inventory was stated on a FIFO basis; (2) Sieg-Fort Dodge\u2019s inventory was obsolescent and slow moving; and (3) Sieg\u2019s internal staff believed, based on their knowledge of Sieg-Fort Dodge\u2019s inventory, that the stated book value of the inventory was accurate. Starting with a figure of $30.96, Si dge had continued to deteriorate in the year following this sale, the directors concluded the stock was worth less at the time of the merger than it had been worth a year earlier. Finally, they relied on offers made by one Sid Fisher, who was pressuring Sieg to sell Sieg-Fort Dodge for \u201cpennies on the dollar.\u201d See id. (<HOLDING>). We conclude there is substantial evidence to Holdings: 0: holding void shares issued in excess of the amount of common shares authorized in the articles of incorporation 1: holding that the failure to place a dollar value on a possible decrease in property value was not unreasonable 2: holding preliminary offer tended to prove the lowest possible value of the shares 3: holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition 4: holding that defendant must prove when the services were rendered to establish that the new value exception applies", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the two calendar years preceding the calendar year in which the petition was filed. R.68 \u00b6\u00b6 20-21. Segal provided this explanation only in an opposition brief filed by counsel; he did not submit an affidavit to this effect. 8 . Segal also asserted claims for fraud and civil conspiracy based on the Guarantors\u2019 alleged forgery of Segal\u2019s signature on the release. 9 . The Bankruptcy Court\u2019s April 3, 2013, Order approving the Trustee\u2019s application to employ special litigation counsel was the subject of a previous appeal, which this Cou le, in which the Supreme Court held claims for loss-carryback tax refunds based on losses suffered and net income taxes paid by the debtors before they filed for bankruptcy protection were property of the debtors\u2019 estates. See 382 U.S. at 380, 86 S.Ct. 511 (<HOLDING>). Although Segal was decided under the Holdings: 0: holding that because the purpose of the bankruptcy code is to give honest debtors a fresh start the language of section 523a1c includes attempts by a debtor to evade payment of taxes 1: holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted 2: holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate 3: holding the losscarryback refund claims were sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupts ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that they should be regarded as property under  70a5 of the bankruptcy act 4: holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "ostensible use \u2014 here, the number of heaters sold \u2014 necessarily relevant. The Lanham Act provides that \u201c \u2018[u]se\u2019 of a mark means bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade.\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1127 (emphasis added); see Blue Bell, Inc. v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. 497 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir.1974) (noting the \u201cclear line of decisions holding that the use must be bona fide, with token transactions accepted only where there is an accompanying intent to engage in commercial use in the future\u201d); accord Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 101 (5th Cir.1983) (\u201cThe [Lanham] Act does not allow the preservation of a mark solely to prevent its use by others.\u201d); cf. O\u2019Connor & Gordon, Inc. v. Handicraft Publ\u2019ns, 206 Misc. 1087, 1089-90, 136 N.Y.S.2d 558, 560 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1954) (<HOLDING>). An effort to dispose of the remaining stock Holdings: 0: holding that under new york state law purely pro forma use intended only to acquire rights is not bona fide 1: holding that new york law applies to this matter 2: holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration 3: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 4: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that continuing these plaintiffs on administrative leave would elicit a public outcry. See Lineback v. Printpack, Inc., 979 F.Supp. 831, 849-50 (S.D.Ind.1997) (chastising employer for tendering \u201cno evidence that its customers ... would be outraged by a court-ordered reinstatement\u201d). Moreover, the court finds it difficult to believe that delaying the plaintiffs\u2019 terminations \u2014 which, it bears noting, have been pending for over a year \u2014 until the court can address the pending dispositive motions would impose any great hardship on the defendant. See Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng\u2019rs, 457 F.Supp.2d 198, 236 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (emphasizing minimal financial prejudice from delay of a few months); Silva v. Univ. of New Hampshire, 888 F.Supp. 293, 326 (D.N.H.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, the defendant has submitted Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under  523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury 1: holding that a notice recommending termination of an employee to the board without notice to the employee of employees right to attend and dispute the claims violated due process 2: recognizing that due to the inequality of bargaining power the brunt of injury from termination falls on the employee rather than the employer 3: holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously 4: holding that a termination of benefits must go handinhand with a termination of the liability of an employer", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "[\u00b6 26] In support of his argument, Muhle asserts that the \u201cnew statements by G.E.\u201d just before trial were favorable to the defendant in that they were completely inconsistent with G.E.\u2019s prior interviews, that Muhle would have been able to better prepare for cross-examination and his testimony if he had known of the inconsistency, and that he had \u201cno way to anticipate this new evidence.\u201d [\u00b6 27] The United States Supreme Court has held evidence that can be used to impeach a witness is subject to disclosure under Brady. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (stating that the duty under Brady \u201cencompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence\u201d); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (<HOLDING>). See, e.g., Spicer v. Roxbury Correctional Holdings: 0: holding evidence not to be material within the meaning of brady when the evidence did not eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator 1: holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule 2: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation 3: holding that the prosecutors nondisclosure of material evidence affecting a witnesss credibility which goes uncorrected falls within the requirements of brady 4: holding that an admission  falls under the rule of completeness", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not enforce contracts made in contravention of the law or public policy of this State. See Woolsey v. Panhandle Refining Co., 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675 (1938); Dodd v. Harper, 670 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); cf. Baron v. Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Baab, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.App.\u2014Texarkana 1981, writ ref\u2019d n.r.e.). We therefore hold that the contract for the release and settlement of the Quinteros\u2019 cause of action is void and unenforceable. In so holding, we are well aware that the Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted a different approach to violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility as the Code relates to criminal matters. See Henrich v. State, 694 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Pannell v. State, 666 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (<HOLDING>). See also Holt v. State, 683 S.W.2d 92 Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that the disciplinary rules of the code of professional responsibility are not laws of the state of texas for purposes of statute which excludes the admission of evidence obtained in violation of law 2: holding that in the absence of compliance with the code of professional responsibility a charging lien will not be granted 3: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 4: holding that the rules of professional conduct are selfimposed internal regulations and do not play a role in determining the admissi bility of evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "properly within the province of the\u201d Legislature. See State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256, 272 (2005). The court also observed that until its decision \u201cno two state supreme courts [had] resolved Blakely issues in the same manner.\u201d Id. at 271 n. 7 (summarizing the results in a number of recent cases). {53} We recognize that a majority of state supreme courts have reasoned as did the Court of Appeals in Frawley that Blakely\u2019s discussion of the relevant statutory minimum within Washington\u2019s sentencing scheme requires a state court to equate the presumptive sentence in a determinate sentencing scheme with the punishment authorized by the jury\u2019s verdict. See, e.g., Natale, 878 A.2d at 737-38 (summarizing the varying conclusions); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 682-84 (Ind.2005) (<HOLDING>). We are more persuaded by the reasoning of the Holdings: 0: holding that appellant properly preserved booker claim by citing blakely in his written objections to the psi and reminding the court at sentencing of his blakely objection 1: holding that blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines 2: holding blakely not retroactive 3: holding that a sixfold increase in sentence involved no enhancement of sentence because harrisonphilpot was charged and convicted of conspiracy the extent of the conspiracy caused the tremendous increase in her sentence 4: holding an increase in the sentence above the presumptive term in indianas sentencing scheme unconstitutional under blakely", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "light-blue suit [Princess Diana] wore when she was presented with her signature flower\u201d and \u201c[c]ompletely accessorized with [a] purse and a tiny bouquet of Princess of Wales Roses\u201d that Princess Diana carried on the same occasion. But it is far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to juxtapose \u2014 as Franklin Mint also did \u2014 a picture of the doll and a photograph of Princess Diana wearing the same suit and carrying the same purse and the same bunch of flowers. We therefore hold that Princess Diana\u2019s physical appearance is not readily identifiable without the use of her likeness. Thus, the first element of the New Kids nominative fair use test is met. The second element of the New Kids n laintiffs product\u201d differs from case to case. Compare Playboy Enters., Inc., 279 F.3d at 804 (<HOLDING>), with Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 Holdings: 0: holding that a former employee was not entitled to recover a yearend bonus from his former employer where no definite sum of money or percentage of profits was promised and where the employee left the company before the end of the fiscal year in question 1: holding that the former wife did not waive her attorneyclient privilege simply because the credibility of her claim that she relied on her husbands representations could be impeached by deposing her former attorney 2: holding that the fact that the former wife lost on an issue which is not spurious does not mean that she could not be a candidate to receive attorneys fees from the former husband 3: holding that the government did not present sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict in a  2251 case because the government did not provide evidence to prove that the defendant intended to create a visual depiction of the sexual conduct 4: holding that the repeated depiction of pmoy 81 is not necessary to describe a former playmate of the year on her website", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "action a claim for nominal damages based on assertion that statements were \u201cdemonstrably false\u201d). This Court finds that in light of the length of the unexcused delay, the prejudice that results from the motion practice completed and the need for additional discovery and motion practice to address a fraud claim (or the inability to do the same) is sufficient to warrant denial of Plaintiffs\u2019 cross-motion. Of course, a defense of fraud, which Plaintiffs have already alleged, might mitigate the prejudice if such a defense were valid. In that event, Defendants could suffer little prejudice in having to litigate as a claim precisely the same legal issue that they would already have to confront as a defense. However, in this case, Plaintiffs\u2019 defense of fraud is clearl 88 (N.Y.App.Div.1940) (<HOLDING>); cf. McKeon v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 108 Holdings: 0: holding that immunity from suit precluded claim for breach of contract for sale of county property and request for specific performance of contract 1: holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to an action for recision on contract for sale of real property based on fraud when they had treated contract as valid for more than a year after discovering the fraud 2: holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable 3: holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract 4: holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not an element of the crime under \u00a7 841; the statute is not susceptible to a contrary interpretation.\u201d). Even if its intent were unclear, to conclude that, in light of Apprendi, Congress would have intended drug quantity to be an element of the offense \u201cwould be to proceed in an essentially legislative manner for the definition and specification of the criminal acts.\u201d Evans, 333 U.S. at 490-91, 68 S.Ct. 634. This is a task outside the bounds of judicial interpretation. It is better for Congress, and more in accord with its function, to revise the statute than for us to guess at the revision it would make. That task it can do with precision. We could do no more than make speculation law. Id. at 495, 68 S.Ct. 634; United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) (<HOLDING>). Ultimately, the solution of what a Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: holding that it is the legislative authority of the union that must  make an act a crime 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 4: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Judge Donahoe did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Trombi had engaged in willfully contemptuous conduct. We therefore uphold the civil contempt sanction to pay the court $2,000, but vacate the remaining sanctions, without prejudice to further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CONCURRING: LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP and MICHAEL J. BROWN, Judges. 1 . We cite the current version of the statute because the portions material to this opinion have remained unchanged. 2 . Trombi did not seek a stay of the contempt ruling in this court. 3 . A.R.S. \u00a7 31-225 (2002) also provides for the transport of state prisoners by the sheriff upon order of the court. 4 . Courts also have inherent contempt power. Owen v. City Court of City of Tucson, 123 Ariz. 267, 268, 599 P.2d 223, 224 (1979) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Holdings: 0: holding that this court has inherent as well as express statutory authority to punish for contempt 1: holding that in addition to statutory contempt powers city courts have inherent contempt power 2: recognizing inherent power of supreme court independent of statutory authority to punish for contempt of court 3: recognizing civil contempt power under  105a 4: holding evidence insufficient to show direct contempt and no basis for indirect contempt because of failure to meet procedural requirements", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "29 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 825.305-308. With respect to Defendant\u2019s liability in the instant ease, the Court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact at least as to whether Plaintiff was entitled to leave under the FMLA at the time of his termination. See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 2612; 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 825.114. Therefore, summary judgment as to Claim III is inappropriate. With respect to the available affirmative defenses, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient notice for his absences under the FMLA, and therefore, he is precluded altogether from seeking its protections. Plaintiff is not required, however, to specify that his request for leave is covered by the FMLA in order to come within its provisions. See Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 761-64 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also 29 C.F.R. \u00a7 825.303 (setting out Holdings: 0: holding that the employees reference to his mental condition did not constitute the requisite notice of an intent to invoke fmla leave 1: holding that an employee requesting unforeseeable medical leave is not required to even mention the fmla when requesting leave for a serious health condition 2: holding that both the cfra and the fmla require the employee to provide notice to the employer of the employees intent to take leave 3: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 4: holding that employers oral denial of plaintiffs request for fmla leave showed interference", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "existed for injuries sustained when claimant stepped on a brick while exiting the car); cf. Parker v. Atlanta Cas. Co. 157 Ga.App. 539, 278 S.E.2d 119, 120 (1981) (finding that PIP coverage was not available when claimant stepped on grease when alighting from car only because policy excluded conduct within the course of business of repairing or servicing vehicles unless conduct also involved \u201cactual operation of a motor vehicle as a vehicle on business premises\u201d). 11 . See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Howe, 31 Conn.App. 132, 623 A.2d 1031, 1034 (1993) (finding that UIM coverage existed for injuries sustained when claimant was grasping door handle pri- or to being struck); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 253 Ga.App. 217, 558 S.E.2d os., 368 Pa.Super. 159, 533 A.2d 765, 767-68 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Whitmire v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant abandoned the car he was driving thus relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy to the contents of the car when he jumped out of the stillmoving car and fled on foot during a high speed chase with police 1: holding that liability insurance covered the injuries sustained when claimant exited car and was struck by a live wire since the claimant was still occupying the vehicle 2: holding that the factfinder may conclude that recovery is not likely when the car is left on street with keys in the car 3: holding um policy provider was the proper source of loss benefits for injuries sustained when claimants car was struck while he was seated in his car with his left foot still on the ground 4: holding that even if an officers stop of a defendant who was on foot was unlawful the search of a parked car was justified by a different officer observing a gun magazine in plain view in the car", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Parties then desiring to appeal shall observe the appropriate federal rules of procedure applicable to a judgment of the district court.... [Mjotions directed to the district court shall not require it to act as an appellate court. Rather, the motions that we envision are those in the nature of proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).... Id. at 68-69. Although this case did not involve a final judgment on appeal from a state court, it does involve an interlocutory judgment from which leave to appeal could have been obtained in state court and that is now appealable as of right in federal court. Thus, we find that the policies underlying the supervisory rule laid down in Nemberg apply here. 9 . See Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 810 (9th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). 10 . Compare ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him 1: holding that the rule preventing one judge of a district court from overruling a decision by another judge of the same court except under exceptional circumstances should be followed in the third circuit 2: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant 3: holding that in absence of changed circumstances and except there be some other most cogent reason when judge makes or denies interlocutory order and when appeal lies as of right from such order it should not be reconsidered even by judge who made the order much less by another judge 4: holding that order denying motion to vacate restitution order should be reversed where trial judge failed to inform defendant of right to appeal", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "offense shall not be admitted as evidence in the trial of a subsequent civil action arising out of the same accident or occurrence.\u201d ORS \u00a7 41.905. But the Oregon statutes do not otherwise distinguish between guilty and no contest pleas as to misdemeanors versus felonies. Second, Snyder contends that because the term \u201cbuilding\u201d in Oregon\u2019s second degree burglary statute, ORS \u00a7 164.215, is defined broadly, this court cannot presume the word \u201cbuilding\u201d is intended in its ordinary sense. This is true under a categorical approach. Under Oregon law, a building, \u201cin addition to its ordinary meaning includes any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein.\u201d ORS \u00a7 164.205(1). See also Mayer, 560 F.3d at 959 (<HOLDING>) (brackets in original); State v. Keys, 244 Or. Holdings: 0: holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary 1: holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary 2: holding that burglary is violent felony 3: holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary 4: holding that first degree burglary under oregon law is broader than the definition of generic burglary because the statute does not limit burglary to buildings or structures but also includes nonstructures such as booths vehicles boats and aircraft that are regularly or intermittently used as lodgings", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "we cannot glean much from that fact given that a State can waive its Eleventh Amendment protection. Finally, we note that every other court of appeals to have decided the question has held that the Takings Clause does not override the Eleventh Amendment. See Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201c[W]e conclude that the constitutionally grounded self-executing nature of the Takings Clause does not alter the conventional application of the Eleventh Amendment\u201d); DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 526 (6th Cir.2004) (\u201cTreating DLX\u2019s claim as a self-executing reverse condemnation claim, ... we conclude that the Eleventh Amendment\u2019s grant of immunity protects Kentucky from that claim ... \u201d); Harbert Int\u2019l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem\u2019l Found, v. Holdings: 0: holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts 1: recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment 2: holding that a takings claim was barred under the eleventh amendment where state courts provided a means of redress for such claims 3: recognizing that claims against a state under  1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment 4: recognizing that section 1981 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Troy v. City of Hampton, 756 F.2d 1000, 1002 (4th Cir.) (back pay under Veteran\u2019s Reemployment Rights Act is equitable), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864, 106 S.Ct. 182, 88 L.Ed.2d 151 (1985); Sheets v. Johnson, 805 F.2d 767, 774-75 (8th Cir.1986) (awarding equitable back pay for interim between termination in violation of due process and the required hearing), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir.1987) (en banc); McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 646 (10th Cir.1981) (same); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115, 1122 (3d Cir.1980) (awarding equitable back pay in action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 to victim of discrimination on the basis of blindness), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923, 101 S.Ct. 1375, 67 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981); McFerren v. County Board of Educ., 455 F.2d 199, 203-04 (6th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 2461, 32 Holdings: 0: holding that an award of back pay is an issue for the court 1: recognizing equitable nature of back pay award under age discrimination in employment act 2: holding there was no jury trial right where court ordered reinstatement and back pay to teachers fired after desegregation order in discrimination case back pay is equitable 3: holding in an adea case that when after acquired evidence of employee wrongdoing cut off accrual of back pay reinstatement or the award of front pay was inappropriate 4: holding that back pay was an integral part of title vips equitable remedies and that therefore no right to jury trial existed", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the existence of some quantity of some controlled substance is proven to the jury, the Government had to prove the precise drug type and quantity only before the sentencing judge and then only by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Monk, 15 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir.1994). Apprendi held that consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution, a defendant is entitled to a jury finding on each element of a crime that increases his or her maximum statutory sentence. In the case of \u00a7 841 prosecutions occurring after Apprendi, the Government unquestionably must prove the drug type and quantity beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury in order to obtain a correspondingly enhanced sentence. See United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir.2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). The critical question here is whether this Holdings: 0: holding that drug quantity is an element of an offense under 21 usc  841 1: holding that postapprendi drug quantity is an element of the offense to be proven to jury 2: holding that where the indictment charged drug quantity but drug quantity was not submitted to the jury the district court erred in using drug quantity to increase the penalty beyond the twentyyear maximum of  841b1c 3: holding that statutory maximum is twenty years when drug quantity is not charged as element of offense and found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that when the indictment charges that a certain minimum quantity of drugs is involved in the offense proof of that quantity is a fourth element of the offense", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of its case. See Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 927 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.1991). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In assessing the proof, the \u201cevidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.\u201d Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. C. Limitations The parties do not dispute, and the Court has no reason to question, that Texas law governs this dispute. See Dkt. Nos. 24 & 32. See also 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) (<HOLDING>). Under Texas law, a party alleging the Holdings: 0: holding that a federal court in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law 1: holding that in diversity cases federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law 2: holding that state substantive rules of decision apply in federal diversity cases 3: holding that in a diversity action a federal court must apply the law of the forum state 4: holding that federal courts sitting in diversity shall apply state substantive law", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to pay arbitral fees simply to begin arbitration \u2014 a conclusion which could seriously discourage the driver from attempting to vindicate his or her rights as a putative employee in any forum. The Court cannot sanction such a result. See Iskanian, 59 Cal.4th at 382-83, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 (explaining public policy is frustrated where individuals cannot effectively litigate claims related to their unwaivable statutory rights). Uber next argues that drivers are not responsible for paying arbitration fees under the 2013 Agreement because the contract expressly states that \u201cin all cases where required by law, Uber will pay the Arbitrator\u2019s and arbitration fees,\u201d and Uber understands Armendariz to require that employers cover its employees\u2019 arbitration fees. See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 113 (<HOLDING>). As should be obvious from the Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding the party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement because of prohibitive arbitration fees bears the burden of proof and the possibility of such party incurring prohibitive costs is too speculative to invalidate an arbitration agreement where the record reveals only that the agreement is silent on the subject of arbitration costs 1: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added 2: holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable 3: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement  as providing  that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs 4: holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "violated Herring\u2019s right to privacy by disclosing information regarding his HIV status to his sister and his employer. Our threshold question, therefore, is whether there is a constitutional right to privacy that protects information concerning a person\u2019s health from being disclosed to others by government officials. Keenan contends that there is no clear right to privacy in the non-disclosure of such personal information because the Supreme Court has never directly held that such a right exists. This circuit, however, has repeatedly interpreted the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), as creating a right to privacy in the non-disclosure of personal information. See e.g., Slayton v. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that the supreme court explicitly recognized the constitutional right to privacy in whalen v roe 1: holding that every citizen has a constitutional right of privacy in his or her medical records 2: holding right to testify was federal constitutional right 3: recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in mental health records 4: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (noting that when \u201cCongress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion\u201d (quotation omitted)). The debtors\u2019 interpretation of the phrase of \u201callowed secured claim\u201d is also based on the faulty premise that \u00a7 506(a) generally defines the term \u201callowed se cured claim.\u201d Section 506(a) provides a method for the judicial valuation of an allowed secured claim; it does not provide a definition of the phrase \u201callowed secured claim\u201d applicable to other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (<HOLDING>). In addition, nothing in \u00a7 1325(a)(5) suggests Holdings: 0: holding that the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506a does not determine the meaning of allowed secured claim in  506d 1: holding that the words allowed secured claim in  506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under  502 2: holding that if claim is not an allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506a by its terms section 1325a5b is inapplicable 3: holding that section 506d does not permit the strip down of a partially secured lien 4: holding that if  506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "after subtracting a subrogated medical expense claim. 5 The negligence theory of the case was submitted to the jury by way of the standard pattern jur . Ind. 1995) (finding that one's failure to wear a helmet could be relevant in calculating damages); Warfel v. Cheney, 758 P.2d 1326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing a common law duty to wear a helmet while on a motorcycle); Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1983). See e.g., cases disallowing the helmet defense: Dare v. Sobule, 674 P.2d 960 (Colo. 1984) and Lawrence v. Taylor, 8 P.3d 607 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (disallowing evidence of the plaintiffs failure to wear a helmet while on a motorcycle in order to prove the plaintiffs negligence or failure to mitigate damages); Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 844 P.2d 620 (Haw. 1993) (<HOLDING>); Rogers v. Frush, 262 A.2d 549 (Md. 1970) Holdings: 0: holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance 1: holding that because there was no common law duty to wear a helmet evidence showing that the plaintiff failed to wear one was properly excluded 2: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 3: holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty 4: holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "months and a maximum of life imprisonment. See id. Thus, Apprendi is not applicable because Parrado\u2019s sentence has not been enhanced under either of the standards set forth in Norris or Guevara. IV. Parrado\u2019s Plea Agreement A. Parrado\u2019s Contention that the Plea was neither Knowing nor Voluntary Parrado contends that his guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered because of an interveni d voluntarily entered because there was no error in the \u201cCourt Advice\u201d delivered at his plea allocution. See United States v. Vonn, \u2014 U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1046, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (ruling that Rule 11 is used to ensure the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea); United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1520 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Parkins, 25 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1994)) (<HOLDING>). Although Parrado has made no other complaint Holdings: 0: holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 1: holding that the district court must strictly comply with rule 11 so that it can be determined whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered 2: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 3: holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims 4: holding that a counsels oral statements at a plea hearing  that the plea being entered was conditional  did not satisfy the rule 11 writing requirement", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "negligence to project\u2019s construction workers). The record lacks evidence that Oncor engaged in any negligent activity contemporaneous with Murillo\u2019s injury at the job-site, or controlled the details of Murillo\u2019s work, or had a hand in salvaging cable, or authorized entry into the transformers it operated within its electrical easement, or represented to anyone the status of its transformer as de-energized. Without such evidence, Oncor\u2019s duty was, at most, that of an occupier of the premises. As a premises defendant, Oncor was entitled to standard jury instructions that would have defined the scope of Oncor\u2019s duty to Murillo in light of the warnings to those who came near its energized transformers and the efforts Oncor made to keep its premises safe. See Brooks, 336 S.W.2d at 603 (<HOLDING>); compare Tex. Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Ramming, 861 Holdings: 0: holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury 1: holding that electrical supplier owed no duty in general negligence to construction worker injured by contact with live highvoltage electrical transmission lines on construction site 2: holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the contractor where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding a duty to an injured construction worker 3: holding that an employer through its employees did not breach an independent duty to power company not to come in contact with power companys transmission lines because such a duty is a general duty not an independent one 4: holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is liable. The Comments to The Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 920A (1979) provide in pertinent part: a. Payments by or for defendant. If a tort defendant makes a payment toward his tort liability, it of course has the effect of reducing that liability. This is also true of payments made under an insurance policy that is maintained by the defendant, whether made under a liability provision or without regard to liability, as under a medical-payments clause Essentially, money paid out pursuant to 51 O.S.2011 \u00a7\u00a7 158(E) & 162(D) on behalf of a tortfeasor State or political subdivision-or an employee-by the tortfeasor's own insurer, is not a collateral source, and therefore may be credited against the liability of those entities. See Overturff v. Hart, 1975 OK 13, \u00b6\u00b6 12-13, 531 P.2d 1035 (<HOLDING>). Title 51 0.S8.2011 \u00a7\u00a7 158(E) & 162(D) do not Holdings: 0: holding agent liable for fire damage after his customer requested a new policy to replace one cancelled by the insurer and the agent neither procured such a replacement policy nor alerted the customer to this failure by returning the unearned portion of the premium from the original policy 1: holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract 2: holding that where plaintiff brought claim for fire loss after allegedly being compensated by its insurer defendant could not claim benefit from insurance because proceeds came to the plaintiff from a collateral source wholly independent of the defendant and which as to him was res inter alios acta  3: holding funds received by plaintiff from an insurance policy that was procured by the defendant and for which a premium was paid are not a collateral source 4: holding that no binding insurance contract took effect because the initial premium was not paid", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "93 A, \u00a7 9, if his rights are adversely affected or if he suffers \u201cinjury\u201d because of another party\u2019s breach of his statutory duty. Id. In this context, \u201cinjury\u201d simply refers to \u201cthe invasion of any legally protected interest of another.\u201d Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 159 (1985), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 7 (1965). The text of G. L. c. 93A, \u00a7 9 (1), and our interpretation in Van Dyke are both clear affirmations of third-party rights, and we cannot accept Utica\u2019s argument that only insureds are owed a duty of fair dealing when it comes to an insurer\u2019s settlement practices. See S. Young, Chapter 93A and the Insurance Industry \u00a7 14.04, Chapter 93A Rights and Remedies (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ. 1996 & Supp. 1996). See also Flattery v. Gregory, 397 Mass. 143, 150 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The duty of fair dealing in insurance Holdings: 0: holding that household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile liability insurance are contrary to public policy 1: holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies 2: holding that badfaith claims under  8371 arise under insurance policies 3: holding that variable insurance policies are covered securities under slusa 4: recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "major parties in Presidential elections since 1860, Congress may by law attempt to assure that this pattern will endure forever.\u201d Id. at 298-94, 96 S.Ct. 612. c. Unlike Subtitle H, the CEP is Alleged to Burden the Political Opportunity of Minor Parties, Primarily in One-Party-Dominant Legislative Districts It is immediately apparent from the face of the statute itself that the CEP\u2019s qualifying criteria make it substantially more difficult for minor party candidates to receive public funds than major party candidates. In fact, plaintiffs allege that the criteria, as a practical matter, all but categorically exclude them from receiving public funds. As the Supreme Court held in Buckley, however, an exclusion from public funds is not necessarily unconstitutional. Id. at 102, 96 S.Ct. 612 (<HOLDING>). The relevant question here is thus not Holdings: 0: holding that the public interest factor was not implicated in a noncompete case because the specific action at issue would not help or harm the public and the public interest factor is generally considered within the confines of disputes involving governmental agencies or programs rather than in the adjudication of private controversies 1: holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract 2: holding that the achievements of minor political parties were accomplished without the help of public funds thus the limited participation or nonparticipation of nonmajor parties or candidates in public funding does not unconstitutionally disadvantage them 3: holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice 4: holding that service and notice in a technical sense are incidental where the main purpose of obtaining the appearance of parties and their participation is accomplished", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the existence of purposeful discrimination suggested by a defendant\u2019s pri-ma facie case; rather, the question is whether a defendant\u2019s proof, when weighed against the prosecutor\u2019s offered \u201crace-neutral\u201d reasons, is strong enough to persuade the trier-of-fact that such discriminatory intent is present. Any other approach would violate the principle that the ultimate burden of proving racially motivated strikes in violation of Batson rests with the opponent of the strike. See State v. Green, 94-0887 at p. 29, 655 So.2d at 290. While defendant correctly observes that Carroll White, who served on the jury, had a seventh grade education as did Bradley, the fact that White was accepted by the state and Bradley was excused by the state does not ir.1989), (writ denied, 560 So.2d 20 (La.1990) (<HOLDING>). After carefully reviewing the entire record Holdings: 0: recognizing that the drafters of  1981 were not concerned with practices that were facially neutral 1: holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination  unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason 2: holding that an employee may establish that the legitimate reason for an employment decision offered by an employer is pretextual by showing by a preponderance of the evidence either that the discrim inatory reason was the true reason motivating the employers conduct or that the profferred legitimate reason was false 3: recognizing a veniremans failure to make eye contact with the prosecutor as a racially neutral reason 4: recognizing a veniremans inattentiveness as a racially neutral reason", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "discuss what occurred at the Grant trial \u2014 a trial that was terminated early because a settlement was reached. Moreover, Colleton, Dr. Meacher, and Meacher P.A. expressly denied any negligence or fault resulting from Grant\u2019s medical treatment as part of the settlement agreement. As noted above, the stipulations are not accompanied by a transcript of the Grant trial and thus provide an incomplete picture of that trial. We believe these stipulations were akin to stipulations as to the law. Therefore, the circuit court was not required to accept these stipulations as conclusive proof that Dr. Meacher was liable for causing Grant\u2019s injuries, or as conclusive proof that Colleton was not liable. See Greenville Cnty. Fair Ass\u2019n v. Christenberry, 198 S.C. 338, 345, 17 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1941) (<HOLDING>); McDuffie v. McDuffie, 308 S.C. 401, 409-10, Holdings: 0: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 1: recognizing that decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts 2: holding that a stipulation as to the law is generally not binding upon the courts 3: holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is applicable to the states and therefore the us supreme courts interpretation of the provision is binding upon this court 4: recognizing the supreme courts interpretation of the federal feloninpossession statute as binding", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that he still bore scars from these wounds and submitted doctors\u2019 reports confirming the injuries to his wrist and back. When Plesea attempted to report the episode to the police, he was mockingly-told to seek relief in Strasbourg, which is the seat of the European Court of Human Rights. Plesea further testified that later that year, in August, the police detained him for his religious activities in his home city of Ploiesti. The police physically abused him and threatened him with arrest if he did not cease proselytizing. The Pleseas subsequently left Romania. The cumulative evidence in the record, if we assume it is credible, compels the conclusion that Plesea suffered past persecution on account of his religious beliefs. See Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). The police officers\u2019 mockery and their Holdings: 0: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment 1: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 2: holding that material alterations in the applicants account of persecution are sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding 3: holding that a petitioners unwillingness to return must be based upon persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race religion nationality membership in a particular social group or political opinion   4: holding that facts compelled finding of persecution where record showed cumulative specific instances of violence and harassment on account of religion", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Trooper Madison identified multiple instances in which Jones displayed unsafe driving behavior consistent with a person being intoxicated including nearly hitting Trooper Madison\u2019s police car, weaving and twice crossing the center line, passing in a no-passing zone, and nearly hitting parked vehicles parked on the shoulder of the road. Trooper Madison noted that he smelled alcohol when he encountered Jones, that Jones\u2019s eyes were red and bloodshot, that Jones fumbled with his license and could not locate his registration, that when Jones exited his vehicle he displayed a lack of balance, that Jones staggered as he walked and leaned against his vehicle to steady himself, and that Jones failed three field sobriety tests. See Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 255 (Ind.1997) (<HOLDING>), reh\u2019g denied. II. The second issue is whether Holdings: 0: holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed 1: holding that it is error for court of appeals to reverse trial courts ruling that had not been objected to at the trial court level 2: holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice 3: holding that even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the admissibility of evidence we will reverse only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice and that the error was harmless 4: recognizing that harmless error review applies when the court errs in the guidelines calculation", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "discovers that he or she has been injured.\u201d Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385-86 & n. 5 (3d Cir.1994) (observing that the rule\u2019s origins lie in products liability and medical malpractice cases, but that the rule has been subsequently applied to employment discrimination cases). As the Court previously observed, Plaintiff alleges that he was removed from his position as HOCALJ on June 4, 2010, see Am. Compl. \u00b6 62, and \u201cPlaintiff avers that defendant Bede informed him of the removal on June 4, 2010.\u201d See Bridges, 2014 WL 1281158, at *16; Am. Compl. \u00b6 75; Am. Compl. Ex., at 106a, ECF No, 30-2. Because Plaintiff discovered his alleged injury on the same day the alleged injury occurred, the discovery rule has no role to play. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386-87 (<HOLDING>). Thus, the Court did not err in failing to Holdings: 0: holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment 1: holding the pro se plaintiff has no breach of contract or wrongful discharge claim against defendant employer where the employer wrongfully characterized her discharge as for cause but remanding to trial court to consider whether the pro se plaintiff suffered some other compensable injury if the employer as alleged intentionally mischaracterized the plaintiffs discharge in order to reduce its unemployment contributions 2: holding that where the plaintiff discovered the injury on the very datedefendant informed her of her discharge the discovery rule offered no relief in relation to the timeliness of the filing of her discriminatory discharge claim 3: holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine 4: holding that where the immediate cause or motivating factor of a discharge is the employees assertion of statutory rights the discharge is discriminatory under section 215a3 whether or not grounds for other discharge exist", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1148 (1957)) (emphasis added). 86 . Id. (emphasis added). 87 . In addition, one could broadly argue that the concern of constitutional avoidance should apply to the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling. While normally applied to statutes its reasoning can be readily applied to the situation before this Court \u2014 determining whether the Supreme Court's ruling will render unconstitutional a large or a small number of proceedings defined by Congress as core, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) (\" '[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.' \u201d (citations omitted)); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, Holdings: 0: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage 1: holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute 2: holding that a statute is certainly not so plainly unconstitutional that the failure of the trial court  to hold it so can be regarded as a plain error or a culpable neglect of judicial duty internal citation omitted 3: holding that a statute must be construed if fairly possible so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score citations omitted 4: holding that a statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "court ruled that Tyrone \u201cis bound by the 1989 judgment.\u201d In his appeal to this Court, Tyrone poses three questions for review, which we have rephrased: I. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in ruling that the 1989 paternity judgment could not be vacated except upon a finding of fraud, mistake, irregularity, or clerical error? II. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or fact in denying his request for blood or genetic testing under F.L. \u00a7 5-1029? III. Were the trial court\u2019s findings of waiver and lack of ordinary diligence legally incorrect and/or clearly erroneous? DISCUSSION I. Timing of Appeal Although not raised by the parties, we first address the jurisdictional question whether this appeal was timely filed. Newman v. Reilly, 314 Md. 364, 387-88, 550 A.2d 959 (1988)(<HOLDING>). The circuit court\u2019s memorandum opinion and Holdings: 0: holding that timeliness of filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional issue 1: holding time for filing notice of appeal under rule 8002 is jurisdictional 2: holding that where plaintiff fails to raise issue of timeliness of departments hearing at administrative level the issue is waived on appeal 3: holding that an appellee who fails to file any documents in response to timeliness show cause order or order deeming appeal timely may not relitigate issue of timeliness in appellate brief because a timely notice of appeal is a claimsprocessing rule rather than a jurisdictional requirement 4: holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla.1996). In affirming the trial court, the Simmons court found that the first prong was clearly met. See 753 So.2d at 763. However, the second prong was not met because \u201cthe statute does not alter the definition of criminal conduct and does nof constitute punishment.\u201d Id. We noted that we had previously found section 943.0435 to be regulatory and \u201c[rjegulatory statutes do not constitute punishment.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). See Walker v. State, 718 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (\u201cThe sexual predator designation \u2018is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of' certain crimes.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Ortega v. State, 712 So.2d 833, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); State, Dep\u2019t of Corrections v. Goad, 754 Holdings: 0: holding application of successor statute regarding registration of sexual predator was regulatory and not an ex post facto violation 1: holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause 2: holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute 3: holding that the ex post facto clause  has no application to deportation 4: holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); 7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury Instr. T.P.I.-Crim. 42.04 (18th ed. 2014). It is apparent, then, that the significance of a witness\u2019 demeanor , most cases will allow a successor judge to evaluate the weight of the evidence because most eases will not depend so heavily upon witness demeanor alone as the determining factor of witness credibility. We reiterate that most components of witness credibility may be determined from the record. Stated another way, the argument that a successor judge is unable to rule as the thirteenth juror presumes that the witnesses\u2019 demeanor on the stand was so significant in and of itself as to raise a concern that the jury\u2019s verdict was a \u201cmiscarriage of justice.\u201d We are not persuaded to adopt this approach. See Willis, 373 S.E.2d at 81 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that a successor judge Holdings: 0: holding that it is the exclusive province of the judge in nonjury trials to assess the credibility of witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony 1: recognizing that the argument that the nature of the witnesses testimony and their relationship to each other in this case itself creates an issue of fact as to its credibility is not legally sound 2: recognizing that in any criminal trial the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is central 3: holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts 4: holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(Emphasis in original.) 2 . Although the federal collateral order doctrine is not applied in our state courts, we believe the reasoning of these cases is sound. 3 . Two factors, the right to a fair hearing and need for witness cooperation, are not relevant because the divorce proceeding has ended. Another factor, the impact on sensitive child custody issues, is not implicated. Justice PLEICONES, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in the majority\u2019s conclusion that the order of the family court unsealing the divorce record is immediately appealable, but only because this is a final judgment of the family court. As the majority observes, \u201cNo further action is required in the family court to determine the parties\u2019 rights... apital Corp., 317 Ark. 238, 878 S.W.2d 708 (1994) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation omitted). Because the Holdings: 0: holding that ajlthough the decision we review is that of declining to unseal the records the issue is whether the records should have been sealed in the first place and the one who seeks to overcome the expectation of access bears the burden of establishing the requisite important state interest 1: recognizing that the defendant bears the burden of establishing that plain error was prejudicial 2: holding that when state law prohibited discovery of records of a medical review committee the district court should have determined whether the records came within the statutes coverage and if so whether the right of access nevertheless outweighed the public policy expressed by state law 3: holding that if the court determines that the papers and records should be kept confidential the burden to show good cause would be upon the party requesting to unseal or open the documents 4: holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM: Eugene Dwight Hunt pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(g) (2000), and was sentenced to a fifteen-year minimum sentence because he was found to be an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924(e)(1) (West Supp.2005). On appeal, Hunt argues that the district court erred by sentencing him as an armed career criminal in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), because this judicially-imposed sentencing enhancement was neither found by a jury nor admitted by him. We affirm. Hunt\u2019s argument is foreclosed by two of our recent decisions. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 282-84 (4th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert, filed (Oct. 25, 2005) (No. Holdings: 0: holding that all facts that would enhance the defendants sentence above the statutory maximum must be found by a jury 1: holding that the fact of prior convictions under  924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under  924e 2: holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury 3: holding that sixth amendment not violated when sentence enhanced based on prior convictions that were not charged in indictment or admitted by defendant 4: holding that this court reviews a booker issue de novo where the defendant objected in the district court to sentence enhancements based on facts not found by a jury nor admitted by the defendant", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "as constitutional \u201cproperty\u201d if the person can be deemed \u201centitled\u201d to them. 2 Donald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure \u00a7 17.5, at 628 (2d ed. 1992). Applying these principles, we find no merit in Harrell\u2019s claim that the Board\u2019s failure to provide him a hearing before suspending him violated due process. He was suspended on January 17, 1990, and he continued to receive his salary until his employment ceased after the hearing on March 12, 1990. His contract and Section 22-10-17 (establishing standards and procedures for discharge of certified school employees) afforded him only the right to be fully compensated; he had no right to occupy the office of superintendent. See Royster v. Board of Trustees, 774 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121, 106 S.Ct. 1638, Holdings: 0: holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation 1: holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment 2: holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position 3: holding that faa does not occupy entire field of arbitration 4: holding that the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of a property interest in his continued employment because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned when he refused to report to work after being transferred to a new position", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "III. DISCUSSION We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain that Florida law permitted the Board to delegate to Adams authority to bind it to arbitrate disputes under the consulting contract. Second, we explain that Adams possessed implied actual authority to bind the Board to arbitrate disputes under the consulting contract. A. Florida Law Permitted the Board to Delegate to Adams the Authority to Bind the Board to Arbitration Under the Consulting Contract. Citigroup contends that ordinary principles of administrative law permit the Board to delegate to Adams, its agent, the authority to bind the Board to arbitrate disputes under the consulting contract. The Board disagrees, and advances a related argument that the Florida Sunshine Law, Fla 1, 479 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Delray Beach municipal law does not prohibit Holdings: 0: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 1: holding that the attempt to remove  a director by written consent of the board is invalid 2: holding employment contracts of former executive director of township community mental health board ultra vires and void ab initio though board members had staggered terms of appointment because the contracts extended beyond the term of the township supervisor in office at the time of the execution of the contracts and the board was appointed by the supervisor 3: holding that state law affirmatively required full board to approve employment contracts so superintendent modification was invalid 4: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "by liability for filing fees.' \u201d Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 136-37 (5th Cir.1996). Accord Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1127-28 (5th Cir.1997). 11 . See docket entry nos. 6 and 7. 12 . See docket entry no. 9. 13 . See docket entry no. 11. 14 . Plaintiff has filed several motions requesting that this Court, the Magistrate Judge, or both waive the PLRA\u2019s IPFF requirement or otherwise excuse plaintiff from paying the statutorily-mandated IPFF. See docket entry nos, 13, 16, 19, 20, 24, and 26. This Court and the Magistrate Judge denied all of those motions. See docket entry nos. 15, 17, 18, 21, and 25. 15 g that unverified pleadings and unauthenticated documents did not constitute proper summary judgment evidence); and Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d at 192, (<HOLDING>). 67 . See Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Holdings: 0: holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment 1: holding courts review motion for summary judgment in light most favorable to nonmovant 2: holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant 3: holding that a nonmovant could not oppose a summary judgment motion with an unauthenticated letter 4: holding that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered at summary judgment", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "his second motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Based upon the trial court\u2019s thorough order and record attachments, we affirm finding that the claims raised could have been raised in the defendant\u2019s first motion for postconviction relief, and are, therefore, procedurally barred, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(\u201cA second or successive motion may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the movant or the attorney to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure governed by these rules.\u201d); Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199 (Fla.2002)(<HOLDING>); Scrambling v. State, 919 So.2d 671 (Fla. 5th Holdings: 0: holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied 1: holding that a successive 3850 motion can be denied on the ground that it is an abuse of process if there is no reason why the issue could not have been raised in a previous motion 2: holding that defendants 3850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the defendants current rule 3850 motion is one that could have or should have been raised in his first rule 3850 motion 3: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal 4: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Cardiovascular as shielding continuations-in-part from narrowing disavowals made in parent applications. Our precedent holds to the contrary, indicating that an interpretation asserted in the prosecution of a parent application can also affect continuation applications, Elkay, 192 F.3d at 980, 52 USPQ2d at 1114, continuation-in-part applications, Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1384, 53 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed.Cir.1999) (\u201c[T]his subject matter is common to the continuation-in-part application, and argument concerning the [prior art] reference was correctly viewed as applying to the common subject matter.\u201d), and even related continuation-in-part applications arising from the same parent, Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 818, 14 USPQ2d 1863, 1869 (Fed.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, that the '678 patent is a Holdings: 0: holding that claim 22 which depends from nonexistent claim 38 could be corrected because the error in the dependency was evident based on the face of the patent and that the correct antecedent claim was apparent from the prosecution history 1: holding that when two patents issued from continuationinpart appliea tions derived from one original application the prosecution history of a claim limitation in the first patent to issue was properly applied to the same claim limitation in the second patent to issue 2: holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if 3: holding that in order to understand patent claims a court can take instruction from the other claims the specification and the prosecution history 4: holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "operations\u201d test and other federal choice-of-law requirements are fulfilled. See Guerra v. Selsdon Mar. Corp., 711 So.2d 1298, 1298 (Fla.Ct.App.1998) (\u201cEven if ... the action is properly maintainable under the Jones Act on the principle adopted in [Rhoditis], the trial court correctly concluded that forum non conveniens is applicable to such an action in the Florida state courts ....\u201d) (internal citations omitted); see also perations\u201d requirement fulfilled where record reflected that the defendants maintained offices in Florida and New York, operated cruise ships out of two ports in Florida and elsewhere in the U.S., offered special rates to customers in the Continental United States, and employed shipping agents and a doctor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); cf. Cooper, 575 F.3d at 1178 (<HOLDING>); Membre\u00f1o v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 425 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that us are accorded wide latitude in calendar management and the court will not micromanage their scheduling decisions any more than when it reviews such decisions by district judges 1: holding base of operations requirement fulfilled where defendant kept its largest office in new york was 95 owned by a us domiciliary who had lived in the united states for twentyfive years and derived its entire income from shipping cargo to or from the united states 2: holding that the courts jurisdiction is limited to the appeal of final board decisions that are adverse to the claimant 3: holding that the puc does not have the authority to regulate or control the management decisions of a utility absent a finding that the management decision would adversely affect the public 4: holding base of operations requirement unmet absent information demonstrating that the us is where the defendants operations occur management decisions are made or revenues are generated", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "October 14, 1996, at A NEWS. 20 . Id. 21 . Bruce Mohl, Student Credit Cards: A visa to Big-debt Land, San Diego Union-Tribune, October 10, 1996, at LIFESTYLE. 22 . Consumer Bankruptcy News, Consumer Bankruptcies Continue to Set Record Pace, July 3, 1997. 23 . Faulkner & Gray, Inc., Fending Off the Personal Bankruptcy Plague, Bank Technology News, March 1, 1997. 24 . Id. 25 . Faulkner & Gray, Inc., Fending Off the Personal Bankruptcy Plagu 985). 87 . 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 523(a)(2)(C). 88 . Id. See also Citibank South Dakota, N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir.1996). 89 . Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Hernandez (In re Hernandez), 208 B.R. 872, 881 n. 17 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1997). See also AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Acker (In re Acker), 207 B.R. 12, 16 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); First Card Serv., Inc. v. Kitzmiller (In re Holdings: 0: recognizing presumption 1: holding that a presumption of fraud eliminates the need to prove reliance 2: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to the ute citizens presumption of reliance 3: recognizing a rebuttable presumption of reliance in rule 10b5 4: holding that plaintiff failed to prove reasonable reliance on a false statement", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Miller\u2019s awareness of problems other companies had experienced with their silage bag manufacturers nor the fact that Miller contemplated sending Hyplast\u2019s bags to an independent lab for testing is sufficient \u201cto show whether a reasonable person, in similar circumstances to Miller, would have conducted such an independent lab analysis or adopted some other quality control measure.\u201d J.A. 2612. In its reply brief, Farrar simply argues that the district court erred in concluding that Farrar failed to create a jury issue with this theory without addressing, or even acknowledging, the basis for the district court\u2019s ruling. See Appellants\u2019 reply brief at 25-29. Thus, Farrar\u2019s argument is waived for this reason as well. See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 653 n. 7 (4th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). III. Farrar next maintains that the district Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant developed his argument sufficiently to raise the issue for appellate review 1: holding that conclusorily assigning error without providing supporting argument is insufficient to raise issue 2: holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment 3: holding that random mention of an issue without elaboration or supporting authority is insufficient to raise issue for appellate courts consideration 4: holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "high among the interests in our jurisprudential system is that of finality of judgments. It has become almost a judicial commonplace to say that litigation must end somewhere, and we reiterate our firm belief that courts should not casually permit the relitigation of litigated issues out of a friendliness to claims of unfortunate failures to put in one\u2019s best case. 563 F.2d at 33. Turning to the prevailing doctrine, it should be no surprise that for a movant\u2019s case to succeed, the material offered in support of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion must be \u201chighly convincing.\u201d Id. For example, it is well established that a supervening change in decisional law on its own is insufficient to afford relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See id.; Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 749 (5th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In fact, absent a sufficient showing of Holdings: 0: holding that the state law violated equal protection principles 1: holding the best interest of the child standard does not violate federal constitutional principles 2: holding that changes in decisional law based on constitutional principles are not of themselves extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify rule 60b6 relief 3: recognizing that postoffense rehabilitative efforts while normally not grounds for departure may support departure in extraordinary circumstances and noting that the totality of the circumstances may justify a departure where a single circumstance is not alone sufficient 4: holding in review of a downward departure that an extraordinary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "longer than eight consecutive years. 15 . A member who has not been nominated for a second term is not disqualified from serving as a holdover under the plain language of HRS \u00a7 26-34(b), as the member continues to occupy a status of being eligible for nomination and confirmation, whereas the Senate\u2019s rejection of a member\u2019s nomination for a second term renders the member ineligible, and therefore disqualified for membership under subsection (a). 16 . This court has stated that under HRS \u00a7 26-34, \"the governor would be entitled to at least a reasonable time after a term expires to nominate a qualified person to a board or commission.\u201d Life of the Land v. Burns, 59 Haw. 244, 251, 580 P.2d 405, 410 (1978). See Hanabusa v. Lingle, 119 Hawai'i 341, 351, 198 P.3d 604, 614 (2008) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 17 . The Senate's discussion of the amendment Holdings: 0: holding that where the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal the plainness of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal 1: holding that the university of californias board of regents is shielded from suit under the eleventh amendment 2: holding that governors duty to nominate and appoint members of the board of regents of the university of hawaii is subject to a reasonable time standard judged by the totality of the circumstances 3: holding that communications between the university of colorados counsel and former employees of the university concerning activities during their period of employment may be protected by the attorneyclient privilege under the rationale presented in upjohn but holding that the university waived the privilege by disclosing the documents 4: holding that the legislature which created the state board of education has the power to abolish modify and control it and therefore had the power to do away with the prerequisite that the senate affirm the governors appointments of all commissioners serving on the board", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1978))). Loop-Net challenges the reasonableness of hours claimed and rates charged by CoStar\u2019s counsel as well as the amount of their expenses. 1. Reasonable Billing Rate \u201cTo inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence ... that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.\u201d See Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541. A rate determined in this way is normally deemed reasonable, and is referred to as the prevailing market rate. Id. Evidence of the prevailing market rate usually takes the form of affidavits from other counsel attesting to their rates or the prev (10th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). CoStar requests the following rates for its Holdings: 0: holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate 1: holding that the district court should have looked to prevailing rates in the area 2: holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area 3: holding that the fee applicant must produce specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award 4: recognizing that rates awarded in other cases do not set the prevailing market rateonly the market can do that", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.1986). What is most important for case-dispositive sanctions is whether the misconduct \u201cthreaten[s] to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.\u201d Valley Engineers Inc. v. Elec. Eng\u2019g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir.1998). Accordingly, \u201c[dismissal is appropriate where a pattern of deception and discovery abuse [make] it impossible for the district court to conduct a trial with any reasonable assurance that the truth would be available.\u201d Id. (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir.1995)); see Oil States Skagit Smatco, 664 at 79 (affirming district court\u2019s determination that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction where a plaintiff lied at deposition); Arnold, 2012 WL 3276979 at *15 (<HOLDING>); Knapp v. Convergys Corp., 209 F.R.D. 439, 443 Holdings: 0: holding that lesser sanctions would not be appropriate where a plaintiff repeatedly lied at deposition and refused to comply with discovery obligations 1: holding default was the appropriate remedy for failure to comply with numerous court orders and discovery requests 2: holding if a deposition is taken for discovery only  not for use at trial the deposition is not a stage of trial for which the defendant must be present 3: holding that dismissal for failure to comply with discovery orders is on the merits 4: holding that under new york law a dismissal for failure to comply with discovery obligations is not a judgment on the merits and does not bar a subsequent suit involving the same parties and issues", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that \u201ca large percentage of his income comes from doing examinations and giving testimony for defendants and insurance companies and that more than approximately 90% of his opinions are contrary to the opinions of the physicians who actually treat the patients.\u201d (Paper No. 24 at p. 4). It is true that Rule 35 confers on the moA\u00dang party no absolute right to choose the examiner, and that the Court has the authority to reject an examiner proposed by a party upon a sufficient shoAving of bias or prejudice. See 8A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 2234.2, at 486; cf. Main v. Tony L. Sheston-Luxor Cab Co., 249 Iowa 973, 89 N.W.2d 865 (1958) (rejecting physician who was also a client of defendant\u2019s attorney); Adkins v. Eitel, 2 Ohio App.2d 46, 206 N.E.2d 573 (1965) (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, even assuming the Holdings: 0: holding that a district court may preclude a defendant from invoking the adviceofcounsel defense when he refused to answer questions regarding relevant communications with counsel 1: holding district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing government to ask leading questions of eightyearold witness reluctant to testify regarding sexual abuse 2: holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions 3: holding that an inmates eighth amendment legal claims were straightforward and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel 4: holding an abuse of discretion by trial court to appoint physician when attorney refused four times to answer questions regarding his business relationship avith the doctor", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to recover further response costs.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9613(g)(2). The question posited here is whether, under section 113(g)(2), a plaintiff can seek a declaratory judgment, as distinct from contribution or indemnification, without first incurring response costs. Because no party has cited any Supreme Court, First Circuit or District of Massachusetts case addressing this issue, the court has looked to case law from other jurisdictions. The clear answer derived therefrom is that the incurrence of response costs is a prerequisite to declaratory r In re Dant & Russell); Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 825 F.Supp. 1575, 1582 n. 14 (S.D.Fla.1993) (allowing declaratory judgment \u201c[bjecause an expenditure has been made\u201d); Bowen Eng\u2019g v. Estate of Reeve, 799 F.Supp. 467, 476 (D.N.J.1992) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir.1994); United Holdings: 0: holding that the proper remedy for future response costs is not a present lumpsum payment of anticipated expenses but instead a declaratory judgment award dividing future response costs among prps 1: holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action 2: holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken 3: holding that declaratory relief only appropriate once some expenditure has been made toward necessary response costs 4: holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "7:08-CV-211-FL, 2010 WL 4484447 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 25, 2010). 6 . In providing guidance to lower courts as to what might constitute a watershed procedural rule falling within the second Teague exception, the Supreme Court has referred only to the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which held that state courts must provide counsel for indigent criminal defendants. Indeed, the Gideon decision \"alter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.\u201d Beard, 542 U.S. at 418, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The new procedural rule announced in Padilla, in contrast, \"has none of the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon.\" Id. at 420, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (<HOLDING>). 7 . Petitioner, for her part, states in a Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs have standing to pursue facial challenge to alleged prior restraint without the necessity of first applying for and being denied a permit citing city of lakewood v plain dealer publishing co 486 us 750 108 sct 2138 100 led2d 771 1988 1: holding that simmons announced a new rule and retrospective application of the rule was barred by teague 2: recognizing that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 that the eighth amendment prohibits any barrier to the sentencers consideration of mitigating evidence was not a watershed procedural rule falling within the second teague exception 3: holding that the rule announced in mills v maryland 486 us 367 108 sct 1860 100 led2d 384 1988 doesnt apply retroactively on collateral review 4: holding that united states v gaudin 515 us 506 115 sct 2310 132 led2d 444 1995 which shifted the determination of materiality in a prosecution under 18 usc  1001 from the judge to the jury was not a watershed rule justifying retroactive collateral review under teague", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Barnes was registered as Hebrew Israelite and not Jewish, he was not given kosher meals. Barnes wrote letters and filed a grievance requesting kosher meals, and on June 23, 2004, the Central Office Review Committee granted the grievance, concluding that it was \u201cappropriate\u201d for inmates self-identifying as Hebrew Israelites to be given Kosher meals. Barnes began receiving kosher meals shortly thereafter. Hence, while Barnes was first denied kosher meals in accordance with Southport policy because he had not registered as Jewish, the decision was reversed by central DOCS authorities after Barnes complained. While it was clearly established in 2004 that inmates had the right to a diet consistent with their religious beliefs, see Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495-96 (2d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Holdings: 0: holding orthodox jewish inmates are entitled to a kosher diet 1: holding orthodox jewish inmate was entitled to kosher meals 2: holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative 3: holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate 4: holding that prison official could not deny inmate kosher meals based on rabbis determination that inmate was not jewish under judaic law", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "they nevertheless were the bases for the upward departure for which Garrison was prepared by the notice in the revised PSR. 31 . Sentencing Guidelines policy statements are binding on federal courts as interpretive guides to the , meaning of an applicable guideline. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 200-01, 112 S.Ct 1112, 1119, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992); Stinson, 508 U.S. at 42, 113 S.Ct. at 1917. 32 . The district court's factual findings concerning the \u00a7 5E1.2(d) factors in determining a fine is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard and is to be distinguished from our abuse-of-discretion review of the district court\u2019s decision to depart upward. See Long, 122 F.3d at 1366; Lombardo, 35 F.3d at 527; see also United States v. Rowland, 906 F.2d 621, 623 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 33 . As the PSR recommended, the district Holdings: 0: recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error 1: holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine 2: holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine 3: holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it 4: holding that when a fine is paid there is a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law and that the fine cannot be reimbursed in order to punish the defendant instead with imprisonment", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "considering Thompson filed his Statement within 21 days of the order, his Statement is timely. 3 . There is no dispute section 6309.2 is applicable. Section 6309.2, as amended throughout the years, is applicable to Philadelphia, the only city of the first class in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Henley, 909 A.2d 352, 362 (Pa.Super.2006) (en banc) (citing the Historical and Statutory Notes following section 6309.2). See also Appellant\u2019s Brief at 12. 4 . As also explained below, Thompson does not contend the police did not have the authority to immobilize the vehicle. Instead Thompson argues the police, under the circumstances, did not have the authority to tow the vehicle before the expiration of the 24-hour immobilization period. 5 . See Henley, 909 A.2d at 364 (<HOLDING>) 6 . Regardless of whether Thompson actually Holdings: 0: recognizing that police perform a community caretaking function separate and apart from the enforcement of criminal statutes 1: recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement 2: holding that section 63092 coexists with the traditional community caretaking functions of the police 3: recognizing that the community caretaking function as an exception and enunciating a test for its application 4: recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the judge\u2019s comments in any way influenced (or even could have influenced) the jury. As such, the trial judge\u2019s comments did not violate OCGA \u00a7 17-8-57. Additionally, the trial court committed no error by allowing the State to reopen the case to establish venue. Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Blackwell, J., concur. 1 Additionally, Davenport was found guilty of driving under the influence of methamphetamine and two counts of improper lane change, although he does not challenge those convictions on appeal. 2 We note that any inconsistencies in the jury\u2019s verdicts between the co-defendants have no bearing on our review of the appellants\u2019 claims because the inconsistent-verdict rule has been abolished in Georgia. See Parker v. Mooneyham, 256 Ga. 334, 335 (349 SE2d 182) (1986) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v. Holdings: 0: holding that cjonsistency in the verdict is not necessary and refusing to allow inconsistent verdicts to be upset by speculation or inquiry into the possibility of compromise or mistake on the part of the jury 1: holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts 2: holding that the principles applicable to inconsistent verdicts against one defendant are applicable to inconsistent verdicts between codefendants 3: holding that joint trials promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts 4: holding rule applicable to witness", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Christopher S. Martinez appeals pro se from the dist ev. Adv. Op. 34, 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (2013) (describing requirements of quiet title action under Nevada law); Edelstein v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 48, 286 P.3d 249, 257-60 (2012) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Holdings: 0: recognizing in a materially similar situation the authority of mortgage electronic registration system inc to assign both the note and deed of trust on behalf of the original lender and the lenders successors and assigns 1: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title 2: holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given 3: holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan 4: holding that the putative noteholder lacked standing to foreclose because mers lacked authority to assign the note though it arguably had authority to assign the mortgage", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "was postponed until after the ruling on the merits, this does not mean that we may simply assume that they have standing to raise challenges to the statute on behalf of any members of the putative class. For example, because Willey has not established that he is a professional gambler, he lacks standing to raise the as-applied constitutional claims of professional gamblers notwithstanding that this case has been filed as a class action. In order to represent a class, the petitioners must be part of that class, possessing the same interest and suffering the same injury as the class members. Even the cases cited by the petitioners in support of their argument are, in fact, fully consistent with this rule. See Kinney v. Metro Global Media, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 173, 181 (D.R.I. 2001) (<HOLDING>); Gen. Elec. Co., 154 N.H. at 463 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent 1: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 2: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 3: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 4: holding that putative class representatives had standing to represent the class even when they owned stock for only part of lengthy class period because they alleged a common course of conduct to defraud over that entire period including the period during which they owned stock", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Hansen\u2019s release does not bar her claims against Ford. Ford counters that adoption of a specific identity rule ignores the unambiguous language of the release and ignores the intentions of the parties. Ford also argues that adoption of the specific identity rule would deprive the settling defendant of important rights, including contribution rights and the right to be free from further litigation. Finally, Ford argues that Perea correctly concluded that releases should be interpreted according to general contract law principles and thus urges us to affirm the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment. Those courts adopting the flat bar rule hold that language such as \u201call other nt number of courts, however, have opted for the specific identity rule. See, e.g., Young, 455 P.2d at 893 (<HOLDING>); Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 299 Ark. 232, Holdings: 0: holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release 1: holding that release must specifically name or otherwise specifically identify the persons to be discharged 2: holding that in order to fulfill legislative intent to abolish commonlaw release rule general release must specifically identify parties to be released 3: holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release 4: holding that release discharges only those tortfeasors specifically named in the release agreement", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "County v. Breedlove, No. 11-03-00356-CV, 2004 WL 2549146, at *2 (Tex.App.-Eastland Nov. 4, 2004, no pet. h.). 9 . Within section 101.021(1)(A), \"use\u201d means \u201cto put or [to] bring into action or service; to employ for or [to] apply to a given purpose,\u201d and \"operation\u201d means a \"doing or performing of a practical work.\u201d LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.1992) (quoting Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989)). Ballard does not explain how failing to secure a detainee within a vehicle constitutes the \"put[ting] or bring[ing] into action\u201d of, or the \"doing or performing of a practical work\u201d with, the vehicle itself. See id. But cf. Finnigan v. Blanco County, 670 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (<HOLDING>). However, given our disposition, we need not Holdings: 0: holding mr contrisciane was occupying his insured vehicle when he was struck and killed by an uninsured vehicle after leaving his car to walk over to patrol car with his drivers information as directed by police officer 1: holding that the defendants possession of contraband in a jail was not the result of a voluntary act on his part because officers brought him into the jail under arrest 2: holding that officers exiting and leaving patrol car running beside jail near jail escapee who then commandeered car was use of vehicle within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver 3: holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offense of supplying contraband to a jail because the defendant was not in possession of the drugs when he was taken to jail where the arresting officer entered the jail with the drugs 4: holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "relief at the time of the hearing. Because Lopez-Velasquez has not established that his deportation order was invalid, his motion to dismiss his \u00a7 1326 indictment was improperly granted. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court\u2019s order granting the motion to dismiss the indictment. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . The other category was a general amnesty program for aliens who had resided continuously in the United States since 1982. 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1255a. 2 . Although we and the Second Circuit have held that an IJ's failure to inform an alien of possible eligibility for discretionary relief constitutes a due process violation, most other circuits have adopted a more limited interpretation of the IJ\u2019s duty to inform. See United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 70-73 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 Holdings: 0: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 1: holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he is eligible for relief from deportation constitutes due process violation where alien establishes prejudice 2: holding that failure to advise an alien of possible forms of relief may violate due process 3: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim 4: holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he was eligible for relief from deportation constitutes a due process violation if alien establishes prejudice", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), is not applied to hybrid cases except those involving unemployment compensation); see also MoConnell, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1127-28 (noting that \u201c \u2018compelling interest\u2019 standard is a misnomer\u201d for hybrid rights claims but that Court outlined standard of review entails \u201cheightened scrutiny\u201d). The Tenth Circuit clearly agrees that the proper scrutiny for review of a hybrid rights claim is a heightened one. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699. However, because the Swanson court determined that the Plaintiffs did not have a colorable hybrid claim, it did not apply any heightened standard of scrutiny test and did not detail which heightened standard test discussed by the Smith Court would actually apply. See Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700 (<HOLDING>). Swanson does offer guidance, however, on the Holdings: 0: holding that where no colorable claim can be construed from a complaint it should be dismissed 1: holding that we could not review an aliens colorable due process claim that an ij was not impartial because the alien raised the claim for the first time on appeal 2: recognizing that appellate counsel is under no duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by a client 3: holding that this is not a hybridrights case because plaintiffs demonstrated no colorable claim of infringement on the constitutional right 4: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "conviction and resentencing for a lesser-included offense, where the jury had not been instructed on that lesser offense at trial. The Court of Appeals below answered in the affirmative and remanded for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of attempt to commit the eight violations of the WQA. Villa, 2003-NMCA-142, \u00b6 45, 134 N.M. 679, 82 P.3d 46. The Court of Appeals held that an appellate court may remand for resentencing for a lesser offense on which the jury was not instructed, provided the following conditions are met: (1) there is a failure of proof of one element of the greater offense; (2) the evidence is sufficient to sustain all the elements of the lesser offense; (3) the lesser offense is included in the greater; and (4) no undue prejudice to the de 2d 862, 869 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Significantly, the trial courts in both Holdings: 0: holding the interests of justice would not be served by remanding for new trial on the offense of seconddegree murder 1: holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder 2: holding that although premeditation is outside the heartland of seconddegree murder guideline upward departure from seconddegree murder guideline based on premeditation was improper because commission considered the defendants state of mind in assigning a higher base offense level to firstdegree murder than to seconddegree murder 3: holding on rehearing that the interests of justice would be better served by remanding for new trial on the offenses of seconddegree murder and voluntary manslaughter 4: holding jury instruction on lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter by act which required finding of intent to kill constituted fundamental error and required reversal of defendants conviction for seconddegree murder", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the administrative claim. Plaintiff maintains that it was not until early September of 1998 that she became aware that Defendant had decided to recruit substantially younger employees instead of her. Moreover, Plaintiff claims that her lack of diligence in discovering the true reason for her dismissal was hindered by Defendant\u2019s alleged misrepresentations concerning the possibility of future employment. Thus, Plaintiff argues that the limitations period should be tolled until she became aware of the alleged facts that led to her termination due to Defendant\u2019s misrepresentations. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites a line of Fifth Circuit Court of Ap peals cases standing for the above-stated proposition. Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau Inc., 640 Holdings: 0: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 1: holding that the limitations period should be tolled because plaintiff was told in his severance report that he might be reinstated 2: holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination 3: holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled until both the motion for ifp and the motion for counsel are ruled upon 4: holding that the limitations period is not tolled while a federal habeas petition is pending", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the district court\u2019s ruling for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). To establish plain error, Huether must show an error that is plain and that affects his substantial rights. United States v. Mireles, 617 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir.2010). But even where plain error is found, Huether will not automatically prevail as we will remedy the error only if it \u201cseriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d United States v. Robertson, 606 F.3d 943, 950 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Huether\u2019s Confrontation Clause arguments rely mainly on Bullcoming v. New Mexico, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2716, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011) (<HOLDING>) and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that waiver of the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront ones accusers cannot be presumed from a silent record 1: holding that the admission of a pretrial confession of a nontestifying codefendant that incriminates the defendant violates that defendants right to confront witnesses even if a limiting instruction is given 2: holding defendant had right to confront analyst who certified bloodalcohol report 3: holding that the defendant conceded the accuracy of his prior convictions in his psi report by failing to object to the report 4: holding that the defendants right of confrontation was not abridged where an agent discarded a handwritten draft of a report after the report had been typed", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "shows that he attempted to prevent her from transferring. The evidence shows that Captain Baldwin refused to allow Appellee to review the memorandum explaining her denial to participate in the sign-up. Had Captain Baldwin allowed Appellee to do so, she might have been able to resign her current position and participate in the sign-up. The manner in which Captain Baldwin prevented Appellee\u2019s transfer left the reasonable impression with Appellee that Captain Baldwin would not allow her to transfer to a different unit. Appellant acknowledges that one factor that can go to prove a constructive discharge is when the employer badgers, harasses, or humiliates an employee in order to encourage the employee\u2019s resignation. Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass\u2019n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The evidence shows that Captain Baldwin knew Holdings: 0: holding that in order to sustain an action for constructive discharge the plaintiff must show that the conduct resulting in the resignation violated a virginia public policy embodied in an existing statute 1: recognizing constructive discharge where employer rather than acting directly deliberately makes employees working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced into involuntary resignation 2: holding that there are seven factors a fact finder looks at to determine whether a constructive discharge occurred one of which is badgering harassment or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employees resignation 3: holding that a constructive discharge would constitute a tangible employment action and prevent the employer from utilizing the affirmative defense to vicarious employer liability for sexual harassment 4: holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of law are reviewed de novo. Andreu ex rel. Andreu v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The special master\u2019s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Id., see also Broekel-schen v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 618 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (\u201cWe uphold the special master\u2019s findings of fact unless they are arbitrary or capricious.\u201d) (citation omitted). In addition, a special master\u2019s findings regarding the probative value of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed so long as they are \u201csupported by substantial evidence.\u201d Doe v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 601 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also Burns v. Sec\u2019y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). This \u201clevel of deference is especially apt in Holdings: 0: holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony 1: holding that the decision of whether to accord greater weight to contemporaneous medical records or later given testimony is uniquely within the purview of the special master 2: holding that the weight and credibility to be given to the opinions of expert witnesses is uniquely within the province of the fact finder  in this instance the trial court citation omitted 3: holding that reviewing court should accord deference to special masters decision and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the special master 4: holding the question of whether an accomplice is credible and the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the theft to the police. The BIA determined that Cervantes had failed to establish past persecution based on his membership in a particular social group. Cervantes has failed to brief sufficiently that he was persecuted on the basis of his membership in a particular social group. Pursuant to Rule 28(a)(8)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant\u2019s argument must contain the reasons for the requested relief with citation to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which he relies. Cervantes\u2019s brief fails to meet this standard, as it contains only speculative and conclusional assertions relating to past persecution; he makes no argument relating to his membership in a particular social group. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, Cervantes\u2019s conclusional Holdings: 0: holding issues not adequately briefed on appeal are abandoned 1: holding that issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned 2: holding that issues not briefed are deemed abandoned 3: recognizing that arguments not briefed on appeal are waived 4: holding that arguments not briefed are abandoned", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the two parties, and whether the nonsignatory re 441 (7th Cir.2012) (reasoning that \u201c[w]ere it not for judicial willingness in appropriate circumstances to enforce forum selection clauses against [nonparties], such clauses often could easily be evaded\u201d). Sk\u00f3ld alleges that S.A. is the owner of Inc., the successor-in-interest to Col-lagenex (the original signatory). Compl. \u00b6 8. He also alleges that S.A. has received a direct benefit from the agreement: according to the Complaint, S.A. has \u201ctaken the fruits of the Sk\u00f3ld-Collagenex contract \u2014 the trademark and related goodwill associated with the Restoraderm\u00ae name\u2014 and used those assets in the marketing and sale of its Cetaphil\u00ae products.\u201d PL\u2019s S.A. Opp\u2019n at 8. See Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc., 887 F.Supp.2d 598, 607 (E.D.Pa.2012) (<HOLDING>). He further alleges that S.A. has \u201cregistered Holdings: 0: recognizing that a forum selection clause also applies to a nonsignatory third party where the third partys conduct is closely related to the contractual relationship or the contractual dispute and where the third party enjoys financial benefit from the contract 1: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant 2: holding that sovereign immunity also applies to cross claims and third party claims 3: holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys 4: holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting from defendants injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has contractual business relationship", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the Commission to divide Newark and Jersey City into no more than two districts each, and could not be ignored unless it would have been impossible to comply with both federal and state requirements. See Scrimminger, supra, 60 N.J. at 489, 291 A.2d at 137-38. Although I acknowledge that the provision has been breached in practice in the past, without objection from either political party, it is this Court\u2019s duty when presented squarely with the question of the provision\u2019s enforceability to answer that legal question of constitutional significance cognizant of, but not foreclosed by, what went before. The unambiguous language is entitled to enforcement by this Court unless there is a contradictory requirement of higher law. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247 (N.C.2003) (<HOLDING>) challengers of redistricting plan proved that Holdings: 0: recognizing that a redistricting plan can be driven at least to some extent by partisan interests 1: holding courts attempt to recognize actual jury verdict was improper in wake of landgraf but affirming judgment on basis of courts own findings of fact and conclusions of law 2: recognizing frequent use of respect for municipal boundaries as criteria in evaluating redistricting plan 3: holding that state appropriation to ports authority violated constitutional prohibition against state debt and other constitutional provisions 4: holding that redistricting plan violated state constitutional mandate and thus affirming trial courts findings that 1", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "attribute, entitles the defendants to immunit U.S. 167, 174-75, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) (retaliation for complaints of unlawful discrimination is a form of discrimination). Under these precedents, plaintiffs such as Blasic can challenge as discriminatory actions that were taken against them for reporting unlawful discrimination, even if the plaintiffs were not subject to discrimination based upon their own race, gender, or similar protected status. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) (permitting white plaintiff to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1982\u2019s racial discrimination provisions because he suffered retaliation for protesting discrimination against black person); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (<HOLDING>). In sum, the grant of summary judgment against Holdings: 0: holding eeoc could maintain action alleging discrimination against male employees in the administration of the retirement system although original charge was filed by female alleging discrimination on the basis of her sex 1: holding male athletic coach could bring suit under prohibition on sex discrimination in title ix of the education amendments of 1972 because coach alleged that he suffered adverse consequences for protesting discriminatory treatment of female athletes 2: holding that a class of all high school female athletes could not be certified  even if the alleged conduct of the defendant school system was discriminatory  when some female athletes did not share the same goals or interests as the named female plaintiffs because those unnamed female athletes were satisfied with andor benefitted from the alleged discriminatory treatment 3: holding that third persons do not have standing to assert title ix claims on behalf of female athletes 4: holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "actions which are instituted before the administrative remedies are exhausted under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2675(a), even in cases where no substantial progress has taken place in the litigation before the administrative claim is finally denied. See also Lazarini v. U.S., 898 F.Supp. 40, 44 (D.P.R.1995) (\u201cPlaintiff must comply with the procedures established in order to proceed with suit against the United States, and failure to comply with the procedural regulation mandates the dismissal of the action.\u201d); see also Flory v. U.S., 138 F.3d 157, 159-160 (5th Cir.1998) (reading FTCA as literally requiring plaintiff to first exhaust administrative remedies with the appropriate agency and wait for a denial of that claim before filing judicial suit); see also Jerves v. U.S., 966 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The language of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2675(a) is Holdings: 0: holding that a district court had sufficient reason to reject the plaintiffs belated attempt to amend her complaint fifteen months after the commencement of her action and nine months after the initial amendment to her complaint 1: holding that section 591610 applies to actions commenced before its effective date 2: holding jurisdictional requirements were not satisfied when victim commenced her action before receiving agencys final denial of her claim or before allowing six months to elapse from date of initial administrative filing 3: holding that party waived disqualification complaint by filing her motion six and onehalf months after learning of the potential conflict 4: holding the petitioner abandoned her cat claim when she failed to raise it in her initial appellate brief", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "recusal.\u201d Hall v. Hall, 333 Pa.Super. 483, 482 A.2d 974, 976 (1984) (citations omitted). 4 , Rule 313 provides that an appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order. A collateral order is defined as \u201can order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.\u201d Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). 5 . Father also contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the guardian ad litem by order filed September 10, 1998. We conclude that this is not a final order, and, therefore, we shall not address the merits of the issue at this time. See Givens v. Givens, 304 Pa.Super. 571, 450 A.2d 1386 (1982) (<HOLDING>). We note that if we were to conclude that the Holdings: 0: holding that courtappointed guardian ad litem for child in child custody dispute did not act under color of state law 1: holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 2: holding that a statute that provided that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem left the court with discretion to make an appointment 3: holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child 4: holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Smith upon execution of the land-sale contract. In sum, the contract called for possession to transfer to Smith at closing. None of the evidence designated is inconsistent with that provision. As a matter of law, liability under section 348, the only provision addressed by the parties, lies with Smith as the possessor of the land. II. Negligence Per Se Scheible also argues that summary judgment is improper because Jackson's violation of a city ordinance constitutes negligence per se. We do not believe the cited ordinance applies to Jackson. At the time of the accident, a Columbus city ordinance required property \"owners\" to trim street trees to certain specifications. \"Owner\" was defined to include include \"any part owner, joint owner, ten ant in commo , 225 & n. 11 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 4 . The parties have not Holdings: 0: holding that marina could not be liable for injury on a houseboat even though the marina had the right to move the houseboat in an emergency 1: holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy 2: holding that an attorney charged with misconduct had standing on the basis of reputational injury to appeal those portions of the district courts opinion that reflected unfavorably on the attorneys professional conduct even though the district court had otherwise dismissed the charges 3: holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees 4: holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim  and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976) (citing United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59, n. 25, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94, 94 S.Ct; 334, 38 L.Ed.2d 287 (1973)) (noting that courts have refused to follow administrative guidelines when they conflict with past pronouncements of an agency); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass\u2019n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (requiring an agency to provide reasoned analysis before changing its standards). The majority\u2019s reliance by analogy on state police power legislation is particularly inappropriate considering that the federal government lacks a similar police power. See Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 23 S.Ct. 321, 47 L.Ed. 492 (1903) (<HOLDING>). Although I will discuss this point more fully Holdings: 0: holding there is no such thing as a nonviolent burglary 1: recognizing that a municipal council acting as a governmental agency  is bound always to act as trustee of the power delegated to it and may not surrender or restrict any portion of such power conferred upon it 2: holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws 3: holding that there is no such thing as a federal police power except in respect of those specific subjects delegated to congress such as treason counterfeiting piracies and felonies on the high seas and offences against the laws of nations 4: holding such action violative of the high obligation of good faith and fair dealing imposed by such agreements", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to be tried, not to deciding them.\u2019 \u201d Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994)). B. Preemption Plaintiff, an i there are regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation dealing with the warning horns that \u201c \u2018cover\u2019 \u201d or \u201c \u2018substantially subsume\u2019 \u201d the issues raised by plaintiffs FELA claims here. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 352, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Eastenvood, 507 U.S. at 664-665, 113 S.Ct. 1732) (noting that the term \u201ccover\u201d requires more than just a showing that the regulations \u201c \u2018touch upon\u2019 or \u2018related to\u2019 \u201d to the subject matter); see also Major v. CSX Transp., 278 F.Supp.2d 597, 608-10 (D.Md.2003) (<HOLDING>). There are specific federal regulations Holdings: 0: holding that when the federal government puts into play a series of events which result in a taking of private property the fact that the government acts through an  agent does not absolve it from the responsibility and the consequences of its actions 1: holding that where train speed and locomotive design complied with federal regulations railroad employees fela claims were preempted by the frsa since congress has established a policy of national uniformity of laws rules regulations orders and standards 2: holding that the control factor did not weigh heavily in favor of either party after noting the detailed statutory regime the political nature of the appointment of the members of the board of trustees the retirement systems corporate status and the boards powers to sue and be sued and to buy and sell property 3: holding that the county government not the federal government was liable for the taking of an air easement over plaintiffs property even though the airport was funded in part by a federal grant based on compliance with federal regulations 4: holding that when the federal government applies its regulations and requirements to signal systems through inspection and testing the result is preemption by the frsa of the fela claims based on the design and operation of those signal systems", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the county in which such real estate or a part thereof is located . . .\u201d). 6 See Heritage Creek Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank, 268 Ga. App. 369, 372 (1) (601 SE2d 842) (2004) (\u201cNot every irregularity or deficiency in a foreclosure advertisement will void a sale\u201d); accord Oates v. Sea Island Bank, 172 Ga. App. 178, 179 (2) (a) (322 SE2d 291) (1984); Walker v. Northeast Production Credit Ass\u2019n, 148 Ga. App. 121, 122 (2) (251 SE2d 92) (1978). 7 Se. Timberlands, Inc. v. Sec. Nat. Bank, 220 Ga. App. 359, 360 (1) (469 SE2d 454) (1996) (\u201cThe minimum legal requirements of a foreclosure advertisement are prescribed in OCGA \u00a7 9-13-140 (a), and only a failure to properly include those items will render the advertisement defective as a matter of law.\u201d); ac . App. 529, 531 (1) (744 SE2d 369) (2013) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Creek Dev. Corp., 268 Ga. App. at Holdings: 0: holding that a typographical error in a security deed does not necessarily invalidate the legal description when the deed also referred to the propertys physical address 1: holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed 2: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title 3: holding that because the purchase price typically is not included in the deed this term of the contract of sale is not merged with the deed 4: holding that deed was valid when the deed was conveyed to grantee corporation which formally incorporated after the conveyance", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and Le-Blanc on all claims and awarded them damages for past mental anguish. The trial court granted a judgment n.o,v. that let stand the jury\u2019s findings on liability, but set aside the jury\u2019s award of mental-anguish damages, holding that mental anguish relating to the birth of a child is not a compensable injury as a matter of law. The issue in this case is whether Texas law prohibits Hardin and LeBlanc from recovering mental-anguish damages on their claims for IIED, conversion, and breach of contract. Our analysis is guided by two conflicting rules of law. The first is that \u201cvictims of conduct that is determined to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community\u201d should have a \u201creasonable opportunity for redress\u201d of their injuries. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 622-26 (Tex. 1993) (<HOLDING>); cf. Pat. H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a wife who invited and encouraged children to visit her premises even though she knew that husband had molested women and children in the past and might do so again could be held liable in negligence 1: holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce 2: holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted 3: holding wife abandoned her attempts to seek sanctions against husband and husband was not placed on notice that those issues would be raised again by guardian ad litem 4: holding that wife could bring iied claim against her husband and could do so within divorce proceeding subject to limitations preventing double recovery", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "muddy the decree. Rangen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 808, 367 P.3d at 203 (noting that adopting a perspective that would render a \u201cpartial decree less, rather than more, clear\u201d is disfavored). Second, an adjudicated water right is a judicially decreed property right. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011) (\u201cWhen one has legally acquired a water right, he has a property right....\u201d (quoting Bennett v. Twin Falls North Side Land & Water Co., 27 Idaho 643, 651, 150 P. 336, 339 (1915))). It is binding on the IDWR, indeed the Director has a \u201c \u2018clear legal duty\u2019 to distribute water\u201d according to decreed water rights. In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 393, 336 P.3d 792, 800 (2014); see also Musser v. Higginson, 125 Idaho 392, 395-96, 871 P.2d 809, 812-13 (1994) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Rincover v. Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to use water to generate power 1: holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district 2: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 3: holding that mandamus was appropriate to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder 4: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "statement of what the statute mean[s].... \u201d); Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160, 6 L.Ed. 289 (1825) (\u201c[T]he construction given by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction .... \u201d). Our previous applications of Zadvydas have recognized the broad scope of its ban against continued and potentially indefinite detentions. See Xi, 298 F.3d at 836 (\u201cThe Supreme Court\u2019s unqualified holding provides that[\u00a7 1231(a)(6)] \u2018does not permit indefinite detention.\u2019 It is a venerable principle of statutory interpretation \u2018that where the Legislature makes a plain provision, without making any exception, the courts can make none.\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). It is also noteworthy that, although federal Holdings: 0: recognizing that at a bond hearing there is no limit to the discretionary factors that may be considered  in determining whether to detain an alien pending a decision on  removal 1: holding that the ins lacks authority under  1231a6 to detain a resident alien for more than a reasonable time beyond the removal period if there is no reasonable likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future 2: holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states 3: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review whether alien established that he will more likely than not be tortured if  removed 4: holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "home was justified under the emergency exception because the police had a reasonable belief that there might be an injured person or another shooter lurking inside Espinoza\u2019s home. The government\u2019s argument is not supported by the record. At the time of the entry into Espinoza\u2019s house, Espinoza was in custody and detained in the back of a police car. Neighbors had reported that Espinoza lived alone, and no one reported seeing or hearing anyone besides Espinoza inside the house. When the police arrived, they did not see anyone enter the house or hear any other voices coming from inside. In short, there were no facts upon which an officer could base a reasonable belief that an emergency existed after Espinoza was in custody. See United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court stated in Michigan v. Holdings: 0: holding that warrantless search of a shooting suspects tent was unreasonable because suspect was in custody and there was no actual ongoing threat despite the recent discharge of a firearm 1: holding that threat occurring 36 days before possession of firearm not present threat 2: holding that strip search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in view of the public 3: holding that warrantless search of defendants vehicle was legal because defendants consent was voluntary even through he was in police custody at the time of giving consent 4: holding that an officer did not employ excessive force in shooting a suspect who turned out to be unarmed because at the time of the shooting the officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a threat and was armed", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to believe his workers\u2019 compensation benefits would not be reduced as a result of his decision to take disability retirement. Rather, Mr. Richard asked her \u201cwill this workman\u2019s comp affect my retirement\u201d [emphasis added]. Ms. Dodge\u2019s negative response to this question would not cause a reasonable person to believe his workers\u2019 compensation payments would not be reduced. Considering the facts of this case, we find the court of appeal erred in holding DOTD was estopped from claiming that it is owed an offset under La. R.S. 23:1225. Likewise, we find no evidence of any agreement for purposes of La. R.S. 23:1225(C)(l)(d) which would prohibit DOTD from reducing Mr. Richard\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits. See Jones v. General Motors Corp., 03-1766, p. 12 (La.4/30/04), 871 So.2d 1109, 1118 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Mr. Richard argues that even if the Holdings: 0: holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed 1: holding that contracts between employers and employees concerning wageloss benefits are not prohibited however an agreement which waives or alters statutorily established rights must be clear and unambiguous 2: holding that in order for a contract to be enforced it is necessary that all the essential terms of the contract must first be established by competent evidence and shown to be definite certain clear and unambiguous 3: holding that only deliberate clear and unambiguous statements are judicial admissions 4: holding that an appellate court must give a statute its clear and plain meaning when the statute is unambiguous", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(<HOLDING>), and 371 (conspiracy). The indictment and bill Holdings: 0: recognizing involuntary manslaughter as an offense that does not in and of itself constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for purposes of attorney disbarment 1: recognizing that a defendant may commit involuntary manslaughter if he acts in selfdefense but is criminally negligent in doing so 2: holding in involuntary servitude 3: recognizing that motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon in involuntary manslaughter case for purposes of providing notice in indictment 4: holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Price understood that he had the right to conflict-free representation.\u201d Id. Here, Movant testified at the plea hearing that he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up certain rights, including the right to be tried by a jury, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Movant also testified that, before making his statement to the police, he was \u201cadvised that [he] had the right to be represented by a lawyer, and if [he] did not have the money to hire one, one would be appointed for [him] before answering any questions ...\u201d However, there is no indication in the record that the plea court or counsel informed Movant that, if Movant could not afford counsel at trial, the court would appoint trial counsel for him. Cf. Phillips v. State, 356 S.W.3d 179, 183 (Mo.App. E.D.2011) (<HOLDING>). Nor does Movant\u2019s tentative expression of Holdings: 0: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires 1: holding that the defendants prior conviction was not obtained in violation of his right to counsel because he had the opportunity for appointed counsel at public expense 2: holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel 3: holding that at resentencing the district court was entitled to assume that the waiver was still in effect and was not required to again advise defendant of his right to counsel where defendant had waived counsel at the plea stage 4: holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "evidence that his net yearly income, averaging the years 2009 through 2011, was $138,056, or about $11,505 monthly. See In re Marriage of Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d 48, 53 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that when a person\u2019s income fluctuates, the court must average the person\u2019s income over a reasonable period of years). Melissa argues Scott\u2019s income is higher. She presented evidence that Scott\u2019s net income, again- averaging the years 2009 through 2011, was $284,889, or about $23,741 monthly. The disparity results from a dispute over whether to calculate Scott\u2019s income using straight-line or accelerated-depreciation deductions under the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. \u00a7 168 (2006). Notably, our caselaw favors the straight-line method of depreciation. See Knickerbocker, 601 N.W.2d at 52 (<HOLDING>); In re Marriage of Gaer, 476 N.W.2d 324, 329 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals may not reverse a trial courts judgment in the absence of properly assigned error 1: holding that an issue first argued in a reply brief is not properly before a court of appeals 2: holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals 3: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals 4: holding court of appeals properly recalculated income under straightline method of depreciation", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "787 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(allowing non-signatories to compel arbitration when they received rights and accepted obligations under agreements containing arbitration clauses, and the claims against them arose solely in connection with their activities as officers and directors of a signatory); Ocwen Fin. Corp. v. Holman, 769 So.2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(same). This case is distinguishable from Koech-1% Tenet and Ocwen. In each of those cases, in addition to receiving rights and accepting obligations under an agreement containing an \u25a0 arbitration provision, the non-signatory party was an agent, officer, or director of a signatory. We conclude that such a relationship is critical to the exception that Turner wishes to apply. See MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (<HOLDING>). However, neither Turner nor Advanced has such Holdings: 0: holding that state law governs whether an arbitration clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the faa 1: holding that an exception to the rule that a nonsignatory cannot invoke arbitration exists when under agency or related principals the relationship between the nonsignatory and a signatory is sufficiently close that the only way to avoid eviscerating the arbitration agreement is to allow the nonsignatory to compel arbitration 2: holding nonsignatory defendants who were sued separately from signatory defendants on same claims could enforce arbitration agreement under this equitable exception further nonsignatory defendants were undisputedly agents or servants of signatory defendants 3: holding nonsignatory defendant companies affiliated with signatory defendant company could enforce arbitration agreement against signatory plaintiff when same operative facts were involved 4: holding that nonsignatory was estopped from denying applicability of arbitration clause where nonsignatory received direct benefits from contract including lowered insurance rates and the ability to sail under the french flag", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "facts] claim. Wood v. Nat\u2019l Computer Sys. Inc., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir.1987) (addressing situation where one teacher\u2019s certification scores were sent to another teacher). According to the United States District Court for the District of Utah, dissemination of private facts to an individual\u2019s employer, mother, and two siblings is insufficient \u201cpublicity\u201d as well. Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F.Supp. 1518, 1520-21 (D.Utah 1997). The United States District Court for the District of Nevada found that a creditor\u2019s telephone calls to no more than six co-workers of a debtor was not sufficient \u201cpublicity\u201d of private information. Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F.Supp. 1443, 1448 (D.Nev.1994). See also Davis v. Monsanto Co., 627 F.Supp. 418, 421-22 (S.D.W.Va.1986) (<HOLDING>); Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 64 Holdings: 0: holding that employer telling two persons outside of management level of information regarding an employees private mental health status was not the widespread publication requiredto establish a cause of action 1: holding that where statutory remedies exist private employees do not have a private cause of action for violation of state constitutional rights 2: holding that hiring of only two mental health experts was not deficient 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: holding that the medicaid statute did not create an enforceable cause of action against a private health care facility", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "enjoyment of a dwelling may support a claim under section 3617 of the Act, see Halprin v. Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass\u2019n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir.2004) (citing 24 C.F.R. \u00a7 100.400(c)(2)), the interference must constitute more than a simple landlord-tenant dispute; it must constitute a \u201cpattern of harassment, invidiously motivated.\u201d Id. Farrar\u2019s only allegation to support her claim is that she is African-American while the owner of her building is \u201cnon-Black\u201d and the representative of her building\u2019s management company is white. The mere fact that Farrar has a dispute over rent or services with the \u201cnon-Black\u201d owner and manager of her building does not establish a claim under the Fair Housing Act. Id.; see also Maki v. Laakko, 88 F.3d 361, 364-65 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). As this appeal is frivolous, the decision of Holdings: 0: holding that police officers warrantless search of rented home with consent of landlord but not tenant violated tenants fourth amendment rights 1: holding that increase in rent combined with friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under fair housing act 2: holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property 3: holding over and paying the increased rent showed an intent to exercise the option and acceptance by landlord waived notice 4: holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Amendment of the United States Constitution. The state argued the officers\u2019 entry into the apartment was with the consent of someone having apparent authority and that the search and seizure were valid because the officers had probable cause to believe a valid arrest warrant for appellant\u2019s arrest existed, and a warrant did in fact exist. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment\u2019s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, \u201c[a] warrantless, nonconsensual intrusion of one's dwelling * * * is considered presumptively unreasonable.\u201d State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn.1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684,109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). See U.S. Const, amend. IV; Minn. Const.' Art. 1, \u00a7 10. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1375, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (<HOLDING>). As a preliminary matter, since appellant was Holdings: 0: holding that in die absence of exigent circumstances the mere existence of probable cause does not justify a nonconsensual entry by police into a home without an arrest or search warrant 1: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 2: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 3: holding that absent exigent circumstances the fourth amendment prohibits warrantless nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a felony arrest  notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to arrest 4: holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the dry cask storage containers, see 10 C.F.R. \u00a7 72.214 (List of approved spent fuel storage casks), or regarding whether the site and the installation, including the cask storage pads, are adequate to withstand the weight of the casks, or threats posed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes and tornados, or the threat of sabotage. See 10 C.F.R. \u00a7 72.212. Moreover, while defendants have claimed authority to consider Maine Yankee\u2019s \u201cfinancial capacity\u201d (e.g. to deal with future economic contingencies related to spent fuel disposal) in determining whether to issue a Site Law permit, they of course cannot employ a \u201cfinancial capacity\u201d requirement to indirectly regulate in the field of spent nuclear fuel storage. Cf. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F.Supp. 1220, 1232 (D.R.I.1982) (<HOLDING>). That is, the state cannot stand in the way \u00f3f Holdings: 0: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted 1: holding that state statute requiring nuclear processing plant that had ceased operations to post a ten million dollar twenty year bond to cover any expenses incurred by the state in decontaminating areas surrounding the plant was preempted by federal law 2: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 3: holding that erisa preempted state law claim brought by employer against insurance company for wrongful claims processing 4: holding the state law claims were not preempted", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of such acts. (iii) The shipping of merchandise directly or indirectly into or through this Commonwealth. (iv) The engaging in any business or profession within this Commonwealth, whether or not such business requires license or approval by any government unit of this Commonwealth. (v) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this Commonwealth. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5322(a)(1)(i)-(v). 6 . We also note that the use of video conferencing, videotape depositions for trial, and the internet are commonplace in litigation today. 7 . Since we have general jurisdiction over Defendants, we need not engage in a specific jurisdiction analysis. See, e.g., InfoMC, Inc. v. Comprehensive Behavioral Care, Inc., No. 10-4907, 2012 WL 1114360, at *9 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (<HOLDING>); Corporate Aviation Concepts, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant was assignee of assignor over whom court had personal jurisdiction 1: holding that since the court already determined that it had general jurisdiction over a defendant it was unnecessary to engage in the specific jurisdiction analysis 2: holding that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that a defendant that invokes the jurisdiction of a court as a plaintiff waives its personal jurisdiction defense in all actions related to the claim for which it invoked the courts jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "CONCLUSION Because the Department of State\u2019s decisions were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful, the Court cannot disturb those decisions; thus, Mr. Fox\u2019s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants\u2019 Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 9]. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 1 . Section 3 of the Law of Return grants every Jewish individual the right to come to Israel as an \" 'oleh \u201d (a Jew immigrating to Israel) and become an Israeli citizen. Compl. \u00b6 28; see also Israeli Citizenship Law of 1952, \u00a7 2(b)(4). See id.., Attach. 1, Ex. E. 2 . Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (<HOLDING>). 3 . The APA provides a cause of action to a Holdings: 0: holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law 1: recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights 2: recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states 3: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from asserting an indemnity claim against a state 4: recognizing the delegation of authority to the united states attorneys", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Dec. 21, 2011) (generic drug manufacturers\u2019 failure to update their labels, \u201cafter the brand named manufactur ers enhanced their warning labels in 2004, might preclude the application of conflict pre-emption, but only as to the labeling information added by the brand named manufacturers in 2004\u201d); In re Reglan Litigation, No. 289, 2012 WL 1613329 (Super.Ct. Atlantic County, N.J.2012); Fisher v. Pelstring, 817 F.Supp.2d 791, 805 (D.S.C.2011). Generic Defendants have argued that since there is a federal statute specifically excluding private causes of action for violations of FDA regulations, 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 337(a), state tort suits premised on violations of federal law are impliedly preempted. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs\u2019 Legal Cmte., 531 U.S. 341, 348, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001) (<HOLDING>). However, these failure to update claims are Holdings: 0: holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted 1: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 2: holding the state law claims were not preempted 3: holding that state law fraud on the fda claims were impliedly preempted by the food drug and cosmetic act 4: holding that state claims for fraudulent submissions to the fda were preempted", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "limit set forth in HRPP Rule 48(b) was not violated. The State argues the because HRPP Rule 48 was not violated, Maddox\u2019s counsel had no duty to file a HRPP Rule 48 motion to dismiss and was not ineffective for failing to do so. Maddox did not include as part of the record on appeal transcripts of hearings held on the State\u2019s motions to continue the trial that were granted by the circuit court. Maddox therefore failed to meet his burden of demonstrating \u201cerror by reference to matters in the record.\u201d State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai'i 333, 334, 3 P.3d 499, 500 (2000). Without the missing transcripts, Maddox cannot show that HRPP Rule 48 had been violated and thus cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a HRPP Rule 48 motion to dismiss. Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reject Maddox\u2019s claim that Holdings: 0: holding that the presumption is that the trial court acted reasonably in sentencing and that the defendant must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record that amounts to an abuse of discretion 1: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error 2: holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record 3: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail 4: holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "its claim against [the] debtor\u201d but pursuant to \u00a7 727(a)(2)(A). Id. at 288. The complaints alleged various facts concerning loan transactions between the plaintiff and the debtor and conduct by the debtor. However, the facts did not present any allegations of \u201cfraud in the execution of the note and subsequent guarantee, defalcation and/or injury to property by conversion.\u201d Id. at 292. Therefore, when the plaintiff sought to amend the amended complaint beyond the bar date by adding new facts to support new claims under \u00a7\u00a7 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4) and (a)(6), the bankruptcy court denied leave to amend. Id. at 292. Other cases which have denied relation b\u00e1ck of a \u00a7 523 claim to an original \u00a7 727 complaint include: Rufenacht, Bromagen, and Hertz, Inc. v. Russell, 69 B.R. 394, 395 (D.Kan.1987) (<HOLDING>); In re McClellan, 60 B.R. 719, 721-22 Holdings: 0: holding that causes of actions against directors of corporations for breach of fiduciary duty are contract actions 1: holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs 2: holding that adea class actions are optin actions under  216b not optout actions subject to rule 23 3: recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn 4: holding that actions under  727 are factually different from actions under  523", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and found that Benitez did understand his Miranda rights. On the other hand, it is also possible that the trial court accepted Dr. Henley\u2019s opinion as accurate that Benitez did not understand those rights and applied the incorrect standard of \u201cdiminished mental capacity\u201d to its finding. Because the trial court\u2019s order denying Benitez\u2019s motion to suppress and its failure to make critical Ramirez determinations of fact may have resulted from the trial court\u2019s erroneous view of the law, we reverse and remand for either a written order which makes the required findings and conclusion as to whether Benitez knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights or a new hearing and an order, whichever the trial court deems necessary. See Phillips v. State, 707 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); Wright v. State, 766 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA Holdings: 0: holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly 1: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 2: holding that the trial court must give due consideration to the applicable law and facts 3: holding that where supreme court in prior appeal reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary to determine the issue of accounting only trial court on remand could not consider defendants new defenses to joint venture and fraud claims determined in first trial 4: holding that this court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order which remanded the case so that a new hearing examiner could be appointed and a new hearing conducted where the appellant raised the issue of commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions during the original hearing", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,, an exigency sufficient to exeuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.\"). In the instant case, the warrantless search of Myers's vehicle was improper because the automobile exception to t the police to obtain a search warrant. The canine sweep at Austin High School was conducted on Thursday, December 12, 2002, at approximately 9:00 am. Myers was locked inside a classroom, and his car was parked in the school lot, police officers and school officials surrounded Myers's vehicle, and the vehicle was not obstructing traffic. The courts were probably open that day and a judge was likely available to sign a search warrant. See Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of Holdings: 0: holding that an arrest warrant  without a search warrant  does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant 1: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 2: holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person 3: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 4: holding it was reasonably practicable to obtain warrant to search defendants vehicle where courts were open on day of warrantless search and judges were available to sign warrant", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984). 3 . In determining the appellants\u2019 claims here, we need not decide whether Puerto Rico is a state under the Fourteenth Amendment or a federal territory under the Fifth Amendment. See Examining Board of Eng'r, Architects & Surveyors v, Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 600-01, 96 S.Ct 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976). 4 . In their brief, the plaintiffs also appear to complain that the defendants engaged in \"illegal detention of Plaintiffs and their employees.\u201d Appellant Br. 1, 4. However, the Complaint itself contains no allegations that the plaintiffs were actually detained. See JA 15. 5 . B & B Trucking, Inc, v, U.S. Postal Serv., 406 F.3d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy, Inc, v. United Holdings: 0: holding that if the usps abridged the plaintiffs contract rights the proper recourse would be a breachofcontract claim not a takings claim 1: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because the plaintiff tried to enlarge the federal rights that were incorporated into the contract 2: holding by texas supreme court that takings claim failed as a matter of law because the state took possession of the property in question under a contract with the plaintiff and therefore with the plaintiffs permission and consent 3: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because contract did not explicitly incorporate a federallaw provision 4: holding breachofcontract claim was preempted", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "he reports or gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person or who has requested the information from a person that the peace officer has good cause to believe is a witness to a criminal offense. Act of May 29, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 869, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2944 (amended 1993) (current version at Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 38.02 (Vernon Supp.2005)). 52 . See Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 805, 809-10 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (defendant not \"lawfully detained\u201d within meaning of st icense and warrant check on driver is generally viewed as reasonable law enforcement exercise and an \"additional component\u201d of a routine traffic stop). But see State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454, 460 (2004) (<HOLDING>); see generally 4 LaFave, supra note 35, \u00a7 Holdings: 0: holding warrant check lawful if detention not extended beyond time necessary to request license and registration and issue citation 1: holding taint from illegal detention attenuated by discovery of outstanding warrant where there was no evidence officer stopped appellant solely to request identity in order to run warrant check 2: holding encounter became improper detention when officer took passengers license back to police car to run warrant check 3: holding warrant check not unreasonable where detention not extended solely for that purpose 4: holding that one must look to circumstances of encounter to determine whether detention under fourth amendment took place", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "but also pure water and fresh oxygen for humankind. 21 . The opinions do not mention any allegation by the plaintiffs in those cases that wilderness characteristics had to be considered in NEPA documents. 22 . Several district courts are in accord with this analysis. See Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Shuford, No. 06-242-AA, 2007 WL 1695162 (D.Or. June 8, 2007) (upholding the BLM's NEPA wilderness analysis where the \"BLM evaluated ONDA\u2019s proposed [wilderness areas] and identified one parcel ... as having wilderness characteristics\u201d); Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Norton, 507 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1235-38 (D.N.M.2007) (recognizing the BLM's duty to \"address potential wilderness-quality lands through NEPA\u201d); Or. Natural Desert Ass\u2019n v. Rasmussen, 451 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1212-13 (D.Or.2006) (<HOLDING>). 23 . The BLM also suggests that it did not Holdings: 0: holding that in a redistricting case the legislature has the initial responsibility to act but in the event the legislature fails to act the responsibility shifts to the state judiciary 1: holding that the movant has the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion 2: recognizing a cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty in failing to provide relevant information under section 502a3 of erisa where the fiduciary had knowledge that its failure to provide the participant andor his beneficiaries with complete and accurate information would mislead them as to the coverages in effect 3: holding that the blm has a responsibility to provide accurate information regarding any changes to the wilderness characteristics in an area affected by its actions 4: recognizing that blm discussed the modeling results and explained the basis for its decision to discount those results", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "as exempt. See id. at 1192-93. The Court found this \u201csurcharge\u201d to be improper, holding that \u201cfederal law provides no authority for bankruptcy courts to deny an .exemption on a ground not specified in the Code\u201d and that \u00a7 105(a) does not empower bankruptcy courts to surcharge a debtor\u2019s allowed exemption for payment of administrative expenses, despite the debtor\u2019s fraudulent conduct in claiming the exemption, as doing so contravened \u00a7 522. Id, at 1195-96. While the Court\u2019s specific holding was limited to the interpretation of \u00a7 522(k), its further comments on the authority of bankruptcy courts to use their \u00a7 105 powers to remedy debtor fraud has \u201caffect[ed] a sea-change among lower courts facing this issue.\u201d Mateer v. Ostrander (In re Mateer), 525 B.R. 559, 565 (Bank. D. Mass. 2015) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court closely scrutinized \u00a7 522 Holdings: 0: holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes 1: holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary 2: holding that a debtors technically incorrect exemption in a wrongful death claim based on west virginias homestead exemption stands as claimed because the trustee did not object to the exemption in time 3: holding that while the court would have stood on solid ground presiegel in denying a claimed exemption based on the debtors attempt to conceal the existence of an insurance claim and cash payments received from his insurer and mortgage lender the debtor was entitled to claim a massachusetts homestead exemption which included the insurance proceeds despite his intentional and fraudulent conduct 4: holding despite contrary authority that husband debtor with a mere possessoiy interest was not entitled to claim a homestead exemption and stating it is a fundamental tenet of the law of exemptions that the debtor must have an ownership interest in the property before an exemption may be claimed a long line of illinois cases has required that a debtor have title or some ownership interest in property in order to claim a homestead exemption other courts deciding the issue under the federal exemption scheme have held that the key word is interest and that an interest in real property up to a specified amount implies a monetary interest more than just one spouses right to reside with the other", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "postconviction motion, because access to the files and records pertaining to his case in the possession of certain state agencies has been withheld in violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes; (9) the jury was misled in the penalty phase by comments, questions, and instructions that unconstitutionally and inaccurately diluted the jury\u2019s sense of responsibility in the sentencing process, and trial counsel was ineffective for not properly objecting; and (10) Franqui\u2019s sentence of death is premised on fundamental error because the jury received inadequate guidance under Florida\u2019s capital sentencing statute concerning the aggravating circumstances to be considered, and trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these errors. 5 . Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982, 983 (Fla.1993) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified 1: holding that the  district court did not give the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to be heard where it failed to conduct an in limine hearing and denied oral argument on the evidentiary issues 2: holding that the judge must allow the attorneys the opportunity to be heard on an initial 3850 motion in a capital case for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion 3: holding that a hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal is not required if the parties are given an opportunity to respond on the record 4: holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "270, 274 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (stating that all shareholders are indirectly affected by and benefit from a derivative lawsuit); see also Kaplan v. Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir.1999) (\u201cWe think that a shareholder who objects to the payment of a fee from corporate funds in compensation of attorneys who have brought a derivative action on behalf of the corporation has an interest that is affected by the judgment directing payment of the fee.\u201d). A 2 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cTo merely object to the settlement of a derivative action, however, the objector apparently need only own stock in the corporation at the time of the settlement hearing, and appear at the settlement hearing to raise his or her objections.\u201d); Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (<HOLDING>). Also, as discussed in Part II below, most Holdings: 0: holding noncontemporaneous shareholders status is that of an objector 1: holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a  209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status 2: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review denial of motion to continue to pursue adjustment of status if application to adjust status is futile 3: holding that the status exception extends to termination proceedings because the tjermination of parental rights is nothing more than a determination of the legal status between the natural parent and the child 4: holding that firing authority is indicative of employer status", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cTAP shall purchase TAK390MR preparations from [Takeda Japan] until the last TAK390MR patent is expired.\u201d Offer Letter at DEX1169490 (emphasis added). The Offer Letter also contains other terms indicative of an offer for sale: an initial payment of 3 billion Yen upon signing the license agreement, a royalty payment of 6% of net sales, and a transfer price per 60 mg capsule. Id. In addition, the letter indicates that the transfer price would be the same for TAK-390MR as for Prevacid\u00ae, which Takeda Japan was already selling to TAP. Id. Viewing this competing evidence in the light most favorable to Takeda, the Court finds a genuine dispute as to whether the Offer Letter amounts to an offer for sale under \u00a7 102(b) or an offer to license rights under a patent. See Grp. One, 254 F.3d at 1049 (<HOLDING>). Because there is a genuine dispute of Holdings: 0: holding that the documentary evidence was unclear as to whether group one was offering only to license the patent to hallmark and was not offering to license or sell the invention as such and that as a result the district judge erred in deciding this disputed question of fact on summary judgment 1: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 2: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 3: holding that the verification of mishlers medical license was part of the protected property interest in the license and reversing the district courts dismissal of his complaint 4: holding that whether the gerrymandering at issue was the product of impermissible racial motivation was a disputed fact and that it was error in this case for the district court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "rules apply depending on whether the cause of action sounds in contract or in torf\u2019); Buchanan v. Doe, 246 Va. 67, 71, 431 S.E.2d 289, 291 (1993) (\u201cforum state applies its own law to ascertain whether the issue is one of tort or contract\u201d). See, also, Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws \u00a7\u00a7 3.3 to 3.5 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing, generally, importance of initial subject matter characterization in conflict analysis). \u201c[I]t is well-settled Nebraska law that an insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured, whose respective rights and obligations must be determined by application of contract principles.\u201d Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 264 Neb. 337, 344, 647 N.W.2d 599, 606 (2002). See, also, Schrader v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 259 Neb. 87, 608 N.W.2d 194 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The right of an insured to recover benefits Holdings: 0: holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement 1: holding that um carriers are subrogated to any substantive defense that the tortfeasor may have been able to assert against the insured 2: holding that neb rev stat  446413le reissue 2004 barring actions for um or uim coverage when insureds underlying claim against tortfeasor expires is inapplicable when insured timely files action against tortfeasor in that circumstance applicable statute of limitations on claim against insurer for um or uim benefits is statute governing actions on written contracts 3: holding that because plaintiff released the tortfeasor plaintiff may not assert a claim against the uim carrier because of the derivative nature of the uim carriers liability 4: holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not warranted. This error relates solely to the issue of damages. The jury did not reach the issue of damages because it found that the appellees were not liable for Peterson\u2019s injuries. Recognizing this obstacle, Peterson argues: The message was ... sent to the jury that Brian Peterson would always be properly cared, for \u201cfree,\u201d and thus there was no need to give an award against the Appellee for this aspect of damages. Appellee\u2019s strategy thereby transcends the damage issue and impacts (or \u201cspills over\u201d) on the determination of liability. Initial Brief of Appellant, p. 24. We recognize that in some situations, errors relating to damages may \u201cspill over\u201d into a jury\u2019s determination of liability. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Peter Kiewit Sons\u2019 Co., 624 F.2d 749, 759 (6th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Here, however, we find no evidence of \u201cspill Holdings: 0: holding that since the jury was prejudiced with respect to its award of damages it cannot be said that its finding of liability was free from prejudice 1: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages 2: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 3: holding that when a jury finds section 1988 liability but fails to award damages nominal damages are available to plaintiff 4: holding that nominal damages award was appropriate where the evidence supporting the damages was speculative", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and offering a reasonable compromise. Nevertheless, no substantive response was received. Slightly more than a month later, defendant was \u201clocked-out\u201d of her home and, three months after that, she made her first application to vacate the sheriff\u2019s sale. Finally, since the date defendant was \u201cloeked-out\u201d of her home, nothing has happened at or to the property; plaintiff continues to hold title to it and the record reflects that it remains vacant. In the balance of equities that lies at the very foundation o 64, 232 A.2d 679 (App.Div.1967) (explaining that where mortgagor did not receive mandatory notice of sheriffs sale and had no knowledge of sale for five months, sale can be set aside). Cf., Heinzer v. Summit Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 87 N.J.Super. 430, 439, 209 A.2d 662 (App.Div.1965) (<HOLDING>). We are constrained, therefore, to reverse the Holdings: 0: holding that where defense of laches was not pleaded denial of equitable relief on grounds of laches was error 1: holding that private plaintiffs can seek equitable relief under rico 2: holding that identical language in montana postconviction relief statute bars application of laches 3: holding that plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983 4: holding that laches bars relief where second mortgagee failed to seek relief for almost seven months after learning of sheriffs sale", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "should have been instructed as to attempted second-degree murder. Accepting defendant\u2019s premise that the offense of attempted second-degree murder existed, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction. Our Supreme Court, faced with a similar argument, reached a similar result in State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357 (1998). We are constrained and guided by our precedent. Thus, while North Carolina appellate courts previously have assumed the existence of attempted second-degree murder and have shown no skepticism toward the existence of the crime, they have never directly confronted the challenge raised here by defendant. Because this Court has been advertent to logical inconsistencies in the law, see Lea, 126 N.C. App. 440, 485 S.E.2d 874 (<HOLDING>), we find guidance in our previous ready Holdings: 0: holding that attempted felony murder is a logical impossibility 1: holding that attempted felony murder was abolished 2: holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist 3: holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida 4: holding that the crime of attempted felony murder no longer existed in florida", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "aerial observation of these areas did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the marijuana in these areas was first detected in plain view while the helicopter was positioned over the abandoned property outside the curtilages. The position of the helicopter when it first spotted the marijuana is a fact-intensive inquiry that we would normally review for clear error; however, the district court made no fact findings with respect to the exact position of the helicopter upon first spotting the marijuana on Defendants\u2019 properties because the government did not raise this argument below. Accordingly, because the government failed to raise the issue below, we deem the argument waived on appeal. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 208-09, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1646, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (<HOLDING>). We also decline to review for plain error Holdings: 0: holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief 1: holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court 2: holding that a litigant who fails to raise an argument in opposition to a properly raised motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to raise that same argument later either in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal 3: holding that government lost right to raise lack of expectation of privacy argument on appeal when it failed to raise argument below 4: holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(1923) (Repl. Vol.2005) (a juror with any case that is to be tried by a jury during the same term); W. Va. Code \u00a7 61-5-3 (1923) (Repl.Vol.2005) (a juror who has been convicted of perjuiy, subornation of perjury or false swearing); W. Va.Code \u00a7 61-6-12 (1923) (Repl.Vol.2005) (a juror who participated in a mob or riotous assemblage, committed such crimes or expressed an opinion in favor of such crimes). 7 . \"We traditionally have not applied [Beckett ] to mandate the automatic disqualification of a prospective juror merely because of a ... social relationship with an employee of a law enforcement agency who is actively involved in the prosecution of the case.\" State v. Mills, 211 W.Va. 532, 538, 566 S.E.2d 891, 897 (2002). See State v. King, 183 W.Va. 440, 451, 396 S.E.2d 402, 413 (1990) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Mr. Mills has also attempted to rely upon Holdings: 0: holding that new evidence impeaching credibility of governments key witness was cumulative of other evidence of witness criminal activity 1: holding that juror was not automatically disqualified under beckett because of the jurors friendship with a law enforcement officer who was a key witness for the stale 2: holding that the trial court should have granted the defendants motion for mistrial after it was revealed that a police officer who also was a prosecution witness had sat with several jurors during a lunch break even though the witness testified that he did not discuss the business of the case with the jurors 3: holding that there could be no conscious or subconscious influence from shadow jurors contact with juror when juror was unaware of shadow jurors affiliation with a party 4: holding that a court must allow the defendant to ask in voir dire whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty and suggesting that such a juror should be disqualified for cause", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in commerce. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1127 (1999). Trademarks cannot be sold or assigned apart from their business as they do not have discrete value as property. The assignment of a trademark may be declared invalid if the trademark is assigned or sold without the asso tutory basis for the invalidation of an assignment in gross. In interpreting this Statute, courts have consistently held that the policy for invalidating such transfers is to protect the public from being misled or confused about the source and nature of the goods. Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258 (5th Cir.1999). The most telling sign of an assignment in gross is the transfer of the trademark separate and apart from any tangible assets. Pepsico, Inc., supra; Haymaker Sports v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A.1978) (<HOLDING>); Greenlon, Inc. v. Greenlawn, Inc., 542 Holdings: 0: holding the assignment invalid because the assignee never used the mark and never acquired any of the assignors tangible assets or goodwill 1: recognizing that a broad definition of stolen is consistent with the guidelines purposes and finding that the enhancement was properly applied where a defendant found a gun that was lost or mislaid by its owner who never authorized anyone to take the gun never sold it and never gave it away as a gift 2: holding that because the repose period in question was eliminated before it expired it never operated to insulate defendants from liability and never vested defendants with any substantive rights 3: holding that employee did not invoke grievance procedure where he never mentioned the word grievance to the union and where he never asked the union to take any action on his behalf 4: holding that because a claim was never raised in the district court this court would not consider it for the first time on appeal", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "standing. See id. To determine whether a licensee is a bare licensee or an exclusive licensees the court must \u201caseertain[ ] the intent of the parties to the license as manifested by the terms of their agreement and examining the substance of the grant.\u201d Textile Productions, Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed.Cir.1998); see Ortho Pharmaceutical, 52 F.3d at 1032 (\u201cTo resolve the issue of standing, we must examine the licensing agreement to determine whether the parties intended to effect a transfer of proprietary rights to the licensee as an incident to protection of its interests.\u201d). In particular, if the patent owner reserves the right to grant other licenses in the future, then the licensee is not an exclusive licensee. See Ortho Pharmaceutical, 52 F.3d at 1033-34 (<HOLDING>); see also, e.g., Textile Productions, 134 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement 1: holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion 2: holding governments repudiation of license gave patentee right to terminate license 3: holding that a licensee was nonexclusive on the ground that the patentee had reserved the right to grant additional licenses despite the existence of a righttosue clause in the license 4: holding that nonexclusive license is not transferable without copyright owner authorization", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "After a foreign judgment has been duly filed, the grounds for reopening or vacating it are limited to lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in procurement (extrinsic), satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that make a judgment invalid or unenforceable. The nature and amount or other aspects of the merits (i.e., defenses) of a foreign judgment cannot be relitigated in the state in which enforcement is sought. See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488 (1946). Id. at 867-68 (citations omitted). 987) (stating that \u201cthe grounds mentioned in Rule 60(b) which allow relief from a judgment are not available to vacate a foreign judgment\u201d under the South Dakota UEFJA); Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Wyo. 1976) (<HOLDING>). This interpretation of the UEFJA also finds Holdings: 0: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack 1: holding that a motion brought under rule 60b6 two years after the district courts judgment was untimely where the reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original judgment 2: holding that a foreign judgment for alimony and child support arrearages was not subject to attack in wyoming except on grounds that would permit attack upon any other money judgment such as want of jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment or lack of service so as to vest jurisdiction over the defendant 3: holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where  the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court  exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions 4: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "receive \u201clump-sum alimony\u201d in section F of the antenuptial agreement, did, in fact, relinquish the right to a division of the property acquired during the marriage. The Alabama trial court had no authority to disregard the antenup-tial agreement and to ameliorate, via the mechanism of a \u201cproperty settlement,\u201d any perceived harshness resulting from the wife\u2019s waiver of \u201calimony in any form\u201d because, under Mississippi law, lump-sum alimony is the functional equivalent of a property settlement. The trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding the wife any \u201cproperty settlement,\u201d much less a property settlement of $520,000, which amounts to 37.5 percent of the husband\u2019s separate property acquired during the marriage. See Richardson v. Richardson, 912 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion The husband has already paid the Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of frauds applies to a sellers wife holding only a dower interest in the property so the wife must sign the purchase agreement as well as the seller husband 1: holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage 2: holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage 3: holding that the trial court committed manifest error by substituting its judgment for that of a valid and enforceable contractual agreement between the parties when it awarded wife nearly half the value of specific assets acquired during the marriage in disregard of antenuptial agreement calling for husband to take 23 and wife to take 13 of property acquired during the marriage 4: holding that tjhere is a strong legal presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Appellees Chapter 7 Trustee Tracy D. Trunnell and Lee D. Dorsey, trustee of the Dorsey Loving Trust, concerning certain property of the bankruptcy estate (the \u201cProperty\u201d). We review de novo an appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Paulman v. Gateway Venture Partners III, L.P. (In re Filtercorp, Inc.), 163 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir.1998), and conduct an independent review of a bankruptcy court\u2019s rulings. Racusin v. Am. Wagering, Inc. (In re Am. Wagering, Inc.), 493 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm. 1. We reject Dorsey\u2019s contention that the appeal is moot. Should Appellants prevail in their claims, disgorgement of monies received by Dorsey on the sale of the Property could be effective and equitable relief. See Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 491 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that the reviewing court must accept the adverse credibility finding so long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the petitioners claim of persecution internal quotation marks omitted first alteration in original 1: holding that a case is not moot so long as the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief for the injured party 2: holding that compliance with rule 3 is both a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal internal quotation marks omitted 3: holding that appeals are moot when appellate courts can provide no effective relief 4: holding that an appeal is not moot so long as the appellate court can fashion relief that is both effective and equitable internal quotation marks omitted alteration in original", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "dimensions even after accounting for on-the-job training. (Docket Entry No. 37-1, at 60-61). The consent decree, however, would use a passing score on the knowledge test only to determine which candidates could proceed to the next steps of the exam. Although the record shows that exclusive use of a multiple-choice job-knowledge test is linked to disparate impact, the record does not show that reducing the job-knowledge test to one part of the promotion exam and grading it pass/fail \u2014 and making it otherwise irrelevant to the promotion decision\u2014 are steps tailored to the disparate impact remedy. Cf. Clements, 999 F.2d at 847 (stating that \u201cany federal decree must be a tailored remedial response to illegality\u201d); United States v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp.2d 77, 118-21 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (<HOLDING>). It appears that once a candidate\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a promotional exam was not jobrelated when it failed to test important cognitive and noncognitive abilities 1: holding that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously if it entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem 2: holding that evidence of a witnessess refusal to take a polygraph exam is inadmissible 3: recognizing and discussing difficulty in determining whether mistrial should be declared when error involves evidence that defendant refused to take polygraph exam rather than involving clearly inadmissible evidence regarding results of exam 4: holding that even if plaintiff could demonstrate that failed drug test proffered by defendant as ground for dismissal was in error that showing would not demonstrate that reliance on test was pretext for discrimination", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "heavy,\u201d as \u201cthe determination of reasonableness is a factual one, requiring consideration of all the facts and circumstances.\u201d Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting WellSpan Health v. Bayliss, 869 A.2d 990, 999 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005)). Varga challenges only one aspect of the non-compete covenant, that of its seemingly unlimited geographic extent. Varga argues that the non-compete covenant\u2019s lack of a geographic scope renders the covenant unenforceable. Such is not the case. Courts have upheld non-compete covenants lacking geographic limits (or with very broad geographic restrictions) where the employee\u2019s duties and the employer\u2019s customers were geographically broad. See Fisher Bioservices, Inc. v. Bilcare, Inc., 2006 WL 1517382, at *13 (E.D.Pa. May 31, 2006) (<HOLDING>); Nextgen Healthcare Info. Sys., Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that noncompete lacking geographic restriction was enforceable because the former employer sought only to prevent the employee from soliciting customers she dealt with while at the former employer 1: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 2: holding that a former employee was not entitled to recover a yearend bonus from his former employer where no definite sum of money or percentage of profits was promised and where the employee left the company before the end of the fiscal year in question 3: holding that question of whether former employer was entitled to preliminary injunction ordering former employees to comply with noncompetition provisions of employment agreements was moot since the noncompetition restriction expired by time of appeal 4: holding that former employees state law claim of fraud brought against his former employer was preempted by labor management relations act", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "promised financial assistance under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. We hold that Dr. Johnson has failed to present evidence of reasonable reliance, and thus her promissory estoppel claim fails. The district court granted summary judgment on this claim on the ground that it was barred by the statute of frauds. Georgia law is unclear regarding whether the statute of frauds can defeat a claim of promissory estoppel. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 Willamette L.Rev. 263, 367-69 (1996) (attempting to summarize Georgia law on promissory estoppel and expressing confusion over whether Georgia recognizes the doctrine as a defense to a statute of frauds argument). Compare Presto v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 193 Ga.App. 606, 388 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga.Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>), and Godwin v. City of Bainbridge, 172 Ga.App. Holdings: 0: holding that the absence of a binding agreement does not defeat a promissory estoppel claim 1: holding that the plaintiff failed to allege breach of a valid and enforceable contract but stated a claim for promissory estoppel 2: holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract 3: holding that unenforceable promises cannot form the basis for a claim of promissory estoppel 4: holding that the issue of whether a contract exists under promissory estoppel is grounded in contract law", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Inc. v. Carpenter, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 599, 606, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). There, the Supreme Court's primary concern was setting a high bar before permitting \"piecemeal, prejudgment appeals\u201d that run counter to \"the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until the final judgment has been entered.\u201d Id. at 605 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In this context, there is no similar concern, and thus the Objectors\u2019 argument in this respect is unpersuasive. 20 . See In re Iida, 377 B.R. 243, 259 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) (\"This public policy exception is narrow and, by virtue of the qualifier 'manifestly,' is limited only to the most fundamental policies of the United States.\u201d); In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. 333, 335-337 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (<HOLDING>); In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Inv., 421 Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death 1: holding that personal representative may amend personal injury suit to state wrongful death claim following plaintiffs death 2: recognizing and enforcing canadian insolvency courts claims resolution procedure even though it did not provide for jury trial for personal injury and wrongful death claims 3: holding that claims under 42 usc  1983 are not personal injury tort claims 4: holding that federal courts apply the forum states personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "defense based on the defense of illegality. Finally, several jurisdictions have allowed a plaintiff to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense, even after the two-year statute of limitations has run for an offensive ECOA claim, based on the principle that a contract in violation of a statute is void and unenforceable. See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F.Supp. at 329 (stating \u201ca creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance\u201d); Boone Nat\u2019l Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 374-76 (Mo.2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat\u2019l Bank, 248 Va. 245, 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The basis for this position is that the Holdings: 0: holding a plaintiff cannot assert a violation of the ecoa as an affirmative defense 1: holding that ecoa violation cannot be asserted as affirmative defense 2: holding defendant was entitled to assert an ecoa violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be to enforce conduct that is forbidden by the ecoa 3: holding even though an affirmative action for damages is barred the debtor may assert an ecoa violation defensively in the nature of recoupment 4: holding that an ecoa violation is not properly asserted as an affirmative defense to liability and should instead take the form of a compulsory counterclaim", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "than Goldens factors. Gump, 35 Kan. App. 2d at 509-12; see Board of Johnson County Comm\u2019rs, 263 Kan. at 677. While Intervenors join the Plaintiffs in arguing the Golden factors should apply, they primarily attack the three bases characterized by Judge Ireland as forming the basis for the Board\u2019s decision. We need not determine whether, as the Board argues, it also relied upon other bases, e.g., commercial wind farms would harm the county infrastructure. As explained below, we hold the bases identified by Judge Ireland are sufficient to sustain the Board\u2019s action. Aesthetics As the court held in Gump, Kansas appellate courts have long allowed aesthetics to be considered in zoning matters. 35 Kan. App. 2d at 509-10; see, e.g., Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 P. 99 (1923) (<HOLDING>). As our court acknowledged 60 years later: Holdings: 0: recognizing state laws can be preempted by federal regulations as well as by federal legislation 1: holding that zoning regulations which tend to preserve the residential or historical character of a neighborhood andto enhance the aesthetic appeal of a community are considered valid exercises of the public power as relating to the general welfare of the community 2: holding that ordinance conferred unbridled discretion where issuance of permit was subject to broad findings that proposed use will not have a harmful effect upon the health or welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the welfare of the general public and will not be detrimental to the aesthetic quality of the community or the surrounding land uses 3: recognizing in a zoning case that tjhere is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which may be fostered within reasonable hmitations citations omitted such legislation is merely a liberalized application of the general welfare purposes of state and federal constitutions 4: recognizing tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201d (Maj. Op. at 640 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S.Ct. at 2658).) Ber cause I find that this standard of intent sweeps- more broadly than required by the Equal Protection. Clause, I am unable to agree with the intent prong of the majority\u2019s three-prong test. Rather, I would require Plaintiffs to prove that\u2018this intent predominated over other considerations in the redistricting process. Although \u201c [legislation is frequently multipurposed,\u201d Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 n.11, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), the Supreme Court has expressly held that courts are equipped, in the particular context of redistricting legislation, to discern whether one consideration predominated over others, see Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (<HOLDING>). I see no reason to believe that courts are Holdings: 0: holding in the context of racial gerrymandering cases that plaintiffs must prove that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislatures decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district 1: holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant 2: holding that universities can  consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant and that a diverse student body is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify such use of race 3: holding that custody decision based on race is not justified 4: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "added). The important and relevant part of the standard established by the Second Circuit was that it allowed scienter to be shown in two different ways: (1) by alleging facts \u201cestablishing a motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so,\u201d or (2) by alleging facts \u201cconstituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior.\u201d In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir.1994). There is currently a split among the circuits as to what the appropriate pleading standard is under the PSLRA and whether it mirrors the preexisting Second Circuit standard. Compare Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.1999) and Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1999 WL 688050 (11th Cir. Sept.3, 1999) (<HOLDING>) with Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that the pslra imposes a more rigorous pleading standard than applied by any of the courts of appeals prior to the enactment of the statute 1: holding that congress intended to adopt a standard more stringent than the prepslra second circuit standard 2: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter 3: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 4: holding the pslra standard for pleading scienter is more stringent than the second circuits standard prior to the act and that motive and opportunity is not an independent basis to show defendants had scienter", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Resisting this conclusion, Monster invokes St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938), to argue that Zuckman cannot now make representations to reduce the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional minimum. See Def.\u2019s Supplemental Br. at 2 & n. 2. But St. Paul Mercury turned on the fact that the complaint was facially clear in requesting an amount of damages above the jurisdictional minimum \u2014 the complaint there expressly sought an amount greater than required under the then-governing statute, see 303 U.S. at 284, 58 S.Ct. 586, and the Supreme Court held that \u201ca subsequent amendment, reducing the sum claimed to substantially less than that amount,\u201d did not warrant remand to state court. See id.; see also id. at 296, 58 S.Ct. 586 (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court reasoned that a subsequent Holdings: 0: holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount 1: holding that the petitioner could demonstrate its constitutional standing for the first time on judicial review of an order of the land use board of appeals because the need to do so first arose when the petitioner sought to invoke the courts jurisdiction on judicial review 2: holding that in the absence of an exception a motion filed outside the twoyear period will not invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court 3: holding that on the face of the pleadings petitioner was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court and a reduction of the amount claimed after removal did not take away that privilege 4: recognizing that federal removal jurisdiction is determined by the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "9, (Vernon Supp. 1995), which provides that the judge shall direct the preparation of a report on \u201cthe criminal and social history of the defendant and any other information relating to the defendant....\u201d Appellant responds that the admissibility of the extraneous offense evidence in this case is governed not by article 42.12, but by article 37.07, which specifically made such evidence inadmissible to the of fense in this case. We agree with the appellant. We note that article 37.07 is the more specific statute concerning the admissibility of evidence at the punishment stage of trial. Moreover, it has been held in other contexts that article 37.07 controls over article 42.12 in the event of a conflict. Turcio v. State, 791 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>); Stewart v. State, 732 S.W.2d 398, 401 Holdings: 0: holding that preparation of a psi report is discretionary under article 3707 rather than mandatory under article 4212 1: holding that when the type of insurance procured is not listed in article 2104 the article does not apply 2: recognizing one reason for affirmative deadly weapon finding under article 4212 is to act as a deterrent 3: holding same conduct can be used as element of offense and also serve as basis for a deadly weapon finding under article 4212 section 3ga2 and explaining that to hold otherwise would conflict with the unambiguous language of article 4212 section 3ga2 4: holding wjhere an appeal is taken the terms of probation do not commence until the mandate of this court is issued and citing former section 8 of article 4212 texas code of criminal procedure", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is \u201cunclaimed\u201d and mail that a party \u201crefuses to claim.\u201d See Pressler, supra, comment on R. 1:5-2, comment 1 on R. 1:5-4. Although a literal distinction between the two phrases may suggest otherwise, we are satisfied that Caldwell\u2019s interpretation is consonant with the intent underlying the rules. See Town of Morristown v. Woman\u2019s Club of Morristown, 124 N.J. 605, 610, 592 A.2d 216 (1991) (observing that plain language of statute [or rule] should be given effect unless there is \u201cspecific indication of legislative intent to the contrary\u201d). D. Due process is implicated in this case because a wage garnishment affects defendant\u2019s interest by depriving him of the continued use of some portion of his property. See Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 8, 376 A.2d 909 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In New Jersey, as elsewhere, \u201c[t]he essential Holdings: 0: holding that deprivation of property must conform to due process principles 1: holding written judgment must conform to oral pronouncement 2: holding that the trial courts oral pronouncement must conform to the written judgment 3: holding that courts written sentence must conform to oral pronouncement 4: recognizing that before due process guarantees are implicated there must be a deprivation by the government of constitutionally protected interest", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Carroll\u2019s scope, however, is quite modest, as the decision holds only that the Commission lacks authority to invalidate licensees\u2019 contracts with third parties and to abrogate state-law contract remedies. See id. Although the data roaming rule dictates certain interactions between licensees and third parties, this kind of third-party impact differs in kind from the state-law contract issue at stake in Carroll. Because Verizon nowhere suggests that the data roaming rule will void third-party contracts, Carroll does not stand in the Commission\u2019s way. Third, Verizon contends that Title III gives the Commission no authority to make \u201cfundamental changes\u201d to the terms of existing licenses. See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT & T, 512 U.S. 218, 228, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Community Television, Inc. v. FCC, 216 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding right to be fundamental 1: holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes 2: holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of  changes in statutory or decisional law 3: holding that a hearing does not contemplate an oral presentation unless required by express language or context 4: holding that a sentence exceeding statutory authority constitutes fundamental error", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453 (citations omitted). That passage from Irwin, which was quoted in Bailey, supra, refers to a presumption that equitable tolling is potentially available to toll specific statutory time limits absent Congress\u2019 clear intent otherwise to rebut that presumption. See also Bailey, 160 F.3d at 1365 (<HOLDING>). The appellant cites to no language in Bailey, Holdings: 0: holding that absent a contrary congressional expression the court  would be entitled to toll the statute of limitations found in section 7266 1: holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity 2: holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations 3: holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations 4: holding that a veteran who seeks redress of a claim and misfiles his or her request for reconsideration at the same varo from which the claim originated is entitled to toll the statute of limitations of 88 usc  7266", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and substantial evidence on the whole record.\u201d Id. (citations omitted). A FOF is clearly erroneous when \u201c(1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, or (2) despite substantial evidence to support the finding or determination, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as \u201ccredible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). We review the Water Commission\u2019s action \u201cpursuant to the deferential abuse of discretion standard.\u201d Paul\u2019s Electrical Service, Inc. v. Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 419, 91 P.3d at 501-02 (2004) (<HOLDING>). However, because water is a public trust Holdings: 0: recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard 1: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard 2: holding that if the legislature has granted the agency discretion over a particular matter then we review the agencys action pursuant to the deferential abuse of discretion standard  bearing in mind that the legislature determines the boundaries of that discretion 3: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 4: holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and operation of workmen\u2019s compensation. If an employer and employee are covered by the Act, all their rights and remedies are defined exclusively by the Act. \u00a7 52-1-9, N.M.S.A.1978. As between the employer and the employee, all other common law and statutory actions are barred by the Act. Id., 94 N.M. at 61, 607 P.2d at 599. The reasoning of the Michigan Court in Beauchamp is inconsistent with the language of Section 52-1-9 and prior decisions of both our Supreme Court and this Court. Moreover, following the decision in Beau-champ, the Michigan Legislature amended its statute so as to legislatively reject the \u201csubstantial-certainty standard\u201d recognized by the Illinois Court. See Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill.App.3d 205, 155 Ill.Dec. 600, 604-05, 569 N.E.2d 1211, 1215-16 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiff also argues that since the Holdings: 0: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 1: holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation 2: holding that the modern view respecting actionable intentional misconduct by the employer is that it must be alleged and proved that the employer acted deliberately with the specific intent to injure the employee 3: holding that when an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed by that misconduct the employee may pursue a civil action against his employer and also pursue benefits under the workers compensation act 4: holding that an employee could not establish pretext when the employer in good faith believed that the employee engaged in misconduct regardless whether the employee in fact engaged in the misconduct", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or extreme hardship. 1. Prudential Has the Right to Finality of the Litigation The Court must consider the potential impact that late opt-outs would have on the Settlement. Prudential maintains that to ensure the finality the Settlement was intended to achieve, it is necessary for the Court to enforce the opt-out deadline. See In re Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir.1977) (emphasizing that in managing a large class settlement consisting of nearly one-half million people, \u2018\u201ca cutoff date [for claims] is essential and at some point the matter must be terminated\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted). The impetus for defendants to settle class action suits is finality of the litigation. See, e.g., O\u2019Brien v. Nat\u2019l Property Analysts Partners, 739 F.Supp. 896, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, to grant leave for an extension of Holdings: 0: holding that courts should consider the merits of the litigants claims the nature of the factual issues the litigants ability to present his claims and the complexity of the legal issues 1: recognizing a strong policy preference in favor of arbitration 2: recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality 3: holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination 4: recognizing policy of this court to favor complete coverage when interpreting insurance contracts", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Government. We are not convinced the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act is a money-mandating statute. It authorizes payments to local governments according to a formula, but neither the statute nor applicable regulations suggest or imply remedies for local governments that receive less than their full allotments under the formula if Congress does not appropriate sufficient funds. Language in the case law speaking of \u201cfair inferences\u201d of a right to recover and readings of statutes that are \u201creasonably amenable\u201d to money damages, suggest that the standards may lean slightly in a claimant\u2019s favor. However, we cannot read this statute to mandate compensation or to imply that money damages would be due' in these circumstances. Cf. Britell v. United States, 372 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Mitchell v. United States, 229 Ct.Cl. 1, 664 Holdings: 0: holding that mandatory language such as will pay or shall pay creates the necessary moneymandate for tucker act purposes 1: holding that the term shall is mandatory for purposes of statutory construction when the statute is unambiguous 2: holding that shall language in rule 702h conveys a mandatory act 3: holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language 4: recognizing that shall will and must are all mandatory terms", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "hearing before the district court, Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.1990), and we lack jurisdiction to consider the defaulted claims on appeal, Davis v. Woodford, 333 F.3d 982, 1007 (9th Cir.2003). The trial court\u2019s decision to combine the guilt and penalty phases of Davis\u2019s trial was neither \u201ccontrary to, [n]or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\u201d Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71. Under Nevada law, separate sentencing proceedings are only required in death penalty cases. McCabe v. State, 98 Nev. 604, 607, 655 P.2d 536 (1982) (interpreting Nev.Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 175.522 & 175.544); see also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). This standard satisfies the Supreme Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that federal courts must accept the decision of the states highest court even if it is an erroneous one 1: holding that when applying state law a federal court is bound to follow the highest court in the state 2: holding that federal courts may not substitute them reading of a state statute for that of the states highest court 3: holding that when there is no ruling by the states highest court it is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can what the highest court of the state would decide 4: holding that when applying state law this court follows the decision of the highest state court or in the absence of such a decision and any indication that the highest court would rule differently the decisions of the states intermediate courts", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Holmes\u2019 lmes and since in denying RICO standing to parties who suffer derivative or passed-on injuries. As we explained in County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839, 851 (6th Cir.1989), a case involving antitrust and RICO claims, \u201c[t]he doctrine of privity of contract ... was in its heyday in 1890,\u201d when Congress enacted the Sherman Act, and the Supreme Court \u201cstated a truth with which lawyers practicing in 1890 would have been totally comfortable when it said that \u2018[t]he general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 851 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533, 38 S.Ct. 186, 62 L.Ed. 451 (1918) (Holmes, J.)); see also Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 324 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Pik-Coal Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 200 Holdings: 0: holding that a union lacked standing to sue for injuries passed on to it by intermediaries 1: recognizing that detariffmg would result in some increased administrative costs but anticipating those costs to be initial and fixed costs only resulting from the shift to a detariffed environment  such as the cost of developing short standard contracts 2: holding that an indirect purchaser lacked standing under the antitrust laws to sue for overcharges passed on to them by intermediaries 3: holding that policy holders lacked standing under rico to sue tobacco companies for increased costs of insurance passed on to them as a result of the increased costs of treating smokingrelated illnesses 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "why the court does not find King persuasive in this matter. First, the King decision was partially based on a Third Circuit holding defining hostile work environment claims as a \u2018single cause of action\u2019; there is no such analogous holding by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See id. Second, the improper quid pro quo claim in King was against parties that appear to not have even been mentioned in the plaintiff\u2019s EEOC charge; here Soto alleges quid pro quo harassment at the hands of Tanner, the primary perpetrator mentioned in her charge. Id. at 164. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has found various Title VII claims unexhausted as not \u2018reasonably related\u2019 to the allegations in the administrative charge. See, e.g., Russell v. TG Missouri Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 747-48 (8th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Dorsey, 278 F.3d at 838 (finding \u201cclaims for Holdings: 0: holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim 1: holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation 2: holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under  1981 3: holding retaliation claim not reasonably related to discrimination charges where eeoc complaint set forth retaliation as a motive for plaintiffs termination and not as a motive for plaintiffs overtime assignments 4: holding court did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs retaliation claim where plaintiff did not check the retaliation box or describe anything that indicates such a claim in the eeoc complaint", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "independently fatal.\u201d 197 F.3d at 1310. We concluded, despite the horrific nature of the crime, and the repeated stabbings, that a reasonable jury might find adequate provocation, heat of passion resulting from fear and terror, causation and immediacy, so as to warrant a first-degree manslaughter instruction. Id. at 1309. To correct the error of the denial of the requested lesser-included offense instruction, we reversed and ordered a new trial. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 513 P.2d 335, 337, 338-39 (Okla.Crim.App.1973) (when defendant shot his wife eight times at close range, and when defendant testified that \u201cI just went blank and just stood there just pumping that gun,\u201d the OCCA ordered a new trial, holding that \u201c[t]he lack of a premeditated design to effect death should p.2000) (<HOLDING>); Boyd v. State, 839 P.2d 1363, 1367-68 Holdings: 0: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction 1: holding that instructions on depraved mind murder were correctly refused when the defendant shot the victim a second time in the chest at close range 2: holding that evidence the victim tried to keep defendant from fleeing the scene of a crime and defendant killed victim in order to escape supported the finding that murder was committed to avoid arrest 3: holding that instructions on depraved mind murder were correctly refused when the defendant entered a restaurant with intent to rob its occupants with a firearm stood directly in front of the victim raised the firearm demanded money and fatally shot the victim in the back of the chest when the victim tried to defend himself 4: holding that when defendant drove to a transmission shop where the victim worked pushed the victim to the ground and shot him twice at close range the evidence did not support a lesserincluded offense instruction on seconddegree depraved mind murder", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "where the creditor lacked the required notice, once the complaint deadline passes without extension, a court can do nothing to alter the nondischargeability of a bona fide fraud claim. The other line of decisions, which includes In re Thompson, has favored allowing the debtor to reopen the case (In re Thompson, 152 B.R. at 26), at least when the debtor has acted in good faith and the creditors will not be prejudiced. See, e.g., In re Candelaria, 121 B.R. 140, 142, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). Although one reason cited for allowing this is the desire for accuracy in the debtor\u2019s schedules (In re Candelaria, 121 B.R. at 142), the idea that newly scheduled creditors should have a limited time to file section 523(c)(1) complaints is a common thread in these cases. See In re Walker, 195 B.R. at 208 (<HOLDING>); In re Maddox, 62 B.R. 510, 514 (Bankr. Holdings: 0: holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review 1: holding that the 180day filing deadline is jurisdictional and mandatory 2: holding that in this context the filing deadline is tantamount to a statute of limitations 3: holding that it had the power to set a 90day deadline for the filing of section 523c1 complaints in reopened cases 4: holding that an agency filing deadline set forth in a regulation as a rule of administrative convenience is not jurisdictional", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "615, 629 (5th Cir.2000) (stating that an adverse employment action includes employment decisions on hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating). 21 . See Mota, 261 F.3d at 519; Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir.2001). 22 . See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir.1994) (upholding a judgment not withstanding the verdict and observing that no evidence existed of a hostile reaction to the plaintiff's protected activity). 23 . See Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir.1992) (finding that the passage of 14 months between the filing of an EEOC charge and employee's discharge was insufficient proof against retaliation claim). 24 . See Meiners v. Univ. of Kan., 359 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Fabela v. Socorro Ind. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation 1: holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation 2: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than three months after the protected activity 3: holding one and onehalf months establishes causation while three months is too long and does not 4: holding that by itself three and onehalf months was insufficient to prove causation", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The court determines that no reasonable juror following the law could conclude that Rollins\u2019 comments are because of Plaintiffs race, and thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for racial harassment, (emphasis in original). We disagree. The evidence proved a slew of vulgar and harassing comments that continued over a period of years established genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether the harassment she suffered was based on race, specifically the race of the man with whom she was romantically involved. A reasonable jury could have concluded that Rollins\u2019 comments were about that interracial relationship, and harassment based on an interracial relationship is forbidden under Title VII. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 890-92 (11th Cir. 1986) (<HOLDING>). Tomczyk presented enough evidence to permit a Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under   1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii 1: holding that an attorneys letters constitute protected conduct under title vii 2: holding that participation in an interracial relationship places a plaintiff in a protected class under title vii and  1981 3: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii 4: holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "purpose was to force a purchase of his stock at an unreasonable price.\u201d Id., 223 Pa. at 198, 72 A. at 553-54. The Supreme Court affirmed the order which had compelled the corporation to arrange for an inspection of its books by the stockholder: Realtor as a stockholder has without question the right to inspect the books of the company, at a proper time, and in a proper way, even though his only object is to ascertain whether the business has been properly conducted. Such a right is necessary for the protection of stockholders. The Realtor seeks at the present time merely for information. It may be that as a result of his examination of the books and of the records his suspicions will be shown to be groundless. Id. See also Taylor v. Eden Cementery Co., 337 Pa. 203, 10 A.2d 573 (1940) (<HOLDING>). In Klein v. Scranton Life Insurance Co., 139 Holdings: 0: recognizing principle but concluding that there was no evidence that debtor was in fact a shareholder of the corporation or that the corporate formalities had been disregarded 1: holding that even where no attorneyclient relationship exists between a shareholder and the corporate attorney this does not necessarily mean that the law firm had no fiduciary duty to the shareholder and observing that instances in which the corporation attorneys stand in a fiduciary relationship to individual shareholders are obviously more likely to arise where the number of shareholders is small in such cases it is not really a matter of the courts piercing the corporate entity 2: recognizing that a shareholder seeking to examine corporate books is vitally concerned with the salaries paid to officers because exorbitant salaries decrease the net proceeds earned by the corporation thus reducing the return from the initial investment in the stock 3: holding that the funds in the privatelyheld corporations account belonged to the corporation not to the individuals who owned the corporation and expressly stating that directors officers and shareholders of a corporation do not have standing to claim an ownership interest in corporate property in their individual capacities they must state a claim in the corporate name 4: holding that resident shareholder of s corporation is eligible for tax credit for taxes paid by corporation in another state and noting that this conclusion is consistent with the internal revenue code which provides that shareholders of an s corporation are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income tax paid by an s corporation", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not (except in cases of personal injury) ... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending. 46 App. U.S.C. \u00a7 183, revised at 46 U.S.C. \u00a7 30505 et seq. 13 . We note that on another occasion, in United States v. Nassau Marine Corp., 778 F.2d 1111, 1114 (5th Cir.1985), this Court stated in dicta that \"non-negligent shipowners may be entitled to limit their liability under [the Limitation Act].\" We of course are not bound by dicta, and in any event Nassau Marine was decided before the enactment of the 1986 amendments to the Wreck Act. 14 . See Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, . 419 U.S. 102, 134, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed ir. 1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. CF Indus., Inc., 542 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the park system resource protection act 1: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act 2: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the transalaska pipeline authorization act 3: holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act 4: holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201cpending\u201d status for the period between when the lower court issued its decision and the higher court takes up or dismisses the appeal. But the record in Hernandez-Alberto\u2019s case includes no indication that Hernandez-Alberto failed to satisfy any appellate procedural requirements in appealing the trial court\u2019s competency determination and its dismissal of his postconviction petition. Until the Florida trial court dismissed his petition with prejudice, Hemandez-Alber-to could not appeal those issues and resolve his postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Christner v. State, 984 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (\u201c[A]n unfavorable ruling on one or more postconviction claims with leave to amend is not an appealable, final order.\u201d); Howard v. State, 976 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). And AEDPA insists that we respect these Holdings: 0: holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order 1: holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order 2: holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order 3: holding that a district courts dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is not final and that a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes appealable 4: holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.\u201d 4 . I note that the Supreme Court, in the border patrol checkpoint cases, has held that stops, hence seizures, were reasonable without the articulation of reasonable suspicion, when the stops were evenly enforced for every automobile that passed through the checkpoint, were minimally intrusive and there was a compelling need for those stops to stem the overwhelming 1ide of entry of illegal aliens into the country. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3085, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1131-33 (1976) (recognizing that \"traffic-checking S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 618 (1975) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Although not involving a search, at best Holdings: 0: holding that to justify detention of a criminal suspect the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion 1: holding that although roving patrols in which officers stop and question motorists about their resident status may be conducted without probable cause such stops must at least show that the stopping officer is aware of specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts that reasonably warrant suspicion that a vehicle contains illegal aliens who may be illegally in the country 2: holding that for a terry stop to be considered valid from its inception the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion  quoting terry 392 us at 21 88 sct at 1880 3: holding that an investigatory stop must be supported by specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that intrusion 4: holding that search of the passenger compartment of an automobile limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which taken together with the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "counsel at the guilt phase as a motion to expand the certificate of appealability. See Ninth Circuit Rule 22-l(e). We previously provided the State an opportunity to brief the issue and now grant Gallegos\u2019s motion. 15 . Contrary to the State\u2019s contention, Gallegos did not procedurally default his claims that Clark was ineffective for failing adequately to consult an independent expert and for failing adequately to prepare to cross-examine Dr. Bolduc. Gallegos presented these claims in his supplemental petition for post-conviction relief. A copy of that petition was included in an appendix to his petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, which \u201cis sufficient to present the issue[s] in a full and fair manner to the state courts.\u201d Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) (citing Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, Holdings: 0: holding a petitioner accomplished a full and fair presentation of his claims because they were included in a copy of the amended petition for postconviction relief which was attached in the appendix of his petition for review to the arizona supreme court 1: holding that untimely petition for postconviction petition divests trial court of jurisdiction 2: holding that even where postconviction petitioner reserved the option to file an amended petition in his opening petition simply filing an amended petition is insufficient to request leave to file an amended petition a motion for leave to file an amended petition was required before it was necessary for the district judge to consider the amended petition 3: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief 4: holding that because the defendants challenge to his sentence implicated his plea agreement the defendants request must be construed as a petition for postconviction relief", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "between the defendants\u2019 negligence and the harm caused\u201d by April 5, 2005, at the latest. The plaintiffs argument regarding fiduciary tolling is also unavailing. The plaintiff contends that the defendants were fiduciaries who breached their duty to disclose their errors. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants withheld from him their accounting errors in 1998 and 1999, failed to inform him of the nature of the IRS examination, and refused to cooperate with him or his counsel during the tax court proceedings. He argues that the defendants\u2019 failure to disclose these alleged breaches of duty tolls the limitation period. Assuming, without deciding, that the defendants acted in a fiduciary capacity, but see Sorenson v. H & R Block, Inc., 107 Fed. Appx. 227, 230-31 (1st Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>); Block v. Razorfish, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d Holdings: 0: recognizing special trust and confidence that must exist between attorney and client citations omitted 1: holding that under massachusetts law agency or fiduciary relationship did not exist between tax preparer and its client 2: holding that relationship between executor and estates beneficiaries is one that gives rise to fiduciary duty as matter of law 3: holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law 4: holding that agreements established agency relationship", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rendered his videotaped statement involuntary. Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he was kept in a cold cell for ten hours without a blanket, food, or water. However, Investigator Jody Johnson testified that he did not recall Appellant complaining on the day of the interview about the conditions of the jail or saying that he was cold or hungry. And Investigator Hilliard testified that he interviewed Appellant approximately four hours after he was arrested. Given this conflicting testimony, the volun-tariness of Appellant\u2019s videotaped statement involved the trial court\u2019s evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Stewart v. State, No. 04-08-00274-CR, 2009 WL 2183397, at *6 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 21, 2009, pet. refd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Deferring as we must to the trial court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding trial court did not err by finding oral statements voluntarily given when trial court heard conflicting evidence concerning the appellants alleged deprivation of food water medication or bathroom access over the course of twelve hours 2: holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing 3: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 4: holding the trial court is required to make a determination on impairment of access prior to trial", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "551 U.S. at 251, 127 S.Ct. at 2403. The Supreme Court never mentioned the use of deadly force, hostages, innocent bystanders, or any other facts that are remotely similar to the case at bar. Therefore, even if the Supreme Court intended Brendlin to apply to the events that took place in this case, it could not have provided Officer Black with fair notice that a seizure was taking place and thus cannot be used to satisfy the requirement that the law be clearly established. See Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1015 (11th Cir.2011). Meanwhile, this court in Vaughan certainly clearly established that if a passenger-suspect is shot by a bullet intended to stop his fleeing during a chase with police officers, then he is seized for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. 343 F.3d at 1329 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). However, this court just as Holdings: 0: holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous 1: holding a seizure occurs when a passenger of a car is hit by a bullet that is meant to stop him 2: holding that no seizure occurred where shots were fired at a truck but did not hit the suspect because they failed to produce a stop 3: holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped 4: holding no seizure occurred when after defendant began to walk away officer directed him to stop", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "J.). Section 405(h) was enacted in 1939, as part of the Social Security Act (\u201cSSA\u201d). As written, it barred jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 41. At that time, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 41 contained virtually all the important grants of subject-matter jurisdiction to the district courts, including federal-question, diversity, and bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 41(19) (1940) (repealed) (granting jurisdiction over \u201call matters and proceedings in bankruptcy\u201d). In 1948, however, Congress re-codified Title 28 and separated \u00a7 41\u2019s twenty-eight subsections into new sections 1331 through 1359. This caused no substantive change in the coverage of the SSA\u2019s jurisdictional bar; courts simply referred to \u00a7 41 as it existed in 1939. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (<HOLDING>). In 1976, however, only one year after the Holdings: 0: holding that section 1406a grants district courts power to transfer cases even where personal jurisdiction is lacking 1: holding that provision requiring exhaustion within two years of injury was not jurisdictional and was subject to tolling 2: holding that section 311034 does not make section 890041 jurisdictional 3: holding that section 1144 is a jurisdictional limitation 4: holding twentyseven years after title 28s recodification that  405hs reference to  41 continued to capture all jurisdictional grants formerly housed within that section", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments.\u201d United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1991). As a result, it is \u201cneither unusual nor improper for a prosecutor to voice doubt about the veracity of a defendant who has taken the stand.\u201d United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th Cir.1984). Indeed, we have found that, in \u201cinstances of flatly contradictory testimony on important issues ... it [is] proper for the government to argue that the jury ought not to believe the [defendant\u2019s] version.\u201d Molina, 934 F.2d at 1445. Thus, the prosecution may refer to a defendant as a liar if it is \u201ccommenting on the evidence and asking the jury to draw reasonable inferences.\u201d Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d at 520; see also United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1548 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the prosecutor referred to Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants objection was untimely when he waited until the end of the prosecutors closing argument to raise it 1: holding that prosecutors use of the words lie lies or lied more than ninety times was not improper when viewed in the context of the monthlong trial 2: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony 3: holding that solicitors statement during closing that defense witnesses have lied was merely a question which was submitted to the jury for its determination when it made its findings and returned its verdict 4: holding that a prosecutors use of the words lie lies or lied over 90 times when referring to the defendants in its closing argument was within the boundaries of proper  summations", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "been sleeping, he was clad in boxer shorts. Generally, the court is faced with a situation where a person has initially consented to a police search and later claims that the consent was actually coerced. The court must then consider the situation, and the coercive factors present, when determining the validity of the consent. But here, Mr. Newsom testified at the suppression hearing and, as pointed out by the district court, never claimed that his consent was coerced. Instead, he testified that he consented to the search because he had nothing to hide. In light of Mr. New-som\u2019s own testimony, it is impossible to conclude that the district court committed clear error in finding that his consent was not coerced. See United States v. Griffith, 584 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Mr. McKinney also briefly argues that, even Holdings: 0: holding that we review a district courts refusal to apply ussg  5c12 for clear error because it is a factual finding 1: holding that we must have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed before reversing a factual finding for clear error internal quotation omitted 2: holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 4: holding that we will overturn the factual findings of the district court only where we have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Brown did not promise or misrepresent anything, and made no threats to secure Vargas-Miranda\u2019s further cooperation or his consent. The officer merely asked if there were any drugs in the vehicle, and when Vargas-Miranda denied possession of drugs, asked, \u201cYou care if I look and see?,\u201d his accompanying hand gestures further conveying the meaning of his question. Vargas-Miranda was not under arrest. His drivers license and the vehicle insurance card had been returned. Vargas-Miranda and Lopez-Mendoza watched the search and neither defendant asked or indicated that the search should be stopped. Under the totality of these circumstances, I conclude Vargas-Miranda voluntarily consented to the search of the Dodge Magnum. See e.g., United States v. Carrate, 122 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir.1997)(<HOLDING>) Although Vargas-Miranda claims he withdrew his Holdings: 0: holding the defendant voluntarily consented to the search where despite his limited ability to speak english and the troopers failure to use a written consent form or advise the defendant of his right to refuse consent the defendant understood and appropriately answered the troopers questions had been detained for only a short amount of time before consenting was not threatened or physically intimidated and no promises or misrepresentations were made was not under arrest when he consented was on a public interstate and he stood idly by while the troopers searched his car never indicating that he objected to the search 1: holding the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of his bedroom based upon evidence that defendant 1 did not contest the fact that he had voluntarily given verbal consent to the search 2 did not appear to be nervous or scared and was cooperative with the officers 3 led officers to his bedroom and 4 was present for the search and did not indicate at any time that he wished to revoke his consent 2: holding that the defendant voluntarily consented to a search and the patdown of his person did not exceed the scope of his consent which included a search of the groin area 3: holding that because the individual was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage that  consent was tainted by the illegality 4: holding that defendants consent to search his person while on board an interstate bus was voluntary even though the police did not tell the defendant of his right to refuse consent", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Colonial Bank, N.A., 2008 WL 4790122 at *4 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 3, 2008) (stating that the economic loss rule does not apply when the parties accept tort remedies in their contract); PNC Bank, N.A. v. Colonial Bank, N.A., 2008 WL 2917639 at *2-3 (M.D.Fla. July 24, 2008). Next, it must be determined whether the economic loss rule bars the County\u2019s claim for breach of fiduciary duty. In Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So.2d 973 (Fla.1999), the Florida Supreme Court found that the economic loss rule does not bar actions for breach of fiduciary duty even when there is an underlying contract between the parties. Id. at 983-84; see also Invo v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); First Equity Corp. of Fla., Inc. v. Watkins, 1999 WL 542639 at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA July 28, 1999) (<HOLDING>). Although contrary precedent does exist, \u201c[i]f Holdings: 0: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument 1: holding that claims for erisa violations arose from the purchase or sale of debtors securities 2: holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities 3: holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities 4: holding that an independent fiduciary duty arises from a brokers purchase and sale of securities", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "language, the legislative history shows that Congress enacted the EM-TALA not to improve the overall standard of medical care, but to ensure that hospitals do not refuse essential emergency care because of a patient\u2019s inability to pay.\u201d). The EMTALA prohibits participating hospitals from taking adverse action \u201cagainst any hospital employee because the employee reports a violation\u201d of the EMTALA. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1395dd(i). Here Plaintiff claims that Defendants retaliated, against him for reporting Kapiolani\u2019s alleged violation of the EMTALA\u2019s requirements for an \u201cAppropriate Transfer\u201d under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1395dd(c)(2). (PL\u2019s Opp. 9-11). However, the transfer requirements established by 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1395dd(c)(2) must be triggered. See James v. Sunrise Hospital, 86 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). For the EMTALA\u2019s transfer provisions to Holdings: 0: holding that review of medical history during an examination assisted doctors medical conclusions 1: holding that statements made by a child who was brought to an emergency room by her mother were admissible when the child knew a doctor would conduct a medical exam the physician explained he was a doctor and he asked questions about medical history and performed a physical examination of the child 2: holding that the transfer restrictions of 42 usc  1395ddc apply only when an individual comes to the emergency room and after an appropriate medical screening examination the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition  3: recognizing emergency exception 4: holding a victims statements to emergency room doctor not testimonial where the purpose of the examination was for medical diagnosis and treatment", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "like Ms. Rotolante, the FINRA Rules do not define the term, leading to varying interpretations. The Fourth Circuit has defined \u201ccustomer\u201d for purposes of FINRA Rule 12200 as \u201cone, not a broker or a dealer, who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member in the course of the member\u2019s business activities insofar as those activities are regulated by FINRA\u2014 namely investment banking and securities business activities.\u201d Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d at 325; see Goldman, Sachs & Co., 747 F.3d at 738-39 (adopting Carilion Clinic definition of \u201ccustomer\u201d). This definition comports with other courts\u2019 decisions addressing the meaning of the term \u201ccustomer\u201d under FINRA Rule 12200. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Abbar, No. 13-2172, 2014 WL 3765867, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2014) (<HOLDING>). The Eighth Circuit construed \u201ccustomer\u201d to Holdings: 0: holding that a nasd member is required to arbitrate claims brought by the customer of an associated person 1: recognizing that plaintiff who is not actually disabled may still be a member of third protected class 2: holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa 3: holding that plaintiff who was iranian is a member of a protected class 4: holding that finra customer is one who while not broker or dealer either purchases good or service from finra member or has account with finra member", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "conservator of appellant\u2019s child, D.E.S., and appellant was appointed possessory conservator. Appellant did not challenge that part of the judgment in her points on appeal filed with her motion for new trial. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. \u00a7 263.405(b) (Vernon 2002) (requiring party intending to appeal such an order to file statement of points on appeal within 15 days after order is signed). In addition, appellant\u2019s rights to her child, L.G.V., were terminated in a separate suit, and that appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas. On February 12, 2004, the decree terminating appellant\u2019s rights to L.G.V. was affirmed. See In re L.G.V. a/k/a L.G., a child, No. 01-03-00591-CV, 2004 WL 253312 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] February 12, 2004, no pet. h.) (mem.op.) (<HOLDING>). 2 . See J.K. v. Lee County, 668 So.2d 813, Holdings: 0: holding there are no grounds to appeal when defendant receives the remedy he requested from the trial court 1: holding no arguable grounds for appeal were present 2: holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal 3: holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal 4: recognizing an appellee may assert additional independent grounds for affirmance of the judgment even if it does not file a notice of appeal as long as such grounds were raised in appellees motion for summary judgment", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The record reveals that the jury was sufficiently concerned that the foreperson \u201calready ha[d] [his] mind made up\u201d regarding defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence to request instructions from the trial court and to elect another foreperson. In response to the jury\u2019s request for guidance, the trial court summoned only the foreperson and provided him with instructions on and off the record that it did not provide to the rest of the jury. The trial court instructed only the foreperson that jurors needed to resolve the issue in the jury room. The trial court\u2019s failure to similarly instruct the remaining jurors may have given them the impression that the trial court had resolved the matter, foreclosing further debate on this issue during deliberations. Further, following the t d 362, 363-64 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The record in the present case does not Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant 1: holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal 2: holding that the state cannot demonstrate harmless error where the substance of the trial courts conversation with an excused juror was not revealed by the transcript or reconstructed at trial 3: holding that the state could not meet its burden of proving harmless error where the record did not reveal the substance of the trial courts unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors 4: holding that the state failed to meet its burden when the record failed to show that the jurors would or would not be available after a weeks continuance", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in this court in Canady I. As a result, we hold that the relitigation exception may be warranted in this case, even though the merits of the case were never reached in Canady I. In examining the third criterion of the federal res judicata inquiry, we consider whether both the Saunders cases and the Canady I litigation involved the same parties and the same cause of action. It is undisputed that the eighteen Saunders defendants also were named as defendants in Canady I. Therefore, the parties are undeniably the same in both cases. Further, we agree with the district court that the Saunders cases involved the same cause of action as the Canady I litigation. \u201cThe same cause of action framed in terms of a new legal theory is still the same cause of action.\u201d NAACP I, 125 F.3d at 1174 (<HOLDING>) (citing United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, Holdings: 0: holding that for res judicata purposes the cause of action is the same when substantially the same evidence would support a recovery in both actions 1: holding that a state law claim mirroring a fair housing act claim had res judicata effect because it sought to redress the same wrong in both actions 2: recognizing that res judicata does not apply unless the facts and evidence necessary to maintain suit are the same in both actions 3: holding that a claim is barred by res judicata if it arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the prior claim 4: holding that when the basic wrongful acts pleaded in all actions appear to be the same state and federal law claims constitute the same cause of action for res judicata purposes", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and implied warranty claims is that Defendants made representations that the Products were proven to be effective weight-loss supplements and were safe. However, according to the FAC, the Products were not effective and were unsafe. Even if any of the Plaintiffs lost weight while taking the drug, it cannot be assumed that the weight loss was due to the Products\u2019 effectiveness since in a study commissioned by Iovate, the subjects using Hydroxycut actually lost less weight than the placebo group. Furthermore, even if Plaintiffs did not suffer any physical injury, the FAC alleges that the product is not safe for consumption. Therefore, Plaintiffs allege that they did not get what they paid for and have sufficiently alleged breach of warranty. See In re Bayer, 701 F.Supp.2d at 383-84 (<HOLDING>); Rikos, 782 F.Supp.2d at 541-42, 2011 WL Holdings: 0: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 1: holding that fifra preempts breach of warranty claims based on labeling 2: holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for breach of warranty by alleging that the combination products could not fulfill the promises bayer made on the labeling and that bayer had falsely implied that the combination products had been fdaapproved 3: holding that an implied warranty of merchantability does not create a labeling requirement different from or in addition to those mandated by fifra because the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the sale itself not from a state labeling regulation citation omitted 4: holding plaintiff had to commence his breach of implied warranty action under the dtpa within two years because tjhis special statute of limitations denies plaintiffs alternative proposal of entitlement to recover for breach of the common law implied warranty", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "likely to result in his or her harm. By contrast, the acts of merely extending a plain invitation, or making a neutral offer to another person, which are unaccompanied by any inducement intended or designed to increase the probability that the person will accept, do not, in their most common understanding, constitute endeavors to \u201clure.\u201d See American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 675 (principally defining the verb \u201cinvite\u201d as \u201c[t]o request the presence\u201d) and Webster\u2019s Third International, supra, at 1566 (primarily construing the verb \u201coffer\u201d as \u201cto present for acceptance or rejection\u201d). Such acts simply do not involve the additional and extra element of powerful persuasion designed to influence the person to take action, which is the sine qua non of a lure. See Adamo, 637 A.2d at 307 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, as the legislature specifically Holdings: 0: holding that an offer to compromise is generally not admissible as an admission 1: holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added 2: holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged 3: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 4: holding that a simple offer of a ride by a friend or neighbor does not constitute a lure as that term is usually defined as the offer is not accompanied by an inducement such as a promise of pleasure an enticement or prospect of financial gain", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "her with an elevator key. (Pl.\u2019s Mot. 19-20.) II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard 1. Mandatory Preliminary Injunction A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). In the Ninth Circuit, preliminary injunction is also appropriate if the plaintiff can show that \u201cserious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardship tips sharply towards the plaintiff\u2019s favor.\u201d Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). A mandatory injunction, Holdings: 0: recognizing a challenge to jurisdiction as a viable claim 1: recognizing sentencing manipulation as a viable defense 2: holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy 3: holding that so long as a complaint provides notice plaintiff can recover under any theory supported by the evidence 4: holding that the sliding scale test remains viable so long as plaintiff can satisfy other factors contained in winter", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "benefits requires us to decide first whether the person was employed at the time of the separation and therefore in a position to quit. The supreme court has recognized the unique nature of employment through a temporary-labor service. These businesses are \u201clabor brokers engaged in the business of s 895 (Minn.App.2000) (\u201cOnce each assignment is completed, the employment relationship ends because there is neither a guarantee of future assignments nor any employer obligation to provide them.\u201d). In contrast, an employee who refuses to complete an accepted assignment quits. McDonnell v. Anytime Temps., 349 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn.App .1984) (affirming disqualification of woman who worked one day of two-week assignment and refused to complete it); see also Mbong, 608 N.W.2d at 895 & n. 2 (<HOLDING>). The record supports the ULJ\u2019s finding that Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel 1: recognizing distinction between two types of waiver 2: recognizing this distinction 3: recognizing distinction between smith and mcdonnell 4: recognizing distinction between sole power and sovereignty", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "scheme, it is possible for a defendant convicted of a Class I felony to be sentenced to up to fifteen months imprisonment. See N.C. Gen.Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(d) (2005). I relied on the reasoning in Harp, that \u201cif any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than one year,\u201d then the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. Harp, 406 F.3d at 246 (citing United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205, 206-07 (4th Cir.1999)). Although the Harp and Jones decisions did not construe \u00a7 802(44), I found these cases to be persuasive because they interpreted similar language in other sentencing contexts. In addition, there was a nonprecedential Fourth Circuit opinion on point. See United States v. Curry, 213 Fed.Appx. 181, 181 (4th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Thereafter, with Iberson facing a mandatory Holdings: 0: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 1: holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction 2: holding that for purposes of applying enhanced penalty in  841b1a felony drug offense includes any crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment regardless of whether it is classified as a felony or a misdemeanor 3: holding that harp foreclosed any claim that north carolina conviction for felony pos session of cocaine did not qualify as a felony drug offense for purposes of applying the enhanced penalty under  841b 4: holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "nothing has been taken, and thus the claimant cannot maintain a takings claim. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In general, \u201c[v]alid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state, or the United States.\u201d Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934); see U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (\u201cContract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid.\u201d); A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, 66 S.Ct. 596, 90 L.Ed. 729 (1946) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Piszel\u2019s employment contract with Freddie Holdings: 0: holding option to renew in lease that provided for rental amount to be negotiated but not to exceed specified amount too vague and indefinite to be enforceable 1: holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for governments taking of option to renew a lease 2: holding that governments lease of former railroad easement to state for conversion to trail was a taking 3: holding that under an option requiring renewal at the expiration of the lease the lessee was required to exercise the option on or before the last day of the lease 4: holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessees holding over without express notification of renewal was deemed an election to renew the lease", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "trial. During his direct examination by the government, McFarlane testified about his extensive drug dealings and his affiliation with the Jamaican Waterhouse Posse. During cross-examination, McFarlane admitted to selling 400 to 500 kilograms of cocaine. McFarlane and the government believe that McFarlane\u2019s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was violated when tates v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, 63 S.Ct. 409, 87 L.Ed. 376 (1943), and the [Supreme] Court has insisted that the \u2018constitutional guarantee is only that the witness not be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony.\u2019 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977).\u201d McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 122 S.Ct. 2017, 2026, 153 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002) (plurality opinion) (<HOLDING>). The Fifth Amendment privilege against Holdings: 0: holding that policy requiring strip searches of prisoners prior to transfer did not violate fourth amendment 1: holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights 2: holding that prison did not violate prisoners fifth amendment rights when it changed the prisoners privilege status level and moved him to a maximumsecurity facility when he refused to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program during which he would have been required to admit all prior improper sexual activities without any guaranty of immunity 3: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse 4: holding that a prison official can violate a prisoners eighth amendment rights by failing to intervene", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the substance of a declarant\u2019s hearsay statements (e.g., physical evidence of sexu al abuse). Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (emphasis added). Although Wright did not decide whether courts may consider noncorroborating evidence that refutes the substance of a declarant\u2019s statements (e.g., physical evidence contradicting an accuser\u2019s abuse allegations), see Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir.1993) \u2014 an issue not before us here\u2014 the Court\u2019s reasoning strongly suggests that courts must at least consider any circumstances surrounding the making of an out-of-court statement that challenge the statement\u2019s trustworthiness (e.g., inconsistencies, motives to fabricate). See Wright, 497 U.S. at 825-27, 110 S.Ct. 3139; Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Swan, 6 F.3d at 1381 n. 7 (reasoning in dicta Holdings: 0: holding that an objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve for appeal an exception to the hearsay rule that was not specifically raised 1: holding that wright does not forbid recourse to other evidence that confirms the presumptive unreliability of the hearsay 2: holding that immunized testimony which merely confirms information previously known to government agents from independent sources does not preclude prosecution 3: holding that the defendants objection did not suggest that the objected to statement was hearsay and therefore concluding that the defendant waived appellate review of the hearsay argument 4: holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to replicate at the appellate level by examining only the transcripts of the various proceedings.\u201d), aff'd, 548 Fed.Appx. 717 (2d Cir.2013); United States v. Barret, No. 10-CR-809, 2012 WL 3229291, at *33 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (construing defendant\u2019s post-trial, pre-sentence \u201callegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for his motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33\u201d); United States v. Biear, No. 09-CR-1185, 2012 WL 946964, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2012) (\u201c[I]f a defendant wishes to have the district court decide [ineffective-assistance-of-trial-eounsel} issues prior to sentencing, then his proper course is to file a timely motion for a new trial under Rule 33....\u201d); United States v. Buczek, No. 09-CR-121, 2010 WL 4451668, at *2 n. 1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 457 Fed.Appx. 22 (2d Cir.2012). Here, Holdings: 0: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 2: holding that consideration of defendants ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the posttrial preconviction stage was permissible 3: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate 4: holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Instead, the evidence shows that Appellee\u2019s only explanation for the denial was from Captain Baldwin. Appellee could have reasonably assumed that Captain Baldwin, as her superior in the DWI unit, had some say in her request to participate in the sign-up. In fact, in order for Appellee to resign her position in the DWI unit, Captain Baldwin would have had to approve it. Appellee could further have reasonably assumed that Captain Baldwin prevented her transfer due to the Harkrider report. Captain Baldwin\u2019s statement could go to show that he was harassing Appellee because of the Harkrider report. We hold that there is some evidence to show that Captain Baldwin might have used the FOB sign-up to retaliate against Appellee for making the Harkrider report. See Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d at 450 (<HOLDING>). Having found that legally sufficient evidence Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that sufficient evidence of causation existed where adverse employment action occurred less than two months after protected activity 3: holding that circumstantial evidence that the stated reason for an adverse employment action was false can be evidence of causation in a whistleblower cause of action 4: holding that even an incorrect belief that an employees performance is inadequate can be a legitimate reason for an adverse employment action", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "suits are illustrative of the type of determination which, under accepted common-law principle, should not be held conclusive in later cases. Because of the rela e entitled to some preclusive effect in a later civil action, here there is not a precise \u201cidentity of issues\u201d in the former and latter matters, required for application of collateral estoppel. Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 617 (2d Cir.1998) (\u201cIn New York collateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine which can never be rigidly or mechanically applied. Nevertheless, the requirement of identity of issues, unlike the requirement of identity of parties, is an absolute requirement.\u201d) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In traffic court, the relevant question is whether plaintiff committed a S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The harried determination of a New York Holdings: 0: holding that an unconstitutional act of congress has no legal effect 1: holding that equitable determinationcan have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent legal action 2: holding that a void decree has no legal effect 3: recognizing that the determination is an equitable one 4: holding equitable determination can have collateralestoppel effect in a subsequent legal action without violating seventh amendment", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "over the preliminaiy hearing. 5 . The transcription of CW\u2019s recorded interview was not completed until after the preliminary hearing. 6 . We need not reach the question of whether defense counsel opened the door during his closing argument. Even assuming the \"opening the door\u201d doctrine would be applicable in this context, the remedy of introducing CW's death was inappropriate. 7 . Prior to closing arguments, the circuit court did instruct the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence. However, given the generic nature of the instruction and that the court provided no specific instruction in relation to the prosecutor commenting on CW\u2019s death, the court's instruction failed to mitigate the prejudice to Nofoa. See State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 415, 984 P.2d 1231, 1241 (1999) (<HOLDING>); State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 661, 728 P.2d Holdings: 0: holding prejudicial effect of prosecutors comment not rendered harmless by courts general instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence 1: holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify 2: holding that allegedly inflammatory and prejudicial arguments by one defendants counsel did not have an impermissible effect on the trial of another defendant 3: holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error 4: holding instruction to jury that counsels arguments were not evidence did not negatej the prejudicial effect of the prosecutors inflammatory comments", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "under Pennsylvania law is to determine whether a conflict exists between the laws of the competing states. Wilson v. Transp. Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 570 (Pa.Super.2005), quoting Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 702 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 715, 785 A.2d 90 (2001). If no conflict exists, further analysis is unnecessary. Id. If a conflict is found, it must be determined which state has the greater interest in the application of its law. Id. Weighing these interests requires a further determination as to which state had the most significant contacts or relationships with the insurance contract. Id., citing Nationwide Ins. Co. v. West, 807 A.2d 916, 921 (Pa.Super.2002), citing in turn Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964) (<HOLDING>). We will refer to this rubric as the Griffith Holdings: 0: holding that party waived an objection to choice of law 1: holding that disputed questions of fact and all ambiguities in state law must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party 2: recognizing the tally of cases deciding the issue is greatly in favor of applying article 2 3: holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld 4: holding the strict lex loci delicti rule is abandoned in favor of applying a flexible approach to choice of law questions", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or future grievance that has been or may be filed with the Master under the injunctive judgment and decree issued by the Court on November 7, 1979. In addition, this Decree is not intended to affect, limit or in any way resolve any pending or future claim or charge of racial discrimination against Local 542 ... that could not have been raised in this litigation. Thus, the plain language of the Decree was not intended to limit claims for monetary damages arising after its entry and based on charges of racially discriminatory conduct. These plaintiffs were not included among those who had their damage claims resolved through the Decree and accordingly are not, and cannot be, barred from bringing their present claims. See, e.g., Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338, 342-43 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Black Grievance Comm. v. Philadelphia Elec. Holdings: 0: holding that subsequent action barred by res judicata where party had full and fair opportunity to present case before zoning board 1: holding that res judicata did not preclude the subsequent filing of an action which was a permissive claim in a prior action 2: holding that where no member of present plaintiff class had cause of action at time prior judgment was entered claim cannot be barred by res judicata 3: holding second action barred by res judicata because plaintiff asserted identical claims and jurisdictional grounds as the first action 4: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Board was going to consider each case \u201canew.\u201d (Enterprise J.A. 467; Huntington J.A. 1808). Both Enterprise and Huntington objected to the Board\u2019s consideration of their respective cases on the basis that, absent a remand from this court, the Board lacked jurisdiction. On October 2, 2014, a properly constituted Board issued a decision in Enterprise\u2019s case, and a similarly constituted Board issued a decision in Huntington\u2019s case on October 3, 2014. The Board rejected Enterprise\u2019s and Huntington\u2019s arguments that the Board lacked jurisdiction to issue its decisions. The Board reasoned that our prior decision clearly contemplated further Board action and that such further action was consistent with the Eighth Cir-' cuit\u2019s decision in NLRB v. Whitesell Corp., 638 F.3d 883, 889 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). On the merits, the Board adopted the Holdings: 0: holding that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the board had erred in finding that certain picketing was lawful because no party had raised the issue to the board either during the initial proceedings or on motion for reconsideration 1: holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings 2: holding that because there was no quorum of validly appointed board members the nlrb lacked authority to act and the enforcement order was therefore void ab initio  3: holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration 4: holding that the denial of enforcement on the basis that the board lacked a proper quorum did not deprive the board of jurisdiction to consider the case anew", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "which he concluded she was totally disabled, the court accords little weight to [the doctor\u2019s] assessment.\u201d). Flanagan v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 2006 WL 2571878, at *4 (N.D.Okla.2006), affirmed, 251 Fed.Appx. 484, 488-89 (10th Cir.2007) (finding \u201cno appropriate clinical evidence to establish a disability\u201d where the only testing referenced was an x-ray and MRI which allegedly showed mild disk degeneration but no bulging, neither of her physicians could account for her subjective complaints of pain, and one physician confirmed that there was no significant disk disease). In such cases, mere statements by physicians do not constitute objective evidence sufficient to show disability Flanagan, 251 Fed.Appx. 484, 488-89, citing Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) Plaintiffs claim of disability focuses on her Holdings: 0: holding that a rational plan administrator could reject a doctors report when there was no accompanying clinical data to support the conclusion 1: holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary 2: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 3: holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review 4: holding that it was error for a plan administrator to require the claimant to submit clinical findings to support his diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome when the plan did not require such evidence", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a criminal case involving the forfeiture of such property....\u201d). Third, the cases cited by the Watts Petitioners for the argument that the government may only take by forfeiture property that is owned by Dupree are outdated or distinguishable from this case. To start, United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888 (11th Cir.2001), and United States v. O\u2019Dell, 247 F.3d 655 (6th Cir.2001), are both premised upon a version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which predated the enactment of Rule 32.2 in 2000. Under then-Rule 31(e), which no longer exists, some courts, including Gilbert and O\u2019Dell, required the jury to return a special verdict \u201cas to the extent of the interest of the property\u201d to be forfeited by a criminal defendant. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e) (1994); Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 923 (<HOLDING>); see O\u2019Dell, 247 F.3d at 680 (\u201c[W]e must Holdings: 0: holding that jurys verdict was fatally deficient where jury did not find the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture if any pursuant to rule 31e 1: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 2: holding that a motion denying summary judgment will not be reviewed on appeal from a jury verdict where sufficient evidence supports the jurys verdict 3: holding that scope of property subject to forfeiture is defined by the instrument creating an interest in the property 4: holding that where the meaning of the jurys verdict was not clear in light of the trial courts jury instructions the court of appeals erred in directing entry of judgment for respondent the case should have been remanded to the trial judge who was in the best position to pass upon the question of a new trial in light of the evidence his charge to the jury and the jurys verdict", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on that ground.\u201d Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir.2000). II. With regards to the incident occurring on August 26, 1996, Officer Gregg Wes-temeyer (Westemeyer), Brown, McBride, and Richardson contend that the district court should have granted them immunity on appellees\u2019 Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and due process claims. A. Fourth Amendment In connection to a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, the relevant inquiry is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Larry Smithson. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2693-94, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Hannah v. City of Overland, Mo., 795 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Probable cause exists if \u201cthe totality of Holdings: 0: holding that there is no  1983 cause of action for false arrest unless the arresting officer lacked probable cause 1: recognizing the defense of good faith and probable cause in  1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest 2: holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding  1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause 4: holding that in a  1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "verdicts in similar cases, and considering other relevant factors, we conclude that the $100,000 punitive damages award is not excessive. VIII. Constitutional Challenge CEC also raises an additional issue for the first time on appeal: It asserts that the retaliatory discharge provision of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is unconstitutional. We must first determine whether this issue is properly before this Court. \u201cIn order for this Court to review the constitutionality of a legislative act, the appellant must have raised that issue in a court below that had jurisdiction to adjudicate that issue.\u201d Docena Fire District v. Rucker, 564 So.2d 422, 424 (Ala.1990) (citing Wallace v. State, 507 So.2d 466 (Ala. 1987)). See also Campbell v. Alabama Power Co., 567 So.2d 1222, 1225 (Ala.1990) (<HOLDING>); Chatman v. City of Prichard, 431 So.2d 532, Holdings: 0: holding that personaljurisdiction challenges not raised in trial court may not be raised for first time on appeal 1: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal 2: holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered 3: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 4: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Crawford, the victim\u2019s testimony before the grand jury is testimonial in nature. See id. (\u2018Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony ... before a grand jury[J\u201d). Thus, the grand jury testimony is inadmissible absent a finding that Defendant forfeited his confrontation rights. {49} We also hold that the statement taken by Lewandowski at the police station is testimonial because it was given in response to a \u201cpolice i 2d 130, 133 (2005) (\u201c[S]tatements made in response to police questioning after the scene was secure and the victim had assured the officer she did not want emergency medical attention were made in response to investigatory interrogation. As such, they were testimonial per se.\u201d); State v. Walker, 129 Wash.App. 258, 118 P.3d 935, 940 (2005) (<HOLDING>). {51} In this ease, the State acknowledges Holdings: 0: holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial 1: holding witnesss formal signed written statement given at the police station one hour after the crime following structured police questioning was testimonial 2: holding victims statement testimonial where it was elicited in response to structured police questioning pursuant to a police investigation 3: holding testimonial statements to include those involving a declarants knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative environment 4: holding that postmmmda statement knowingly given in response to structured police questioning was testimonial", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "5(a) of the FTC Act. A. Deceptive Acts (Count I) Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits \u201cunfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce\u201d and empowers the FTC to prevent such acts or practices. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 45(a)(1), (2). An act or practice is deceptive if (1) there is a representation, omission, or practice, (2) that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the representation, omission, or practice is material. FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083, 115 S.Ct. 1794, 131 L.Ed.2d 722 (1995). District courts consider the overall, common sense \u201cnet impression\u201d of the representation or act as a whole to determine whether it is misleading. See FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that a defamation claim cannot be sustained for truthful information in a credit report even if the information reported supports misleading inferences 1: holding that the furnishing of misleading information cannot support a claim for negligent misrepresentation the information must be false 2: recognizing that plan administrators have an obligation to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiarys circumstances 3: holding that defendant failed to counter the ftcs substantial showing that he made statements and created an overall net impression of a misleading representation regarding the ability to remove negative information from consumers credit report even if the information was accurate complete and not obsolete 4: recognizing that when a beneficiary requests information from an erisa fiduciary who is aware of the beneficiarys status and situation the fiduciary has an obligation to convey complete and accurate information material to the beneficiarys circumstance even if that requires conveying information about which the beneficiary did not specifically inquire", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "12(b)(6), claiming the FDCPA requires a plaintiff to plead that the debt collector had actual knowledge of the plaintiffs representation. We affirm the district court\u2019s dismissal of Schmitt\u2019s complaint without prejudice and hold that a plaintiff must plead actual knowledge under the FDCPA in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The theory of implied knowledge contradicts established agency law, which dictates that while the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the principal, the converse is not true. See S.O.G.-San Ore-Gardner v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 658 F.2d 562, 567 (8th Cir.1981) (stating that an agent cannot be imputed with information which the principal failed to disclose); Siharath v. Citifinancial Servs. (In re: Siharath), 285 B.R. 299, 304 (Bankr.D.Minn.2002) (<HOLDING>); Waswick v. Stutsman County Bank (In re: Holdings: 0: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 1: holding that a principal is not hable for the actions of an agent when these actions exceed the agents authority and the thirdparty has knowledge that the agent does not have the authority asserted 2: holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it 3: holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment 4: holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and Landry v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 85571, slip op. (La. 15th Jud. Dist. Ct., Vermillion Parish, Jan. 4, 2007), the court found that the homeowners were entitled to the full face value of the policies when their property was rendered a total loss by covered and excluded perils. 28 . See State v. Williams, 830 So.2d 984, 986 (La.2002) (\u201c[u]npublished opinions and/or writ grants with orders should not be 'cited, quoted or referred to,\u2019 and therefore will not be considered by this Court\u201d (citation omitted)); Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat\u2019l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 565 (5th Cir.2004) (opinions that are non-precedential under state law \"do not factor into this court\u2019s Erie guess.\u201d). 29 . See Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 943 So.2d 823 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass\u2019n, Holdings: 0: holding that damage to realty was not excluded from coverage if such damage resulted from subsidence caused by something other than soil condition despite homeowners experts description of the damage as settling 1: holding that property damage occurred when homeowners noticed damage not when house was improperly constructed 2: holding that the vpl requires an insurer to pay the full value of the policy only when a covered peril causes a total loss 3: holding that insurer owed homeowners full amount of policy when they suffered a total loss in not insignificant part as the result of windstorm damage although an excluded peril water contributed to the damage 4: holding that the damage to a home resulting from the entrance of hail a covered loss and water into the basement of the house after a severe storm was not covered by the policy because the concurrent causation clause excluded water damage", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "period, we further conclude that the Panel properly recognized that the estate \u201cextracted nearly all of the economic value available from the land\u201d during that time, and determine that the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s computation method was inappropriate in this case because the reasonable rental value of the farmland was not constant during the entire lease term. Thus, we hold that the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s calculation unjustly enriched the bankruptcy estate by not recognizing that the majority of the land\u2019s economic benefit attached to the growing season. See In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 707 (9th Cir.1988) (trustee\u2019s liability for actual use and occupancy is founded upon equitable principle of preventing unjust enrichment); cf. In re Longua, 58 B.R. 503, 504-06 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1986) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we remand to the Bankruptcy Holdings: 0: holding the aggregate value of the land and its improvements is the controlling value 1: holding that there was no evidence of market value where owners testimony affirmatively showed that it was based on personal value 2: recognizing two lines of eases regarding calculation of administrative claims for rent  one based on reasonable value of portion of demised premises actually used and occupied and one on the reasonable value without regard to amount of space used holding that landlords were entitled to full rental payments not warehouse value of premises until lease assumed or rejected 3: holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition 4: holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1438 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cIt follows that statements impugning the integrity of a judge may not be punished unless they are capable of being proved true or false....\u201d) And no such conclusion would be possible here. Contrary to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court\u2019s characterization, Kendall\u2019s remarks cannot be reasonably interpreted as \"blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.\u2019\u2019 Kendall's statements were nothing more than \u201crhetorical hyperbole\u201d using language in a \"loose, figurative sense\u201d and therefore cannot be interpreted as asserting actual facts about the Justices. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-85, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974); see also id. at 286, 94 S.Ct. 2770 (<HOLDING>); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass\u2019n v. Bresler, 398 Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: holding that a description of a public figures negotiating position as blackmail could not be construed as charging the plaintiff with committing a crime 2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 4: holding that a union newsletters description of a scab as a traitor could not be construed as a factual assertion", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "548. In this case, however, Officer Luthy waited five days after the search of Defendant's trash container to seek a search warrant. Thus, we must determine whether the passing of that five days rendered the evidence obtained during the search of Defendant's garbage stale. \"Staleness issues usually arise when a significant lapse of time occurs between the discovery of information suggesting that evidence of the crime can be found at a particular locale and the magistrate's finding of probable cause or the execution of the warrant.\" State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (concluding that evidence of the defendant's motive to commit murder not stale) (citing State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 56-57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (<HOLDING>)). Furthermore, \"[a] mere passage of time does Holdings: 0: holding prior use of one type of drug is not relevant to establish use of another type of drug on a different occasion 1: holding that the gang evidence was too stale to establish probable cause for a search warrant 2: holding that informants personal observation of drug use by defendant six weeks prior to warrant not stale where affidavit included facts consistent with protracted and continuous use 3: holding that affidavit was stale and thus failed to establish probable cause to support wiretap 4: holding corroboration is not a necessity where confidential informants reliability was well established and his tip was based on direct personal observation of criminal activity", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "its nationals from suing Japan for wrongs committed against them individually constituted a taking of their private causes of action for a public purpose or use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Whether the United States might have other defenses for such an act deriving from its powers as a nation-state is not before us. The sole issue on appeal is whether the six-year statute of limitations bars these plaintiffs from recovering against the United States for the alleged wrong: if the statute applies to bar causes of action such as this one that are not brought until after six years from its accrual, and if the entry into force of the treaty in 1952 is the event that violated plaintiffs\u2019 rights and marks the accrual of the cause of action, then pla r.1996) (<HOLDING>); Kunkes v. United States, 78 F.3d 1549 Holdings: 0: holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence 1: holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs 2: holding that government placement of groundwater monitoring wells was a taking 3: holding that government freshwater diversion project was not a taking of leased waterbottom lands used for oyster propagation 4: holding that the federal government was liable for a taking of property where city of burlington acted under federal authority", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the indistinctiveness of the trade dress. See id. at 1536. First, Merisant has established that its mark has acquired secondary meaning, for it is undisputed that Equal and NutraSweet have devoted substantial resources to the advertising and promotion of Equal, and that as a consequence, the NutraSweet trademarks and trade dress are well known to the purchasing public throughout the United States. Also undisputed is the fact that sweeteners bearing the Equal and NutraSweet trademarks and the Equal trade dress have been and are now recognized by the public and in the food industry as originating from a single source. See Remcraft Lighting Products, Inc. v. Maxim Lighting, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 855, 858 (S.D.Fla.1989) (citing Isaly Company v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F.Supp. 983, 990 (M.D.Fla.1985) (<HOLDING>)). See also Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Company, Holdings: 0: holding that the ordinary concept of use as applied in determining the existence of a nonconforming use must yield to the realities of the business in question and the nature of its operations 1: holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark 2: holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion 3: holding that the trier of fact must consider the length of time and manner of use of trade dress the nature and extent of its use and efforts made in order to promote a conscious connection in the publics mind between the mark and the particular source of origin 4: recognizing the need to balance the states interest in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public the extent to which the speech in question involves a matter of public concern and the manner time place and context of the speech", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "1190 (Ind.Ct.App.1982)) (internal-quotation marks omitted). But it is also a \u201cblunt ... instrument,\u201d see Waterfield Mortg. Co., Inc. v. O\u2019Connor, 172 Ind.App. 673, 680, 361 N.E.2d 924, 927 (1977), by which \u201cthe non-prevailing party is prevented from having his day in court,\u201d Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind.1986). We have therefore cautioned that summary judg ment \u201cis not a summary trial,\u201d id. (internal quotation marks omitted); and the Court of Appeals has often rightly observed that it \u201cis not appropriate merely because the non-movant appears unlikely to prevail at trial.\u201d Tucher v. Brothers Auto Salvage Yard, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied; see also LaCava v. LaCava, 907 N.E.2d 154, 166 n. 9 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (<HOLDING>). In essence, Indiana consciously errs on the Holdings: 0: recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance 1: holding that plaintiff who provides evidence of acts more severe than a lack of due care may withstand summary judgment motion on a failure to protect claim 2: holding that unsubstantiated representations will not withstand summary judgment 3: holding that because plaintiff failed to advance evidence rebutting motion for summary judgment alongside a concession in their interrogatory response the district court did not err in granting defendants motion for summary judgment 4: recognizing that the decedents claim should withstand summary judgment despite counsels concession  that he will be unlikely to prevail at trial", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1052-53 (2d Cir.1982). Competition comes at the time loans are made; cooperation in an effort to collect as much as possible of the amounts due under competitively determined contracts is not the sort of activity with which the antitrust laws are concerned. Moreover, businesses are entitled under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to act jointly when presenting requests to courts and agencies. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). Collective renegotiation succeeds only if the court approves. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (<HOLDING>). On top of all this comes \u00a7 1110(a)(1), which Holdings: 0: holding that the eleventh amendment applies in  1981 litigation 1: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings 2: holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion applies in removal proceedings 3: holding that the noerrpennington doctrine applies to collective presentations in litigation 4: recognizing doctrine", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.\u201d Id. at 1269 (brackets omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3161(h)(7)(A)). Defendant\u2019s case was joined with those of several codefendants, and there were ongoing investigations in Arizona and Texas. Id. Where defendants are properly joined for trial, as here, the case\u2019s complexity necessarily must be assessed with reference to the joint trial. United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004). This case involved voluminous discovery, a large number of counts, several defendants, ongoing investigations in other districts, and potential witnesses from other countries. We have upheld \u201cends of justice\u201d continuances because of complexity in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Dota, 33 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1381 Holdings: 0: holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under  3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under  3161h7 1: holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal 2: holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion 3: holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time 4: holding that an endsofjustice continuance may be justified on grounds that one side needs more time to prepare for trial", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1 . Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 238 (D.C.2011); see also Sandwick v. District of Columbia, 21 A.3d 997, 1000 (D.C.2011) (agreeing that \u201ca mental element must be read into the statute\u201d since it was \" \u2018inconceivable that the legislature intended that punishment would be imposed for failure to follow the course of conduct outlined, if the operator of the vehicle was ignorant of the happening of an accident\u2019 \u201d). 2 . In Holly v. United States, 464 F.2d 796 (D.C.Cir.1972), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed McClough. on other grounds, notwithstanding the fact that, pursuant to the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were no longer subject to review by the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 798 (<HOLDING>); see also id. at 799 (Tamm, J., concurring) Holdings: 0: holding that provision of dccode  221515a 1967 that made criminal liability for presence in an establishment where illicit narcotics were administered or dispensed turn on a defendants ability to give a good account of himself was unconstitutionally vague 1: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague 3: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "jurisdiction. But we conclude that two of Mr. Umoh\u2019s issues fall within the jurisdictional grant of \u00a7 1252(a)(2)(D). First, although we may review \u201cquestions of law,\u201d we have construed that term to include only \u201ca narrow category of issues regarding statutory construction.\u201d Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). Mr. Umoh\u2019s contention that the BIA applied the wrong standard in determining the extent of hardship to his family under \u00a7 1182(h)(1)(B) raises a question of statutory construction and we have jurisdiction to determine \u201cwhether the BIA applied the correct legal standard in making its determination.\u201d Brue v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.2006). We also have jurisdiction to review his constitutional claim regarding the agency\u2019s 005) (<HOLDING>). Standard of Review We review Mr. Umoh\u2019s Holdings: 0: recognizing that categorical constitutional challenge was fundamentally similar to asapplied constitutional challenge initially raised on appeal 1: holding argument that ij incorrectly weighed and ignored evidence not properly viewed as constitutional challenge 2: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals 3: holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal 4: holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "explains: \"One who supplies a chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous character ... if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved.\u201d 12 . The Court notes for the sake of clarity that, with respect to allegedly inadequate warnings, maritime law recognizes both strict product liability causes of action (i.e., defective warning or defective design) and 1184 (D.N.J.1984) (also holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims); O\u2019Neal, 10 F.3d at 251 (citing Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 325 Md. 385, 601 A.2d 123 (Md.1992), aff'g 84 Md.App. 397, 579 A.2d 1191 (Md.App.1990)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson, 43 Cal.4th at 71, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d Holdings: 0: holding defense applicable to both types of claims 1: recognizing distinction between two types of waiver 2: holding that plaintiff who filed administrative charge for racial harassment and discrimination could add claim for retaliation because some of the same facts supported both types of claims 3: recognizing that legal expenses incurred can be characterized as both deductible and nondeductible when the litigation is rooted in situations giving rise to both types of expenditures 4: holding rule applicable to witness", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "were not relevant to the negligence claim set forth in the original complaint; the focus had shifted from whether the floor was improperly maintained so that it became wet and slippery to whether the materials used to build the floor and the way in which it was constructed met applicable safety standards. See also Chambers v. Seghetti, 107 Md.App. at 539, 668 A.2d 1006 (observing that an amended complaint stating claim for negligent entrustment did not relate back to original complaint stating claim for negligent operation of vehicle, because the amended complaint relied upon \u201cdistinctly different operative facts from those supporting the claims contained in [the] initial complaint.\u201d); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., 88 Md.App. 672, 689-91, 596 A.2d 687 (1991)(<HOLDING>); University Nursing Home, Inc. v. R.B. Brown & Holdings: 0: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 1: holding a lien is a claim against property  here a surety bond and breach of contract is a claim against a person thus the lien proceeding did not dispose of the breach of contract action 2: holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action 3: holding that breach of contract claim related back to misrepresentation claim because operative facts upon which the breach of contract claim was based were contained in the misrepresentation counts of the original complaint 4: holding that a breach of contract claim against one defendant related back to interference with contract claim against that defendant and breach of contract claim against second defendant because it was based on same set of operative facts", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "v. INS, 452 F.3d 154, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006), the BIA properly found that Babalola failed to comply with the threshold requirements set forth in In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988). Specifically, Babalola failed to include with her motion \u201ca statement as to whether [she] filed a complaint with any disciplinary authority regarding counsel\u2019s conduct and, if a complaint was not filed, an explanation for not doing so.\u201d Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.2005) (citing In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639). We have previously noted that \u201can alien who has failed to comply substantially with the Lozada requirements in her motion to reopen before the BIA forfeits her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.\u201d Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); cf. Esposito v. INS, 987 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that failing to substantially comply with the matter of lozada requirements in a motion to reopen before the bia forfeits an ineffective assistance claim in this court 1: holding that the petitioner was not entitled to claim ineffective assistance because she did not comply with the lozada requirements and made no effort to explain her lack of compliance 2: holding that failure to comply with the hozada requirements is not fatal where the alleged ineffective assistance is plain on the face of the administrative record 3: holding that the petitioners failure to comply with the lozada requirements results in a forfei ture of his ineffectiveassistanceofcounsel claim 4: recognizing that while slavish adherence to matter of lozada is not required when an alien does not comply with those requirements in any respect the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is forfeited", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "therefore, must be assessed by looking to the period of time during which these activities occurred, not by focusing on the actual date of Medina\u2019s resignation. An employer need not ignore failing, preleave performance if that performance gives it reason to terminate an employee, or, in this case, to criticize an employee\u2019s performance and reconfigure her territories. See, e.g., Kohls v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin, Inc., 259 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir.2001) (\u201cBeverly has asserted that Kohls\u2019 deficiencies were the reason for her termination and that she would have been terminated regardless of her [maternity] leave, and Kohls has not presented sufficient evidence for a fact finder to conclude otherwise\u201d); Armstrong v. Systems Unlimited, Inc., 75 Fed.Appx. 550 (8th Cir.2003) (Unpub.Disp.) (<HOLDING>). The question, however, is whether in this Holdings: 0: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 1: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 2: holding that discharging an employee because she was on maternity leave would violate that poli cy 3: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 4: holding that an employer was justified in demoting plaintiff after she returned from maternity leave because plaintiff could not rebut the employers evidence that she was having performance problems before she went on leave and that additional performance problems were discovered while she was on leave", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "App. 816, 825 (9) (665 SE2d 898) (2008). See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713 (I), 715 (I) (B) (119 SC 2240, 144 LE2d 636) (1999) (\u201c[A]s the [federal] Constitution\u2019s structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States\u2019 immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today .... The generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity. When the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown c 109, 110 (611 SE2d 762) (2005) (same); see also Baskin v. Ga. Dep\u2019t of Corrs., 272 Ga. App. 355, 358 (2) (612 SE2d 565) (2005) (<HOLDING>). 11 Williams v. Ga. Dep\u2019t of Human Res., 272 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs were entitled to vacate final order of dismissal as void when they did not receive the motion for dismissal or notice of the hearing on the order until after the dismissal was entered 1: holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count 2: holding that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate where a plaintiff failed to name each of the persons alleged to have violated the appropriate standard of care 3: holding that dismissal of a breach of contract claim was proper in light of the plaintiffs failure to recite or attach a copy of the contract 4: holding that dismissal was appropriate when plaintiff did not attach the required receipt from the department of administrative services", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "regarding Marks\u2019s malingering. Because the State disclosed Dr. Arambula\u2019s opinions, Marks could reasonably have anticipated the need to rebut Dr. Arambula\u2019s testimony later at trial. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Williamson, 785 S.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, writ denied). In general, rebuttal witnesses, whose use reasonably could have been anticipated, are not exempt from the scope of the discovery rules. Moore v. Mem\u2019l Hermann Hosp. Sys., Inc., 140 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Am. Bank of Waco v. Waco Airmotive, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 168, 177 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991, writ denied); Walsh v. Mullane, 725 S.W.2d 263, 264-65 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); but see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Bullock, 870 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). Rule 103 of the Rules of Evidence placed the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court had erred by excluding the expert testimony of a doctor 1: holding expert testimony remedies speculation by the court 2: holding trial court properly permitted party to use undesignated expert to rebut a material and unanticipated change in testimony of the opposing partys expert 3: holding that fire expert should not have been sequestered where opposing expert testified to facts and theories not revealed prior to trial 4: holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (specifically, 42 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2000d) and the injunction and decree in the Sinajini case. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that \u201c[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\u201d U.S. Const. amend. XIV, \u00a7 1. It was meant to prevent state actors from discriminating against persons based on their race or national origin. See Shaw v. Reno, \u2014 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2824, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993); 3 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, supra, \u00a7 18.5 at 67. Official action that distinguishes between individuals on racial grounds falls within the core of , 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1399-1400, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, Holdings: 0: holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection 1: holding that the cap does not violate equal protection 2: holding that federal criminal statutes subjecting native americans to federal prosecution did not violate equal protection even though they arguably lessened the burden the prosecution would have had under state law 3: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 4: holding that a 30year sentence imposed under 18 usc  2241c did not violate a defendantnative americans equal protection rights", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "c. 225, \u00a7 1. If the court does not give the warning in the required form, and it is later shown that the plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated immigration consequences, the court, on motion, \u201cshall vacate the judgment.\u201d Ibid. 4 The statute requires that the defendant also show that he may face immigration consequences. See Commonwealth v. Berthold, 441 Mass. 183, 185 (2004). There is no question in this case that the defendant is at risk of deportation. 5 The defendant cites Sacco, supra, for the proposition that amendments to the power to grant a new trial are jurisdictional. At the time of the Sacco and Vanzetti trial, the court\u2019s authority to hear a motion for new trial in a criminal case was considered jurisdictional. See Rollins, supra at 430, 433-434, and cases cited (<HOLDING>). In Sacco, the Commonwealth argued that the Holdings: 0: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 1: holding that jurisdiction to hear a motion for new trial was granted by statute and could be exercised solely in accordance with the terms of the statute 2: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 3: holding that trial court erred by granting a directed verdict on statute of limitations defense and remanding for a new trial on the statute of limitations only 4: holding that although a statute regarding sentencing for firsttime drug offenders was plain obvious and unambiguous in its terms construing the statute by its plain language would be inconsistent with contrary to and illogical in light of the legislatures intent in enacting the statute", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "distribution in exchange for their membership interests and, therefore, the distribution could not have been a policyholder dividend. The Court rejects this reasoning. From the record submitted on this motion, the Court cannot discern any statement by either party that the policyholders did not receive their entire equity share. In fact, it appears that UNUM alleges in this litigation that the policyholders received something more than their equity share, but certainly not less. Thus, the Government has failed to demonstrate to this Court that any conversion plan found to be fair and equitable under the Maine insurance code must necessarily not constitute a policyholder dividend trader federal tax law. 12 . See Teledyne Industries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). 13 . The Superintendent's affidavit provides, Holdings: 0: holding that federal law applies because judicial estoppel relates to protection of the integrity of the federal judicial process 1: holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position 2: holding the order is only reviewable if actually considered by the district court 3: holding that a zoning estoppel plaintiff must show that he or she has been given assurances of some form by the county that his or her proposed construction met zoning requirements and that he or she had a right lo rely on such assurances 4: holding that in order for judicial estoppel to operate the first court must actually adopt the litigants position that he or she now contradicts", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "no requirement that Plaintiff seek a determination of the good faith of the settlement under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6. Thus, the failure to do so does not support summary judgment in favor of Roto-Rooter. b. Allocation of settlement Roto-Rooter argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to indemnification because it failed to allocate the settlement not only as to the negligence claims, but also as to economic and noneconomic damages. Where the \"settling parties have failed to allocate, the trial court must allocate in the manner which is most advantageous to the nonsettling party.\" Dillingham Construction v. Nadel Partnership, 64 Cal.App.4th 264, 287, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 (1998); see also Knox v. County of Los Angeles, 109 Cal.App.3d 825, 835, 167 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The testimony of an attorney for the party Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination 1: holding that reversible error was committed when the court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant 2: holding that the plaintiff has the burden of proving an agreed allocation in a settlement as between the claims in which joint tortfeasor status was alleged so the court could determine the appropriate setoff amount to be applied against a money judgment entered in the plaintiffs favor after trial against a nonsettling defendant and remanding for further proceedings to determine the setoff amount 3: holding that a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff agreed to drop all claims against the defendants in exchange for a specific sum of money was enforceable despite the fact that the agreement did not specify whether the plaintiffs promise would take the legal form of a release or a covenant not to sue 4: holding that joint tortfeasor defendant does not get setoff equal to amount of recovery injured plaintiff receives from carrier of his uninsured motorist coverage", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "direct discrimination. 2. Indirect Discrimination Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach, in order to establish a prima facie case for gender discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job to her employer\u2019s legitimate expectations; (3) that in spite of her meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees. See, e.g., Bragg v. Navistar Int\u2019l Transp. Corp., 164 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir.1998); Randle, 876 F.2d at 570-71. Markel meets the first prong of the test because she is a member of a protected class. However, the district court found that Markel did not mee r.2000) (<HOLDING>); Conley, 215 F.3d at 712 (requiring village Holdings: 0: holding that denial of a bonus was not an adverse employment action 1: holding that termination is an adverse employment action 2: holding that a lateral transfer without a loss in benefits does not constitute an adverse employment action 3: holding that the loss of a telephone and cubicle were too trivial to amount to an adverse employment action 4: holding that an unrealized risk of future adverse action even if formalized is too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment action", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and INA \u00a7 240A(d)(2). IIR-IRA \u00a7 309(c)(5)(A) clearly applies both provisions of INA \u00a7 240A(d) to OSCs served before April 1, 1997, and, while Ram did not address INA \u00a7 240A(d)(2) specifically, its analysis applies squarely to petitioners\u2019 argument. Therefore, we find that the IJ did not err in applying IIRI-RA\u2019s ninety-day statutory bar under the IIRIRA transitional rules. Petitioners next contend that the IJ erred in applying IIRIRA\u2019s transitional rules at the June 9, 1999 hearing, as opposed to the law that existed before the April 1, 1997 effective date of IIRIRA. Petitioners do not dispute the general proposition that the transitional rules apply in cases initiated before but decided after IIRIRA\u2019s effective date. See, e.g., Astrero v. INS, 104 F.3d 264, 266 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Rather, they argue that they are entitled not Holdings: 0: holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective 1: holding that because the removal proceeding began after april 1 1997 iirira governed 2: holding that iiriras effective date is april 1 1997 3: holding that because iirira  309 would not become effective before april 1 1997 retroactive application of ina 240a could not take effect before that date 4: holding that prisoners whose convictions became final on or before april 24 1996 must file their  2255 motions before april 24 1997", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "this case is a \u201cnegative easement\u201d because it prevents the owner of land subject to the easement \u201cfrom doing something, such as building an obstruction.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 550 (8th ed. 2004). As happened in this case, a land owner may impose a restrictive covenant as a condition of the sale of all or a portion of his property. See, e.g., McKay v. Townson, 528 So.2d 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (upholding a restrictive covenant on lake property, reserving the use of the lake to the predecessor in interest). Here, although the parties\u2019 properties were originally owned by a common owner, Mr. Spivey, their subsequent sales were not subject to a general scheme or plan of development subjecting them to mutual restrictions. Cf. Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So.2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (<HOLDING>). \u201cA \u2018general building scheme\u2019 may be defined Holdings: 0: holding that wjhere the owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate grantees imposing restrictions on its use pursuant to a general plan of development or improvement such restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee either on the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration or on the ground that mutual negative equitable easements are created 1: holding that property owner could not argue it had no notice of deed restrictions simply because guidelines were unclear when owner acknowledged having copy of such restrictions 2: recognizing that the acceptance by the grantee of a deed poll signed and sealed by the grantor containing covenants to be performed by the grantee binds the latter to the performance of these covenants as effectually as if he had executed the instrument quotations and citation omitted 3: holding that contrary to restrictions regarding use a unit owner may not be deprived of his interest in a substantial portion of the general common elements without his consent 4: holding that property owners who are aware of deed restrictions and accompanying guidelines are considered to be on notice of such restrictions despite believing that guidelines are unclear and inapplicable", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "380 B.R. 753, 758 n. 5 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 2008); Drown v. ESB (In re Farley), 387 B.R. 751 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on trustee's attempt to avoid their security interests using the strong-arm power). 4 . See Doc. 40 in Adv. Pro. No. 07-2915. 5 . On May 13, 2009, Aurora, Charter One, Citimortgage, Colony, MERS, Option One and Wells Fargo filed a combined supplemental brief. On May 16, 2009, the Trustees filed their initial supplemental brief. See Doc. 36 in Adv. Pro. No. 08-2085. On May 27, 2009, AWL, Countrywide, MERS and the SBA filed a supplemental brief. See Doc. 37 in Adv. Pro. No. 08-2085. 6 . See Rieser v. Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP (In re Troutman Enters., Inc.), 356 B.R. 786 (table), 2007 WL 205640 at *10 (6th Cir. BAP Jan. 26, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Consol. Partners Inv. Co. v. Lake, 152 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 1: holding the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial statements 2: holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action 3: holding that  1146a applies only to transfers under the plan occurring after the date of confirmation 4: holding that   544 applies to prepetition transfers only", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Carter, 936 P.2d at 345. This procedural bar will be adequate if (1) trial and appellate counsel differ and (2) the claim can be resolved solely on consideration of the record. English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir.1998). In this case, it appears trial and appellate counsel did not differ. Although trial counsel David Autry\u2019s name is not on the direct appeal brief, he indicat ed in an affidavit filed with the habeas petition that he was in fact assigned to write part of that brief. Fed. Dist. Ct. R. vol. 3, doc. lo, app. H at 4. Trial counsel\u2019s assistance with the brief, along with appellate counsel\u2019s failure to raise any ineffective assistance of trial counsel issues on direct appeal, suggests named appellate counsel was in an awkward position. Cf. McCracken, 268 F.3d at 977 (<HOLDING>); Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1270 Holdings: 0: recognizing that the defendant whose trial counsel represented him on motion for new trial had no opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to appeal and remanding the case for a hearing solely on this issue 1: holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal 2: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 3: holding that res judicata does not bar a defendant from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for the first time in a postcollateral proceeding if the defendant was represented by the same counsel at trial and on direct appeal or if an actual conflict of interest enjoined appellate counsel from raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal 4: recognizing first english requirement was not met where trial counsel represented petitioner on direct appeal", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "bad character or propensity of the accused. See Wright v. State, 19 So.3d 277, 291-92 (Fla.2009) (\u201c[C]ollateral-crime evidence, such as bad acts not included in the charged offenses, is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, but is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.\u201d); see also Czubak, 570 So.2d at 928; Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114-15 (Fla.1989). In fact, this Court has consistently held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence \u201cis presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guilt.\u201d Robertson, 829 So.2d at 913-14 (quoting Castro, 547 So.2d at 115); see also Czubak, 570 So.2d at 928 (<HOLDING>). In addition, even assuming evidence that Holdings: 0: holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify  1: holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted 2: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder 3: holding that collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful 4: holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the statute would not necessarily constitute an unlawful prior restraint, so long as it is narrowly tailored, based on a continuing course of repetitive speech, and granted only after a final adjudication on the merits that the speech is unprotected); Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir.1990) (upholding injunction enjoining statements that had been found to be false and libelous); Hill, 325 S.W.3d at 309 (adopting modern rule that defamatory speech may be enjoined after trial court\u2019s final determination by a preponderance of the evidence that the speech at issue is false, and on the condition that the injunction is narrowly tailored to limit the prohibited speech to that which has been judicially determined to be false); Balboa Island, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 156 P.3d at 349 (<HOLDING>); Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs must plead alleged defamatory statements with precision 1: holding that the court may issue an injunction prohibiting a defendant from repeating statements determined at trial to be defamatory 2: holding that the constitutional level of punitive damages is not a finding of fact that must be determined by the jury it may be determined de novo by the court 3: holding that defendant could not be liable for distributing defamatory statements unless it knew or had reason to know of statements 4: holding that statements in personnel files that would otherwise be defamatory are privileged", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as exempt on such list is exempt.\u201d 11. U.S.C. \u00a7 522(1). Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b)(1), a party in interest who disputes the debtor\u2019s exemption claims must generally file an objection \u201cwithin 30 days after t D.Mass.2013) (explaining that the court did \u201cnot read either [!Taylor ] or [Schwab ] to prohibit its review of a claimed exemption ... after the expiration of the objection deadline\u201d but in the context of evaluating a motion to avoid a judicial lien after a Massachusetts statute providing an exemption claimed by the debtors had been amended to no longer expressly extend to the property at issue). When Ms. Gervais filed schedule C accompanying her chapter 7 petition, she put the trustee and all interested parties on notice that she was (1) claiming an exemption i 989) (<HOLDING>). But it is too late for the trustee to assert Holdings: 0: holding the real estate sale proceeds 1: holding that a debtors  522d1 exemption was invalid when the debtor exempted proceeds from the prepetition sale of the debtors marital home which were paid to a judgment creditor with an attachment on the debtors interest in the home 2: holding that a debtors entitlement to an exemption under  522d1 is determined as of the filing date of  a bankruptcy petition 3: holding that provision in prepetition agreement which precluded sale of assets by debtor was not a bar to a sale under section 363 because prepetition agreements purporting to in terfere with a debtors rights under the bankruptcy code are not enforceable 4: holding that debtors could not exempt under  522d1 proceeds from the prepetition sale of their home", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at liberty to do so. See People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, \u00b6 26, 320 P.3d 1194 (The supreme court \"alone can overrule [its] prior precedents concerning matters of state law.\"); see also Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (\"If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.\"). Consequently, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in using the Robertson \"reasonable exercise of police power\" test to assess the validity of H.B. 13-1224, Cf. People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 14, 1 25, - P.3d - (<HOLDING>). C. The Application of the Standard \u00ab28 We Holdings: 0: holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that federal constitution does not permit state to use prearrest silence to imply guilt and characterizing the states argument to the contrary as nothing short of incredible 2: holding that the exercise of judicial power under article iii of the united states constitution requires an actual case or controversy 3: holding that article ii section 18 of the state constitution does not protect an individuals right to possess a short shotgun for selfdefense because the states prohibition of short shotguns is a reasonable exercise of its police power 4: holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "some reservation about whether the evidence here was \u201cunequivocal,\u201d see McCartney v. Fletcher, 11 App. D.C. 1, 19 (1897) (noting that the \u201cmere making of the deeds, or directing them to be made to the grantee, would certainly not be sufficient\u201d part performance to take a parol agreement out of the Statute of Frauds), we need not decide that question because we agree with the trial court\u2019s determination that the Statute of Frauds should never bar the imposition of a constructive trust. See Tauber v. District of Columbia, 511 A.2d 23, 27 n. 11 (D.C.1986). Express trusts are created when the settlor manifests an intent to place trust property in the hands of the trustee for the benefit of another, and the settlor must use written words to express her intention d 1157, 1160 n. 2 (1981) (<HOLDING>); cf. Edwards v. Woods, 385 A.2d 780, 784 n. 5 Holdings: 0: holding the statute of frauds  does not apply to constructive trusts which are implied by operation of law 1: holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply 2: holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply 3: recognizing theory of constructive possession 4: holding defendants perceived demotion from change of duties does not constitute constructive discharge as a matter of law", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "second-hand clothing while buying herself new clothes, Vettel spends little quality time with R.J., and Vettel infrequently washes R.J.\u2019s clothing. [\u00b6 26] There is no dispute Vettel remarried and relocated with R.J. from Jamestown to Bismarck and these facts may constitute a material change in circumstances. See Dietz, 2007 ND 84, \u00b6 13, 733 N.W.2d 225. However, to establish a prima facie case, Jensen had to provide competent evidentiary facts showing these changes compel a change in residential responsibility because they adversely affect the child. See Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 609; Alvarez, 524 N.W.2d at 589. Most of Jensen\u2019s significant allegations are conclusory or lack firsthand knowledge and may not be considered as competent evidence. See Thompson, 2012 ND 15, \u00b6 6, 809 N.W.2d 331 (<HOLDING>). Although Jensen has provided multiple Holdings: 0: holding that the verdict must be sustained if there is any competent evidence to support the verdict 1: holding that affidavits must set forth facts admissible in evidence and explain its conclusions 2: holding that district court properly refused to rely on affidavits to the extent that they contained only legal conclusions 3: holding affidavits must include competent evidence and affidavits are not competent if they fail to show a basis for actual person knowledge or if they state conclusions without the support of evidentiary facts 4: holding that unsupported affidavits setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary judgment", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.\u201d). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1408 and 1409. B. McKool Smith is entitled to recover a fraction of the fees requested in the Fee Statements as sanctions against the Plaintiffs. This Court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions in order to regulate the practice of attorneys and litigants appearing before it. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). The Court should limit the amount of the sanction to what is sufficient to determine if they are reasonable and necessary. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Pratt (In re Pratt), No. 3:06-CV-257-L, 2007 WL 824117, at *8 (N.D.Tex. March 16, 2007), aff'd in part and dismissed in part, 524 F.3d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Consistent with this authority, the Court Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest on attorneys fees paid prior to the entry of judgment 1: holding that district court abused its discretion in refusing to include in its attorneys fees award the depositionrelated travel expenses incurred by prevailing plaintiffs counsel in an adea case 2: holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in awarding opposing counsels attorneys fees and expenses as sanctions without affording the sanctioned party the right to examine question or provide argument against the claimed fees and expenses 3: holding that at a minimumthe court should weigh the cost of the claimed fees and expenses against the benefits conferred upon the estate 4: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "v. Kitsap County, 59 Wn. App. 177, 180, 797 P.2d 516 (1990). 14 See Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 541, 886 P.2d 189 (1994). 15 CR 60(b). We note that \u201cirregularity in obtaining the order\u201d is one of several bases for a motion to vacate a voidable order, whereas \u201cprocedural irregularity\u201d in the due process discussion describes all potentially voidable orders. 16 Moody, 137 Wn.2d at 988 (\u201cThere are a number of reasons why married couples decide to petition for legal separation rather than dissolution. These could include religious concerns, emotional unpreparedness for dissolution, and financial considerations such as continuation of employment or social security benefits.\u201d). 17 RCW 26.09.175(2); see In re Marriage of McLean, 132 Wn.2d 301, 306, 937 P.2d 602 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 18 50 Wn. App. 633, 637, 749 P.2d 754 (1988). Holdings: 0: holding notice of balance due satisfies notice and demand requirements 1: holding such service satisfies due process 2: holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause 3: holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service 4: holding that a preponderanceoftheevidence standard with respect to sentencing matters satisfies due process requirements", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "specific, cogent reasons for questioning Hasan\u2019s credibility, including discrepancies between Hasan\u2019s asylum application and testimony relating to the source and extent of Hasan\u2019s persecution and fear of future persecution. Because these discrepancies go to the heart of Hasan\u2019s asylum claim, the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 992-93 (9th Cir.2003). By failing to qualify for asylum, Hasan necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. Id. at 993. Because Hasan failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any claim under the Convention Against Torture, we dismiss the petition with regard to that claim. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741 Holdings: 0: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia 1: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia 2: holding that  1252 generally bars us for lack of sub jectmatter jurisdiction from reaching the merits of a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below 3: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte 4: holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Id. Mere inequality in bargaining power is an insufficient basis to invalidate an arbitration agreement: Gilmer v. Inter state!Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1655, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). It is undisputed Ottman is an experienced broker who has worked in the securities industry for years and has executed several U-4 registration agreements. In the course of the arbitration, Ottman was required to pay a non-refimdable filing fee of $500, a hearing fee of $600, and a forum fee of $1,800. We conclude the U-4 registration agreement at issue does not constitute a \u201ccontract of adhesion\u201d because Ottman is a sophisticated individual dealing in a sophisticated industry, and the arbitration process placed no disproportionate burden on him. See Brown, 664 F.Supp. at 974 (<HOLDING>); Battle v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 973 Holdings: 0: holding securities industry arbitration clause not a contract of adhesion where record shows employee sophisticated individual dealing in sophisticated industry employee not coerced to sign u4 registration agreement and no disproportionate burden placed on employee pursuant to clause 1: holding county employee with unenforceable contract was atwill employee 2: holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee 3: holding unconscionable under california law employment contract compelling arbitration of claims employee most likely to bring against employer but not claims employer most likely to bring against employee and requiring first 125 of arbitration fees to be paid by employee 4: holding that absent a law or collective bargaining agreement a municipal employee is an employee atwill", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "than the offense level calculation under \u00a7 2D1.1. See Moore, 541 F.3d at 1327. Lewis is therefore precluded from receiving a reduction in his sentence, and we affirm the district court\u2019s denial of his \u00a7 3582 motion on this issue. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.10(a)(2)(B). Moreover, to the extent that Lewis raises an Equal Protection claim regarding the application of Amendment 706, jurisdiction to resentence a defendant is limited to certain motions by the Bureau of Prisons, a Rule 35 motion by the government, or a Guidelines amendment that lowers the sentencing range of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3582(c). Because an alleged Equal Protection violation is none of those, \u00a7 3582 is not an appropriate vehicle for raising such a challenge. See United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 782 (11th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the district court. Holdings: 0: holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration 1: holding that where it was clear that the court of appeals had limited the issues on resentencing to the one issue raised in the defendants first appeal the district court did not err in declining to consider other issues raised by the defendant on remand 2: holding that the district court properly declined to consider an eighth amendment argument because section 3582c does not grant jurisdiction to consider extraneous resentencing issues 3: holding this court does not consider issues not supported by propositions of law authority or argument 4: holding that resentencing should consider all sentencing arguments and remanding for court to consider defendants argument for downward departure based on postconviction rehabilitation", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rebuttal witnesses after having noted, presumably, the news story in the email chain, the subjects of McDonald\u2019s and Miller\u2019s testimony discussed in the news story appear unrelated to the subjects to which Penny and Richardson testified on rebuttal. Thus, nothing Penny and Richardson may have learned from the news story about the prior testimony of McDonald or Miller resulted in the \u201cartificial harmo ny of testimony that prevents the trier of fact from truly weighing all the testimony[, or] ... the outright manufacture of testimony,\u201d which Md. Rule 5-615 is intended to prevent. Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 629, 655 A.2d 390, 394 (1995) (quoting Hurley v. State, 6 Md.App. 348, 351-52, 251 A.2d 241, 244 (1969)); see also Erman v. State, 49 Md.App. 605, 624, 434 A.2d 1030, 1042 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The hearing judge\u2019s response that nothing Holdings: 0: holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony 3: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss on de minimis grounds where his expert witness testimony was inadmissible 4: holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to exclude testimony of a witness for an alleged sequestration violation where no impermissible harmonization of testimony could be inferred from the witnesss reading of the newspaper in the absence of any evidence that this testimony was based on what he read", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the indictment and the record provide Patterson with sufficient protection from the risk that he will be placed in jeopardy a second time for the same conduct for which he was convicted, given the specificity with which the government identified at trial the members and goals of the drug conspiracies, the conspiracies\u2019 geographic scopes, the drugs distributed in the conspiracies, and the conspiracies\u2019 termination dates. See also United States v. Young, 862 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir.1988) (\u201c[Kjeeping in mind that reference may be had to the entire record in a subsequent proceeding, the indictment is sufficient to protect the defendant against double jeopardy.\u201d (citing Russell, 369 U.S. at 763, 82 S.Ct. 1038)); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 942-43 (11th Cir.2001) (per curium) (<HOLDING>). This claim therefore fails. G. Evidence Used Holdings: 0: holding that an indictment charging a cocaine distribution conspiracy with a start date unknown to the grand jury was sufficiently specific to allow the defendant to plead double jeopardy if charged again for the same conduct 1: holding that an indictment that referred to wholesale quantities of cocaine and cocaine base was sufficiently broad to include the specific quantities of drugs actually found by the jury 2: recognizing that an indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged fairly inform a defendant of the charge and enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy as a defense in a future prosecution for the same offense 3: holding that a plea to an indictment charging a 28member conspiracy involving possession with intent to distribute or distribution of 30 kilograms of cocaine did not relieve the government of proving at sentencing the amount attributable to the defendant 4: holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s disqualification of one of defendant\u2019s attorneys where \u201ca potential conflict of interest existed *** which may have precluded [the attorney] from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial\u201d); People v. Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d 104, 111, 545 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1989) (stating that defendant need not show prejudice under the per se rule where his attorney had \u201can actual or possible conflict of professional interests\u201d); People v. Franklin, 75 Ill. 2d 173, 176, 387 N.E.2d 685, 686 (1979) (noting that the per se rule provides that \u201cwhere defense counsel is involved in an actual or potential conflict of interest, it is unnecessary for the defendant to establish actual prejudice\u201d); People v. Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162, 167-68, 361 N.E.2d 569, 572 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Here, at the time the issue was brought Holdings: 0: holding that there was a valid waiver of defendants right to conflictfree representation despite the courts failure to inform the defendant of the existence of a potential conflict of interest since the defendant was well aware of the factual basis which created the conflict 1: holding that a potential conflict was present necessitating reversal of defendants conviction 2: holding that even a potential conflict can justify disqualification 3: recognizing conflict 4: recognizing the conflict", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "acts for the substantive RICO violation alleged in count one, or overt acts to support the conspiracy charged in count two. The jury specifically found, however, that Sanchez participated in two other conspiracies \u2014 the conspiracy to murder Turs-cak, and a conspiracy to distribute narcotics' \u2014 which independently constituted both predicate acts for the substantive count and overt acts for the conspiracy count. Therefore, even if the district court had struck Torvisco\u2019s testimony about the uncharged conspiracies, it is certain that the jury would still have convicted Sanchez on the relevant counts. Moreover, to the extent that Torvisco\u2019s testimony may have had an impact on the jury\u2019s consideration of the other counts with which Sanchez was ch . 21 (9th Cir.1988) (amended opinion) (<HOLDING>). XII. Sentencing Challenges Appellants Holdings: 0: holding that errors not rising to level of plain error are to be considered in assessing cumulative error 1: holding error was structural because of the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error 2: holding that cumulative  effect of multiple errors worked to deprive defendant of fair trial although  some errors standing alone would be subject to plain error review and others might be harmless 3: holding that it was reversible error for the trial court to consider cumulative error in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "352 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (1976). Reed notes that the federal Due Process Clause also requires a defendant be convicted \u201cupon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.\u201d In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, he contends that the SJC\u2019s decision to allow the conviction to stand violated the clearly established federal law as to due process. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1). The Commonwealth replies that Reed did not present sufficient evidence to justify a jury charge of self-defense, and that therefore the trial court was correct. See Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 269, 552 N.E.2d 558, 562 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The Commonwealth insists that the Holdings: 0: holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion 1: holding that defendant may be entitled to selfdefense instruction even though he did not testify 2: holding that defendant properly raised selfdefense but passing on the applicable burden of proof for establishing selfdefense in a voluntary manslaughter prosecution in the virgin islands 3: holding the defendant sufficiently raised a selfdefense justification in a murder prosecution while thoroughly evaluating selfdefense burden of proof jurisprudence but declining to address applicable burden of proof for raising selfdefense in the virgin islands 4: holding that a judge may exclude selfdefense if the facts support such a decision", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "government also had to prove that Mousavi had a specific understanding of the ITR\u2019s licensing requirements. 2 Using the correct definition of \u201cwillfully,\u201d we now must determine whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational juror could conclude that Mousavi knew that his conduct was unlawful. A rational juror could conclude that the evidence showed that Mousavi knew that his agreement with Al Mal, and his subsequent provision of services under that agreement, was unlawful. The evidence showed that Mousavi concealed his income from Al Mai from the government on his tax returns, and the Supreme Court has recognized such evidence of concealment as sufficient to indicate knowledge of unlawfulness. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 189 & n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1939 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, evidence viewed in the light Holdings: 0: holding that the same types of evidence used to prove a title vii claim also may be used to prove a  1983 claim 1: holding that undisclosed evidence of witnesss prior perjury was material despite availability of other types of impeachment material 2: holding that the plaintiff must prove that management level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually  hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action 3: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law 4: holding evidence of types of concealment unquestionably adequate to prove bryans knowledge of unlawfulness", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the district court properly applied the McConnell factors. The district court aptly determined that the proposed testimony lacked the requisite \u201csubstance\u201d to generate prejudice. R., Vol. II, Doc. 322, at 2 (Order Den. Pursley\u2019s and Wardell\u2019s Renewed Mot. to Sever, dated Dec. 5, 2005). The testimony consisted, in its entirety, of two statements. We address the exculpatory \u201csubstance\u201d vel non of each statement. The first statement simply memorialized a legal conclusion disavowing culpability \u2014 -that neither coconspirator \u201cconspire[d]\u201d with Mr. Wardell or Mr. Pursley. R., Vol. II, Doc. 316, at 5, 6. Under our precedent, this conclusory assertion of innocence lacks the requisite exculpatory value to require severance. See United States v. Rogers, 925 F.2d 1285, 1287-88 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); McConnell, 749 F.2d at 1445-46 (noting that Holdings: 0: holding that when the testimony relating each of the statements by codefendants was admissible against at least one of the codefendants the statements were not rendered inadmissible because each statement would be hearsay as to the other two defendants 1: holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine 2: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant 3: holding that codefendants purported testimony that defendant did not sell cocaine or handle weapons at codefendants apartment lacked substance because it amounted to little more than his assertion that defendant had no involvement in the charged crimes 4: holding that testimony regarding a little pistol defendant carried was inadmissible where nothing in the record linked the little pistol to the gun used in the crimes charged", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Corp., 794 S.W.2d at 4. Misidentification arises when two separate legal entities actually exist and a plaintiff mistakenly sues the entity with a name similar to that of the correct entity. Chilkewitz, 22 S.W.3d at 828; Enserch Corp., 794 S.W.2d at 5. In such a case, the plaintiff has sued the wrong party and limitations is not tolled. Enserch Corp., 794 S.W.2d at 5. It would be difficult to justify a set of rules that extended limitations when a plaintiff intentionally named a fictitious defendant, but barred an action when a plaintiff misidentified the defendant. See Grantham, 683 So.2d at 542. In either case, the true defendant was not notified of the action before limitations expired. See id.; cf. James v. Gru.ma Corp., 129 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); see also Pierson, 959 S.W.2d at 347 (stating Holdings: 0: holding that the government had not produced evidence that the defendant intended to influence an official proceeding because the evidence showed only that he intended to influence the state civil proceedings that he had brought against his insurance agency 1: recognizing primary reason that limitations is tolled in cases of misnomer is that the party intended to be sued has been served and put on notice that he is the intended defendant 2: holding that it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent that is tortious malicious or even criminal or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress the conduct itself must be extreme and outrageous 3: recognizing that when a state employee is sued in his official capacity the state is the real party in interest and as a result the eleventh amendment is implicated 4: holding that to establish estoppel defense to copyright infringement defendant must prove inter alia that plaintiff intended that its conduct would be acted on or so acted that defendant has a right to believe that it was so intended", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the burden to the creditor to prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence). This Court will now consider whether the Trust met its burden with regard to participation liability and alter ego liability. B. Participation Liability Participation liability is a separate and distinct basis of liability from alter ego liability. See Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa. 614, 621, 470 A.2d 86 (1983) (explaining difference between alter-ego liability and participation liability). To establish participation liability, the Trust must establish (1) the existence of tortious conduct and (2) knowing participation in or personal direction of the tortious conduct by Richard. See USTAAD Systems, Inc. v. iCAP Intern. Corp., Civ. No. 09-1149, 2010 WL 2838593, at *5 (M.D.Pa. Jul. 16, 2010) (<HOLDING>); Alpart v. General Land Partners, Inc., 574 Holdings: 0: recognizing that to maintain unjust enrichment claim against a corporate officer the claimant must show the officer actually participated in the misconduct 1: recognizing distinction between corporate officer acting on behalf of himself and corporate officer acting on behalf of his corporation 2: recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer 3: recognizing the need for a nexus or causal connection between the claim against the officer and onces official corporate capacity 4: holding that grand jury testimony of officer and inhouse counsel for corporate defendant was properly admitted as admission against the corporate defendant", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "if lacking power to control.\u201d Id. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. 33 . Dhuka, 716 F.3d at 156. 34 . 24 I. & N. Dec. 324 (BIA 2007). 35 . See 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1003.1(g) (\"By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the Board rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.\u201d); BIA Practice Manual ch. 1.4(d)(i) (\"Published decisions are binding on the parties to the decision. Published decisions also constitute precedent that binds the Board, the Immigration Courts, and DHS.\u201d). 36 . 8U.S.C. \u00a7 1159. 37 . 23 I. & N. Dec. 836 (BIA 2005). 38 . Id. at 840, 842. Summarizing the refugee adjustment process set forth in In re Jean, on which Nguyen relies, the BIA in I Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by Arobelidze v. Holdings: 0: holding that an alien who illegally reenters this country is not eligible for adjustment of status because the reinstatement provision controls 1: holding that a motion to reopen to apply for an adjustment of status based on an unadjudicated visa petition filed by a united states citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse must be denied 2: holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a  209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status 3: holding that an alien who adjusted status from refugee to lawful permanent resident no longer qualified as a refugee and was thus no longer eligible to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility in connection with an adjustment of status under  209 4: holding that adjustment of status was permitted even if deportable alien had entered the country as a lawful permanent resident", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "police promptly located that gun. For purposes of determining whether the officers had probable cause, the pertinent issue is what Mr. Torres said to the officers at the t up identification should have been suppressed becau 2006) (same where defendant was handcuffed and surrounded by \u201cat least ten police officers and numerous police vehicles\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on trial testimony, Mr. Wade argues that the show-up in this case was particularly suggestive because Officer Garcia knew the eyewitness, who worked as a maintenance man in the area where Officer Garcia used to live. We hold, however, that Officer Garcia\u2019s passing familiarity with the eyewitness did not render the identification procedure unduly suggestive. Cf., e.g., Singletary, 383 A.2d at 1068-69 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). IV. Mr. Holdings: 0: holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person 1: holding that a showup identification was valid even though the suspect was handcuffed 2: holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about 3: holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight 4: holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or damage. Brown v. National Home Ins. Co., 239 S.C. 488, 123 S.E. (2d) 850 (1962). There is at least an implication in some of our case law that damages of a pecuniary nature must be demonstrated where special damages are required. See, e.g., Brown, supra. The resulting system presently in place in South Carolina allows, depending on the circumstances, either: (1) presumed damages; or (2) narrowly defined \u201cspecial damages.\u201d In my view, a less rigid scheme is required by the Supreme Court decisions. Whether our present rules should be retained is thus open to question, but is an issue not presented for our decision here. 3 In light of Gertz, many of our cases stand, in my judgment, overruled or modified. See Merritt v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 179 S.C. 474, 184 S.E. 145 (1936) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Garner, 250 S.C. 479, 158 S.E. (2d) Holdings: 0: recognizing distinction between actual and per se conflicts of interest 1: holding that in a slanderous or libelous per se context actual damages need not ever be proved 2: holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation 3: holding that false statements impugning honesty of county commissioners in transacting public business were libelous per se 4: recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "whether to require Laos to post the security was a decision committed to its discretion and it \u201cwould decline to exercise that discretion.\u201d Id. at 229 n.12. On appeal, Petitioners 'argue that the FSIA posed no bar to requiring security from Laos and that the District Court should have so required to protect Petitioners\u2019 \u201crights\u201d pending resolution of Laos\u2019s motion to vacate the August 2011 judgment. Appellants\u2019 Br. 86. The District Court made clear that even if the FSIA did not preclude it from entering such an order, it would decline in its discretion to do so. We identify no abuse of discretion in that decision and therefore do not address whether the FSIA would bar the District Court from ordering Laos to post security here. See McCarthy v. S.E.C., 406 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that an appellate court can review a district courts decision to remand when that decision rests upon a ground not authorized by statute 1: recognizing that the district court did not reach the merits 2: holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal 3: holding that a court need not reach  challenges when an independent ground for a decision remains unchallenged 4: holding that when trial court found two alternate independent and sufficient grounds for voiding realestate contract this court would not review alleged error regarding first ground when trial courts judgment could be affirmed on second ground which appellant did not address", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "same company and that profits from both flow directly into the pockets of the same principal does not overcome this critical deficiency in its pleadings. (See Pl.\u2019s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def. Re-Source US\u2019s Mot. to Dismiss 6, 8.) Even if Re-Source U.S. may have been aware of the UK suit and participated in it to a certain extent, such as providing testifying witnesses, as Plaintiff argues, that would not make Re-Source U.S. a party to the suit and would not change the court\u2019s legal analysis. (See Pl.\u2019s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def. Re-Source US\u2019s Mot. to Dismiss 7.) Moreover, basic principles of comity require that this court not engage in relit-igating the UK action or delve into that foreign action\u2019s underlying merits. Cf. Tronagun Corp. v. Mizerock, 820 F.Supp. 225, 227 (W.D.Pa.1993) (<HOLDING>). The scope of the UK court\u2019s judgment must be Holdings: 0: holding that the analogous 42 pacs  4306 is procedural in nature and does not empower pennsylvania to reopen the sisterstate judgment 1: holding that a motion to reopen seeking only to apply for a form of relief which was unavailable to the movant at the time of the hearing  is subject to the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen 2: holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device 3: holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court 4: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is more akin to the crime of harboring a fugitive than it is to wire fraud. Cf. Bowens, 224 F.3d at 309-10 and Ebersole, 411 F.3d at 525-527. Similarly to the offense of harboring a fugitive in Bowens, there are not multiple conduct elements involved in misusing a passport, much less essential conduct elements. Instead, the one and only essential conduct element contained in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1544 is the actual misuse of a passport: here, its presentation to authorities in Florida. Moreover, contrary to argument of the United States, it is not enough for venue purposes that some other action (i.e., obtaining the passport) is a logically necessary predicate to the offense\u2014even if that predicate action is also criminal. See United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 532 (4th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). Bowens and Villarini teach that venue is Holdings: 0: holding that inmates have a property interest in their money 1: recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money 2: recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico 3: holding that defendants state conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was not part of the instant federal money laundering offense even though the concealed weapon was found at the time of defendants arrest for attempting to carry out money laundering scheme 4: holding that venue did not he in virginia for money laundering that occurred in florida de spite the fact that the money was embezzled in virginia", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "venue provision as permissive. See, e.g., Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1067, 106 S.Ct. 1381, 89 L.Ed.2d 607 (1986) (permissive); In Re VMS Securities Litigation, 21 F.3d 139 (7th Cir.1994) (permissive); but see Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, 872 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir.1989) (mandatory). Additionally, two district courts within this circuit, excluding the court in the decision below, have had occasion to interpret section nine; both have held that it confers permissive, rather than mandatory, venue on district courts with the requisite subject matter and personal jurisdiction. U.S. for Kirchdorfer v. Aegis/Zublin Joint Venture, 869 F.Supp. 387 (E.D.Va.1994) (<HOLDING>); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Holdings: 0: holding that counterpart section of missouri uniform act confers jurisdiction on circuit courts of that state to enter judgment on an award and concluding that circuit court had no jurisdiction to act where the parties agreement provided for arbitration in new york and not missouri 1: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties 2: holding that section nine does not limit confirmation of an award to the district court in the district of arbitration and confirmed a new york arbitration over whose parties the court had personal jurisdiction 3: recognizing forum selection clause providing that no such claim shall be commenced prosecuted or continued in any forum other than the courts of the state of new york located in the city and county of new york or in the united states district court for the southern district of new york as clear and unambiguous expression of parties selection of exclusive forum in affirming district courts dismissal of action commenced in united states district court for the district of new jersey 4: recognizing that an action at common law can be maintained on an arbitration award rendered under the parties submission that does not comply with the arbitration statute", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "argues (inconsistently) that Dr. Steinert opined that he could either stand for up to two hours or walk for up to two hours in a standard eight hour workday. See id. at 4. Dr. Steinhert\u2019s report instead indicates that Mr. Freeman self-reported more severe limitations on his ability to walk and stand, which Dr. Steinert declined to credit. See A.R. 245. She opined that Mr. Freeman could walk for up to two hours and stand for up to two hours in an eight hour workday. See A.R. at 248. 3 . We are not persuaded by Mr. Freeman's argument that the ALJ engaged in \u201csit and squirm\u201d jurisprudence. The record reveals that the ALJ did not substitute her own judg ment regarding Mr. Freeman's condition for that of the medical experts. See Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Mr. Freeman\u2019s argument that the AU did Holdings: 0: holding that an aljs decision to discount a subjective claim of drowsiness was supported by substantial evidence where the alj noted among other things that the claimant did not appear drowsy at the hearing 1: recognizing that the alj has an obligation to investigate a claim not presented in the application for benefits when testimony at the hearing places him on notice of the need for further inquiry 2: holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision 3: holding the alj may discredit complaints of claimant where inconsistencies appear in record 4: holding that the alj may not engage in sit and squirm jurisprudence by subjectively arriving at an index of traits which he expects the claimant to manifest at the hearing", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "date might result in appropriate sanctions, including dismissal. Moreover, Wrubleski neither explained in the tax court, nor on appeal, why he did not appear at his scheduled trial date, or why he could not have presented evidence at that time. Although Wrubleski filed a pretrial document labeled \u201cpraecipe for judicial notice of pending settlement and petition for stay,\u201d in which he requested the court to stay the proceedings pending a settlement between the parties, as discussed below, he presented no evidence showing that a \u201cbinding settlement agreement\u201d existed. Thus, similar to Freedson, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Wrubleski\u2019s petition. See Freedson, 565 F.2d at 955; see also Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to conclude that the tax Holdings: 0: holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them 1: recognizing that although pro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights than represented litigants due process principles permit the imposition of a procedural bar only after consideration of the pro se litigants reasonable expectations about what had occurred 2: holding that although a pro se litigants pleadings are construed liberally a pro se litigant must still follow the same rules that govern other litigants including the requirement of constructing and supporting arguments with legal authority 3: holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure 4: holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "risk\u201d in order to trigger the protections of Exemption 7(C). 13 . Plaintiff also brings a claim under the APA based upon the same alleged conduct by the FBI, and seeking the same relief. However, \"the APA only allows review where there exists 'no other adequate remedy in a court.\u2019 \u201d Ctr. Platte Natural Res. Dist. v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Agric., 643 F.3d 1142, 1148 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704). When, as here, the FOIA provides an alternate adequate remedy, a plaintiff is precluded from seeking relief directly under the APA\u2019s judicial review provisions. 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 704 (\"Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.\u201d); see also Rimmer v. Holder, 700 F.3d 246, 262 (6th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>); Nat\u2019l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 898 F.Supp.2d Holdings: 0: holding that when a court of appeals has jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal the scope of appellate review is not limited to the precise question certified by the district court because the district courts order not the certified question is brought before the court 1: holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality 2: holding that because the district court has authority under the foia to order production of the unredacted documents plaintiff seeks the foia clearly provides an alternate adequate remedy in court and thus triggers  704s bar on claims brought under the apa 3: holding that transfer of possession to the archives did not affect the documents status under the foia because the court was confident that congress did not intend to expose  material to foia simply because the material had been deposited with the archives 4: holding that while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judges signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court the city waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the indiana supreme court has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection and more recently this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to define the scope of the instant exclusion in the abstract, applying the exclusion to real property in eases such as the instant one is far from easy. Houses and buildings can be divided into so many parts that attempting to determine which part or parts are the subject of the insured\u2019s operations can produce several reasonable conclusions. For example, the \u201cparticular part of the real property on which [the insured] is performing operations\u201d could mean, as Columbia Mutual contends, \u201cthe entire area of real property that Schauf is scheduled to work.\u201d Under this interpretation, any damage the insured causes to property in the area in which he was contracted to work would be excluded from coverage. See William Crawford, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 838 F.Supp. 157, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (<HOLDING>); see also Jet Line Serv. v. American Employers Holdings: 0: holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage insured caused to well as it was lowering gun to depth at which insured was to use gun to perforate well 1: holding that predecessor particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to a switchboard upon which insured was adding circuit breakers 2: holding a personal profit exclusion applicable to an insured corporation where the purpose of the exclusion was to exclude coverage when the insured received profits to which the insured was not legally entitled 3: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 4: holding that particular part exclusion barred coverage for damage to entire apartment insured was renovating even though insured was working only on one part of apartment at time of damage", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "\u201c1) that she [or he] belongs to a protected group; 2) that she [or he] was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on sex; 4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her [or his] education and create an abusive educational environment; and 5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established.\u201d Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467-68 (8th Cir.1996); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir.1996) (same); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159, 116 S.Ct. 1044, 134 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996) (same); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F.Supp. 1369, 1376 (N.D.Cal.1997) (same); see also Doe, 103 F.3d at 515 (<HOLDING>); Oona, R.S. v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1210 Holdings: 0: holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix 1: recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii 2: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim 3: holding that the elements of a hostile environment claim under title vii equally apply under title ix 4: recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in complex cases, productive attorney discussions and strategy sessions, negotiations, routine activities such as making telephone calls and reading mail related to the case, monitoring and enforcing the favorable judgment, and even preparing and litigating the request for attorneys\u2019 fees. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 573 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (allowing compensation for productive attorney discussions and strategy conferences); Webb v. Board of Ed., 471 U.S. 234, 243, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985) (allowing compensation for pre-litigation services in preparation of suit); Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th Cir.1985) (allowing compensation for preparing and litigating fee request); Adams v. Mathis, 752 F.2d 553, 554 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children Holdings: 0: recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury 1: holding that measures to enforce judgment are compensable 2: holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance 3: holding that court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce judgment requiring payment of future medical expenses 4: holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "ability to prove his claim of malicious prosecution, and each offers different reasons as to why. We will address Howard\u2019s claims against each deputy separately. A. Deputy Highsmith Deputy Highsmith contends that Howard can prove neither a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights nor that Deputy Highsmith was the legal cause of his prosecution. We disagree. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Howard, Deputy Highsmith violated Howard\u2019s Fourth Amendments rights by filing a false incident report that led to Howard\u2019s arrest and prosecution. See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir.1999) (\u201c[T]he Constitution prohibits a police officer from knowingly making false statements in an arrest affidavit about the probable cause for an arrest....\u201d); Riley, 104 F.3d at 1253 (<HOLDING>). Though Deputy Highsmith insists that Howard Holdings: 0: holding the same for malicious prosecution 1: holding that section 1983 claims alleging due process violations stemming from malicious prosecution are unavailable when a state malicious prosecution action exists 2: holding that no  1983 malicious prosecution claims exist after albright 3: holding that a  1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution  is  similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor  4: holding in the context of a plaintiffs  1983 and state law malicious prosecution claims against police officers that fabricating incriminating evidence violates constitutional rights", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 547(a)(2). Before new value can be determined, a court must measure \u201cthe value given to the debtor in determining the extent to which the trustee may void a contemporaneous exchange.\u201d Sulmeyer v. Suzuki (In re Grand Chevrolet, Inc.), 25 F.3d 728, 733 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting Milchem, Inc. v. Fredman (In re Nucorp Energy, Inc.), 902 F.2d 729, 733 (9th Cir.1990)); see also Creditors\u2019 Committee v. Spada (In re Spada), 903 F.2d 971, 976-77 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). New value is measured at the time of the Holdings: 0: holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance 1: holding that under 11 usc  547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer 2: holding that a party invoking a  547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received 3: holding that defendant must prove when the services were rendered to establish that the new value exception applies 4: holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "fact-finding for purposes of sentencing guidelines enhancements, provided that it is done with the understanding that the guidelines are applied in an advisory fashion. United States v. Ameri, 412 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir.2005). Because the record establishes that the guidelines were applied in an advisory manner, such fact-finding was permissible. In addition, the Appellants argue that the district court could not increase their advisory sentencing guidelines ranges on the basis of acquitted conduct. This argument also fails. Even post-Booker, for purposes of calculating the advisory guidelines range, the district court may find by a preponderance of the evidence facts regarding conduct for which the defendant was acquitted. United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 844 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). As the record indicates that there was ample Holdings: 0: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard 1: holding that there was no prejudice where had the district court allowed the moving party the proper opportunity to respond the evidence would have been properly in front of the district court 2: holding that a district court may find acquitted conduct by a preponderance of the evidence 3: holding that in determining whether the district court had correctly calculated fraud loss the jurys acquittal  establishes only that there was reasonable doubt as to the defendants involvement with such conduct and the district court was still free indeed obliged to consider whether his involvement had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence 4: holding that the district court was permitted to find conduct that had been acquitted by the jury when determining the defendants sentence", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "out-of-state marriage recognized in other states (i.e. Texas). In dealing with the issue of out-of-state same-sex marriage recognition, the Supreme Court in Windsor held that by treating state-sanctioned same-sex married couples differently than state-sanctioned opposite-sex married couples, Section 3 of DOMA violated basic due process principles applicable to the federal government. 133 S.Ct. at 2693. In this case, the Court must decide whether a state can do what the federal government cannot \u2014 discriminate against state-sanctioned same-sex couples and deny them the benefits conferred by marriage. The Court in Windsor did not clarify whether out-of-state marriage recognition implicated a fundamental right, but held that it was a right protected under the Constitution. See id. at 2696 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, in reviewing Plaintiffs\u2019 due Holdings: 0: holding that entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution 1: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 2: holding doma was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty of the person protected by the fifth amendment 3: holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege 4: holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at five of the six controlled purchases of crack cocaine; the amount sold by Leonard Sapp in the controlled buys was 48.7 grams. See Presentence Invest\u00ed- gation Report, \u00b6 10-17, 21. In addition, while executing the search warrant for the house where Leonard Sapp resided, the Government seized 20.8 more grams of crack cocaine. Presentence Investigation Report, \u00b6 21. We conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable to Leonard Sapp that the conspiracy encompassed sales of crack cocaine of at least 50 grams. Because the district court\u2019s factual findings support reasonable foreseeability, the error committed by the district court did not prejudice Leonard Sapp\u2019s substantial rights and the district court did not plainly err. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1015 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). V. CONCLUSION The convictions and sentences Holdings: 0: holding that where the district courts sentencing decision was amply supported by the evidence and the defendant thus received a sentence merited by the evidence the defendant could not show the error affected his substantial rights 1: holding that the defendants substantial rights were not affected by a sentencing guidelines enhancement even in the absence of a specific finding by the district court because the evidence amply supported the enhancement 2: holding that a district court may not impose a sentencing enhancement based on conduct of which the jury acquitted the defendant 3: holding that because the district courts error resulted in the imposition of a sentence substantially greater than the maximum otherwise permitted under the sentencing guidelines the error affected the defendants substantial rights and the fairness of the judicial proceedings 4: holding that the district court lacked authority to revisit the application of the career offender enhancement in a  3582 motion because that enhancement was not affected by a retroactive amendment", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "The State is within the powers reserved to it to refuse to enter into such agreements and so to declare by statute. [Id. at 1077.] Following the lead of these two cases, the federal courts have cons (noting that deputy sheriffs had \u201cno constitutional right to mandatory collective bargaining\u201d), affd., 723 F.2A 918 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 959, 104 S.Ct. 2171, 80 L.Ed.2d 555 (1984) (citations omitted); Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit of the N.C. Ass\u2019n of Educators v. Phillips, 381 F.Supp. 644, 646 (M.D.N.C.1974) (\u201c[T]he Constitution does not mandate that anyone, either the government or private parties, be compelled to talk to or contract with an organization.\u201d); Newport News Fire Fighters Ass\u2019n Local 794. v. City of Newport News, Va., 339 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Va.1972) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the First Amendment does not give Holdings: 0: holding that an employer cannot enter into an individual contract if it would result in a diminution of the employers obligations in matters covered by the collective bargaining agreement 1: holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights 2: holding that a city cannot be required to enter into collective bargaining sessions with an association of its employees 3: holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement 4: holding that employer overstepped its role when it refused to enter into written collective bargaining agreement because it believed unions entering the deal would violate union constitution", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in order to gain consent to enter the premises when, in fact, his real reason is to search inside for evidence of a crime, we find that this deception under the circumstances is so unfair as to be coercive and renders the consent invalid. *** This police conduct offends the fourth amendment and is fundamentally unfair when compared with the need for effective police investigation.\u201d Daugherty, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 400. While Daugherty appears to be the only Illinois case invalidating consent on the ground that it was obtained through trickery, defendant also likens his case to those that invalidated consent on the ground that the police had misrepresented the defendants\u2019 rights. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549-50, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 802-03, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1791-92 (1968) (<HOLDING>); People v. Casazza, 144 Ill. 2d 414, 418, 424 Holdings: 0: holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search 1: holding that absent consent or exigent circumstances law enforcement officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant 2: holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given 3: holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit 4: holding consent invalid when given under coercive circumstances in which police misrepresented that they had a warrant to search the home", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "relief, the appellate review centers on an examination of whether the evidence of record supports the PCRA court's ruling and whether such ruling is free from legal error. See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434, 445, 725 A.2d 154, 159-60 (1999). 3 . This Court has allowed appeal in Commonwealth v. Schofield, 580 Pa. 4, 858 A.2d 1157 (2004), to reconsider Lord's strict waiver rule. Unless and until the Court modifies Lord\u2019s holding, however, it remains controlling law. 4 . See also Johnson v. Champion, 288 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir.2002) (explaining that \"the negligent failure to perfect an appeal \u2018amount[s] to a complete denial of assistance of counsel during a critical stage\u2019 of the criminal proceedings\u201d (citation omitted)); McHale v. United States, 175 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Cowley, 28 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Holdings: 0: holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal 1: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 2: holding that trial counsel owes a criminal defendant a duty to file a notice of appeal regardless of whether the attorney was retained for the appeal or not 3: holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe 4: holding that where counsel has failed to file or perfect an appeal despite the defendants request it is clear that the defendant need not demonstrate that but for the ineffectiveness of counsel such an appeal would have succeeded or even would have merit", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the parties, we find only one to have merit. The trial court properly considered the Husband\u2019s police pension plan as a marital asset, but erred in its valuation for the purpose of equitable distribution. The only evidence of the value of the police pension plan related to actual cash contributions. No evidence of its present value was presented. We therefore reverse and remand for a proper calculation of the Husband\u2019s police pension plan, utilizing the concept of present value. Since reconsideration of the value of this asset will likely affect the overall equitable distribution plan, we also remand with instructions to re-consider the equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital assets in light of the changed valuation. See Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte, 692 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(<HOLDING>). We affirm in all other respects. However, Holdings: 0: holding that if the market value of an asset can be ascertained the decree should account for the change in value between the date of the decree and the timely execution of the distribution plan in the decree the distribution based on value at the distribution date 1: holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue 2: holding that where the trial court awarded the former husband the value of his pension plan but failed to calculate the present value of the plan case must be reversed and remanded for redetermination of equitable distribution 3: holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan 4: holding that a fixed system of distribution is applicable where no present value can be established", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Columbia. It is especially important in cases involving allegations of copyright, infringement using an IP address that the plaintiff demonstrate a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a District of Columbia resident or that the injury occurred in the District of Columbia. See Nu Image, Inc. v. Doe, 799 F.Supp.2d 34, 39-40 (D.D.C.2011). In AF Holdings LLC the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that geolocation services which \u201cenable anyone to estimate the location of Internet users based on their IP addresses\u201d are \u201csufficiently accurate to provide at least some basis for determining whether a particular subscriber might live in the District of Columbia.\u201d AF Holdings LLC, 752 F.3d at 996; see also Nu Image, Inc., 799 F.Supp.2d at 41 (<HOLDING>). III. DISCUSSION Upon consideration of the Holdings: 0: holding that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the district of columbia 1: holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim 2: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 3: holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar 4: holding that the plaintiff has a good faith basis to believe a putative defendant may be a district of columbia resident if a geolocation service places his her ip address within the district of columbia or within a city located within 30 miles of the district of columbia", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and deferring on issue). Although the other circuits are arguably split on the question, Taylor, 119 F.3d at 630, it appears that the majority hold that the use of keys solely to test locks does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 455-57 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1173 (7th Cir.1991) (\u201cAlthough the owner of a lock has a privacy interest in a keyhole-enough to make the inspection of that lock a \u2018search\u2019-the privacy interest is so small that the officers do no need probable cause to inspect it. Because agents are entitled to learn a suspects\u2019s address without probable cause, the use of the key to accomplish that objective did not violate the fourth amendment.\u201d); United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Absent any controlling authority to the Holdings: 0: holding that mere insertion of key was not a search or at least not an unreasonable search protected by the fourth amendment 1: holding that strip search incident to arrest was not per se unreasonable but holding that search was performed in an unreasonable manner when conducted in view of the public 2: holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises 3: holding that insertion of a crowbar into the door of a suspects house by officers before they announced their presence constitutes an unreasonable search 4: holding that the insertion of a key into the door of a car to see if it fit constituted the beginning of a search because there is a reasonable expectation of privacy", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that this is consistent with the legislative intent \u201cto increase the grading of the offense when a Chapter 31 sexual offense comprised the act which corrupted or tended to corrupt the morals of a minor.\u201d Commonwealth\u2019s Brief, at 10. Appellant\u2019s claim demands that we interpret the corruption of minors statute before we determine whether he committed an offense under subsection (a)(l)(ii). Because statutory interpretation is a matter of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. McClintic, 589 Pa. 465, 472, 909 A.2d 1241, 1245 (2006). Consequently, we are not bound by the lower court\u2019s conclusions regarding the proper meaning of the applicable provisions of this statute. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 582 Pa. 624, 632, 874 A.2d 12, 17 (2005) (<HOLDING>). Our review is further governed by the Holdings: 0: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court 1: holding that our court owes no duty of deference to the legal conclusions of lower courts regarding an issue of statutory construction 2: holding that where the issue before the court is legal as opposed to factual an appellate court need not give deference to a trial courts decision 3: holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo 4: holding that a trial courts statutory interpretation is given no deference on review", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from the court to submit more than eighty statements of facts, the United States\u2019 Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Exceed the Page Limit also requested that it be permitted to exceed the number of facts allowed in the Statement of Material Facts, Local Rule 56.1(a)(3). (See Def.\u2019s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 59) at 1.) 4 . The parties and witnesses refer to the time of events relating to Flight 2745 in \"Zulu,\u201d \"GMT\u201d (Greenwich Mean Time) and \"UTC,\u201d interchangeably, and also in EST. For the purposes of this opinion, the court will refer to time in EST and UTC. 5 . The court notes that under the FTCA's discretionary exception, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2680(a), the United States cannot be held liable for a discretionary policy judgment. Collins v. United States, 564 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). As will be discussed below, based on the Holdings: 0: holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents 1: holding that a municipality may only be held liable under  1983 for a policy practice or custom 2: holding that a police officer cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to prosecute the plaintiff 3: holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii 4: holding that under the discretionaryfunction exception the faa could not be held liable for negligence for its determination not to install automated radar at an airport because the decision was a discretionary policy judgment", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Wallace\u2019s \u201cway of making it look like he was just playing with me.\u201d Id. at 78. Plaintiff acknowledged in his deposition that he may have been laughing after this incident\" occurred, although he contends that any laughing was \u201cmad and nervous laughter ... it wasn\u2019t happy laughter.\u201d' Def.\u2019s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 142. Furthermore, Mr. Newell, the third participant in this event, \u201cwas laughing because [he] thought it was funny.\u201d Id. at 93. Given the circumstances in this case, the Court finds that a reasonable jury, at most, could conclude that while Mr. Wallace\u2019s actions may have been in bad taste, and personally offensive, they were not severe enough to constitute a hostile working environment. See Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 39, 45-46 (1st Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Tatum v. Hyatt Corp., 918 F.Supp. 5, 7 Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegations that coworker attempted to grab her breast and later touched and rubbed her thigh that customers made sexually threatening remarks and that supervisors did not respond to her complaints about these incidents did not support a hostile work environment claim 1: holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture 2: holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences   and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment 3: holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters 4: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "has been to take from the legislature and the courts, and place in district attorneys, the actual discretion to determine the severity of individual sentences in a substantial number of felony cases. The effect may be to empower a prosecutor to force upon a trial judge the imposition of a sentence so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense involved as to shock the conscience of the court. Such a sentence may be so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution. For a careful, thorough discussion supporting this position, see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert, den., 415 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The practical effect of the habitual criminal Holdings: 0: holding  1130 to be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff 1: holding west virginia recidivist statute unconstitutional as applied to require disproportionately severe sentence 2: holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied 3: holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants 4: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Six Feathers continually eluded the officers and took them on a lengthy and ' highly dangerous chase. Near the end of the pursuit, Six Feathers intentionally drove his car directly into Tarrell\u2019s vehicle. Jarman testified that it was his belief that Six Feathers was an \u201cimmediate threat.\u201d Dep. of Brett Jarman at 178. Jarman further testified that, after the collision, he believed Six Feathers, as he was backing up and turning his car in Jarman\u2019s direction, intended to run him over. Id. at 179. Based on these undisputed facts, we hold that Jarman\u2019s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances as Jarman knew them to be at that time. See Cole, 993 F.2d at 1333 (<HOLDING>). In denying Jarman\u2019s motion, the District Holdings: 0: holding the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm either to the officer or to others 1: holding that an officers use of deadly force to stop a dangerous car chase did not shock the conscience because an officers poor judgment in using unreasonable force does not automatically convert the officers acts into conscience shocking conduct 2: holding officers decision to use deadly force to stop truck driver was not objectively unreasonable because officer believed driver posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to the officers in the pursuit as well as other innocent motorists 3: holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver 4: holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in Owens\u2019 deed to Sonora and applying the doctrine of merger. Sonora\u2019s cross-claim was based on the district court\u2019s ruling that Owens had nothing to convey to Sonora. Our ruling means that Owens did have something he could convey. Thus, the rationale for the cross-claim has evaporated. We reverse on that basis only. We venture no opinion on the law relied on by the district court for its ruling. CONCLUSION {32} We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. {33} IT IS SO ORDERED. MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge WE CONCUR: LINDA M. VANZI, Judge M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 1 We recognize that issues can arise with regard to the unintended conveyance of unsevered appurtenant water rights. See Turner v. Bassett, 2005-NMSC-009, \u00b6 24, 137 N.M. 381, 111 P.3d 701 (<HOLDING>). No one here argues that there were any Holdings: 0: holding that failure to use irrigation water rights on conveyed property for more than ten years did not sever water rights from said property absent compliance with statutory requirements 1: recognizing that water rights constitute a real property interest 2: recognizing a presumption that the issuance of a permit by the state engineer allowing recognized irrigation water rights to be shifted to other users works as severance of those water rights from the land 3: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 4: holding that the state engineer has discretion to refuse to accept for filing amended declarations of water rights pertaining to water rights that are not vested and that the state engineer may rely on information contained in his own records in exercising this discretion", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Young because it is the \u201cnecessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature.\u201d Id. at 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Moreover, the injunction does not directly lead to the payment of state funds from the treasury because the Fund will still make the final decision determining whether Dairy Mart meets the numerous other filing requirements imposed by Kentucky law. Thus, whether reimbursement is ultimately appropriate, the injunctive relief sought in this case falls on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment, rather than on the Edelman side because \u201cwhether or not [the claimant] will receive retroactive benefits rests entirely with the State, ... not with the federal court.\u201d Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 348, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Appellants dispute that the eventual payment Holdings: 0: holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action 1: holding that state sovereign immunity bars state constitutional claims 2: holding that state could not assert sovereign immunity defense where the state had waived immunity in state court and agreed to remove suit to federal court 3: holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity 4: holding that sovereign immunity did not bar an order forcing the edelman defendants to send a notice to plaintiffs advising them that state administrative procedures were available by which they could obtain past welfare benefits", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the extrinsic and charged offenses.\u201d). The rationale is that if \u201cthe defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.\u201d Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. But to understand whether two acts have the same intent, we must define the \u201cintent\u201d at issue. In Watson\u2019s case, the United States tells us that it is the \u201cintent to smuggle aliens.\u201d See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1324(a)(2) (punishing \u201c[a]ny person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien\u201d), 1327; see also United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1068 (11th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Watson agrees on this point. Consequently, Holdings: 0: holding that the phrase resident alien means an alien lawfully residing in the united states 1: holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give the defendants requested instruction concerning his mistaken belief about united states citizenship because the court had given an instruction covering the elements of the crime including the mens rea element 2: holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them 3: holding that district courts acceptance of a defendants guilty plea to bringing an unlawful alien into the united states under 8 usc  1324alai was plain error in part because the defendant did not accompany or arrange to have a person accompany the alien across the border and we have found no case where a defendant has been convicted under clause i of this statute for bringing an alien into the united states except where the defendant accompanied or arranged to have the alien accompanied as in a smuggling operation across the border 4: holding that  1324a2 requires the mens rea of knowingly bringing an alien to the united states", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or distribute, a controlled substance ... for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.\u201d Id. \u00a7 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). A \u201cviolent felony\u201d is any crime punishable by an imprisonment term exceeding one year that: (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. \u00a7 924(e)(2)(B). Senecharles\u2019s argument with regard to his Florida conviction under Fla, Stat. \u00a7 893.13(1) for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is directly foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1266-68 (11th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>). Senecharles\u2019s argument that Smith was wrongly Holdings: 0: holding that a conviction under fla stat  893131 is a serious drug offense 1: holding convictions under fla stat  893131 qualify as serious drug offenses pursuant to the acca despite the florida statutes lack of a mens rea element 2: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea 3: holding that a conviction for a violating fla stat  84301 constitutes a violent felony under the acca 4: holding that an indictment that omitted the mens rea element was sufficient because it cited the applicable statutes which informed the defendant of the elements of the charged offenses", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and unrelated to authority stemming from the war power; there was no connection shown between Schlomann\u2019s military duties and the offenses; the victims were not engaged in the performance of duties relating to the military; there was present and available a civilian court where the case might be prosecuted; there is no showing of flouting of military authority; there was no threat to a military post; there was no violation of military property shown; and the offenses were among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts. See Alaska Statutes Annotated, 1962, Title 11 \u00a7\u00a7 11.15.010 (first degree murder, including felony murder) ; 11.-15.030 (second degree murder, including unpremeditated murder) ; 11.15.220 (assault with a dangerous weapon) ; 11.15.-240 (robbery) ; 11.0 L.Ed.2d 2 (<HOLDING>) ; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 Holdings: 0: holding that testimony of witnesses absent from the jurisdiction shall not be used unless good faith effort has been made by the state to secure appearance of the witnesses as announced in barber v page 390 us 719 88 sct 1318 20 led2d 255 to be retroactive 1: holding that mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led2d 336 1967 controlled with respect to texas revocation proceedings that suspended the imposition of sentence and accorded a constitutional right to counsel and further holding that gagnon v scarpelli was inapplicable 2: holding that counsel must be appointed to indigents for purposes of appeal as announced in douglas v california 372 us 353 83 sct 814 9 led2d 811 to be retroactive 3: holding that indigents have a right to a transcript on appeal as announced in griffin v illinois 351 us 12 76 sct 585 100 led 891 to be retroactive 4: holding the rule requiring that counsel be furnished in proceedings for probation or imposition of deferred sentence as announced in mempa v rhay 389 us 128 88 sct 254 19 led 2d 336 to be retroactive", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "what additional factors are sufficient to create the requisite inference of participatory involvement. In Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91, 100 S.Ct. at 341-42, officers had a warrant to search a bar and its bartender for heroin. They conducted a pat-down search of Ybarra, a bar patron, despite the fact he had made no gestures suggesting criminal conduct, no attempts to conceal contraband, and no suspicious statements. In declaring the search invalid, the Court noted that the officers \u201cknew nothing more about Ybarra except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale.\u201d Id. at 91, 100 S.Ct. at 342. See also Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. Holdings: 0: holding that while search incident to arrest could not justify search in that case probable cause plus exigency justified search 1: holding that the legitimate search and seizure of one suspect in a public place cannot be bootstrapped into probable cause for a broadbase search of the business establishment and its patrons 2: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause 3: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 4: holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "their children because no conflicting interests were implicated. See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir.2001) (\"[U]nless a conflict of interest exists between the representative and minor, a district court need not even consider the question whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.\u201d); Gonzalez-Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1196 (M.D.Fla.2002) aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United States, 378 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that \"[tjypically, the next friend who sues on behalf of the minor is that minor\u2019s parent\u201d and finding that the mother of the minor plaintiffs, as a party to the suit, was not required to bring the action as a \"next friend\u201d); see also Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 17 . The court concluded that \"the instant Holdings: 0: holding that claim belongs to child but allowing mother to assert it on childs behalf 1: holding a fathers duty to support his minor child did not include a duty to contribute to the cost of the minor childs college education 2: holding that the minor was otherwise represented because the childs legal guardian his mother brought the action on his behalf 3: holding in a paternity action that the selection and change of the childs surname from the name chosen by the mother must be based on the trial courts determination that renaming is in the childs best interests and the record must affirmatively show such a name change is required for the welfare of the minor child 4: holding in syllabus point 4 that when a childs mental health records are sought to be produced and the child is not directly represented in the proceeding the child should be joined as a party and a guardian ad litem must be appointed by the circuit court to protect the childs rights", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of Faber is satisfied because Plaintiffs claims fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. See Faber, 367 F.3d at 1052. The arbitration agreement also is valid under the first-prong of Faber. Missouri law, like federal law, supports the enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of employment discrimination. Mo.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 435.350; see also Berkley v. Dillard\u2019s Inc., 450 F.3d 775, 777 (8th Cir.2006). Claims based on the federal equivalent of Michigan\u2019s Elliob-Larsen Civil Rights Act\u2014the Age Discrimination in Employment Act\u2014have been held subject to binding arbitration. Faber, 367 F.3d at 1052 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, 111 S.Ct. 1647); see also Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 95-3432, 1997 WL 4783, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6,1997); cf. Bailey, 346 F.3d at 824 (<HOLDING>); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 Holdings: 0: holding that discriminatory pay reduction under fair labor standards act does not constitute continuing violation 1: holding right to liquidated damages under fair labor standards act nonwaivable 2: holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state 3: holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration 4: holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "defense suffice\u2014 \u201ceven if the parties concede that the defense is the only disputed issue in the case\u201d and, in that sense, \u201cnecessary to the resolution\u201d of the state law claim. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d at 138-40 & n. 5; See id. at 140 n. 4 (stating that jurisdiction is inappropriate under Grable where a federal issue is \u201cnot necessarily raised by [the plaintiffs] affirmative claims,\u201d but rather \u201ccomes into the case as a defense\u201d); see also, e.g., Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160, 1173 (10th Cir.2012) (\u201cTo determine whether an issue is \u2018necessarily\u2019 raised, the Supreme Court has focused on whether the issue is an \u2018essential element\u2019 of a plaintiffs claim.\u201d (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 315, 125 S.Ct. 2363)); see generally Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (<HOLDING>). And finally, if a claim does not present \u201ca Holdings: 0: recognizing cause of action 1: recognizing the cause of action 2: holding veilpiercing claim does not state cause of action under erisa and cannot independently support federal subject matter jurisdiction 3: holding that federal issues interposed as a defense generally do not create a cause of action arising under federal law 4: holding that a federal defense to a state cause of action does not support federalquestion jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "financing, and the procedure for receiving benefits.\u2019 \u201d Peckham, 964 F.2d at 1047 (quoting Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1373). A plan also implicates the existence of benefits \u201cwhose provision by nature requires an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer\u2019s obligation.\u201d Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2217, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Because any simple insurance policy must logically include the statutory criteria, most determinations of the existence of a plan hinge on whether the plan requires the employer either to institute an ongoing administrative program that might be subject to conflicting (and therefore preempted) state regulations, or to administer funds that might be subject to abuse or misappropriation. See, e.g., Peckham, 964 F.2d 1043,1048 (<HOLDING>); Hansen v. Continental Insurance Co., 940 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a two to threeday time period between the employees complaint and his discharge was sufficient 1: holding administrative program shown by employers keeping records making regular payments and employing two liaisons between insurer and employees 2: holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future 3: holding that an insurer can be estopped from denying coverage for failure to make payments where that insurer has established a course of conduct of accepting late payments 4: holding that bivens plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies where administrative remedy program provided only for injunctive relief", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the Tucker Act, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends that his filing an application with the DOT BCMR on November 3, 2006, renders his claim timely. Plaintiff reasons that this filing tolled the court\u2019s general statute of limitations. Nevertheless, it is a canon of military-pay jurisprudence that seeking permissive administrative review does not toll the statute of limitations in the Tucker Act. See Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2003) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that the statute of limitations for Tucker Act claims is not tolled by the claimant\u2019s exercise of his right to seek permissive administrative review of his claim.\u201d); see also Brighton Village Assocs. v. United States, 52 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). The Administrative Record reveals some Holdings: 0: holding that the post conviction relief act extends to challenges arising from the penalty phase of trial including ineffectiveness claims 1: holding that a  1983 claim is an independent original action rather than a review proceeding even when it challenges an administrative action 2: holding that  1983 claims may be joined with an administrative review 3: holding that administrative challenges did not postpone accrual of  claims 4: holding premature a suit filed before final administrative determination of claimants administrative claim", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Inc. v. United States, 344 F.Supp.2d 257, 264 (D.Mass.2004); Ass\u2019n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1228 (W.D.Wash.1999); Or. Laborers-Emp'rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1182-1183 (D.Or.1998); Felton v. Schaeffer, 229 Cal.App.3d 229, 237-38, 279 Cal.Rptr. 713 (1991); Rojas Concrete, Inc. v. Flood Testing Labs., Inc., 406 Ill.App.3d 477, 347 Ill.Dec. 71, 941 N.E.2d 940, 946-47 (2010); Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., 636 N.W.2d 74, 82-83 (Iowa assisting its employees in obtaining group health insurance, an employer assumed an extra-contractual duty to make accurate representations to an employee about her insurance coverage); McDonald v. Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 49 Or.App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654, 656-59 (1980) (<HOLDING>). 11 . Although Harmon was not in a contractual Holdings: 0: holding that if counsel retained by an insurer acts as an investigator and not as an attorney then the communications between the insured and insurer are not privileged 1: holding that the insureds ordinary burden to allocate a verdict between covered and noncovered claims does not shift to the insurer unless the insurer had an affirmative duty to defend the underlying claims 2: holding that under new york law for an insurer to have no duty to defend the court must find as a matter of law that based on the pleadings there was no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured 3: holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue 4: holding that an escrow agent and title insurer may have voluntarily assumed a duty to advise the buyers on their potential legal liability for  subcontractors liens on the property in addition to the defendants ordinary contractual and professional duties as an escrow agent and title insurer", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "judicata because of the state decision. Id. The state claim was based on Missouri law, while the federal claim was based on federal law, so the state decision was not going to be \u201cdeterminative of the similar issue\u201d in the federal suit. Id. We therefore held that, because the stay would not put the plaintiff out of federal court, it was not a final judgment and not appealable. Id. at 516-17. In other cases, we have used similar factors to conclude stays were not appeal-able. In Marcus v. Township of Abington, the causes of action in two proceedings \u2014 a state criminal suit and a federal \u00a7 1983 suit \u2014 were different, and we held the stay was not a final, appealable order. 38 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (3d Cir.1994). We also noted in Marcus that stays on Works), 525 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Here the Wildermans have clearly conceded Holdings: 0: holding that such a stay is appropriate where in the absence of a stay the continuation of the proceedings in the trial court disrupts the arbitration proceedings and can render them ineffective 1: holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order 2: holding a stay appealable because the state suit was likely to continue beyond the expiration of the federal grand jurys term with the practical effect of a dismissal of the proceedings 3: holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court 4: holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "601, 604-05 (1981). We conclude that a general publication occurred in the manner in which MBA disseminated its PRIDE manuals and forms. See White v. Kimmell, supra, 193 F.2d at 747. Further, the limited publication exception arose in circumstances quite different from this case. If the author disseminated his work without a copyright notice and if it was held that a publication had occurred, the author\u2019s protection was forfeited. National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951). Where finding a general publication would divest the author of the benefit of his work, courts have avoided a complete forfeiture by concluding that a limited publication occurred. Compare Pierce & Bushnell Manuf\u2019g Co. v. Werckmeister, 72 F. 54 (1st Cir. 1896) (<HOLDING>) with Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Holdings: 0: holding that exhibition of a painting in a public art gallery was sufficient publication to entitle plaintiff to recover under the copyright act 1: holding that plaintiff could recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act because the profits awarded under the federal trademark statute constitute compensation rather than a penalty while statutory damages are awarded under the copyright act are designed to serve a variety of purposes other than compensation including deterrence and punishment 2: holding that the copyright act distinguishes between employees and independent contractors for copyright possession 3: holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply 4: holding that a plaintiff may recover damages under both the lanham act and the copyright act provided the copyright damages serve a purpose other than compensation", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "have a vested property interest in his contractual rights to severance because Freddie Mac operated in an environment of pervasive federal regulation. The government\u2019s theory is that because Mr. Piszel voluntarily contracted with an entity that was subject to pervasive regulation, he assumed the risk of future regulation and thus cannot claim a vested interest in property that was likely to be subject to additional regulation. Because Mr. Piszel voluntarily entered into a highly regulated area, he lacked a right to exclude the government from his property. To be sure, if a regulation existed at the time of contract formation, the regulation would have inhered in the title. See A & D, 748 F.3d at 1152; Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>); Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate 1: holding that the governments precluding plaintiff from building a mitigation bank on his property was not a taking because the governments authority predated plaintiffs property right 2: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort when the government seized and failed to return plaintiffs property or in the alternative that his property was lost as a result of the governments theft 3: holding that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for governments taking of option to renew a lease 4: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.\u201d); see also People v. Duran, 757 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo.App.1988)(\u201cBecause defendant\u2019s right to counsel in [a] Crim. P. 35 proceeding is statutory and not constitutional, its waiver must be voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent.\u201d). Indeed, it appears to us, based on the circumstances leading to Davis\u2019s withdrawal, that C.S. knew very well what risk her conduct posed. See People in Interest of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo.1990) (\u201cThe totality of the circumstances is relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.\u201d); see also People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo.1989)(<HOLDING>). 2. No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel  under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance 1: recognizing a defendants right to dismiss retained counsel in favor of appointed counsel 2: holding in situation of appointed counsel that if nonfrivolous issues may exist new counsel must be appointed 3: holding that once counsel was appointed defendant spoke to the court through counsel and thus the court was not required to respond to defendants request for a speedy trial 4: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "offenses not involving violence or harm to a victim. See \u00a7 42-4-1801.1(8), C.R.S. (2010) (an officer cannot physically require submission to a chemical test unless there is probable cause to believe that the person has committed criminally negligent homicide, vehicular homicide, assault in the third degree, or vehicular assault); \u00a7 42-4-18301(2)(d), C.R.S. (2010) (if a person refuses chemical testing and is subsequently tried for DUI or DWAI, the refusal is admissible at trial); cf., State v. Lovig, 675 NW.2d 557, 566 (Iowa 2004) (\"[A] defendant is permitted to refuse a chemical test ... [and therefore] the claim of destruction of evidence in the context of blood aleohol content testing may be illusory.\"); Commonwealth v. DiGeronimo, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 714, 652 N.E.2d 148, 158 (1995) (<HOLDING>). With these characteristics in mind, we must Holdings: 0: holding that the state police is a state agency 1: holding that the police officers had probable cause to make a warrantless entry 2: holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect 3: holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry 4: holding that under state law police may not constitutionally compel a suspect to take a field sobriety breathalyzer or blood test and therefore police can have no reasonable expectation that a warrantless entry will enable them to obtain or preserve such evidence", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Serv. Co., 210 A.D.2d 207, 620 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (1994) (emphasis added). The purpose of this limitation is to ensure that the tort of conversion\u2014a property tort\u2014is applied only where a plaintiff alleges interference with money in which he has a property interest, as contrasted with a mere right to receive payment. See High View Fund, 27 F.Supp.2d at 429; Selinger Enters., Inc. v. Cassuto, 50 A.D.3d 766, 860 N.Y.S.2d 533, 536 (2008) (\u201cThe mere right to payment cannot be the basis for a cause of action alleging conversion; the essence of such a cause of action is the \u2018unauthorized dominion over the thing in question.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Fiorenti v. Cent. Emergency Physicians, 305 A.D.2d 453, 762 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (2003))); Horn v. Toback, 44 Misc.3d 42, 989 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (App. Term 2014) (<HOLDING>). That determination often turns on whether the Holdings: 0: holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an identifiable fund and thus a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim 1: holding that contract debt  was not subject to an act in tort for conversion 2: holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent 3: holding that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on conversion claim because the claim seeks merely to recover an allegedly unpaid debt and does not seek to recover money from a discrete identifiable fund 4: holding that carrier was entitled to summary judgment on claim regarding false statements that claimants were not entitled to coverage because the claim was limited to complaints about delays claim handling and disputes regarding entitlement to benefits", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(Tex.Crim.App.1991). The ADA was not asking about the insanity defense as it related to the case against the appellant, and the ADA was not attempting to ask or direct restrictive questions of a particular juror to test the juror\u2019s qualifications. See Tex.Code Crim.P. art. 35.20. Instead, the ADA initiated a general discussion when he asked, \u201cHave you all ever heard of Jeffrey Dah-mer? Let me have a show of hands. Be hard not to .... \u201d The ADA\u2019s references went beyond the point of questioning and assessing the relative desirability of the venire members. The ADA went so far as to inject his opinion of the Dahmer case when he said, \u201cI beg to ask anybody if they ever heard of a sicker case than that.\u201d This, too, was improper. See Johnson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 154, 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). Generally, the error in an improper statement Holdings: 0: holding that plainerror exception did not apply where prosecutor asked jury to assume the role of the victim in closing argument 1: holding that various expressions of personal belief by the prosecutor in closing argument were improper warrant ing admonishment by the trial court 2: holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument 3: holding that a defendant bears the burden of objecting to an allegedly improper closing argument at the time the improper argument is made 4: holding that it was harmless error when the prosecutor focused on a single incident in closing argument", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "from activities as an independent contractor); Carroll v. Morrison, 116 Ga. App. 575, 576 (3) (158 SE2d 480) (1967) (including as lost earnings waitress\u2019s estimated loss of tips). 9 See, e.g., Gipson, 232 Ga. App. at 236 (noting that damages at issue could be characterized as either \u201clost profits\u201d or \u201clost earnings,\u201d and holding that \u201ceven if we were to find the evidence was insufficient to provi with respect to the types of evidence necessary to prove damages for \u201clost profits\u201d and \u201clost earnings,\u201d and that \u201c[t]o recover for lost profits the damages must be proven definitely,\u201d whereas \u201clost earnings may be recovered if the proof is reasonably certain and not mere speculation or guesswork\u201d) (Beasley, J., dissenting); Douglas v. Rinker, 134 Ga. App. 949, 950 (216 SE2d 629) (1975) (<HOLDING>); Kroger Co., 105 Ga. App. at 686 (3) (\u201cLoss of Holdings: 0: holding that lost earnings can be recovered if the proof is reasonably certain 1: holding that in certain circumstances fraud can be prosecuted under the statute 2: holding that in an action for breach of contract only nominal damages can be recovered if there is no evidence produced from which the facts necessary to determine damages under the proper rule can be determined 3: holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff 4: holding that the content of emails recovered from other sources was probative of the contents of lost emails", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "excluded pretrial release on bail, time spent on bail pending appeal, and time spent on parole or probation, if revoked, from the definition of \u201ccustody\u201d). This interpretation is augmented by the Ninth Circuit\u2019s conclusion that a pretrial defendant who absconded from a halfway house to which he had been released on a personal recognizance bond could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 751(a) for escape because he was not legally in custody. United States v. Baxley, 982 F.2d 1265, 1268-70 (9th Cir.1992). Dawson was confined to the premises of the halfway house at night only. During the day, he was to work at a job or to seek employment. Such liberty is markedly different from custodial incarceration in a penitentiary. See United States v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Thus, we have joined other circuits that have Holdings: 0: recognizing that time spent in community confinement subject to bop custody entitles a prisoner to sentencing credit while community confinement on pretrial release does not because ujnlike defendants released on bail defendants who are detained or sentenced always remain subject to the control of the bureau  1: holding confinement to home and work through electronic supervision does not equate to custody 2: holding that state may not subject indigent defendants to period of imprisonment beyond statutory maximum 3: holding that confinement in community treatment center after parole revocation was part of original term of imprisonment 4: holding that confinement subject to a defendants being released to go to work cannot possibly be equated with an equivalent period of imprisonment", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "or omissions and plaintiffs economic loss, including allegations of material misrepresentation or omission, followed by the leaking out of relevant or related truth about the fraud that caused a significant part of the depreciation of the stock and plaintiffs economic loss.\u201d Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 258 (5th Cir.2009). The pleading standard is not difficult to satisfy: \u201cAsking for plausible grounds for an element of a claim does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of that element.\u201d Id. at 267, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Furthermore, they only need to plead causation, not prove it. Erica P. John Fund, 131 S.Ct. at 2183 (<HOLDING>). Houston American\u2019s stock fell by 35.5% when Holdings: 0: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 1: holding two days is sufficient to prove causation 2: holding that securities fraud plaintiffs do not have to prove loss causation to obtain class certification 3: holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud 4: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "con-clusory. We agree. Conclusory allegations without factual substantiation are.not sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective. E.g., James v. State, 2013 Ark. 290, at 4, 2013 WL 3322333. Harris never presented any evidence at either the sentencing hearing or in his Rule 37 proceedings to support his allegations. Jurors are presumed to be unbiased, and the burden is on the appellant to show otherwise. E.g., McIntosh v. State, 340 Ark. 34, 38, 8 S.W.3d 506, 509 (2000). Because Harris failed to show any bias or misconduct, his trial counsel was not deficient for failing to file a meritless posttrial motion based on such an allegation. Boatright v. State, 2014 Ark. 66, at 6, 2014 WL 585976; see also Monts v. State, 312 Ark. 547, 549, 851 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court Holdings: 0: holding counsel was not deficient for declining to make a meritless argument 1: holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit 2: holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue 3: holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument 4: holding that an attorney is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "16 (D.C.1980) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We need not decide whether the prosecution of an administrative proceeding (such as the Maryland Securities Commission investigation), which is conducted independently by the agency once a complaint is filed, can constitute a continuing tort on the part of the complainant, because we agree with appellants that the ongoing prosecution of a lawsuit (such as the Putty Hill litigation) can suffice. It seems to us that a lawsuit is a continuous, not an isolated event, because its effects persist from the initial filing to the final disposition of the case. It is repetitive in that it represents the assertion, every day, of the plaintiff\u2019s claim. Cf. Neumann v. Vidal, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) \u00b6 64,933, at 72,770, 1981 WL 2218 (D.D.C.1981) (<HOLDING>). A defendant subject to a lawsuit is likely to Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered 1: holding that the statute of limitations on an abuse of process charge begins to run not when the defendant institutes the allegedly abusive claim but when he ceases to assert it 2: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims 3: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court 4: holding that the statute of limitations for a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations begins to run when the contract in question has been breached", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(5th Cir. 2004). 68 . In re Jasper, 559 Fed.Appx. 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Osborne, 379 F.3d at 283). 69 . Tex Gov\u2019t Code Ann. \u00a7 78.054(b) (West). 70 . Cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 \u00a7 2(e) (West) (providing time periods for when state habeas counsel must move to appoint federal habeas counsel after the court of criminal appeals denies relief). 71 . In re Paredes, 587 Fed.Appx. 805, 824-25 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 72 . Id. 73 . Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2013). 74 . 545 U.S. 524, 531-32, 125 S.Ct 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). 75 . Id. at 532 n.5, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citation omitted). 76 . Clark v. Thaler, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 179, 184 L.Ed.2d 90 (2012) (mem.). 77 . See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (<HOLDING>). 78 . Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that aedpas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling only when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 1: holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights 2: holding that  2244d is subject to equitable tolling if ae petitioner demonstrates  1 that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and 2 that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filling quoting pace v diguglielmo 544 us 408 418 125 sct 1807 161 led2d 669 2005 3: holding equitable tolling available if an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 4: holding that equitable tolling is only available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.18(a)(1). In this case, the IJ found Mrs. Demiraj\u2019s proof of \u201cconsent or acquiescence [by] a public official\u201d lacking. A state actor only \u201cacquiesces\u201d in torture if \u201cthe public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, ha[s] awareness of such activity and thereafter breaches] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.\u201d 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 1208.18(a)(7); see also Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 154-57, 2010 WL 5064379, at *4-6 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). We have thus held that \u201crelief under the Holdings: 0: holding that class actions may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis that the prerequisites of rule 23a have been satisfied 1: holding that new evidence impeaching credibility of governments key witness was cumulative of other evidence of witness criminal activity 2: holding that appellant satisfied exception 3: holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing 4: holding that  acquiescence is satisfied by a governments willful blindness of torturous activity", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "522(g)(1)(A) and 551 of the Code preserve the recovered property for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. VI Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the bankruptcy court. 2 . The Honorable William A. Hill, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of North Dakota. 3 .210 B.R. 799 (Bankr.D.N.D.1997), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir.1998) (Table). 4 . Gourley v. Usery (In re Usery), 123 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir.1997); O\u2019Neal v. Southwest Mo. Bank (In re Broadview Lumber Co., Inc.), 118 F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir.1997) (citing First Nat\u2019l Bank of Olathe, Kansas v. Pontow, 111 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir.1997)). Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. 5 . First Nat\u2019l Bank of Olathe, Kansas v. Pontow, 111 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir.1997); Sholdan v. Dietz, 108 F.3d 886, 888 (8th Cir.1997). .N.D.Iowa Jan.3, 2000) (<HOLDING>); Schieffler v. Beshears (In re Beshears), 182 Holdings: 0: holding that if a debt or had voluntarily granted a security interest that was later avoided the debtor was not entitled to exempt the interest recovered 1: holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing 2: holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest 3: holding that the trustee could not avoid a security interest under section 549 when that security interest was authorized by the bankruptcy court 4: holding that under virginia law a banks security interest which secured a loan made to refinance preexisting debt was a nonpossessory nonpurchasemoney security interest", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM: Miriam J. Jiggetts appeals the district court\u2019s order dismissing without prejudice her complaint filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d) and Virginia Human Rights Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Individuals cannot be held liable for employment discrimination under the ADEA. See Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We therefore affirm the dismissal of the Holdings: 0: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 1: holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees 2: holding that individual employees are not proper defendants in adea lawsuits 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: holding no individual liability under the adea", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "both the original judgment and the bill of review in one appeal. Id. at 246. The mere filing of a bill of review affects neither the finality nor the enforceability of the judgment it challenges. Schwartz, 520 S.W.2d at 889; Kantor v. Herald Publishing Co., 632 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.App.\u2014Tyler 1982, no writ) (super-sedeas bond filed in bill of review action does not suspend final judgment in original action). In order to protect the status quo in the original proceeding while a bill of review is pending, trial courts have stayed execution of the original judgment by granting a temporary injunction in the bill of review action. See, e.g., Petro-Chemical Transp., Inc., 514 S.W.2d at 242; American Fidelity Fire Im. Co. v. Pixley, 687 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Because the City is not subject to a writ of Holdings: 0: holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a temporary injunction in the absence of a showing that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at law 1: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction 2: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time 3: holding that although doctrine of primary jurisdiction required trial court to abate claims over which agency had primary jurisdiction trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing temporary injunction to maintain the status quo 4: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this court. Specifically, Haberland v. Bulkeley, 896 F.Supp.2d 410 (E.D.N.C.2012), which Defendants rely bn, allowed the court to \"consider documents that are referenced in and central to the complaint, and the authenticity of , which neither party questions,\u201d Haberland, 896 F.Supp.2d at 419. The Haberland court used this logic to allow consideration of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and refer- ' enced specifically in the complaint. Here, the documents Defendants would like this court to consider were not referred to in the com- \u2019 plaint and are not public filings. Therefore, this court finds it improper to consider these documents, like the Davis service agreement, at this time. See also Phillips v. LCI Int\u2019l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir.1999) Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 1: holding court could consider a mortgage agreement not attached to the complaint in ruling on motion to dismiss because the complaint refers to the mortgage numerous times the mortgage is attached to this motion and is central to plaintiffs claims 2: holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity 3: holding that although a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment 4: holding that documents integral to the complaint are properly considered on a motion to dismiss", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "protect plaintiffs\u2019 economic interests. Not every relationship gives rise to a duty \u201cbeyond the common law duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm.\u201d See Onita, 315 Or at 159 (stating standard). Determining which relationships give rise to such a duty has not always proven easy, however. This court has observed that section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) provides a good starting point for the analysis when a party has been negligent in obtaining or communicating information. Id. (describing that rule as \u201cclose to the mark\u201d). The court, however, has declined to adopt that section of the Restatement as a \u201cblack letter \u2018rule,\u2019 \u201d id. \u2014 a view that sometimes has divided the court. Compare Conway v. Pacific University, 324 Or 231, 244, 924 P2d 818 (1996) (<HOLDING>); with id. at 251 (Durham, J., dissenting) Holdings: 0: holding that the courts grant of summary judgment did not violate the plaintiffs seventh amendment right to a jury trial and describing the plaintiffs argument that it did as very misleading 1: holding the original notice and verified account did not substantiate plaintiffs claim and was insufficient for the court to enter a default judgment against the plaintiffs 2: holding that defendant did not have a special responsibility to exercise independent judgment in the plaintiffs behalf and to look after the plaintiffs interests 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to warn claim could not proceed independent of plaintiffs aemld claim 4: holding that the need to look to the cba to determine the plaintiffs rate of pay did not trigger preemption", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "appointed under \u00a7 333(a)(1) must be a disinterested person, and must: (1) monitor the quality of patient care provided to patients of the debtor, to the extent necessary under the circumstances, including interviewing patients and physicians; (2) not later than 60 days after the date of appointment, and not less frequently than at 60-day intervals thereafter, report to the court after notice to the parties in interest, at a hearing or in writing, regarding the quality of patient care provided to patients of the debtor; and (3)if such ombudsman determines that the quality of patient care provided to patients of the debtor is declining significantly or is otherwise being materially compromised, file with the court a motion or a written report, with notice , 359 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2007) (<HOLDING>); In re 7-Hills Radiology, LLC, 350 B.R. 902, Holdings: 0: holding that a chapter 11 debtor which provided services to the public only ancillary to its primary function of administrative support to a physicians group was not a health care business within the scope of  10127a 1: holding that a chapter 11 debtor who was in the business of providing plastic and reconstructive surgery to the general public met the definition of a health care business under  10127a 2: holding claim that negligent supervision caused assault was health care liability claim because it was inseparable from the health care and nursing services provided 3: holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business is eligible for chapter 11 4: holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201ctoo old and incapable of adapting to the new technologies and techniques,\u201d R. at 327, and that \u201c[h]e want[ed] to get rid of he[r] because she [was] too old to keep [up] with the work load,\u201d id. at 327. As supporting evidence, Howell again relies on the EEOC reports. But as discussed above, those reports are inadmissible, unreliable, and largely unhelpful to Howell. She also cites the unsigned document purportedly written by supervisor Robertson. But that document is not in the form of an affidavit or an unsworn declaration, see 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1746, and \u201cwas not within the range of evidence that the district court could consider\u201d on summary judgment. DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 920 F.2d 457, 471 (7th Cir.1990); see also Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Further, even if the Robertson document were Holdings: 0: holding that an acknowledgment was defective because it did not include the name of the person who appeared before a notary public 1: holding that district court properly excluded affidavits that lacked signatures and attestation before a notary public 2: holding that district court properly refused to rely on affidavits to the extent that they contained only legal conclusions 3: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals 4: holding that when the trial court proceeded to consider affidavits submitted with motion to reconsider summary judgment the affidavits were properly before the appellate court for purposes of reviewing the propriety of the trial courts grant of summary judgment", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "transparently frivolous to either defendant or the court. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant\u2019s staffing and travel expenses were reasonable because defendant could not have been aware that Austin had misled the court. Defendant mitigated its damages to the extent possible, given the impossibility of knowing how much evidence Austin possessed to sustain his contentions. B. Minimum to Deter Although courts have not ruled consistently on the issue of whether a trial court is required to impose only the minimum amount of sanctions necessary to deter, this court is persuaded by the majority of cases that require such a ceiling. Dodd Ins. Servs., 935 F.2d at 1159-60 (vacating district court\u2019s sanctions award where the \u201cminimum to deter\u201d was not considered); White, 908 F.2d at 684 (<HOLDING>); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Holdings: 0: holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior 1: holding that it is not 2: holding that injunctive relief does not meet the amount in controversy when the only reason the injunction is worth more than the jurisdictional minimum is that it would affect defendants future sales 3: holding inference appropriate when reliance is the only logical explanation to explain behavior 4: holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Id. at 1284 (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24-26,125 S.Ct. 1254,161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)). The Government does not dispute Washington\u2019s assault statute is ambiguous, but we need not tarry long on this issue because Defendant made a factual concession as part of his state court plea demonstrating his prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. In the \u201cStatement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty,\u201d filed in Washington State court and later made part of the record before us, Defendant acknowledged the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty were as follows: \u201c[I]n Mason County, on 6/12/01, [Defendant] did intentionally assault Cecelia Howland, and inflicted substantial bodily harm.\u201d See United States v. Torres-Ruiz, 387 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). These elements track most closely with Wash. Holdings: 0: holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure 1: holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under  2l12bla 2: holding that  2241a1 requires actual use of force meaning use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome restrain or injure a person 3: holding that the decision of a police officer to preserve public safety and order through use of commands backed by threat of force or actual use of physical force is a matter of discretion 4: holding that malicious or sadistic use of force with intent to harm violates the eighth amendment", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "(a) Appealable Orders. (1) The following orders may be appealed from dependency-neglect proceedings: (A) adjudication order; (B) disposition, review, no reunification, and permanency planning order if the court directs entry of a final judgment as to one or more of the issues or parties based upon the express determination by the court supported by factual findings that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal, in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. Rule 54(b); (C) termination of parental rights; and (D) denial of right to appointed counsel pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-316(h). In Posey v. Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services, 370 Ark. 1, 256 S.W.3d 504 (2007) (per curiam), this court explained that Rule 6-9 was a new rule adopted b Ark. 206, 644 S.W.2d 594 (1983) (<HOLDING>). As such, a party is not required to wait Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal from a denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right is allowed under rule 2a2 1: holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 2: holding an order denying a nonpartys motion to intervene is appealable because it effectively concludes the proceedings for intervention and prevents the movant from becoming a party to the original action 3: holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable 4: holding that pursuant to rule 2a2 a party may appeal an order denying a motion for permissive intervention", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that is conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.\u201d The court must first look to the plain language of the statute, and absent ambiguity in the language, the court\u2019s inquiry ends ther AP 1998) (finding that under Wyoming law, the debtors\u2019 right to cure a mortgage arrearage in a Chapter 13 plan expired at the time of the foreclosure sale even though the state has a statutory redemption period); In re Watts, 273 B.R. 471, 476 (Bankr.D.S.C.2000) (granting the creditor\u2019s motion for relief from stay to allow it to record the foreclosure sale deed for the foreclosure sale that occurred prior to filing because the debtor no longer retained any equitable interest in the property and no right to cure the mortgage arrearage); In re Crawford, 232 B.R. 92, 96 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1999) (<HOLDING>). Thus, these courts employ a plain meaning Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing 1: holding that the debtors could cure their arrearage until the expiration of the 10day upset bid period which would render the foreclosure sale complete under north carolina law 2: holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court 3: holding that  1322c1 is not ambiguous that the debtors cure right terminates on the date of the foreclosure sale regardless of the intricacies of the state foreclosure sale process and refusing to attach significance to the legislative record indicating that more extensive cure rights under state law persevere 4: holding that the debtor is entitled to cure the arrearage until entry of an order confirming the foreclosure sale completes the foreclosure process under oklahoma law", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and profits in the land.\u201d Rest\u00fcd Torts \u00a7 821E. As explained above, Plaintiffs only interest in the foreshore is that of an easement providing free ingress and egress to the abutting navigable waters. As I have already determined Plaintiffs interest in and enjoyment of this right was not disturbed by the presence of the barges, Plaintiff cannot maintain his nuisance claim based on this theory. G. Plaintiffs Failure To Mitigate Damages Even if Plaintiff had proven that Defendants trespassed on Plaintiffs land, Plaintiffs claim would fail, insofar as it relates to the two steel barges, because Plaintiff did not mitigate his damages. New York courts adhere to the universally accepted common law principle that a harmed plaintiff must mitigate damages. Air Et Chaleur, 757 F.2d at 494 (<HOLDING>); see also Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, Holdings: 0: holding a party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach 1: holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract 2: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 3: holding that the district court properly applied new yorks mitigation doctrine against plaintiff stockholders who brought suit for breach of contract 4: holding that because suit requested damages for breach of contract colorado river applied even though district court characterized suit as declaratory judgment action", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "FEC\u2019s interpretation of the term \u201cpolitical committee\u201d is an unreasonable reading of the FECA, or that this interpretation is inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the statute. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The FEC argues that its determination of whether AO 2006-20 infringes the plaintiffs\u2019 First Amendment rights is entitled to Chevron deference. However, \u201cthe Commission\u2019s advisory opinions are not entitled to Chevron deference [when] they are necessarily based upon the Commission\u2019s interpretation of the Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals.\u201d Federal Election Comm\u2019n v. GOPAC, 917 F.Supp. 851, 860 (D.D.C.1996); see also Chamber of Commerce, 69 F.3d at 604-605 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the question is whether the FEC\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was no longer entitled to chevron deference given that the agency had changed its position on the issue 1: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 2: holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that the fec was not entitled to chevron deference with regard to whether its interpretation of the feca infringed the plaintiffs first amendment right to communicate with its members", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "& Smith, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 170, 529 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 945, 533 N.Y.S.2d 52, 529 N.E.2d 420 (1988)). However, both Talking Togs and Moshiko turned on the fact that the wholesale broker had merely relayed information to the insurer, which issued a policy that conformed in all respects to the broker\u2019s requests. Neither of these cases stands for the proposition that a wholesale insurance broker cannot be held liable for the alleged failure to fully inform an insurer of all the information in its possession. Moreover, the Court believes that the issue whether Yerkes was acting as an agent for Knight or O\u2019Leary is a question of fact that has not been conclusively resolved on the current record. Cf. Citibank, N.A. v. Nyland (CF8) Ltd., 878 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, because Yerkes has not demonstrated as Holdings: 0: holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal 1: holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party 2: holding that apparent authority refers to a third partys reasonable belief that the principal has authorized the acts of its agent it arises from the principals indirect or direct manifestations to a third party 3: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant 4: recognizing that a principal may limit the authority of its agent and such limitation will be binding on a third party who is aware of the limitation", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and dissenting in part). And third, the Majority\u2019s reliance on this IRS notice goes over and above any canon of judicial deference to agency interpretation. In this respect, it\u2019s important to ask: what authority was' the IRS interpreting to support its view that all double deductions should be disallowed? The IRS does not claim to be \u201cimplementing a statute,\u201d so we know that it is not entitled to Chevron or Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227-28, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). And since the IRS concedes that \u00a7\u00a7 1.337(d) and 1.1502 did not disallow these deductions, its belief could not have been derived from those regulations \u2014 and therefore is not entitled to deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Rather, the Majority seems to claim that the Holdings: 0: holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation 1: holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law 2: holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference 3: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 4: holding that the district courts apa review of a sba size decision was not entitled to deference but that the agencys interpretation and application of its own regulations did merit deference", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "requirement under the \u201cadversely affected\u201d standard. 647 S.W.2d at 252-53. Both producing cause and proximate cause contain the cause-in-fact element, which requires that the defendant\u2019s act be \u201ca substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which the harm would not have occurred.\u201d Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, 907 S.W.2d at 481; accord IHS Cedars v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex.2004) (discussing the cause-in-fact element); see also Ford v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex.2007) (defining \u201cproducing cause\u201d n Parkins and Royal Globe, if not compelled by logic, is required by the 1979 amendments to the DTPA and is consistent with an established line of authority from other states. See, e.g., Johnson & Higgins of Alaska Inc. v. Blomfield, 907 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Alaska 1995) (<HOLDING>); Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete\u2019s Satire, Holdings: 0: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff 1: holding employer satisfied its burden of production 2: recognizing the majority rule 3: recognizing burden 4: holding that plaintiffs satisfied a burden to show that coverage was commercially available for the loss sustained and noting that such a burden seems to be the majority rule citations omitted", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Tex.R. Evid. 609(a); Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263. However, if the date of conviction or the release of the witness from confinement is more than ten years from the moment of impeachment, impeachment is permissible only if the probative value of the conviction supported by the facts and circumstances \u201csubstantially outweighs\u201d its prejudicial effects. Tex.R. Evid. 609(b); see Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263. Although the ten year limitations period in Rule 609 usually militates against admissibility, Texas courts have held that subsequent felony or misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude can be tacked onto remote convictions to cause them to be evaluated under Rule 609(a) instead of Rule 609(b). See Morris, 67 S.W.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>); LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 620 Holdings: 0: holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap 1: holding that when a defendant admits prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing he waives any complaints about the validity of the prior convictions 2: holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a 3: holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final 4: holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cir.1976) (criminal trial for transporting and selling stolen cars)). Guaglione, Welsh, Netterville, and Leslie are consistent with two more recent decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. In Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901 (2d Cir.1991) (products liability complaint), the out-of-court declarant was available to testify in person, and in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1991) (civil rights action for police brutality), the three witnesses who had made relevant out-of-court statements were also available to testify. In both eases, the respective Court of Appeals held that the out-of-court statements should not have been admitted under the residual exception. In the present case, however, the \u201cother evidence\u201d the appellant would have had the judge use to 6) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Rudolph, 35 M.J. 622 Holdings: 0: holding childvictims statement to babysitter admissible un der residual exception in addition to statement to physician under medical treatment exception 1: holding childvictims statement to police investigator admissible under residual exception as well as identical corroborating statement to babysitter 2: holding heroin overdose victims statement to police identifying her source admissible under residual exception in addition to admission by accused that he had supplied victim 3: holding statement by childvictim to teachers aide admissible under residual exception in addition to statements to school nurse and pediatrician under medical treatment exception 4: holding ehildvictims testimony at pretrial investigation admissible under residual exception in addition to doctors testimony under medical treatment exception", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "on this ground is rejected. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed.Cir.1998); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Defendants then argue that since Claims 2-13 of the \u2019608 patent depend on Claim 1 of the \u2019608 patent, Claims 2-13 are invalid as being anticipated by the Combinations Hanger for the same reasons as Claim 1. (Defs. Mem. at 9.) This argument is rejected for the same reasons defendants\u2019 first point was rejected: Defendants have offered insufficient support for their argument and genuine issues of material fact remain. Thirdly, defendants argue that the Petrou patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,997,114 (\u201cPetrou patent\u201d)) anticipated the structure added by Claim 13 of the \u2019608 patent. (Defs. Mem. at 10) (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>).) Defendants have shown only that on October Holdings: 0: holding that a court can correct a patent claim for a grammatical error where the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims 1: holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it 2: holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation 3: holding that prosecution history will limit the interpretation of claim terms so as toexclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution 4: holding that the prosecution history may modify a claim terms scope if the patentee expressly disclaimed the prior arts subject matter", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "pockets. After Vasquez gave appellant twenty dollars, appellant searched his pockets and took his wallet. When appellant found only \u201cfake Mexican\u201d money, Levy struck Vasquez again and shot him in the head. Appellant then left the scene with Levy and gave Vasquez\u2019s wallet to Levy. Based on this evidence that appellant and his companions coordinated their movements throughout the offense, as well as appellant\u2019s remark about what one of his companions \u201cwas supposed to do,\u201d a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt a prior or contemporaneous plan to commit this robbery in which appellant pai'ticipated. There was no evidence that appellant ever argued with or refused to follow Levy\u2019s directions. See Thompson v. State, 54 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Although appellant said he was afraid of Holdings: 0: holding criminal conspiracy is sustained where the commonwealth establishes the defendant entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person with a shared criminal intent and an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy a coconspirator may commit the overt act and conspirators are liable for acts of the coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy 1: holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction 2: holding that a joint conspiracy trial was proper based on the lack of complexity of the conspiracy the number of defendants and an appropriate jury instruction 3: holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient and noting lack of evidence that any member of the group did anything but cooperate with the terms of the plan to commit robbery 4: holding the fedrevid 801d2e requires proof of the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence and allows consideration of the offered declaration as part of the proof of the conspiracy", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "act \u2014 aimed a gun at Deputy Martin \u2014 and threatened bodily harm \u2014 threatened to kill. An analysis of these facts thus supports a finding that Deputy Martin was justified in using deadly force. Similar to the determination of comparative fault, the issue of the applicability of the affirmative defense of self-defense is a fact-intense, totality of the circumstances determination. Freeman v. Teague, 37,982, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 371, 374. As such, this determination is generally 1 Inappropriate for summary judgment. However, where reasonable minds cannot differ, the question of self-defense with a dangerous weapon is a question of law that may be resolved by summary judgment. Id.; Rance v. Harrison Co., 31,503, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/20/99), 737 So.2d 806, 810 (<HOLDING>). Mr. Brown acknowledges that his conviction Holdings: 0: holding that the question of whether the defendants recording device was an intercepting device was a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 1: holding where reasonable minds may differ questions of causation are for the jury 2: holding in a civil context when reasonable minds cannot differ on the issue of intervening cause the matter can be decided as one of law 3: holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment 4: holding summary judgment was improper because the issue of whether a reasonably prudent person would have undertaken a more diligent investigation was a matter about which reasonable minds could differ", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "has noted, \u201ceven if we were torn between two competing yet sensible interpretations of [state] law ... we should opt for the interpretation that limits liability, rather than expands it, until the [state\u2019s] Supreme Court ... decides otherwise.\u201d Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 680 (3d Cir.2002) (discussing Pennsylvania\u2019s economic loss doctrine). Here, the logic used by the New Jersey courts suggests that the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery under the Hunters\u2019 tort claims \u2014 the interpretation of New Jersey law that \u201climits liability, rather than expands it.\u201d Id. Specifically, the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery under the Hunters\u2019 claim for conversion and negligence. 'See Cargill Global Trading v. Applied Dev. Co., 706 F.Supp.2d 563, 577-79 (D.N.J.2010) (<HOLDING>); Gleason, 243 F.3d at 144 (holding that New Holdings: 0: holding that the economic loss rule does not preclude independent tort claims that fall outside the scope of a breach of contract 1: holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting from defendants injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has contractual business relationship 2: holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract 3: holding that the economic loss doctrine may bar recovery if the defendants duties emanate from contractual relationships 4: holding that the economic loss doctrine will preclude conversion claims arising out of a contractual relationship", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "pose complications that are not always easily resolved. Still, the question Murphy presents here regarding his own registration will not always require case-by-case evaluation. Once the application of Wisconsin\u2019s sex offender registration law is correctly decided, future cases like Murphy\u2019s will also be a matter of routine. Balancing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors shows that this is a case in which the post-registration remedies were adequate: the DOC provided its reasons for requiring Murphy to register, and the state provides a judicial remedy if informal resolution proves unsatisfactory. Protections such as these are adequate when the deprivations are moderate, like the ones Murphy faces. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (<HOLDING>); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 345-46, 96 S.Ct. 893 (\u201cA Holdings: 0: holding that the parole commission is required to state reasons for its finding that an inmate continues to be a poor candidate for parole release 1: holding that the state courts decision to uphold the parole boards denial of parole was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 2: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation 3: holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings 4: holding that an important part of due process in the context of parole revocation is a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at 14; see Williams v. Social Sec. Admin., 586 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2009) (quoting Douglas, 5 MSPB at 332, 5 M.S.P.R. 280) (\u201cOne of the Douglas factors that agencies are required to consider in determining an appropriate penalty for employee misconduct is \u2018(6) consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar of-fences.\u2019 \u201d). The arbitrator, however, found that participating in the annual office basketball pool was not similar to engaging in outside business during work hours or sending inappropriate emails. The arbitrator acted within his discretion in so finding, and in affirming the penalty of removal. See Kumferman v. Dep\u2019t of Navy, 785 F.2d 286, 291-92 (Fed.Cir.1986) (quoting DeWitt v. Dep\u2019t of Navy, 747 F.2d 1442, 1445 (Fed.Cir.1984)) (<HOLDING>). Conclusion Having considered Mr. Jones\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the penalty is applicable 1: holding that the authority to determine the appropriate penalty is with the supervisor of liquor control and not the administrative hearing commission or the reviewing court 2: holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt 3: recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and    the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty 4: holding the boards affirmance of the penalty of removal was within the discretionary authority of the board because the record reflects a reasoned concern for the factors appropriate to evaluating a penalty ", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "must show that he took affirmative action to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy.\u201d). As the D.C. Circuit recently noted, \u201cwithdrawal from the conspiracy is difficult, requiring an affirmative step.\u201d Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 800 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Thus, withdrawal requires either coming clean to authorities of communicating abandonment to co-conspirators. See United Stales v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 2. Analysis Agust\u00edn acknowledges, as he must, that he bears the burden of establishing that he withdrew from the conspiracy upon his arrest, see Agustin\u2019s MIL Preclude Posb-Arrest Intercepts at 3, a burden that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, see Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 109, 133 S.Ct. 714, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>); Moore, 651 F.3d at 90 (holding that \u201cthe Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause 1: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 2: holding that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the action should be transferred 3: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof for all elements of section 523a15 4: holding that doctrine does not violate due process", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "adequate equipment available. Moreover, a common carrier is not required to provide the types of services that United provided for General Mills in the present case, although it is plainly permitted to do so. Thus, whether or not a common carrier could provide the transportation services that United provided to General Mills is not the issue; the issue is whether, by requiring such service, the actual carriage was tailored to meet a shipper\u2019s particular needs in the context of an on-going contractual relationship. See, e.g., International Detective Service, Inc. v. ICC, 198 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 613 F.2d 1067, 1074 (1979). The continuing nature of the contractual relationship is particularly important. See, e.g., ZoneSkip, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 8 I.C.C.2d 645, 654-55 (1992) (<HOLDING>), petition for review denied sub nom. ZoneSkip, Holdings: 0: holding that bill of lading not charterparty governed contract dispute between carrier and shipper 1: holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier 2: holding fact that the carrier provides substantially identical services to a certain largevolume common carriage shipper as it offers to its contract carriage customers does not threaten the character of its valid contract carriage service 3: holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder 4: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of evidence under Evid.Code, \u00a7 352 \u201cdesigned for situations in which evidence of little evidentiary impact evokes an emotional bias\u201d].) Based on the strong link between the gang-related evidence and the shooting of Terry and Witherow, the evidence was highly relevant to the issue of motive and thus, as the trial court concluded, more probative than prejudicial.\u201d (Lodgment No. 4 at 6-8). 4. Findings and conclusion The Court concurs with the California Court of Appeal that the evidence in question was relevant to petitioner\u2019s motive for shooting the victims. Accordingly, the admission of such evidence did not violate petitioner\u2019s federal constitutional rights to due process and to a fair trial. See Estelle, supra; Jammal, supra; Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). The Court therefore finds and concludes that Holdings: 0: holding other crimes evidence admissible to show motive where motive was put in issue by defense at trial 1: holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with 2: holding appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to appeal district courts decision to admit evidence that defendant was a member of a gang because gang membership was relevant to show motive and intent 3: holding that evidence of gang involvement was properly admitted to prove motive for participating in the alleged crimes 4: holding the district court properly admitted expert testimony on defendants active gang membership", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to trial before an Art. Ill judge. The Government argues that, because Belle Chasse is a federal enclave, Hollingsworth does not have a right to trial before an Art. Ill judge. In Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973), the Supreme Court held that \u201cCongress [is] not required to provide an Art. Ill court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws applicable only within the District of Columbia.\u201d Id. at 410, 93 S.Ct. 1670. Hollingsworth was tried for the violation of a federal criminal statute that applies only \u201cwithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 113(a)(5). Thus under Palmore, Hollingsworth has no constitutional right to trial before an Art. III court. See Jenkins, 734 F.2d at 1326 (<HOLDING>). Hollingsworth also argues that, even if Holdings: 0: holding no violation of federal establishment clause 1: recognizing the power of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the cases and controversies clause of article iii 2: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter 3: holding that the requirements of article iii are consistent with the establishment by congress of nonarticle iii courts to enforce federal criminal laws in clause 17 federal enclaves 4: holding that the requirements of title iii apply and must be satisfied", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "request for preliminary injunctive relief, but the court\u2019s inherent equity power does provide jurisdiction to do so). This is instead a case where a statute divests the court of jurisdiction to do a particular act, regardless of what the jurisdictional basis of the act would otherwise have been. Once a court is made aware that the controversy before it \u201cinvolv[es] or grow[s] out of a labor dispute,\u201d it has no jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief except in conformity with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, although the \u201cpreservation of jurisdiction\u201d rationale might support a stay imposed in order to permit the court to decide whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable, cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 289-93, 67 S.Ct. 677, 693-96, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (<HOLDING>), it cannot support a stay pending a Holdings: 0: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under kansas law 1: holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force 2: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under missouri law 3: holding that the united states was a statutory employer under puerto rico law 4: holding the act inapplicable to the united states in its role as employer", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "are required by law to spend a substantial portion of their fives in classrooms, student expression may not be suppressed simply because it gives rise to some slight, easily overlooked disruption, including but not limited to \u2018a showing of mild curiosity\u2019 by other students, see Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748, \u2018discussion and comment\u2019 among students, Reineke v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D.Ga.1980), or even some \u2018hostile remarks\u2019 or \u2018discussion outside of the classrooms\u2019 by other students, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514, 89 S.Ct. at 737, 740. Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1271-72. Further, \u201c[wjhere students\u2019 expressive activity does not materially interfere with a school\u2019s vital educational mission, and does not raise a realistic chance of doing so, it may not be prohibited simp (<HOLDING>). 2. Application The issues of homosexuality Holdings: 0: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students 1: holding that school officials may not limit the first amendment rights of students and teachers to freedom of speech and expression 2: holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school 3: holding that public school violated homosexual students first amendment right to speech and expression when it banned him from bringing a samesex date to the prom notwithstanding that the student and another homosexual student had previously been assaulted by other students and that the school was forced to provide additional security and escorts 4: holding that student stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to speech when he alleged that school officials prevented him from openly stating that he was homosexual and retaliated against him for doing so", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is afforded virtually unlimited latitude in this regard as long as the argument is supported by the evidence and made in good faith. Porter v. State, 832 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.). The record here reflects that, in fact, after a series of questions by the prosecutor Officer Hatton was asked, \u201cOkay. So Tanoah indicated that her daddy had cut her mom\u2019s neck and that her daddy had cut his own wrist?\u201d And Officer Hatton responded, \u201cThat\u2019s correct.\u201d Detective Graham also opined that Davis\u2019s neck wound was self-inflicted. Thus, the State\u2019s argument quoted above was a reasonable deduction from the evidence and did not interject any new or harmful facts into the record. Accord Arnold v. State, 234 S.W.3d 664, 674 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); DeLarue v. State, 102 S.W.3d 388, 406 Holdings: 0: holding the states argument that the best way to protect the community was to give the defendant substantial time in prison was a proper plea for law enforcement 1: holding states argument was proper deduction from evidence 2: holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument 3: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper 4: holding that argument raised at oral argument that was not included in brief is waived", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of fact and a review of the trial court\u2019s application of a legal standard to the facts.\u201d Id. at 1215 (internal citation omitted). In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-604, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2435-37, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), the Supreme Court held that collateral statements contained within a broader inculpatory confession are not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). The Court was particularly concerned with the reliability and admissibility of statements implicating codefendants within a broader self-inculpatory confession. Id. The Court instructed that to determine whether a statement is self-inculpatory, it must be viewed in context and in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id.; see also United States v. U.S. Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195, 1208-09 (11th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 Holdings: 0: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county 1: holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement 2: holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature 3: holding that a statement made by a county official regarding bribes was inculpatory because it did not seek to lessen blame as to his crime by spreading blame to others 4: holding that plaintiffs testimony in employment discrimination case about statement made to her by manager was inadmissible hearsay because it included statement made by others who were unidentified", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "which held that \u201csuppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment\u201d). A second circumstance arises when the State destroys, loses, or fails to preserve evidence that has previously been collected during the investigation of a crime. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d at 613; State v. Judge, 100 Wash.2d 706, 675 P.2d 219, 225 (1984) (en banc) (recognizing that the State\u2019s duty to preserve material evidence \u201cis derived from the duty to disclose exculpatory evide Rptr. 269, 274 (Ct.App.1985) (the duty to preserve evidence does not include an initial duty to gather or collect potential evidence for defendant\u2019s use at the crime scene); People v. Rivera, 765 P.2d 624, 628 (Colo.Ct.App. 1988) (<HOLDING>); rev\u2019d on other grounds, 792 P.2d 786 (1990); Holdings: 0: holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel 1: holding that the mere passive extension of credit does not constitute any form of reliance 2: holding that the failure to investigate and present the confession of a third party deprived defendant of the most critical evidence supporting his best defense 3: holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material 4: holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that the officer\u2019s testimony was an inadmissible expert opinion because it was unreliable and the officer lacked expertise. Whether the opinion testimony requires expertise or not, as was discussed in Dunnington, an objection was required to preserve any error by the trial court in allowing the opinion to be expressed by the officer. Weatherly complains only of the lack of an objection as to expertise and reliability, however. The State established the expertise of the officer to express the opinion and a sufficient basis for this opinion. See Hernandez v. State, 53 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (stating that experience may provide a sufficient basis for an expert\u2019s testimony); Hardin v. State, 20 S.W.3d 84, 92 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). The evidence indicated appellant\u2019s actions Holdings: 0: holding experts experience knowledge and training is considered in determining reliability 1: recognizing that virtually all of the studies show  that relatively few juvenile sex offenders are charged with a subsequent sex crime and sexual recidivism of juvenile sexual offenders posttreatment was very rare 2: holding that proper foundation existed for qualified experts testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome where expert had extensive training and experience with sexually abused children expert testified regarding the characteristics of the syndrome and its recognition by specific agencies and defense counsel rigorously crossexamined witness concerning the basis of her knowledge of the victims conduct 3: holding experts twenty years of experience investigating and supervising sex offenders and her extensive and continuous training qualified her to testify as an expert on the issue of whether a convicted sex offender posed a continuing threat to society 4: holding the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it ordered the department of corrections to pay for a convicted sex offenders treatment program", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "surrounding its execution, and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby. See Richard\u2019s Original Long Creek Lodge v. Seymour Inn, Inc., 791 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Mo.App.1990). On the other hand, MECO\u2019s basic premise that the presence of the condition precedent in the Addendum meant \u201cthere was either no agreement at all, or no enforceable agreement until [the financing contingency] was satisfied\u201d is flawed. First, such argument runs counter to the general principle that a condition precedent presupposes the existence of a contract and not the converse, as MECO argues. Career Aviation Sales, Inc. v. Cohen, 952 S.W.2d 324, 326 (Mo.App.1997); Highland Inns Corp. v. American Landmark Corp., 650 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.App.1983). See Morgan v. City of Rolla, 947 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). Under certain circumstances not implicated Holdings: 0: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 1: holding that a contract must entitle the plaintiff to money damages in the event of the governments breach of that contract 2: holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective 3: holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract 4: holding that a contract is not effective until the performance of the conditions precedent and that a condition precedent calls for the happening of some event or the performance of some act after the terms of the contract have been agreed on before the contract shall be binding on the parties", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "sought to quash the subpoenas duces tecum on the alternate basis that the materials sought were privileged under the physician-patient privilege set forth in section 8 \u2014 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 802). While it is only problematic that this issue would arise again upon remand, we point out that an exception to the physician-patient privilege exists in reckless homicide cases under subsection (1) of section 8 \u2014 802 (People v. Bates (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 218, 225, 523 N.E.2d 675) and in prosecutions where written results of blood-alcohol tests are admissible pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, under subsection (9) of section 8 \u2014 802. (See People v. Saulsburry (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 857, 862, 533 N.E.2d 1154 (<HOLDING>).) Whether these exceptions to the Holdings: 0: holding to the same effect 1: holding that for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction a tort occurs where the negligence takes effect not where the negligent act occurred 2: holding in dicta that subsection 9 as a rule of evidence would apply to litigation pending when the law takes effect 3: holding that a trust comes into immediate effect upon being established and funded while a will never takes effect until the death of a testator 4: holding that an adverse action occurs when the decision is carried out when it is communicated or actually takes effect", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of their attendance do not conflict with the Establishment Clause, since Riles, it has also upheld the constitutionality of other governmental programs that benefit all students, including those who attend private and parochial schools. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645, 662 (2002) (concluding that a law in which the state of Ohio created a program that provided tuition assistance to parents of eligible children to attend a participating public or private school of the parent\u2019s choosing was \u201centirely neutral with respect to religion\u201d and did not violate the Establishment Clause); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793 (upholding program lending educational materials and equipment to public and private schools based on enrollment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209-10, 240 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 Holdings: 0: holding that establishment of christmas day as legal public holiday did not violate establishment clause 1: holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children 2: holding that a federallyfunded program in which public school teachers provided remedial education to disadvantaged children in parochial schools as well as public schools did not violate the establishment clause 3: recognizing the districts duty of care for the protection of school children in its schools 4: recognizing that public schools are owned by the government maintained with tax revenue and used for mandatory classroom attendance as well as for other public functions", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s balancing of the preliminary injunction factors. A preliminary injunction requires both a showing of irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir.2009). The district court concluded that the harm to Pro\u2019s was irreparable because it was difficult to ascertain the specific amount of revenue being lost, and because damages might come too late to adequately compensate the plaintiffs business. See Hess Newmark Owens Wolf, Inc. v. Owens, 415 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir.2005) (\u201c[I]t is precisely the difficulty of pinning down what business has been or will be lost that makes an injury \u2018irreparable.\u2019 \u201d); Somerset House, Inc. v. Turnock, 900 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The district court heard live testimony on Holdings: 0: holding that the threat of irreparable harm must be immediate 1: holding that harm is irreparable where damages would come too late to save the plaintiffs business 2: holding that the potential loss of valuable business may constitute irreparable harm 3: holding that a party who can show a significant risk of irreparable harm has demonstrated that the harm is not speculative 4: holding that monetary damages do not generally constitute irreparable harm", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "court dismissed the charges against Cruz before trial based on a rule of procedure and due to the prosecution\u2019s lack of preparedness. The appellate court stated: \u201cUnder Super. Ct.Crim. R. 48(b): \u201c \u2018a court has inherent authority to dismiss for want of prosecution. However, there are limitations on this authority to dismiss for want of prosecution: Such authority may not be exercised in an \u201carbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable\u201d manner, and the court may dismiss with prejudice for want of prosecution only when it [has] concluded] that the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated.\u2019 \u201cUnited States v. Mack, 298 A.2d 509, 510 (D.C.1972) (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).\u201d (Footnote omitted.) In Cruz, the court concluded that the t .2007) (<HOLDING>); State v. Fisher, 212 S.W.3d 378 Holdings: 0: holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial  the state claims should be dismissed as well 1: holding that the pretrial order did not adequately disclose a theory because it did not give notice of that theory 2: holding that trial court improperly dismissed charges pretrial because the state did not disclose the identity of a confidential informant 3: holding that it was error for the trial court to allow the state to question the confidential informant on direct examination about her lack of felony charges when there was no prior attack of the witnesss credibility 4: holding that the district court was within its discretion not to order disclosure of the governments confidential informant where the informant only helped orchestrate the search that led to discovery of incriminating evidence not the crimes themselves and could not testify to any relevant fact", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "statement underlying the claims was made.\u201d); NAHC, 306 F.3d at 1330 (stating that statement or omission must have been misleading at time it was made and that \u201cliability cannot be imposed on the basis of subsequent events\u201d) (citation omitted); Northwestern, 2004 WL 2166293, at *18 (stating that Section 10(b) violation occurs \u201con the date that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is made or, in the case of an omission, on the date a duty to disclose the withheld information arises.\u201d); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F.Supp. 584, 605 (D.N.J.1996) (finding that three-year limitations period for Section 10(b) claims begins on date a defendant makes an affirmative misrepresentation); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 892 F.Supp. 676, 686 (W.D.Pa.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 832 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that section 10b violation occurs on date of alleged misrepresentation not the date of the sale or purchase of securities 1: holding breach of best execution duty is a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities 2: holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale 3: holding that for statute of limitations purposes the injury in a section 10b action occurs at the time of plaintiffs entry into purchase agreement not on later date when plaintiffs failed to receive expected payment 4: holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "where he passed the bar examination but falsely reported on his application that he had no pend ing professional misconduct charges. The attorney\u2019s Pennsylvania license was revoked shortly after his representation of the defendant. In determining that the representation was not per se ineffective, the court noted: The courts have consistently looked to the licensing authorities of the legal profession to determine in circumstances of this kind the boundaries of the per se exception to the Strickland rule. If a lawyer is authorized by those authorities to practice law, his or her performance on a criminal defendant\u2019s behalf is acceptable for Sixth Amendment purposes so long as the Strickland criteria are not m rt. denied 459 U.S. 1218, 103 S. Ct. 1221, 75 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1983) (<HOLDING>); People v Pubrat, 451 Mich. 589, 548 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding representation at a suppression hearing by lawyer disbarred on final day of hearing not per se ineffective 1: holding defendants request to call someone about possible representation to be ambiguous 2: holding representation by attorney who met all requirements for obtaining license but failed to take oath for admission not per se ineffective distinguishing circumstance from representation by someone impersonating lawyer 3: recognizing that a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford 4: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "release from custody less likely and increasing the risk he poses to the public. See id. at 42:20-44:06. General and specific deterrence are achieved by a below-Guidelines sentence. Assuming the court\u2019s recommendations, as outlined below, are followed, defendant will serve approximately fifteen mandatory years in prison. He will be entitled to a credit of up to 54 days at the end of each year for \u201cexemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.\u201d See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3624(b). Upon his release, he will have to live with the serious collateral consequences of his conviction: he will perpetually bear the scarlet letter that comes with being a convicted felon registered as a sex offender. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Holdings: 0: recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex 1: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 2: holding that one essential element of the crime of failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offenders change of address is that the defendant is a person required  to register  3: recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii 4: recognizing that the stigma imposed for a violation of a sex crime statute is not trivial", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "and necessarily made this very determination when we held (in the prior appeal) that the trial court had no legal basis upon which to overturn the arbitrator\u2019s determination (that there was no prevailing party) and to declare that Castro was the prevailing party. As a result, the trial court should have granted Wells\u2019 motion for attorney\u2019s fees, under section 57.105(l)(b), from February 14, 2012 \u2014 the date that the arbitrator expressly determined that there was no prevailing party as between Wells and Castro. See In re Forfeiture of 100,000 Euros, 170 So.3d 810, 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (reversing trial court\u2019s denial of 57.105 fees where \u201cneither the facts nor the law supported in any fashion\u201d the claims of the appell\u00e9\u00e9s.) See also Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). We reverse the order denying Wells\u2019 hiotion Holdings: 0: holding that it is the results not the procedure which govern the determination of which party prevailed for purposes of awarding attorneys fees 1: recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case 2: holding that a party does not need a net recovery to be awarded attorneys fees all that is required is that the party prevail on a just claim 3: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed 4: holding that party is not insulated from 57105 fees just because they prevailed in the trial court", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "distinct evidence. In addition, Oscar\u2019s alert was not even a factor in Mr. Long\u2019s final conclusion that the fire was caused by arson. \u00b6 34 Furthermore, Mr. Long directly testified that the fire investigation guide upon which all new fire investigators are tested directly states that \u201c[a]ny canine alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis should not be considered validated.\u201d Ms. McNair also testified that the laboratory results were negative. Such testimony basically negates the evidentiary value of Oscar\u2019s alert. \u00b6 35 The jury easily could have based its decision to convict upon evidence entirely independent of the testimony concerning Oscar\u2019s accelerant detection, such as Mr. Long\u2019s fire investigation results and eyewitness testimony. Cf. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62,-\u00b629, 29 P.3d 638 (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Marji, 158 F.3d 60, Holdings: 0: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of  one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 1: holding that the trial court had erred by excluding the expert testimony of a doctor 2: holding that no one factor is determinative and the weakness of one factor may be overborne by the strength of the others 3: holding that excluding expert testimony was harmless and did not affect the jury verdict because the subject matter of the testimony was only one factor and by no means a determinative one 4: holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a petition for a writ of certiorari. Those forms of relief are properly sought in modem Pennsylvania practice via a petition for review of governmental action. See Pa. R.A.P. 1502 and 1561; 1 G. Ronald Dar-lington, Kevin J. McKeon, Daniel R. Schuckers, Kristen W. Brown, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice 2d \u00a7 1501:1 (2d ed.2002); see also Harvey. \u00b6 8 While our rules of procedure distinguish between civil actions, actions in equity, actions in mandamus, and petitions for review of governmental determinations, see Pa.R.C.P. 1001, 1091, 1501, and Pa. R.A.P. 1511, for purposes of jurisdiction, all of these are nonetheless civil. In this context, \u201ccivil action\u201d simply means \u201cas opposed to criminal actions.\u201d See State Board of Dentistry v. Weltman, 168 Pa. Cmwlth. 197, 649 A.2d 478, 479 (1994) (<HOLDING>). No matter which category we put Dan-ysh\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunction against agency with statewide authority 1: holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review aliens eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal 2: holding that where the question did not involve subject matter jurisdiction this court should not have raised sua sponte whether the local commission had authority to enforce a provision not analogous to any in the statewide human relations statute 3: holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute 4: holding that the grant of subject matter jurisdiction in  502e1 is exclusive", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that, although the trial court entered only a single order on defendant\u2019s change of plea for all of these cases, that order did not consolidate them into a single case. As defendant implicitly acknowledges, the four armed robberies involved in these prior cases did not occur on the same occasion so as to render them related. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4A1.2 comment, (n. 3); U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4Al.l(f) (stating that it does not apply where the prior sentence for crimes of violence \u201care considered related because the offenses occurred on the same occasion\u201d). Moreover, defendant does not argue that these four prior armed robberies \u201cwere part of a single common scheme or plan\u201d so as to constitute related cases. See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 4A1.2 comment, (n. 3); United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634, 638-39 (6th Cir.1999)(<HOLDING>). As the district court correctly noted, all of Holdings: 0: holding that separate instances of harassment committed against the same victim were not related because the defendant did not jointly plan the crimes 1: holding evidence of uncharged prior cocaine sales with numerous similarities to those for which the defendant was on trial admissible for among other purposes showing the existence of a common plan involving the prior sales and the transactions which were the subject of the charges pending against the defendant 2: recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence 3: holding that as to whether the defendants prior convictions were part of a single common scheme or plan so as to be related under ussg  4a12a2 defendant has the burden of establishing that those prior offenses were jointly planned or that the commission of one entailed the commission of the other 4: holding that two robberies committed within hours of each other were not part of a common scheme or plan when the defendant did not originally plan to rob his second victim", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "erroneous deprivation is \"primarily temporal,\u201d as \u201cthere is little concern that in the Article 78 proceeding a plaintiff who is legally entitled to the return of confiscated longarms will ultimately be denied a proper remedy.\u201d Razzano, 765 F.Supp.2d at 188 (emphasis added). But a lengthy deprivation can be enough to violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Cf. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389, 95 S.Ct. 533, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (\"[T]he possible length of wrongful depriva tion ... is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests.... the rapidity of ... review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire process.\u201d); Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 770 N.Y.S.2d 277, 802 N.E.2d 616, 623-24 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 10 . In any event, the hearing ordered by the Holdings: 0: recognizing the potential length of the deprivation in evaluating whether a procedure is adequate 1: holding that idea administrative procedures provided an adequate post deprivation remedy 2: holding that deprivation of personal property does not violate the constitution if there are adequate state remedies available 3: holding that a prior hearing is not required where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures  are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination 4: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court\u2019s holding that Belson was entitled to counsel of his own choosing to be paid for by the insurance companies and, as such, is entitled to reimbursement of his reasonable legal fees. Appellants\u2019 Br. 47-52 (discussing Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d at 625-26). We disagree. The district court recognized that, at the outset of the White and Anglin litigation, Belson and the other defendants had divergent interests. If Belson and the other defendants lost the \u201che said/she said\u201d argument about Belson\u2019s conduct, the other defendants had an alternative argument unavailable to Belson: Belson\u2019s conduct was outside the course and scope of his employment; therefore, the other defendants should not be liable. See, e.g., Frazier v. Badger, 361 S.C. 94, 603 S.E.2d 587, 591 (S.C.2004) (<HOLDING>); Doe v. S.C. State Budget and Control Bd., 337 Holdings: 0: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii 1: holding that assistant principal could not use an immunity defense because his sexual advances and ensuing retaliatory conduct towards a teacher were outside the scope of his official duties of employment 2: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 3: holding that a janitorial workers sexual assault of a student deviated from his duties and was clearly outside of the scope of his employment 4: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Docket Nos. 54, 58, & 61.) Under Puerto Rico law, \u201cthe consent of the contracting parties is an essential element of a contract.\u201d P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31, \u00a7 3391. \u201c \u2018Consent is shown by the concurrence of the offer and acceptance of the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.\u2019 \u201d Marrero-Garcia v. Irizarry, 33 F.3d 117, 122 (1st Cir.1994) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, \u00a7 3401). Additionally, there must be a \u201cmeeting of the minds as to the terms agreed upon.\u201d K-Mart Corp. v. Davis, 756 F.Supp. 62, 66 (D.P.R.1991) (finding that the parties did not reach a final contract because the text of the agreement evidenced the defendant\u2019s intent not to be bound until the parties had finalized negotiations); see also Soc. de Gananciales v. Velez & Asoc., 145 D.P.R. 508, 517 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs\u2019 primary argument in response to Holdings: 0: holding that the one thing without which a contract cannot be made  is the assent of the parties to the agreement the meeting of the minds upon a definite proposition 1: recognizing that an implied contract must result from a meeting of the minds of the parties in mutual assent to the terms and must be based upon a sufficient consideration free from fraud or undue influence not against public policy and sufficiently definite to be enforced 2: holding that a valid contract requires a meeting of minds that gave rise to an obligation situation or state of law resulting from an agreement and that created certain expectations on the basis of which the parties acted 3: recognizing that the duty arises not from the terms of the insurance contract but from an obligation imposed in law as a result of the special relationship 4: holding that contract between parties not law of negligence gave rise to duty and accordingly provided exclusive source of remedy", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the Statements and had no way to verify the numbers. Joint Ex. A, at 1939-43. And the Board has rejected that uncertified financial statements are sufficient to meet an employer\u2019s burden to produce financial information. See, e.g., R.E.C. Corp., 307 NLRB 330, 333 (1992) (\u201cIndeed even absent such evidence of financial \u2018looseness\u2019 of employers, uncertified financial statements have not been deemed sufficient to meet the employers\u2019 obligations under Truitt.\u201d); Am. Model & Pattern, 277 NLRB 176, 184 (1985) (\u201cRespondent, in order to satisfy its duty to bargain in good faith, was under a clear obligation to produce, for inspection and analysis, any and all books and records available to it which would tend to support its bargaining position.\u201d); Tony\u2019s Meats, Inc., 211 NLRB 625, 626 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Although Respondents argued before ALJ Holdings: 0: holding that while the investigatory hearing is not a full evidentiary hearing it nevertheless must be expanded to permit the accused attorney to cross examine witnesses 1: holding that records relating to a student court were not education records 2: recognizing it is common and reasonable for doctors to examine medical records and arrive at professional opinions 3: holding counsel must examine public information like prior conviction records prosecutor is likely to use 4: holding that an employer must permit cpa to examine employers records", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "relationships under Virginia law. Many of those courts have done so in cases involving contracts governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which, pursuant to Va.Code \u00a7 8.1A-304, there is no question \u201cimpose[] an obligation of good faith in [their] performance and enforcement.\u201d See, e.g., Charles E. Brauer Co., Inc. v. NationsBank of Virginia, 251 Va. 28, 466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1996) (stating \u201c[t]he breach of an implied duty under the U.C.C. gives rise ... to a cause of action for breach of contract\u201d). Many of those decisions, however, have acknowledged an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in cases involving contracts not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore outside Va.Code \u00a7 8.1A-304\u2019s ambit. See, e.g., Stepp v. Outdoor World Corp., 18 Va. Cir. 106, 111 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Holdings: 0: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages 1: holding where parties had not reached a binding contract the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not apply 2: holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract 3: recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate 4: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "576 F.2d at 564, our Court of Appeals elected to \u201cstand with the vast majority of courts of appeals and hold that the receipt of Hill-Burton construction funding, Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the existence of tax exemption, as well as state licensing requirements for nonprofit hospitals, do not constitute state action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\u201d Four years later, the Supreme Court in Blum reached the same conclusion, holding that despite the state\u2019s subsidization of the operating and capital costs of nursing homes, payment of the medical expenses of more than ninety percent of the nursing homes\u2019 residents, and licensing of the facilities, the state was still not responsible for the nursing homes\u2019 decisions. See also, e.g., Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Based on this abundance of case law, we find Holdings: 0: holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college because the language of the section does not distinguish between direct and indirect receipt of federal funds 1: holding that medicaid and medicare funds are subject to levy and that even if the inability to pay was the result of government regulation it would not excuse the tax liability 2: holding that government regulation even extensive regulation and the receipt of federal funds such as medicare medicaid and hillburton funds are insufficient to establish that a hospital or other entity acted under color of state law 3: holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action 4: holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the sort of question which can be decided only in the concrete factual context of the individual case * * * \u201d, (Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 1. c. 59, 88 S.Ct. 1. c. 1901), Judge Donnelly in the Moody opinion noted: \u201c * * * We limit the holding in this case to \u2018the precise facts to which it is to be applied\u2019 * * * \u201d, 443 S.W.2d 1. c. 804. It is also argued the trilogy of cases in the Durham litigation upheld an automobile search and seizure similar to that involved herein. Durham, however, involved not only search incident to arrest, but the added factors of visibility of a portion of the stolen goods on the floor of the auto and safety of the arresting officers (the automobile was driven by the three suspects to the police station behind the police car). State v. Novak, 42 d 283 (<HOLDING>); and Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Holdings: 0: holding that sniff test of automobile trunk not a search requiring probable cause 1: holding that an officer had probable cause to search bags in the trunk of the car when he opened the trunk and smelled a strong odor of methamphetamine 2: holding trunk search was for general exploration not for detaining prisoner or preventing escape 3: holding search of trunk unnecessary to protect officers or prevent defendants escape 4: holding that although search of passenger compartment was legal search of trunk was not", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "omitted). \u201cThe purpose of an action for reformation is to change a written instrument by inserting some omitted provision or deleting some existing provision so that the document conforms to the original agreement of the parties.\u201d 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments \u00a7 5, at 253 (footnote omitted). \u201cIn order to support reformation, the evidence must show that the instrument is not the true expression of the agreement.\u201d Gagnon, 97 N.H. at 64 (quotation omitted). Generally, \u201cto be entitled to the reformation of a deed, one must be a party to the deed or in privity with a party to the deed.\u201d 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instruments \u00a7 59, at 304; see id. \u00a7 60 (entitled \u201cPersons in privity with original parties to instruments\u201d); Bourne v. Lajoie, 540 A.2d 359, 361 (Vt. 1987) (<HOLDING>). The nature of an action to reform a deed is, Holdings: 0: holding merger by deed prohibits reformation when one of the parties learns of a mistake before closing and still signs the deed 1: recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title 2: holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed 3: holding in part that party seeking reformation of deed must show the original intent or agreement of parties by clear and convincing evidence 4: holding that sellers agreement to furnish title policy was a separate agreement not superseded by the deed and properly not included in the deed", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "due process claims because there was no clearly established law guiding Detective Rogers\u2019 conduct on the night in question. I respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s decision to exercise jurisdiction over the district court\u2019s partial summary judgment to Eric on those same claims. With respect to the jurisdictional issue, I believe that the majority\u2019s disposition deviates from important binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, resulting in an unacceptable conflict of law in our circuit. I \u201c[T]he right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice....\" Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Thus, \u201c[i]t must be remembered that the Holdings: 0: recognizing that it is well settled law that an action is commenced by the service of a summons and without valid service of process the trial court has no jurisdiction to act 1: holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal 2: holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right 3: holding that the obviousness of an error is hard to determine where there is no settled appellate law on point 4: holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Mkts., Inc., 891 S.W.2d at 644-45 (internal citations omitted). 54 . Id. at 645. 55 . Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn, 388 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.Civ.App.1965) 56 . 891 S.W.2d 640. 57 . American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem. Co., 352 F.3d 254, 260 (5th Cir.2003). 58 . Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir.2003). 59 . Id. 60 . Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir.2002) (Title VII action). As the TCHRA was designed to align Texas state law with federal law, courts look to federal law interpreting Title VII when analyzing TCHRA claims. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.2001). 61 . Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Gee, 289 F.3d at 345). 62 . Id. 63 . Id. at 488-89 (<HOLDING>). 64 . Although Ameen contends in her brief Holdings: 0: recognizing a cause of action under texas law for misappropriation 1: holding that texas cause of action for retaliation does arise under its workers compensation laws 2: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied 3: holding that but for standard applied to retaliation case brought under texas law 4: holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "ha[d] cooperated with the government, and [was] a single-mother with a child with medical issues\u201d); United States v. Price, 618 F.Supp.2d 473, 475 (W.D.N.C.2008) (finding that a defendant\u2019s pregnancy and the impending birth of the child constituted exceptional circumstances meriting release); United States v. Mitchell, 358 F.Supp.2d 707, 708-09 (E.D.Wis.2005) (finding that \u201cexceptional reasons\u201d were present where the defendant had fully cooperated with the government, performed well in pretrial release, renounced criminal activities, secured full-time employment, successfully passed all drug screenings, and fulfilled all of his familial responsibilities, including paying child support); United States v. Reboux, No. 5:06-CR-451 (FJS), 2007 WL 4409801, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Hooks, 330 F.Supp.2d 1311, Holdings: 0: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 1: holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware 2: holding that exceptional reasons for release existed where the defendant underwent selfimprovement through his faith community and work environment and was completely and unconditionally cooperative with the federal authorities 3: recognizing that the elements of title vii sexually hostile work environment claims apply to icra sexually hostile work environment claims 4: holding that unfair scrutiny was not sufficiently severe to result in a finding that an objectively hostile or abusive work environment existed", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it at least arguable in the language of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3182, when it refers to \"the agent of [the executive authority of the demanding state] appointed to receive the fugitive,\u201d where, as here, there is some basis to conclude that private extradition services are not authorized under the law of the demanding state. See Off. Att'y Gen., New York, Informal Op. No. 90-18 (March 19, 1990). 4 . See, e.g., Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 919 (9th Cir.1986); Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 649-50 & n. 4 (3d Cir.1981) (per curiam); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 764 (8th Cir.1980); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir.1979); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 323 (4th Cir.1977); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1974); but see Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1295 (6th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The Supreme Court has also suggested as Holdings: 0: holding that since the constitutional and statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect fugitives but rather  are designed to facilitate the administration of justice between states the failure to comply with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right and therefore provides no basis for a  1983 claim 1: holding that the protections of the iad are not founded on constitutional rights or the preservation of a fair trial but are designed to facilitate a defendants rehabilitation in prison and to avoid disruptions caused when charges are outstanding against the prisoner in another jurisdiction 2: holding that punitive damages are not duplicative since they are designed to punish rather than to compensate 3: holding that the extradition procedures are a matter of state law 4: holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of crime. State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 380-81, 323 S.E.2d 316, 327-28 (1984) (citing State v. Smith, 66 Ore. App. 703, 706, 675 P.2d 510, 512 (1984); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976)). The underlying theory behind excluding hearsay observations of police officers at the scene of the crime is that they may not be as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal cases. State v. Harper, 96 N.C. App. 36, 40, 384 S.E.2d 297, 299 (1989) (citation omitted). For example, the notes of a non-testifying, undercover officer summarizing alleged drug transactions 295, 629 S.E.2d 288 (2006); United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). In the instant case, the photos in the Holdings: 0: holding that a booking sheet does not recount the work that led to an arrest so much as the mere fact that an arrest occurred and thus constituted a nonadversarial ministerial observation that was not excluded by rule 8038b 1: holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute 2: holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment 3: holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest 4: holding that the searehincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Overland Park, Kansas. The Chapter 13 Standing Trustee, William H. Griffin, appears by his attorney, Cynthia F. Grimes of Grimes & Rebein, L.C., Lenexa, Kansas. 2 . Debtors\u2019 Motion for Discharge filed August 30, 2000 (Doc. # 47). 3 . Trustee's Objection to Motion for Discharge filed September 8, 2000 (Doc. # 50), para. 7 at 3-4. 4 . Debtors\u2019 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed April 3, 2001 (Doc. # 75). 5 . Trustee\u2019s Objection to Motion for Discharge filed September 8, 2000 (Doc. # 50), para. 4 at 2. 6 . \"Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts\u201d in Debtors\u2019 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judg ment filed April 3, 2001 (Doc. # ) (vesting property of the estate in the debtor upon confirmation). 23 . In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913 (Bankr.D.Kan. 1986) (<HOLDING>). 24 . McCray v. McCray (In re McCray), 62 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that confirmation vests in the debtor property of the estate not dedicated to the plan 1: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support 2: holding that workers compensation awards remained property of the estate despite confirmation of the debtors plans where the confirmation orders specifically provided that property of the estate did not vest in the debtor until the completion of the plan 3: holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor 4: holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for standing are that the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury be fairly redressable by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1991). In seeking mandamus, the injury Appellant is trying to cure is the failure of the territorial auditor to audit the legislature. He is not seeking the return of the property he alleges has been taken \u2014 i.e., his income tax. As was stated above, Appellant has shown no property interest in the audit itself. There are innumerable cases in which the plaintiff, although having standing to bring a due process challenge, is ultimately found to have no property interest. See, e.g., O\u2019Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 805 F.2d 874, Holdings: 0: holding that claim against nursing home regarding patients death from spider bite fell within the statutory definition of a health care liability claim 1: holding that the medicaid statute as amended by the federal nursing home reform amendments did not create a private cause of action for nursing home residents against nursing homes 2: holding that nursing home patients did not have a property interest in receiving care at a particular facility 3: recognizing that a patients choice of a health care facility does not render the facility a beneficiary under 502a1b 4: holding that an assisted living facility licensed to provide personal care was not licensed to engage primarily in providing nursing care", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "added). Coady presented no evidence at trial with respect to whether Toyota\u2019s regional office in Mansfield, Massachusetts (approximately 15 miles from Coady\u2019s dealership) is within its \u201crelevant market area.\u201d Given that the formula for determining the \u201crelevant market area\u201d of a dealer has been said to \u201cperplex even the most percipient logician,\u201d Bernardi\u2019s, 432 Mass, at 428, 735 N.E.2d at 351, the absence of any such evidence is fatal to Coa-dy\u2019s claim and this Court concludes that Coady has failed to prove that Toyota violated \u00a7 4(3)(k) by owning and operating a motor vehicle dealership of the same line make within Coady\u2019s \u201crelevant market area.\u201d 6. Arbitrary, in Bad Faith or Unconscionable Acts As a catch-all provision, M.G.L. c. 93B, \u00a7 4(1) broadly declares that acts t .E.2d at 15 (<HOLDING>). C. Defamation In Massachusetts, defamation is Holdings: 0: holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order 1: recognizing that where the board properly finds a violation of the act it can order reinstatement under its remedial powers granted by  160c although finding no violation of the act here 2: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation 3: recognizing that it would be anomalous to find a violation under  41 without a prior finding of a violation of  431 4: holding that there can be no violation of  1986 without a predicate violation of  1985", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in 2006, OxBlue utilized a script to gather confidential information from EarthCam\u2019s customers\u2019 webpages, including customer names, camera names, images from customer cameras, the URL to the image for each camera, and the date and time stamped on the last image taken from a camera. The OxBlue Defendants dispute that the script accomplished what EarthCam argues. Even if the Court assumes that the script accessed all of the information alleged\u2014even though there is no evidence it did\u2014EarthCam has the burden to show that the customer information gathered in 2006 \u201c(1) derive[s] economic value from being a secret not readily ascertainable by proper means, and (2) [ ] [is] the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.\u201d Vito v. Inman, 286 Ga.App. 646, 649 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2007) (<HOLDING>). EarthCam is \u201crequired to prove both prongs to Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof because he offered absolutely no evidence to support his claim that the costs of arbitration will deny him an effective forum to vindicate his statutory rights 1: holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list 2: holding that plaintiff failed to prove both prongs because he admitted that his competitors would not seek to use the customer list to take his patients from him 3: holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that its customer list was a trade secret because the plaintiff presented evidence that the list took ten years and great expense to the company to develop 4: holding former employee could properly use recollection of customer information where he did not otherwise misappropriate an actual customer list", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "decide whether the refusal of NOCO to enter into an \u201cinteractive process\u201d alone would foreclose summary judgment. See Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir.2000) (citing Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir.1999)). In like vein, the plaintiff, and the EEOC as amicus cu/riae, urge us to hold, as have other circuit courts of appeals, that the defendant had not only a duty reasonably to accommodate the plaintiffs disability, but an independent duty to institute and engage in an \u201cinteractive process\u201d with the plaintiff to attempt to find a reasonable accommodation the breach of which is itself a violation of the ADA. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1111-17 (9th Cir.2000) (in banc) (collecting cases); id. at 1117 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiff did not raise this argument in Holdings: 0: holding that if the employer requests reasonable medical evidence to support an employees claim of changed condition the employer is under no obligation to engage in further interactive processes if the employee fails to submit such evidence 1: holding that the interactive process requires both sides to communicate directly and exchange essential information such that the employer may be liable only if the employer is responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process 2: holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation 3: holding that in a failuretotransfer case if after a full opportunity for discovery the summary judgment record is insufficient to establish the existence of an appropriate position into which the plaintiff could have been transferred summary judgment must be granted in favor of the defendant  even if it also appears that the defendant failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process 4: holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if  reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the District Court that the acts of the BOP officials in this case involved an element of judgment or choice, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Mitchell analysis. See Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that \u201ceven if \u00a7 4042 imposes on the BOP a general duty of care to safeguard prisoners, the BOP retains sufficient discretion in the means it may use to fulfill that duty to trigger the discretionary function exception\u201d). As to the second prong of Mitchell, a judgment as to how best to protect one prisoner from attack by another \u201cis of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.\u201d Mitchell, 225 F.3d at 363 (quotation omitted); see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1340-45. As a result, we Holdings: 0: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions although administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit them 1: holding that erisa does not require plan administrators to give special deference to treating physicians opinions 2: recognizing the considerable deference afforded to regulations concerning medicare 3: holding that prison administrators should be afforded wideranging deference in implementing and executing policies because discretion is needed to preserve internal discipline and maintain institutional security 4: holding that the secretary is not entitled to deference when construing the acts implementing regulations", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "class of persons 16 and over, or drinking to a class of persons 18 and over. In addition, classifications by gender have been utilized to require men to register for the draft, but not women, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981), and to qualify only men for employment in maximum security prisons, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). In short, the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cdoes not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.\u201d Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). When a regulation undertakes to define a class, however, the criteria for defining the class must be related to the purpose of the regulation. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76, 92 S.Ct. at 254 (<HOLDING>). We may thus begin the analysis for Holdings: 0: holding that a similar hawaii statute violates equal protection 1: holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause 2: holding that neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require the appointment of counsel on a petition for discretionary review to a state supreme court 3: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause 4: holding that idaho statute which gives preference to the appointment of men over women as estate administrators violates the equal protection clause", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the juror had been sufficiently attentive in response. The Court did not agree with defense counsel\u2019s assertion that the juror had been sleeping during the second day of trial, and stated that it was \u201cpleasantly surprised\u201d with the attention that Juror # 3 had been paying. In refusing to dismiss Juror # 3, the District Court acted well within its broad discretion to decide when to remove a juror, see United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir.1998), and we will not second-guess the Court\u2019s judgment. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Zhao also asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel because her attorney would not allow her to testify, despite her having repeatedly expressed a desire to do so. See Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance claim Holdings: 0: recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is only procedural and does not create substantive rights internal quotation marks and citations omitted 1: holding that issues not argued specifically and distinctly in a partys opening brief are waived internal quotation marks and citations omitted 2: holding that strategic refiling in district court violatefd the spirit of the sixmonth rule internal quotation marks and citation omitted 3: holding that regardless of strategic considerations that a lawyer concludes weigh against such a decision a defendant who wishes to testify must be permitted to do so citations and internal quotation marks omitted 4: recognizing that absent illegality we do not weigh the wisdom of any particular employment decision internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "salt and the intent that the adulterated product enter into interstate commerce, we need not address the milk container issue: Whether the milk was within interstate commerce because it was bottled into containers that were in interstate commerce manufactured and labeled by Champion International Corporation, which is located in Morristown, New Jersey. 4 . Defendants have also raised the issue of the indictment merely alleging a de minimus effect on interstate commerce. We find this argument unavailing. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (\"[Wjhere a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.\u201d); see, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202 Holdings: 0: recognizing that  the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce 1: holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce 2: holding that the presence requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfied when keys were taken from a restaurant employee whose car was parked outside the restaurant 3: holding that restaurant that bought and sold products produced outside of state satisfied interstate commerce requirement for federal arson statute 4: holding that arson of an owneroccupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property used in commerce and is not subject to federal prosecution under federal arson statute", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "60(c)(1). 44 . In re Osborne, 379 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287-88 (5th Cir. 1985)). 45 . Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing First RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (\"What constitutes \u2018reasonable time' depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.\u201d). 46 . Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federa ir. 2014) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). 56 . - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant who had waited thirteen months after trevino was decided before seeking appointment of conflictfree counsel had not filed his rule 60b motion within a reasonable time 1: holding that defendant abandoned his motion by failing to pursue it within a reasonable time after it was filed 2: holding defendant entitled to appointment of conflictfree counsel to assist with preparation of facially sufficient motion to withdraw plea 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 60b motion when the relevant change in law occurred eight months prior and petitioner filed the motion two days before his execution 4: holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Amendment right.\u201d). Because the supreme court found subsection (C) applicable in Jones, the question became whether there was \u201cevidence to support the judge\u2019s ruling that Jones acted in self-defense.\u201d Id. at 300-01, 786 S.E.2d at 141. \u201cConsistent with the Castle Doctrine and the text of the Act, a valid case of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must necessarily consider the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant\u2019s entitlement to the Act\u2019s immunity. Therefore, the defendant must demonstrate the elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat, by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d Id. at 301, 786 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 371, 752 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013)); see also State v. Douglas, 411 S.C. 307, 318, 768 S.E.2d 232, 238 (Ct. App. 2014) (<HOLDING>); Curry, 406 S.C. at 372, 752 S.E.2d at 267 Holdings: 0: holding that if the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is that the accused murdered her then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable 1: holding that a defendant asserting immunity based on selfdefense under  13a323d ala code 1976 is entitled to an opportunity to prove that claim by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial hearing before the court 2: holding that the district court determines the amount of loss under the preponderance of the evidence standard 3: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence 4: recognizing that immunity under the act is predicated on an accused demonstrating the elements of selfdefense to the satisfaction of the trial court by the preponderance of the evidence save the duty to retreat quoting curry 406 sc at 37172 752 se2d at 26667", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "740, 742 (1962). Estoppel \u201ccannot have created liability where non existed under the policy.\u201d Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1198 (Colo. 1988). An insurer that reconsiders its decision to provide a defense under a reservation of rights is not barred from later contesting coverage and its duty to defend. See, e.g., American Economy Ins. Co. v. Schoolcraft, 551 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1241 (D.Colo.2007) (\u201cI conclude that the fact that American Economy at some point made the strategic decision to offer a defense under a reservation of rights, and then reconsidered, does not create a legal duty to defend where there is none under the facts alleged in the complaint under the law.\u201d); cf. Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1228-29 (D.Colo. 1999) (<HOLDING>). I therefore grant Mid-Con\u2019s motion with Holdings: 0: holding that claims were clearly excluded from coverage under assault and battery exclusion and therefore insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify 1: holding the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend 2: holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend 3: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 4: holding that an insurer is not estopped from challenging its duty to indemnify even if it hadand breachedits duty to defend", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "not present sufficient evidence that defendant failed to release the child in a safe place, and thus the charge of second degree kidnapping should have been submitted to the jury, instead of the charge of first degree kidnapping. We again note that the General Assembly has neither defined nor given guidance as to the meaning of the term \u201csafe place\u201d in relation to the offense of first degree kidnapping. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39. Further, our case law in North Carolina has not set out any test or rule for determining whether a release was in a \u201csafe place.\u201d Several of the cases that have addressed the question of whether the defendant released the victim in a safe place have centered on whether there was a voluntary release by the defendant. See Heatwole, 333 N.C. at 161, 423 S.E.2d at 738 (<HOLDING>); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 263, 307 Holdings: 0: holding that releasing a victim when the kidnapper is aware he is cornered and outnumbered by law enforcement officials is not voluntary 1: holding that a defendant is aware of the consequences of his plea for sentencing purposes and the plea is voluntary as long as he understands the length of time he might possibly receive 2: holding that it is not 3: recognizing that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present and  that in such cases those officials  should not be held personally liable 4: holding that alleged misconduct by public officials particularly by law enforcement officials is matter of public concern", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "withstand. In granting summary judgment because Bispo failed to produce evidence of risk, the district court misapplied California law. Even where a plaintiff never so much as mentions \u201crisk-benefit,\u201d a prima facie showing of injury and causation shifts the burden to the defendant. McCabe v. American Honda Motor Co., 100 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1127, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 303 (Cal.Ct.App.2002). In any event, the district court\u2019s determination that Bispo produced no evidence of risk was clearly incorrect. The accident itself, caused by the failure of the rubber seal and resulting in severe injury, is evidence of risk. Moreover, Robertshaw did not show any benefits of its valve design. See Bernal v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments Corp., 221 Cal.App.3d 1326, 1335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal.Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). Robertshaw cannot carry its burden of showing Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 1: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive 2: holding that the defendant bears the burden under plainerror review 3: holding that the defendant not the plaintiff bears the burden with regard to feasible alternative designs 4: holding that the plaintiff bears the burden when relying on the discovery rule", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "especially illustrative: Neal asked the court, \u201c[I]s there any way possible I could go to trial on the conspiracy?\u201d Finally, while it is hardly disposi-tive, Neal submitted his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas the day after he entered them, giving a good indication of how he would have pleaded had he understood his options. In the letter, he makes clear that he is particularly upset at the idea of having a murder conviction on his record. Unlike cases where, for instance, the sentencing court merely failed to make the sentencing consequences clear to a defendant, and it is therefore debatable what the counterfactual scenario would have looked like, here, Neal clearly articulated the alternative he would have explored. Cf. United States v. Watch, 7 F.3d 422, 429 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). But for the district court\u2019s mistake in Holdings: 0: holding that due process requires that defendant be fully aware of direct consequences of guilty plea 1: holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence 2: holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy 3: holding that a failure to inform the defendant of the minimum possible sentence meant that the defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and his rights were therefore automatically substantially affected 4: holding that in light of the trial courts inquiry the defendants verbal responses and the defendants answers to the questions on the transcript of plea the trial court did determine that defendant was fully informed of the consequences of his choice to enter an alford plea", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "intervention in arbitration \u201cmust be prompt and simple or the values of arbitration will be largely dissipated through prolonged litiga tion.\u201d Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 204 (1954), cited in Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis, Inc., 380 Mass. at 96, 401 N.E.2d at 842-43 (1980). Uniform Acts should be interpreted consistently. The Tennessee Supreme Court declared: It is axiomatic that a purpose in enacting uniform laws is to achieve conformity, not uniqueness____ This court should strive to maintain the standardization of construction of uniform acts to carry out the legislative intent of uniformity. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Olsen, 692 , 751 P.2d 542 (1988); General Cable Corp. v. Citizens Utils. Co., 27 Ariz. App. 381, 385, 555 P.2d 350, 354 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Because we do not consider W.E.S. to be a Holdings: 0: holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access 1: holding that successful party is one who is the ultimate prevailing party in the litigation 2: holding that where complaint seeks greater damages than counterclaim and court denied relief to both parties there is no successful party 3: holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief 4: holding that it is possible to have no successful party when one prevails on the complaint and the other prevails on the counterclaim", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the prosecutor rhetorically asked in closing argument, \u201c \u2018 \u201c[I]s there any evidence that it didn\u2019t happen? Is there any evidence that the things she told you didn\u2019t happen?\u201d \u2019 \u201d 278 Kan. at 92. We held that these comments were improper attempts to shift the burden of proof. 278 Kan. at 92; see also State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, Syl. \u00b6 4, 237 P.3d 1229 (2010) (\u201cIt is improper for the prosecutor to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.\u201d). The comments made by the prosecutor in this case were not like those made in Tosh. Rather, in context, it appears the prosecutor here was commenting on the efficacy of Wilson\u2019s defense by pointing out to the jury where Wilson\u2019s version of events logically broke down. See, e.g., State v. Duong, 292 Kan. 824, 832-33, 257 P.3d 309 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Stone, 291 Kan. at 18 (finding prosecutor\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding prosecutors arguments questioning duongs failure to present evidence of misidentification did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defense because prosecutor did not call upon defense to disprove the occurrence of a crime but rather pointed out that evidence supporting defense theory was thin 1: holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify 2: holding that defense counsel may call attention to the states failure to produce evidence 3: holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence 4: holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "where it is undisputed that the defendants received notice through the indictments, and where the Government has made available to the defendants and their counsel the results of the intercepted communications as part of the lengthy pretrial discovery that has transpired in this case. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n. 26, 97 S.Ct. 658 (finding that respondents were not prejudiced by their failure to receive post-intercept notice under either of the district court\u2019s inventory orders where the Government made available to all defendants the intercept orders, applications, and related papers and where, in response to pretrial discovery motions, the Government produced transcripts of the intercepted conversations); see also United States v. Davis, 882 F.2d 1334, 1344 & n. 13 (8th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing, the Court does not Holdings: 0: holding suppression not required where the government mailed the required notice 34 days after the 90day statutory period because defendant had access to the recorded calls and transcripts and failed to demonstrate actual prejudice 1: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 2: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 3: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required 4: holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(\"It is not for the Court to decide, on a motion to dismiss, ... whether or to what extent the market functioned efficiently. [That is an] issue[] of fact for trial.\u201d); In re Ashanti Goldfields Sec. Litig., No. CV 00-0717, 2004 WL 626810, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) (\u201c[P]roof of market inefficiency ... or rebuttal of the presumption of reliance is best left to the trial phase of litigation.\u201d) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n. 29, 108 S.Ct. 978) (other citations omitted); Rmed Int\u2019l v. Sloan\u2019s Supermarkets, No. 94 Civ. 5587, 2002 WL 31780188, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2002) (\"Whether or not a market for a stock is open and efficient is a question of fact.\u201d) (citing In re Laser Arms Corp. Sec. Litig., 794 F.Supp. 475, 490 (S.D.N.Y.1989)); In re Laser Arms Corp., 794 F.Supp. at 490 (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 969 F.2d 15(2d Cir.1992). 137 . IPO I, Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 1: holding it is a question of fact 2: holding that whether in fact laser arms traded in an efficient market is a question of fact therefore resolution of that issue must await presentation of further proof at trial 3: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 4: holding that estoppel was a question of fact", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "motive from circumstantial evidence.\u201d Id. Among the factors on which the Board may base such inferences are \u201cthe timing of the discharges in relation to the union activity [and] the simultaneous nature of otherwise unconnected dismissals.\u201d Id. at 580. Both the timing and the nature of the discharges in this case suggest anti-union motivations. The firings occurred just as Local 23\u2019s campaign was picking up steam, and the employees, who worked in various different departments, were all dismissed on the same day for entirely disparate reasons. Furthermore, of the eight employees laid off, six were union supporters, and this occurred at a time when only thirteen out of more than one hundred employees had signed cards. Cf. NLRB v. Cameo, Inc., 340 F.2d 803, 810 (5th Cir.1965) (<HOLDING>); see also Brief for NLRB at 40 (relying on Holdings: 0: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 1: holding that knowledge of union activities could be inferred from the fact that an employer discharged eleven of sixteen union adherents without discharging any of its remaining seventyfour employees 2: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 3: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union 4: holding that an employer could only distribute its proposal to union employees when the proposal was properly before the union", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and no discriminatory effect of its application, we cannot conclude that the plan \u201cin some sense was designed to accord disparate treatment on the basis of racial considerations.\u201d Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 485, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982). Consequently, the district court correctly held that the New Plan was not subject to strict scrutiny. 3. Rational Basis Review Instead, since race-based classifications are not in play and plaintiffs failed to show that the New Plan was adopted with a discriminatory purpose, the New Plan must only survive rational basis review; as long as the plan is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, it must be upheld. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (<HOLDING>). As we have explained at some length, Holdings: 0: holding that the classification made by  252242 was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary 1: holding that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end 2: holding that the trial courts classification of property will not be disturbed as long as there is competent evidence to support that determination 3: holding that juveniles form neither a suspect nor semisuspect class for equal protection purposes 4: holding that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history suggests that appointment is permissible only in some limited set of circumstances", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "despite the text\u2019s reference only to \"property described in subsection (a)\u201d). 33 . The conclusions reached here are also based on the sworn statement of facts made a part of the plea agreement of co-conspirator Paul V. Mederos, which is in the public record. See United States v. Mederos, Case No. 1:04cr314 (E.D.Va. July 26, 2004) (Statement of Facts). 34 . In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 353 (4th Cir.1994) (upholding in camera review of evidence establishing crime-fraud exception to subpoena recipients\u2019 attorney-client privilege objection and holding that such review did not violate due process even though subpoena recipient had no opportunity (i) to view the submission or (ii) to offer rebuttal evidence); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 126 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, Holdings: 0: holding that governments weak interest in preserving grand jury secrecy did not warrant in camera submission where party seeking access to submission would learn of submission contents as soon as he was called as a grand jury witness 1: holding that where government does not intend to disclose grand jury materials in camera proceedings are appropriate to protect govern ments interest in secrecy 2: holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy 3: recognizing the importance of grand jury secrecy 4: holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the petitioner\u2019s \u201csubsequent release from custody does not itself deprive the federal habeas court of its statutory jurisdiction.\u201d Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1279 (9th Cir.1983). Physical custody is not indispensable to confer jurisdiction. \u201cHistory, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man\u2019s liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.\u201d Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). \u201c[T]he boundary that limits the \u2018in custody\u2019 requirement is the line between a \u2018restraint on liberty\u2019 and a \u2018collateral consequence of a conviction.\u2019 \u201d Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183-84 (<HOLDING>). These above precedents go to the first Holdings: 0: recognizing for the first time that the habeas court had the power to retain the petitioner in conditional custody before granting relief 1: recognizing that federal habeas statutes require petitioner to be in custody when petition filed 2: holding habeas petition challenging denial of custody credits is not related to the conditions of  confinement and was properly brought in the district of conviction 3: holding that compliance with registration statute did not abrogate common law and statutory trademark law 4: holding that a habeas petitioner challenging washingtons sexoffender registration law did not meet the in custody requirement because the law did not impose a significant restraint on the petitioners liberty", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "1998, the appellant entered into a fee agreement with her counsel, Robert A. Laughlin. That fee agreement includes the following: Robert A. Laughlin shall have the right to claim attorney fees or [sic] expenses, based upon the appeal which is the subject of this Contract, to the full extent that such rights are conferred upon the Client by the [Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2412(d) (EAJA)]. Fee Agreement at 1. This provision is unreasonable and unenforceable because it transfers to the attorney the client\u2019s EAJA rights. See Shaw v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1997) (\u201cthe law gives the EAJA cause of action and standing to the client[,] ... and the attorney cannot amend the law by bestowing such standing on the attorney\u201d); accord Fritz v. West, 13 Vet.App. 190, 192-93 (1999) (<HOLDING>); In the Matter of the Fee Agreement of Mason, Holdings: 0: holding that when the basis of the earlier suit was that the plaintiff had had defaulted on a promissory note and the claim in the instant action is whether that promissory note was valid the transaction test is met 1: holding retroactive application 2: holding that where there is a substantial question as to whether the instant eaja application has the appellants authorization appellant must provide a verification that he approves the submission of the instant eaja application 3: recognizing district court application of the same rule 4: holding that there is no rational reason for the retroactive application of 80173 and the prospective application of 833", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Although the Court recognized the cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, it nevertheless held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the defendant-employer, because the controversy merely involved a difference in medical opinions and plaintiff was not asked to engage in a project which constituted a violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 75, 417 A.2d 505. The Court indicated that the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public must be balanced in recognizing this cause of action. Id. at 71, 417 A.2d 505. See also Lepore v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 224 N.J.Super. 463, 471, 540 A.2d 1296 (App. Div.1988), aff'd, 115 N.J. 226, 557 A.2d 1371 (1989), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 366, 107 L.Ed.2d 353 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In order to maintain a Pierce claim, Holdings: 0: holding that appellant failed to state a claim of retaliatory discharge where the record showed he merely gave his supervisor feedback and did not report alleged violations to any outside authority 1: holding that employee may maintain retaliatory dis charge claim where he alleged that he was terminated for reporting violations of the occupational safety and health act 2: holding that a union employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement was in no different position than an atwill employee and could similarly maintain an action for wrongful discharge for reporting workplace safety violations 3: holding that no commonlaw cause of action for a discharge in retaliation for reporting violations existed before passage of the wpa which thereafter became the exclusive remedy for an employee whose employment is terminated in retaliation for reporting an employers violation of the law 4: holding employee has cause of action for retaliatory discharge in contravention of public policy where employee was fired for reporting fellow employees alleged criminal activities to local law enforcement", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "from the debt- or\u2019s request for use of cash collateral; and (3) The court must determine whether the debtor\u2019s adequate protection proposal protects value as nearly as possible against risks to that value consistent with the concept of indubitable equivalence. Martin v. United States (In re Martin), 761 F.2d 472, 476-77 (8th Cir.1985). In addition to reviewing the debt- or\u2019s adequate protection proposal, the court should consider whether there is any reasonable chance of reorganization. If a debtor is engaged in an obviously futile attempt to reorganize, it should not be permitted to jeopardize a creditor\u2019s cash collateral. In re C.F. Simonin\u2019s Sons, Inc., 28 B.R. 707, 711 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.1983). See also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 159 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1993) (<HOLDING>). Debtor does not dispute that under the First Holdings: 0: holding that the debtor in possession was liable for civil contempt when he disobeyed the courts order to turn over the cash collateral and violated 11 usc  363 1: holding that debtor could not use cash collateral although objecting creditors were oversecured when business plan was unrealistic and unattainable 2: holding transfers of cash totaling 32350000 made by a debtor to an insider creditors company void under the statute 3: holding that a creditors security was preserved notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the debtor 4: holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "indictment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444 (2011) (listing the issues that a defendant who has pled guilty is entitled to appeal as a matter of right); see also State v. Absher, 329 N.C. 264, 265 n. 1, 404 S.E.2d 848, 849 n. 1 (1991) (\u201cWhile it is true that a defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court, such challenge may be made in the appellate division only if and when the case is properly pending before the appellate division.\u201d). Accordingly, we grant the State\u2019s motion to dismiss Defendant\u2019s appeal. However, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1444(e) and N.C. R. App. P. 21, Defendant has petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We elect to grant Defendant\u2019s petition and review the issues. See State v. Keller, 198 N.C. App. 639, 641, 680 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); see also State v. Demaio, Holdings: 0: holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari 1: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 2: holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea 3: holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right before it is accepted by the court based on ndr crim p 32d3 which states that a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court  alteration in original 4: holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court construes the debtor\u2019s motion as a request for the Court to reopen his ease for the pur pose of revoking the discharge and dismissing the case. Although the Court is sympathetic to t relief sought by the debtor under the circumstances he presents. Although the debtor has not relied on any authority or rule in seeking relief, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s inherent powers to reconsider its own orders must be determined within the parameters of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Rule 9024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, Gekas v. Pipin, 490 U.S. 1006, 109 S.Ct. 1642, 104 L.Ed.2d 157 (1989) (<HOLDING>). The Court\u2019s review of the debtor\u2019s motion Holdings: 0: holding that the old inherent power to reconsider bankruptcy orders has been merged into  rule 60b  1: recognizing the inherent power of the court to coerce compliance with its orders 2: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it 3: holding that bankruptcy courts have inherent power and authority under 11 usc  105a to sua sponte reconsider modify or vacate orders previously entered 4: holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "benefits or for breach of fiduciary duty. Gelardi, 761 F.2d at 1324-25. Some equitable remedy may have been available. However, because Gibson sought only damages, summary judgment is appropriate. CONCLUSION The district court\u2019s summary judgment order is AFFIRMED. 1 . The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Prudential on the basis of res judicata. Because we affirm the dismissal on the basis of ERISA preemption we do not reach the res judicata issue. 2 . Appellant has found a few situations where a state law claim has been permitted in a benefits case. However, in those cases the premise underlying the claim has been that a duty, unconnected to the administration of the benefit plan, has been violated. See e.g., Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1505-06 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Greenblatt v. Budd Co., 666 F.Supp. 735, 742 Holdings: 0: holding that when an employee had his duties changed but had no interest created or protected by the constitution or state law in those duties then no liberty interest claim was stated 1: recognizing similar duties 2: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders 3: holding that the amount of time devoted to managerial duties and the significance of those duties present factual questions 4: holding that one claim was not preempted because it did not allege the violation of duties created by any welfare plan but a violation of duties as a past employer", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Ross\u2019s care and thereby induced the hospital to care for him. But as we observed above, federal law already required Denver Health to treat Ross. And once he arrived on the hospital steps, Arvada\u2019s representations no' longer dictated whether Ross would receive care. Regardless, the facts do not disclos\u00e9 misrepresentation. When the hospital presented an Arvada Officer with .a \u201cGuarantee of Payment for Patient/Inmate\u201d form, the officer signed it but noted next to the medical expenses, \u201csuspect is responsible\u2014he shot self.\u201d \u00b6 42 We will not shoehorn contractual facts into a tort theory. See id. at 1007 (explaining that we apply a \u201ccase-by-case analysis\u201d to determine whether an unjust enrichment claim - could lie in tort); cf. Bd. of Cty. Comm\u2019rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714, 717 (Colo. 1996) (<HOLDING>). Denver Health, by virtue of its statutory Holdings: 0: holding that this court erred in concluding that richmond stands for the proposition that equitable estoppel will not lie against the government for any monetary claim and remanding for consideration of the facts supporting the estoppel claim 1: holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation 2: holding that when the essence of the claim is either negligent or intentional misrepresentation the claim could lie in tort 3: holding that a negligence claim is not a personal injury tort claim 4: holding that although the form of relief alone does not govern the categorization of a claim as a tort or other type of action a trial court must consider the nature of the relief sought to determine whether a particular claim lies in tort or could lie in tort", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "290, 292, cited with approval in GenCorp, Inc., supra, 477 F.3d at 372. {\u00b6 44} Defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment is therefore granted in part. All of plaintiffs allegations contesting or denying guilt, or suggesting any notion of actual innocence are barred by his federal conviction. IX. Defendants\u2019 Intervening-Cause Argument {\u00b6 45} Defendants also seek summary judgment premised upon the view that Blackwell\u2019s \u201cacts of witness intimidation and false testimony are an intervening cause of his conviction\u201d separate and apart from the law firm\u2019s alleged legal malpractice. Reply Memorandum filed Jan. 25, 2007, at 7. Because all of the events implicated in plaintiffs conviction cannot be revisited in this case, this argument is moot. X. Ohio St. 47, 51-52, 44 O.O. 72, 97 N.E.2d 549 (<HOLDING>), following Gillette v. Tucker (1902), 67 Ohio Holdings: 0: holding that whether in tort or contract all malpractice claims are covered by the same statute of limitations 1: holding that covered employee stands in the same position as an insured in a private insurance contract 2: holding that an action for consequential damages to property whether the action is brought in contract or in tort is an action for injury to property within the threeyear statute of limitations 3: holding the same 4: holding that whether in contract or tort all bodilyinjury cases are covered by the same statute of limitations", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Stephenson and the government adequate notice of and an opportunity to respond to the sentencing issues each party had raised on the day of the hearing. To the extent that Stephenson has not waived appellate review of the district court\u2019s decision by withdrawing his departure request and agreeing to proceed immediately with the sentencing hearing without the district court considering either party\u2019s last-minute suggestion, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Zamora-Hernandez, 222 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1200, 121 S.Ct. 1208, 149 L.Ed.2d 122 (2001) (reviewing the district court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a continuance for abuse of discretion); United States v. Green, 105 F.3d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not Holdings: 0: holding that the district court must give parties notice of intent to depart 1: holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent 2: holding that district court must provide reasonable notice of intent to upwardly depart from guideline range 3: holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart 4: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "incorrect burden shifting instruction did not deny petitioner due process. With regard to the \u201cacquittal first\u201d contention, the trial court did not expressly require the jury to acquit petitioner of aggravated murder and murder before considering his guilt of voluntary manslaughter. The Ohio Supreme Court dealt with a similar instruction in State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 220, 533 N.E.2d 286 (1988). The Court stated that, although such instruction is not proper, the instruction did not have a coercive effect on the jury because the instruction dealt primarily with the jury\u2019s inability to find an element of a greater offense. Similarly, the instruction in this case did not fundamentally deny petitioner a fair trial. See Jamison v. Collins, 100 F.Supp.2d 647, 719 (S.D.Ohio 2000) (<HOLDING>). b. Flight Instruction Petitioner next Holdings: 0: holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given 1: holding virtually identical instruction did not deny petitioner a fair trial 2: holding that identical error did not prejudice defendant because by giving the instruction the judge merely gave the jury the opportunity to overturn his own ruling 3: holding that in a criminal trial the trial court must correct or amend an improper instruction if the proper instruction is necessary for the jury to understand the case 4: holding that district court did not err in giving an instruction identical to that proposed by jenkins", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "complaint, with nothing more to provide a defendant with notice, is not a charging instrument.\u2019\u201d Id. (citation omitted). The affidavit of complaint document in this case contemplates further action because the document provides choices allowing for the issuance of either an arrest warrant or criminal summons. Additionally, the fact that the document provides a choice for the issuance of an arrest warrant clearly suggests that the document is not itself an arrest warrant. Our supreme court has emphasized that the issuing of an arrest warrant is necessary even where, as here, \u201cthe defendant has already been taken into custody,\u201d because \u201cthe purpose of the warrant is to serve as the charging instrument.\u201d Ferrante, 269 S.W.3d at 913; cf. State v. Frasier, 914 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tenn. 1996) (<HOLDING>). At oral argument in a related case, the State Holdings: 0: holding that reasoning which would justify the arrest by the search and at the same time justify the search by the arrest  will not do 1: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of a  formal charge which we construe to be an arrest warrant or at the time of the preliminary hearing in those rare cases where a preliminary hearing is not preceded by an arrest warrant or by indictment or presentment when the charge is initiated by the grand jury quoting state v mitchell 593 sw2d 280 286 tenn 1980 2: recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment 3: holding admission of preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the sixth amendment where defendants motive during crossexamination was the same as at trial 4: holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "upon which relief can be granted. Because the GEO employees were not required to respond to Pollard\u2019s complaint, we have no idea whether they could pursue the government contractor defense were Pollard\u2019s claims to be tried under state tort law. Nor do the GEO employees have any incentive to make such an argument at this stage of the litigation, as their argument rests on the existence of adequate alternative remedies under state tort law which would be foreclosed by the successful invocation of such a defense. Thus, the GEO employees may have a complete defense to liability under state tort law or they may not; we simply don't know. 17 . Another, closely related, example of one of these potential defenses is federal preemption. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 11-13 (D.C.Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). 18 . According to the United States Justice Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law 1: holding that plaintiffs state law tort actions against private military contractors working for the federal government were preempted by federal law 2: holding the state law claims were not preempted 3: holding that the application of an element of a state law tort is preempted if in holding a defendant hable for the conduct  there would be conflict with federal patent law 4: holding that state law claim regarding breach of settlement agreement was preempted by federal labor law", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "his case. Although \u201c[a] defendant\u2019s right to counsel of his choice is not an absolute one,\u201d United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979), we have consistently recognized that the right of a defendant who retains counsel to be represented by that counsel is \u201c \u2018a right of constitutional dimension\u2019.\u201d United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir. 1973), quoting United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 90 S.Ct. 68, 24 L.Ed.2d 76 (1969). Hence we have observed that the \u201c[cjhoice of counsel should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court.\u201d United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir. 1976), citing United States v. Sheiner, supra, 410 F.2d at 342. See also United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 1977) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d Holdings: 0: recognizing the right to counsel on appeal 1: recognizing constitutional right to effective counsel 2: recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel 3: holding the trial court violated bradleys right to counsel of choice because none of the conditions identified in wheat as overriding the right to counsel of choice were present 4: recognizing a defendants constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choice", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "his 15-year sentence, raising three arguments: (1) a 30-month upward variance was unwarranted under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a); (2) his sentence creates an unwarranted disparity with Hawkins\u2019s ten-year sentence; and (3) his sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of \u00a7 3553(a). Jones contends that the court abused its discretion by varying upwards solely on his criminal record. But the record does not support Jones\u2019s contention. The court did, as Jones suggests, rely on his past criminal conduct. But the court explicitly relied on past unscored criminal history. Under our reasonableness review, which gives due deference to the district court, see United States v. Barrett, 552 F.3d 724, 727 (8th Cir.2009), we cannot say the district court abused its discretion. See id. at 727 (<HOLDING>). Given the holding in Barrett, we cannot say Holdings: 0: holding that request for departure in sentencing based on a criminal history category that overstated defendants record violated plea agreement that prohibited departure requests but did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category 1: holding a court may consider a defendants criminal history even if that history is included in the defendants criminal history category 2: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance after finding that the defendants criminal history category of i understated the seriousness of his criminal history 3: holding that when a defendant qualifies as a career felon it is not necessary to ascertain the defendants criminal history category because the sentencing guidelines mandate a criminal history category of vi 4: holding that a district court may depart upward based upon based criminal conduct when such conduct is not included in the computation of criminal history category", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is not bound by a stipulation of the parties. See O\u2019Neil v. Behrendt, 212 Neb. 372, 322 N.W.2d 790 (1982). However, when stipulated expenses are undisputed, \u201cthat fact may be considered in determining whether or not the verdict was inadequate.\u201d Id. at 377, 322 N.W.2d at 793. In this case, the stipulated expenses were incorporated into a jury instruction to which neither party objected. The jury was instructed that the reasonable value of funeral and burial expenses incurred by the estate was $6,880.75 and that the reasonable value of medical care provided to the deceased was $26,523.97. We have held verdicts in personal injury cases to be inadequate as a matter of law where the amount was in irreconcilable conflict with stipulated or uncontested damages. See, O\u2019Neil v. Behrendt, supra (<HOLDING>); Webster v. Halbridge, 185 Neb. 409, 176 Holdings: 0: holding that verdict of 1000 was inadequate where special damages for medical expenses were stipulated in amount of 164118 1: holding verdict inadequate when stipulated medical expenses were 319499 and verdict was in same amount notwithstanding evidence of additional uncontested damages 2: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid 3: holding that verdict of liability that awarded past medical expenses only and nothing for pain and suffering clearly shows it was result of compromised verdict where negligence was seriously disputed 4: holding that jurys damagesrelated questions and verdict of liability with clearly inadequate damages of only medical expenses but no noneconomic damages in case where liability was hotly contested strongly suggested compromised verdict", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "more familiar with Wayne neighborhoods and road conditions; and (5) there is a risk of fraud inherent in solicitation that does not exist with respect to pure political campaigning. (Def. Br. in Opp., at 5, 12.) Defendant spends the majority of its brief addressing the Ordinance\u2019s carve-out for political campaigning. However, Wayne articulates virtually no basis for why these same justifications apply to charitable organizations that do not solicit for donations yet do not apply to charitable organizations that do solicit for money. In addressing this question, Defendant simply relies on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Kokinda, where the Court upheld a postal regulation banning solicitation on post office sidewalks. 497 U.S with Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (<HOLDING>)(internal quotation marks and citation Holdings: 0: recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral 1: holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information 2: holding a regulation is contentneutral as long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech 3: holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication 4: holding that contentneutral time place and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "place him in the same position he would have occupied had the breach not occurred. Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603, 612 (Colo.1987); Taylor v. Colorado State Bank of Denver, 165 Colo. 576, 580, 440 P.2d 772, 774 (1968). However, damages are not recoverable for losses beyond an amount that a plaintiff can establish with reasonable certainty by a preponderance of evidence. Riggs v. McMurtry, 157 Colo. 33, 39, 400 P.2d 916, 919 (1965) (stating that the trier of fact may not base an award of damages on mere speculation, rather, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has in fact suffered damage and that the evidence introduced provides a reasonable basis for a computation of damages); see also Bunch v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 505 P.2d 41, 43 (Colo.App.1972) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 352 Holdings: 0: holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants acted with malice 1: holding that there must be sufficient competent evidence from which the trier of fact could estimate the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty 2: holding that a settlement letter is relevant evidence of the amount in controversy if it appears to reflect a reasonable estimate of the plaintiffs claim 3: holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding in part that the severity of a victims injuries may be sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a victim has been knowingly killed", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Williams\u2019s certiorari petition and reinstating his parole. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court\u2019s judgment reinstating Williams\u2019s parole is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. McMILLAN, P.J., and COBB, BASCHAB, and WISE, JJ., concur. 1 . Pursuant to \u00a7 12-3-9, Ala.Code 1975, this Court has appellate jurisdiction over postcon-viction writs in criminal cases. Certiorari petitions challenging the Board\u2019s revocation of parole are considered postconviction writs for purposes of \u00a7 12-3-9. See Ex parte Alabama Board of Pardons & Paroles, 849 So.2d 255 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). The Board filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to \u00a7 6-6-641, Ala.Code 1975. See Dearborn Stove Co. v. Dean, 269 Ala. 561, 115 So.2d 258 (1959) (<HOLDING>); and Ex parte Wright, 860 So.2d 1253 Holdings: 0: holding that  1074 t7 code 1940 the predecessor to  66641 provides for appeals from final judgments of circuit courts in certiorari proceedings 1: holding that for purposes of certiorari review court of appeals must identify the basis for refusing to treat an issue 2: holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available 3: holding that previous legal ruling granting certiorari was law of the case in subsequent proceedings 4: recognizing that where a state prisoner declines to pursue certiorari in the united states supreme court that petitioners conviction is not final  until  after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the supreme court has passed", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 17 . Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 770-71 (Tex. Crim.App.2002); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). 18 . United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). 19 . Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 65 n. 43 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing with approval United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir.1999), which holds that prolonging a detention for the purpose of issuing the citation is \u201cwell within the bounds of the initial stop\u201d); see Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>), cert, denied,-U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 502, 166 Holdings: 0: holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished 1: holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law 2: holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense 3: holding that purpose of stop was complete upon the issuance of the citation 4: holding that if an agent does not develop reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before the justifying purpose of a checkpoint stop has been accomplished he may not prolong the stop", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "reliance on the mediation statement fails for several reasons. To begin, there is the language of Rule 3(c)(4), which says that a party\u2019s intent to appeal must be gleaned \u201cfrom the notice.\u201d (Emphasis added); cf. Smith, 502 U.S. at 248, 112 S.Ct. 678 (\u201cthe notice afforded by a document, not the litigant\u2019s motivation in filing it, determines the document\u2019s sufficiency as a notice of appeal\u201d). Consistent with the plain language of the rule, we have looked to the \u201ctext\u201d of a notice of appeal, not to surrounding circumstances, to gauge compliance with the rule. Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (<HOLDING>). And just as importantly, under the Supreme Holdings: 0: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 1: holding that failure to designate the judgment or order being appealed is a jurisdictional defect 2: holding that appellant had standing to appeal because it was bound by the judgment even though it did not meet the second requirement 3: holding that appellant complied with rule 3as requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was clear from the face of the notice of appeal which judgment appellant sought to appeal 4: holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "express representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims and an examination of any of the prior art cited. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 181 Ct.Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 399 (1967). It is appropriate for the Court to consider not only the changes made during prosecution, but also the reason for the changes. See Insta-Foam Prods., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698, 703 (Fed.Cir.1990) (\u201cA close examination must be made as to not only what was surrendered, but also the reason for such a surrender.\u201d). Prosecution history \u201climits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.\u201d Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). In most disputes over claim construction, an Holdings: 0: holding that the meaning of a term in a claim must be consistent with its appearance in other claims in the same patent 1: holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning 2: recognizing that plain meaning does not control where context shows that the parties have assigned an unusual meaning to a term 3: holding that statements made during the prosecution history may commit the applicant to a particular meaning for a patent term which meaning is then binding in litigation 4: holding that court of appeals erred in relying on the plain meaning of a statute when the legislative history clearly indicated another meaning", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "See White, 45 F.3d at 362 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., \u00a7 1630.2(o)). Neither was Boeing obligated to transfer plaintiff to four of the other remaining positions \u2014 Plumber Maintenance B, A, and Special, and Millwright B \u2014 because transfer to any of those positions would have constituted a promotion. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., \u00a7 1630.2(o) (\"[A]n employer is not required to promote an individual with a disability as an accommodation.\"). Finally, had Boeing transferred Aldrich to any of the last three disputed jobs \u2014 Maintenance Oiler, Assembler Sub-Assembly B, and Assembler Installer General B \u2014 it would have violated the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. This is not required by the ADA. See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 Holdings: 0: holding that a job transfer provided as a reasonable accommodation under the rehabilitation act did not conflict with a collective bargaining agreement when the agreement included a provision authorizing transfers and requiring a seniority preference in transfers ejxcept in the most unusual of circumstances 1: holding that antidiscrimination rights under title vii cannot be waived by a collective bargaining agreement 2: holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable 3: holding that a requested reassignment was not reasonable because it would violate the seniority rights of other employees 4: holding that a debtorinpossession could reject a collective bargaining agreement", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "treatment center for up to 60 days. We affirm because the district court neither extended Gaines\u2019 supervised release nor revoked it, but simply reinstated the original, three-year term. Gaines admitted to violating the condition of his supervised release that he obey all federal, state and local laws. This court has held that \u201cdistrict courts possess the authority under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3583(e) to reinstate a defendant\u2019s term of supervised release after the defendant has been found to have violated the conditions of that release.\u201d Trenter, 201 F.3d at 1264. Although Games\u2019 three-year term of supervised release began in September 1994, that term of supervised release was tolled while he was in state custody. See 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3624(e); United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, reinstatement of his original term Holdings: 0: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release 1: holding term of supervised release tolled while defendant was in state custody 2: holding that deportation does not extinguish term of supervised release 3: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses 4: holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to  3583e", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. of Marquette, 717 F.2d 1016, 1020 (6th Cir.1983); see also Jerry v. UAW-Local 735, 818 F.2d 866 (6th Cir.1987) (unpublished table decision) (\u201cA ruling on a Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motion to vacate is appealable.... \u201d). As other courts have noted in addressing the appealability of Rule 60(b) orders, \u201cthe finality of such orders derives from the finality of the underlying judgment upon which relief is sought.\u201d Mason v. Integrity Ins. Co. (In re Mason), 709 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir.1983). In this case, the underlying order\u2014the supplemental sale order- \u2014 is itself a final order. See Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir.2003); cf. Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 579 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). In concluding that this court lacks appellate Holdings: 0: holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment 1: holding that a bankruptcy order is not final unless it 1 2: holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes 3: holding that a bankruptcy courts sale order is a final order for res judicata purposes 4: holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "was the same caliber as the shell casings found at the scene of the murder, but a ballistics expert testified that he could not say one way or the other whether the shotgun was the murder weapon. Id. We held that the evidence was relevant and admissible, reasoning: The matching caliber was a circumstance of some probative value. The expert\u2019s testimony that he could not say one way or the other whether the shotgun admitted was the murder weapon, was not conclusive or binding on the jury which was free to determine credibility and weight to be ascribed. Under those circumstances, the jury would be entitled to consider the shotgun and give whatever weight was due in light of the expert\u2019s testimony. Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Delhall v. State, 95 So.3d 134, 155 (Fla.2012) (<HOLDING>). Conversely, when the nexus between the weapon Holdings: 0: holding that trial court did not err 1: holding that the trial judge did not err by admitting copies of the indictments as part of the defendants record of conviction  2: holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact 3: holding that the trial court did not err admitting evidence of a 9mm cartridge found in a backpack owned by a murder defendant where the victim was shot with 9mm bullets although not made by the same manufacturer as the cartridge found in the backpack 4: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to prove if the case were to go to trial. Based on those allegations, there is a substantial relationship between Proskauer\u2019s prior representation of Interliant and the entirety of the current action where debtors\u2019 entire background leading up to the request for bankruptcy relief is in question. V. Laches argument Little need be said of defendants\u2019 argument that the motion to disqualify should be barred by the doctrine of laches, or that plaintiffs purported delay in bringing the motion shows that the motion is merely a tactical ploy. Even if there had been delay in moving to disqualify, the Second Circuit has held that \u201c[s]inee ... disqualification is in the public interest, the court cannot act contrary to that inter of New York and New Jersey, 862 F.Supp. 889, 901 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>); Schwed v. General Electric Co., 990 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that a year delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was no evidence that the motion was inspired by dilatory tactics 1: holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable 2: holding that a tenmonth delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of prejudice and because disqualification is in the public interest where there is an ethical violation 3: holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay 4: holding that a twoyear delay did not bar the motion where there was no demonstration of unfair prejudice", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "proceeding can be considered a debt to the child. In re Peters, 964 F.2d 166, 167 (2d Cir.1992) (per curiam), aff'g 133 B.R. 291 (S.D.N.Y.1991). In Peters, we endorsed the reasoning of the district court below, which had explained that \u201c[i]t is ... generally accepted that fees incurred on behalf of a child are nondischargeable because they are deemed to be support when those fees are inextricably intertwined with proceedings affecting the welfare of a child.\u201d Peters, 133 B.R. at 295; see also Spong, 661 F.2d at 9-10. Other circuits have concurred that the debt owed to an attorney appointed to represent a child in custody or support proceedings is properly considered a debt to that child within the meaning of \u00a7 523(a)(5). See, e.g., In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); In re Dvorak, 986 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Holdings: 0: holding that legal fees for a childs guardian ad litem in a custody proceeding were clearly for the ehilds benefit and support and as such were nondischargeable under  523a5 1: holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child 2: holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 3: holding that where the trial court denies a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a child support case the order is unappealable 4: holding that debts for a guardian ad litem and a psychologist were nondischargeable under  523a5 because the emphasis is to be placed on the determination of whether a debt is in the nature of support rather than on the identity of the payee", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at 226). In In re Hall, the court held that a \u201csingle catalogued thesis in one university library\u201d at Frieburg University, Germany, constituted sufficient accessibility to those interested in the art exercising reasonable diligence. Id. at 899-900. As the court in American Stock Exchange, LLC v. Mopex. Inc. recently observed: The need to flip through hundreds of documents, although time-consuming, clearly falls within the bounds of \u201creasonable diligence\u201d. Surely, if a single copy of a doctoral dissertation maintained in one university library in Germany has been found to be \u201cpublicly accessible\u201d, see In re Hall, 781 F.2nd at 899-900, so too is an application that is indexed in the Reference Room \u2014 the most logical place to look for prior art. 250 F.Supp. 2nd 323, 329 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (<HOLDING>). To a person of skill in the art, browsing a Holdings: 0: holding that public demonstration of electronic organ at show for national association of music manufacturers constituted public use under section 102b despite fact that instrument was not then available for sale to the public 1: holding prior publication must not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the document but must also disclose those elements arranged as in the claim internal citations omitted 2: holding a document accessible only through the public reference room at the securities and exchange commission constituted a printed publication under  102b 3: holding that plaintiffs personal opinion on how the kansas corporation commission should carry out the statutory purposes of the kansas securities act is not public policy 4: holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by the ratio of the verdict to the amount of Breen's medical expenses caused by the accident, which it claims to be approximately 50:1. A jury verdict may be set aside as excessive or a remittitur may be granted only if it appears that \"the verdict is so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous, showing the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption.\" Elmore v. Doenges Bros. Ford, Inc., 2001 OK CIV APP 27, \u00b6 12, 21 P.3d 65, 70 (citing Currens v. Hampton, 1997 OK 58, \u00b6 10, 939 P.2d 1138, 1141). Determination of whether a mistrial or a new trial was warranted based on prejudice depends on the facts and cireumstances of each case. Hutton v. Lowry, 1968 OK 114, \u00b6 13, 444 P.2d 812, 814-16 (<HOLDING>). The fundamental and controlling question is Holdings: 0: holding that whether proximate cause exists is to be decided in a common sense fashion in the light of the attending facts and circumstances and unless the facts are undisputed and admit of but one inference the question is for the jury 1: holding that reference to the defendants insurance at trial is harmless unless the defendants rights are prejudiced thereby and whether such prejudice has occurred depends essentially upon the facts and circumstances of each case 2: holding that defendant was not deprived of any procedural rights or prejudiced by trial court hearing the evidence at defendants child molesting trial as evidence in the states petition to revoke defendants probation 3: holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case 4: holding that when there are multiple defendants rule 9b requires that a plaintiff allege facts specifying each defendants contribution to the fraud", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "overdosed). Exhibit D-3. 10 . Although application of the Sentencing Guidelines is no longer mandatory, [in the Eighth Circuit] district courts are still required to consult the Guidelines and take them into account in calculating a defendant\u2019s sentence. A district court must calculate a defendant's advisory Guidelines sentencing range based on his total offense level, criminal history category, and any appropriate departures. The court may also vary from the advisory Guidelines range based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3553(a) as long as the resulting sentence is reasonable. Proper application of the Guidelines \"remains the critical starting point\u201d for fashioning a reasonable sentence under \u00a7 3553(a), and a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>)- 12 . The court notes that Rebmann II is not Holdings: 0: holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility in part because he suborned perjury 1: holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility  were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility 2: holding that defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he failed to fully account for the proceeds of his crime and attempted to delay a longscheduled hearing based on an incredible claim of innocence 3: holding that courts mention of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility to defense counsel was not reversible error 4: holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility despite his plea of guilty where he attempted to suborn perjury", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in making the parallel determination of whether a police officer has the authority to open a vehicle door as part of issuing an order to exit the vehicle. In the realm of defining reasonable searches and seizures, no meaningful or relevant difference exists between the grant of authority to order an occupant of a vehicle to exit the vehicle and the authority to open the door as part of issuing that lawful order. Plain logic demands that the principles that govern whether a passenger of a vehicle lawfully can be ordered out of the vehicle must apply with equal force to whether a police officer is entitled, as a corollary and reasonable safety measure, to open the door as part of issuing a proper order to exit. See State v. Matthews, 330 N.J.Super. 1, 6, 748 A.2d 1125 (App.Div.2000) (<HOLDING>); State v. Conquest, 243 N.J.Super. 528, 533, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence 1: holding that since the officer was entitled to order defendant out of the car he was equally entitled to open the door to accomplish that object 2: recognizing that trial court properly left the door open for defendant to prove its defenses to the fed complaint 3: holding that a secured creditor is not entitled to receive any more than that to which it was entitled pursuant to the terms of the confirmed plan 4: holding a car was broken into or entered when defendant reached in through the open window of a car", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "affirm the district court. The district court in this case denied Folkerts\u2019 request to be absent from the deposition of the victim until the lawyers completed all questions pertaining to the description of the assailant. Folkerts objected to her presence at the deposition based on due-process grounds, and the issue presented was whether Folkerts had a right under the Due Process Clause to be absent from the deposition. The district court determined she did not, and we are presented with the same question in this interlocutory appeal. We have previously held that a defendant does not have a right to be absent from a deposition. State v. Davis, 259 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Iowa 1977); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Randle, 603 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Iowa 1999) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, our rules of criminal procedure Holdings: 0: holding a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial 1: holding that when a constitutional right is vested in a party and there is a doubt as to whether that right has been waived the doubt should be resolved in the defendants favor 2: holding that a right to be released when a joint tortfeasor has been released is a vested right 3: holding that expenditures on architectural planning do not create vested right 4: recognizing that remedial statutes may be applied to pending cases because they usually do not affect vested right", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the double-damages provision to play an important role in compensating the United States in cases where it has been defrauded.\u201d); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (noting that the \u201cchief purpose of the statute here was to provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and... the device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely whole.\u201d). There matters stood until 1986, when Congress amended section sh Sch. Bd., 46 F.Supp.2d 546, 558-59 (E.D.La.1999) (concluding that states and municipalities were \u201cpersons\u201d under the FCA); and United States ex rel. Chandler v. Hektoen Inst. for Med. Research, 35 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1083 (N.D.Ill.1999) (<HOLDING>) with United States ex rel. Graber v. City of Holdings: 0: holding that county of delaware was not a person for purposes of fca liability 1: holding that county defendant was a person within meaning of fca for purposes of suit by private plaintiff 2: holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983 3: holding that suit against county sheriff in his official capacity was suit against county 4: holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of  1983", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "decision that conclusively resolves this issue in the context of these specific Guideline provisions. However, circuit courts have addressed the relationship between Chapter 4 and \u00a7 2L1.2. See e.g., United States v. Frias, 338 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir.2003) (\u201cThe Government disputes [Defendant\u2019s] conclusion that there is a theoretical difference between Chapter 4 and \u00a7 2L1.2, arguing that each section is clearly aimed at the same thing, which is varying the punishment based on the criminal record and thus the expected dangerousness of the offender. We agree, believing that, while it may not always be appropriate to look at other sections of the Guidelines to interpret a term, such a course is warranted in this case.\u201d); United States v. Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d 456, 460 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Galicia-Delgado, 130 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a sentencing judge would violate section 3553a by limiting consideration of the applicable guidelines range to the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant instead of considering the applicable guidelines range as required by subsection 3553a4 based on the facts found by the court 1: holding that section 4a12 is a broadly applicable section of the guidelines 2: recognizing that the epa can consider the section 404b1 guidelines when acting under section 404c 3: holding that standards used in section 1988 cases are applicable to determine prevailing party under section 505b of the rehabilitation act of 1973 4: holding that a prior conviction is not a predicate offense under the sentencing guidelines if the statute that provides the basis for the prior conviction sweeps more broadly than the generic crime described in the guidelines", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to allay the investor\u2019s concern.\u201d LC Capital Partners, 318 F.3d at 155. The statements cited by Gottex express optimism about a positive outcome to the investigations, but such \u201cmere expressions of hope\u201d are insufficient to dissipate Gottex\u2019s duty to inquire. Id. at 156. Even if these were outright denials of the specific practices being investigated, they do not fulfill Gottex\u2019s duty of inquiry and were insufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 289 F.Supp.2d 429, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (\u201cA plaintiffs duty to inquire is not dissipated merely because of a defendant\u2019s denial of wrongdoing.\u201d); see also Great Rivers Co-op. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Inds., Inc., 120 F.3d 893, 898 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Lenz v. Associated Inns & Restaurants Co. of Holdings: 0: holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it 1: recognizing that nondisclosure agreements did not have to list the secret information in order to put employees on notice 2: holding that selfserving statements about the invalidity of the suit do not  negate the other pertinent information that otherwise put plaintiff on inquiry notice 3: holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration 4: holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "judgment debtor to determine if there are any funds owed to the judgment debtor by the third party. Id. at \u00a7\u00a7 63.001-.008. It requires a separate lawsuit against the third party consisting of an application supported by affidavits affirming that the defendant does not possess property in Texas subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the debt. It also requires a bond. Tex.R. Crv. P. 657-674. In the case before us, however, the creditor and the third party are effectively the same; the creditor is the State of Texas and the party holding the funds, the TDCJ, is an agency of the State. See Martin v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (recognizing that TDCJ is a state agency); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976) (<HOLDING>). It is unlikely that the legislature Holdings: 0: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office 1: holding that a damages suit against a state officer in his official capacity was barred because it was functionally a suit against the state 2: holding that the state police is a state agency 3: holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state 4: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is irrelevant. The issue of whether Davis was entitled to prejudgment interest had already been determined and any countervailing equities should not have been a consideration for the Cibola County court. The surety bond states that Safeco is to pay claimants \u201csuch sum or sums as may be justly due claimant\u201d following a lawsuit. It has long been black-letter law that \u201c[i]nterest normally commences to run against the principal from the date that he violates his obligation and, since the surety is liable for the principal\u2019s entire debt, he will be hable also for such interest on the debt.\u201d Arthur A. Stearns, The Law of Suretyship \u00a7 8.19, at 283 (5th ed. 1951); cf. Social Sec. Admin., Baltimore Fed. Credit Union v. Employer\u2019s Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 234 Md. 493, 199 A.2d 918, 919 (1964) (<HOLDING>); Borough of Totowa v. American Surety Co., 39 Holdings: 0: holding bond protecting credit union against loss from employees dishonesty made surety hable for interest on sum embezzled 1: holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members 2: holding school district strictly hable for sexual harassment by its employees 3: recognizing employers interest in protecting confidentiality of data bearing on employees basic competence 4: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and calculations\u201d (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the Agreements were not otherwise justified by \u201cavoided litigation costs or fair value for services.\u201d Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2236. \u2018 In light of the standard for dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their burden and have adequately alleged that the sum total of the Watson Agreement constituted a large and unjustified payment, as did the Lupin Agreement (challenged by the EPPs and Retailers only). Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden to allege facts that, with the benefit of fact and expert discovery, have the reasonable expectation of proving their prima facie case under the rule of reason. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (<HOLDING>). C. Fraud on the PTO, Sham Litigation, and Holdings: 0: holding ban violated the sherman act 1: holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act 2: holding that a complaint must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim 3: holding that a complaint must plead facts sufficient to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of a sherman act violation 4: holding that same activity violated  2 of the sherman act", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "absence of probable cause is a long established constitutional right,\u201d Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 128. Therefore, one who gives false information to a prosecutor that he knows will induce a prosecutor to commence or continue proceedings against a plaintiff, knowingly violates the law and is not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. Cf id. at 131 (action against police officers who \u201ccreate[d] false information likely to influence a jury\u2019s decision and forward[ed] that information to prosecutors\u201d). Moreover, extension of qualified immunity in such circumstances would thwart the basic purpose of \u00a7 1983 itself\u2014 to protect persons from abuse of official authority, see Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 161, 112 S.Ct. at 1830, and, thus, must be rejected in any event. See id. at 164, 112 S.Ct. at 1831 (<HOLDING>). An examination of the specific inquiries Holdings: 0: holding that the considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity at common law dictate the same absolute immunity under  1983 1: recognizing that the claim at issue was one under state common law between two private parties the experts in the federal system at resolving common law counterclaims  are the article iii courts 2: holding that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to officers in common law actions for false arrest and imprisonment as well as in actions brought pursuant to section 1983 3: holding that irrespective of the common law support we will not recognize an immunity available at common law if  1983s history or purpose counsel against applying it in  1983 actions 4: recognizing common law privileges", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "sexually abused Doe. Nelson did not testify at the hearing. Nelson appeals. II. Nelson argues on appeal that his equal protection and due process rights were violated by the family court\u2019s failure to hold the family court action in abeyance pending resolution of the related criminal charges. The essence of Nelson\u2019s position is that the pending criminal charges (and his right to remain silent) unduly and impermissibly influenced his decision whether to testify in the family court action and, more generally, his ability to defend himself against the family court abuse allegations, amounting to a constitutional violation. Case law from other jurisdictions has uniformly rejected Nelson\u2019s constitutional challenge. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Peiffer v. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 848 F.2d 44, Holdings: 0: holding that simultaneous civil and related criminal proceedings do not constitute unfairness and want of consideration of justice requiring reversal of a criminal conviction 1: holding that isolated criminal attacks do not constitute persecution 2: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 3: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 4: holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in the Harris County -Jail. Although the trial court did not set aside its judgment of contempt, it later released Evans from confinement. There is no appeal from a contempt judgment, and a writ of habeas corpus is not available because Evans is no longer restrained. Therefore, this court has the ability to exercise mandamus jurisdiction over the contempt judgment. See Rosser v. Squier, 902 S.W.2d 962 (Tex.1995); In re K.S.E., 2003 WL 21269585, at *1, n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Jun.4, 2003, no pet.) (mem.op.). Under section 574.037(a), the trial court lacked authority to order Evans to provide outpatient mental health services. Consequently, the trial court\u2019s judgment of contempt against Evans for violating that order is void. See Ex parte Evans, 939 S.W.2d 142, 144. (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>); In re Villanueva, 56 S.W.3d 905, 908-10 Holdings: 0: holding that when the district court improperly purported to transfer to the circuit court an action over which the circuit court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction the circuit court was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment which was void and dismissing the appeal from that void judgment 1: holding that a defendant cannot be punished by contempt proceedings for disregarding a void order 2: holding that circuit court that had no jurisdiction to modify georgia custody determination could not enter valid contempt judgment against husband for violating void modification judgment 3: holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction 4: holding that judgment of contempt was void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988). The Supreme Court has noted that \u201cthe selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function.\u201d Id. In order for a contractor to claim the government contractor defense, (1) the government must have approved \u201creasonably precise\u201d specifications; (2) the equipment must have conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier/contractor must have warned of those equipment dangers that were known to the supplier/contractor, but not to the government. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512, 108 S.Ct. 2510; Stout, 933 F.2d at 336. The government need not prepare the specifications to be considered to have approved them. See Trevino v. General Dynamics, 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether \u201csubstantive review\u201d Holdings: 0: holding that there was adequate opportunity when state court judicial review of an administrative proceeding was available 1: holding that substantive review is adequate 2: holding that pennsylvanias full judicial review of a denied building permit is adequate process 3: holding that a petition for review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 4: holding that standard of review is a matter of procedural rather than substantive law", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "and Ms. Kirton], including but not limited to those involving any transaction or the construction, performance, or breach of this or any other agreement between [Merrill Lynch and Ms. Kirton], whether entered into prior [to], on, or subsequent to the date hereof.\u201d We agree. Ms. Kirton and Ms. Adamson executed the 1995 customer agreement in connection with the creation of their joint account at Merrill Lynch. At her deposition, Ms. Kirton testified that before she signed that agreeme olding that a clause providing for arbitration of \u201call claims ... and controversies of every kind or nature that may arise between [the Buyer and the Dealer]\u201d was broad enough to cover the plaintiffs claims of conversion and wrongful repossession); Jones v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra (<HOLDING>). See, also the following cases, from other Holdings: 0: holding that in a suit on a sworn account the petition with an attached sworn account and verified affidavit of the sworn account was a liquidated claim proved by written instruments 1: holding that the rights conferred to a joint account holder by massachusetts statutes and case law in fact give a joint account holder legal title in a joint account 2: holding that nonsignatory settlor and trust beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate under account agreement between trustee and merrill lynch which contained an arbitration clause because agreement was the underlying basis for all the claims of the beneficiaries and there would have been no claims without the agreement 3: holding that fathers investment account with stock brokerage firm was not a multipleparty account available for payment of child support 4: holding that language in a merrill lynch customer account agreement that the plaintiff signed upon opening the first account  providing for arbitration of any controversy  arising out of its business  applied to the disputed second account even though the plaintiff did not sign a separate customer account agreement for the second account", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "961, 115 S.Ct. 420, 130 L.Ed.2d 335 (1994); Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 235, 238, aff'd, 429 Fed. Appx. 995 (Fed.Cir.2011), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1105, 181 L.Ed.2d 973 (2012); Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 640, 650 (2009); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed.Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 Fed.Appx. 615 (Fed.Cir.), reh\u2019g denied (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050, 128 S.Ct. 675, 169 L.Ed.2d 529 (2007); Agee v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 284, 290 (2006); Zhengxing v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 732, 739, aff'd, 204 Fed.Appx. 885 (Fed.Cir.), reh\u2019g denied (Fed.Cir.2006). Any claim alleging negligence by government officials raises a question of tortious conduct, which is not reviewable in this court. See Husband v. United States, 90 Fed.Cl. 29, 35 (2009) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted). This court, Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort when the government seized and failed to return plaintiffs property or in the alternative that his property was lost as a result of the governments theft 1: holding that a passenger who lacked a property or possessory interest in the automobile or property seized lacked standing to challenge a search of the car 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in tort including fraud 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and obtained some benefit from it, \u201cthen section 503(b)(1)(A) comes into play irrespective of whether damages for breach might otherwise lie.\u201d Id., citing In re Thompson, 788 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.1986); Kinnan & Kinnan P\u2019ship v. Agristor Leasing, 116 B.R. 162 (D.Neb.1990). Other courts have also decided Section 365(d)(10) does not take away a personal property lessor\u2019s right to apply for administrative expenses during the first sixty days of a case. See In re Magnolia Gas Co., 255 B.R. 900, 917 (W.D.Okl.2000); In re Eastern Agri-Systems, Inc., 258 B.R. 352, 354-55 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2000) (finding administrative expense claims arising under \u00a7 365(d)(10) are independent from administrative expense claims under \u00a7 503(b)); In re Pan Am. Airways Corp., 245 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Russell Cave Co., 247 B.R. at 659 Holdings: 0: holding that in an agreement where the father agreed to pay reasonable expenses to the extent that such expenses are not provided by any scholarship grant or other assistance for his sons education those expenses did not include loan repayment because it was not one of the forms of enumerated assistance 1: holding that although the lessor was not entitled to an administrative expense claim under  365d10 for the debtors use of leased property during the first sixty days of the ease the lessor would be entitled to those expenses under  503b1 to the extent the lessor could prove the expenses represented the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate 2: holding that debtors have the burden of proving that other necessary expenses on form b22c are actual reasonable and necessary expenses and that these expenses should be considered in light of schedule j and other relevant evidence 3: holding that expenses refers to costs 4: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in good faith also requires an employer to supply relevant employment information when requested by the employees\u2019 representative. E. Tenn. Baptist Hosp. v. NLRB, 6 F.3d 1139, 1143 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979)). The Board found that Galicks had a duty to collectively bargain with the Union. It also found that Galicks violated this duty by withdrawing recognition from the Union and failing to respond to the Union\u2019s information request in August 2006. Galicks does not dispute that it took either of these latter actions. Instead, Galicks argues that it did not have a duty to bargain in the first place because it had one or fewer journeymen in the bargaining unit. McDaniel Elec., 313 N.L.R.B. 126, 127 (1993) (<HOLDING>). But the Board found that Galicks could not Holdings: 0: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify 1: holding that there can be only one final appealable order 2: holding that there is no duty to bargain if an employer can prove it has a stable one or noman bargaining unit 3: holding if there has been no termination of employment there has been no layoff or reduction in force 4: holding defendant did not prove an enforceable agreement only that there was some discussion of a plea bargain", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not be subjected to another trial where he attacked only excessiveness of sentence, not the conviction). Unlike the defendant in Goodley, Appellant collaterally attacked his conviction on the correct assertion that the non-waivable structural defect of an 11-person jury verdict rendered the entire proceeding invalid. Courts have addressed whether a trial is rendered a nullity due to \u201cstructural defect\u201d or \u201cstructural error.\u201d Generally, when an error is subject to a harmless error analysis, the reviewing court will not consider the entire trial invalid. By contrast, a structural error \u2018affec[ts] the framework within which the trial proceeds\u2019 and [is] not \u2018simply an error in trial pro , United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), in which i th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>), with North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, Holdings: 0: holding that when the jury acquitted the defendant on the greater offense but deadlocked on the lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lessers 1: holding double jeopardy prohibition not applicable where jury unable to agree on greater charge but convicts on lesserincluded offense because no implied acquittal occurred on greater offense 2: holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense 3: holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense  because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense  operates as an acquittal of the greater offense  to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense 4: holding that when jury acquitted defendant on greater offense but deadlocked on lesserincluded offenses double jeopardy did not bar retrial of the lesers", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "no significant requirements on cigarette manufacturers: the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 concerns smokeless products, not cigarettes; the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments imposed a requirement on the Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit reports about cigarettes; and the ADAMHA Reorganization Act conditions block grants to states. Contrary to R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris\u2019s argument, the statement of purpose in the Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331, does not preserve cigarette sales. The second listed purpose of establishing a program to \u201cdeal with cigarette labeling and advertising\u201d states, \u201c[C]ommerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy a F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2004) (<HOLDING>). Federal law is silent both by its terms and Holdings: 0: holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt plaintiffs state law claims 1: holding that the labeling act did not preempt design defect claim against cigarette manufacturer 2: holding that the federal cigarette labeling and advertising act did not preempt state law damages actions 3: holding that the labeling act did not preempt negligent and wanton design and manufacture claims against cigarette manufacturer 4: holding that federal law did not preempt commonlaw fraud claim against cigarette manufacturer based on advertising of light cigarettes", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for money under Section 306(a)(1), including tax liens, so far as the same can be paid out of the proceeds of the property subject to such mortgage or other hen\u201d). 17 . See Tex Prob.Code \u00a7\u00a7 319-21 (requiring court approval of all payments in statutory priority, with pro rata payments when assets are deficient). 18 . See id. 50(d)(2). 19 . \"The Legislature shall have no power to release the inhabitants of, or property in, any county, city or town from the payment of taxes levied for State or counly purposes, unless in case of great public calamity in any such county, city or town, when such release may be made by a vote of two-thirds of each House of the Legislature.\u201d Tex. Const, art. VIII, \u00a7 10. 20 . See Mexia Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Mexia, 134 Tex. 95, 133 S.W.2d 118, 122 (1939) (<HOLDING>). 21 .See, e.g., Tex Tax Code \u00a7 33.05(a)(2) Holdings: 0: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city 1: recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket 2: holding notice of impending tax sale of property was not reasonably calculated to reach property owner when notice sent via certified letter by state was returned unclaimed and state did not take additional reasonable steps to ensure notice was provided 3: holding that cjourts may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute 4: holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(2007), which requires a showing of medical necessity. Here, the employer and carrier never contested the medical necessity of the referral, and the uncontradicted evidence was that claimant\u2019s authorized medical care provider made repeated recommendations for an orthopedic evaluation. Claimant\u2019s doctor testified that the compensable accident was the major contributing cause of the need for the evaluation, and that the purpose of the evaluation was to determine whether claimant\u2019s ongoing symptoms were related to his injury \u2014 or at least to determine whether there was an objective basis for claimant\u2019s symptoms. In such circumstances, this court has held a claimant is entitled to an evaluation. See Grainger v. Indian River Transport/Zurich U.S., 869 So.2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). Because the judge erroneously denied Holdings: 0: holding that records of students evaluation by school psychologist were not subject to the psychologistpatient privilege because the student and his mother did not expect the communications to remain confidential and because the purpose of the interview was to  assess  the students need for special education services not for the purpose of treatment or counseling 1: recognizing a breachofduty action by an employee against a workers compensation carrier even though the carrier issued its policy to the employer 2: holding that the judge of compensation claims erred by not requiring the employer and carrier to pay for an evaluation to determine the etiology of claimants medical problem and that it is the purpose of the evaluation not its result that determines its compensability 3: holding if a workers compensation carrier denies liability for medical expenses of its insured the nofault carrier is bound promptly to pay benefits concerning such expenses under its policy 4: holding that where the board had already made the necessary factual evaluation underlying the legal standard to be applied it then becomes the courts responsibility to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the boards findings were supported by substantial evidence", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "case filed by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, section 263.405(i) bars this court from considering any issues not \u201cspecifically presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of the points on which the party intends to appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new trial.\u201d Section 263.405(i) is effective for cases, like this one, appealed on or after September 1, 2005. We note that the legislature has also mandated that indigent parents in these termination cases receive appointed counsel. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that this \u201cstatutory right to counsel in parental-rights termination cases embodies the right to effective counsel,\u201d and this court has specifically held that \u201cthe statutory right to appointed counsel aff 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); In re D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d 281, 291 Holdings: 0: holding statement of points in notice of appeal sufficient 1: holding failure to raise issue in statement of points does not forfeit it on appeal 2: holding an argument to be waived for inadequate briefing and failure to raise the issue in the statement of points on appeal 3: holding failure to file statement of points is no bar to appeal 4: holding failure to timely file statement of points does not forfeit issues on appeal", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "arbitration award but citing cases showing split of authority), cases from other jurisdictions, including those from Texas, support our determination that whether goodwill is a distributable asset in a professional entity presents a question of fact. See, Stefanski v. Gonnella, 15 Mass. App. 500, 446 N.E.2d 734 (1983) (relating history of Massachusetts case law deciding issue as question of fact); Durio v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 82, 85, 358 P.2d 703, 705 (1961) (concluding in action by veterinarian partner to recover agreed-upon price for his interest from former partner that better rule was \u201cgood will also exists in professional practice, or in business founded upon personal skill and reputation and is salable\u201d); Spaulding v. Benenati, 57 N.Y.2d 418, 442 N.E.2d 1244, 456 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Berg v. Settle, 70 Wash. 2d 864, 425 P.2d 635 Holdings: 0: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 1: holding that goodwill of dental practice could be sold by deceased dentists wife who was sole beneficiary of his estate when sale of goodwill included something other than personal attributes of professional such as right to practice at same location 2: holding the real estate sale proceeds 3: holding in case where the asserted defense to plaintiffs contract action to recover fees for his professional services was that the professional services were for the unlicensed practice of law in new jersey and that the contract was therefore illegal and unenforceable that questions of unlawful practice of law will turn on the particular facts presented that the issue could be determined only on a full and complete appreciation of the events and surrounding circumstances that the trial court not evaluate the merits of appellees affirmative defense without reference to matters outside the pleadings and therefore that judgment on the pleadings was not warranted 4: holding contract for sale of law practice which included duty on part of selling attorney to refer clients as consideration for the sale violated rpc", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because it failed to secure a ruling as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The language of Rule 120a is specific that any affidavits \u201cshall be served at least seven days before the hearing.\u201d See Tex.R. Civ. P. 120a(3). Imlay and the law firm did not file their second affidavit until after the hearing. The rule provides that, when it appears from the affidavits of a party opposing the special appearance that he is unable to present by \u201cfacts essential to justify his opposition,\u201d the trial judge may \u201corder a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.\u201d See id. (emphasis added); see also Potkovick v. Reg\u2019l Ventures, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1995, no writ) (<HOLDING>). This part of the rule appears to permit the Holdings: 0: holding that after stem bankruptcy judges have the authority to enter interlocutory orders in noncore proceedings and in core proceedings as to which the bankruptcy court may not enter final orders or judgment consistent with article iii absent consent 1: holding that orders that deny some rule 3850 claims but dismiss others with leave to amend under spera are not final appealable orders 2: recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal 3: holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief 4: holding that trial court does have some discretion under rule 120a to enter other orders as are just", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "colleague also contends that the Court has a long history of interpreting the 120-day period prescribed by Congress to allow, in essence, additional time to file a Notice of Appeal. We disagree. In cases where the Court has allowed \u201cadditional\u201d time \u2014 for example, in cases where the 120th day fell on a date the Court was closed, or where an incarcerated prisoner deposited his Notice of Appeal with prison authorities prior to the expiration of the time period but the Notice of Appeal was not received by the Court until after the expiration of the time period \u2014 technical compliance with section 7266(a) was not merely \u201cdifficult,\u201d as our colleague asserts, but impossible. If the Court is closed, a document simply cannot be filed. Cf. Torres v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 15, 17 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Once a prisoner deposits mail with prison Holdings: 0: holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed 1: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice 2: holding timely notice of appeal under fed rapp p 4a is jurisdictional 3: holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal 4: holding in a case in which the appellant mailed his notice of appeal to va at a time when the court had no physical facilities that literal compliance with filing requirements is not required in cases in which it cannot fairly be exacted  quoting fed rapp p 3 advisory comm note", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "As we previously noted in the context of discrimination claims, \u201cNew York cases vary widely in the amount of damages awarded for mental anguish.\u201d Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 177 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 78 (2d Cir.2004) (compiling discrimination cases in which New York courts reduce awards for mental anguish to $30,000 or below as well as cases in which New York courts uphold awards of more than $100,000)). Based on our survey of damages awards for emotional distress and malicious prosecution, $100,000 appears to reflect the upper end of the range of awards in comparable cases. Compare Patterson, 440 F.3d at 120 and Morsette, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 422, with Rohrs v. Rohrs, 17 A.D.3d 659, 793 N.Y.S.2d 532, 533-34 (2d Dep\u2019t 2005) (<HOLDING>), Lynch v. Cnty. of Nassau, 278 A.D.2d 205, 717 Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff who proves a cause of action under  1981 may recover punitive damages where the plaintiff is entitled to an award of compensatory damages even if nominal 1: holding that award of 50000 was reasonable 2: holding that a 50000 malicious prosecution compensatory damages award deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation and ordering a new trial on the issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to a reduction in the award to 25000 3: holding that award of 25000 was reasonable 4: holding that conduct must be beyond the fraud which supported compensatory damages to award punitive damages", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "effect to a fully informed vote of the disinterested stockholders. In many of the cases, that effect was given to a statutorily required vote or one required by the certificate of incorporation. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del. 1992) (\"Inherent in [enhanced scrutiny] is a presumption that a board acted in the absence of an informed shareholder vote ratifying the challenged action.\u201d); Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1127, 1133, aff\u2019d, 746 A.2d 277 (dismissing a challenge to, a spin-off of a subsidiary because a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the stockholders that was required under the corpora tion\u2019s charter invoked the business judgment rule); In re Lukens Inc. S\u2019holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736-38 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (<HOLDING>); In re Gen. Motors Class H S\u2019holders Litig., Holdings: 0: holding that the only fraud that could vitiate the contract is fraud that would invalidate the merger clause itself ie fraud relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause quoting 3 corbin contracts  578 1: holding that the fully informed stockholder approval of a merger invoked the business judgment rule 2: holding under delaware law that if the directors individually and the board collectively fail to inform themselves fully and in a deliberate manner then they lose the protection of the business judgment rule  3: recognizing that pursuant to the business judgment rule the decisions of business professionals on the board of directors should be presumed valid 4: holding that consistent with parol evidence rule a merger clause can be avoided based on fraud in the inducement", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "too high. The district court relied on reasonable data in reducing Sandra Jasso\u2019s counsel\u2019s hourly billing rate to $288. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion and made no clearly erroneous factual findings in reducing the hourly rate of Sandra Jasso\u2019s counsel. See Graves, 700 F.2d at 221. The district court also reduced the fees requested for time spent traveling to 17.5 hours at the hourly rate of $288, as opposed to the requested 35 hours at $375 per hour. Courts often reduce working and non-working travel time. See In re Babckock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (noting' that generally \u201cit is not an abuse of discretion to discount non-working (and even working) travel time\u201d); see also Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). As the district court properly noted, counsel Holdings: 0: holding district court did not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend complaint for a third time 1: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a complaint with prejudice based on the plaintiffs failure to amend the complaint by the deadline imposed by the court 2: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest at the colorado statutory rate of 8 percent 3: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits 4: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the hourly rate billed by 50 for travel time", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to carry on the business of banking.\u2019 \u201d Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. \u00a7 24 Seventh). \u201cTo prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation from impairing the national system, Congress provided: \u2018No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law[J\u201d Id. (citing \u00a7 484(a)). Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has \u201crepeatedly made, clear that federal control shields national banking from 03 (Miss. 1976) (\u201cUnanimously, other state courts have' held that a statute, similar to Mississippi\u2019s, prohibiting a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State from maintaining any action in any court of the State, does not apply to a national banking corporation.\u201d); In re Hibernia Nat\u2019l Bank, 21 S.W.3d 908, 909-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (<HOLDING>). As these cases demonstrate, \u201cthe iaw is Holdings: 0: holding misrepresentation made by outofstate defendant to texas plaintiff who relied on it in texas satisfied requirement for jurisdiction under longarm statute based on commission of a tort in part in texas 1: holding that the nba preempted a kentucky statute that re quired a national bank as a foreign corporation transacting business in the state to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining suit in a kentucky court as it significantly impaired the banks exercise of authority under the nba 2: holding that a florida statute requiring a foreign corporation to obtain a certificate of authority prior to transacting business in the state was preempted as it applied to national banks 3: holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba 4: holding that the nba preempted application of a texas statute that would infringe on a national banks federally granted right to sue in any court as fully as natural persons by requiring the bank to obtain a certificate of authority before it could maintain a suit in texas", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "aggravated felonies. As the record shows, she did not properly challenge that determination during her expedited removal proceedings; rather, the only point at which Sutariya appears to have challenged it was in the context of her motion to an IJ for bond redetermination, which did not directly challenge her removability and was filed over ten days after she received notice of the DHS\u2019s intent to issue a final order of removal. Indeed, Sutariya admits in her brief that she did not properly challenge the determination that she was an aggravated felon, saying that she \u201cwould have challenged\u201d it if she had been granted a hearing before an IJ. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this claim. See Lubowa v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., \u2014 Fed.Appx. -, -, 2008 WL 4148523, at *2 (11th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); see also Fonseca-Sanchez v. Gonzales, 484 Holdings: 0: holding that dhss motion to reconsider was a collateral attack on a bia order 1: holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal 2: holding that we lack jurisdiction based on a failure to exhaust where an alien in expedited removal proceedings failed to challenge the dhss determination that he committed an aggravated felony after receiving notice of the dhss intent to issue a final removal order on that basis 3: holding that an alien raising a due process challenge to removal proceedings must show error and substantial prejudice 4: holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to locate a seller in Peru, arrange for a purchase of cocaine which would have a street value of $280,000 in the United States, his \u201cnerve\u201d in handling such a transaction, and his expertise in securing a field test all support the sentencing judge\u2019s inferences. The district court\u2019s conclusions here were not unreasonable. The facts surrounding Robelo\u2019s crime sufficiently support the conclusion that Robelo probably belonged to a group of persons involved in drug smuggling and that he probably had committed similar crimes previously. AFFIRMED. 1 . See United States v. Wondrack, 578 F.2d 808, 810 (9 Cir. 1978) (refusing to vacate a sentence when the allegedly unreliable allegations were not entirely without support). Cf. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1360 (9 Cir. 1978) (en banc) Holdings: 0: holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel 1: holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision 2: holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case 3: holding due process requires a sentencing court not to give unwarranted weight to allegedly unreliable hearsay information to enhance sentence 4: holding that due process requires appellate courts to scrutinize the sentencing process to insure that sentences are based on reliable information", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "under like circumstances, (4) the relative merits of the parties\u2019 positions, and (5) whether the action conferred a common benefit on a group of pension plan participants.\u201d Id. at 871. In this case, it is clear that the fourth factor, \u201cthe relative merits of the parties\u2019 positions,\u201d does not favor an award of attorney\u2019s fees to the plaintiffs. The Court has found that both plaintiffs\u2019 positions are entirely meritless. Likewise, the first and third factors are not satisfied because the defendants have not been found to have exhibited any \u201cculpability and bad faith\u201d at all, and accordingly there is no improper action to deter. The fifth factor is not met because plaintiffs\u2019 suit did not have \u201cthe effect of conferring a common benefit\u201d on any group of plan participants. Id. at 872 (<HOLDING>). Given that the Chambless factors tilt so Holdings: 0: holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege 1: holding that effect of suit rather than the purpose for which it was brought is controlling for purposes of the fifth factor 2: holding that a charge for the use of a public wharf was a user fee rather than a tax for constitutional purposes 3: holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time 4: holding that despite the parties failure to address a controlling statute wle consider the statutes effect on this case sua sponte because it is controlling and it would be contrary to public policy to decline to do so", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "law is the important question). Consequently, the subsequent opportunity for review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision is irrelevant. See id. at 1123 (phrasing the second part of the consideration \u2014 possibility of application of U.S. law and subsequent review \u2014 in the conjunctive). Thus, the Court finds that Thomas appropriately governs the arbitration provision in this case. Accord Pav\u00f3n v. Carnival Corp., Case No. 09-22935-CV-LE-NARD (S.D.Fla. Jan. 20, 2010) (remanding seaman\u2019s Jones Act claims in part because to arbitrate such claims would contravene public policy where the Jones Act imposes strict liability on employers for the negligence of its employees); Sivanandi, 2010 WL 1875685 at *3; see also Sorica v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., Case No. 09-20917-CV-HUCK (S.D.Fla. Aug. 4, 2009) (<HOLDING>). The Court declines to adopt NCL\u2019s narrow view Holdings: 0: holding that the jones act does not preempt state law in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens and thus state law governs 1: recognizing that a provision providing for arbitration under bermuda law in a bermuda forum of a jones act claim is void under the thomas analysis 2: holding that joinder of a nonremovable jones act claim with a removable claim under general maritime law that is not separate and independent is not grounds for removal 3: holding that injured seamans loss of consortium claim under state law was preempted by jones act 4: holding that a usbased company was an employer under the jones act", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "either knew that Khan and Motey had inside information, or that he deliberately determined not to draw the obvious conclusion. See Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 480 (noting that the \u201csame evidence that will raise an inference that the defendant had actual knowledge of the illegal conduct ordinarily will also raise the inference that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct\u201d). Accordingly, the district court did not err in instructing the jury on conscious avoidance. B. Knowledge of a Personal Benefit to a Tipper We have yet to decide whether a remote tippee must know that the original tipper received a personal benefit in return for revealing inside information. Compare United States v. Rajaratnam, 802 F.Supp.2d 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Newman, No. 12cr121, Holdings: 0: holding that agreement between chicago mercantile exchange and its members did not impart direct benefit to nonparty clearing member of exchange 1: holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit 2: holding the suspension in abeyance in exchange for not exercising privileges 3: holding that the witness had accepted immunity in exchange for no prosecution 4: holding that exchange of mutual promises to devise is sufficient valid consideration", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "on the court of appeals, an amended notice of appeal filed by the State pursuant to Rule 25.2(d), which did contain the previously omitted certifications, could not retroactively confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals. Id. at 413. Specifically, the court said: It is true that Rule 25.2(d) allows an amendment to a notice of appeal. But when the Legislature granted this Court rule-making authority, it expressly provided that the rules could not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of a litigant. And our caselaw prevents a court of appeals from using an appellate rule to create jurisdiction where none exists. It does not matter which appellate rule the court of appeals attempts to use, be it former Rule 83, former Rule 2(b), or current Rule 25.2(d) Tex. Crim.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). Because appellant\u2019s original notice does not Holdings: 0: holding that notice requirements under rule 252b3 are jurisdictional 1: holding service requirements under fedrcivp 4 to be jurisdictional 2: holding that notice requirements of 4206a are jurisdictional 3: holding that notice requirements under former rule 40b1 are jurisdictional 4: holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "removal from flight for disorderly conduct expressly preempted by federal law), with Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.1995) (\"Neither the language nor history of the ADA implies that Congress was attempting to displace state personal injury tort law concerning the safety of the airline business.\"), and In re Air Disaster, 819 F.Supp. 1352 (E.D.Mich.1993) (negligence claims arising from an airplane crash, alleging negligent operation of airplanes, not preempted by ADA). 5 . Although Atlantic Coast does not raise the issue in precise terms on transfer, it seems to imply that federal law also preempts the Cooks' breach of contract claim. However that is not the case. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 Holdings: 0: holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties 1: holding that contract terms themselves will be controlling when they establish the parties common meaning so that a reasonable person in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract language 2: holding a deviation from the terms of a contract constitutes an impairment of contract 3: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 4: holding that the adas preemption prescription bars stateimposed regulation of air carriers but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "stated therein that it did not wish to \u201csuggest, of course, that an employer can avoid his responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells. Title VII applies to \u2018any agent\u2019 of a covered employer .... \u201d 435 U.S. at 718 n.33, 98 S.Ct. at 1380 n.33. Finally our conclusion here is in accord with that of a number of other courts. These courts have recognized that exempting plans not actually administered by an employer would seriously impair the effectiveness of Title VII, and have held Manhart applicable to pension plans run by third-party insurers. See Norris v. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. pet. filed, Docket No. 82-52 (U.S.L.W. July 27, 1982); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1141 (1st Cir. 1978) (<HOLDING>); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F.Supp. 1256, Holdings: 0: holding tiaacref subject to title vii 1: holding that title vii claim was subject to compulsory arbitration 2: holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration 3: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling 4: holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to perform its obligations to Schwan\u2019s under the Services Contract is not attributable to the bank. The bank advanced all funds to Good Stuff required by the Agreement. Third, Schwan\u2019s contends that the bank improperly froze Good Stuffs credit line in June 2002. The bank, however, had no duty to continue to advance funds once Good Stuffs Borrowing Base eroded\u2014 even if the bank knew that the practical effect of its decision was likely to be Good Stuffs inability to perform for its clients. See In re General Plastics, 158 B.R. at 288. Rather, the bank was free to take steps to protect itself and its investment without considering the interests of Good Stuffs other debtors. See In re Sharp, 403 F.3d at 52; see also B.E.L.T., Inc. v. Wachovia Corp., 403 F.3d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Fourth, Schwan\u2019s contends that the bank\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that a bank had no duty to inform other lenders of its borrowers financial problems even though those other lenders funds were used to pay off the borrowers debt to the bank 1: holding a bank liable where a bank officer held checks that were intended to pay the irs for withheld taxes 2: holding that bank had right to set off funds in a customers account against debt that the bank customer had incurred as a surety or guarantor 3: holding that the lenders excess withdrawal of soft costs warranted the equitable subordination of the lenders claim because the depletion of the funds available for construction and its attendant impact on the trusts renovation efforts was a sufficiently concrete harm to the trusts other creditors  4: holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "proceeding\u201d to an individual hearing, a trial, or - to either' the guilt/innocence phase or punishment phase of the trial,, rather than to the entire course of a criminal prosecution.\u2019 In addition, there is a distinction between a \u201ccriminal proceeding\u201d and a \u201ccriminal action.\u201d The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that \u201c[a] criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the State of Texas against the accused, and is conducted by some person acting under the authority of the State, in accordance with its laws.\u201d Tbx.Cod6 CRiM. Peoc. Ann. art. 3.02 (West 2015). Thus, the Legislature uses \u201ccriminal action\u201d in the sense of encompassing the entire course of an action at law against the accused, i.e., the entire course of a criminal prosecution. See Howland, 990 S.W.2d at 277 n. 5 (<HOLDING>). This leads us , to the conclusion that by Holdings: 0: recognizing the cause of action 1: recognizing one definition of prosecution as used in section 1 of article 3837 is criminal action meaning the entire course of an action at law1  2: holding that  where an action is simply for the recovery  of a money judgment the action is one at law1  quoting whitehead v shattuck 138 us 146 151 11 sct 276 34 led 873 1891 3: holding that the rule of splitting of causes of action as related to res judicata does not permit the owner of a single or entire cause of action or an entire indivisible demand to divide or split that cause of action and that all damages from a single wrongful act must be claimed in one action 4: recognizing cause of action", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "this case to the standa ore the United States Coast Guard has an effect within the sovereign territory insofar as the agency\u2019s function is compromised and the laws that agency seeks to enforce undermined. RCCL next argues that \u00a7 1001 is not properly invoked because the United States has enacted a more specific \u201cfalse statement\u201d law, APPS, regulating the specific conduct at issue, and thus cannot elect instead to proceed under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001. The principle of statutory construction that a specific statute is given precedence over a more general statute addressing the same conduct is invoked by Defendant to suggest that APPS, with its penalty provisions, is the proper statute under which to proceed. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978) (<HOLDING>); see also San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d Holdings: 0: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern 1: recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one 2: holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls 3: holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict 4: holding that gl1956  43326 embodies a policy of statutory construction that requires courts to give precedence to a specific statute over a general statute when the two are in conflict", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "possession, we consider several factors, including, [OJwnership and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle where the drugs were found, presence of defendant at the time drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, presence of drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control, ete. Id. \u00b6 32; accord Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. This list is not exhaustive and \"many of these factors, by themselves, are insufficient to establish the requisite nexus.\" Id. \u00b6\u00b6 32-33. For example, \"[olJwnership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found, although important factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when occupancy is not exclusive.\" See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319-20 (<HOLDING>); see also State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, Holdings: 0: holding the evidence sufficient to support a finding that the defendant a front seat passenger of a vehicle occupied by three individuals was in constructive possession of marijuana found in white bag directly under the defendants seat 1: holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract 2: holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence 3: holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge 4: holding that evidence that the defendant lived in a home where marijuana was being cultivated was insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claims, and clarify the contours of controversies for cases that are ultimately brou did not pursue his administrative remedies in the seventeen days he had remaining after Suarez denied him the form. See 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 542.14(a) (stating that the deadline for filing a step two grievance form is twenty days after the even RIOR TO FILING A CLAIM UNDER THE FTCA Even if the Court construes Indelicato\u2019s complaint as asserting a claim under the FTCA, the Court finds that he has failed to adequately plead such a claim. To file a claim under the FTCA, a claimant must first present the claim to the appropriate federal agency, in this case the BOP, and receive a written denial. See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2675(a); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Pender v. United States, 63 F.Supp.2d 473, Holdings: 0: holding that the ftca bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies 1: holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted 2: holding that habeas corpus petitions are premature until administrative remedies have been exhausted 3: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 4: holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a claim in court", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "these decisions and their reasoning. The sex discrimination provisions of Title VII and the ICRA were enacted to stop the perpetuation of sexist or chauvinistic attitudes in employment which significantly affect employment opportunities. Title VII and the ICRA were not meant to prohibit employers from instituting personal grooming codes which have a de minimis affect on employment. Applying these principles to Fareway\u2019s unwritten personal grooming code, we conclude this grooming code did not constitute discrimination based on sex within the meaning of Title VII or the ICRA. This grooming code was never intended to be covered by Title VII\u2019s or ICRA\u2019s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. See Kleinsorge v. Eyeland Corp., 81 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1601 (E.D.Pa.2000) (<HOLDING>); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Fed. Credit Union, 43 Holdings: 0: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original 1: holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability 2: holding that title vii prohibits discrimination based on any race including caucasian 3: holding personal grooming code which allows females to wear earrings but prohibits men from wearing earrings does not constitute a violation of title vii 4: holding that title vii does not include a continuing violation doctrine", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of that Constitutional doctrine and allows the political branches to set the parameters of the United States\u2019 dealings with Ecuador. Ecuador\u2019s proper recourse, therefore, is not in the courts but rather in negotiating a tax treaty with our political branches or adjudicating and enforcing these claims within its own territory. D. Civil vs. Criminal RICO \u2014 Is there a Distinction? Ecuador urges this Court to follow two criminal RICO cases from the Second Circuit, where it held abstention under the revenue rule improper. See generally United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.2000). In Trapito and Pierce, the Second Circuit held the revenue rule did not bar adjudication of a criminal RICO prosecution. See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 552 (<HOLDING>); Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167-68 (reversing Holdings: 0: holding that both federal and state tax statutes are revenue production laws and not enacted for plaintiffs benefit 1: holding that revenue rule did not bar prosecution of a money laundering scheme to defraud the canadian government of tax revenue 2: holding that it is apparent that this act is not a revenue bill within the contemplation of said section of the constitution fpr the reason that the revenue to be derived therefrom is merely an incident to the main object of the bill and that its general purpose was not that of raising revenue id  5 3: holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue 4: holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(a), does not make the definition an essential element of the crime pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32.1(e). Therefore, we reject Defendant\u2019s argument that it is not sufficient for the indictment to \u201cmerely state that the victim was \u2018handicapped.\u2019 \u201d Furthermore, the indictment provided Defendant with enough information to prepare a defense for the offense of felony assault on a handicapped person. See Leonard, _ N.C. App. at _, 711 S.E.2d at 873 (rejecting the defendant\u2019s argument that the indictment was not sufficient because the indictment tracked the relevant language of the statute, listed \u201cthe essential elements of the offense[,]\u201d and provided the defendant \u201cwith enough information to prepare a defense\u201d); State v. Crisp, 126 N.C. App. 30, 36, 483 S.E.2d 462, 466 (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 346 Holdings: 0: holding that even when a jury instruction is defective such a defect is cured when the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that although the indictment did not track the exact language of the statute the indictment when read as a whole sufficiently stated facts which support every element of the crime charged and apprised defendant of the specific charge against him 2: holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where  the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt  citation omitted 3: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense 4: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "incentive to dispute invalid claims when it would be reimbursed by the insured pursuant to the retrospective premium payment plan. 110 S.W.3d at 97. The court specifically rejected this argument relative to the insured\u2019s negligence action \u2014 not breach-of-contract. See id,, at 89-90, 97. But, obviously, this argument did not sway the court when rejecting both causes of action as a matter of law. See id. at 89-90. We acknowledge a retrospective premium payment plan is not the same as a deductible. Nevertheless, the fact the insured might incur financial loss if the insurer paid an invalid claim did not persuade the court to disregard the right-to-settle provision or impose an extra-contractual duty not recognized under Texas law. See id. at 97; see also Dear, 947 S.W.2d at 912, 913-15 (<HOLDING>). In fact, a Texas court has addressed, albeit Holdings: 0: holding insured had no viable breachofcontract or negligence theories of recovery for liability insurers improper handling and settlement of thirdparty claim although he complained its actions caused him loss of business and increased costs for professional liability insurance because he was bound by terms of policy he purchased including provision vesting insurer with right to settle any claim 1: holding that insurers assurances that it would pay for repairs including its attempt to settle with a thirdparty did not waive right to deny coverage 2: holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage 3: holding insured relinquished right to sue general liability insurer for breach of contract relative to insurers allegedly improper handling and payment of thirdparty claim by purchasing policy which gave insurer right to settle 4: holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the parties,\u201d Pungitore, 965 F.Supp. at 673 n. 1, or had any legal consequences independent of its substantive content. Compare United States v. Montana, 199 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining difference between verbal acts such as \u201ca promise, offer, or demand,\u201d which \u201ccommit the speaker to a course of action,\u201d and hearsay statements, which \u201cnarrate, describe, or otherwise convey information, and so are judged by their truth value\u201d) (emphasis added), and Trepel v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 717 (6th Cir.1999) (upholding exclusion of statement as hearsay where statement \u201cwas not an offer to sell\u201d but rather, a declaration of the price range the owner \u201cwould be willing to take ... should someone make an offer to buy\u201d); with Puma v. Sullivan, 746 A.2d 871, 874-76 (D.C.2000) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants 1: holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment 2: holding that oral statement containing an offer which statements proponents had accepted was admissible for consideration on summary judgment as a verbal act 3: holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control 4: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(2006). The Minnesota Supreme Court has generally \u201cagreed with the [United States] Supreme Court that most constitutional errors can be harmless.\u201d State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 252 (Minn.2005) (quotation omitted); see State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 376 (Minn.1999) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has applied harmless-error analysis even to errors deemed presumptively prejudicial, such as a court official\u2019s improper statements about the merits of a case in front of the jury). The Minnesota Supreme Court has also applied the structural-error analysis set forth in Fulminante, Neder, and Recuenco to determine that certain errors constitute structural errors\u2019requiring automatic reversal without regard to the evidence presented. See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 253 (<HOLDING>); State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 Holdings: 0: holding that a jury instruction directing the verdict on one element deprived defendant of the right to a jury determination on every element of the charged offense and thus constituted structural error 1: holding that the judges entry into the jury room constituted reversible error 2: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 3: holding that the judges independent investigation into a factual assertion and revelation of the results of that investigation to counsel deprived defendant of his right to an impartial judge and finder of fact and thus constituted structural error 4: holding that a new york statute allowing judges in a criminal bench trial to deny counsel the opportunity to make a closing argument deprived defendant of his sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "could make, and is based instead on the specialized knowledge obtained through experience in the field,\u201d must comply with Rule 702 as expert testimony. United States v. Jones, 739 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir.2014). But that .was not the sort of testimony offered here. Dermenchyan\u2019s and Redman\u2019s testi mony contained rudimentary statements about supply and demand, concepts that are relatively easy to grasp. As traders, the witnesses had to speak about these concepts in order to describe their own observations about market activity at specific points in time. Because the statements were based on their personal knowledge and were not offered as opinions based on their years of expertise, the statements complied with Rule 701. See, United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 447-48 (7th Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>). Dermenchyan and Redman also made statements Holdings: 0: holding that when a law enforcement officer testifies using technical terms but based on his personal knowledge of a relevant investigation the officer testifies as a lay witness 1: holding that agent who interpreted the conversations based on personal knowledge as opposed to his general involvement in the investigation gave permissible lay witness testimony 2: holding that a witnesss testimony is incredible as a matter of law if the witness testifies as to facts that the witness could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature 3: holding that defendants remarks cannot be a statement for jencks act purposes when the agent testifies as a government witness because it does not represent the agents own words 4: holding that lay opinion testimony on the technical subject of asbestos in the workplace was inadmissible when the witness failed to demonstrate sufficient personal experience or technical knowledge to qualify him to offer an opinion", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "just as the act of walking precludes one from running. For this reason, Juarez\u2019s affidavit suffices to create a disputed issue of fact. A disputed issue only warrants an evi-dentiary hearing, however, \u201cif the difference in facts is material, that is, only if the disputed fact makes a difference in the outcome.\u201d United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1385 (7th Cir.1991). An eviden-tiary hearing was not necessary in this case because it is undisputed that the officers were justified in conducting a Terry stop whether Juarez was walking or running. While Juarez challenged this conclusion in his brief, his counsel conceded at argument that the facts in the affidavit provided reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (<HOLDING>). Because no disputed issue of material fact Holdings: 0: holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 1: recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot 2: holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area 3: holding that absent probable cause to arrest a police officer may approach an individual to conduct a brief investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot 4: holding that an officer  may detain a person in order to determine identity and circumstance when that officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "regarding all partnership issues. The order determined the judgment amount that Kenneth owed Gregory. Proceeds from the real estate and equipment sales were to be used to adjust the accounts between the brothers. The only details that remained were those that were required to enforce the already decided issues, i.e., the realty and personalty sales. The court also needed to make a determination regarding Gregory\u2019s request for prejudgment interest. In our view, the order disposed of the rights of the parties and was final and appealable as nothing remained for the trial court to do except implement its order. Because Kenneth did not appeal from that order within 30 days, he is precluded from appealing those issues now. See McCaffrey v. Nauman, 204 Ill. App. 3d 761, 562 N.E.2d 628 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Kenneth cites McCaffrey v. Nauman, 204 Ill. Holdings: 0: holding that 120 days notice was satisfied by 30 days work plus 90 days pay 1: holding that the requirement that an alien appeal a removal order within 30 days is jurisdictional 2: holding that the appeal was properly before the court where the appellant appealed from an order amending a prior order without appealing from the prior order 3: holding that an order that finally determines the rights of the parties in a partnership dissolution must be appealed within 30 days 4: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to occur in the environmental design branch. See PL\u2019s Ex. 20 at \u00b6 3. Meyers stated that \u201cif there is a valid reason for not seriously considering Mr. Vernon\u2019s qualification for an executive level position ..., I was unable to uncover it.\u201d See id. at \u00b6 8. Meyers also noted that staff with less tenure and fewer related credentials than Vernon has been promoted to more senior positions at a faster rate. See id. at \u00b6 9. He pointed out that Rosenberg, who started working for Port Authority later than Vernon and had less credentials, was promoted more quickly than Vernon. See Meyers Oct. Dep. at 47. Most importantly, Meyers wrote that Krishner claimed that \u201che preferred to promote younger staff.\u201d See Pl.\u2019s Ex. 20 at \u00b6 5; Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the position was not filled by Holdings: 0: holding that discriminatory remarks made nearly a year before the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination 1: holding that remarks made by decisionmakers could be viewed as reflecting discriminatory animus 2: holding that repeated remarks about need to bring in new blood or young blood by one of the decisionmakers were not stray remarks and may permit inference of discrimination 3: holding that  ambiguous remarks tending to suggest animus based on age are insufficient standing alone to prove an employers discriminatory intent  4: holding that plaintiff may prove discriminatory motive by presenting evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged retaliatory attitude ", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "accordance with the foregoing understandings and the terms in the General Conditions, Specifications and Agreement of the Contract * * * and all supplements thereto.\u201d Id. at 298. The broad language in the McGrath subcontract binding the subcontractor to \u201cGeneral Conditions, Specifications and Agreement of the Contract\u201d has no parallel in the subcontract between plaintiff and Bakke. Mindful that we may not read into contracts provisions that the parties themselves have not included, Thompson v. Bolliger, Hampton & Tarlow, 118 Or App 700, 710, 849 P2d 526, rev den 317 Or 163 (1993), we decline to read into Bakke\u2019s purchase order a broader incorporation by reference than is apparent on the face of the document. Accord Edward E. Morgan Co. v. United States, 230 F2d 896, 903 (5th Cir 1956) (<HOLDING>); John W. Johnson, Inc. v. Basic Construction Holdings: 0: holding that prime contractor plaintiffs in an interpleader action could not press arbitration for a counterclaim by a subcontractor 1: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 2: holding that subcontract requirement that work    be performed in accordance with specifications in prime contract meant that prime contract governed the manner of the performance of the work not    the basis for computing the amount to be paid the subcontractor 3: holding that only provisions relating to work specifications and performance were incorporated into the subcontract because the relevant clauses limited the incorporation of the terms insofar as they relate  to the work undertaken herein 4: holding that prime contractor must prove that it is liable to the subcontractor before it can assert a passthrough claim", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "In analyzing whether Section 346a precludes judicial review under the APA, we first note that the FDCA is unique in that it only commits certain specific agency actions to appellate court review. Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 888 n. 61 (D.C.Cir.1987). Because the FDCA contains no \u201csingle, overarching provision governing judicial review\u201d \u2014 instead subjecting \u201cdiscrete agency actions\u201d to specialized review provisions \u2014 actions taken under sections silent as to appellate review are \u201cdirectly reviewable in a district court under some appropriate head of jurisdiction, for courts of appeals have only such jurisdiction as Congress has chosen to confer upon them.\u201d Id.; see also Alabama Tissue Ctr. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir.1992); Nader v. EPA, 859 F.2d 747, 754 (9th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Despite the absence of an overarching Holdings: 0: holding epas rejection of rulemaking petition was not an order appealable to the court of appeals because the sections permitting appellate review allowed such review only of orders issued under subsections not implicated in the litigation 1: holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review 2: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 3: holding that an appellate court may not exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review a nonfinal district court order where the merits of the nonfinal order are not inextricably intertwined with the properly appealed collateral order or where review of the former is not necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter 4: holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a  2241 petition", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "spouse of the person aggrieved. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Marriott Int\u2019l, Inc., 905 F.Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (finding that the ADA along with the New York State Human Rights Law and a parallel New York city ordinance did not allow for loss-of-consortium claims); Miller v. CBC Cos., Inc., 908 F.Supp. 1054 (D.N.H.1995) (allowing loss-of-consortium claims ancillary to state law tort claims to stand, but holding that \u201d[t]he spouse of an alleged federal civil rights victim [bringing ADA and Title VII claims] is not permitted an ancillary cause of action for loss of consortium\u201d (citations omitted)); Reed v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 704 F.Supp. 170 (E.D.Wis.1989) (ADEA preempted spouse\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim). But see Kulling v. Grinders for Indus., Inc., 115 F.Supp.2d 828 (E.D.Mich.2000) (<HOLDING>). It appears that none of the Circuit Courts of Holdings: 0: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award 1: holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse 2: holding no individual liability under the adea 3: holding that the adea itself did not provide for the recovery of damages under theories of wrongful death or loss of consortium but that the adea did not preempt state wrongfuldeath or lossofconsortium claims 4: recognizing loss of consortium claims", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "If the trial discloses that the services were not formally ordered, then the discussion herein concerning constructive ordering of services is applicable. 12 . See United Artists Payphone Corp. v. New York Tel. Co., 8 FCC Rcd 5563 (1993); see also AT & T v. City of New York, 83 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.1996); AT & T Corp. v. Community Health Group, 931 F.Supp. 719 (S.D.Cal.1995); In re Access Charge Reform, 14 FCC Rcd 14221 (1999). 13 . See also City of New York, 83 F.3d at 553 (relying on United Artists to hold that a party can become a \" \u2018customer,\u2019 in one of two ways: (1) by affirmatively ordering the service ... or (2) by constructively ordering [service] and creating an 'inadvertent carrier-customer relationship ....' \u201d). 14 . See US Wats, Inc. v. AT & T Co., 1994 WL 116009, at *5 (<HOLDING>). 15 . While not directly stating so, AT & T Holdings: 0: holding that filedrate doctrine does not apply when adjudication of the plaintiffs claim will not result in rate discrimination nor embroil the court in a dispute over reasonableness of charges 1: holding that the doctrine does not apply in such circumstancesi 2: holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts 3: holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine 4: holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "considered the content, form and context of the Plaintiffs\u2019 speech and held the Plaintiffs\u2019 speech is constitutionally protected because it was in response to Superinten dent Brezina\u2019s request for an update on the implementation of the improvement plan. The Plaintiffs were charged with this duty as members of the ICC and the SBDM committees. To hold that the Plaintiffs\u2019 speech is not protected is to require teachers to sit on their hands, abandoning their legislatively created duties as committee members, allowing the school environment to deteriorate to an even more deplorable level in order to keep their jobs. Additionally, we note that while our statement in Noyola v. Texas Dep\u2019t of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021, 1026 (5th Cir.1988) still reflects the law of this circ r.1992) (<HOLDING>). JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissents from Holdings: 0: holding the failure of defendants to claim any disruption in workplace resulting from speech is fatal to his claim of qualified immunity 1: holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that speech was public concern 2: holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision 3: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity 4: holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "oath. Such a prior statement is substantive evidence. D.C.Code \u00a7 14-102(b) (2001). As we understand the record, however, the trial court initially admitted the video only to impeach D.J.\u2019s credibility and show her demeanor at the CAC. It later allowed the tape to be treated as substantive evidence because, after the vid 3d 1, 289 P.3d 791, 828 (2012) (comparing refusal to testify to claimed memory loss and holding that \u201ca witness\u2019s refusal to answer may be materially inconsistent with prior statements, exposing the witness to impeachment\u201d). In contrast, some courts have reasoned that a witness\u2019s refusal to testify is unlike a claim of memory loss because there is no current testimony to compare with the pri- or statement. See Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127, 1132 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Barksdale v. State, 265 Ga. 9, 453 S.E.2d 2, Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand 1: holding that the effect of witnesss refusal to testify was virtually the same as if he had not physically taken the witness stand and if he had not taken the stand his prior testimony could not be deemed inconsistent  2: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 3: recognizing that a witness may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding 4: holding that the defendants prior conviction referenced in his presentence report could be taken as admitted because he had made no objection to the facts in his report", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Co v Long, 588 F2d 538, 541 (CA 6, 1978); Nix v Spector Freight Sys, Inc, 264 F2d 875, 877 (CA 3, 1959). 62 As previously noted, one of the fundamental purposes of the CLA is to protect contractors, workers, and suppliers by providing a method to secure payment for their labor and materials. 63 The dissent frets that allowing attorney fees when a party prevails on the related contract action will open the floodgates to claims for attorney fees under \u00a7 118(2) any time a party prevails on other, unspecified, ancillary claims. However, it is hard to imagine other ancillary claims bearing as close a relationship as the lien foreclosure and underlying contract claims. The plain language of the CLA contemplates that a party may achieve its main objective thro 3 Wy 31, \u00b6 9; 64 P3d 739 (2003) (<HOLDING>); Murphy v Nat\u2019l Union Fire Ins Co, 438 Mass Holdings: 0: holding continuing controversy not moot 1: holding that payment does not moot a confirmation request 2: holding that a trial court may deny a confirmation motion when satisfaction has rendered the controversy moot 3: holding that dismissal for failure to prosecute rendered moot any prior ruling of the district court 4: holding a case becomes moot when a ruling will have no practical effect upon the existing controversy", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that makes the injury possible.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Bossley, 968 S.W.2d at 343). Assuming without deciding that the failure properly to secure Mark within the car can be equated with the car\u2019s overall use to restrain and to transport him, we hold that his injury did not arise from those uses. The actual cause of Mark\u2019s death was his deliberate decision to flee into freeway traffic and a separate car\u2019s hitting him there; the failure to secure Mark in the first place merely furnished the condition that made it possible for him to escape and then run into oncoming traffic. There is thus no \u201cdirect nexus\u201d between the failure properly to secure Mark in the car and the impact causing his death. See City of Kemah v. Vela, 149 S.W.3d 199, 204 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); compare Gutierrez, 54 S.W.3d at 866 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition 1: holding mr contrisciane was occupying his insured vehicle when he was struck and killed by an uninsured vehicle after leaving his car to walk over to patrol car with his drivers information as directed by police officer 2: holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his fourth amendment rights by requiring him to get back in his car before questioning him 3: holding that officers exiting and leaving patrol car running beside jail near jail escapee who then commandeered car was use of vehicle within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver 4: holding that injury of plaintiff  who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle  did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in ordering a new punishment trial. The Code of Criminal Procedure gives a trial judge broad discretion in im posing conditions of community supervision. See Tex.Crim. PROc.Code Ann. art. 42.12, \u00a7 11(a) (Vernon Supp.2000) (\u201cThe judge may impose any reasonable condition that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant\u201d). Nevertheless, where a trial judge imposes an \u201cinvalid\u201d condition, \u201cthe proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition.\u201d Ex parte Pena, 789 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (deleting condition where trial judge was without lawful authority to impose jail time as condition of probation); see also Ex parte Gingell, 842 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>); Milligan v. State, 465 S.W.2d 157, 158-59 Holdings: 0: recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing 1: holding that a court has no power to impose jail time as a condition of a deferred sentence 2: holding trial court lacked authority to impose electronic monitoring condition and deleting the provision as a condition of applicants deferred adjudication probation 3: holding electronic home monitoring is not time spent in custody because there is a difference in restrictions between electronic home monitoring and jail 4: holding that trial judge was not authorized to impose jail time as condition of probation and deleting the 90 day jail penalty", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at issue is a person\u2019s \u201cright to cut off questioning.\u201d Id., at 474 [86 S.Ct. at 1627]. Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person\u2019s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda, on whether his \u201cright to cut off questioning\u201d was \u201cscrupulously honored.\u201d Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321 (footnote omitted). Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Appellant maintains that Mosley is Holdings: 0: holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 1: holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications 2: holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 3: holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available  unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police 4: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused  having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir.1989) (stating that automatic stay seeks \u201cto protect the bankrupt\u2019s estate from being eaten away by creditors\u2019 lawsuits and seizures of property before the trustee has had a chance to marshal the estate\u2019s assets and distribute them equitably among the creditors\u201d). To effectuate these congressional purposes, section 362(a) generally must be construed broadly. See 2 Collier on BANKRUPTCY \u00b6 362.04 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1994) (\u201cThe stay of section 362 is extremely broad in scope and ... should apply to almost any type of formal or informal action against the debtor or the property of the estate.\u201d); see also Midlantic Nat\u2019l Bank v. New Jersey Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 504, 106 S.Ct. 755, 761, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Its breadth is not unlimited, however. As the Holdings: 0: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay 1: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 2: recognizing that in enacting  362 in 1978 congress significantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay 3: holding that refusal to provide chapter 7 debtor transcript because of default on student loan was a violation of the automatic stay based on the plain language of 11 usc  362 4: recognizing fdcpa claim for violation of bankruptcy codes automatic stay provision 11 usc  362 which explicitly provides private cause of action", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "because the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention are substantial.\u201d Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981)); see Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (stating that legitimate law enforcement interests supporting detention include (1) \u201cpreventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found,\u201d (2) \u201cminimizing the risk of harm to the officers,\u201d and (3) the \u201corderly completion of the search,\u201d which \u201cmay be facilitated if the occupants of the premises .are present\u201d); see also Barrera v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Homeland Sec., Civil No. 07-3879, 2009 WL 825787, at *5 (D.Minn. Mar. 27, 2009) (<HOLDING>). \u201cAn officer\u2019s authority to detain incident to Holdings: 0: holding that agents were allowed to seize and question occupants of business while executing search warrant for illegal aliens 1: holding that officers may detain the occupants of a vehicle while executing a search warrant 2: holding that officers may detain the occupants of a house while executing a search warrant 3: holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted 4: holding that it is permissible under the fourth amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "challenged by Plaintiff. Plaintiff relies instead on a statistical analysis of a company-wide data pool and makes no attempt to narrow the data pool to the locations in which she worked or the positions which she challenges. As this Court noted in the order denying class certification, the probative value of Plaintiffs statistical evidence is therefore highly questionable, in significant part due to the treatment of factors such as experience, education, and specific promotion processes. Cooper v. Southern Company, 205 F.R.D. 596, 613-14 (N.D.Ga.2001). The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment. See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 Holdings: 0: holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext 1: holding reliance on statistical evidence of inexorable zero was sufficient to establish prima facie case notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to reference appropriate workpool 2: holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 3: holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons 4: holding the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the defendants failure to promote him was discriminatory where the plaintiff failed to that show he was qualified for the relevant position", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court is \u201cmindful of the Supreme Court\u2019s repeated suggestion that HHS interpretations, in particular, should receive more respect than the mine-run of agency interpretations.\u201d Landers, 545 F.3d at 107 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 69 L.Ed.2d 460 (1981). In fact, \u201cin cases such as those involving Medicare or Medicaid, in which CMS, \u2018a highly expert agency[,] administers a large complex regulatory scheme in cooperation with many other institutional actors, the various possible standards for deference\u2019 \u2014 namely, Chevron and Skidmore \u2014 \u2018begin to converge.\u2019 \u201d Landers, 545 F.3d at 107 (quoting Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>)). The Court additionally notes that Holdings: 0: holding ceq regulations entitled to substantial deference 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 2: recognizing the considerable deference afforded to regulations concerning medicare 3: holding regulations entitled to chevron deference 4: holding that the secretary is not entitled to deference when construing the acts implementing regulations", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "604 N.W.2d 43, 48 (Iowa 1999). For this reason, we have viewed the effect of promissory estoppel to imply a contract in law based on detrimental reliance. Id. However, other principles of contract law can conflict with the doctrine of promissory estoppel, such as the requirement of a writing for some types of contracts under the statute of frauds, and Miller opened the door to expand the promissory estoppel doctrine beyond its role as a substitute for consideration. Thus, promissory estoppel is not only a substitute for consideration, but is also recognized as an exception to the statute of frauds even in cases where the promise may be supported by consideration. See Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc., 274 N.W.2d at 343; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts \u00a7 139 cmt. b, at 355 (1981) (<HOLDING>). Like part performance, it focuses on Holdings: 0: holding appellants deposition testimony that he believed his oral contract would exist for another eight to ten years was unenforceable pursuant to statute of frauds 1: recognizing circumstances that justify enforcement of a promise unenforceable under the statute of frauds 2: holding that the statute of frauds operates even when there has been reliance on a promise 3: holding that the statute of frauds bars a breach of contract claim based on an oral agreement to enter a future employment contract that would need to meet the statute of frauds 4: holding that a parol modification of a lease having two years to run reducing the amount of rent was unenforceable under the statute of frauds", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "violated public policy \u201cin that, termination of any employment based on the employee\u2019s status as a victim of domestic violence tends to be injurious to the public and against the public good.\u201d On 30 October 2002, the trial court entered an order granting Defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s complaint, from which Plaintiff appealed. The issue on appeal is whether Plaintiff\u2019s complaint states a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be based, and we affirm the order of the trial court. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Considine , 528 S.E.2d 368, 370 (2000) (<HOLDING>). The complaint filed in the instant case does Holdings: 0: holding a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is not available where the employee has an existing statutory remedy 1: holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to state a claim for wrongful discharge where he alleged he was discharged due to his political affiliation and activities 2: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 3: holding the complaint stated a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee was discharged for refusing to comply with his employers demand that he continue to operate a commercial vehicle for periods of time that violated federal regulations 4: recognizing claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the employee alleged he was handicapped and that his employer discharged him because of his handicap in violation of nc gen stat  1434222", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at 671. 31 5 USC 552(b)(6) exempts \u201cpersonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy 32 493 US 182; 110 S Ct 577; 107 L Ed 2d 571 (1990). 33 Id. at 200-201. 34 Id. 35 MCL 15.232(c); MSA 14.1801(2)(c); Swickard, n 14 supra at 544. 36 Tobin, n 2 supra at 668-669. 37 Albro v Allen, 434 Mich 271, 286; 454 NW2d 85 (1990). 38 Swickard, n 14 supra at 556. 39 MCL 15.243(l)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(a). 40 MCL 15.232(c); MSA 4.1801(2)(c). 41 401 Mich 80, 95; 257 NW2d 522 (1977). 42 MCL 15.243(l)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(a); Swickard, n 14 supra at 546-547; State Employees Ass\u2019n v Dep\u2019t of Management & Budget, 428 Mich 104, 123; 404 NW2d 606 (1987); Kestenbaum, n 20 supra at 528, n 7. 43 See Booth, n 5 supra at 234 (<HOLDING>). 44 See Tobin, n 2 supra at 677-678. 45 Holdings: 0: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively 1: holding that in a personal injury suit the timely notice requirement does not apply  2: holding that title ii does not apply to the states 3: holding that subsection 13la does not apply if the information is not of a personal nature 4: holding that  1447c does not apply to counsel", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "similar to those of the plaintiff. See id. at 1265-67; see also G-Force Entertainment, Inc. v. G-Force Partners, Inc., 2000 WL 1346699 *2, No. 00-372 (M.D.Fla., Aug. 23, 2000) (\u201cThe use of another\u2019s unregistered, i.e., common law, trademark, can constitute a violation of ... the Lanham Act where the alleged unregistered trademarks used by the plaintiff are so associated with its services that the use of the same or similar marks by another company constitutes a false representation that its goods came from the same source.\u201d). All of the circuits that have analyzed whether an item in the public domain could be subject to a claim for reverse palming off have reached the same result. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int\u2019l v. Holden Found\u2019n Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1241-42 (8th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Waldman Publ\u2019g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant who had copied plaintiffs swath was not liable for reverse palming off where it represented to public that its swaths were interchangeable with those of plaintiff 1: holding that plaintiff had not stated an equal protection claim where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant treated him differently from anyone else who both had problems with alcohol and had been arrested 2: holding that plaintiff had established reverse palming off claim against defendant who modified plaintiffs seeds after obtaining them in open corn field 3: holding that a plaintiff who had asserted no claim against a thirdparty defendant lacked standing to complain of the courts action with regard to the thirdparty defendant 4: holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "agreed to withdraw his claim of mental retardation. The PCRA court did not authorize the parties to raise new issues in the written submissions filed in support of the already established claims. Nevertheless, Elliott raised for the first time in his 2010 Supplemental Brief the discrete contention that he was entitled to a new trial pursuant to this Court\u2019s holding in Brooks, ie., that trial counsel is deemed ineffective if he fails to meet with the defendant in person prior to trial. Because Elliott did not include in his PCRA petition the claim alleging trial counsel\u2019s ineffectiveness for failing to meet with him prior to trial, and did not obtain permission to amend his petition to include the same, the issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 613 Pa. 510, 35 A.3d 4, 14 (2012) (<HOLDING>); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B) (providing that the Holdings: 0: holding that a pcra petitioner may not raise new claims by merely supplementing a pending pcra petition without court authorization because to do so would wrongly subvert the time limitation and serial petition restrictions of the pcra 1: holding that because an untimely pcra petition was premised on claims that were cognizable under the pcra the statutory writ of habeas corpus was unavailable 2: holding no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely pcra petition 3: holding that the pendency of a petitioners federal habeas corpus petition does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to address a pcra petition 4: holding that the constitutional nature of the violations alleged in a pcra petition has no effect on the application of the pcra jurisdictional time bar", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of one penalty precludes the execution of the other; and (4) since he has paid the fine, his prison sentence must be vacated. Discussion 1. The Validity of the Sentence The criminal contempt statute provides: A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority ... as\u2014 (3) Disobedience ... to its lawful ... order____ 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 401(3) (emphasis added). Before the SRA was passed, it was clear that a defendant convicted of criminal contempt could not be sentenced to both a fine and imprisonment under section 401. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 51, 63 S.Ct. 470, 470, 87 L.Ed. 608 (1943) (construing similarly worded predecessor to section 401); United States v. Sampogne, 533 F.2d 766, 767 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). Our first issue is whether the SRA eliminates Holdings: 0: holding that reasoning of in re bradley applies to section 401 1: holding that lockheed reasoning applies to permit thirdparty actions under the lhwca 2: holding that section 888e applies only to vehicles seized under section 881a4 3: holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254 4: holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to section 101 challenges", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Defendants\u2019 Memorandum of Law at 5 (arguing that the City Charter gives the Mayor appointive power over only administrative and not legislative employees). Plaintiff has never alleged that defendant Spencer personally fired him. Instead, plaintiff has alleged that each of the defendants, all political allies, conspired to terminate plaintiff because of their disapproval with Fuentes\u2019 voting record. If the defendants thus acted in concert, it is of little import if, for example, only one of the defendants was formally empowered under the City Charter to fire employees. One need not be vested with the formal power to fire an individual in order to take adverse employment action against them. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 1: holding that mere reprimand even if it does not result in actual dismissal can constitute adverse employment action 2: recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually 3: holding that the action taken need not be the substantial equivalent of dismissal in order to constitute adverse employment action 4: holding that termination is an adverse employment action", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u00a7 541, Comment a (1976)). 67 . 84 B.R. 653, 657 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). 68 . Id. 69 . See e.g. AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Burdge (In re Burdge), 198 B.R. 773, 775 (9th Cir. BAP 1996); AT&T Universal Card Serv. v. Reneer (In re Reneer), 208 B.R. 731, 733 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1997); AT&T Universal Card Serv. Corp. v. Sziel (In re Sziel), 206 B.R. 490, 493-94 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1997) Agreement established an annual percentage rate of 16.4 percent, however, the two statements received by Ms. Ellingsworth also disclose the effective annual percentage rate when the cash advance fees are included. On the first statement the effective annual percentage rate was 29.54 percent. PI.Ex. A. 79 . See American Express Travel Related Serv. Co. v. Christensen (In re Christensen), 193 B.R. 863, 867 (N.D.Ill.1996) (<HOLDING>). 80 . Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co. v. Ward Holdings: 0: recognizing statutory credit 1: holding that the defendant maintained a passive website and was therefore not subject to general jurisdiction 2: holding that the mere passive extension of credit does not constitute any form of reliance 3: holding that the mere failure to investigate does not constitute suppression of the evidence 4: holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "used; he just had a different opinion. And comparable sales are just that; they are not required to be identical. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 182 (under comparable sales analysis, appraiser finds data for sales of similar property, makes upward or downward adjustments to sales prices based on differences in subject property); Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Kempwood Plaza Ltd., 186 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (discussing comparable sales method). Moreover, whether an expert\u2019s appraisal is- based on non-comparable sales is an issue for the trial court when determining admissibility of the expert\u2019s opinion concerning the market value of the property. See City of Garland v. Joyce, 462 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco, 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). And here, MISD does not complain about the Holdings: 0: holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events 1: holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis  2: holding opinion testimony of sales should have been excluded because opinion not based on comparable sales 3: recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue 4: holding that sales made to contractor who builds roads for the state are not sales to the state and therefore are not exempt", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and \u201csufficient, equitable, and consistent in application to a class of consumers\u201d); Minn.Stat. \u00a7 216B.08 (\u201cThe commission is hereby vested with the powers, rights, functions, and ju whether exigent circumstances exist is not a question requiring application of the Commission\u2019s technical knowledge because it is merely a question of basic arithmetic. The dissent\u2019s conclusion is misguided. Minnesota Statutes \u00a7 216B.09, subd. 1, requiring the Commission to fix just and reasonable rates, and Minn.Stat. \u00a7 216B.16, subd. 3(b), requiring the Commission to determine whether exigent circumstances exist, mandate not only that the Commission identify the factors that impact the setting of rates and the questi t calls for application of the Commi Minn. 442, 448-49, 181 N.W.2d 696, 699-700 (1970) (<HOLDING>). The Commission discussed three \u201cextraordinary Holdings: 0: recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public 1: holding that determination of public convenience and necessity by the public service commission was an issue of fact which warranted substantial judicial deference to the factfinding processes of the administrative agency 2: holding the separate classification of one purported administrative convenience claim can never be reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience 3: holding that the convenience of the witnesses has less relevance where the case involved judicial review of an administrative decision 4: holding that a plaintiff was not obligated to apply for a certificate of convenience and necessity and submit to the administrative procedures incident thereto before bringing an action", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "is accepted by the court, there will not be a further trial on the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt; and \u201c(viii) The fact that there is no right to appeal unless the defendant has, before entering the plea of guilty, expressly reserved the right to appeal with respect to a particular issue or issues, in which event appellate review shall be limited to a determination of the issue or issues so reserved.\u201d Here, the circuit court failed to employ the safeguards required by Rule 14.4, Ala. R.Crim. P., and Boykin before accepting Clark\u2019s stipulation of guilt. (R. 3-4.) Indeed, there is no indication in the record that Clark understood and voluntarily waived any of his constitutionally protected rights when he entered the \u201cgood behavior\u201d stipulation. See Fleming v. State, 972 So.2d at 836 (<HOLDING>). Because this court cannot presume a valid Holdings: 0: holding that when the defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty he waived any claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the defendants inculpatory statements 1: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional 2: holding that the record must establish that a defendants guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and that the circuit court complied with rule 144 ala rcrim p 3: holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently 4: holding trial court failed to make a finding of fact but rather made a finding of the ultimate question of law  that the defendants plea was not knowingly and intelligently made", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "killed a cop.\u201d The indictment read to Madison\u2019s third jury charged him with the capital murder of a law enforcement officer who was \u201con duty\u201d or who was performing some \u201cofficial or job-related act.\u201d Section 13A-5-40(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975, defines the following capital offense: \u201cMurder of any police officer, sheriff, deputy, state trooper, federal law enforcement officer, or any other state or federal peace officer of any kind, or prison or jail guard, while such officer or guard is on duty, regardless of whether the defendant knew or should have known the victim was an officer or guard on duty, or because of some official or job-related act or 'performance of such officer or guard.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The indictment contained two counts. The counts set forth alternative theories 87) (<HOLDING>); but see State v. Murray, 308 Or. 496, 782 Holdings: 0: holding that the accused cannot impeach a verdict on the basis that the jury could not agree on the theory of firstdegree murder 1: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 2: holding that the jury need agree only that the defendant committed firstdegree murder not on the theory by which it reached the verdict 3: holding that defensive theory must be submitted to jury when theory is raised by evidence from any source 4: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "added). \u00b6 20 Further, common law from other states has developed addressing the responsibility of tenants using an easement regardless of them status as servient or dominant tenant. These cases set forth a general principle that a party having rights to use an easement should share in the maintenance and repair expense for that easement. See Barnard v. Gaumer, 146 Colo. 409, 361 P.2d 778, 781 (1961) (noting that \u201cthe burden of upkeep should be distributed between dominant and servient tenements in proportion to their relative use of the road, as nearly as such may be ascertained\u201d); Story v. Bly, 217 P.3d 872, 878-79 (Colo.Ct.App.2008) (relying on \u00a7 4.13 of the Restatement (Third)); Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass\u2019n v. Larson, 121 Ill.App.3d 805, 77 Ill.Dec. 68, 459 N.E.2d 1164, 1170 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Larabee v. Booth, 463 .App.1980) (\u201cIn this Holdings: 0: holding that the duty to maintain an easement was upon those entitled to its use rather than upon the servient estate 1: holding that one who possesses deeded easement need not use the easement to maintain his title and easement cannot be extinguished from nonuser alone 2: recognizing that an easement may entitle the easement owner to do acts which were not for the easement would constitute a nuisance 3: recognizing that where a grantee has an easement which he shares with others his duty to repair and maintain it must be apportioned with all other easement holders based upon the extent of the individuals use of the easement 4: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not to call Morales, but the allegation that counsel failed to interview Morales after Vazquez informed his counsel that Morales had exculpatory information and was willing to testify on Vazquez\u2019s behalf. \u201cWe have stated that failing to interview witnesses or discover mitigating evidence may be a basis for finding counsel ineffective within the meani L.Ed.2d 201 (1989). Vazquez has provided no affidavits or any other information supporting his claims to the court. The only information about what Morales\u2019s potential testimony would have been is speculation on the part of Vazquez. Recognizing the deferential standard when reviewing the conduct of counsel, we decline to find prejudice in this situation when there is no evidence other than speculation to support the finding. See id. (<HOLDING>). Because Vazquez cannot satisfy both Holdings: 0: holding that experts opinion that doctor performed surgeries in order to avoid financial losses due to insurance deductibles was nothing more than conjecture and speculation 1: holding that grant of summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party adduces nothing more than speculation to support its claims 2: recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance 3: holding that it would be improper for original trial counsel to raise the issue of his own alleged ineffectiveness in a posttrial habeas corpus case 4: recognizing the general rule of avoiding excessive posttrial inquiry into actions of counsel at trial in order to avoid any chilling effect on attorneys willingness to serve and stating that nothing would encourage a proliferation of ineffectiveness of counsel claims more than to permit an accused to establish the prejudice prong of strickland on a showing of nothing more than speculation that he had been prejudiced by his counsels performance", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "women. Schwan\u2019s contends that the portion of Milliren\u2019s charge that she added in February 2009-alleging systemic gender dis crimination \u2014 is invalid because it was filed more than 300 days after Milliren resigned, but this argument is premature. As the district court concluded, the appropriate time to address the timeliness issue is if and when an actual lawsuit is filed, not during the subpoena enforcement stage. Accord EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir.1987) (rejecting the argument of untimeliness because \u201c[i]f every possible defense, procedural or substantive, were litigated at the subpoena enforcement stage, administrative investigations obviously would be subjected to great delay\u201d); EEOC v. Children\u2019s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir.1983) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds by Gilmer v. Holdings: 0: holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support  a civil suit under the act for any discrimination  developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc 1: holding that plaintiff stated a discrimination claim despite not including a discrimination heading in eeoc complaint because the facts included in eeoc complaint were sufficient to trigger an investigation into whether plaintiff suffered an adverse action because of his religion 2: holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim 3: holding that a valid defense to a subsequent lawsuit does not prevent an eeoc investigation 4: holding that statements made to internal investigator of employer were made in an investigation under this subchapter where investigation was pursuant to a charge filed with eeoc", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "\u201cfear\u201d of economic harm. The case law, however, indicates that threats of litigation may not constitute inducement of \u201cfear\u201d under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984) (even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \u201cfear\u201d under Hobbs Act); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (\u201cThe ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a \u2018wrongful use\u2019 of force or fear\u201d under Hobbs Act). But see United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act); Hall American Center Associates Limited Partnership v. Dick, 726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97 (E.D.Mich.1989) (<HOLDING>). Thus, it is not clear that the acts alleged Holdings: 0: holding that impossibility is not a defense to attempts or conspiracy under the hobbs act 1: holding that proof of racketeering was not a separate prerequisite to criminal liability under the hobbs act 2: holding that at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity threat of litigation may constitute extortion under hobbs act 3: holding the meaning of commerce element in a different federal statute the hobbs act to be a question of law 4: holding that the test is whether at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of law that the videotape itself is not a judicial record to which the common law right of public access attaches. Appellants are incorrect to assume that this issue turns on whether or not the videotape itself was admitted into evidence and that, therefore, the litigants at trial have control to decide whether or not the public\u2019s right may be exercised. See Brief for Appellants (Reporters) at 13 (\u201cThe defendants should not be permitted to circumvent the common law and constitutional rights to access by marking only the transcript of the videotaped deposition.\u201d). Even if the defendants had moved for the admission of the videotape into evidence, the videotape itself would not necessarily have become a judicial record subject to public review. See, e.g., Nixon v. War 58 (2d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>)). In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. and Holdings: 0: holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness 1: holding that absent extraordinary circumstances the press has a common law right to inspect and copy the videotape of depositions used at trial where the witness is unable to provide live testimony privacy interests of an ill witness were not sufficiently extraordinary to preclude press access 2: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case 3: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 4: holding that closure was limited not only because it lasted only for the testimony of one witness  but also because there was no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officers testimony", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "with Judge Campbell that \u201c[t]he Forshees\u2019 fail[ed] to explain how they supposedly were damaged other than as shareholders, and they ... presented no evidence in support of such a claim.\u201d ApltApp. at 17. Finally, even if we were to overlook the deficiencies in the Forshees\u2019 summary judgment opposition and assume that Manheim owed certain duties directly to the Forshees based on their guarantees, it is undisputed that the Forshees\u2019 guarantees were never enforced. Instead, as noted above, Manheim used the proceeds it obtained from the sale of Forshee Auto\u2019s vehicle inventory to satisfy Forshee Auto\u2019s obligations under the promissory note and security agreement. Consequently, the Forshees did not suffer any sort of direct injury based on their guarantees. See Marchman, 898 P.2d at 717 (<HOLDING>). C. Bankruptcy Court Orders. This court does Holdings: 0: holding under pennsylvania law that where fraud mismanagement or other wrong damages a corporations assets a shareholder does not have a direct cause of action however a corporation can suffer an injury unto itself and any claim it asserts to recover for that injury is independent and separate from the claims of shareholders creditors and others 1: holding that a shareholders status as a guarantor of a corporations debts did not give him standing to assert individual claims against a creditor of the corporation where the guarantees were never enforced and all of the injuries alleged were indirect damages suffered by the parties in their capacities as shareholders or employees 2: holding that a shareholderguarantor did not suffer direct injury for standing purposes where the guarantees entered into by the shareholder were never enforced 3: holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder 4: holding that shareholder could not prevail on breachoffiduciaryduty claim against other shareholder because alleged mishandling of funds did not result in any injury to the corporation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "testimony \u2014 after giving her considerable leeway \u2014 to limit it to matters relevant to the case. Similarly, the district court interrupted defense counsel\u2019s questioning about the amnesty forms to ensure that the questioning would focus on the \u201cportions on the application which [were] in question in the suit.\u201d In addition, at the end of the trial, the district court instructed the jury that it was to ignore any comments that the court had made during the trial and reiterated that the jurors were the final arbiters of the facts. Given the district court\u2019s wide discretion in limiting repetitive or irrelevant testimony and its curative instructions, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in this case. See United States v. Day, 405 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 4. The Deliberate Ignorance Jury Instruction Holdings: 0: holding that counsels failure to object or request a limiting instruction for evidence of defendants incarceration was sound trial strategy 1: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial 2: holding that district court enjoys broad latitude in managing a trial including commenting on evidence questioning witnesses clarifying facts and limiting counsels examinations 3: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony 4: holding that counsels decision not to call witnesses was unreasonable because counsels stated reasons for disputing the witnesses credibility were not supported by objective evidence", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by the government. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.2005). If she cannot show past persecution, then a petitioner must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. The subjective component can be established \u201cby the applicant\u2019s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution,\u201d while the objective component \u201ccan be fulfilled either by establishing past persecution or that he or she has a good reason to fear future persecution.\u201d Id. (quotation omitted). Liu challenges the IJ\u2019s adverse credibility finding. We have required that an IJ must make \u201cclean\u201d credibility determinations. See Yang v. U.S. Att\u2019y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). This means that the IJ, or BIA, must provide Holdings: 0: holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization 1: holding that an ijs statement that applicants testimony was extremely inconsistent and made absolutely no sense whatsoever was not a clean credibility finding but a comment on the sufficiency of the evidence 2: holding that the ij must make clean determinations of credibility 3: holding that an ij failed to make explicit credibility finding when he made passing remark that he disbelieved applicants testimony 4: holding that in light of an applicants omission of various relevant facts from his asylum application substantial evidence supported the ijs adverse credibility determination", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "move to dismiss Gaines\u2019 RICO claims. The court need only address whether Gaines has alleged an injury to his business or property. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c) provides that a person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of RICO may recover treble damages and attorney\u2019s fees. Section 1964(c) imposes a significant limitation upon the types of injuries that are compensable under RICO. In this case, it is unclear precisely what injuries Gaines alleges that he suffered. He has not responded to defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss and his pleadings are not models of clarity on this issue. Nevertheless, this court may not dismiss Gaines\u2019 RICO claims in the Fed.R.Civ.P 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979)). Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847-48 (11th Holdings: 0: holding that under the common law a claim for personal injuries died with the victim 1: holding that recovery for loss of consortium is a right  separate and apart from right of injured spouse to receive compensation for personal injuries 2: holding that the appropriate state statute of limitations to borrow for section 1983 actions is that for recovery of damages for personal injuries 3: holding that  1964c does not permit recovery for personal injuries 4: holding that the avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is for the benefit of the estate", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "This is the same public policy alluded to by the trial court in its order/judgment as a basis for sustaining the respondents\u2019 motion for summary judgment that a party cannot insure against that party\u2019s own unlawful acts. Given this public policy and the fact that the alter ego rule would logically apply in piercing the corporate veil or reverse piercing of the corporate veil, the question remains open as to whether in the absence of the \u201cright to direct and control\u201d or similar language in a policy, an argument could be made that public policy alone would be sufficient to invoke the alter ego defense to prevent a corporate insured from recovering for the fraudulent or dishonest acts of its corporate alter ego. See Halpin v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. banc 1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Interstate Agri Servs., Inc. v. Bank Holdings: 0: recognizing that the legislature sets public policy to be enforced by the courts in the absence of constitutional infirmity 1: holding that as a matter of contract no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so 2: holding that enforcing new jersey law would violate new yorks strong public policy against interest rates which exceed 25 which policy must be enforced 3: recognizing that an insurance contract will generally be enforced as written unless to do so would violate the law or public policy 4: holding that where a merger clause is included in the written contract alleged collateral promises will not be enforced through fraud because under fraud the reliance must be reasonable", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to chapter 602. (Emphasis added.) 18 .Petitioners acknowledge that twice since the adoption of the RUAA, this court has restated its holding in Swinerton that appeals are allowable under the collateral order doctrine. (Citing Luke, 105 Hawai'i at 246, 96 P.3d at 266 n. 10; Douglass, 110 Hawai'i at 522, 135 P.3d at 131 n. 1 (2006).) However, Petitioners explain that the RUAA, which applies only to contracts made \"on or after July 1, 2002,\u201d HRS \u00a7 658A-3 (Supp. 2011), did not govern those cases because the contracts at issue were ent L 4078421 (N.C.App. Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished) (\"[0]ur Court has consistently held that \u2018an order compelling the parties to arbitrate is an interlocutory order.\u2019 \u201d); Teufel Const. Co. v. American Arbitration Ass\u2019n, 3 Wash. App. 24, 472 P.2d 572, 573 (1970) (<HOLDING>). 29 . At oral argument, Petitioners stated Holdings: 0: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final 1: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision 2: holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable 3: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court 4: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "activity. Breeden., 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (reasoning that the EEOC\u2019s issuance of a right-to-sue letter is not a protected activity because the employee takes no part in it). By the plaintiffs own version of events, approximately three to four months elapsed between his attorney\u2019s inquiry and the allegedly retaliatory evaluation. Pl.\u2019s Opp\u2019n at 19. This time gap is too large for the plaintiff to establish the temporal proximity required to show that the allegedly retaliatory action is causally connected to his protected activity. Id. (citing cases holding that a three or four month gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the defendant\u2019s adverse action was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); see also Sullivan-Obst, 300 F.Supp.2d at 94 (<HOLDING>). (5) The Plaintiff Did not Establish a Causal Holdings: 0: holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation 1: holding that a threeyear gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to support an inference of causation 2: holding more than eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship 3: holding that three and onehalf months between the filing of an eeoc charge and the adverse employment action was insufficient by itself to establish causation 4: holding eightmonth gap between eeoc complaint and retaliatory action suggested a causal relationship", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the importer\u2019s intent and the relief sought.\u201d Mattel, Inc., 72 Cust. Ct. at 262, 377 F. Supp. at 960. Directly relevant to this dispute, 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1514 governs the timing of protests. Title 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1514(c)(3) provides as follows: A protest of a decision, order, or finding described in subsection (a) of this section shall be filed with the Customs Service within ninety days after but not before\u2014 (A) notice of liquidation or reliquidation, or (B) in circumstances where subparagraph (A) is inapplicable, the date of the decision as to which protest is made. 19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1514(c)(3). Both parties to this actio requirement strictly. Boe, 64 Ct. Cust. App. at 15, 543 F.2d at 154; see also Star Sales & Distrib. Corp. v. United States, 10 CIT 709, 710, 663 F. Supp. 1127, 1128 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Court now considers Plaintiff\u2019s protest Holdings: 0: holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review 1: recognizing that motions to reopen to adjust status must be filed no later than ninety days after the bia issues its final decision 2: holding that the court does not have jurisdiction over an action contesting the denial of a protest filed more than ninety days after notice of liquidation 3: holding that a notice of removal based on fraudulent joinder was procedurally defective because it was filed more than thirty days after defendants could have intelligently ascertained that the action was removable 4: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction where a complaint was filed more than 30 days after the filing of the summons", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "dispute, may effectively question the attorney regarding the reasonableness of his fee.\" Id. But that is not the' case with testimony offered under the Property Owner Rule, where the adverse party is less likely to share a corresponding knowledge of the property\u2019s market value. 8 . See also 2 Steven Goode et al., Texas Practice Series, Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence \u00a7 701.3, at 11-12 (3d ed.2002) (noting that \"[cjlassifying an opinion as either lay or ex pert has proved particularly troublesome when the opinion is rooted in \u2018other specialized knowledge,'\" and observing that cases allowing owners to testify to the fair market value of their property \"do not fit th[e lay witness opinion] mold as neatly\u201d). 9 . Cf. Dietz v. Consol. Oil & Gas, Inc., 643 F.2d 1088, 1094 (5th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See also Rich v. Eastman Kodak Co., 583 Holdings: 0: recognizing that an owners opinion testimony on the value of his property cannot be based on naked conjecture or solely speculative factors 1: holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless 2: holding that district court properly admitted property owners opinion testimony that was based on more than naked conjecture 3: holding the district court properly admitted expert testimony on defendants active gang membership 4: holding that experts opinion on proximate causation amounted to no more than mere conjecture and speculation as to events surrounding accident", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim \"federal.\u201d Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004). Following Baldwin, we have demanded less of state ha-beas petitioners seeking to raise a federal claim, exemplified by Taylor v. Cain, 545 F.3d 327 (5th Cir.2008), where we deemed a claim fair writ and presented although the petitioner \"did not label his claim as a federal constitutional one,\u201d because \"his brief made the type of arguments that support a Confrontation Clause claim\u201d and he cited two Louisiana cases mentioning the federal confrontation right. Id. at 333-34; see also Kittelson v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306, 316-17 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Absent certain exceptions not available Holdings: 0: holding that a state defendant has a sixth amendment right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendments due process clause to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 1: holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment 2: holding that the sixth and fourteenth amendments imply the right to selfrepresentation 3: holding municipalities  are not persons within the meaning of the due process clause of the fifth or fourteenth amendments 4: holding that petitioner fairly presented federal confrontation and due process claims by invoking those concepts and citing the sixth and fourteenth amendments", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "claims are not subject to mandatory arbitr ing because it was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, before the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. However the Defendants have not pointed to any changes between the Act and the Code that would lead to a different result. While the present Bankruptcy Code includes substantial amendments to sections 547 and 550 from their pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act counterparts, none of those changes alters in any way the underlying rationale of Allegaert that exempts statutory avoidance claims from arbitration. Defendants also argue that since Allegaert\u2019s holding that securities claims are not arbitrable has subsequently been rejected by the Supreme Court, see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (<HOLDING>), Allegaert\u2019s holding that fraudulent Holdings: 0: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement 1: holding that claims brought under section 10b of the securities exchange act and rico claims were arbitrable 2: holding that claims under the securities act of 1934 and the rico statutes are arbitrable 3: holding that claims under  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 were arbitrable under a predispute arbitration agreement 4: holding that claims under the securities act of 1933 are arbitrable", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United St Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 681 (10th Cir.1984) (requiring a plaintiff bringing a claim under \u00a7 13(a) to show that the price differential had a detrimental effect on competition). Because the plaintiffs have failed to allege a viable civil conspiracy claim against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, we affirm the district court\u2019s dismissal of the claims against the Individual Defendants, albeit on different grounds than those stated by the district co . Activities Assn. 483 F.3d 1025, 1031 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2 . Whether a \"sue or be sued\" clause in a Holdings: 0: holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief 1: holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived 2: holding an argument made in plaintiffs reply brief but not in their opening brief waived 3: holding issue was waived when appellant identified issue in its opening brief but devoted less than one page of brief to it and provided no other argument and no citations 4: holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the FTCA\u2019s contractor exception to liability, Congress did not simultaneously adopt the various state exceptions to the independent contractor rule. 412 U.S. at 528, 93 S.Ct. 2215. Rather, Congress expressly granted jurisdiction for suits brought against the United States for its employees\u2019 conduct, and not the conduct of contractors. State common law principles cannot overcome this federal statute. See Roditis v. United States, 122 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir.1997); Berkman v. United States, 957 F.2d 108, 112-13 (4th Cir.1992); Flynn v. United States, 631 F.2d 678, 681-82 (10th Cir.1980); Alexander v. United States, 605 F.2d 828, 835 (5th Cir.1979); Gibson v. United States, 567 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (3d Cir.1977). But see Dickerson, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 1577, 1583 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the plaintiffs\u2019 attempts to hold Holdings: 0: recognizing the general rule that a property owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor 1: holding that the government is liable under the ftca in the same respect as a private person under the law of the place where the act occurred 2: holding that the owner of property who retained an independent contractor did not owe any nondelegable duty of care to the plaintiff who had slipped and fallen on the adjoining sidewalk 3: holding that the independent contractor exception in the ftca would not insulate the government from the contractors negligence if the duty was nondelegable under florida law 4: holding that the government could not charge contractor excess cost of relet contract where government caused a delay in contract performance in which contractor was to use his own equipment original contractors costs increased and government refused to allow original contractor to perform at cost but allowed new contractor to use government equipment and paid new contractor a different rate", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of approaches that are available when making decisions that may affect the environment, even if they ultimately decide that some are impractical for reasons such as loss of flexibility. The very purpose of NEPA is to force agencies to take stock of environmental factors in their decisionmaking, and not automatically to reject potential courses of action without first assessing the relevant environmental concerns. By narrowing its objectives to flexibility and power generation, BPA impermissibly circumvented consideration of alternatives that would have guaranteed at least some benefit to fish from the outset. City of New York v. U.S. Department of Transp., 715 F.2d 732, 743 (2d Cir.1983); cf. City of Carmel-By-the-Sea v. U.S. Department of Transp., 95 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). The two alternatives that BPA did consider \u2014 Holdings: 0: holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact 1: holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen 2: holding district court abused discretion by changing characterization of defendants conduct without a reasoned explanation 3: holding that agency abused its discretion by changing statement of purpose to eliminate all but one of the initial range of alternatives 4: holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "not itself a state court, the form of the proceeding is not determinative under Rooker-Feldman; rather, it is the nature, character, and effect of the proceedings themselves that is controlling. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303. In Feldman, the Supreme Court took note of the judicial nature of state bar disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 482 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass\u2019n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982)). Additionally, this court has held that the disciplinary board of a state bar can be considered as part of the \u201csystem of state courts\u201d and that their judicial decisions are not subject to review by the federal courts. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 817-18 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). The Virginia State Bar is, by statute, an arm Holdings: 0: holding rookerfeldman doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of west virginia state bar 1: holding that rookerfeldman doctrine bars federal determination of claim where the district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the plaintiff 2: holding rookerfeldman doctrine inapplicable to claims that do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case 3: holding that the rookerfeldman doctrine is broad enough to bar all federal claims that were or should have been central to the state court decision 4: holding that a state court judgment that modifies a discharge in bankruptcy is void ab initio and the rookerfeldman doctrine would not bar federal court jurisdiction", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors,\u201d citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269, 112 S.Ct. 1311). In deciding whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged proximate causation, the court focuses on \"three nonexhaustive factors ... [which determine] whether the injury is `too remote\u2019 to allow recovery: (1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongful conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to ascertain the amount of the plaintiffs\u2019 damages attributable to defendant\u2019s wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will have to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.\" Mendoza, 301 F.3d at F.3d 957, 963-67 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 31 F.3d at 928-29 Holdings: 0: holding that beneficiaries of an estate lacked standing under rico to sue for an injury derivative of the estates injury 1: holding that a rico plaintiff alleging destruction of the value of his stock lacks standing because his injury is derivative of the corporations injury 2: holding that a union health trust had standing to sue tobacco companies to recover medical expenses paid by the trust and allegedly caused by beneficiaries smoking 3: holding that health care trust funds that paid medical claims could not sue tobacco companies under rico because their injury was derivative of smokers injury and stating a direct relationship between the injury and the alleged wrongdoing although not the sole requirement of rico  proximate causation has been one of its central elements citations omitted 4: holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Lorisme v. INS, 129 F.3d 1441, 1444-45 (11th Cir.1997)). We view \u201cthe record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency\u2019s decision and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.\u201d Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc). Under this highly deferential standard of review, the IJ\u2019s decision can be reversed only if the evidence \u201ccompels\u201d a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise. Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney General, 401 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir.2005). When the BIA issues its own opinion, we review only the decision of the BIA, except to the extent the BIA expressly adopts the IJ\u2019s decision. R ompel a reasonable factfinder to find that it was more likely than not she would face persecution upon her return to Indonesia. See id. at 1232 (<HOLDING>). Tan relies on stories of attacks on churches, Holdings: 0: holding that the clear probability standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum which requires only a reasonable possibility of persecution 1: holding that the asylum standard for past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution is lower than the clear probability standard to show eligibility for withholding of removal 2: holding that petitioner must demonstrate it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon his return 3: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is more demanding than the standard for asylum 4: holding that the standard for withholding of removal is a showing that it is more likely than not that a petitioner will face persecution upon her return", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "between the United States and the Iowa agents who spoke to Kozak\u2019s counsel renders any cooperation agreement reached between the Iowa agents and Kozak unenforceable against the United States. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in Long, 511 F.2d 878, supports this conclusion. In Long, the court held that the federal government was not bound by an agreement made by the defendant and state agents. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that \u201cthe existence of an agency relationship was essential to support\u201d the enforcement of the agreement made. Id. at 881. The court concluded that because the state agents acted without actual or apparent federal authority, their promise to the defendant did not bind the United States. Id. As in Long, the Iowa actors th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); cf. Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633 Holdings: 0: holding that united states attorney was not required to abide by a secret service agents promise to a defendant to drop federal charges in exchange for defendants cooperation where the united states attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agents authority 1: holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary 2: holding that county officers were neither agents of the united states nor did they have any duty to investigate federal consequences of actions before securing defendants cooperation 3: holding the rule 4 requirement of delivery to the appropriate united states attorney required personal service not service by certified mail 4: holding that agents promise to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation does not render a subsequent confession involuntary", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "has entered a final order or judgment, then a motion for reconsideration is considered a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 59(e) if it is filed within ten days after the entry of judgment. See id. at 1296. If the motion for reconsideration is filed more than ten days after the entry of final judgment, it is considered a motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b). See id. Rule 59(e) and 60(b), however, apply only to final judgments. See Raytheon Constructors Inc. v. Asarco Inc., 368 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir.2003); Bass v. Richards, 308 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir.2002); Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1988). \u201cFinality is judged by the standards applicable to determining [appellate] juri ., No. CIV 01-883, at 2 (D.N.M. May 25, 2004)(Brack, 'J.)(<HOLDING>); Ambrose v. White, Civ. No. 01-1263, at 3 Holdings: 0: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 1: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights 2: holding that a denial of a motion for partial summary judgment is interlocutory and subject to revision at discretion of the court 3: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  4: holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with the standards set forth in section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 218, 641 N.E.2d at 353. Section 2 \u2014 107.1(a) of the Code provides that \"[a]ny person *** may petition the circuit court\u201d for an order to authorize the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. (405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 107.1(a) (West 1992).) In addition, section 2 \u2014 107.1(b) requires that \"[t]he court shall hold a hearing within 30 days of the filing of the petition.\u201d (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 107.1(b) (West 1992).) Thus, we hold that section 2 \u2014 107.1 of the Code specifically contemplates the formal filing of a written petition seeking the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication before a trial court can issue such an order. See In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126, 132-33, 601 N.E.2d 712, 716 (<HOLDING>). The supreme court essentially recognized this Holdings: 0: holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212 1: holding that railroad right of way under the act of march 3 1875 ch 152 18 stat 482 vested upon actual construction of the road 2: holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report 3: holding that section 3  810 of the code ill rev stat 1989 ch 9112 par 3  810 implicitly requires a written predispositional report 4: recognizing the creation of constructive employees under nmsa 1978 section 52122 1989", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "before the child is four years old or the suit was barred. Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 674, \u00a7 2, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 2536, 2536-37. Although the J.A.M. court expressed no opinion on the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment\u2019s four-year statute of limitations, see J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d at 732, the court of appeals in Smith v. Cornelius held that this amendment was also unconstitutional based on its analysis of Mills and Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 18, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that Tennessee\u2019s two-year statute of limitations on paternity and child-support actions was unconstitutional. See 665 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, no pet.); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 464, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In 1983, chapter 13 was again amended to Holdings: 0: holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional 1: holding pennsylvanias similarly worded sixyear statute of limitations for paternity actions unconstitutional 2: recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act 3: holding latefiling penalty mandatory absent reasonable cause under a similarly worded predecessor statute 4: holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "be considered a system of records unless there is actual retrieval of records keyed to individuals\u201d (emphasis added)); Baker v. Department of Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.) (stating that \u201cthe definition of \u2018system of records\u2019 makes coverage under the Act dependent upon the method of retrieval of a record rather than its substantive content\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 390 (1987); Boyd v. Secretary of the Navy, 709 F.2d 684, 686 (11th Cir.1983) (finding that \u201ca record must be maintained by the agency in a group of records cued to the requestor\u201d (citations omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Boyd v. Lehman, 464 U.S. 1043, 104 S.Ct. 709, 79 L.Ed.2d 173 (1984); Savarese v. United States Dep\u2019t of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 479 F.Supp. 304, 307 (N.D.Ga.1979) (<HOLDING>), aff'd sub nom. Savarese v. Harris, 620 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that neither a reading file nor a program file since not keyed to retrieval by names or identifiers were systems of records under the act 1: holding that neither the ada nor the rehabilitation act applies to prison employment 2: recognizing the debtorinpossessions duty to file records and operating reports 3: holding that neither rule 18 nor section 30002 allowed the successor to an electoral loser to file findings when the transition did not happen during the period in which the trial court was obligated to file findings 4: holding reasonable an agency determination that a request for an investigative file did not include the employment file", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at O.C.G.A. \u00a7 10-7-20). Hendricks could have been decided solely on the Overcash ground that the creditor had released a co-surety; thus, the Hendricks holding that release of the principal also discharged the surety was at best an alternative ground for decision. Hardaway argues that the practical reasons underlying the rule of Overcash and section 10-7-20 of the Georgia Code do not apply to the creditor\u2019s release of the principal and therefore the release should not discharge Amwest. When a co-surety is released, the remaining surety is prejudiced because he bears the full burden of liability. When a surety is not prejudiced by the release of a co-surety, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held that the surety is not discharged. Holcombe v. Eng, 163 Ga.App. 343, 294 S.E.2d 568 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Amwest was not prejudiced by the release of B Holdings: 0: holding that the court had no jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a plea agreement 1: holding no prejudice occurred because no new information was presented on the material matter in dispute 2: holding that release caused no prejudice because guaranty agreement had already allocated liability among cosureties 3: holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice 4: holding that trial courts witness interrogation did not cause defendant prejudice when there was already overwhelming evidence showing defendants guilt", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of alcohol or drugs, is \"less able than the person would ordinarily have been, either mentally or physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the driving of a vehicle.\u201d 21 Del.C. \u00a7 4177(c)(5). See also 21 Del.C. \u00a7 4177(a)(1) (stating that no person shall drive a vehicle when the person is under the influence of alcohol). 7 . Tr. at 44-45 (ruling from the bench). 8 . Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 362. In Ruthardt, the Superior Court held an extensive evidentiary hearing and the issue was briefed by both parties. Id. at 352. The court concluded that the HGN test is scientific in nature and not based on common knowledge. Id. at 355. See also Cantrell v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, Del.Super., C.A. No. 95A-09-001, 1996 WL 453425, at *4 (April 9, 1996) (ORDER) (<HOLDING>), affd sub nom. Cantrell v. Sha-han, Del.Supr., Holdings: 0: recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered 1: holding that the hgn test may be considered as a factor in determining probable cause 2: holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing 3: holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same 4: holding that the areas propensity toward criminal activity is one factor to be considered in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Head Start Fellow and Director, among other relevant professional experiences. See PX 18 (resume of Amanda Bryans). When considering a plaintiffs challenge to an employer\u2019s non-discriminatory explanation for non-selection, the courts have \u201cconsistently declined to serve as a \u2018super-personnel department that reexamines an entity\u2019s business decisions.\u2019 \u201d Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 897 (citing Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C.Cir.1999)). While there may be differences in qualifications between Ms. Simpson and Ms. Bryans, there is nothing that approaches the \u201cwide and inexplicable\u201d gulf between their qualifications that is required to rebut the defendant\u2019s nondiscriminatory explanation. See Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d at 1091; compare Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>). When the differences between candidates are Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff failed to show she was similarly situated to her comparators without evidence that they shared the similar attributes experience education and qualifications relevant to the position 1: holding plaintiff with nineteen years experience as hospital assistant and bachelors and masters degrees to be significantly better qualified for pharmacy technician position than applicant with no college education and two months relevant experience 2: holding that expert was qualified to testify regarding sexuallyabused children based on witness education professional license and experience 3: recognizing that experience and practical knowledge as fully as formal education qualify one to make technical judgments 4: holding that better education work experience and longer tenure with the company do not establish that an applicant is clearly better qualified", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "would turn into product specifications, which they were never intended to be.\u201d); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586, 15 Otto 580, 26 L.Ed. 1177 (1881) (\u201cThat which is common and well known is as if it were written out in the patent and delineated in the drawings\u201d). Therefore, the Federal Circuit has stated that \u201c[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.\u201d Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed.Cir.1987). The statutory language of \u00a7 112, \u00b6 6, however, requires the inventor to disclose \u201cstructure ... described in the specification and equivalents thereof.\u201d 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112, \u00b6 6. As a quid pro quo for the' convenience of employing means-plus-function claim language, the inventor has a duty to c 1381-82 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Ampex Corp. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., 966 Holdings: 0: holding that the specifications reference to commercially available vacuum sensors constituted sufficient structure as one skilled in the art would have understood the reference 1: holding that black box labeled purchase orders was insufficient structure to perform the generate purchase orders function 2: holding that a claim was not indefinite for using the term selector because it was a standard component and its structure was well known in the art 3: holding black box labeled sel was sufficient structure because it was a well known electronic structure and performs a common electronic function 4: holding that box labeled vacuum sensor and passage which notes that vacuum sensors were well known in the art at the time the patent issued sufficiently disclosed structure", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the trial court that res judicata bars the cloud on title count and with the grandsons that res judicata also bars the other two counts. There are three prerequisites to the application of res judicata: (1) identity of the cause of action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies; and (3) a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546 (629 SE2d 260) (2006). The plaintiffs acknowledge that there is an identity of the parties, and the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in the prior appeal upholding the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment plainly constitutes an adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 604 (203 SE2d 173) (1974) (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the causes Holdings: 0: holding that a motion for a summary judgment is an appropriate means of seeking an adjudication on the merits 1: holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits 2: holding that application of res judicata requires that a prior adjudication include a ruling on the merits 3: holding that review is de novo where there has been no adjudication on the merits in state court 4: holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are most substantial. Rather, they seem concerned with whether each contributing cause, standing alone, is a substantial factor in causing the alleged injury. Id. at 424. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that a comparative approach to the substantial factor test would create the same inequities that result when applying the \u201cbut-for test,\u201d previously rejected by Maryland courts for application in multi-defendant asbestos products liability cases. We hold that a decedent\u2019s exposure to each defendant\u2019s product should be evaluated independently to determine whether such exposure was a substantial factor in causing the decedent\u2019s injury; evidence of exposures to other products is not relevant to such an inquiry. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1141 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). But see Laney v. Celotex Corp., 901 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that industrial wastes were not products under a products hazard exception because they were not intended for consumption sale or use by others  1: recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law 2: holding that evidence of gideons exposure to the products of two companies that had filed for bankruptcy was not material to the litigation so long as the jury found that the products of each defendant cast in judgment were producing causes of gideons condition 3: holding that when a plaintiff can establish that she was in the vicinity in which asbestos dust from defendants products was inhaled a jury can reasonably infer that plaintiff was injured by defendants products 4: holding that although the district court recognized confusion based on similarity of products it failed to give proper weight to the virtual identity of the parties products", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "with the IJ\u2019s conclusion that a petitioner is not credible,\u201d we review both the IJ\u2019s and the BIA\u2019s decisions \u201cfor the sake of completeness.\u201d Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005); see Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-es tablished. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(b)(4)(B) (\u201c[ 9, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough credibility determinations are entitled to the same deference on review as other factual determinations, the fact that the [agency] has relied primarily on credibility grounds ... cannot insulate the decision from review.\u201d). Indeed, we have indicated in other cases that certain factors standing alone may not be sufficient to support an IJ\u2019s denial of relief. Cf. Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Diallo v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody 1: holding that the mere fact that a petitioner took voluntary trips back to his home country standing alone does not suggest either any fundamental change in circumstances or the possibility of internal relocation 2: holding that perjured testimony standing alone does not constitute fraud upon the court 3: holding that a change in personal circumstances in the united states does not constitute a change in country conditions and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen 4: holding relocation alone even if to another state was not a substantial change in circumstances", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence\u201d). The record belies Cooper\u2019s contention that the court failed to adequately consider the \u00a7 3553(a) factors and did not explain its rationale for the variance. The court specifically noted its consideration of all the \u00a7 3553(a) factors. Additionally, the court\u2019s comments at sentencing, as well as the arguments that it heard, demonstrate the court\u2019s consideration of many pertinent \u00a7 3553(a) factors. Although the court\u2019s nine-month variance above the high end of Cooper\u2019s guideline range was significant, the district court\u2019s consideration of many of the \u00a7 3553(a) factors and its statements that the sentence was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, serve as sufficient justification. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (<HOLDING>). The record also demonstrates that the court Holdings: 0: holding that the court must consider the adequacy of the inquiry into the conflict the extent of the conflict and the timeliness of the motion 1: holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement 2: holding that a reviewing court must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance above the guideline range 3: recognizing that while our reasonableness review may take into consideration the extent of the district courts deviation from the guidelines range we must give due deference to the district courts decision that the  3553a factors on a whole justify the extent of the variance 4: holding that if a court decides that an outsideguidelines sentence is warranted it must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "is focused on whether, under the facts of this case, PECO interfered with, restrained, or coerced its employees in organizing, forming, joining, or assisting the BGC. PECO and the Board correctly argue that because the BGC has never been recognized or certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of PECO\u2019s employees, PECO had no independent obligation to listen to or recognize the BGC for purposes of its members\u2019 grievances. See, e.g., Morrisville Cotton Mills, 2 N.L.R.B. 952, modf'd and enf'd, 94 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.1938). They also correctly point out that the agreement with the IGA to accord its members privileged treatment for grievance purposes is not, standing by itself, unlawful under the Act. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (<HOLDING>). But the Board and PECO err when they conclude Holdings: 0: holding that membersonly agreements with nonmajority unions do not violate sections 8a2 or 8a1 of the act 1: holding that in the grievance representation context an employee must prove that the unions acts tainted the grievance procedure such that the outcome was more than likely affected by the unions breach internal citation and quotation omitted 2: holding that unions were not entitled to specific performance of collective bargaining agreements after employees voted in boardsupervised elections to decertify the unions 3: holding that the agreements made with the governments witnesses did not violate the antigratuity statute 4: holding that agreements which afford cooperating accomplices leniency in exchange for testimony do not violate  201c2", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in \u00a7 1B1.10 are binding on district courts and limit their authority to grant motions for reduction of sentences.\u201d McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1292. Thus, in considering a \u00a7 3582(c)(2) motion, a district court must first determine whether the prisoner is eligible under \u00a7 1B1.10 for a sentence modification. See McGee, 615 F.3d 1287, 1291-92. If a reduction is not authorized by the applicable policy statement, the court does not proceed to the second step of determining whether, in its discretion, a reduct Cir.1993) (per curiam) (same); see also United States v. Horn, 612 F.3d 524, 527 (6th Cir.2010) (\u201cBecause Amendment 709 is not listed in subsection (c), the district court did not have the authority to resentence [defendant].\u201d); United States v. Peters, 524 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Carter has not identified any error in Holdings: 0: holding that the act is not retroactive 1: recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary 2: holding apprendi is not retroactive 3: holding that the act is retroactive 4: holding amendment 709 is not covered amendment under  1b110 to which retroactive treatment may be given", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "be induced to intervene as a matter of self-protection. Such protective intervention by class members might be compelled because those class members who have not intervened by the time the untolled statute of limitations runs would be unable to seek relief individually. The Court therefore reasoned that a rule which would result in the individual intervention of class members and which would \u201cbreed\u201d needless duplicative motions was not in keeping with the objectives of the federal class action procedures. [Haas v Pittsburgh Nat\u2019l Bank, 526 F2d 1083, 1097 (CA 3, 1975).] Therefore, the ng that when the district court determined that the class representative did not have standing it should have allowed a class member with standing to become the new class representative); Haas, supra (<HOLDING>). Simply stated, the American Pipe rule has Holdings: 0: recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class 1: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 2: holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory 3: holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity 4: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Record is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.\u201d Orders issued by a trial court after this date generally are void. Id. \u201cThe policy underlying the rule is to facilitate the efficient presentation and disposition of the appeal and to prevent the simultaneous review of a judgment by both a trial and appellate court.\u201d Id. There are exceptions to this rule, such as to allow a trial court \u201c\u2018to reassess costs, correct the record, enforce a judgment, continue with a trial during an interlocutory appeal concerning venue, or preside over matters which are independent of and do not interfere with the sub ject matter of the appeal.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 727 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ind.Ct. App.2000), trans. denied); see also In re Marriage of Bartley, 712 N.E.2d 537, 547 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>). Here, the Notice of Completion of the Clerk\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions 1: holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce 2: holding trial court order which purportedly corrected divorce decree to alter marital property division was void because it was entered  after this court obtained jurisdiction 3: holding that the superior court had no jurisdiction over the division of marital property when the district court had properly invoked jurisdiction over the property 4: holding that the trial court had authority to enforce a marital property settlement agreement that had not been incorporated into the parties final divorce decree", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in the bankruptcy context also have distinguished between employees whose employment, although critical to the business, does not require judicial approval and those whose role is central to the administration of the estate and, therefore, requires judicial approval. See In re EMGE Aviation Marine Products, 1992 WL 108849 (E.D.Pa.) (president of Chapter 11 debtor which was liquidating was a professional and could not be compensated under section 503 without being appointed under section 327): In re Florida Airlines, Inc., 110 B.R. 570 (M.D.Fla.1990) (president of debtor-in-possession played central role in the administration of the debt- or, and thus, was \u201cprofessional person\u201d who required approval pursuant to 327(a)); In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 1993 WL 370629 (D.Mass.) (<HOLDING>); In re Madison Management Group Inc., 137 B.R. Holdings: 0: holding that 1 principal shareholder and chief executive officer of chapter 11 debtor in liquidation is not entitled to compensation beyond normal salary for performing duties required of the debtor 2 professional is a term which is not narrowly construed but applies to anyone the nature of whose services meet the criteria of a professional person 3 a professional license is not dispositive and 4 factors include form of compensation time of retention pre or postpetition and whether employment is full time or parttime 1: holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services 2: holding that financial gain from compensation for professional services is not a sufficient motive for purposes of pleading scienter 3: holding that professional defendants who merely perform their usual professional functions and receive their normal compensation are not liable under the draconian provisions of section 122 4: holding that as a general matter membership or shareholder status in a professional corporation does not shield an attorney from individual liability for his own mistakes or professional misdeeds", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "violation would constitute a \u201clack of ordinary care in failing to discover\u201d the presence of the dog, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, at \u00a7 79 at 565, rather than a voluntary exposure to a known risk. II Rossi argues that the trial court\u2019s error in admitting into evidence prior incidents involving the dog \u201cprejudiced the jury so as to taint the [damage] verdict.\u201d We agree. As noted, the trial court permitted evidence that prior to plaintiffs injuries, Rossi\u2019s dog had bitten Rossi\u2019s sister-in-law, nephew, and had even bitten Rossi himself, requiring twenty- - seven stitches to the arm. In order for plaintiff to prevail under the \u201cdog-bite\u201d statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog\u2019s dangerous propensities. See DeRobertis, 94 N.J. at 151, 462 A.2d 1260 (<HOLDING>); see also Nicholes v. Lorenz, 396 Mich. 53, Holdings: 0: holding obscenity statute required proof of scienter 1: holding that a fact that the statutory elements obligate the government to prove is considered to be material 2: holding that when a complaint alleges defects involving common elements a home owners association has standing to sue for damage to noncommon elements as well 3: holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter 4: holding that under the dogbite statute even owners without scienter become liable upon satisfaction of the statutory elements", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "457 S.E.2d at 58). In doing so, the district court considered Evo\u2019s potentially improper and personal motive as the dispositive factor in finding that Evo\u2019s alleged actions fell'outside the scope of his employment. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia make it clear that an employee\u2019s improper motive cannot be determinative; rather, it is merely a factor. Thus, the court\u2019s analysis was erroneous. Nevertheless, when we analyze La-casse\u2019s state.law claims under Gina Chin, it becomes clear that Evo\u2019s alleged actions fell outside the scope of his employment with Didlake. The alleged sexual harassment deviated so significantly from Evo\u2019s expected duties as a Project Manager that it could not have occurred in the ordinary course of Didlake\u2019s business. See Blair, 386 F.3d at 628 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Evo neither gained nor possessed Holdings: 0: holding that a police officers rape of an arrestee was outside the scope of his employment 1: holding that a janitorial workers sexual assault of a student deviated from his duties and was clearly outside of the scope of his employment 2: holding that assistant principal could not use an immunity defense because his sexual advances and ensuing retaliatory conduct towards a teacher were outside the scope of his official duties of employment 3: holding intentional assault by coworker to be outside the course and scope of employment 4: holding that absolute immunity cannot attach to a quasijudicial officer if his actions are clearly and completely outside the scope of his jurisdiction", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "1298 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127, 125 S.Ct. 2935, 162 L.Ed.2d 866 (2005). Under this standard of review, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. If these three conditions are met, we may notice the error only if \u201cthe error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Williams\u2019s methamphetamine conspiracy conviction carried a 40-year (480-month) statutory maximum and his marijuana conspiracy conviction carried a 20-year (240-month) statutory maximum. See 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 841(b)(1), 846. Williams was sentenced to 97 months\u2019 imprisonment under the advisory Guidelines. The district court submitted the question of the amount of 1th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dulcio, 441 F.3d 1269, 1277 Holdings: 0: holding that if sentence does not exceed maximum authorized by facts admitted by defendant or found by jury there is no sixth amendment violation 1: holding that where the defendants sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the district court applies the guidelines as advisory the district court does not err by enhancing the defendants sentence based on facts not charged in the indictment or admitted by him 2: holding that the statutory maximum for apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant and without any additional findings by the court 3: holding nonconstitutional booker error occurs when the district court applies the guidelines in a mandatory rather than advisory fashion even though the resulting sentence was calculated based solely upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury 4: holding that there is no sixth amendment error when the sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by facts the defendant admitted", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "287 (2d Cir.1989)\u2014\u201cdid not accurately represent the law in every respect.\u201d United States v. Abelis, 146 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir.1998); see also United States v. Vasquez, 82 F.3d 574, 577 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201cA conviction will not be overturned for refusal to give a requested charge ... unless that instruction is legally correct, represents a theory of defense with basis in the record that would lead to acquittal, and the theory is not effectively presented elsewhere in the charge.\u201d (emphasis added)). The \u201csingle transaction rule,\u201d set forth in Zabare, 871 F.2d at 287, has been invoked by this Court only in the context of a contraband purchaser\u2019s alleged participation in the greater conspiracy of trafficking in such contraband. See, e.g., United States v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir.1943) (<HOLDING>). We have never extended it to a situation Holdings: 0: holding that the hobbs act jurisdictional nexus was met by the robbery of a delicatessen that sold goods produced out of state without mentioning whether the goods were purchased from outofstate or instate suppliers 1: holding that a buyer who purchases goods subject to an express warranty that the goods are free from all liens takes free of any unperfected security interest 2: holding that the single transaction rule protects a purchaser of stolen goods who by definition must know the goods to be stolen from being made party to the original theft via conspiracy 3: holding that a statement of conditional sale of goods can be filed with the state auditor before the delivery of goods where statute says the statement must be filed within ten days of delivery of goods 4: holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of you or any resident relative and that neither: 1. is owned by: a. you-, b. any resident relative-, c. any other person who resides primarily in your household; or d. an employer of any person described in a., b., or c. above; State Farm Policy at 8. However, Plaintiffs do not argue that the above exclusion of an employer-owned car in the definition of \u201cnon-owned car\u201d is ambiguous or confusing. Compare Haynes, 32 Cal.4th at 1211, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 68, 89 P.3d 381 (finding exclusion to not be plain and clear where an ambiguous term was left undefined). The \u201cnon-owned car\u201d definition also does not use any complicated words that are outside \u201cthe vocabulary of average lay persons.\u201d Compare Ponder, 145 Cal.App.3d at 723, 193 Cal.Rptr. 632 (<HOLDING>). Finally, the sentence structure is not so Holdings: 0: holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation 1: holding that clause excluding coverage for temporomandibular joint syndrome without a definition for that disease was not plain and clear 2: holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts 3: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 4: holding that decedent employees common law negligence claim against employer was not barred when disease was not compensable under the wca or the occupational disease act", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Plaintiffs claims are based on the allegation that Defendant violated ERISA by changing its dividend policy in 1998. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 45, 46. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are based on a distinct event and the limitations period runs from the original wrongful act and is not restarted each time a plaintiff suffers incremental, additional injury flowing from the same event. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 394; see also Miele v. Pension Plan of N.Y. State Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund, 72 F.Supp.2d 88, 102 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (\u201ccontinuing claims doctrine does not apply to a claim based on a single distinct event which has ill effects that continue to accumulate over time\u201d); see also Rabouin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 10 Misc.3d 1061(A), 2005 WL 3536441, at *9 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 23, 2005) (<HOLDING>). Defendant\u2019s analysis on this point is sound. Holdings: 0: holding that the statute of limitations for  1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims 1: holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable 2: holding that limitations period was not retriggered each time defendant calculated the dividend if any under existing dividend policy and that contract claims were timebarred 3: holding that either a fouryear or a twoyear limitations period applies to claims under the idea in ohio for tuition reimbursement either way the claims were timebarred 4: holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "third proposed expert, the court held his knowledge and experience \u201ccrosses the threshold of admissibility.\u201d Id. at 1567. Accordingly, the court found that any weaknesses in the third expert\u2019s opinion and expertise went to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. Id. From Bolt\u2019s depositions and QCBT\u2019s arguments, the district court concluded Bolt \u201cis not an expert who can determine whether or not an audit has been performed pursuant to some generally accepted auditing standard because he\u2019s not a CPA.\u201d While the district court\u2019s reasoning was flawed, its conclusion was correct. The fact that Bolt was not a CPA did not disqualify him from testifying on the ultimate issue of whether Kireher violated generally accepted accounting standards. See, e.g., Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 886 (<HOLDING>). Rather, Bolt was unqualified to testify on Holdings: 0: recognizing that the dc circuit has stated that by attempting to evaluate the credibility of opposing experts and the persuasiveness of  competing studies the district court conflates the questions of the admissibility of expert testimony and the weight appropriately to be accorded such testimony by a factfinder  1: recognizing if a person is qualified by learning and experience the lack of board certification or licensure goes to the weight of the experts testimony not its admissibility 2: holding statistical conclusions admissible and questions regarding the size of a tests database goes to the weight not admissibility of the evidence 3: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility 4: holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "10 Ga. App. 818 (1) (74 SE 303) (1912). Accord, Murray v. State, 30 Ga. App. 373 (118 SE 62) (1923) (ruling that, on unspecified facts, the sheriff was not the prosecutor). But one who is merely heavily involved in the transaction out of which the prosecution flows is not a \"prosecutor.\u201d E.g., Prysock v. State, 44 Ga. App. 229 (161 SE 153) (1931). \"It has been held that the fact that a juror is closely related to one acting as a partisan for the state in a criminal prosecution, even where such one actively assists in the prosecution by assisting in striking the jury, prompting questions, and suggesting witnesses, affords no ground of challenging such juror for cause. Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 248 (12 SE2d 64) and cits.\u201d Durham v. State, 129 Ga. App. 5 (3) (198 SE2d 387) (1973) (<HOLDING>). There are a few other circumstances, not Holdings: 0: holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing 1: holding that seating arrangement in which the defendant sat in row behind counsel table did not impair the defendants presumption of innocence 2: holding that acts by a sheriff which gave rise to the plaintiffs claim against him were taken in the execution of his duties as sheriff and thus the sheriff was immune under  14 from an action seeking damages against him in his individual capacity 3: holding sheriff not a prosecutor even though he sat at counsel table with the district attorney 4: holding government agent to be an arm of the prosecutor where he 1 actively participated in the investigation 2 supervised a confidential informant and 3 sat throughout trial at counsel table with the prosecutors", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "policy or procedure for diabetic detainees whose blood sugar was not being measured and who refused to eat.\u201d Because the plaintiffs have sued Sheriff Walsh in his official capacity, they must show (1) that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he \u201cmaintains a policy or custom that infringes upon the rights protected\u201d by the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause; and (2) that \u201ca genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether [the death] was proximately caused by either an official policy of the municipality or from a governmental custom or usage.\u201d Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison, Illinois, 746 F.3d 766, 780 (7th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). A plaintiff can show that a municipality has Holdings: 0: holding that under  521 the coercive force applied against a plaintiff must result in an interference with a separate constitutional or statutory right and it is not sufficient that the right interfered with is the right to be free of the force or threat of force that was applied 1: holding that city may properly be held liable where policy is moving force behind constitutional violation 2: holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived 3: holding that public policy must be evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions 4: holding that the policy or practice must be the direct cause or moving force behind the constitutional violation", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "(\"PLRA\u201d), 42 U.S.C. Section 1997 e(a)\")), the Court notes that an inmate's failure to exhaust may be justified where prison officials prevented him from filing or appealing a grievance. See, e.g., Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.2011) (\"A prisoner may invoke the doctrine of estoppel when defendants took affirmative action to prevent him from availing himself of grievance procedures.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.2004) (observing that an inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be justified where prison officials prevented him from complying with grievance procedures or \u201cfail[ed] to timely advance the inmate\u2019s grievance\u201d); Ferguson v. Bizzario, No. 09-CV-8106, 2010 WL 4227298, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010) (<HOLDING>); but see Rosado v. Fessetto, No. 09-CV-67, Holdings: 0: holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day 1: holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional 2: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing 3: holding the plaintiffs allegation that correction officers either prevented or discouraged him from filing his complaint on the same day the event occurred  raises estoppel as a second potential excuse for nonexhaustion 4: holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "727 N.E.2d 763, 768 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)). Thus, in Rexroot, we held that the probation condition prohibiting contact with minors was neither vague nor overbroad. Rex-roat, 966 N.E.2d at 178. Brateher's probation condition 15 is reasonably related to Bratcher's treatment and to the protection of public safety. Additionally, just as in Rexroat, we conclude that Bratcher's probation condition restricting his contact with minors is not vague or overbroad. See also Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117 (upholding the defendant's probation conditions that restricted him from being alone with minors and from participating in activities involving minors where those conditions were reasonably related to the treatment of the defendant and protection of public safety and children); Stott, 822 N.E.2d at 179-80 (<HOLDING>). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did Holdings: 0: holding that the defendants probation condition that restricted his contact with minors was a protective measure for children and would assist the defendant in his rehabilitation 1: holding that warrantless search as probation condition was a valid limitation to the defendants fourth amendment rights when defendant asserted the condition was not reasonably related to rehabilitation 2: holding that probationer failed to satisfy the donaldson test for determining if a probation condition is not reasonably related to the probationers rehabilitation and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation 3: holding that probationer failed to satisfy two of the three prongs of the donaldson test for determining if a probation condition was reasonably related to the probationers rehabilitation and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing random urinalysis as a condition of probation 4: holding that the defendantchild molesters probation conditionwhich restricted his internet access unless he had prior approval of his probation officerwas reasonably related to his reintegration into the community and to protecting the public", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4 Oregon Laws 2013, chapter 649, section 6, provides: \u201c(1) The amendments to ORS 137.717 by section 5 of this 2013 Act apply to sentences imposed on or after August 1, 2013. \u201c(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the amendments to ORS 137.717 by section 5 of this 2013 Act do not apply to persons who were originally sentenced before August 1, 2013, and who are subsequently resen-tenced on or after August 1, 2013, as the result of an appellate decision or a post-conviction relief proceeding or for any other reason.\u201d 5 The state also argues that the judgment imposing the probation revocation sanctions is not appealable, and we must therefore dismiss this appeal. However, we recently rejected that argument in State v. Johnson, 271 Or App 272, 274-75, 350 P3d 556 (2015) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Lane, 357 Or 619, 630, 355 Holdings: 0: holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney 1: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 2: holding that judgments imposing probation revocation sanctions are appealable under ors 138053le and ors 1382227b 3: holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence 4: holding probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to later impose imprisonment and did not pertain to enhancement of the charge. Id. We reasoned that \u201c[t]he lack of reliability in an uncounseled conviction that prevents the imposition of incarceration also prevents the enhancement of the charge.\u201d Id. We concluded that \u201cthe reasoning of Baldasar and our own view of the importance of counsel preclude an enhanced conviction as well as a sentence of imprisonment.\u201d Id. Ten years later the United States Supreme Court partially overruled Balda-sar. In Nichols, the Court held an un-counseled misdemeanor conviction could enhance a later offense so long as no incarceration was imposed in the first prosecution. 511 U.S. at 748-49, 114 S.Ct. at 1928, 128 L.Ed.2d at 755. But see id. at 748 n. 12, 114 S.Ct. at 1928 n. 12, 128 L.Ed.2d at 755 n. 12 (<HOLDING>); Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.28. We recognized this Holdings: 0: recognizing that under the act states are granted federal funds to provide disabled children with a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment 1: holding the states smv statute as applied to old order amish defendants unconstitutional because the states interest in public safety was not sufficiently compelling to override the right to free exercise protected by the first amendment of the united states constitution 2: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights 3: recognizing states are free to afford more protections to defendants 4: recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the May 1990 BVA decision. Charging attorney fees for services related to those issues, after having provided representation before this Court, will be discussed in part II, B, infra, of the Court\u2019s opinion. The Court recognizes that the Board, in a June 1995 decision, found (incorrectly) that the appellant had been retained within one year after the Board\u2019s May 1990 decision. In the decision currently on appeal, the Board passed on deciding that question, but did find that the fee agreement had been entered into in July 1991. This Court is not bound by the Board\u2019s 1995 determination if the conclusion at that stage of the fee-eligibility litigation was clearly erroneous. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also J.E.T.S, Inc. v. United States, 838 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a lower court cannot change the law of the case as decided by the highest court hearing a case 1: holding that a court is not bound by a lower tribunals decision under the law of the case doctrine 2: holding that while a decision of the court will not be disturbed because it is law of the case under res judicata the court is not bound by a conclusion stated as obiter dictum 3: holding that the court is not bound by the law of the case where an earlier decision of the us armed services board of contract appeals was clearly erroneous 4: holding that court is bound by prior panels interpretation of supreme court decision", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "because Zadvydas construed \u00a7 1231(a)(6) to forbid the post-removal-period detention of an alien once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699, 121 S.Ct. 2491, and because the Government does not dispute that Thai\u2019s removal is not reasonably foreseeable, we hold that Thai\u2019s continued detention is not authorized under \u00a7 1231(a)(6). D. The Detention Regulations in 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 241.14(f) Having concluded that \u00a7 1231(a)(6) does not authorize Thai\u2019s continued detention, we turn our attention to the civil commitment regulations in 8 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 241.14(f), et seq. It is beyond dispute that a federal regulation cannot empower the Government to do what a federal statute prohibits it from doing. See e.g., Public Citizen v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1031 (9th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 957, 157 Holdings: 0: holding that epa regulations do not allow the agency to act contrary to federal statute 1: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 2: holding that epa action initiating permitting proceedings was not final agency action 3: holding the epa has the discretion to consider an untimely certification by a state agency 4: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Westberry v. Moore, 772 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla.2000) (<HOLDING>); Bowles v. Singletary, 698 So.2d 1201, 1204 Holdings: 0: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release 1: holding authority to control limits duty to control 2: holding that a defendant who accepts the benefits of control release waives any argument that application of the control release program in the form of the forfeiture of gain time was an ex post violation because control release was enacted after the date of his or her offenses 3: holding that state work release regulation was not an ex post facto law 4: holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "rather than the product itself.\u201d Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When determining whether a trade dress has secondary meaning, courts consider several factors, including: (1) plaintiffs advertising expenditures; (2) consumer surveys linking the trade dress to a particular source; (3) sales success; -(4) unsolicited media coverage; (5) attempts to plagiarize the trade dress; and (6) the length and exclusivity of the use. See Urban Grp. Exercise Consultants, Ltd. v. Dick\u2019s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 12 CV 3599, 2012 WL 3240442, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2012). To meet the plausibility standard under Twombly, a complaint must include sufficient facts to support an inference of secondary meaning. See id. (<HOLDING>). Here, Plaintiffs allegations with respect to Holdings: 0: holding that proof of phenomenal sales success substantial advertising expenditures unsolicited media coverage requests from third parties to license the use of plaintiffs design and defendants deliberate attempt to imitate plaintiffs trade dress sufficed to create serious questions going to the merits even in the absence of consumer surveys 1: holding that inconsistent advertising of an alleged protected trademark for five years did not establish secondary meaning 2: holding that copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendants intent in copying is to confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiffs in that situation the defendants belief that plaintiffs trade dress has acquired secondary meaning  so that his copying will indeed facilitate his passing off  is some evidence that the trade dress actually has acquired secondary meaning 3: holding that plaintiff inadequately pleaded secondary meaning where it failed to allege facts relating to its advertising expenditures consumer surveys marketing coverage or prior attempts to plagiarize plaintiffs trade dress 4: holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "On rehearing, the panel certified an issue related to its holding as one of exceptional importance that should be addressed by the supreme court, and also noted a possible conflict with Winter v. State, 781 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), disapproved on other grounds, Carbajal v. State, 75 So.3d 258, 260 (Fla.2011). The supreme court ultimately dismissed review of King as improvidently granted (by unpublished order). King v. State, 820 So.2d 941 (Fla.2002). 5 . We note that if the facts supporting OSP's authority are disputed, a pretrial evidentiary hearing may be required. Although the Flori da Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for evidentiary hearings on motions to dismiss, the supreme court has authorized the procedure. See Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456 (Fla.2010) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, J., concurring in part, dissenting in Holdings: 0: holding that a hearing officer may not quash a subpoena for a fact witness pursuant to section 32226152 florida statutes and rule 15a60135 florida administrative code and the defense has the absolute right to subpoena other witnesses to testify as to whether or not the defendant exhibited any signs of impairment at or near the time of arrest 1: holding a trial court commits fundamental error by failing to follow florida rule of juvenile procedure 8150 the juvenile rule equivalent of florida rule of criminal procedure 3830 2: holding that a defendant claiming immunity pursuant to section 7760321 florida statutes must file a motion to dismiss pursuant to florida rule of criminal procedure 3190b and requiring trial court to address the motion at a pretrial evidentiary hearing 3: holding that pursuant to florida rule of criminal procedure 3050 the court may extend the sixtyday time limit for a motion to mitigate sentence as long as the motion to mitigate is resolved within a reasonable time 4: holding that argument was not preserved where defendant did not file a pretrial motion to suppress and did not object or make a motion to exclude the evidence until his motion to dismiss at the close of all of the evidence", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of a defendant's waiver of rights, we will look to the totality of the cireumstances to ensure that a defendant's self-incriminating statement was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant's free will. Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230. The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights. Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 114-115 (Ind.2005), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 910, 126 S.Ct. 2936, 165 L.Ed.2d 962 (2006). To the extent that Banks argued in his motion to suppress that his confession was not voluntary, we observe that Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that \"[nlo person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against 3) (<HOLDING>). Standard indicators for voluntariness include Holdings: 0: holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given 1: holding that the reasonableness inquiry is based upon the totality of the circumstances in determining whether or not a search was reasonable 2: holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law 3: holding that admissibility of a confession is governed by determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily 4: holding that the admissibility of a state ment is controlled by determining from the totality of the cireumstances whether it was made voluntarily and not induced by violence threats or other improper influences that overcame the defendants free will", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Colameta began to search for another job before Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 changed his duties or reduced his compensation, Colameta attests \u2014 without contradiction from Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 \u2014 to the importance of the increase in his compensation in remaining with Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 after the expiration of his 2004 Employment Agreement, and he only left Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 after his salary was reduced and his job duties underwent their second alteration, resulting in Colameta\u2019s having more responsibilities for less pay. Viewing Prot\u00e9g\u00e9\u2019s actions together, it was in breach of the 2007 Employment Agreement, at the latest, by January 2009, when it reduced Colameta\u2019s salary by $40,000, eliminated Colameta\u2019s commission plan, and had twice effected changes to Colameta\u2019s job duties. See, e.g., F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 353 Mass. at 587 (<HOLDING>); Grace Hunt IT Solutions, LLC, 2012 WL Holdings: 0: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract 1: holding that change in employees rate of compensation and sales area constituted far reaching changes that strongly suggestedl that the parties had abandoned their old arrangement and had entered into a new relationship 2: holding that an order requiring the agency to search the records did not constitute courtordered change in the relationship of the parties 3: holding that hearing officers noting the parties agreement did not constitute a change in the parties legal relationship 4: holding that agreement had been reached where the plaintiff had proposed terms for providing his services to the defendant and the parties then entered into a business relationship  despite defendants claim it never agreed to the plaintiffs proposed salary terms for that relationship", "references": ["3", "0", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Court had been apprised of the potential for a change of venue motion. 7 . The Court agrees with the general proposition of defense counsel Goldstein that the acts of counsel should not be held against the defendants. (12/13/96 Tr. at 85). A defense attorney, however, is a defendant's representative to the Court. Nevertheless, the Court has also taken action to alleviate a great deal of the burden on the defendants of the trial in New York. 8 . See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969) (stating in broadcast licensing case that \"[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.\u201d); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581-82, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (<HOLDING>). See generally, Ian M. Rose, Note, Barring Holdings: 0: recognizing first amendment and fourteenth amendment interests in inmate correspondence 1: recognizing a first amendment right to receive mail subject to uniform policies of opening mail to ensure prison security 2: recognizing first amendment retaliation right 3: recognizing the right of students to challenge on first amendment grounds actions of school officials which circumscribe the range of ideas to which students are exposed 4: recognizing in first amendment jurisprudence the right to receive information and ideas", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "More recently, the Fourth Circuit characterized the limited application of Eastern Enterprises as follows: Eastern Enterprises can only be viewed as rendering a decision that Congress acted arbitrarily in imposing retroactive liability on a signatory to [National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements] in existence prior to those that promised lifetime health benefits to retired miners when that signatory made no promise of lifetime benefits, did not contribute to the problem that caused the funding shortfall for the promised lifetime benefits or to the need for such benefits, and was not put on notice by any governmental action during the relevant time period that it might be subjected to later liability. Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 606-607 (4th Cir. 1999) (<HOLDING>). In this case, no doubts have been expressed Holdings: 0: holding that the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss raising a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute waives the issue on appeal 1: holding the failure to comply with the act does not bar defendant from raising a constitutional challenge to jury selection procedures 2: holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration 3: holding that any motion made within ten days of entry of judgment which seeks a substantive change in the judgment will be considered a rule 59e motion which suspends the finality of the judgment and tolls the time to appeal 4: holding that eastern enterprises did not constitute a change in the law sufficient to justify the raising of a constitutional challenge to the coal act in a motion for reconsideration after judgment under fed rcivp 59e", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of Hews, 108 Wn.2d 579, 589-92, 741 P.2d 983 (1987); CrR 4.2(d). The State contends, and we agree, that his argument is predicated on the mistaken belief that the connection between the gun, the crime, and the defendant is itself an essential element of being armed. \u00b611 We take this opportunity to summarize our relevant holdings. \u201cA person is \u2018armed\u2019 if a weapon is easily acces sible and readily available for use, either for offensive or defensive purposes\u201d and there is a connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime. Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d at 282; Barnes, 153 Wn.2d at 383. However, the connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime is not an element the State must explicitly plead and prove. See State v. Willis, 153 Wn.2d 366, 374, 103 P.3d 1213 (2005) (<HOLDING>); see also Gurske, 155 Wn.2d at 138-39 (same); Holdings: 0: holding that the district court correctly instructed the jury that there had to be a substantial similarity between the indictment and the proof in order to find the defendant guilty 1: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used 2: holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense 3: holding that the jury need not be specifically instructed to find whether there is a connection between the defendant the weapon and the crime 4: holding that to find negligence jury need not find violation of federal motorcarrier regulation", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "agencies). However, an otherwise-valid referral fee agreement does not violate public policy merely because of a minor technical deficiency with respect to the professional rules. Moreover, permitting Eggen to invoke the ethical rules as a defense to enforcement of the referral fee agreement would do a disservice to the intent of the rules. [T]he purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer\u2019s self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Minn.R.Prof. Conduct scope; accord L & H Airco, 446 N.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). These comments would hold less force if rule Holdings: 0: holding that rules 33 and 34 did not apply to ivys misconduct because these rules are intended to govern attorneys when they are acting as advocates and not in thelr personal capacities 1: holding professional rules do not provide basis for civil liability 2: recognizing professional rules are not intended to run to personal benefit of attorneys adversaries 3: holding that a breach of the rules of professional conduct would not justify setting aside a divorce judgment and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures 4: holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts\"). For this exception to apply, one of the fora s the Labor Commission exelusive authority over employees' claims against their employers for injuries sustained in the workplace. Utah Code Ann. $ 34A-2-105 (Supp.2008). Agencies, in contrast, are limited to the adjudicative authority granted by the legislature. SMP, Inc., 843 P.2d at 533 (\"As a statutorily created agency, the Industrial Commission has only those powers expressly or impliedly granted by statute.\") For this reason, it is more likely that an administrative agency's subject matter jurisdiction will be limited than a district court's. Id. (\"[AJgencies typically have limited subject matter jurisdiction.\"); see also id. at 533-34 (<HOLDING>); Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, \u00b6 23, 34 P.3d 180 Holdings: 0: holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 1: holding that the industrial commission only had subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the payment of wages statute and not contract claims 2: holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute 3: holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract 4: holding that the trial court could not award a refund of restitution where the defendants payments had gone to the states industrial commission over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "income. 2. The statutory child support guidelines provide that a trial court may deviate from the presumptive amount of child support in the event of special expenses incurred for child rearing, including school-sponsored extracurricular activities. OCGA \u00a7 19-6-15 (i) (2) (J) (ii). However, a trial court is free to reject a claim for a deviation from the presumptive child support amount. Turner v. Turner, 285 Ga. 866 (2) (684 SE2d 596) (2009). Here, the trial court \u201cadhered to the child support obligation table (OCGA \u00a7 19-6-15 (o)) and enforced the presumptive amount of child support\u201d and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in declining to add the child\u2019s cheerleading expenses to the child support calculations. See Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Ga. 366, 367 (1) (667 SE2d 350) (2008) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that a tuition waiver is not the same as income for child support purposes 1: holding that trial court did not err 2: holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement 3: holding trial court did not err in declining to apply the childrens private school tuition in child support calculations 4: holding that district court did not clearly err in declining to credit prisoners testimony about exhaustion", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "following a state prosecution arising out of the same events.\u201d Arena, 180 F.3d at 399; see also Heath, 474 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 433. Although Judge Calabresi invited the Supreme Court to re-examine the doctrine in light of increased instances of federal and state successive prosecutions, the doctrine remains viable. See United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 497-99 (2d Cir.1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). Sewell\u2019s double jeopardy challenge is without merit because his successive prosecutions involved separate sovereigns \u2014 New York State and the United States. It is immaterial that the proceedings stemmed from the same events and that the state prosecution ended in acquittal while the federal prosecution ended in conviction. See Arena, 180 F.3d at 399 (<HOLDING>). Sewell\u2019s invitation to compare the state and Holdings: 0: holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation 1: holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct 2: holding that state immunity agreement did not bind federal prosecutor 3: holding that a federal prosecutor may in deciding whether to pursue a subsequent prosecution take into consideration what he deems an inadequate result obtained in the state trial 4: holding that a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages under  1988 in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the states case including deciding which evidence to present", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge\u2019s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or .1998) (<HOLDING>). The court reviews the Magistrate Judge\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that district courts adoption of the magistrate judges report and recommendation one day after issuance did not constitute reversible error where district court conducted a meaningful review of the report and recommendation 1: holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus 2: holding that we review for clear error the bankruptcy courts factual findings 3: holding that the court will review the report and recommendation for clear error 4: holding that a partys failure to raise objections to the report and recommendation waives the partys right to review in the district court", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a claim upon which relief can be granted, we review the legal issues raised herein on the assumption that the facts, as alleged by plaintiff, are true. Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 263, 696 A.2d 546 (1997). With these circumstances in mind, we turn to the CFA to determine whether coverage pursuant to that Act exists. That Act, enacted by the Legislature fifty years ago, created \u201ca powerful weapon to curb consumer fraud.\u201d Lee v. First Union Nat\u2019l Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 257, 971 A.2d 1054 (2009). \u201cIts purpose is to \u2018eliminat[e] sharp practices and dealings in the marketing of merchandise and real estate.\u2019 Channel Cos. v. Britton, 167 N.J.Super. 417, 418, 400 A.2d 1221 (App.Div.1979); see also Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., 198 N.J. 511, 514, 969 A.2d 1069 (2009) (<HOLDING>).\u201d Lee, supra, 199 N.J. at 257, 971 A.2d 1054. Holdings: 0: recognizing that cfa represents a legislative broadside against unsavory commercial practices 1: holding that legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity 2: holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law 3: holding acts of voting to be quintessentially legislative and the introduction of a budget to be formally legislative 4: holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the bus\u2019s lower luggage compartment constituted a seizure, we then could hold the district court did not commit clear error in finding Loos\u2019s and Escobar\u2019s consents to search did not purge the taint of the unlawful seizure. Such a holding is more faithful to the district court\u2019s decision and the parties\u2019 arguments on appeal. Deciding consent cases is a fact-intensive exercise, requiring district courts to \u201ccareful[ly] sift[ ] misrepresentation of legal authority and a misunderstanding of legal authority,\u201d the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding Loos\u2019s and Escobar\u2019s consents to search, in light of the lie about the drug dog alerting, were insufficient to overcome the taint of an unlawful seizure. See United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254, 1262, 1264 (8th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Because I would be Holdings: 0: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept 1: holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law 2: holding threat to obtain a search warrant if individual does not consent to a search is just one factor in deciding whether the totality of the circumstances supports a voluntary consent finding 3: holding a search pursuant to the service of a subpoena duces tecum as in normal consent search situations involves a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances and recognizing a vast difference between a misrepresentation of legal authority and a misunderstanding of legal authority 4: holding that whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion express or implied is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The definition is not useful in resolving whether residency is an employment qualification as opposed to some other type of employment requirement. 7 . In St. Louis Fire Fighters Ass\u2019n, the City chose to make its firefighters\u2019 salaries dependent on the salary given to police employees under state law. Because this was a decision by the City as to salary, it did not constitute an impermissible legislative arrogation of power or an improper delegation of city authority to set compensation to the legislature. The legislature, this Court stated, \"has not sought to require that firemen be hired, or to provide their duties, or fix their compensation. The general assembly has done nothing to violate art. VI, s[ec] 22.\u201d Id. at 461. 8 . See also Cohen v. Poelker, 520 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. banc 1975) (<HOLDING>). 9 . In situations in which the question of Holdings: 0: recognizing that intent of public records act is to provide all citizens with access to the records of all public governmental bodies 1: holding that chapter 610 rsmo which requires public governmental bodies to open their meetings to the public when conducting the peoples business does not violate the home rule law because it does not regulate powers duties or compensation 2: holding section 625 only requires a showing that the conduct was done in a place that is open to the public or where the public has a right to be 3: holding texas open meeting act prohibiting governmental body from conducting closed meetings during which public business or public policy over which the governmental body has supervision or control is discussed to be contentneutral because closed meetings 1 prevent transparency 2 encourage fraud and corruption and 3 foster mistrust in government 4: holding that motorcycle training course is not a matter of public necessity and release does not violate public policy", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "may be required to meet a rigorous liability standard mandated by the First Amendment). In taking cases, like other cases, a \u201cwell-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.\u201d Franco, 930 A.2d at 172 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, like evaluation of an affirmative defense that the claimed public purpose for a taking was pretextual, evaluation of a claim that the District abused the eminent domain process does not require us to stretch to draw dubious inferences that the executive branch acted improperly. Cf. Oh v. National Capital Revitalization Corp., 7 A.3d 997, 1002-03 (D.C.2010) (<HOLDING>). Even if discovery might reveal facts Holdings: 0: recognizing that the federal pleading standard is a less stringent standard than the delaware pleading standard 1: holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard 2: holding under lenient pleading standard that party failed adequately to allege that the taking was under a pretext of a public purpose 3: holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant 4: holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under  1983", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000d. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). The Court\u2019s decision does not bar all claims to enforce to such regulations, but only disparate impact claims brought by private parties directly under Title VI. Id. at 299-300, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Disparate impact claims may still be brought against state officials for prospective injunctive relief through an action under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 to enforce section 602 regulations. Id. The decision in Sandoval does not affect plaintiffs\u2019 right to bring a disparate impact claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and defendants do not contend otherwise. See New Mexico Ass\u2019n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 854 (10th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, Holdings: 0: holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea 1: recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact 2: holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea 3: recognizing the cause of action 4: recognizing cause of action", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category pf claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction)- and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that : the court's decision will bind-them,\u201d). 22 . Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, Abb U.S. 408, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 23 . Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). 24 .See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (finding that \"continuous and systematic\u201d corporate activities with Ohio subjected a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction there); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (<HOLDING>); see also Monestier, supra note 1, at 1352 Holdings: 0: holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts  ie general jurisdiction  if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state 1: recognizing general jurisdiction where availment is systematic and continuous 2: holding that when determining whether a nonresident defendant has continuous and systematic contacts with texas sufficient to support general jurisdiction courts examine the defendants contacts and forumrelated activities only up to the time that suit was filed 3: holding that thirteen business trips of short duration over eighteen months was not continuous and systematic solicitation of business in the state to justify general jurisdiction 4: holding that a ceos trip to the forum state to negotiate a services contract did not constitute the continuous and systematic general business contacts required to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "appeal following the trial court\u2019s resolution of the remaining equitable counts. It has been noted that a \u201cRule 54(b) certification does not authorize the entry of a final judgment on part of a single claim.... \u201d Fullilove v. Home Fin. Co., 678 So.2d 151, 154 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (citing Precision American Corp. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 505 So.2d 380 (Ala.1987)). We have also observed that \u201cRule 54(b) is properly applied in a situation where the claim and the counterclaim present more than one claim for relief, either of which could have been separately enforced.\u201d Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So.2d 1373, 1374 (Ala.1987) (citing Cates v. Bush, 293 Ala. 535, 307 So.2d 6 (1975) (emphasis added)). See also Pate v. Merchants Nat\u2019l Bank of Mobile, 409 So.2d 797, 800 (Ala.1982) (<HOLDING>). As the appellants correctly argue, Thom holds Holdings: 0: holding rule 54b certification appropriate under the facts because ejither of these claims could have been separately enforced 1: holding that dismissal of some but not all claims or parties not immediately appealable absent rule 54b certification 2: holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification 3: holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification 4: holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "opposed the termination of the parents\u2019 rights to the three children. Rather, the guardian recommended readjudicating the children dependent, retaining their placement with the maternal aunt, and permitting the parents to enter into a case plan with the Department with a goal of reunification. The guardian noted that the parents adequately provided for the children\u2019s housing, clothing, health, and nutritional needs. The guardian was mainly concerned that the parents receive education and support regarding child development, i.e., help in determining what level of supervision and interaction was appropriate for children in different developmental stages. The guardian described the family as \u201cclose knit\u201d and indicated that the children were very bonded wi So.2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). In the context of egregious conduct, this Holdings: 0: holding that an unborn child is not a dependent for purposes of the neglect statute 1: holding a woman may be prosecuted for child neglect and endangering a child for prenatal substance abuse 2: holding that social services attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity for actions related to the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency proceedings 3: holding egregious conduct occurred with oneyearold child who had broken arm skull fracture bruising healing rib fracture and other indications of neglect 4: holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "could not be overemphasized. Id. (emphasis in original). Federico expressed the same sentiments. See Federico\u2019s Commentary at 182-83 (explaining that while perhaps the word \u201cinvented\u201d in the prior patent act may have been the source of judicial demand for more than just novelty, Section 103 replaced any requirement for \u201cinvention\u201d). Contemporaneous commentators also recognized that any need for \u201cinvention\u201d had been rejected in favor of nonobviousness. See generally, Karl B. Lutz, The New 1952 Patent Statute, 35 J. Pat. Off. Soc\u2019y 155, 157-58 (1953) (explaining that courts had long ago decided that novelty was not enough and had disagreed on how to determine how much more was necessary, but that that issue was now addressed solely by Section 103); Dean O.S. 50 (Fed.Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Thus, any requirement for \u201cinventiveness\u201d Holdings: 0: recognizing that kotteakos sets out the harmlesserror standard for nonconstitutional errors 1: holding that defendant may not pursue interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial 2: holding in the context of the assertion of a qualified immunity defense that a trial courts summary judgment order that merely determines that the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial does not meet the requirements of the federal collateral order doctrine 3: recognizing that section 103 sets forth the standard and so synergism of a known combination is not required 4: holding that although the board set forth the appropriate standard of review at the outset of its decision in this case whether the bia properly applied that standard was a question of law", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "outside of the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 595, 597. Here, the district court faced an unrepentant defendant, who absconded from the United States within a month of commencing his term of supervised release with a history of failing to comply with conditions of parole and probation. The court justified its sentence based on Angelo-Guarino\u2019s inability to comply with the conditions of supervised release, suspicions regarding his explanations for his conduct, and the need to deter further criminal conduct and protect the public from future criminal conduct. Considering the testimony, evidence, and record before it, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence that exceeded the Guideline range. See United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we affirm Angelo-Guarino\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range  even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range 1: holding statutory booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines 2: recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed 3: holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence unless its was an upward departure barred appeal of sentence within guidelines range 4: holding that the district court which had considered the guidelines but found an upward variant sentence necessary given the defendants previous violations did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 24month sentence instead of a guidelines range sentence of 3 to 9 months incarceration", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "statutory denial of its then pending motion for a new trial, their appeal must be dismissed. State v. Wall, Ala., 348 So.2d 482. Appellants\u2019 alternative motion that this court grant them relief via Rule 2(b) and Rule 26(b), ARAP, must also be denied. Although appellants contend that Rule 2(b) and Rule 26(b) may be used to reflect that express consent to extend the 90 day time limit of Rule 59.1 was shown in the trial record, no such consent was given by appel-lee\u2019s attorney. To grant appellants\u2019 alternative motion under Rule 2(b) and Rule 26(b) would in effect extend their time for filing a notice of appeal \u2014 -a result which both of the aforementioned rules expressly -prohibit. APPEAL DISMISSED. WRIGHT, P. J., concurs. HOLMES, J., concurs specially. 1 . See State v. Wall, 348 So.2d 482 (<HOLDING>). 2 . Our supreme court has construed this Holdings: 0: holding that the 90 day period set out in rule 591 begins to run from the date of filing rather than the date set for hearing of the posttrial motion 1: holding the 90 day period begins to run the date the eeoc right to sue letter is delivered to plaintiffs counsel 2: holding that rule 6e is inapplicable where the time for filing begins to run on the date of mailing 3: holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made 4: holding that where the violation of the fdcpa was the filing of a lawsuit the statule of limitations begins to run on the date of filing", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are entitled. Although plaintiffs claim \u201cthe Court need not look further than the New York statute to conclude that this matter does not involve claims for benefits and does not fall , within ERISA\u201d (Pis. Opp\u2019n at 6), this is not true: as previously set forth, turning solely to N.Y. GOL \u00a7 5-335 will not assist either plaintiffs or this Court in determining the rights plaintiffs hold, the benefits they are entitled to, and any conditions attached to such benefits under the Plans! Indeed, the allegations here stand in contrast to those cases in which a court has held that the plaintiffs claim was better categorized as an \u201camount of payment\u201d dispute, as opposed to a \u201cright to payment\u201d matter. Compare Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), with Zummo v. Zummo, No. 11 CV Holdings: 0: holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 1: holding that erisa did not preempt hospitals claims against erisa plan administrator for misrepresentation under texas insurance code because hospitals claims were not dependent on or derived from the beneficiarys right to recover benefits under the plan 2: holding that action against an erisa plan administrator based on his alleged oral promise to pay for the majori ty of beneficiarys medical expenses was not a colorable claim under  502a1b because dispute concerned the terms of the alleged oral promise not of the erisa plan itself 3: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan 4: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the greater complexity of many disputes resolved by arbitration, and the developments of the law in this area.\u201d Prefatory Note to the RUAA. In other words, the RUAA is a \u201crevision of the UAA.\u201d Id. The Prefatory Note to the original UAA explained that \u201c[t]he section on Appeals is intended to remove doubts as to what orders are appealable and to limit appeals prior to judgment as to those instances where the element of finality is present.\u201d Prefatory Note to the UAA. It had been held that in order to ensure that the appeals section of the UAA has the intended effect of \u201cremov[ing] doubts as to what orders are appealable,\u201d that section must be read as an exclusive list of appeal-able orders. See S. California Edison Co. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, 977 P.2d 769, 774 (1999) (<HOLDING>). If orders related to arbitration could also Holdings: 0: holding that the prefatory note indicates that the intent of the uaa drafters was that interlocutory orders including those compelling arbitration are not appealable 1: holding that notice of appeal from final judgment brought forward the entire case including earlier interlocutory orders that were not independently appealable 2: holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable 3: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final 4: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable because it is not final and because it is not listed in the uaa appeals provision", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Absent a proper plea of title, we do not see how the trial court could have ordered an undertaking. Penny v. Penny, 565 A.2d 587, 589 (D.C.1989) (\"[A] ... protective order is an equitable device of the court whereas a \u2018Rule 5(c)' undertaking order is statutorily authorized.\u201d). Moreover, to the extent the Trust or the trial court assumed there was no legal defense to an action for post-foreclosure possession that would not rise to a plea of title, they were mistaken. See Lindsey v. Prillman, 921 A.2d 782, 786 (D.C.2007) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order either a protective order or an undertaking where the person in possession merely alleged a contractual opportunity to purchase); Mahoney v. Campbell, 209 A.2d 791, 794 (D.C.1965) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Crockett does not argue that the trial Holdings: 0: holding that proof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession citation omitted 1: holding that a past arrest for possession without more is simply not enough to provide reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is currently in possession 2: holding that a plea of title was not interposed where the person in possession answered that the party suing for possession was not the established owner of the premises 3: holding that the defendants possession of the firearm was not so fleeting as to warrant an instruction on temporary innocent possession 4: holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "it was \u201cof such a fundamental nature as to render the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.\u201d Chapel v. United States, 21 M.J. 687, 689 (A.C.M.R.1985)(citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505-13, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)). The petitioner now seeks the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel during our initial review of his ease. He alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective because his counsel never contacted him. Applying the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) to this case, we can test such a claim for prejudice. United States v. Curtis, 44 M.J. 106, 164 (1996); cf. United States v. Howard, 47 M.J. 104 (1997)(<HOLDING>). The appellant argues that he was prejudiced Holdings: 0: holding that defendants failure to obtain counsel despite opportunities to do so implied a waiver of counsel 1: holding that an invocation of the advice of counsel defense waives the attorneyclient privilege 2: holding that the failure of defense counsel to call a corroborating witness resulted in prejudice to the defendant 3: holding that failure of substitute defense counsel to establish attorneyclient relationship with accused before responding to staff judge advocates recommendation must be tested for prejudice to obtain relief 4: holding that there is no right to a meaningful attorneyclient relationship", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "seize ammunition boxes that contained linked ammunition rounds or large-capacity magazines. See Doc. 63, Ex. I (authorizing search for \u201ca large capacity feeding device that consists of ammunition, linked together by belt and links\u201d). Based on his testimony that the green ammunition box was empty, Ex. C at 157, Plaintiffs contention seems to be that the box was outside the scope of the warrant because it did not contain any ammunition or magazines, though nowhere does he clearly articulate such an argument. Regardless of whether a reasonable juror would credit such a \u201chyper-technical\u201d interpretation of the warrant, it is also the case that the \u201cplain view\u201d exception allowed the seizure of the ammunition box as probative evidence. Cf. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 160 n. 21 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1163 Holdings: 0: holding warrant was overbroad when probable cause existed to search for a pistol but warrant permitted search and seizure of all firearms and ammunition 1: holding that there was no fourth amendment seizure where delivery of package was not delayed because it is the extent of the interference with the defendants possessory interest in the property that determines whether a seizure has occurred 2: holding seizure of evidence in plain view reasonable under fourth amendment 3: holding that a seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine where there was probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity 4: holding that seizure of ammunition gun clips and related firearm paraphernalia was permitted under plainview doctrine where warrant simply authorized seizure of firearms", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the trial court ultimately awarded Landlord some $56,000.00 in attorney\u2019s fees for the eviction proceedings. Pool and Spa has separately appealed that judgment to this Court in case number 3D 16-840. We express no opinion as to the merits of that appeal. 4 . While not important to our disposition of this c\u00e1se, we note that, in the negligence count of Landlord\u2019s complaint, Landlord does, indeed, assert entitlement to fees by incorporating the fee entitlement paragraph found in the general allegations of the complaint. 5 . The 2012 version of rule 1.442(c), governing the form and content of proposals, required proposals to \"identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve.\u201d Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2)(B). 6 . See Lyons v. Chamoun, 96 So.3d 456, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (<HOLDING>); but see Russell Post Props., Inc. v. Leaders Holdings: 0: holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees 1: holding sanctions order was too general to support award 2: holding a defense based on a contractual waiver and release of liability did not permit the award of attorneys fees in a negligence action 3: holding that a proposal for settlement that provided plaintiff execute a full release but did not attach release to its proposal was too ambiguous to support an award of attorneys fees 4: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "this category. Plaintiffs also present a new claim about SGI\u2019s first quarter shortfall. Plaintiffs have pushed the start of the class period back from October 19, 1995, to September 13, 1995, and now contend that defendants knew of the problems described above early enough that they should have disclosed them prior to announcing the first quarter shortfall in October. Plaintiffs concede, however, that SGI\u2019s first quarter results were \u201cat the low end of expectations.\u201d (FAC \u00b6 8.) The eompa ny\u2019s first quarter revenues of $595 million were only five percent below market expectations of forty to forty-five percent growth (revenues in the range of $628-650 million). This shortfall is immaterial as a matter of law. See In re Convergent Techs. Secs. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 514 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). For this reason, plaintiffs claims regarding Holdings: 0: holding that revenues ten percent below target are not actionable 1: holding that an actionable  20a claim must be preceded by an actionable primary violation under  10b 2: holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal 3: holding that   1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below 4: holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "review on this issue. Or if a new trial is necessary, it may be granted by the trial court without subjecting both the litigants and the courts to the expense and delay inherent in appellate review. Third, appellate courts will be free to more expeditiously dispose of the issues properly preserved for appeal. Finally, the exception requirement will remove the advantage formerly enjoyed by the unprepared trial lawyer who looked to the appellate court to compensate for his trial omissions. Id. at 116-17 (footnotes and citations omitted). This Court subsequently expanded the rule of Dilliplaine to apply to situations where an objection was made timely at trial but the remedy sought on appeal was not requested of the trial judge. See Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 426 A.2d 595, 597 (1981) (<HOLDING>). This Court has also applied the Holdings: 0: holding that claims not raised in a timely postconviction motion are waived 1: holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal 2: holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 3: holding no legitimate basis for distinction may be found between the situation where the claim is not timely raised and where the remedy sought was not timely pursued 4: holding that heirs at law of testatrix were not necessary parties to action where trust fails cy pres is inapplicable and the will contained a residuary clause and finding no basis to distinguish between the situation where the trust does or does not become operative", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the provision to his situation. This is in part due to judicial economy, and in part due to the need for a well developed record including appropriate findings of fact in order for a court to decide whether a particular provision had been applied to specific facts. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. [232], 239-245, 101 S.Ct. [488], 493-496, 66 L.Ed.2d 416. Id. at 488. Courts have applied this general rule when dealing with arbitration under 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1401. See Terson Company, Inc. v. Bakery Drivers and Salesmen Local 194, 739 F.2d 118, 121 (3d Cir.1984) (The basis of Terson\u2019s as applied challenge is not apparent from the published decision.); Republic Industries, Inc. v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 296 (3d Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); See also, Republic Industries, Inc. v. Holdings: 0: holding that in deciding on a facial constitutional challenge it is improper to consider only limited hypothetical applications 1: recognizing that courts should exercise judicial restraint in a facial challenge 2: holding that exhaustion of arbitration procedure is not necessary before the district court could consider a facial constitutional challenge 3: holding that taxpayer was still required to go through tax refund procedure despite facial constitutional challenge to state intangibles tax 4: holding a new constitutional challenge not raised in district court was not properly before court of appeals", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 922(k). The Court finds defendant\u2019s arguments to be unavailing for the following reasons. First, as defendant admits, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has previously held that \u201c\u00a7 922 is a constitutional exercise of Congress\u2019s Commerce Clause powers.\u201d United States v. Teleguz, 492 F.3d 80, 86-87 (1st Cir.2007); see also United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir.1995). The Teleguz decision, decided in the aftermath of three Supreme Court cases that defendant has referenced in his motion, upheld section 922(k) against similar constitutional challenges. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 Holdings: 0: holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce 1: holding the limitations to congresss commerce clause authority recognized in lopez have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the hobbs act 2: holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce 3: holding that housing discrimination has a substantial effect on interstate commerce 4: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "shows that Koch did not render services to \u201canother\u201d under its vetting program, the purpose of which was an internal determination whether a vessel should be taken under charter. Brown\u2019s deposition testimony described the vetting of the Marine Atlantic and made clear that during it no inspection of the vessel was done as part of the analysis. Brown Dep. Ex. E at pp. 38-43. Furthermore, Koch emphasizes, Saudi fails to cite a single case in which a time charterer of a vessel was held liable based on \u00a7 324A. All cases cited by Saudi are distinguishable from this one, Koch urges, and are not decided under general maritime law; he discusses two in detail: United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 821, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)(<HOLDING>); and Merklin v. United States, 788 F.2d 172 Holdings: 0: holding that the government cannot waive or forfeit an argument that the discretionary function exception to the federal tort claims act ftca should apply 1: holding that the discretionary function exception to the federal tort claims act precluded tort actions based on the alleged negligence of the federal aviation administration in failing to check certain thing in the process of certificating the aircraft for use in commercial aviation 2: holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception 3: holding that the contract claims of a passenger who was denied service for failing to produce identification were preempted because the carrier relied on its right under federal law to deny service and on its duty to follow a security directive from the federal aviation administration 4: holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "are split on the issue of whether claims under the Texas Insurance Code survive the decedent. See Launius v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. No. 3:06-CV-0579-B, 2007 WL 1135347, at *3 (N.D.Tex. April 17, 2007) (collecting Texas cases and noting disagreement on issue of survivability). As a named beneficiary of Mr. Kersh\u2019s life insurance policy, however, Plaintiffs claim is direct; issues of assign-ability are inapposite. See Williams v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s of London, 398 Fed.Appx. 44, 47 (5th Cir.2010) (citations omitted) (\u201cA plaintiff has standing to sue under an insurance policy if the plaintiff is a named insured or an additional named insured or if the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary of the policy.\u201d); Mendoza v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants\u2019 Holdings: 0: holding that an insurer who brought a declaratory judgment action and out of an abundance of caution named the injured party as an additional defendant 1 must have thought the injured party had some potential interest in the insurance policy and 2 had tacitly conceded the injured partys standing to appeal by not contesting the appeal on the ground of lack of standing 1: holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code 2: holding that an agent breaches its duty to use reasonable care and diligence in procuring insurance when it fails to provide an insurance policy that covers the contents of the insureds business as the insured had requested 3: holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable 4: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not, either explicitly or implicitly/ limit or abolish the power of the General Assembly in any other area where we have previously found its jurisdiction to be plenary,\u201d see id. at 935-86, the separation of powers amendments reinforced the judiciary\u2019s previously recognized plenary powers, including the power to regulate the practice of law. See State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 590 (R.I.2009) (separation of powers doctrine prohibits \u201cunwarranted legislative invasion of the judicial power\u201d). Accordingly, this Court has the authority, as it has had since its inception, to promulgate and enforce rules of conduct and procedure for the regulation of attorneys, as well as to exercise necessary mea (same); Donatelli Building Co. v. Cranston Loan Co., 87 R.I. 293, 297, 140 A.2d 705, 707 (1958) (<HOLDING>); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, Holdings: 0: recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties 1: recognizing the inherent power of courts to ensure an adversarial proceeding 2: recognizing courts inherent power to issue subpoenas 3: recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants 4: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and classifying contempt as a Class A felony is that it raises the issue of a potential Eighth Amendment challenge. Love, 449 F.3d at 1158 (Barkett, J., concurring). The concurrence in Love correctly noted that \u201cwhere a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.\u201d Id., quoting Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). The Court is mindful that it should always avoid a constitutionally questionable construction, because the presumption is that the laws as passed by Congress are constitutional. However, after careful reflection, the Court finds that the ta , 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (<HOLDING>) (brackets and quotation omitted). As the Holdings: 0: holding that sentence of mandatory twentyfive years followed by life on probation for aggravated molestation of a fouryearold child does not implicate categorical eighth amendment restriction under graham nor is it grossly disproportionate for particular crime 1: holding that the eighth amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime 2: holding that stiffer penalties for cocaine base transactions are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and therefore do not violate eighth amendment 3: holding that the eighth amendment does not require comparative proportionality review by an appellate court 4: holding that although proportionality review is an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences neither precedent including gregg nor the eighth amendment mandates proportionality review in every case", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "participation in airport ownership and operation in most other parts of the world\u201d); Zane O. Gresham & Brian Busey, \u201cDo As I Say and Not As I Do\u201d\u2014United States Behind in Airport Privatization, 17 Air. & Space Law. 12,' 13-14 (2002) (describing airport privatization internationally and experimentation with airport privatization in the United States). And, even domestically, Congress has enacted a \u201cpilot program\u201d for privatization of airports. See 49 U.S.C. \u00a7 47134. Moreover, the Supreme Court and other federal appellate courts have recognized the inherently competitive and commercial nature of airport operations. See Int\u2019l Soc\u2019y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U S. at 682, 112 S.Ct. 2701; see also Four T\u2019s, Inc. v. Little Rock Mun. Airport Comm\u2019n, 108 F.3d 909, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1997) (<HOLDING>). Airports also compete against private modes Holdings: 0: holding in response to a commerce clause challenge that a city that operated an airport was acting as a participant in the market for airport rental car services 1: holding that owners of an airport failed to meet their burden of showing that their skydiving business was an accessory use to the airport 2: holding that one plaintiff bringing negligence and wantonness claim against car rental company for failing to remove rental car from stolen car list could not recover mental anguish damages because he was never at risk of physical harm but that fact question existed as to whether other plaintiff was at risk of physical harm when police pulled weapon on him 3: holding that the state of maryland was a participant in the market of purchasing junk car hulks through a bounty system 4: holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "terms and conditions of his probation. The Court finds that Mr. Redman has not learned his lesson from his earlier period of incarceration. He continues to break the law by using these illegal controlled substances. The Court further finds Mr. Redman is a detriment to society and that it is in the best interest of the public that he be kept out of society. The Court finds the defendant to be a public menace who should not be on probation. Because nothing new had transpired in the period following the trial court\u2019s ruling on the probation revocation petition, it stands to reason that there would be no additional findings of fact or legal rulings required, other than the granting or denial of the Rule 35 motion itself. See Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Head, 198 W.Va. at 299, 480 S.E.2d at 508 (<HOLDING>). In making its ruling of August 3, 2001, Holdings: 0: holding that the court may only consider the discrete acts that occurred within the appropriate time period 1: holding that the threeday grace period in fed rcivp 6e does not apply to motions for a new trial under fedrcivp 59 in part because the time period for filing those motions begins to run from entry of judgment 2: holding that when considering west virginia rules of criminal procedure 35b motions circuit courts generally should consider only those events that occur within the 120day filing period 3: holding that a forfeiture action is timely so long as at least an administrative action is filed within the 120day statutory period 4: holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "City as early as June 29, 2000. Nevertheless, Cedar Professional asserts that the one-year notice period in the Act, see Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 63-30-13, did not commence until it discovered facts to support a direct negligence claim against Cedar City. We disagree. \u00b6 14 Cedar Professional was not entitled to wait until it knew all of the facts supporting its negligence claim against Cedar City. It is enough that Cedar Professional was \u201caware that the governmental entity\u2019s action or inaction ha[d] resulted in some kind of harm to its interests.\u201d Bank One Utah, N.A v. West Jordan City, 2002 UT App 271,\u00b6 12, 54 P.3d 135. Further, this is not a case where the claimant was unaware that the governmental entity had harmed its interest. See Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978) (<HOLDING>). Whether Cedar City had hoped to conceal its Holdings: 0: holding that the oneyear limit under the act was tolled until the plaintiff learned despite the defendants contrary representations that the defendants storm drain was the cause of damage 1: holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide 2: holding where the plaintiff presented evidence which demonstrates that the terms alleged by the defendants to be indefinite were in fact sufficiently well delineated to all parties the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendants was inappropriate despite the fact that the defendants contested the plaintiffs evidence concerning the manner in which the relevant contractual language should be construed 3: holding that the statute of limitations did not commence  despite the filing of a prior complaint against another physician  until the defendants deposition made the plaintiff aware of the defendants involvement in the decedents death where the plaintiff failed to discover the defendants involvement because of the defendants misstatement concealment or fraud 4: holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "attempted second-degree murder, a crime one step removed ft\u2019om the necessarily lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter. Jones filed an appeal that was perfected on July 30, 2013. On April 8, 2010, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the standard jury instruction for manslaughter by act was incorrect CA 2005) (determining that appellant\u2019s counsel\u2019s failure to request supplemental briefing on a favorable appellate decision from another district court constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); McCann v. Moore, 763 So.2d 556, 556-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (finding that counsel had ample time to call favorable decision from another district to court\u2019s attention, but failed to do so, so belated appeal granted); Ford v. Singletary, 689 So.2d 392, 392-93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); Whatley v. State, 679 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that the strickland test applies to claims  that counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal 1: holding counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence 2: holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to bring new supreme court decision to courts attention when it expressly applied to pipeline eases 3: holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue 4: holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "his organizational role at all. Instead, it concluded that the enhancement should not apply because Washington did not present a recidivism risk or danger to the public, two of the factors the Sentencing Commission has indicated underlie the role enhancement. See \u00a7 3B1.1 cmt. background. Al though sentencing courts may draw upon background commentary to inform their analysis, they must begin with the plain language of the guidelines. See United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167, 1168 n. 4 (9th Cir.2009). As with the enhancement for obstruction of justice, if the court determines that the factual predicate for the enhancement under \u00a7 3B1.1 has been established, application of the enhancement is mandatory. See, e.g., United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). When imposing a sentence, the court may, of Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant met the third prong of plain error analysis demonstrating prejudice resulting from a booker error where the sentencing judge made several statements indicating the mandatory guideline sentence was very very severe and sentenced the defendant at the low end of the guideline range 1: holding that where the commentary to a guideline is at odds with another provision of the guidelines the guideline prevails 2: holding that once a guideline provisions criteria have been met the enhancement is mandatory not discretionary 3: holding that the statute is mandatory 4: holding that because it is not strictly necessary under the statute for a victim to fear death the guideline enhancement is not coterminous with the basic offense conduct", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce includes the power to prohibit their use for harmful purposes, even if the targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of commerce and is purely local in nature.\u201d), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 829, 126 S.Ct. 368, 163 L.Ed.2d 77 (2005); United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.2004)(\"Congress clearly has the power to regulate the internet, as it does other instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce, and to prohibit its use for harmful or immoral purposes regardless of whether those purposes would have a primarily intrastate impact.\u201d), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1134, 125 S.Ct. 2951, 162 L.Ed.2d 877 (2005); see also United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217-18 (11th Cir.2006) (emphasis added) Holdings: 0: holding it is within congresss authority to regulate all intrastate possession of child pornography not just that which has traveled in interstate commerce or has been produced using materials that have traveled in interstate commerce applying gonzales v raich 545 us 1 125 sct 2195 162 led2d 1 2005 1: recognizing that congress had the power to regulate boxcars that traveled exclusively intrastate because of their inherent mobility and connection to interstate commerce it is no objection to such an exertion of commerce clause power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise in whole or in part out of matters connected with intrastate commerce 2: holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce 3: recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce 4: holding that the feloninpossessionofafirearm statute only requires a showing that the firearm at one time traveled through interstate commerce", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cAn operator emerging from an alley, driveway, or building in a business or residence district shall ... stop the vehicle before moving on a sidewalk or the sidewalk area extending across an alley or driveway.\u201d Tex. Transp. Code Ann. \u00a7 545.256(1) (Vernon 1999). Though the testimony reflected that there was no sidewalk crossing in front of the entrance or exit from the alley to the street, Ferguson testified that there was a curb that was \u201cbroken by the alleyway so that cars\u201d could enter and exit the alley or pedestrians could walk across. Though Throneberry refuted the contention, the State argued that the \u201cimproved area [where] ... pedestrians walk\u201d constituted a \u201csidewalk area\u201d pursuant to section 545.256(1). The jury could reasonably have agreed with the S -Dallas 1992, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Harris v. State, 713 S.W.2d 773, 775 Holdings: 0: holding that accelerating a car so that it screeched and fishtailed a bit was sufficient for offense 1: holding that where evidence was sufficient for attempted murder it was necessarily sufficient for aggravated assault which is a lesser included offense 2: holding that accelerating a car so that its tires spun when a light turned from red to green was sufficient 3: holding that there was probable cause for arrest where officers knew defendants had recently been with suspected drug dealer officers saw defendants car being maneuvered so as to indicate that surveillance had been detected and when officers approached car defendant attempted to place package under car and then pulled the package back inside the car and closed and locked the car door 4: holding that accelerating a car so that it threw gravel on police car was enough to satisfy exhibition of speed violation", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "F.3d at 204. The categorical approach focuses on \u201cthe intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any particular violation.\u201d Id. at 204 (\u201c[T]he singular circumstances of an individual petitioner\u2019s crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant[.]\u201d (quoting Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 270 (2d Cir.2000) (Calabresi, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where, however, a criminal statute encompasses diverse classes of criminal acts \u2014 some of which would categorically be grounds for removal and others of which would not \u2014 we have held that such statutes can be considered \u201cdivisible\u201d statutes. See Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Sui, 250 F.3d at 118 (holding that a statute Holdings: 0: holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing 1: holding that a federal statute prohibiting the export of certain classes of firearms and ammunition was divisible because violation of the statute with regard to firearms would be a removable offense while violation of the statute with regard to ammunition might not be 2: holding that without such a showing the government may only charge the defendant with one violation of  922g1  regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved 3: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 4: holding that under rico plaintiff must prove an injury because of violation of statute", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the police, and (3) the trial court improperly denied the defendant\u2019s request to poll the jury upon return of the verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The victim, who at the time of the incidents giving rise to these convictions was twelve years old, is a female with mild mental retardation. In 1993, the victim was introduced to the defendant, who at that time was twenty-six years old. Sometime in early September, 1993, the victim accepted an automobile ride from the defendant. The defendant drove the victim to a sparsely furnished vacant apartment in Waterbury and, over the victim\u2019s protestations, had sexual intercourse with her. The defenda A.2d 1078 (1995), cert. denied, 237 Conn. 921, 676 A.2d 1376 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Because the constancy of accusation doctrine Holdings: 0: holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection 1: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 2: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proof and that such a disposition does not violate the due process clause 3: holding that negligent inaction by a jail officer does not violate due process 4: holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the reasons described above, Shkreli has not established past persecution and therefore his claim for humanitarian asylum also fails. E. Withholding of Removal and Protection Under the CAT The IJ also denied Shkreli\u2019s claims for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. Shkreli, however, has not challenged these portions of the IJ\u2019s decision before the BIA or this Court. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider whether the IJ erred as to either issue since Shkreli did not exhaust his administrative remedies by presenting them to the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1252(d)(1); Liti, 411 F. 3d at 641. Further, even if they were not jurisdictionally barred, Shkreli\u2019s failure to raise them before this Court constitutes a waiver. United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 566-67 (6th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we Holdings: 0: holding that arguments not raised in district court are waived 1: holding that arguments not raised by a party in its open ing brief are deemed waived 2: holding that arguments that are not raised or that are not accompanied by factual and legal support are deemed waived 3: holding that arguments not raised before the trial court are waived 4: holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "inappropriate in a pre-enforcement challenge to an abortion regulation. As this court has recognized, the Supreme Court has flexibly applied justiciability doctrines in abortion cases. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that \u201cthe Supreme Court has visibly relaxed its traditional standing principles in deciding abortion cases\u201d (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 123-29, 93 S.Ct. 705; Doe, 410 U.S. at 187-89, 93 S.Ct. 739)); accord Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 427-28; see also, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (\u201cconclud[ing] that it generally is appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of women patients as against governmental interference with the abortion decision\u201d); Roe, 410 U.S. at 125, 93 S.Ct. 705 (<HOLDING>); cf. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609-10, 124 S.Ct. 1941 Holdings: 0: holding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permits originally issued eight years earlier was capable of repetition yet evading review 1: holding ease not moot when challenged administrative order expired because icc proceedings are continuing and their consideration ought not be defeated by short term orders capable of repetition yet evading review 2: holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review 3: holding that we have no difficulty concluding that challenge to expired fiveyear npdes permit was capable of repetition yet evading review 4: recognizing a mootness exception for abortion litigation because pregnancy  truly could be capable of repetition yet evading review ", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the Notice procedure purports to set the rights and obligations attendant to submitting a refund claim. The legal consequences flowing therefrom are substantial: no less than the loss of the right to file a refund suit in court should a claimant fail to abide by the Notice procedure. See I.R.C. \u00a7 7422(a) (precluding a refund suit where taxpayer has not filed a prior refund claim with the IRS consistent with IRS regulations). As a back-up argument, the defendant proposes that \u201can adequate remedy already exists under the time-honored, tax-refund-suit procedure.\u201d Def.\u2019s Mot. at 15. The cases cited for this proposition are inapposite because they discuss the Anti-Injunction Act rather than the APA. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 374-76, 104 S.Ct. 1107, 79 L.Ed.2d 372 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746, Holdings: 0: holding that the statutory bar set by the antiinjunction act cannot be avoiding by directing the injunction solely to a party as distinguished from the state court 1: holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act 2: holding the antiinjunction act  does not bar an injunction of a state court proceeding which purports to exercise jurisdiction over a removed case 3: holding the antiinjunction provision inapplicable to a states challenge to the constitutionality of a federal tax exemption provision  103a of the code which exempts from a taxpayers gross income the interest earned on the obligations of any state as amended by  310b1 of the tax equity and fiscal responsibility act of 1982 96 stat 596 because the antiinjunction provision was not intended to bar an action where    congress has not provided the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax 4: holding that the antiinjunction act did not bar south carolinas intergovernmental immunity challenge against tax equity and fiscal responsibility act of 1982", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in the antitrust sense of the word\u201d); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, n. 3 (Fed.Cir.1983) (\u201cIt is but an obfuscation to refer to a patent as 'the patent monopoly\u2019 ... \u201d); Nick-ola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, n. 25 (6th Cir.1978) (\u201cThe patent right, solely that of excluding others, is the fundamental element of all human rights called \u2018property.\u2019 The statutory, and therefore proper, characterization is not 'patent monopoly,\u2019 but \u2018patent property.\u2019 \u201d)). 3 . See also Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Lipscomb\u2019s Walker on Patents, Licenses \u00a7 20:30, p. 121 (3d ed. 1987) (a licensee may challenge the validity of a patent but royalties must be paid to retain the license, citing Wamer-Jenkinson ); cf. Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co., Inc., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed.Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>): Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Dethroning Lear: Holdings: 0: holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity 1: holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined 2: holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings 3: holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment 4: holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Del. Oct. 16, 2009), aff'd, 418 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1026, 131 S.Ct. 3038, 180 L.Ed.2d 858 (2011). The Moore court stated in part, Moore did take the stand and respond to questions from his attorney after his requests to proceed pro se. But by contrast with McKaskle, no presumption of acquiescence attaches to that representation by counsel, because Moore was never permitted to proceed pro se. Without having ruled on Moore\u2019s two requests for self-representation, the trial judge told Moore\u2019s attorney to call the next witness and Moore was called to testify. It would be wholly unreasonable to require Moore, in order to preserve his requests to proceed pro se, to refuse the trial L.Ed.2d 274 (1990); Beverly v. State, 349 Md. 106, 707 A,2d 91, 97-98 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In sum, a \"clear choice between two Holdings: 0: holding defendant whose plea of guilty was improperly denied by trial court did not waive issue on appeal after conviction because he was faced with coercive choice 1: holding that a highly relevant factor concerning whether there was a breach of duty to consult about appeal is whether the conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea both because a guilty plea reduces the seope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings 2: holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional 3: holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea 4: holding that since the statute does not provide for appeal of issues related to a motion to dismiss after entry of a guilty plea the defendant who raised only that issue had no right to appeal", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Mercer v. Dillon, 19 USCMA 264, 41 CMR 264. Since Schlomann\u2019s convictions became final in 1967 this limited retroactivity does not benefit him. 4 . The opinion of the Court of Military Appeals, United States v. Schlomann, supra, and that of the Board of Review do not discuss these issues. The record and information before us do not otherwise show whether these issues were raised prior to these habeas proceedings at a state cannot deny a jury trial in serious criminal cases announced in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 and the rule that there is a right to a jury trial for serious contempts announced in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, not to be retroactive) ; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 89 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (<HOLDING>) ; Johnson v. New Jersey, supra (holding the Holdings: 0: holding the right to assistance of counsel as announced in gideon v wainwright 372 us 335 83 sct 792 9 led2d 799 to be retroactive 1: holding that although walker v birmingham 388 us 307 87 sct 1824 18 led2d 1210 1967 upheld a rule that barred collateral challenges of contempt citations appellant nevertheless could challenge his contempt citation on habeas because california elected not to adopt a collateral bar rule 2: holding the rule that an accused has a right to counsel at any critical confrontation announced in united states v wade 388 us 218 87 sct 1926 18 led2d 1149 and gilbert v california 388 us 263 87 sct 1951 18 led2d 1178 not to be retroactive 3: holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc  924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review 4: holding that counsel must be appointed to indigents for purposes of appeal as announced in douglas v california 372 us 353 83 sct 814 9 led2d 811 to be retroactive", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Defendant contends that Plaintiff has offered no basis for recognizing a federal common law claim under these circumstances and requests Plaintiffs claim be dismissed. Plaintiff responds that the Sixth Circuit has expressly recognized \u201ca common law cause of action in restitution to prevent unjust enrichment\u201d in the context of ERISA pension benefit plans. Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 982 F.2d 1006, 1018 (6th Cir.1993). The Complaint alleges that by redirecting the divisible surplus under the Contracts from the Plan to itself, Defendant breached trust and fiduciary principles, and enriched itself at the Plan\u2019s expense. Compl. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 109-16; see Provident Life & Accid. Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 993-94 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). ERISA also incorporates the law of trusts Holdings: 0: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not 1: holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances 2: holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances 3: holding that plaintiff in erisa action was entitled to restitution under similar circumstances 4: holding so under circumstances similar to the present ones", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and as explicitly set forth in the statute itself, the personnel policy exception is not applicable in those situations where the governmental defendant owes an independent legal duty to the injured party. Likewise, our Supreme Court has held that \u201cthe discretionary function exception [under K.S.A. 75-6104(e)] is not applicable in those situations where a legal duty exists, either by case law or by statute, which the governmental agency must follow.\u201d Barrett v. U.S.D. No. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 263, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001); see Nero v. Kansas State University, 253 Kan. 567, 585, 861 P.2d 768 (1993) (\u201cIf there is a clearly defined mandatory duty or guideline, the discretionary function exception is not applicable.\u201d); see also Cansler v. State, 234 Kan. 554, 570, 675 P.2d 57 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Notably, we already have determined that Holdings: 0: holding that the fourth amendment violation alleged by plaintiff also suffices to establish the breach of a duty of care under california law 1: holding that plaintiffs did not plead fraud where the complaint only alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 2: holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence  that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions     and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise 3: holding that after jury findings of dual breach unchallenged finding that defendants breach was not excused based on prior material breach of plaintiff constituted implicit finding that there was no material breach by plaintiff 4: holding that discretionary immunity does not apply where plaintiff alleged facts that if true constituted a breach of states duty of reasonable care", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "initial BVA decision is abated by that motion for reconsideration ... [and a] new 120-day period begins to run on the date on which the BVA mails to the claimant notice of its denial of the motion to reconsider\u201d. Rosier, supra. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) then held in Linville that 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 20.305(a) (1998), which establishes a postmark rule for the date of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) receipt of certain written documents (including a presumption that the postmark date was \u201cfive days prior to the date of receipt of the document by\u201d VA if \u201cthe postmark is not of record\u201d), must be applied to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the BVA. Linville, 165 F.3d at 1385-86, reversing Linville v. West, 11 Vet.App. 60 (1998 (en banc)) (<HOLDING>). In view of the foregoing, because the Holdings: 0: recognizing that equitable tolling doctrines may toll the time period for filing 1: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period 2: holding that equitable estoppel and equitable tolling cannot apply to extend the 120day noa filing period set forth in 38 usc  7266a 3: holding that noa that was received after 120day noa period but that was postmarked within that period did not toll noa period 4: holding that a forfeiture action is timely so long as at least an administrative action is filed within the 120day statutory period", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The case was based upon the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel prior to being convicted and punished by imprisonment. -In Indiana, it is also a requirement that a defendant be found to have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to assistance of counsel prior to proceeding pro se in a criminal trial See Dowell v. State (1990), Ind.App., 557 N.E.2d 1063. Post-conviction relief is not generally regarded as a criminal proceeding, however. Baum v. State (1989), Ind., 533 N.E.2d 1200. Our supreme court has stated: \"The right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is guaranteed by neither the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor art. 1, \u00a7 18 of the Constitution of Indiana.\" Id. at 1201 (<HOLDING>). See also Medlock v. State (1989), Ind.App., Holdings: 0: holding that ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel could establish cause to reopen judgment but ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not 1: holding that a ground for relief not pled in a motion for postconviction relief is waived and cannot be raised on appeal 2: holding that misadvice of counsel as to the length of a sentence is a basis for postconviction relief if not refuted by the record 3: holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act 4: holding the constitutional standards for judging the performance of counsel need not be employed at the postconviction relief level", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "MT 316, \u00b6 11, 324 Mont. 30, 101 P.3d 301. \u00b621 We review a district court\u2019s M. R. Civ. P. 56(f) ruling for an abuse of discretion. Rosenthal v. Co. of Madison, 2007 MT 277, \u00b6 23, 339 Mont. 419, 170 P.3d 493. DISCUSSION \u00b622 1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Bridgman\u2019s FELA claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. \u00b623 FELA requires an injured railroad employee to commence a claim for injury within three years from the date the cause of action accrued. 45 U.S.C. \u00a756. The Act does not define when an injury accrues, but case law distinguishes the standard based upon whether the injury was an accident from a one-time occurrence or an occupational disease accumulating over time. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S. Ct. 1018 (1949) (<HOLDING>). Claims based upon medical injury accrue when Holdings: 0: holding that claims which were not presented to the motion court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 1: holding that claims raised by appellant for first time in motion for new trial were untimely and therefore waived 2: recognizing occupational disease claims under fela for the first time 3: recognizing the collateral order doctrine for the first time 4: holding that claims raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion for summary judgment are not properly before a court", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "United States v. MMR Corp. 954 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir.1992). Therefore, the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in not recusing himself for alleged bias. See United States v. Anderson, 160 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir.1998). Because the appeal lacks arguable merit and is therefore frivolous, Cooper\u2019s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal should be denied, and his appeal should be dismissed as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n. 24; Howard, 707 F.2d at 220; 5th Cir. R. 42.2. IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 . See Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2006) Holdings: 0: holding official comments to the code are persuasive but not controlling authority 1: holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential 2: recognizing federal authority on standing to be persuasive 3: recognizing that unpublished decisions issued after january 1 1996 are not controlling precedent but may be considered persuasive authority 4: recognizing that although federal precedent was not binding it was persuasive authority", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the survivor of them shall not revoke or modify the will, the parties implicitly agree that the survivor of them will abide by the testamentary intent embodied in the joint will and not dispose of estate property in a manner which is contrary to that intent. Robison v. Graham, 799 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1990). In the present case, the joint will executed by decedent and her husband includes the material provisions of a contract to devise and a contract not to revoke. Specifically, the will provides that decedent and her husband understand and agree that the provisions of the will are binding upon each and upon the survivor. The consideration supporting the contract is the agreement of each to devise his or her respective estate according to the terms of the will. See Concordia College, supra (<HOLDING>). The controversy raised by the parties Holdings: 0: holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness 1: holding that a remote tippee must know that original exchange was given in exchange for benefit 2: holding that exchange of mutual promises to devise is sufficient valid consideration 3: recognizing lack of consideration as an affirmative defense to a release that is valid on its face 4: holding that offer of atwill employment is valid consideration to support an arbitration agreement", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(a lesser included offense), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or dangerous offense. Trial Tr. 27 (Feb. 9, 2009 a.m.). It also instructed that self-defense could be a defense to the federal offense of possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person previously convicted of a felony, but only \"if you find that the defendant came into possession of a firearm or ammunition during the actual exercise of actual self-defense.\u201d Id. at 26. 2 . Purvis does not dispute the instruction that, \u201d[i]f you find that the defendant was the aggressor or if he provoked the conflict himself, he cannot rely upon the right of self-defense to justify his use of force.\u201d Trial Tr. 28 (Feb. 9, 2009 a.m.). See generally Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 775 (D.C.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Grover, 485 F.2d 1039, 1042 Holdings: 0: holding that defendant may be entitled to selfdefense instruction even though he did not testify 1: holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction 2: holding that this instruction is appropriately given when there is both evidence of selfdefense and evidence that the defendant provoked the aggression from which he was defending himself 3: holding that when both parties agree that the facts of the case entitled defendant to a selfdefense instruction failing to so instruct the jury was error 4: holding that both involuntary manslaughter and selfdefense instructions are proper when there is evidence that the killing was accidental", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "recklessness in th reme Court has made clear, it is not only the content of the speech that is important, but the context and circumstances in which the language was used that must also be examined. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-45 (1978). This was not solely the use of one profane word spoken in an effort to register disagreement or protest. It was an unprovoked, aggressive, and abusive tirade aimed personally at Foster in her workplace. The object was not, as the dissent notes, to register her protest at being removed from Our Place without any food, but rather to injure, insult, and accuse Foster of sleeping with her ex-husband and spreading venereal disease. Such behavior falls well outside free speech protection. See In re S.J.N-K., 647 N.W.2d 707, 712 (S.D. 2002) (<HOLDING>); James M., 806 P.2d at 1066-67 (ruling Holdings: 0: holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected 1: holding that a city could not use past conduct to enjoin future protected speech 2: holding that students repeated yelling fuck you and use of accompanying obscene gestures amounted to an ongoing aggression that fell outside protected free speech 3: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students 4: holding that after the district court determined that the plaintiffs speech was protected the court was required to inform the jury of its ruling that knapps speech was constitutionally protected", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "environmental catastrophes); Morton Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831, 848-55, 875 (1993) (refusing to enforce a literal reading of the pollution exclusion, in part because of evidence that the exclusion was intended to apply only to large-scale environmental disasters). 9 . See also Essex Ins. Co., Inc. v. Berkshire Envtl. Consultants, Inc., No. A. 99-30280, 2002 WL 226172, at *4 (D.Mass. Feb. 7, 2002) (concluding \u201cthat the pollution exclusion does not apply because the underlying complaints do not allege that the injuries and deaths resulted from traditional environmental pollution, i.e. hazards discharged onto land, the atmosphere, or a body of water\u201d); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc., 104 N.C.App. 312, 409 S.E.2d 692, 699 (1991) (<HOLDING>), overruled, on other grounds by Gaston Cnty. Holdings: 0: holding that the confrontation clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 1: holding that the penalty is applicable 2: holding that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause 3: holding that a discharge into the environment is necessary for the total pollution clause to be applicable 4: holding that the discharge of paint chips into soil was covered by the pollution exclusion because it polluted the environment but that the presence of lead paint in a household would not be so covered", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "against him in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 702 and the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Straker\u2019s Mem., ECF # 700, at 39-49, 66-68. He argues that, under Daubert, one of the factors in determining the admissibility of expert testimony concerning a particularized scientific technique is \u201c \u2018the technique\u2019s known or potential rate of error,\u2019 \u201d and Schilens\u2019 testimony failed to satisfy this factor because she did not articulate a rate of error. Id. at 66-68 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786). This is the same argument he made immediately following Schilens\u2019 testimony in his motion to strike expert testimony, which was rejected by Order dated June 29, 2009. See ECF # 568 (filed June 29, 2009) (<HOLDING>). In response, the government argues that the Holdings: 0: holding that there are no grounds under daubert or fedrevid 702 to doubt the reliability of schilenss testimony 1: recognizing under fre 702 that there is no clear line dividing testimony based on scientific knowledge from testimony based on technical or other specialized knowledge holding that a single flexible test for reliability applies to all expert testimony 2: holding that the general principles of rule 702 recognized by the daubert decision are applicable to other species of expert testimony 3: holding that under fedrevid 702 expert testimony must be reliable to be admissible 4: holding that daubert sought only to clarify the standard for evaluating scientific knowledge under rule 702", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "in that provision. I, however, focus on the phrase \u201cupon consideration of,\u201d which I believe has the same meaning and effect as \u201cconsider.\u201d We have recognized that a statute requiring a government official to \u201cconsider\u201d certain factors \u201cimplies] wide areas of judgment and therefore of discretion.\u201d Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Bureau of Customs and Border Prot., 402 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Sec\u2019y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Refining Co., 338 U.S. 604, 611-14, 70 S.Ct. 403, 94 L.Ed. 381 (1950)). In Carolina Tobacco, we added that \u201c[i]n considering the factors, the port director may give them whatever weight he deems appropriate; he may conclude that particular factors should be given no weight whatsoever.\u201d Id.; cf. Brehmer v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 294 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in Central Roig the Supreme Court Holdings: 0: holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union 1: holding that oral agreement made in connection with reinstatement should be treated as part of collective bargaining agreement 2: holding that proof of discrimination offered by the plaintiff was insufficient to support a punitive damages award in light of the employers belief that its actions were required by a collective bargaining agreement 3: holding that a job transfer provided as a reasonable accommodation under the rehabilitation act did not conflict with a collective bargaining agreement when the agreement included a provision authorizing transfers and requiring a seniority preference in transfers ejxcept in the most unusual of circumstances 4: holding that the administration complied with a provision of the collective bargaining agreement requiring it to give consideration to nondisciplinary measures in certain circumstances when it considered the possibility of additional training but concluded that in light of the failure of the prior retraining to improve brehmers performance additional retraining would be ineffective", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "relative interests of the involved states, Mississippi\u2019s only interest is in ensuring that the Mississippi plaintiffs are adequately compensated. It has little or no interest in protecting the nonresident Dreyfus. For its part, Dreyfus argues that New York has \u201cno interest in seeing its rules imposed to the disadvantage of one of its residents in a foreign forum.\u201d That plainly is not the case. New York has an undeniable interest in its rule of joint and several liability for economic damages where the defendant is a New York domiciliary, because New York has an interest \u201c \u2018in assuring that its domiciliaries perform their duties and obligations.\u2019 \u201d See Clawans v. United States, 75 F.Supp.2d 368, 373 (quoting Mueller v. Parke Davis, 252 N.J.Super. 347, 354, 599 A.2d 950 (App. Div.1991) (<HOLDING>)). The cases recognizing the interest of the Holdings: 0: holding purposeful and deliberate omission on enactment of new jersey sales and use tax of exemption found in new york counterpart act which served as the model for new jersey act 1: recognizing that alabama had no interest in denying its residents the procedural and substantive advantages afforded under new jerseys product liability and consumer fraud statutes but not alabamas for claims against a new jersey manufacturer 2: recognizing that pennsylvania had no interest in denying its residents the greater damages available under new jersey consumer fraud statutes for claims against a new jersey seller 3: recognizing new jerseys interest in deterrence of tortious misconduct as a relevant factor in choice of law decisions applicable where two of defendants were new jersey residents from whom damages were sought for their negligent acts in new jersey 4: recognizing israel had no interest in denying its citizens the substantive advantages of new jersey defamation law in new jersey residents claims for defamation published in new jersey", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "State\u2019s objections immediately followed each comment, and the trial judge issued his curative instructions after sustaining those objections. Moreover, even if the jury did disregard additional testimony, it is unlikely that Defendant suffered prejudice as a result, because much of his testimony had no relevance to the two incidents that led to the charges against him. In addition, we think the judge maintained appropriate judicial decorum throughout the proceedings. Defendant asserts that \u201c[b]y the time the court excused the jury for its final reprimand, it was clear that the judge was angry with Mr. Fike.\u201d On a cold record, we cannot evaluate whether or not the judge appeared angry. See Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 90 N.M. 414, 418, 564 P.2d 619, 623 (Ct.App.1977) (<HOLDING>). After listening to tapes of the proceedings, Holdings: 0: recognizing difficulty of evaluating judges demeanor upon appellate review 1: holding that bankruptcy judges are not bound by appellate ruhngs of single district judges even those from their own district 2: recognizing difficulty in proving conspiracy 3: holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review 4: holding failure to timely object to magistrate judges recommendation waives appellate review of factual and legal questions", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "a defendant\u2019s HIV-positive status as a ground for departure and that in all cases from other circuits where an HIV-positive defendant received a downward departure under \u00a7 5H1.4, the defendant was not only HIV-positive but also had \u201cfull-blown AIDS\u201d or \u201cadvanced AIDS.\u201d It was at this point in the proceedings that the district court interrupted the prosecutor and accused him of maliciously endangering the defendant. Under this unique set of circumstances, the fact that the prosecutor did not fully state his objection does not render the objection inadequate. See Fed.R.CRImP. 51 (\u201cIf a party does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party.\u201d); United States v. Bernal, 814 F.2d 175, 182-83 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the government Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs objection to an r  r was not specific enough to constitute an adequate objection under  fedrcivp 72b 1: holding that objection was timely even though objection was not made until after question was answered 2: holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection 3: holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully 4: holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "evidence merely indicates harm to its commercial interests, rather than harm to competition. The cases upon which Sunrelies are materially distinguishable and appear to be inapposite to Microsoft\u2019s distribution of extended Java programming tools and present licensing efforts. Unlike Atlantic Refining, Texaco and Brown Shoe, Sun submits insufficient evidence suggesting that Microsoft continues to use its economic power to coerce software developers or other relevant entities in a manner restricting competition in a relevant market. See Atlantic Refining, 85 S.Ct. at 1506-07 (proscribing use of dominant economic power over gas station retailers to coerce them into buying tires, batteries and accessories from one source); Texaco, 89 S.Ct. at 431-33 (same); Brown Shoe, 86 S.Ct. at 1503 (<HOLDING>). Rather, Microsoft essentially altered the Holdings: 0: holding that the certificate of purchase is not a claim because it does not represent a right to payment 1: holding that although purchase of securities on margin does not seem to present source of unfair competition both plain meaning of statute and congressional intent support imposition of ubit on this type of income 2: holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff 3: holding that ftc was within its power to declare as an unfair method of competition the payment of valuable consideration to shoe retailers to secure a contractual promise  not to purchase conflicting lines of shoes 4: holding subsequent purchasers can stand in the shoes of the original owner with respect to a variance provided that the claimed hardship does not arise out of the purchase", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "above reasons, PBS Inc.\u2019s motion to substitute is GRANTED; CHF\u2019s motion to dismiss is DENIED; CHF\u2019s motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and PBS Inc.\u2019s motion for leave to file an amended complaint is DENIED. SO ORDERED. 1 . The Court also denied CHF's motion for summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness of the '651 patent and denied PBS Inc.\u2019s cross-motion for partial summary judgment of infringement. Park B. Smith, 2008 WL 650339 at *6-7. 2 . PBS Inc. did not describe itself as an \u201cexclusive licensee\u201d until after the parties had completed briefing on PBS Inc.'s Rule 17(a) motion and CHF\u2019s motion to dismiss. (See August 2010 Smith Decl. at \u00b6 3.) 3 . At least one circuit has taken the approach CHF proposes. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). As one commentator aptly notes in discussing Holdings: 0: holding that because article iii standing is jurisdictional it must be decided before other legal issues 1: holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees 2: holding that where it was discovered just before trial that it was plaintiffs sister company not the plaintiff that had incurred the injury and thus plaintiff lacked article iii standing the district court was without jurisdiction to consider a rule 17a motion to substitute 3: recognizing that while in a diversity case a federal court may not address the plaintiffs claim unless the plaintiff has standing to sue under state law the plaintiff must also meet article iii standing requirements 4: holding that federal courts may not consider other issues before resolving standing an article iii jurisdictional matter", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "established two methods for resolving disputes between the states. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm\u2019n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 n. 5, 79 S.Ct. 785, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959) (assuming a commission created by an interstate compact had Eleventh Amendment immunity, such immunity was waived by the compact itself). The first method is the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution to resolve disputes between the states. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. III., \u00a7 2). \u201cThe other is the compact _\u201d Id. (citation omitted). As for the first method, we know that when the Supreme Court exercises its original jurisdiction there is no sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 130, 107 S.Ct. 2279, 96 L.Ed.2d 105 (1987) (<HOLDING>). As the Supreme Court said, \u201c[i]n proper Holdings: 0: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims 1: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort 2: holding that monetary relief could be awarded against new mexico because it acted in bad faith by failing to deliver water called for by a compact 3: holding that an insurer acted in bad faith by failing to keep the insured informed of settlement negotiations 4: holding that if the town acted in bad faith in negotiations and litigation which prevented construction then the plaintiffs on remand cannot be deemed to have lost any rights to vest that they would have been able to exercise in the absence of bad faith", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not shown that this finding was clearly 'erroneous and, absent any violation of Rule 2014, the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in approving the fee application. Kennedy also contends that Bankruptcy Court erred in 2006 in approving Skadden as bankruptcy counsel because it was not disinterested, as required by 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 327. But any challenge to the Bankruptcy Court\u2019s initial approval of Skadden is not properly before us because Kennedy never appealed the retention order or previously identified the order as an issue for this appeal. Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201cThe failure to file a timely notice of appeal creates a jurisdictional defect barring appellate review.\u201d); F/S Airlease II, Inc. v. Simon, 844 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Kennedy asserts that we have jurisdiction Holdings: 0: holding that an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court order approving a foreclosure sale became moot upon dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case 1: holding bankruptcy court order approving retention of a law firm retroactively was appealable order 2: holding that a bankruptcy court order denying a trustees claim to immunity was final and appealable under the collateral order doctrine 3: holding adjudication order based upon a determination on the merits in juvenile court is a final and appealable order 4: holding that a bankruptcy court order appointing a chapter 11 trustee constitutes a final order appealable to the eleventh circuit court of appeals", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Appellate Division, Fourth Department continued to affirm definitions of \u201creasonable doubt\u201d which referred to a \u201cmoral certainty,\u201d the court finds that Mercer\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s representation did not fall \u201cbelow an objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d United States v. Aiello, supra, at 532. As such, there is no need to consider whether \u201cbut for counsel\u2019s ... errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Id. It follows that Mercer\u2019s appellate counsel did not err in failing to assert as a ground for direct appeal in 1987 Mercer\u2019s trial counsel\u2019s failure to object to the reasonable doubt jury charge. If trial counsel\u2019s conduct was not ineffective, a fortiori, neither can appellate counsel\u2019s conduct be ineffective. See Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); See United States v. Gallo-Lopez, 931 F.Supp. Holdings: 0: holding that appellate counsel is not required to raise meritless issues on appeal 1: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record 2: holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal when the facts supporting the claim are presented on the face of the record 3: holding that when a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is based on failure to raise viable issues on direct appeal the district court must examine the trial court record to determine whether appellate counsel failed to present significant and obvious issues on appeal and citing gray v greer 800 f2d 644 646 7th cir1986 4: holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to abate fee awards under AS 09.60.010(c)(1) if \"the full imposition of the award would inflict a substantial and undue hardship ... upon the taxpaying constituents of [a] public entity.\" We decline the voters' invitation to conclude from the record that the imposition of full fees will not impose an undue hardship on the Borough or its taxpayers. The Borough may raise the hardship defense on remand. 37 . See AS 09.60.010(c) (stating provision applies \"[in a civil action or appeal\") (emphasis added). 38 . We note that the voters are not entitled to an attorney fees award for work done solely on claims against the Borough that did not concern the voters' constitutional rights to vote. See AS 09.60.010(c)(1). 39 . Cf. Fox v. Vice, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2215, 180 L.Ed.2d 45 (2011) (<HOLDING>). And we note that any attorney fees awarded Holdings: 0: holding that the district court abused its discretion by telling the jury about the right of a prevailing plaintiff to attorney fees under 42 usc  1988 1: recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc  1988 2: holding that attorneys fees awards are available under  1988 for frivolous actions 3: holding that a case awarding fees under 42 usc  1988 has no application in a private claim for attorneys fees sounding in mississippi contract law 4: holding defendant may receive only the portion of his fees under 42 usc  1988 that he would not have paid but for the frivolous claim", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "State v. Gillette, 102 N.M. 695, 705, 699 P.2d 626, 636 (Ct.App.1985) (UJIs pertaining to attempted murder may be modified to fit evidence presented at trial and theory on which the defendant\u2019s culpability rests). Because the crime of attempt to commit a felony requires a specific intent to commit the underlying felony, see NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-28-1 (1978); UJI 14-2801; Johnson, 103 N.M. at 369, 707 P.2d at 1179, and in this case the underlying felony involved the killing of Granados, Rogers, or both, a conviction for attempted second degree murder cannot be sustained on a finding that Defendant merely \u201cknew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm},]\u201d UJI 14-211 NMRA 1998. In order to convey that the attempt must be committed wi 817 P.2d 1196, 1203-05 (1991) (<HOLDING>). B. Change of Venue {18} Defendant\u2019s trial Holdings: 0: holding that reversal of conviction for felony murder was required where jury failed to find the defendant guilty of the underlying felony as essential element of the felony murder offense 1: holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder 2: recognizing intent requirement for first degree felony murder without deciding whether this requirement affects holding in price 3: holding that a conviction of first degree felony murder based on the predicate felony of robbery does not establish the pecuniary gain aggravator set forth in  13703f5 with respect to the murder 4: holding that the crime of attempted first degree felony murder does not exist", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Colorado, the situs of the property, is the law of the contract.\u201d Id. at 123, 33 S.Ct. 69. The Court disagreed, holding that the contract was \u201cstrictly personal,\u201d and \u201c[i]t in no way affects the land or- seeks any remedy against it.\u201d Id. It relied on Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897), in which the court had explained: It is true that the laws of other states cannot render valid conveyances of property within our borders which our laws say are void, for the plain reason that we have exclusive power over the res. But the same reason inverted establishes that the lex rei sitae cannot control personal covenants, not purporting to be conveyances between persons outside the jurisdiction, although concerning a thing within it .Y.S.2d 622, 628 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1962) (<HOLDING>). Applying New York\u2019s contract conflict-of-law Holdings: 0: holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser 1: holding that plaintiff lacked standing after foreclosure sale to set aside the sale arid reinstate her right to redeem property based upon arguments that events surrounding the closing of the sale were improper 2: holding that the new jersey real estate licensing act is applicable to the sale of a company through a stock sale 3: holding in the analogous context of choiceoflaw in relation to the sale of personal property that compensation for arranging the sale is assessed apart from underlying sale 4: holding that where property subject to the irss timely filed lien is sold during a nonjudicial sale and the irs is not given notice of the sale the sale of the property is made subject to and without disturbing the lien", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "contract relating to the division of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or annulment.\u201d SDCL 29A-2-804(b). Storsve argues that the retirement plan expressly designated himself as the beneficiary; therefore, the first exception applies. [\u00b6 14.] However, were we to adopt Storsve\u2019s position that the beneficiary designation alone meets the \u201cexpress terms of a governing instrument\u201d exception, SDCL 29A-2-804 would never apply because every governing instrument contains this provision, and it is this provision that prompts the necessity of the statute. Thus, a beneficiary designation itself is not sufficient to invoke the express terms exception. See also Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Heitz, 468 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1066, 1069 (D.Minn.2007) (<HOLDING>). [\u00b6 15.] We hereby interpret the statute to Holdings: 0: recognizing that a property settlement and divorce decree which provided for a certain party to be named the irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy was valid and enforceable against anyone subsequently named as a beneficiary 1: holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms 2: holding that insureds widow as beneficiary of life insurance policy had standing as an injured person under the insurance code 3: holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit 4: recognizing the same express terms exception found in south dakotas redesignation statute and holding that the beneficiary designation automatically revoked upon divorce despite the life insurance policys designation of the former spouse as the beneficiary", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "stated: \u201cThese definitions are taken largely from the New York Revised Penal Law.\u201d Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Connecticut Penal Code Comments (1969) p. 25. Indeed, the relevant portion of the definition of sexual intercourse in P.A. 828 tracks the New York counterpart exactly. See N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.00 (1) (McKinney 1967). The definition found in N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 130.00 (1), in turn, originally derived from \u00a7 280 of the New York Penal Code of 1881. Therefore, because our statute was modeled after the New York statute, we find the interpretation of the phrase \u201cpenetration, however slight\u201d by the New York Court of Appeals to be particularly persuasive in construing the equivalent language in \u00a7 53a-65. See State v. Havi-can, 213 Conn. 593, 601, 569 A.2d 1089 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion that the \u201ccommon-law Holdings: 0: recognizing that code is speech 1: holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding connecticut law applied where contract negotiations took place in new york and texas agreement was signed by one party in texas forwarded to the other partys headquarters in connecticut and last act necessary to complete the contract ie the signing by the last party was performed in connecticut 4: recognizing that because  the drafters of the connecticut penal code relied heavily upon    the penal code of new york  it is appropriate to look to new york statutory and case law for guidance in interpreting connecticut penal code", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "depression, while Mr. Minor was her supervisor. (Id., at 138). Even if the Court accepts that Ms. Spinks requested time off, that action alone does not constitute a protected activity. Engaging in a protected activity requires complaining of some sort of discrimination that is covered by the TCHRA. Azubuike v. Fiesta Mart, 970 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex.App.-Houston 1998) (finding that the content of plaintiffs let ters would support an inference that he was engaging in a protected activity, ie. complaining of discrimination, particularly where plaintiffs race, color or national origin are not even identified in the letters). A vague charge of discrimination will not invoke protection under the statute. See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). In Ulrich v. Exxon Co. the court determined Holdings: 0: holding vague allegations of bias insufficient 1: holding that each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice  for which an administrative charge must be filed 2: holding that the conduct complained of must be an unlawful employment practice under title vii 3: holding vague charge of discrimination in an internal letter or memorandum is insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice 4: holding that an employee must do more than make a vague charge of discrimination and that an employee who sent a letter complaining that charges against him were the product of ethnocentrism did not engage in protected activity under title vii", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a general release containing \u201call other persons\u201d language are deemed as a matter of law to have expressed their intent to discharge all potential tortfeasors. Flat bar courts thus look only to the four comers of the release document and to adhere to the flat bar rule. As between the remaining two approaches \u2014 the intent rule and the specific identity rule \u2014 the intent rule has been adopted by a bare majority of courts. See, e.g., McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 956-57 (D.R.I.1986) (predicting Rhode Island would adopt intent rule); General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.App.4th 435, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 622, 625-27 (1993) (applying traditional rules of contract construction and determining that terms of release were facially unambiguous); Neves, 769 P.2d at 1053 (<HOLDING>); Sims, 623 A.2d at 1001-02 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that extrinsic evidence of the parties course of conduct may be considered where the contract language is ambiguous 1: holding that extrinsic evidence admissible to determine intent of parties 2: holding that a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract is ambiguous 3: holding that court must determine intent of parties by reference to language of release turning to extrinsic evidence only when it determines as a matter of law that terms are ambiguous 4: holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "who proctored the mini-block exam and observed Amaya set forth their observations in detail in separate written statements, and Amaya presented statistical and other evidence to support his explanation that the professors\u2019 observations and their inferences based on their observations were incorrect. The statements of the professors who observed Amaya and the analysis and other evidence presented by Amaya were carefully considered by the members of the SPC. The designated evidence shows that there was at least some evidence in support of the decision of the SPC and Dean Brater that Amaya cheated on the mini-block exam, and we cannot conclude that the decision to dismiss Amaya from IUSM was not based upon substantial evidence or was arbitrary or capricious. See Reilly, 666 N.E.2d at 446 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in Holdings: 0: holding that if no evidence was presented to support the prevailing party there is no evidence upon which to apply the substantial evidence test and therefore the capricious disregard standard applies 1: holding that the professors observations of cheating behavior by reilly combined with the statistical analysis of the test results constitutes at least some evidence in support of the committees conclusion that reilly cheated on her final exam and that bjecause the committees determination is supported by the evidence we cannot conclude that the decision to expel reilly was arbitrary or capricious 2: holding that even when there is a conflict of evidence before the commission and the evidence was such that the commission could have reasonably reached a contrary decision the commissions decision was not arbitrary and capricious 3: holding that evaluations submitted after the committees final decision cannot be considered in determining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious 4: holding that the commissions choice to regulate  527 groups by determining whether they qualified as political action committees on a casebycase basis was neither arbitrary nor capricious", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "five years in conformity with the terms of the Distributor Agreement. Several references are made to a \u201cdistributor agreement\u201d in CT Miami\u2019s financial statements and emails, and many of these references are accompanied by apparent quotes or paraphrases from the Distributor Agreement. These undisputed facts raise a nearly insurmountable presumption that the Distributor Agreement is a binding agreement and that, the arbitration clause is therefore valid. First, a document exe cuted by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced is presumptively valid even in the absence of the enforcing party\u2019s signature where the events surrounding the contract\u2019s execution support a valid contract. Dodge of Winter Park, Inc. v. Morley, 756 So.2d 1085, 1085-86 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Gateway Cable T.V., Inc. v. Vikoa Holdings: 0: holding an arbitration clause contained in confirmations sent to buyer by seller was part of parties course of dealing and therefore part of the contract after buyer had repeated opportunities to object to the clause and had failed to do so 1: holding that seller carried insurance for benefit of buyer and held proceeds in trust for buyer when seller agreed to maintain insurance until possession date but bam burned before buyer took possession 2: holding that where buyer had opportunity to inspect goods and failed to inform seller in timely manner of defects buyer deemed to have accepted goods pursuant to  672606 3: holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision 4: holding that an agreement on the one side to sell and on the other to buy does not constitute a conspiracy even if the buyer intends to resell the drugs so long as the buyer and seller do not have an agreement to further distribute the drugs", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in order to determine disability. It is not. Objective medical examination findings are also necessary to support the diagnosis.\u201d). Also, the Guide states that if an employee does not return to work at the end of the approved period for absence, additional objective medical evidence is required to support the treatment provider\u2019s recommendation that disability benefits continue. Id. Despite these clear requests for detailed information concerning her ability to work, including a mental status examination, Ms. Atkins never provided the needed information or indicated that a formal mental status examination could not be obtained or that her level of functionality could not be ascertained. Instead, she provided only brief and conclusory medical information. Cf. Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1099 (<HOLDING>). Dr. Shadid\u2019s responses to the questions on Holdings: 0: holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada 1: holding that documents filed with rule 12b6 motion to dismiss are not judicial documents because they do not play any role in the adjudicative process 2: holding in context of application for social security benefits factfinder need not accept a treating physicians opinion which is brief and conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support its conclusion 3: holding med ical documents provided insufficient evidence of disability because they did not contain supporting clinical data for conclusion reached 4: holding that pursuant to the best evidence rule trial testimony relying on documents was inadmissible without submission of such documents or an explanation as to why the documents were unavailable", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that may be drawn therefrom, provide a substantial basis for determining that there is probable cause to believe that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing. {30} We clarify that the substantial basis standard of review is more deferential than the de novo review applied to questions of law, but less deferential than the substantial evidence standard applied to questions of fact. See State v. Koen, 152 P.3d 1148, 1151 n. 6 (Alaska 2007). Furthermore, we emphasize that the substantial basis standard is not tantamount to rubber-stamping the decision of the issuing court and does not preclude the reviewing court from conducting a meaningful analysis of whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause. Cf State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 170, 861 P.2d 192, 206 (1993) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, \u201cwhen an application for a search Holdings: 0: holding that appellate courts should review district court determinations of the adequacy of damage awards under an abuse of discretion standard 1: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 2: holding that mere fact that trial court may decide discretionary matter differently from appellate court does not demonstrate abuse of discretion 3: holding that the abuse of discretion standard does not prevent an appellate court from conducting a meaningful analysis 4: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "they fell, we will be permitting a claimant to recover for injuries resulting from idiopathic causes. [Respondent\u2019s Brief, p. 9] We disagree. Section 287.020.3(3) does indeed provide that \u201c[a]n injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not compensable.\u201d However, as we have already noted, a claimant\u2019s burden to establish a compensa-ble injury is limited to establishing that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, which requires proof only of the two criteria set forth at section 287.020.3(2)(a) and (b). Johme, 366 S.W.3d at 509. Once these criteria are established, any claim that an injury is nonetheless not compensable is in the nature of an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Crumpler v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 286 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Mo.App.S.D.2009) (<HOLDING>); see also Taylor v. Contract Freighters, Inc, Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was harmless error 1: holding that the erroneous omission of a justification defense was harmless where counsel did not invoke the defense during either voir dire or opening statements and where the defense did not appear to be the primary focus of the defensive theory at trial 2: holding that defense counsel opened the door to the prosecutions questioning of the defendant about prior convictions when defense counsel asked a prosecution witness whether he was aware that the defendant was  a convicted felon 3: holding that claimant was aware prior to her hearing of employers theory of defense that claimants injury was idiopathic rendering it harmless error that the defense was not pled by the employer 4: holding that trial error in a civil case which went to the very heart of the defendants defense and was central to his defense could not be deemed harmless in the absence of any steps by the district court to mitigate the effects of the error", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "548 U.S. 140, 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). The government must \u201chonor\u201d a defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to counsel: This means more than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused\u2019s choice to seek this assistance.... [A]t the very least, the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170-71, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). This is intuitive: the right to counsel in an adversarial legal system would mean little if defense counse Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976) (<HOLDING>). Defendants-Appellees do not say that they Holdings: 0: holding admission of preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the sixth amendment where defendants motive during crossexamination was the same as at trial 1: holding that a trial courts order that defendant not consult with his attorney during an overnight recess during trial violated the sixth amendment 2: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 3: holding that an essential interest specific to the defendant is required to physically restrain a defendant during his trial 4: holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing as career offender", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "There are, however, issues pertaining to the abrogation of 11th Amendment immunity as to the Title VII claims, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e et seq. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Nevertheless, these issues have become moot since the Court finds that all claims against the Commonwealth shall be dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit against it. 4 . Furthermore, the PBA is authorized to implement projects for modernization and reconstruction of public housing in agreement with the Public Housing Administration. 1991 Op. Sec. Jus. No. 39. 5 . Nevertheless, the Court is mindful that this factor alone may not necessarily be disposi-tive of the issue at hand. See e.g. Kashani, 813 F.2d at 847 (<HOLDING>); Krieger v. Trane Co., 765 F.Supp. 756, 759 Holdings: 0: holding that entitys formal designation as separate from state for some purposes is inconclusive of autonomy 1: holding that when the state prosecutes and obtains a conviction on separate charges as to which the rule of merger does not apply the state is entitled as a matter of law to a conviction and a separate sentence on each charge 2: holding that court enforcement of a settlement agreement is not state action for constitutional purposes 3: holding that plaintiffs claim for loss of consortium is separate and distinct from spouses malpractice claim for purposes of applying insurance policy limitations 4: holding that an entity may qualify as a state agency for some purposes while being classified as a local agency for other purposes", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to decide complex issues when there is little or no legal authority available. Equally troubling is the majority\u2019s refusal to acknowledge the stock Christy received in TRM as a gift because it was received in exchange for a note receivable. Both of these conclusions are incorrect and unsupported by the record. The majority, like John, too narrowly focus on the term \u201cgift of opportunity\u201d to support its erroneous conclusion that this is marital property. In reality, the record clearly demonstrates that David Sr. gifted Christy and David Jr. the goodwill associated with the |14Tarco businesses. Although goodwill is intangible, this court has recognized that it is an asset that may be transferred or purchased for consideration. See Williams v. Spelic, 311 Ark. 279, 844 S.W.2d 305 (1992) (<HOLDING>). And, here, David Sr., as the majority Holdings: 0: holding that when federal government acquires property through condemnation it must account for state and local property taxes interest and penalties 1: holding that when a business purchases goodwill and a trade name it acquires a valuable property right and that is the right to inform the public that it possesses the experience and skill associated with the previous enterprise 2: recognizing that the right to opening and closing argument is a valuable right and preserving same is a reasonable strategy 3: holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act 4: holding that where state law treats goodwill as property business goodwill is a property interest entitled to protection the owner cannot be deprived of it without due process", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "389 N.W.2d 686. Thus, a \u201csuccessful claim under the [PWDCRA] requires a finding that plaintiff is physically limited in a way unrelated to his ability to work.\u201d Kerns v. Dura Mechanical Components, Inc., 242 Mich.App. 1, 17, 618 N.W.2d 56 (2000). Where an employee claims that he was not actually disabled but was perceived as being disabled by his employer, an employer has no duty to provide an accommodation. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999) (\u201cUnder the third prong, \u2018regarded as\u2019 having a disability, the defendant correctly contends that a finding on this basis would obviate the Company\u2019s obligation to reasonably accommodate Workman.\u201d). See also Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, No. 1:06-cv-01 137, 2009 WL 1231035 at *9 (W.D.Tenn. May 1, 2009) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). Where an employee is unable to demonstrate Holdings: 0: holding that regarded as claim was reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability 1: holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate 2: holding that regarded as claim is reasonably related to claim of discrimination on the basis of disability alleged in eeoc charge 3: holding that regarded as disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation 4: holding that the sixth circuits clear statement in workman that a finding of regarded as disability obviates the obligation to reasonably accommodate is binding precedent and upholding jurys finding that defendant was not liable for failing to accommodate a regarded as disabled employee", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "given full effect. Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tenn.2007). When the language of a statute is ambiguous in that it is subject to varied interpretations producing contrary results, Walker, 249 S.W.3d at 309, we construe the statute\u2019s meaning by examining \u201cthe broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources.\u201d State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn.2008). However, when the import of a statute is unambiguous, we discern legislative intent \u201cfrom the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute\u2019s meaning.\u201d State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000); see also In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 808 (Tenn.2007) (<HOLDING>). We presume that \u201cthe General Assembly is Holdings: 0: holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language 1: holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning 2: recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous  the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect 3: holding that bribery must be given its ordinary meaning at the time of the enactment of the relevant statute 4: holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and suppressing violations of laws of the United States, \u201cofficers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship\u2019s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance.\u201d This statute has been construed to permit the Coast Guard to stop an American vessel in order to conduct \u201ca document and safety inspection on the high seas, even in the absence of a warrant or suspicion of wrongdoing,\u201d United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir.1980), and to conduct a more intrusive search on the basis of reasonable suspicion, see United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 176 (3d Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), superseded by statute on other grounds as Holdings: 0: holding that forfeiture statute is subject to the fourth amendments prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures 1: holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts 2: holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 3: holding that a reasonable suspicion requirement for searches and seizures on the high seas survives fourth amendment scrutiny 4: holding that inmates fourth amendment protection from unreasonable strip searches survives hudson", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. The issue presented in this appeal is whether William Nelson\u2019s due process and equal protection rights were violated by the fact that the family court intervention action proceede Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 484, 78 L.Ed.2d 681 (1983) (same); Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cMany cases have held that parallel criminal and civil trials or investigations do not raise questions of constitutional magnitude with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination.\u201d); Diebold v. Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n of St. Louis County, 611 F.2d 697, 700-01 (8th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477, 478-80 (1st Holdings: 0: holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege 1: holding that various fifth and sixth amendment protections apply to juvenile proceedings 2: holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment 3: holding that both fourth amendment warrant and probable cause and fifth amendment due process requirements apply to civil forfeiture proceedings 4: holding that the fifth amendment presents no obstacle to parallel criminal and administrative proceedings", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), we may apply the standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). See Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir.1993). We must proceed under Chapman, however, if the state court did not. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the claim for prejudice and concluded that \u201cthe jury\u2019s verdict would have been no different if Gray\u2019s out-of-court statement had been excluded.\u201d Richardson, 923 S.W.2d at 312. Although this may have been sufficient to warrant our applying the more deferential Brecht standard of review, we need not determine this question because admission of the statements was harmless even under Chapman. See Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1164 (8th Cir.1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. June 7, 1999) Holdings: 0: holding that chapman harmless error review will be conducted when error is tested for harmlessness for the first time on habeas 1: holding that the state court unreasonably applied chapman but that the error was not prejudicial under brecht 2: holding that chapman mandates harmless error analysis of griffin error 3: recognizing that the state court need not explicitly rely on chapman to warrant federal review under brecht but not deciding the issue because the error was also harmless under chapman 4: holding that chapman harmless error analysis is stricter than its rule 52a counterpart", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "on multiple counts of the same offense arising out of a single episode constitute a double jeopardy violation. See Fogle v. State, 754 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also Jones v. State, 711 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(double jeopardy prevents multiple convictions for the same offense); U.S. Const, amend. V; Fla. Const, art. I, \u00a7 9. Section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), provides for separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction, unless the offenses require identical elements of proof, the offenses are degrees of the same offense, or the offenses are lesser included offenses the elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. See Grubbs v. State, 769 So.2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)(<HOLDING>). In the instant proceeding, Appellant was Holdings: 0: holding that there are no lesser included offenses of second degree felony murder because of the multiple means of committing the offense 1: holding that in the conviction and sentencing for criminal offenses committed in the course of one criminal episode it is the intent of the legislature that there be a separate conviction and sentence for each criminal offense unless one of the offenses is a degree of the other a necessarily included lesser offense subsumed in the other or both offenses are identical 2: holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction 3: holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense  4: holding that for conduct arising out of the same criminal episode the elements for the offense of unlawful use of a twoway communications device  are subsumed within the soliciting and traveling offenses", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Moniz has been subjected to for his complaints about the corrupt and discriminatory towing policy carried out in Monroe County, Michigan.\u201d R. 1 (Compl. at 6) (Page ID # 6). Section 1981 \u201cprohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts involving both public and private actors.\u201d Amini v. Oberlin Coll, 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir.2006); see 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981. To state a claim under \u00a7 1981, a plaintiff must plead, among other things, that \u201che belongs to an identifiable class of persons who are subject to discrimination based on their race\u201d and that \u201cthe defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race.\u201d Amini, 440 F.3d at 358; see Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Racial discrimination includes discrimination Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination 1: holding that a violation of  1981 requires purposeful race discrimination 2: holding intentional or purposeful discrimination a necessary element of equal protection violation 3: holding that 42 usc  1981 requires a showing of purposeful discrimination 4: holding that the constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "claim because they do not suggest how they have preserved an appeal on Rule 60(b)(3) grounds. The plaintiffs noticed an appeal both of the final judgment and of the denial of their \u201cmotion for reconsideration.\u201d Neither appeal encompasses Rule 60(b)(3) relief. The plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cmotion for reconsideration\u201d never argued in any understandable fashion for Rule 60(b)(3) relief. Rather, the plaintiffs asked the district court to reheve them from the judgment on account of \u201cexcusable neglect,\u201d pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). Having failed to include any direct request for Rule 60(b)(3) relief in their motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs have waived any right to ask for such relief on appeal from the denial of that motion. See Larch v. Mansfield Mun. Elec. Dep\u2019t, 272 F.3d 63, 76 (1st Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). See also Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that failure to raise issue at district court forecloses party from raising same issue on appeal 1: holding that the court bars a party from raising an issue on remand that  was not raised on appeal 2: holding where a party failed to raise an issue clearly implicated in the initial decision of the trial court our mandate  acted to prevent that party from raising this issue on remand 3: holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue 4: holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the New York Court of Appeals in Patterson recognized that \u201cextreme emotional disturbance\u201d as contemplated by the statute is a lesser form of mental infirmity than insanity, the court did not hold that all mental infirmities not arising to the level of insanity constitute \u201cextreme emotional disturbance\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\u201d People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d at 677, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769, 404 N.E.2d 1310. Thus, People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d at 302, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898, should not be read \u201cas holding that all mental infirmity, short of insanity, must constitute \u2018extreme emotional disturbance\u2019 if such infirmity causes the defendant to become emotionally disturbed and the defendant subjectively believed his disturbance had a reasonable explanation or excuse.\u201d Id. (<HOLDING>). I find it noteworthy that Linnen, in his pro Holdings: 0: holding that an injured plaintiff with a diminished mental capacity that does not amount to total insanity can be found contributorily negligent but nonetheless should be held to a subjective standard of care 1: holding that people v patterson 39 ny2d 288 383 nys2d 573 347 ne2d 898 does not require that reasonableness be tested with a completely subjective standard ie from solely the defendants point of view 2: holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment 3: holding that the observation of evidence in plain view is not a search for purposes of the fourth amendment and does not require a warrant 4: recognizing a presumption of reasonableness", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "decide whether the Marines made a reasonable decision in seeking to install the wiring box,\u201d and would oblige the court to evaluate the reasonableness of military decisions. Id. at 411-12. By contrast, in Bum Pit we analyzed a military contractor\u2019s \u201cproximate causation\u201d defense, in which the contractor maintained that the plaintiffs\u2019 alleged injuries were caused by military decisions and conduct. 744 F.3d at 340. After examining the record that the district court considered, we concluded that the contractor\u2019s causation defense would require an examination of the reasonableness of military decisions only if the case ultimately proceeded under the law of a state having a proportional-liability system that assigns liability based on fault. Id. at 340-41; see also Harris, 724 F.3d at 463 (<HOLDING>); Lane, 529 F.3d at 565-67 (concluding that the Holdings: 0: holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant 1: holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury 2: holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury 3: recognizing that limitations on the scope of a defendants liability may be analyzed under the rubric of proximate cause 4: holding that the contractors assertion that the military was a proximate cause of the alleged injury did not present a political question under a jointandseveral liability regime and that even if proportional liability applied the plaintiffs could proceed on any damages claim that did not implicate proportional liability", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "belief that Congress was concerned solely with delays engendered by trips to the courts is belied by the complete absence of language even hinting at, much less trying to handle, the special circumstances associated with such a trip. Intervenors offer another scenario in which, they say, \u00a7 4412(b)(2) could actually have an effect, even as interpreted by FERC. If a shipper challenges an existing filed rate under \u00a7 13(1), and the Commission has not previously found that rate to be just and reasonable, the shipper may recover reparations for up to two years prior to filing its complaint. See ICA \u00a7 16(3) (requiring complaint within two years of action\u2019s accrual). See also Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 284 U.S. 370, 390, 52 S.Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932) (<HOLDING>); BP W. Coast Products, LLC v. FERC, 374 F.3d Holdings: 0: holding that when a courts statements from the bench conflict with its written order the order controls 1: holding the commissions order reversing an award and remanding the case to the single commissioner to take further testimony was not final and not appealable to the circuit court until the commissions final determination regarding the single commissioners award the court construed the language in a provision of the code that states appeals from the commission to the circuit court shall be under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions  and stated an appeal to the circuit court will not lie from an interlocutory order of the commission unless it affects the merits citation omitted 2: holding that in reviewing a gaming commission decision the court will examine the record to determine if there is any evidence to support the commissions order 3: holding that the commission may not order reparations where a carrier complied with the commissions earlier order declaring its rate to be reasonable 4: holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of comity. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865, 871 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cGibbs teaches that federal courts must refrain from unnecessary poaching upon a sovereign state\u2019s jurisprudential turf.\u201d). Particularly when, as here, the Court\u2019s decision would have \u201cwidespread ramifications\u201d for an important industry, the Court should refrain from making a needless Erie guess. See, e.g., Jesco Const. Corp. v. NationsBank Corp., 278 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir.2001). Federal and state jurisprudence appear to give opposing guidance on the question of whether the VPL applies to perils other than fire. Compare, e.g., Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); and In re Consolidated Cos., 185 B.R. 223 Holdings: 0: holding that crossdefault provisions in insurance policies were unenforceable because they would impermissibly restrict the debtors ability to assume some of the policies and reject others 1: holding that an arbitration award involving the appellants challenge to the failure of the insurance company to ensure that he had read and understood a signed waiver and to attach the waiver to the insurance policy as contrary to public policy is not reviewable by the courts because there is no challenge to a provision or term of the policy the appellant never claimed that the waiver or policy language itself was contrary to the public policy of this commonwealth 2: holding that household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile liability insurance are contrary to public policy 3: holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing 4: holding that the antitechnical language of section 22692 which applies to policies of fire insurance does not apply to a policy covering a capsized jack up vessel operating offshore and noting that biased upon the language of the statute itself the provision would appear to apply to fire policies only", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "376 N.J.Super. 163, 168, 869 A.2d 473 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 592, 874 A.2d 1109 (2005). The offenses at issue here were committed on October 29, 2000, which was before the June 29, 2001, effective date of certain amendments to NERA L. 2001, c. 129, \u00a7 1. In State v. Manzie, 335 N.J.Super. 267, 278, 762 A.2d 276 (App.Div.2000), aff'd, 168 N.J. 113, 773 A.2d 659 (2001), we held that the version of NERA in effect prior to the 2001 amendments did not apply to murder in part because murder has its own extensive sentencing scheme. However, manslaughter is not murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4c. Thus, the application of NERA to count two in this case was proper. See State v. Viera, 346 N.J.Super. 198, 206-7, 787 A.2d 256 (App.Div.2001), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 38, 803 A.2d 634 (2002) (<HOLDING>). We are additionally satisfied that the Holdings: 0: holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity 1: holding that the date of discrimination is the date on which a decision not to hire a plaintiff becomes effective 2: holding that guidelines did not become effective until adopted by the legislature on july 1 1984 and those who committed their offenses before the effective date must affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines 3: holding that nera applied to passionprovocation manslaughter committed before the effective date of the nera amendments 4: holding that the fsas more lenient penalties apply to defendants who committed their crimes before the acts effective date but were sentenced after that date", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "with disciplinary proceedings, we held that the entitlement of a government official to immunity from suit should be decided on a case-by-case basis, \u201cdepend[ing] upon the nature of the governmental function being performed.\u201d Id. (\u201c[I]mmunity doctrines protect private actors when they perform important governmental functions.\u201d). Consistent with that approach, we recognized that \u201ccourts have not hesitated to extend the doctrine of absolute immunity to private entities engaged in quasi-public adjudicatory and prosecutorial duties.\u201d Id. (emphasis added); see also Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1214 (affirming dismissal of suit against the NASD for improperly de-list-ing and suspending trading in a stock on the NASDAQ stock market on immunity grounds); Austin Mun. Sec., 757 F.2d at 689 (<HOLDING>); cf. Harms v. Riordan-Bellizi, 223 A.D.2d 624, Holdings: 0: recognizing absolute presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the o uter perimeter of his official responsibility 1: holding that a state official can be held individually hable under  1983 for acts taken within the scope of his or her official duties 2: holding that social services attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity for actions related to the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency proceedings 3: holding that nasd disciplinary officers are entitled to absolute immunity from further prosecution for civil liability for them actions taken within the outer scope of them official duties 4: holding that the activities of two loan officers acting within the scope of their authority could not subject them to rico liability for conducting the affairs of the alleged enterprisebank", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Scotty\u2019s and Ms. Rhodes. That Ms. Rhodes dealt with the Scotty\u2019s closure and further events in a manner serving her own economic interests hardly shows a lack of good faith. To the contrary, that Ms. Rhodes m e not strangers to this transaction. Mr. Rhodes was acting as the attorney and agent for Ms. Rhodes. North Monroe Capital was formed after the deal was struck and took title to the leasehold interest acquired from Scotty\u2019s essentially as Ms. Rhodes\u2019 nominee. This was done for tax reasons and to avoid any claim that the fee and leasehold interests had merged as a matter of law, thus terminating the 26-year lease. A party to a contract cannot tortiously interfere with her own contract. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Props. Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp., 575 So.2d 673, 676-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Holdings: 0: holding that while an agents knowledge is imputed to the principal due to the identity of interests that is presumed when an agent acts within the scope of an agency relation this rule does not operate in the converse and the agent cannot be imputed with the information which its principal has failed to give it 1: holding that leasing agent acting within his capacity and scope as an agent cannot be considered to be a separate entity outside of the contractual relationship which can tortiously interfere with that relationship 2: holding that licensed agent is in privity with principal for purpose of establishing identity of parties record establishes classic employeremployee relationship in which corporation is vicariously liable for conduct of agent 3: holding that both agent and principal will be liable when the agent acts within the scope of his employment but for his own purposes 4: holding that a section 1983 suit against an officer in his or her official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the rating schedule for the next-higher disability ratings. The record reflects that he was advised of the evidence necessary to substantiate the next-higher disability ratings for each of these claims (see e.g., R. at 226-27, 457-69, 493-500, 503-04, 529-42). Accordingly, even if notice was otherwise inadequate, Mr. Coker was not prejudiced. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103, 121 (2005) (noting that notice errors can be shown to be nonprejudicial and citing several examples where notice error would not be prejudicial), appeal docketed, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2005); see also 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 7261(b)(2); Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Court is required to \u201ctake due account of the rule of prejudicial error\u201d); Marciniak v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 198, 201 (<HOLDING>); Barker v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 476, 481 Holdings: 0: holding that remand is unnecessary when only one conclusion is supportable on the record 1: holding that remand is unnecessary when it is clear that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of the errors 2: holding that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice 3: holding that in the absence of demonstrated prejudice remand is unnecessary 4: holding remand unnecessary where outcome is clear as a matter of law", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "also take this position. See, e.g., Corwin v. Marney, Orton Invs., 788 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir.1986); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir.1982); Hernandez v. Childers, 736 F.Supp. 903, 909-10 (N.D.Ill.1990); Armbrister v. Roland Int\u2019l Corp., 667 F.Supp. 802, 823 (M.D.Fla.1987); Gutfreund v. Christoph, 658 F.Supp. 1378, 1389 (N.D.Ill.1987); see also Loss, supra, at 990 (stating that, for sections 12(1) and 12(2), \u201cthe three-year cutoffs are absolute\u201d). Against this precedent Plaintiffs submitted a single case, a district court case which has since been reversed, with respect to its decision regarding section 12(2). See In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D.Okla.1975), rev\u2019d sub nom. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other Holdings: 0: holding that both section 122 and rule 10b5 claims are timebarred by section 13 1: holding that options traders may assert rule 10b5 claims 2: holding that even constitutional claims can be timebarred 3: holding only purchasers and sellers of securities can recover under section 10b and rule 10b5 4: holding that statute of limitations for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code applies over limitations period for malpractice actions found in section 13  212 of the code where the plaintiffs complaint was based solely on contribution act ill rev stat 1985 ch 70 par 301 et seq section 13  204 is more specific than section 13  212", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the case. We review the BIA\u2019s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). \u201cAn abuse of discretion may be found ... where the [BIA\u2019s] decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements; that is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.\u201d Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin\u2019s motion to reopen where he failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his former counsels\u2019 purportedly ineffective assistance. See Rabiu v. INS, 41 F.3d 879, 882-83 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, Lin was not prejudiced by his first Holdings: 0: holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim 1: recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense 2: recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance 3: holding that ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for procedural default only if counsels performance was constitutionally ineffective 4: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The voluntariness of attendance at the ceremony does not decrease the concern that prayer at the ceremony might still appear to have the stamp of school approval. Despite the defendant\u2019s contention, the voluntariness of the ceremony is not dis-positive of the matter. Graduation is an important event for students. It represents official recognition of the success ful completion of several years of scholastic endeavor and symbolizes transition into a more mature society than was previously available to the students. It is cruel to force any individual to violate his conscience in order to participate in such an important event in the individual\u2019s life. Lemke v. Black, 376 F.Supp. 87, 89-90 (E.D.Wis.1974). See also Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 832 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>) Thus, the court concludes that prayer at the Holdings: 0: holding that adolescent family life act on its face did not violate the establishment clause but remanding for examination of the constitutionality of particular applications 1: holding no violation of federal establishment clause 2: holding that under the supremacy clause a state court could not enforce a prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law against an individual who was permitted to practice law under the rules of a federal court located in the states jurisdiction 3: holding practice of delivering prayers before high school football games unconstitutional court rejected voluntariness argument stating that the establishment clause focuses on the constitutionality of the state action not on the choices made by the complaining individual 4: holding that the presence of a cross on the city insignia did not violate the establishment clause", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of Law (Dkt, 961) with the additional argument that Florida's garnishment statutes have no extraterritorial effect. 4 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decision of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981. 5 . See also GM Gold & Diamonds, LP v. Fabrege Co., Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 725, 727 (S.D.Tex.2007) (noting that attachment orders may reach only as far as'the court\u2019s in rem jurisdiction). 6 . See also Baker v. Bennett, 644 So.2d 901, 903 (Ala. 1994) (\"Assets not within the jurisdiction of a court issuing a garnishment and not capable of being levied on cannot be reached by the garnishment.\u201d). 7 . See also, e.g., In re Curtina Int'l, 15 B.R. 993, 998 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981) Holdings: 0: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute 1: holding that rule b attachment does not extend to afteracquired property 2: holding that the attachment statute which did not expressly reach property beyond territorial limits of state would not be construed to apply to property outside state 3: holding that a court had the power pursuant to  105a to compel a defendant to deliver her property which was the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding from outside the courts territorial jurisdiction 4: holding that the basis of in rem jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "expressly exempt from that procedure and 3) the CBA provides no express alternative means for resolving a contractual dispute under Article 10. Farley disagrees and contends that it is exactly in cases such as this where the agreement lacks a provision for arbitration or some other method for final resolution that relief in federal court is statutorily permitted. The Court agrees. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that district courts have subject matter jurisdiction in a dispute over an employee\u2019s rights under a collective bargaining agreement in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution. 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 185(a); see also Local 369, Utility Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO v. Boston Edison Co., 588 F.Supp. 800, 804 (D.Mass.1984)(<HOLDING>), aff'd, 752 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1984). Generally, Holdings: 0: holding that a credit card company could not introduce an alternative dispute resolution provision through a bill stuffer where nothing in the original agreement mentioned dispute resolution 1: holding that a party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement 2: holding that judicial is review available in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution of a dispute 3: holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope 4: holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "party, or attendee that further instances of particular behavior will be deemed contemptuous before actually charging the offender with contempt. See Pilsbury, 866 F.2d at 26. None of these caveats, however, undermines the fact that a verbal attack can be so unnecessary and so insulting to judicial authority as to constitute, without prior warning, contempt. Marshall\u2019s conduct easily meets that standard. However, we cannot affirm Marshall\u2019s sentence. As the government concedes, a defendant has a right to a jury trial before being sentenced to a prison term of more than six months for criminal contempt. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512, 516-17, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974); see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198-200, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Holdings: 0: holding that article 3707 section 3 of the code of criminal procedure requires the trial court to give a defendant opportunity to present evidence regarding punishment after it has found the particular defendant guilty and before punishment is assessed 1: holding that determination of whether prior conviction was punishable by term of imprisonment exceeding one year is governed by law in effect on date of conviction 2: holding that the jury is not to consider the potential punishment which could result from a conviction 3: holding that a civil contempt defendant has a right to a jury trial when the act of contempt was not committed in the presence of the court and when the incarceration is in part punitive 4: holding that defendant has right to trial by jury before conviction of contempt punishable by severe punishment", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "reiterated their positions and motions. The Court decided to have the jurors redeliberate on those counts and gave a supplemental instruction telling the jury, among other things, that it was desirable to reach a verdict but emphasizing that the jurors should not surrender their convictions and that the verdict must reflect the conscientious judgment of each juror. After delib erating again, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Wrensford on Counts III and IV and against Muller on Count I. The jury was polled again, and- all jurors, including Juror 7, replied \"Yes,\u201d that it was their independent verdict, on all counts. App. 2566-70. Wrensford was thus convicted on Counts I-V, and Muller was convicted on Counts I, IV, and V. Wrensford moved for , 589, 591-92 (6th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that where an individual voluntarily goes to the police station to discuss the commission of a crime that person has not been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment 1: holding that taking an individual who was not suspected of any crime to a police station and into an interview room and detaining her for approximately four hours where it was made clear she was not free to leave violated the fourth amendment 2: holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview 3: holding that an employee who did not present evidence that she could have returned to work prior to the expiration of her fmla leave allowance was not entitled to additional leave merely because her employer had not properly provided her with notice that the leave was designated as fmla leave 4: holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Immigrant Petition for Alien Relative. At no time did Hamed enter an appearance on behalf of the petitioner in the instant deportation proceedings. . While Scorteanu has averred that he informed Hamed of his pending asylum application and that Hamed had agreed to inquire into the status of petitioner\u2019s asylum case, any statements made by Hamed with respect to the pendency of the deportation proceedings are irrelevant to the petitioner\u2019s claims of exceptional circumstances and lack of notice where Hamed was not petitioner's counsel of record. 3 . The BIA accepted this time frame in its November 9, 2001 dismissal of petitioner\u2019s appeal. 4 . The issue of equitable tolling due to excep-lional circumstances has split the circuits. Compare Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) with Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 1: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional 2: holding that  242bc3a sets forth a mandatory and jurisdictional time bar 3: holding that time limit for filing petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional 4: holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "is sufficiently imminent.\u201d Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.8, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (\u201cIt is the reality of the threat ... that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective apprehensions.\u201d). Courts have broadly rejected claims based on the risk of falling victim to a future terrorist attack, concluding that such harms are impermissibly speculative and so insufficient to confer standing. See, e.g., Tomsha v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. 15-CV-7326 (AJN), 2016 WL 3538380, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2016); Bernstein v. Kerry, 962 F.Supp.2d 122, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2013); People of Colo. ex rel. Suthers v. Gonzales, 558 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1162 (D. Colo. 2007); cf. George v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 63 Fed.Appx. 917, 918 (7th Cir. 2003) (<HOLDING>). 3. Application to the Cohen Complaint The Holdings: 0: holding in the medical malpractice context that a plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence more likely than not caused the victims death 1: holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim 2: holding plaintiffs who claimed their ability to walk sit stand and sleep was moderately below average were not disabled 3: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 4: holding that plaintiffs were no more likely than the average   citizen to be victims of future attacks and so their claimed injury was purely speculative", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "deficient, and (2) they suffered prejudice, which means that \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. \u201c[C]ounsel\u2019s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case.\u201d Id. at 690,104 S.Ct. 2052. 1. Deficient Performance \u201c[A]n attorney\u2019s failure to present available exculpatory evidence is ordinarily deficient, unless some cogent tactical or other consideration justified it.\u201d Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1183 (6th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 258-61 (6th Holdings: 0: holding that counsels total failure to conduct pretrial discovery constituted ineffective assistance 1: holding that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for counsels failure to present the preindictment delay issue was without merit because there was no actual prejudice to the supposed alibi defense as the now unavailable witnesses would not have provided the defendant with an alibi for the time when the murder could have occurred 2: holding that failure to properly pursue a potential alibi defense constituted ineffective representation outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance 3: holding the failure to call alibi witnesses promised during opening statement was not ineffective assistance of counsel 4: recognizing in ineffective assistance of counsel claims a presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "1 Vet.App. at 593; see also Weaver, 14 Vet.App. at 302. B. Duty to Assist The Board found that VA had fully complied with it\u2019s duty to assist the appellant pursuant to 38 U.S.C. \u00a7 5103A. R. at 8. Specifically, the Board determined that further efforts to locate the appellant\u2019s SMRs would be \u201cfutile;\u201d that VA had obtained all postservice medical records that the appellant had identified; and that it had given the appellant opportunities to submit any additional evidence that would support his claim. R- at 8-9. The Board did >not address, however, VA\u2019s duty to exercise greater diligence in assisting the . appellant with the development of evidence in support of his claim in the event that his medical records were lost while in VA custody. See Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 46, 51 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 542, 548 Holdings: 0: holding that the boards duty to assist a claimant in developing his claim is heightened in cases in which the appellants smrs are lost or destroyed and includes the obligation to search for alternate medical records 1: holding that vas duty to assist is particularly great in light of the unavailability of the veterans exit examination and full army medical records 2: holding that the courts caselaw establishes a heightened duty to assist when the appellants medical records have been lost or destroyed 3: holding that constitutional right of privacy does not apply to medical records 4: holding that the visitor records at issue here continue to be agency records for purposes of foia even after they are transferred to the white house or ovp and internally destroyed", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The time frame given in the Arrest Warrant Affidavit for the exchange of money with the Cl overlaps with the time frame during which Defendant was at his mother\u2019s house. Consequently, the affidavits do not impugn the veracity of the Investigating Officers because they are not inconsistent with what the police claim to have observed. The Defendant also maintains that the Investigating Officers must have lied about the April 19 sale because he was wearing a blue shirt that night, contrary to the facts as reported in the Arrest Warrant Affidavit. When a defendant offers proof of actual inaccuracies that are or should be within police knowledge, he has met his preliminary burden under the first prong of the Franks test. See, e.g., United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 780 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); Yusuf, 2005 WL 1592928, at *8-5 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report 1: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible 2: holding that failure to investigate fully is not evidence of affiants reckless disregard for the truth because questioning of others might have caused a leak in the drug investigation 3: holding that defendant made preliminary showing where the proffered evidence the investigation report contradicted the affiants statements 4: holding that statements made to internal investigator of employer were made in an investigation under this subchapter where investigation was pursuant to a charge filed with eeoc", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and they typically involve elements of pressure or inducement.\u201d Id. A certain amount of hyperbole and exaggeration is expected in an election campaign, which is why the responsibility for assessing the relevant facts and deciding whether the union\u2019s conduct interfered with a reasonable employee\u2019s free and fair choice in a representation election lies with the Board. Id. This case is no different. Third and finally, we agree with the Board that, even if Knowles\u2019 statement could somehow be construed as a threat, the statement merely implied that Knowles should not forsake a good relationship with Jones, even if Knowles moved into management, because no one knows what the future may bring. As such, the statement would not coerce a voter or cause a voter to change his or her vote. Cf id. (<HOLDING>). In sum, the Board\u2019s determination that the Holdings: 0: holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted 1: holding that a union agent did not engage in coercive conduct when he told employees that they should sign a petition stating they would vote for the union to  separate the men from the boys  2: recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union 3: holding that a union officials comments may be used to infer the object of union activity 4: holding that a rico action by union members was properly dismissed where any financial improprieties occurred with union funds and directly injured solely the union", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "retroactive application of the statute may still be impermissible if it violates a constitutional provision. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d). This court has previously determined that the retroactive application of the stop-time rule to proceedings that were currently pending when the IIRIRA was enacted does not violate the due process clause. Gonzalez-Torres, 213 F.3d at 902-03; see also Rojas-Reyes, 235 F.3d at 121\u2014 24 (<HOLDING>). There is no reason to treat the due process Holdings: 0: holding that being placed in removal proceedings rather than deportation proceedings does not violate a petitioners due process rights 1: holding that retroactive application of the stoptime rule to proceedings pending when the iirira was enacted does not violate substantive or procedural due process rights 2: holding no retroactive application 3: holding that doctrine does not violate due process 4: holding retroactive application", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "if these other types of rehabilitation services fit within the definition of medical services. ABA is a widely accepted therapy that is \"firmly supported by decades of research and application and is a well-established treatment modality of autism and other [pervasive developmental disorders].\u201d McHenry, 679 F.Supp.2d at 1237. Based on the text and context of the statute\u2014including the statutory definition of \u201crehabilitation services\u201d \u2014 the Court agrees that ABA therapy fits within the ordinary definition of medical services. Accord Hummel v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 164 Ohio App.3d 776, 844 N.E.2d 360, 366 (2005) (interpreting \"medical service\u201d to include ABA therapy under the ordinary definition); KG. ex rel. Garrido v. Dudek, 839 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1276-77 (S.D.Fl. 2011) (<HOLDING>), affirmed in relevant part Garrido v. Dudek, Holdings: 0: holding that aba therapy is a medical service that must be covered under medicaid 1: holding that a state medicaid agency can review the medical necessity of treatment prescribed by a doctor on a casebycase basis 2: holding that a medicaid recipient who was involuntarily removed from private nursing did not have a private right of action under the medicaid statute against a nursing home 3: holding that medical expenses must be proven to be both reasonable and necessary 4: holding that  1396aa8 is enforceable by medicaid recipients under  1983", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the clear and unambiguous language of the statute barred his claims for adverse possession, regardless of when the claim may have accrued. Assuming for argument that a plaintiff may base a quiet title claim on a claim of adverse possession that has ripened into title prior to the United States claiming an interest in the property, there are no facts to support such a claim in this case. Admittedly, the district court did not reach this conclusion in its decision because it found that plaintiffs adverse possession claims were barred. Nonetheless, we may \u201caffirm a grant of summary judgment on grounds other than those relied on by the district court when the record contains an adequate and independent basis for that result.\u201d Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDN Real Estate Overland Park, L (1960) (<HOLDING>). Beginning in 1977, plaintiff claims to have Holdings: 0: holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession 1: holding that placing of markers on property does not constitute actual possession 2: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence 3: holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession 4: holding that property of a public entity includes having exclusive control and possession of  property", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "No. 15 at 6.) The Court agrees. The United States is a sovereign nation, and as such, it may not be sued absent consent. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981); Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir.1985.) If the United States has not consented to the suit, subject matter jurisdiction is lacking and the complaint must be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983); Gilbert, 756 F.2d at 1458. Administrative prerequisites aimed at agency resolution of a claim prior to suit generally are jurisdictional, as the Government\u2019s consent to be sued is premised upon adherence to the prerequisites. See, e.g., Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 519 Holdings: 0: holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit under foia 1: holding exhaustion of regulatory administrative process is jurisdictional prerequisite to district court hearing discrimination claim 2: recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a  1983 action 3: holding that exhaustion of issues is jurisdictional 4: holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "2510, 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). ****** For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby reversed. So Ordered. 1 . In any event, the statutoiy issue is intertwined with the First Amendment concerns. 2 . We note, however, that the Court did not explicitly address whether it ought to decide the constitutional question before addressing the merits of the underlying common law claims in these cases. 3 . We could hardly hold only the appointments of commissioners appointed by a President of the opposite party invalid. 4 . Perhaps the President could challenge the constitutionality of the law by alleging that the statute impinged on his appointment power with respect to a particular nomination. 5 . But see Pillsbury Co. v. F.T.C., 354 F.2d 952, 964-65 (5th Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). 6 . The Commission actually raises the de Holdings: 0: holding that senate subcommittee proceedings where commissioners were questioned about their conduct in a specific case deprived the defendant corporation of due process 1: holding that although the parking citation that the plaintiff received did not indicate where and how to contest the allegation the plaintiff was not deprived of procedural due process because he received a summons to appear in court via first class mail before he was deprived of any liberty interest 2: holding that a prisoner cannot be deprived of a protected liberty interest in goodtime credits without procedural due process 3: holding that lack of notice of charges in disciplinary proceedings violates the due process clause 4: holding that privileges licenses certificates and franchises qualify as property interests for purposes of procedural due process but that due process only becomes relevant where such property is deprived", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201cmakes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual\u2019s ... sex.\u201d See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2(a)(l); see also Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 20, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase terms, conditions or privileges of employment broadly, and has stated that it encompasses Congress\u2019 intent to \u201cstrike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatory hostile or abusive environment.\u201d Harris, 510 U.S. at 20, 114 S.Ct. 367; see also Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-754, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (<HOLDING>). That is, Title VII is violated whenever \u201cthe Holdings: 0: holding that a viable hostile work environment claim requires an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 1: holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute 2: recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context 3: recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983 4: recognizing that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is actionable under title vii", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "she largely ignored obvious signs that her property was being used to grow marijuana plants. The fact that the occupant was Ms. Scott\u2019s son does not relieve her of her duties as a landowner to take all reasonable steps to keep her property free of illegal activities. Such a bond certainly does not automatically entitle her to a jury trial on the question of the reasonableness of her actions. Denying the innocent owner defense to a landowner who failed to investigate thoroughly claims that her son grew drugs on the property, evict her son upon confirmation of those claims, or report such activities to police would be less harsh than what other courts have required of landowners. See, e.g., United States v. Two Parcels of Prop. Located at 19 & 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah Holdings: 0: holding that parents who feared drug lord retaliation notified police and pressed their children to enter rehabilitation consented as a matter of law to their childrens drug activity because they did not search the premises for drugs and did not evict their children 1: holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit 2: recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children 3: holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents 4: recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Court, we decline Darden\u2019s invitation to expand what the Court intended to be a limited exception to Strickland \u2014 that applies only when the defehdant is actually or constructively denied effective assistance of counsel \u2014 into a broader, unintended exception.\u201d Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2013). See also Davenport v. Diguglielmo, 215 Fed.App\u2019x 175 (3d Cir. 2007). \u201cPrevious circuit court decisions have elaborated on this distinction between ineffective assistance of counsel and the constructive denial of counsel. Collectively, these decisions reinforce the notion that defense counsel must entirely fail to subject the prosecution\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing for the Cronic exception to apply. Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2000) (<HOLDING>). Thus, when analyzing an attorney\u2019s decision Holdings: 0: holding that when the defendant receives at least some meaningful assistance he must prove prejudice in order to obtain relief for ineffective assistance of counsel quoting goodwin v johnson 132 f3d 162 176 n 10 5th cir1997 1: holding that an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is rendered moot when a defendant receives an illegal sentence 2: holding that a defendant must show actual prejudice to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 3: recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 4: holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "exemption of noncontiguous jurisdictions must be understood to signify, by implication, Congressional approval of any and all egg-labeling requirements in those places regardless whether justified or unjustified by Dormant Commerce Clause considerations. But this seems to us a more extreme reading than either the statutory language or legislative history necessitates. Absent, at least, an affirmatively stated grant of permission to noncontiguous jurisdictions of the United States to require egg-labeling, we are unable to conclude that appellants have met their burden of showing that Congress\u2019 intent to allow Puerto Rico to enact protectionist egg-labeling regulations was \u201cunmistakably clear.\u201d See e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 2447-48, 91 L.Ed.2d 110 (1986) (<HOLDING>); South-Central, 467 U.S. at 90, 104 S.Ct. at Holdings: 0: holding that state statutes are exempt from the implied limitations of the commerce clause only when the congressional direction to do so has been unmistakably clear 1: holding that enactment of  13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 2: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause 3: holding that a court of appeals may only do so when an appeal has been raised by an existing party to the case 4: holding that there is no clear congressional intent that firreas statutes of limitations 12 usc  1821e12a  apply only prospectively", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Killian\u2019s interaction with the representatives was sufficient to put them on notice of his need for provider network information. Although Mr. Killian used the word \u201cpread-mission\u201d in his deposition when telling the attorneys the purpose of his call, he did not testify that he told the representatives that he was calling for preadmission. His interaction with the representatives included calling the designated number, informing the representative of his location and telling the representative of the needed surgery. 46 . Although Mr. Killian bears the ultimate burden at trial, \"[a] party seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden of proving there is 'no material question of fact with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party\u2019s case.' \u201d MMG Fin. C , 591 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 49 . This is the result reached by the panel. Holdings: 0: holding a fiduciary liable when inadequacies in the plan documents were exacerbated by incorrect and misleading information from its agents 1: recognizing that plan participants should be able to access information about the plan administrators fiduciary duties from the plan administrators counsel 2: holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary 3: holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site 4: holding that plan documents could be considered without converting the motion to one for summary judgment even though the complaint referred only to the plan and not its associated documents", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "relationship of that conduct to the performance of his official duties.\u201d David v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1353 (10th Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted)(quoting Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir.1995)). See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.2001) (\u201cWhether a government employee is acting under color of law is not always an easy call, and the color of law analysis inevitably requires that we engage in line drawing.\u201d). Tenth Circuit precedent makes clear that, where a person without state authority or employment could have undertaken the same alleged unconstitutional conduct as that of which the plaintiff complains, the alleged unconstitutional conduct is not under color of state law. See, e.g., Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d at 1074-75 (<HOLDING>); D.T. ex rel. M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16 Holdings: 0: holding that sanction of removal for nursing home attendant who was found to have hit patient suffering from dementia should be reduced to penalty of sixmonth suspension because act of hitting patient was isolated instance in which patient was aggressor 1: holding that a nurses aide who sexually assaulted a patient while under heavy sedation was not acting under color of state law because as there was no allegation it was the aide who sedated the patient the sexual assault conduct   could have been done by anyone who wandered into the patients room 2: holding that a psychiatrist who sexually assaulted a patient while he was performing  the services for which he was employed such as counseling and therapy did so in the course of his employment 3: holding that fault may not be assessed against a patient in a medical malpractice action in which a patients negligent conduct provides only the occasion for the medical attention care or treatment which is the basis for the action where the defendant doctor was treating the plaintiff patient for injuries sustained in a car accident negligently caused by the plaintiff who was driving while intoxicated 4: holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the Agreement satisfies the requirements of Rule 11. Celltex\u2019s motion to compel arbitration was granted by the trial court\u2019s order signed September 22, 2014. On February 12, 2015, the trial court entered an order confirming the arbitration award. On March 16, 2015, Biostar filed a notice of restricted appeal and K-Stemcell filed a notice of appeal from that order. Because both appeals were filed from Trial Court Cause No. 12-DCV-202563, of the 434th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, they wei-e assigned Appeal No. 14-15-00234-CV. On appeal, Biostar and K-Stemcell both complain of the order compelling arbitration and the order confirming the arbitration award. Jurisdiction We initially address Celltex\u2019s arguments that we lac App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (<HOLDING>); Anderson v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 806, 809-10 Holdings: 0: holding that the appellant waived his claim on appeal because he failed to address that claim in either his application for a coa or his brief on appeal 1: holding that this courts policy is to address on direct appeal only those issues raised by counsel 2: holding that issues were not waived on subsequent appeal when initial appeal was dismissed 3: holding that issues not raised before a district court are waived on appeal 4: holding that appellant did not limit his issues on appeal by gratuitously listing only some of those issues in his notice of appeal", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "IV hinges on our interpretation of the phrase \u201cterm of imprisonment.\u201d This is an issue of first impression for this Court. If Defendant was serving a term of imprisonment at the federal temporary detention facility on August 30, 2007, when he was transferred pursuant to a detainer from federal custody to Gibson County and back to federal custody, then the anti-shuttling provision of Article IV was violated and dismissal of the indictment is required. A split of authority exists as to whether the IAD applies to a convicted and sentenced prisoner who is held in temporary custody pending a transfer to permanent incarceration. See Runck v. State, 497 N.W.2d 74, 81 (N.D.1993) (describing this split of authority and surveying cases from numerous jurisdictions that have reached dif 007) (<HOLDING>); People v. Helmstetter, 914 P.2d 474, 478 Holdings: 0: holding that   3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject  1: holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach 2: holding time begins when the prisoner knows  the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance 3: holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced 4: holding that the term imprisonment    means any imprisonment in a case involving the presumption of incarceration of njsa 2c441d", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Oct. 24, 2013, Exhibit B (Nov. 1, 2011, Agreement between Nolasco and VITELCO). 8 See 5 V.I.C. \u00a7 1451. 9 In Banks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011), the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands held that, while the Restatements may be persuasive authority in determining the common law, they \u201cno longer constitute binding legal authority in this jurisdiction\u201d because 1 V.I.C. \u00a7 4 has been impliedly repealed. Gov\u2019t of the V.I. v. Connor, 60 V.I. 599, 602 (V.I. 2014). As a result, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the applicable common law in this matter. Defendant submitted a supplemental brief on March 18,2014. Plaintiff also submitted a supplemental brief on March 21,2014, to which Defendant replied on April 3, 2014. 10 60 V.I. at 605 (<HOLDING>). 11 Id. at 604 (noting that the Superior Court Holdings: 0: holding that it may not 1: holding that the superior court may be summarily reversed if it does not perform a banks analysis in the first instance 2: holding that this court must remand to the bia to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not yet considered 3: holding that summary judgment may be reversed when it is based on an error of law 4: holding that this court has discretion to hear arguments presented to it in the first instance provided that it otherwise has jurisdiction over the claim", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the jury that Queen\u2019s attorney had, during his closing argument, relied on ambiguous language in the original instruction was a permissible exercise of discretion. Although the supplemental instruction may have undermined defense counsel\u2019s argument, the instruction stated the law properly. We do not reverse judgments for jury instruction errors where \u201cthe charge was not misleading and contained an adequate statement of the law.\u201d United States v. United Med. and Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1407 (4th Cir.1993), quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 675, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1913, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). Furthermore, the instruction did not refer either to counsel or to counsel\u2019s argument. Instead, the instruction fairly responded to the jury question in a non-pre (4th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231, 237 Holdings: 0: holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act 1: holding prior act testimony admissible to establish the identity behind an alias 2: holding testimony admissible as showing context of relationship with coconspirator prior to conspiracy 3: holding that in a prosecution for lurking evidence of a prior act of lewdness by defendant was admissible to establish motive 4: holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Trust Account. IV. We will remand for a proper determination of how the Attorney Trust Account should be apportioned and for an evaluation of Chicago Title\u2019s proposal of a 65%-35% distribution. We recognize matters of interest and other costs are treated in different ways, depending upon the circumstances. Compare In re United States Lines, Inc., 79 B.R. 542, 547-48 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1987) (noting that entitlement to accrued interest could inequitably deplete the proceeds available to all creditors when funds cannot be traced) with A. Scott, The Law of Trusts \u00a7 207 (1988) (reviewing case law that states that when a trustee commits a breach of trust, he is ordinarily liable for interest); see also Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 687, 86 S.Ct. 1674, 1681, 16 L.Ed.2d 853 (1966) (<HOLDING>). We also note that a pro rata distribution of Holdings: 0: recognizing that potential creditors adjust their interest rates to accommodate their prognosis of the particular debtors chances of rehabilitation 1: holding that parents who feared drug lord retaliation notified police and pressed their children to enter rehabilitation consented as a matter of law to their childrens drug activity because they did not search the premises for drugs and did not evict their children 2: holding that inmates have a property interest in their money 3: holding that the interest of the public  especially the debtor and creditors  could limit compensation to a debtors counsel 4: recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "see also Sayne, 418 F.2d at 685 (\u201cUnique rules of \u2018wide latitude\u2019 govern reception of evidence in Section 3184 hearings.\u201d). \u201c[P]rocedurally, [this] appears to make for a broad hearing. Substantively, however, the scope of the hearing is very limited as to matters raised by Respondent.\u201d Cervantes Valles, 268 F.Supp.2d at 772 (citing In re Extradition of Contreras, 800 F.Supp. 1462, 1464 (S.D.Tex.1992)). Specifically, under the general rule of non-contradiction in foreign extradition cases, evidence explaining away or completely rebutting the existence of probable cause appears to be the only admissible evidence which Respondent can present at the probable cause hearing. Id. (citing Contreras, 800 F.Supp. at 1464); see Garza v. United States, 180 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (5th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Although courts have struggled to clarify the Holdings: 0: holding that it was not erroneous for committing court to refuse to admit an affidavit from a private investigator that provided evidence of a witnesss lack of credibility when the affidavit would not have explained away the witnesss testimony but only challenged its credibility 1: holding that under hubbard a trial courts error in excluding bias evidence would be harmless if either 1 despite the exclusion the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess the witnesss credibility or 2 the witnesss credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial emphasis added 2: holding that conviction on appeal is not admissible to impeach witnesss credibility 3: holding that a witnesss testimony or an exhibit may not explicitly and directly contain an opinion as to a trial witnesss credibility 4: holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "this appeal had apparently gone unanswered. The district court, construing Ciempa\u2019s request as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, denied relief, concluding the \u201cfact that [Ciempa\u2019s] request for an administrative appeal out of time was returned unanswered does not ... entitle [him] to relief from the Judgment entered in this action on January 12, 2009, 2009 WL 87787. [Ciempa] had not exhausted administrative remedies when he commenced this action.\u201d R., Doc. 16 at 4. Ciempa now appeals, raising the same claims as he did below. II. Analysis A state prisoner may appeal from the denial of federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2241 only if the district court or this court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2253(c)(1)(A); see Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Before granting a COA, we must conclude that Holdings: 0: holding that state prisoners must obtain a coa to appeal denials of 28 usc  2241 petitions 1: holding state prisoners proceeding under  2241 must be granted a coa before their claims can be considered on the merits 2: holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to  2241 petitions 3: holding that the oneyear statute of limitations set out in 28 usc  2244d applies to  2241 petitions 4: holding  2253clas coa requirement applies to state prisoners proceeding under  2241 when the petition relates to any of the incidents and circumstances of any detention pursuant to state court process", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence\u201d); U.S. v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2242-43, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (Congress has committed decision as to when a convicted defendant should be released to the discretion of the Parole Commission); Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 180 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945, 108 S.Ct. 333, 98 L.Ed.2d 360 (1987). Does a Parole Commission determination to suspend a discretionary parole date while administrative proceedings to determine indigency are held amount to holding a person in prison because of indigency, at least where administrative proceedings are timely? Some court decisions have suggested that it would. See U.S. v. Estrada de Castillo, 549 F.2d 583, 584 (9th Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>); U.S. v. Mack, 655 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Holdings: 0: holding that the fsas more lenient penalties apply to defendants who committed their crimes before the acts effective date but were sentenced after that date 1: holding that where surety was given until date of forfeiture hearing to produce defendant and defendant was killed by police before that date bond would not be forfeited 2: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act 3: holding that limitations period on employment discrimination claim triggered on date of discharge not on date of discovery of discriminatory intent 4: holding that earlier version of 18 usc  3569 which required defendant to wait 30 days beyond normal release date before seeking discharge of committed fine on basis of indigency was unconstitutional but that administrative regulations would if followed guarantee that question of indigency would be considered before parole release date", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). In its Conclusions of Law, the district court stated and applied the standard exactly as it has been enunciated in Meritor and Harris. 9 . Harris, \u2014 U.S. at - - -, 114 S.Ct. at 370-72, 126 L.Ed.2d at 302-03. 10 . See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int\u2019l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir.1986, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 952, 93 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1987). Harris did not change this requirement. Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 403-04 (5th Cir.1993). 11 . Fed.R.App.P. 38. 12 . E.g., Montgomery v. United States, 933 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1988)). 13 . 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1927; Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Cf., Caldwell, 811 F.2d at 919 (holding Holdings: 0: holding that counsels motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellants positions had become adverse 1: holding counsel and appellants jointly liable under  1927 and rule 38 2: recognizing rule 3: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii 4: recognizing wellestablished colorado rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in the United States illegally following an order of deportation, were permitted to have a second and third bite at the apple simply because they managed to marry and have children while evading authorities. This apparent gaming of the system in an effort to avoid deportation is not tolerated by the existing regulatory scheme.\u201d). Furthermore, despite Lin\u2019s submission of various allegedly official Chinese government docu its discretion in concluding that Lin had not provided sufficient evidence that the birth of his U.S. citizen children violated the family planning policy in his area of residence in China, or that the implementation of sanctions resulting from any possible violation would rise to the level of persecution. Cf. Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we decline to examine Lin\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that absent solid support in the record a petitioners fear is speculative at best 1: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an appli cants assertion that she would be persecuted the bia did not err in denying asylum because her fear was speculative at best 2: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that he will be persecuted his fear is speculative at best 3: holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be subjected to persecution his fear was speculative at best 4: holding that absent solid support in the record for the petitioners assertion that he would be persecuted his fear was speculative at best", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 15 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 (682 SE2d 381) (2009); see also Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B). 16 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 (546 SE2d 524) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 17 Creecy v. State, 235 Ga. 542, 544 (5) (221 SE2d 17) (1975); accord Ward u. State, 304 Ga. App. 517, 522 (1) (a) (696 SE2d 471) (2010); Harp v. State, 302 Ga. App. 17, 18 (690 SE2d 424) (2010). 18 Ham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 232, 237 (1) (b) (692 SE2d 828) (2010) (punctuationomitted); see McKisic v. State, 238 Ga. 644, 646 (2) (234 SE2d 908) (1977) (\u201c[T]he identity of the person alleged to have been robbed is not an essential element of the crime and need not be proved by di ) (703 SE2d53) (2010) (<HOLDING>); see also Ham, 303 Ga. App. at 237 (1) (b) Holdings: 0: holding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for pfdcf where defendant was arrested immediately outside his residence and an unloaded handgun was found in the residence under the defendants bed and in the same room as the controlled substances and cash 1: holding that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation when the defendant previously planned to commit the robbery armed himself with a shotgun and shot the victim during the robbery 2: holding that circumstantial evidence that defendant drove the car and fled the scene after his brother committed robbery was insufficient to sustain defendants conviction absent other evidence of defendants intent to aid in the robbery 3: holding that evidence was sufficient to support convictions for two counts of armed robbery when money was taken from one victims immediate presence at gunpoint and given to second victim and second victim was then forced to surrender the money to defendant at gunpoint 4: holding that evidence defendant approached victim with a handgun while attempting to obtain money from conveniencestore cash register but fled without taking cash was sufficient to support convictions for attempted armed robbery", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "wash trades involved a total of 14 different broker-dealers. The VCI trades involved eight different firms, while the SEC instituted administrative proceedings against four. See Graham, 1998 WL 823072, at *3 n. 14. 19 . Like the other brokers, the clearing firm was exposed to the risk that funds it advanced might not have been repaid at the time Broumas became insolvent. Although the clearing broker might be able to recover against the introducing firm in the event of nonpayment, it would incur transaction costs in so doing\u2014 and there was always the risk that Broumas\u2019 scheme would bankrupt one of the broker-dealers involved. See Richard D. Chema, 1998 WL 820658, at *4-*5. 20 .Cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971) (<HOLDING>) (footnote omitted); United States v. Saks, 964 Holdings: 0: holding that travel by an agent of defrauded corporation is imputed to the victim 1: holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation 2: holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation 3: holding that  10b applies to fraud on corporation by controlling stockholder and that the fact that creditors of the defrauded corporation may be the ultimate victims does not warrant disregard of the corporate entity 4: recognizing that when a corporation is insolvent the trust fund doctrine fundamentally alters the relationship between a corporation its shareholders and its creditors and that corporate or shareholder ratification does not apply to creditors who would be prejudiced thereby", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "J. Appellant was convicted of felony driving under the influence. The main points of this appeal concern his attack on the use of prior DUI convictions to support the felony charge. The existence of his prior convictions was established by his sworn motion to dismiss admitting the 1974 and 1975 convictions, combined with the copy of his driver\u2019s license record. See State v. Palmore, 510 So.2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). State v. Pelicane, 729 So.2d 534, 535 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant admits to the psis factual statements about his relevant conduct where he raises no objections to those statements 1: holding that where a defendant expressly manifested his belief in the truth of the statements contained in the motion to dismiss thereby adopting those statements as his own such statements are admissible against the defendant in the states case in chief 2: holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements 3: holding that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of his miranda rights could be introduced to impeach that defendants credibility when the jury was instructed that the statements were not to be considered as evidence of his guilt 4: holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Civ. Phac. & Rem. Code AnN. \u00a7 37.009. Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by Alma\u2019s argument that the declaratory judgment claim in this case was \u201cpretextual\u201d because there was \u201cno real controversy between the parties with respect to the operation of [the Maintenance Association]\u201d because Alma was no longer involved in the operation of the Maintenance Association at the time of trial. The undisputed fact that Alma no longer operated the Maintenance Association does not render the controversy moot because the Co-Owners\u2019 claim for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act remained pending, as it related to Alma\u2019s actions regarding the Co-Owners\u2019 voting rights under the property code. See Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 S.W.3d 769, 774-75 (Tex.App.Dallas 2011, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We overrule Alma\u2019s second issue. IV. Holdings: 0: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending 1: recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act 2: holding plaintiff had no right to recover attorneys fees under declaratory judgments act because declarations requested no greater or different relief than claim for injunctive relief for constitutional violation 3: holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided 4: holding attorneys fees waived in lawsuit brought under declaratory judgments act to interpret statute", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of injunctive relief sought in this action, based on her allegations of sexual assault alone. 9 . The court notes that the Motion to Dismiss does not raise any argument under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the. \"after\u201d claims of Jane Does I-IV and VI-VII, and those claims are not discussed herein. The pending motion is styled as a Motion to Dismiss, rather than a partial motion to dismiss because, as mentioned supra n. 7, the motion also sought' to dismiss the entire action for lack of venue under Rule 12(b)(3), and that request has already been denied. 10 . Indeed, such a holding would comport with Gebser's likening of Title IX funding recipient liability for third-party acts to municipal liability for third party acts under \u00a7 1983. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>) the existence of an illegal official policy or Holdings: 0: holding that monell v new york city dept of social services 436 us 658 69093 98 sct 2018 203537 56 led2d 611 1978 eliminated respondeat superior liability for private corporations as well as municipalities 1: recognizing the restrictive holding of butz v economou 438 us 478 98 sct 2894 57 led2d 895 1978 as applicable only to actions amounting to constitutional violations 2: holding that in order to show municipal liability for an officers actions under monell v dept of soc servs 436 us 658 694 98 sct 2018 56 led2d 611 1978 a plaintiff must demonstrate one of the following 1 3: recognizing miranda v arizona 384 us 436 468 86 sct 1602 1624 16 led2d 694 1966 4: holding that police must consider the age of a juvenile suspect when determining whether the juvenile is in custody for purposes of miranda warnings see miranda v arizona 384 us 436 86 sct 1602 16 led2d 694 1966", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). If the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear, the court may then look to the legislative history for guidance in interpreting its meaning. Id. Courts have been divergent in determining whether the language of \u00a7 1322(c)(1) is ambiguous. One line of cases \u2014 the majority \u2014 has adopted the \u201cgavel rule,\u201d finding that the phrase \u201csold at a foreclosure sale\u201d refers to a specific event \u2014 a sale occurring at a foreclosure auction. The additional phrase \u201cconducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law\u201d refers merely to the state procedures required to be followed in noticing and holding a foreclosure auction. See, e.g., Cain v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 423 F.3d 617, 620 (6th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); In re McCarn, 218 B.R. 154, 160-61 (10th Cir. Holdings: 0: holding that a foreclosure sale was not complete under north carolina law until after the tenday statutory period of redemption had expired 1: recognizing the language of  1322c1 as a minimum floor in cutting off the debtors right to cure and permitting the debtor to cure until the deed was delivered to the successful bidder which would complete the sale under new jersey law 2: holding that debtor could not cure and maintain mortgage after foreclosure sale in case decided prior to effective date adding  1322c1 3: holding that  1322c1 is not ambiguous that the debtors cure right terminates on the date of the foreclosure sale regardless of the intricacies of the state foreclosure sale process and refusing to attach significance to the legislative record indicating that more extensive cure rights under state law persevere 4: holding that  1322c1 did not allow debtors to cure home mortgage defaults after a foreclosure sale regardless of state law redemption rights", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a general policy matter, federal courts favor arbitration. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1159 (7th Cir. 2016) (\u201cThe [Federal Arbitration Act] contains a general policy favoring arbitration and a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.\u201d) (internal quotation omitted). But that general preference yields to explicit contrary contractual language. As we explained in Andermann v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., the \u201cfederal policy favoring arbitration\u201d was originally formulated to simply \u201cmake clear, as had seemed necessary because of judges\u2019 historical hostility to arbitration, that arbitration was no longer to be disfavored.\u201d 785 F.3d 1157, 1159 (7th Cir. 2015). For unambiguous contracts, however, the agreement, as reflected by the document\u2019s explicit terms, controls. Id. (<HOLDING>); see also Granite Rock Co. v. Int\u2019l Bhd. of Holdings: 0: holding that a court must respect the parties disputeresolution preferences as embodied in an arbitration clause 1: holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived 2: holding an entire arbitration clause is void and arbitration cannot be compelled where contract contained unconscionable clause and has a nonseverability clause 3: holding parties to an exculpatory clause where the parties intent is clear 4: holding that the best way to harmonize a choice of law clause and an arbitration clause is to apply the substantive case law of the named state to the entire agreement including the arbitration clause", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that Ms. Krum would be unable to participate in any vocational retraining in its preparation of the Employability Analysis Report or at any future time. This limitation puts Dr. Pearce\u2019s statement that Ms. Krum could sit for eight hours a day in a different light. And while Hartford emphasizes the number of hours that Ms. Krum could sit, it fails to point out that Dr. Pearce left blank the spaces for how long Ms. Krum could stand or walk in the workplace. Dr. Pearce presumably believed that Ms. Krum would not be able to stand or walk at all due to her breathing difficulties. Other courts have reversed plan administrator decisions for plaintiffs with similar statements from their attending physicians. See, e.g., Spangler v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 313 F.3d 356 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The court does not intend to suggest that Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled 1: holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours 2: holding that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied to the decision to deny benefits under the erisa plan 3: holding that evidence that plaintiff could walk only four hours a day was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that she was disabled 4: holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "burdened other employees by requiring them to work parts of a graveyard shift when they otherwise would be off. In contrast, Mr. Espinoza\u2019s testimony indicates that he had to \u201cwork in a different cellhouse\u201d to cover for the sergeants, not that he had to report to work when he otherwise would not have to. Id. at 359. He presented no evidence that the sergeants\u2019 absences caused him or any other employee to remain on duty longer or report to duty earlier. We do not suggest that Mr. Espinoza needed to know every detail about the white sergeants\u2019 alleged absences before he could make a reasonable complaint of discrimination. But he needed to know at least some facts that would support an objectively reasonable belief that their absences were similar to his. See Little, 103 F.3d at 960 (<HOLDING>). Such relevant facts could include the reason Holdings: 0: holding that to prevail under  2254 a petitioner must show that the state court applied strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner 1: holding that a party must at least have a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility and that belief must have been objectively reasonable 2: holding that a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate creates presumption that officers belief in probable cause was objectively reasonable 3: holding that a plaintiff must show his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented 4: holding that an officers mistaken belief that the defendant was speeding was not an objectively reasonable purpose for a traffic stop", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "In addition, if certain class members are able to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, Allstate\u2019s defenses would vary between class members. For example, if Allstate sought to present evidence that a class member\u2019s job performance was the legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for her salary or job position, such evidence would differ for each individual class member, Allstate also may be able to raise a statute of limitations defense against some class members but not others, because as explained above, some proposed class members may have been aware of the existence of possible gender discrimination more than 300 days before Ms. Puffer filed her EEOC charge. See note 9, supra; see also Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Where, as here, a court would have to examine Holdings: 0: recognizing that under 42 usc  2000e5el a title vii claim is timely where the eeoc charge was filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice 1: holding that a title vii cause of action is limited to those discrimination allegations in the complaint that have been under the scrutiny of a formal eeoc complaint 2: holding that plaintiffs eeoc charge alleging sex discrimination did not encompass claim of sexual harassment subsequently asserted in title vii action in federal court because the facts underlying sexual harassment claim could not be inferred from the factual assertions made in the eeoc charge nor would they have been uncovered absent specific allegations to indicate such a cause of action existed 3: holding that statute of limitations barred title vii claim where the plaintiff would have been aware of discrimination more than 300 days before eeoc charge filed 4: holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "claim against the bankruptcy estate alleging that Telegroup breached its agreement to use its best efforts to register its stock. Claimants sought damages on the theory that had Telegroup performed its obligation under the contract, they would have sold their shares as soon as Tele-group\u2019s stock became freely tradeable, thereby avoiding the losses incurred when Telegroup\u2019s stock subsequently declined in value. Telegroup filed objections to these claims, asking the Bankruptcy Court to subordinate the claims pursuant to \u00a7 510(b), which provides that any claim for damages \u201carising from the purchase or sale\u201d of common stock shall have the same priority in the distribution of the estate\u2019s assets a o. 97-1409, 2001 WL 1752566, at *7, 2001 Bankr.LEXIS 158 at *20 (Bankr.D.Del. Jan. 16, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Since the actionable conduct in this case Holdings: 0: holding that a pledge is a sale and purchase of a security under  10b 1: holding that an independent fiduciary duty arises from a brokers purchase and sale of securities 2: holding that a claim for breach of a provision in a merger agreement arises from the purchase or sale of the debtors securities 3: holding that under  510b a claim does not arise from the purchase or sale of a security if it is predicated on conduct that occurred after the securitys issuance 4: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "74, 77 (Mo.1998), quoting James T. Hendrick and James P. Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms \u2014 An Introduction and Critique, Fedn. of Ins. & Corporate Counsel Quarterly 319, 322 (Summer 1986).] Courts generally conclude that the policies are intended to insure the risks of an insured causing damage to other persons and their property, but that the policies are not intended to insure the risks of an insured causing damage to the insured\u2019s own work. [Id.} In other words, the policies do not insure an insured\u2019s work itself; rather, the policies generally insure consequential risks that stem from the insured\u2019s work. Heile v. Herrmann, 136 Ohio App.3d 351, 353, 736 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist.1999). See also ACUITY v. Burd & Smith Constr., Inc., 2006 ND 187, 721 N.W.2d 33, \u00b6 12 (<HOLDING>); Century Indemn. Co. v. Golden Hills Builders, Holdings: 0: holding that under missouri law the term property damage defined as physical injury to tangible property does not cover losses due to the insureds negligent performance of contract work where the defective work does not cause accidental injury to surrounding property 1: holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy  is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance  10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id 2: holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations 3: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 4: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "subsequent purchasers is concerned, the only duty resting upon a mortgagee is the due registration of the mortgage in the office of the probate judge, which is conclusive notice to all the world of everything that appears from the face of the mortgage.\u201d Christopher v. Shockley, 199 Ala. 681, 682, 75 So. 158, 158 (1917) (emphasis added). We conclude that the constructive notice provided by \u00a7 35-4-90 extends to those who, like subsequent purchasers, are under a duty to search the chain of title for claims against a parcel of property but that it does not extend to those who, like Geanie, have an antecedent claim to the property at issue and therefore have no reason to search for subsequently arising claims to the property. See, generally, Pierce v. Rwmmell, 535 So.2d 594, 597 (Ala.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although we conclude that the statute of Holdings: 0: holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument used is a firearm as defined by section 7900016 then that instrument is a deadly weapon as a matter of law  regardless of whether it is loaded or capable of being fired and holding that for purposes of the aggravated assault statute if the instrument is not a firearm then courts are to apply an objective test and look to the nature and actual use of the instrument and not to the subjective fear of the victim or intent of the perpetrator in determining whether the instrument is a deadly weapon 1: holding that recording of an instrument provided constructive notice to subsequent purchasers not to those with an interest antecedent to the making of the instrument 2: holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument 3: holding that recording is notice to one bound to search the record 4: holding if the language of a deed or other written instrument is clear and unambiguous the intention of the parties is gathered from the instrument it is what the grant or said and not what he intended to say", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the jurisdiction of this state.\u201d Miss.Code Ann. \u00a7 75-9-102 (1972). The law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located therefore controls. First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit Corp., 417 F.2d 1081, 1082 (10th Cir. 1969). Because the airplane covered by the security interest is located in Kentucky, we shall apply the law of that state. The UCC defines security interest as \u201can interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.\u201d Ky.Rev.Stat. \u00a7 355.1-201(37) (1970). A security interest thus has no validity absent its underlying obligation; the satisfaction of that obligation extinguishes the security interest. See Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Custom Leasing, Inc., 402 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Amarillo, 1966, no writ) (<HOLDING>). In order to urge the continuing viability of Holdings: 0: holding that foreclosure of a prior mortgage extinguished a declaration of condominium and interests in a parking lot that were subject to the mortgage 1: holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa 2: holding that payment of debt extinguished accompanying chattel mortgage under precode law 3: holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage 4: holding that a bank holding a chattel mortgage on an automobile damaged in a collision had an equitable lien in insurance proceeds because the mortgage required mortgagor to insure the vehicle and name mortgagee as a loss payee", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for a writ of habeas corpus, and not in a civil rights action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201c[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or durar tion of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.\u201d (emphases added)); see also Smith v. Mas-chner, 899 F.2d 940, 951 (10th Cir.1990) (\u201cInsofar as [the appellant] seeks restoration of his good time credits, his complaint runs afoul of the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Preiser v. Rodriguez.\u201d (citation omitted)); Rather, 1991 WL 50541, at *1; accord Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep\u2019t, 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Whether or not Mr. Kailey is entitled to such Holdings: 0: holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied 1: holding that where plaintiff sought relief from custody his complaint sounded in habeas corpus not civil rights 2: holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional 3: holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law 4: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Guideline \u00a7 5 G 1.3(b), which mandates a concurrent sentence where the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offenses fully taken into account in computation of the new sentence. Although this provision is as inhibiting upon a sentencing court\u2019s discretion as \u00a7 5G1.3(a), the issue was not raised in Oser that \u00a7 5G1.3(b) was in conflict with 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3584(a). 5 . We find it unnecessary to address the government\u2019s alternative argument that, while \u00a7 5G1.3 may conflict with the language of \u00a7 3584(a), the guideline departure mechanism adequately preserves a court's discretion. A few circuits have resolved the apparent conflict in this fashion. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 107 F.3d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 3, 1997) (No. 97-5125) (<HOLDING>); see also Flowers, 995 F.2d at 317, United Holdings: 0: holding that while  5 g 13 a creates a presumption in favor of a consecutive sentence sentencing judges are free to depart from the guidelines and order a downward departure so long as they comply with the procedures required for downward departure in general outlined in 19 usc  3553c2 1: holding that defendants responsibilities to son and wife both of whom have medical problems are discouraged as a basis for downward departure 2: holding that while trial courts are encouraged to state all findings in their written orders they are not required to do so as long as the basis for their decisions is clear from the record and thus susceptible to review 3: holding that absolute immunity protects  judges  so long as their acts are judicial  in nature internal quotation omitted 4: holding that later agency action cannot retroactively nullify the consequences of a petitioners failure to comply with a voluntary departure order", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Motivated Killing\u201d, and (5)\u2014\u201cSe-lection of Victims\u201d constitute an \u201c \u2018end-run\u2019 around the Eighth Amendment\u201d because, by allegedly restating the offenses charged, they fail to distinguish the Defendant from other offenders. (Dkt. No. 291 at 26). To the contrary, the challenged aggra 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (\u201cTwo factors are not duplicative merely because they are supported by the same evidence.\u201d). Here, even if some of the nonaggravat-ing factors may be supported by the same evidence, none are duplicative. Like a five-circle Venn diagram, there may be areas of overlap between the five aggravating factors. However, no two factors are identical, which means it aggravating factor may play some role in the weighing process. This is permissible under the FDPA. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>) and United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298 Holdings: 0: holding that if the imposition of the death penalty depends on the existence of aggravating factors a jury must find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that trial court must consider both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors 2: holding that the grand jury need not find nonstatutory aggravating factors 3: holding that the fifth amendment does not require the government to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in the indictment because the finding of a nonstatutory aggravated alone will not support imposition of the death penalty 4: holding that failure to charge nonstatutory aggravating factors in indictment is not constitutional error because under the fdpa only statutory factors expose a criminal defendant to the death penalty", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "zones within 150 miles of the WAII tracts and that most of the Wyoming PRB is considered to be in \u201cattainment\u201d status for PM10 emissions. See J.A. 1388. Meanwhile, despite WildEarth Guardians\u2019 assertion to the contrary, BLM did not \u201cgloss over\u201d PM10 modeling data for the PRB. WildEarth Pis.\u2019 [89] Mem. at 12. In its final EIS, the agency expressly recognized. that modeling projected some ex-ceedances of the 24-hour PM10 standard, but discounted the data in part on the basis that modeling tends to over-predict 24-hour impacts of surface coal mining \u2014 a tendency that is directly reflected in an agreement between EPA and Wyoming environmental authorities that permits greater weight to be placed on PM10 monitoring data. See J.A. 1041, 1395-97; see also WildEarth Pis.\u2019 [89] Mem. at 13 (<HOLDING>). As WildEarth Plaintiffs concede, \u201cBLM has the Holdings: 0: holding that bloodtest results would be irrelevant in action challenging parentage where the results could not be compared to information relating to necessary parties 1: recognizing that enhancement for results obtained may be warranted 2: holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success 3: recognizing that blm discussed the modeling results and explained the basis for its decision to discount those results 4: holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Explaining its causes, even after the fact, is rife with uncertainty. Crime rates are affected by numerous factors, such as the local economy, population density, access to jobs, education, and housing, and public policies that directly and indirectly affect the crime rate. Even if it were possible to do so, Sheriff Arpaio does not explain how increased migration would interact with those and other factors affecting the crime rate. On this record, it is pure speculation whether an increase in unlawful immigration would result in an increase, rather than a decrease or no change, in the number of crimes committed in Maricopa County. Where predictions are so uncertain, we are prohibited from finding standing. See O\u2019Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (<HOLDING>). We faced one example of the obstacles to Holdings: 0: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 1: holding iowa civil liberties union and lawyers lacked standing to maintain action to challenge a supervisory order of the court pertaining to the trial of criminal cases  only defendants in the criminal cases had standing 2: holding that a criminal defendant has standing to pursue a tenth amendment challenge to the statute under which he was charged as an unjustifiable expansion of federal law enforcement into a stateregulated domain 3: holding that a class of african americans and civil rights activists lacked standing to challenge an alleged pattern and practice of selective and discriminatory criminal law enforcement because attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime  takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the hatch act because the nature of the political activities they intended to engage in was a matter of speculation", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "S.W.2d 268, 272 (1973). An objection must be made by counsel in order to preserve for appellate review a claim that a defendant was absent during a critical stage of the proceedings. E.g., Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 608-09, 906 S.W.2d 290, 294-95 (1995); see also Durham v. State, 179 Ark. 507, 509-10, 16 S.W.2d 991, 991-92 (1929) (refusing to reverse in absence of objection by counsel, who was present, when jury was instructed without defendant\u2019s presence). We will not address Clark\u2019s second basis for reversal because it is not preserved for our review. Were we to entertain his argument, however, we would agree with the State that Clark has demonstrated no prejudice or loss of an advantage as a result of his absence. See Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458, 465, 757 S.W.2d 937, 940 (1988) (<HOLDING>). We hold that Clark is not entitled to a new Holdings: 0: holding that the validity of an administrative order is properly before the court when it has been directly placed in issue 1: holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future 2: holding that reversal is required when a significant step in a case is taken in an accuseds absence if it appears that he has lost an advantage or has been prejudiced 3: holding that a federal court must order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored 4: recognizing that dismissal is required if a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case but has failed", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.\u201d). The Court does not believe that Mr. Chien can fairly and adequately represent the interests of Skystar\u2019s shareholders for many reasons, chief among them that Mr. Chien is unrepresented and proceeding pro se; that he struggles with the English language; that he seems to lack even a basic understanding of the law; that he was previously sanctioned for bringing a frivolous lawsuit against these same Defendants; and that he has exhibited an animosity towards Defendants that is above and beyond what is generally expected during the normal course of litigation. See Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 413-15 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). In his First Amended Complaint, Mr. Chien Holdings: 0: holding that pro se litigant cannot act as representative in derivative suit and stating that we can find no reason or justification for permitting the corporation or the other shareholders to be subjected involuntarily to the risks of this plaintiffs transgressions distractions and deficiencies as their advocate 1: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond 2: holding a pro per litigant to the same standard as an attorney 3: holding that a defendant proceeding pro se is bound by same rules as party represented by counsel and a court cannot allow pro se litigant lower standard of performance 4: holding that corporation could not assign rights to pro se litigant to circumvent rule that corporation must be represented by licensed attorney", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Appellant, Elizabeth Harris Lowery, appeals her judgments and sentences and raises two issues, only one of which merits discussion. Appellant argues that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence. Although the State concedes error, we conclude that no fundamental error occurred. Appellant\u2019s testimony established that at the time any alleged resistance occurred, she was aware that the individuals were officers. As such, the knowledge element was not in dispute at trial. Cf. Lett v. State, 29 So.3d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Leonard v. State, 1 So.3d 1271, 1271 (Fla. Holdings: 0: holding that by including a knowledge element in two sections of a statute the legislature demonstrated that it knew how to express its intent to require a knowledge element rendering the absence of the element in another statute supportive of the inference that the legislature did not intend for there to be a knowledge element 1: holding that knowledge element could not be deemed in favor of plaintiff where defendant objected to the omission of that element from the jury charge 2: holding omission in the jury instruction of element of offense requires a new trial 3: holding that although the trial justice did not adopt the specific language that defendant requested be used in instructing the jury    the trial justice adequately and accurately instructed the jury as to that element of the charge 4: holding that the trial court committed fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the knowledge element of the offense of resisting an officer without violence when that element was in dispute at trial", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "before the court, where the dispute arises between two parents, the burden of proof is shared equally between the parties, as the court will not presume that custody should be awarded to a particular parent. Id. In making a determination, the court bases its findings on how the best interests of the child may be served. Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Super. 2004). It is axiomatic that the paramount concern in a child custody case is the best interests of the child, and the court makes its determination based upon a consideration of all factors legitimately affecting the child\u2019s physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well being. Id. Specific factors that a court must consider are set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a75328(a); see also B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168 (Pa. Super. 2012) (<HOLDING>). The court will address each of these factors Holdings: 0: holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child 1: holding that best interests of the child analysis requires consideration of all section 5328a factors 2: holding that paramount consideration in terminationofparentalrights proceeding is best interests of the child 3: holding that the primary and overarching consideration in custody determination is the best interest of the child 4: holding that a childs preference regarding parental contact is not determinative of the best interest analysis and that a court must assess a childs best interest in light of all statutory factors", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "in support of the other spouse after divorce do not constitute court-ordered alimony and therefore are not void in the State of Texas. Francis, 412 S.W.2d at 29. The fact that a court expressly approves such an agreement and incorporates it into the final divorce decree does not transform the contractual payments into prohibited court-ordered alimony. Id.; see also Klise v. Klise, 678 S.W.2d 545, (Tex.App l occasions, confirmed that under Texas law the legal force and meaning of marital property settlement agreements are governed by the law of contracts. See McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984); see also McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979) (applying law of contracts to contractual alimony agreement); cf. Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.1966) (<HOLDING>). Following Francis, courts of appeals have Holdings: 0: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous 1: holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts 2: holding that agreement for periodic child support payments is governed by law of contracts and under contract principles payments survive obligors death absent agreement to contrary shown by provisions of contract or surrounding circumstances 3: holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation 4: recognizing that payments to secured creditors are only required in equal monthly amounts if property to be distributed  is in the form of periodic payments", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a hybrid of the quota bonus system and the salary plus commission system. Id. at *4. Like the court in Donovan, this Court finds that the Level I payment plan constitutes a hybrid of a quota bonus plan and a salary plus commission plan. Under a quota bonus plan, employees are paid commissions on sales over and above a predetermined sales quota. The Level I plan possesses characteristics similar to a quota bonus plan in that account executives\u2019 commissions are added to the non-recoverable draw if they bring in money over and above a predetermined sales quota of $10,000. The Level I plan differs from a quota bonus plan, however, in that account executives are paid the full amount of the non-recoverable draw even if they do not bring in over $10,000. See Donovan, 1986 WL 11266, at *4 (<HOLDING>). The Level I plan also possesses qualities Holdings: 0: recognizing that the compensation plan at issue in that case possessed some qualities of a quota bonus system but that it was not strictly such a plan because a salary is paid to the managers  regardless of the number of gallons they pump 1: holding that professionals who advised the plan were not fiduciaries because they had no decision making authority over the plan or plan assets also noting that the power to act for the plan is essential to status as a fiduciary 2: holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan 3: holding that because the spd at issue stated that it is made part of the group policy its terms were sufficient to find that the plan conferred discretion on the plan administrator 4: holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "cannot be equated with the determination of disability under ERISA. Even if the Social Security administration required a showing of plaintiffs inability to work at any occupation, as does this Plan, the method by which that conclusion is reached in Social Security cases is substantially different than that used in ERISA cases. For example, and significant to this case, ERISA does not contain a treating physician rule, Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003), while Social Security does. In an ERISA case, medical information offered by a Plan participant\u2019s primary physician is to be considered, but it is not entitled to special deference. Id. at 832, 123 S.Ct. 1965. Meraou, 221 Fed.Appx. at 703; See Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1099 (<HOLDING>). Additionally, Mr. Hildre\u2019s reliance on the Holdings: 0: holding that a rational plan administrator could reject a treating physicians report of total disability due to diabetes when there was no accompanying clinical data to support the conclusion 1: holding that it was error for a plan administrator to require the claimant to submit clinical findings to support his diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome when the plan did not require such evidence 2: holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability 3: holding that opinions of treating doctors are not conclusive in determining disability status and must be supported by medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic data 4: holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "product mix shift and lowered its earnings per share forecasts slightly. The report still gave Bailey an \u201cAggressive Buy\u201d rating. After Bailey disclosed that its earnings for the third quarter of fiscal 1994 were only $0.16, Hancock lowered Bailey\u2019s investment rating from buy to sell, based in part on the \u201cserious credibility problem\u201d of Bailey management. Hancock called Bailey\u2019s third quarter earnings \u201ca major negative surprise.\u201d In support of their argument that Bailey should be held liable for alleged misstatements in these analysts\u2019 reports, appellants cite cases in which courts have held that a defendant company may be held liable for any false or misleading statements contained in analysts\u2019 reports. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., No. Holdings: 0: holding that exclusiveremedy provision applied to both temporary staffing company and client company 1: holding that a company may sufficiently entangle itself with analysts forecasts to render the predictions attributable to the company but finding no such liability 2: holding owner of limited liability company may be personally liable to third party if owner acts as agent for company and fails to disclose existence and identity of principal 3: holding that plaintiffs failure to mention vice president of thirdparty company in initial disclosures was harmless because plaintiffs mentioned president of company and defendants conducted no discovery of company 4: holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "only that a forfeiture proceeding be initiated within 25 days after a claim is made, the California controlled substances act requires that, once a person claiming an interest in seized property files a verified claim, \"the [civil] forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing on a day not less than 30 days therefrom, and the proceeding shall have priority over other civil cases.\" Cal. Health & Safety Code \u00a7 11488.5(c)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the civil forfeiture provision of the Wisconsin controlled substances act states that \"the action shall be set for hearing within 60 days of the service of the answer but may be continued for cause or upon stipulation of the parties.\u201d Wis. Stat. \u00a7 961.555(2)(b); see also State v. Rosen, 72 Wis.2d 200, 240 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In South Carolina, when a motorist is Holdings: 0: holding that the statute is mandatory 1: holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days 2: holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction 3: holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue 4: holding the 60day claim period applicable to a constitutional challenge of an assessment and of the statute authorizing the assessment", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that on the record in that particular ADEA action it was reversible error for the district court to fail to give a \u201cbusiness judgment\u201d instruction. Likewise, our circuit has held that the intent of the ADEA is not to review the correctness of employer\u2019s business decisions, Bell v. Gas Serv. Co., 778 F.2d 512, 515 (8th Cir.1985), and that \u201ccourts have no business telling Searle how to make personnel decisions, which may be objectively or subjectively based.\u201d Neufeld v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 335, 340 (8th Cir.1989). See also Jorgensen v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 761 F.2d 502, 505 (8th Cir.1985) (observing that \u201c[t]he ADEA is not intended to be used as a means of reviewing the propriety of a business decision ... \u201d; Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 723 n. 3 (8th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. 1273, Holdings: 0: holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current 1: holding that that choices as to selection and arrangement are entitled to copyright protection only so long as they are made independently 2: recognizing that an employer may develop arbitrary ridiculous and even irrational policies as long as they are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner 3: holding that the court may not overturn the administrative law judges factual findings as long as they are supported by competent substantial evidence 4: recognizing in title vii context that employers may have hidden reasons for terminating employees or hiring someone less qualified  as long as the reasons are nondiscriminatory they are free to hire and fire as they choose", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "trial court decided that putting her on the stand solely to allow her to state \u201cI take the Fifth\u201d in response to the State\u2019s questions would wrongly inject the potentially improper element of inference into the jury\u2019s deliberative process. So instead of calling her to the stand, the trial court allowed Ms. Day to sit in jail pursuant to a contempt ruling. While the State argues there was nothing more the trial court could have done to protect Appellant\u2019s rights once Ms. Day refused to testify at the in camera proceeding, Appellant retorts that not until a witness actually takes the stand and is presented with questions by counsel does the court or counsel know for certain that the witness will refuse to testify. See Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951) (<HOLDING>); see also In Re Anthony Ray Mc., 200 W.Va. Holdings: 0: holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness 1: recognizing that where witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify jurors are entitled to draw negative inference from witness refusal to testify 2: recognizing that trial court has duty to determine whether witness silence is properly grounded in fifth amendment and to require witness to answer where refusal to testify is not warranted 3: holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime 4: holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "389, 432 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 974 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1992)). The indictment here\u2014 even without the description of what Form B-21 requires \u2014 alleges every element of the offense. Accordingly, the additional factual description of Form B-21 is sur-plusage. \u201cSurplusage ... may be disregarded provided it neither broadens the indictment nor misleads the accused.\u201d United States v. Thompson, 990 F.2d 625, at *3 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). The description of what Form B-21 requires does not broaden the indictment because the indictment required the Government to prove a knowingly made false statement to secure a conviction. The indictment alleges that \u201cGrant falsely represented and stated that Grant only had one social security number XXX h Cir. 1987) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the indictment was Holdings: 0: holding that the amendment made to the indictment in this case was not authorized by code  192231 because the amended indictment materially changed the nature of the offense originally charged 1: holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient 2: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the defendant knew before trial the theory of criminality on which the government would proceed 3: holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code  192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment 4: holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "be what ERISA authorizes in a suit for benefits under \u00a7 1132(a). Id. at 379-80, 122 S.Ct. 2151 (footnote omitted). The Rush Prudential Court recognized that allowing the states to establish these types of procedures would somewhat undermine ERISA\u2019s purpose in establishing a \u201cuniform federal regime of \u2018rights and obligations\u2019 under ERISA.\u201d Id. at 381, 122 S.Ct. 2151. However, the Court stated, \u201c *[s]uch disuniformities ... are the inevitable result of the congressional decision to \u2018save\u2019 local insurance regulation.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985)) (alterations in original). The Court acknowledged its previous holding in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (<HOLDING>) and explained that a state statute might \u201cso Holdings: 0: holding that congressional intent as clearly expressed in legislative history cannot trump the irrefutably plain statutory language that emerged when congress actually took pen to paper 1: holding that the plaintiffs causes of action were preempted because their claims were premised on the existence of an erisa plan 2: holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans 3: holding that statutory language is conclusive in absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary  4: holding that congress had clearly expressed through the structure and legislative history of  erisa an intention that the federal remedy  displace state causes of action", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to review his application. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that \u00a7 925(c) \u201cremain[s] in effect,\u201d and that the ATF\u2019s refusal to entertain the plaintiffs application constituted a \u201cde facto denial\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 925(c). McHugh, 49 F.Supp.2d at 111. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge \u201cto develop a record and make a recommendation regarding the relief sought.\u201d Id. Pursuant to the defendants\u2019 request, the district court certified its decision for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1292(b), and on October 5, 1999, this Court granted leave to appeal. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review This appeal turns solely on questions of law which we review de novo. See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that legal issues presented by rule 12b1 motion are reviewed de novo 1: holding that issues concerning the sufficiency of an indictment are reviewed de novo 2: holding that confrontation clause claims are reviewed de novo 3: holding that rule 12b6 disposition is reviewed de novo 4: holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "(applying Maryland law). A similar showing is required to establish agency by estoppel, a situation in which a party \u201cwho receives money, or anything of value in the assumed exercise of authority as agent for another, is estopped to deny such authority in criminal prosecutions, as well as in civil actions.\u201d 2A C.J.S. Agency \u00a7 48. Like apparent authority, \u201can agency by estoppel can arise only where the principal, through words or conduct, represents that the agent has authority to act and the third party reasonably relies on those representations.\u201d Johns Hopkins, 114 Md.App. at 96, 689 A.2d 91. The existence of an agency relationship is a factual matter. Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 460, 620 A.2d 327 (1993); see P. Flanigan & Sons v. Childs, 251 Md. 646, 653, 248 A.2d 473 (1968) (<HOLDING>); Levine v. Chambers, 141 Md. 336, 343, 118 A. Holdings: 0: recognizing the existence of the special relationship 1: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 2: holding it is a question of fact 3: holding that the existence of probable cause in a  1983 case is a jury question 4: recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "may recommend a particular sentence based upon the facts before the court. As part of a plea agreement, the Government is free to negotiate away any right it may have to recommend a sentence. However, the Government does not have a right to make an agreement to stand mute in the face of factual inaccuracies or to withhold relevant factual information from the court. Such an agreement not only violates a prosecutor\u2019s duty to the court but would result in sentences based upon incomplete facts or factual inaccuracies, a notion that is simply abhorrent to our legal system. 660 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (5th Cir.1981) (citations and footnotes omitted). The reasoning of Block has been adopted by the Fourth Circuit as well. E.g., United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dail, 1991 WL 631 at *2, Holdings: 0: holding the government did not violate its plea agreement with a defendant because in addition to specifically retaining the right to comment at the sentencing hearing concerning defendants conduct and background the prosecuting attorney had a duty to bring all relevant information about defendant to the courts attention at the time of sentencing 1: holding that the district court erred when it used rule 36 to amend the defendants sentence to include an order of forfeiture that had been agreed to in the plea agreement but which the court failed to make a part of its judgment at sentencing 2: holding that we review for plain error whether the government breached its plea obligations when the defendant fails to object at sentencing 3: holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the act and to challenge the states evidence regarding the defendants eligibility for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender 4: holding the government was required by law to correct a defendants misrepresentations at a sentencing hearing and doing so did not violate the plea agreement", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Gonzalez, 121 So.3d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime 1: holding prosecutor has discretion to charge defendant under general crime even though more specific crime exists 2: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins 3: holding kidnapping and underlying crime could be merged even when defendant has been acquitted of underlying charge 4: holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 879, 113 S.Ct. 226, 121 L.Ed.2d 163 (1992), the court addressed a challenge that the defendant\u2019s trial was untimely under the 180-day IAD requirement. The court stated that the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 3161-3174, and the IAD speedy trial provision serve the same purposes. 953 F.2d at 1172. The court held that since the Speedy Trial Act excludes a delay attributable to a defendant\u2019s pretrial motions under Section 3161(h)(1)(F), the IAD\u2019s time requirements are also tolled. Id. The Second and Fourth Circuits have also concluded that time periods excluded under the Speedy Trial Act likewise should be excluded under the IAD. See United States v. Cephas, 937 F.2d 816 (2nd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037, 112 S.Ct. 884, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992)(<HOLDING>); United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481 (4th Holdings: 0: holding that the plain language of the rule broadens a courts discretion to extend time for service even if good cause has not been shown 1: holding that delay created by defendant in mistakenly agreeing to a waiver of his speedy trial rights is excludable 2: holding that review of good cause determination to avoid dismissal for speedy trial purposes is abuse of discretion 3: holding that the for good cause shown tolling provision encompasses the same circumstances as the rules for excludable time under the speedy trial act 4: holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "(\u201cMTBE I\u201d) (denying motion to dismiss nuisance claim against petroleum companies for contamination of wells, where plaintiffs alleged that defendants had \u201cknowledge of the dangers MTBE poses to groundwater\u201d and \u201cfailed to warn the downstream handlers, retailers, gasoline purchasers, government officials and well owners\u201d). Second, the Employees based their claim on more than the mere manufacture and sale of PCBs. Their claim includes \u201creleasing and dispersing\u201d the PCBs into their work environment, the GE Plant. Even where the manufacture or sale of a hazardous material does not constitute an abnormally dangerous activity, the manner in which it is transported, stored, used, or disposed of may meet the standard. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The question for the Court, therefore, is Holdings: 0: holding that wind blowing particles of hazardous substances from a pile of waste was a cercla release 1: holding that mere possession of a dangerous weapon is insufficient to support a charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon 2: recognizing that failure to hold a hearing constitutes ah abuse of discretion only where there is evidence that the jury was subjected to influence by outside sources 3: holding that allowing corroding tanks to hold hundreds of thousands of gallons of hazardous waste constitutes abnormally dangerous activity 4: holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "is a trustee for approximately 15 different family trusts. The trustee\u2019s recollection of the specifics of the trust at issue and his dealings with Lesinski is somewhat vague. {\u00b6 15} Appellant argues that the inconsistencies between Lesinski\u2019s and the trustee\u2019s testimony regarding the trustee\u2019s monitoring of Lesinski\u2019s investment of trust assets create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. We first establish that it is uncontested that the trustee received at least quarterly and annual statements concerning the trust, some of which were prepared by Merrill Lynch and some of which were prepared by the accountant the trustee retained to manage the family trusts. While Ohio law has defined and analyzed many duties of a trustee, the R.C. 1339.59( 7, 41 Cal.Rptr. 410 (<HOLDING>). {\u00b6 16} An example of the alleged Holdings: 0: holding that an error is plain if it is clear or obvious 1: holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion 2: holding that it is obvious that the discretion given to a trustee is never unlimited or arbitrary such as might be exercised by an oriental prince out of the arabian nights sitting at the city gate and exercising his own uncontrolled whim as to what is appropriate and just 3: holding that while a court may direct that discretion be exercised it may not specify how that discretion is to be exercised nor require the performance of a particular discretionary act 4: holding that where the statute in question required that the measure of fair market value shall be as determined by the secretary  the court cannot substitute its own discretion for properly exercised administrative discretion", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cal.Rptr. 219, 591 P.2d 509 (1979); Couts v. Rose, 152 Ohip St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950); Vaughn v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Texas 1968); Olseth v. Larson, 158 P.3d 532 (Utah 2007). 33 . 488 P.2d at 717: Appellant asserts that to permit the availability of a statutory agent for service of process to avoid the suspension of the statute of limitations is to impliedly amend the tolling statute by the addition of a limitation not expressed. Some of the cases adopting the minority viewpoint have so held. We cannot agree with their analysis. Id. (citations omitted). 34 . 486 U.S. 888, 108 S.Ct 2218, 100 LEd.2d 896 (1988). 35 . Id. at 894, 108 S.Ct. 2218. 36 . Id. at 891-92, 108 S.Ct. 2218. 37 . Id. at 891, 108 S.Ct. 2218. 38 . See, eg., Rademeyer v. Farris, 284 F.3d 833, 838-39 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Abramson v. Brownstein, 897 F.2d 389, 392 Holdings: 0: holding  922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce 1: holding that because dr medeiros a former california resident moved to texas to take a new job in 1998 thereby engaging in interstate commerce the tolling statute could not be applied under bendix 2: holding that a missouri tolling statute was unconstitutional under the commerce clause in the situation where a resident defendant moved out of state 3: holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause 4: holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "imprisonment on the firearm charge. This appeal followed. II We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rojas, 520 F.3d 876, 884 (8th Cir.2008). In order to prevail on his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Lee must demonstrate: \u201c(1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of trial, (2) the defendant did not lack diligence in attempting to uncover it, (3) the newly found evidence is material, and (4) the evidence is likely to produce an acquittal if offered merely to impeach a government witnesses\u2019s testimony, which is insufficient to warrant a new trial. See United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir.2007) (collecting cases); United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366, 372-73 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Lee has failed to demonstrate the Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach  testimony 1: holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed 2: holding that district court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial because nonmovant presented sufficient evidence at trial for the district court to conclude that the outcome was not against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute a miscarriage of justice 3: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for severance where the allegedly prejudicial evidence would have been admissible in separate trials 4: holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence", "references": ["2", "3", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Defendants\u2019 failure to deposit \u2018immediately upon demand, the sum demanded by the Surety as payment shall cause irreparable harm to the Surety for which the Surety has no adequate remedy at law ...[\u2019] Therefore, the Court finds that absent enforcement of the Agreement, Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.\u201d). However, courts have found such a provision to be at l\u00e9ast persuasive in determining irreparable injury in a trademark infringement context. See Dunkin\u2019 Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. KEV Enters., 634 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1336 (M.D.Fla. 2009) (in addition to presumption of irreparable harm, citing provision in agreement stating \u201cFRANCHISEE further agrees that any unauthorized use of the Proprietary Marks during the term of or after exp cu Gas, Inc., 754 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.l985)(<HOLDING>). \u201cThe most corrosive and irreparable harm Holdings: 0: holding that irreparable injury exists in a trademark case when the party seeking the injunction shows that it will lose control over the reputation of its trademark pending trial 1: holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising 2: holding that the lack of control over ones mark creates the potential for damage to  reputation which constitutes irreparable injury for the purpose of granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark case 3: holding that the defendants reference to the plaintiffs trademark in the metatags of the defendants web page was a violation of trademark law 4: holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "conversion rights were not terminated. See Aristocrat Leisure, 2005 WL 1950116, *3, *4, **6-7, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16788, at *8-9, 12, *20-22. Subsequently, by Opinion and Order dated May 30, 2006, this Court found that because the Bondholders presented evidence that they submitted conversion notices and tendered their interests in the bonds, demonstrating that they exercised their rights to convert under the Indenture, and because Aristocrat had not issued or delivered any shares to any Bondholders, Aristocrat is in breach of the Indenture with respect to each Bondholder who submitted evidence to the Court. See Aristocrat Leisure, 2006 WL 1493132, **6-7, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34709, at *22-23; see also Aristocrat Leisure, 2007 WL 404767, *2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9521, at *6-7 (<HOLDING>); Aristocrat Leisure, 2006 WL 3103481, **3-4, Holdings: 0: holding that aristocrat is in breach with respect to qvt fund lp 1: holding to that effect with respect to rule 64 2: holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress 3: holding that aristocrat is in breach with respect to deutsche bank ag london branch 4: holding the same with respect to an apartment", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the facial applicability of \u00a7 2A3.1 but argues that the Sentencing Commission intended a different result for cases in which no actual minor was involved. However, this court has made clear that \u00a7 2A3.1 is appropriate for cases involving fictitious victims. In DeCarlo, this court considered DeCarlo\u2019s argument that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 2A3.1 is reserved for cases involving actual minors. As the DeCarlo court emphasized, \u201c[t]he critical fact that renders the defendant\u2019s conduct criminal in this case is not the act or the resulting harm, but the intent with which the act was done.... The plain language of the statute makes the age of the intended victim an element of the crime, and it punishes attempts the same as completed acts.\u201d Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added); see also Hochschild, 442 at 978-79 (<HOLDING>). We therefore find that the district court did Holdings: 0: holding that the district court erred in imposing an enhancement under the  5k20 departure provision where an enhancement under the separate guidelines provision for restraining a victim during the course of an offense would have been appropriate 1: holding that because it is not strictly necessary under the statute for a victim to fear death the guideline enhancement is not coterminous with the basic offense conduct 2: holding a single vulnerable victim is sufficient to support application of the vulnerable victim enhancement 3: holding that application of  2a31 is appropriate even when the victim is fictional as an enhancement for a fictitious victim is consistent with the utilitarian purpose of the enhancement 4: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "feature is one that is \u201cessential to the use or purpose of the article,\u201d \u201caffects the cost or quality of the article,\u201d or one that, if kept from competitors, would put them at a \u201csignificant non-reputation-related disadvantage.\u201d TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. By contrast, a feature is nonfunctional where it \u201cis unrelated to the consumer demand . . . and serves merely to identify the source of the product\u201d or business. Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986). Student feedback procedures, catamarans, teaching itineraries, and curriculum all affect the quality of Fair Wind\u2019s business. They play a critical role in the consumer demand for Fair Wind\u2019s services, rather than merely identifying Fair Wind as the source of the sailing instruction. Cf. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32 (<HOLDING>). Thus, Fair Wind\u2019s alleged dress is plainly Holdings: 0: holding that the the statement of the purpose of the law in question in the committee report is not conclusive and reiterating that the question is whether the law is reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate police power purpose 1: recognizing that one purpose of batson is to address the right of a juror not to be excluded from serving on a jury for racial reasons 2: holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose 3: holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation 4: holding that the dualspring design was not protectable because it had a purpose beyond serving the purpose of informing consumers that the sign stands are made by the plaintiff", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "judgments. When a defendant has violated a court judgment or order, its subsequently coming into compliance before the hearing does not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the matter. Otherwise a defendant could violate a court order or judgment and then comply with it without the court having power to reach him.\u2019 \u201d Id., 365. This court held that the trial court \u201cproperly stated the rule of law in Connecticut. [T]he trial court\u2019s continuing jurisdiction is not separate from, but, rather, derives from, its equitable authority to vindicate judgments. Moreover, we [held] that such equitable authority does not derive from the trial court\u2019s contempt power, but, rather, from its inherent powers. See Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano, [191 Conn. 555, 563, 468 A.2d 1230 (1983)] (<HOLDING>); Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, 186 Holdings: 0: recognizing the broad power of federal courts to fashion appropriate relief 1: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals 2: recognizing trial courts power to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of a prior consent judgment 3: holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation 4: recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "consistent both with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations statute.\u201d Id. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 756. Moreover, the Court expressly rejected the contention that limitations is the sole prerogative of Congress, because it constitutes a \u201c \u2018substantive\u2019 element\u201d of a claim. Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. 756. To the contrary, it concluded that \u201cthe mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.\u201d Id. at 559, 94 S.Ct. 756. Accord Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (<HOLDING>). In Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, Holdings: 0: holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification 1: holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions 2: holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint 3: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members 4: recognizing that american pipe established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "plain statement\u201d), 8(e) (\"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.\u201d); Colle v. Brazos County, Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 243 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cA plaintiff\u2019s complaint ordinarily need only be a short and plain statement that gives the defendant notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.\u201d); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir.1991) (requiring plaintiffs to \u201cidentify the grounds upon which their claims are based ... even under the liberal notice pleading\u201d (footnote omitted)); Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 650 n. 9 (3d Cir.1989) (\"[A]s long as the issue is pled, a party does not have to state the exact theory of relief in order to obtain a remedy.\u201d). 14 . See Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 226-27 (1st Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Holdings: 0: holding that the jury need not agree on the theory supporting the conviction if there is sufficient evidence to support either theory 1: holding that if basis described the parties were therefore aware of plaintiffs legal theory even where the theory was mischaracterized citation omitted 2: holding summary judgment appropriate when the facts in evidence supported another plausible theory not the plaintiffs theory of the case 3: holding that the plaintiffs misconceived legal theory did not preclude it from obtaining relief under another theory 4: holding a complaint sufficiently raises a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory as a basis for that claim", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that Chen-Xu suffered any harm while in detention, and he failed to explain the economic impact of the fine. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that to constitute persecution the harm must rise above \u201cmere harassment\u201d); see also In re T-Z, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 169 (B.I.A.2007) (finding that economic harm may amount to persecution). Moreover, the record supports the agency\u2019s determination that Chen-Xu failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. As the BIA noted, there was no evidence submitted showing that the authorities had any further interest in Chen-Xu after they released him from detention, including any interest in collecting the balance of the fine. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). Further, the BIA appropriately noted that Holdings: 0: holding that absent solid support in the record a petitioners fear is speculative at best 1: holding that a fear of future persecution is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best 2: holding that an applicants fear was not objectively reasonable because it lacked solid support in the record and was merely speculative at best 3: holding that absent solid support in the record that a fear is objectively reasonable a claim of future persecution is speculative at best 4: holding that in the absence of solid support in the record for an applicants assertion that he will be persecuted his fear is speculative at best", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the argument that the encounter at issue was not an investigatory stop, but rather an arrest requiring probable cause. Vargas claims that he was under arrest \u201cfrom the very moment the police approached him.\u201d In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause for a search, permitting an investigating officer to briefly detain an individual for questioning. An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, briefly detain an individual \u201cif the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.\u201d United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.2001)(internal quotation marks omitted). During an investigatory stop, \u201c[t]he inves S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)(<HOLDING>). In determining whether an investigatory stop Holdings: 0: holding that flight from police can help establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 1: holding that a defendants unprovoked flight upon noticing the police in a highcrime area was suggestive of wrongdoing and therefore provided reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory detention 2: holding defendants unprovoked flight from area of heavy narcotic trafficking after noticing uniformed officers provided reasonable suspicion to detain and stating headlong flight wherever it occurs  is the consummate act of evasion it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such 3: holding that in a high crime area unprovoked headlong flight from police can form the basis for reasonable suspicion under terry 4: recognizing presence in a high crime area unprovoked flight and nervous evasive behavior as factors supporting a reasonable suspicion", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "did not engage in a drug sale the evening of April 19. As the Investigating Officers claim to have observed him exchange money with the Cl on the porch of Defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s home that night, they must, therefore, be lying. The Government asserts that Defendant\u2019s evidence is not sufficient to make a preliminary Franks showing because it does not constitute proof of a lack of veracity on the part of the affiant, Officer Gramlich, and that only Gramlich\u2019s state of mind is relevant to the Franks inquiry. In order to make a preliminary showing with respect to the first prong of the Franks test, a defendant must challenge the affiant\u2019s state of mind as well as the truth of the affidavit. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674; United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 676-78 (3d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Defendant must, therefore, make a preliminary Holdings: 0: holding that because the information omitted from the affidavit was immaterial to the investigation there was no error in denying defendants motion for a franks hearing 1: holding that a challenge to the truth of the affidavit was not sufficient for a franks hearing where defendant offered no evidence that the affiant knowingly or recklessly gave false statements 2: holding that although affiantofficer filed affidavit in good faith the conduct of police officers who relayed the facts to the affiant was relevant to the franks showing 3: holding allegation that false affidavit was basis for arrest warrant is sufficient to state  1983 fourth amendment claim against affiant officer 4: holding that a statement that the affiant is president of the company asserting a claim on an account is sufficient to affirmatively show how the affiant has personal knowledge of the affidavit statements regarding the account", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the parties have contracted directly, such a duty may arise if one party\u2019s conduct \u201ccreates a new hazard\u201d resulting from something more than nonperformance. See Fultz, 683 N.W.2d at 592-93; see also Hill, 822 N.W.2d at 202. Some older cases draw a distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, finding only the latter to be actionable in tort, but this approach has largely been supplanted by the \u201cseparate and distinct\u201d and \u201cnew hazard\u201d standards. See Fultz, 683 N.W.2d at 592 (\u201c[T]he former misfeasance/nonfeasance inquiry ... is defective because it improperly focuses on whether a duty was breached instead of whether a duty exists at all.\u201d). Under Michigan law, ADT did not owe Ram a statutory or common-law duty to detect the burglary or dispatch police. See Spengler, 505 F.3d at 458 (<HOLDING>); see also Hill, 822 N.W.2d at 196 (no common Holdings: 0: holding that rule 415f worked to cure deficiencies in service of process in action to enforce a judgment lien on real estate where service was provided at debtors last residential address known to lienholder because address was used during underlying lawsuit lienholders attorney checked county record to verify address information debtor did receive summons and residential address was on the former situs of debtors business 1: holding that a correct address could have been determined by checking telephone directory 2: holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case 3: holding that adts failure to dispatch ems to correct address was not actionable in tort 4: holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require disclosure of witness address because personal safety exception applied noting that defendant knew victims prior address thereby limiting value of victims most current address", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "turns On the damages sought. If the damages are for the insured\u2019s own work, there is generally no coverage. If the damages are consequential and derive from the work the insured performed, coverage generally will lie. The underwriting intent is to exclude coverage for the contractor\u2019s business risks, but provide coverage for unanticipated consequential damages.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) [Indiana Ins. Co. v. Alloyd Insulation Co., 2d Dist. No. 18979, 2002-Ohio-3916, 2002 WL 1770491] \u00b6 27-28, quoting Franco, Insurance Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Claims Under Commercial General Liability Policies (1994), 30 Tort and Ins. L.J. 785, 785-787. JTO, Inc. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 194 Ohio App.3d 319, 2011-Ohio-1452, 956 N Dist. No. CA2007-05-0666, 2008-Ohio-1351, 2008 WL 757533, at \u00b6 25 (<HOLDING>); Westfield Ins. Co. v. Coastal Group, Inc., Holdings: 0: holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy 1: holding that under a cgl policy an insurer had no duty to defend its insured in an action resulting from faulty workmanship and that a cgl policy  is not intended to insure business risks ie risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which business management can and should control or manage rowland h long the law of liability insurance  10011 specifically the policies do not insure an insureds work itself but rather they generally insure consequential risks that stem from that work id 2: holding based on deposition which revealed that defective materials were used and construction was contrary to workmanship standards that insurer had no duty to defend because damages should have been expected by the insured 3: holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy 4: holding that a claim of faulty workmanship that results in damage to property other than the work product is an accident and that a cgl policy is not intended to insure business risks that are the normal frequent or predictable consequences of doing business and which businesses can control and manage    a cgl policy does not insure the insureds work itself rather it insures consequential damages that stem from that work    as a result a cgl policy may provide coverage for claims arising out of tort breaches of contract and statutory liabilities as long as the requisite accidental occurrence and property damage are present", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "gravestone); Morro, 1999-NMCA-118, \u00b6 1, 127 N.M. 763, 987 P.2d 420 (upholding multiple convictions for damaging gravestones even though all damage occurred in a single incident). {33} Further, that Defendant may have fulfilled some sort of overall plan or scheme to obtain funds from many victims by deceiving different victims at different times does not somehow mesh or coagulate his actions into but two offenses by labeling an activity to carry out the scheme a \u201ccourse of conduct.\u201d Thus, the double jeopardy proscription does not require the separate convictions to be merged into one for punishment purposes with respect to either Defendant\u2019s unlicensed status or the unregistered security status relating to each transaction. See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, \u00b6 20, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289 (<HOLDING>); State v. Stone, 2008-NMCA-062, \u00b6\u00b6 19-25, 144 Holdings: 0: holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms 1: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders 2: holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case 3: holding that two robberies of different people at the same time are two separate offenses calling for two judgments and two sentences when the defendants were convicted of taking a grandfathers wallet pistol and car and taking a grandsons fishing equipment 4: holding that under the former rules congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "with defendant\u2019s eight-year sentence from another court. The district judge also clearly recognized that, despite the other comments made by the government with regard to the grand jury matter, the government was recommending a seven-year sentence, stating: \u201cI have considered and given lots of thought to the Government\u2019s recommendation of 7 years. After considering it I will not follow that recommendation.\u201d (R.Vol. III, 23). Second, the court finds that the government attorney\u2019s comments can, in the main, be viewed as informing the court about the grand jury incident. As stated above, informing the sentencing court of pertinent information cannot generally be considered a breach of a plea agreement. Williamsburg Check Cashing Corp., 905 F.2d at 28. Cf., Shorteeth, 887 F.2d at 256-57 (<HOLDING>). Third, although the government attorney Holdings: 0: holding a sentence is not based on the guidelines unless the plea agreement itself expressly uses a guidelines sentencing range to establish the term of imprisonment 1: holding that objecting to guidelines calculations as specifically reserved in the plea agreement is not a breach of the plea agreement even if the objection is overruled and thus government is not released from obligation under the agreement to move for acceptance of responsibility 2: holding that the united states breach of the plea agreement releases the defendant from the appeal waiver 3: holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law 4: holding that  1b18 of the guidelines expressly prohibits the use of selfincriminating information gained from a cooperating defendant unless authorized by the plea agreement", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "HOLDS that Plaintiffs allegation of civil conspiracy is a \u201cproduct liability action\u201d within the meaning of \u00a7 29-28-102(6) and that the statute of repose from \u00a7 29-28-103 applies. Plaintiff presents two arguments against application of the statute of repose in this case, but both arguments are lacking in merit. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants\u2019 fraudulent concealment of material facts preven rt would decline to create an equitable exception for fraudulent concealment to \u00a7 29-28-103. Plaintiffs second argument is that the statute of repose is a retroactive impairment of vested rights in contravention of the Tennessee Constitution. At least one Tennessee Court of Appeals has rejected this argument specifically. See Bowman v. A-Best Co., Inc., 960 S.W.2d 594, 595-96 (Tenn.App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The Bowman opinion is well reasoned and is Holdings: 0: holding that allegation of procedural injury does not affect the issues of injury in fact or causation 1: holding that a private right of action does not arise until 180 days after a charge has been filed 2: holding that the right of action does not vest until the injury is discovered and thus  2928103 does not impair vested rights when latent injuries are involved 3: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible 4: holding that for an act to be inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and thus constitute a waiver of that right it must repudiate the right of the party who does the act", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "for the Tulsa Credit Union robbery, Herron testified that Deandre helped steal a car for the robbery, drove the coconspirators to the credit union, and acted as a getaway driver. We think that all three robberies have sufficient evidence to establish three conspiracies. 8 . We do not include the IBC Bank robbery because we concluded in Vernon\u2019s appeal that there was insufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy to rob that bank. Hill, 604 Fed.Appx. 759, No. 13-5084. We also do not include the CVS Pharmacy robbery because that robbery was not even charged in the indictment. 9 . Deandre submits two cases from this court for the proposition that \u201cmere gang membership, by itself, is not evidence of criminal activity.\u201d He cites United States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>), and Robinson, 978 F.2d at 1563. Deandre\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause the warrant was nevertheless valid 1: holding that the gang evidence was too stale to establish probable cause for a search warrant 2: holding that a visual body cavity search requires probable cause and a search warrant 3: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 4: holding that affidavit was stale and thus failed to establish probable cause to support wiretap", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not the businesses, and ordered Jeff to make an equalization payment, while providing mechanisms for Christina to enforce that judgment. Still, Jeff and the Crider Entities contend that the dissolution decree is erroneously worded in such a way as to automatically transfer one-half of Jeffs interests in the businesses to Christina in the event he did not pay the equalization judgment within 180 days. That date was December 28, 2013. We do agree that the decree contains overly-broad language with respect to Christina\u2019s security interests, and that the trial court exceeded its authority to the extent it permitted an automatic foreclosure of Christina\u2019s security interests in the event Jeff failed to pay the equalization judgment. See Moore v. Moore, 482 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). Ownership interests in closely-held Holdings: 0: holding that both husband and wife are obligated to support each other based on relative ability to pay 1: holding stock transfer restriction in corporate bylaws did not prevent levy against and sale of stock by third party in order to pay judgment 2: holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees 3: holding trial court erred in ordering that in event wife failed to pay equalization judgment to husband court clerk could automatically enter judgment against wife and order sale of stock in closelyheld family business 4: holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Murray, 194 Ariz. at 374-75 \u00b6\u00b6 4, 6, 982 P.2d at 1288-89. In holding that the statute violated separation of powers, we noted that parole eligibility on sentencing is a \u201csubstantive right\u201d and the Legislature \u201c \u2018may not disturb vested substantive rights by retroactively changing the law that applies to completed events.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 375 \u00b6 6, 982 P.2d at 1289 (quoting San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, 205 \u00b6 15, 972 P.2d 179, 189 (1999)). \u00b6 14 Senate Bill 1449\u2019s operative provision, in contrast, does not disturb vested rights. The State does not argue, nor does the law suggest, that the government has a vested right to a conviction, at least when, as here, a case is pending trial or on direct appeal. Cf. State v. Morris, 55 Ohio St.2d 101, 378 N.E.2d 708, 715 (1978) (<HOLDING>). \u00b6 15 The court of appeals in Fell held that a Holdings: 0: recognizing separation of powers doctrine 1: holding that statute that retroactively reduced penalties for drug offenses did not violate separation of powers 2: recognizing a referendum on a court judgment would violate separation of powers 3: holding legislatures retroactive amendment of statutory definition which rejected court interpretation did not violate separation of powers 4: recognizing that the judicial rewriting of a statute would violate the separation of powers doctrine", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "the superi- or right to possession of the vehicle. The State\u2019s legal theory lacks merit. A property owner\u2019s gross negligence that facilitates the criminal misappropriation of the property does not result in forfeiture of the owner\u2019s superior right to possess the property vis-a-vis the police department that investigated the crime or the district attorney\u2019s office that prosecuted the crime. The trial court erred as a matter of law by accepting this theory. Universal is entitled to possession of its property. For these reasons, we sustain Universal\u2019s second issue, reverse the trial court\u2019s order, and render judgment that Universal is awarded possession of the vehicle, without conditions. SEYMORE, J., concurring without opinion. 1 . This was not a f 4 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393, 395 (1924) (<HOLDING>); Foust v. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Holdings: 0: holding that drawer of check is liable only for the amount originally stated by drawer on check even though the drawers negligence facilitated the wrongful alteration of the amount on the check and the payment of a larger amount to the payee 1: holding that it was sufficiently foreseeable that the drawer of a check that was otherwise regular but had some unusual features would be harmed by a depositary banks acceptance of the check with a missing indorsement and permitting the drawer to sue the bank for negligence 2: holding that a payment made by certified check rather than the customary regular check was outside the ordinary course of dealings between the parties 3: holding that upon payment by check a transfer does not occur until the bank honors the check reasoning that until the moment of honor the debtor retains full control over disposition of the account and the account remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties 4: holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "against AirTouch; it merely reached a different conclusion based on different factors. The City has demonstrated the absence of a material issue of fact on this point. 3. Does the City\u2019s Decision Prohibit or Have the Effect of Prohibiting the Provision of Personal Wireless Services? Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) mandates that, in regulating personal wireless service facilities, the government\u2019s decision may not \u201cprohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services.\u201d 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (Supp hat \u201clocal zoning policies and decisions have the effect of prohibiting wireless services if they result in \u2018significant gaps\u2019 in the availability of wireless services\u201d). The City\u2019s position was adopted by the Fourth Circuit. See Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d at 428 (<HOLDING>). The Court agrees with the weight of circuit Holdings: 0: holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional 1: holding that  332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government  the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity 2: holding that cue review applies only to prior final decisions of agencies of original jurisdiction ros and not to prior decisions of the board 3: holding that  332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions 4: holding that teague applies only to procedural rules and not to decisions of the supreme court deciding the meaning of criminal statutes", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.\u201d On the other hand, Maharaj left Canada of his own volition to pursue what he perceived to be better opportunities in the United States, after invoking the process that Canada made available but without giving Canadian authorities a chance to confer, or not confer, some kind of permanent residence or resettlement status. Intuitively, this is a sensible reason to believe that asylum in the United States isn\u2019t necessary to protect him fro he INS met its burden of introducing some evidence indicating that[petitioner] had been \u2018firmly resettled\u2019 in Germany, [the petitioner] bore the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had not been resettled\u201d); see also Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399 (<HOLDING>). Second, the threshold showing of an offer can Holdings: 0: holding that the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent under the totality of the circumstances 1: holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury 2: holding that under the regulations the ins bears the initial burden of producing evidence that indicates that the firm resettlement bar applies and should the ins satisfy this threshold burden of production both the burden of production and the risk of nonpersuasion then shift to the applicant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she had not firmly resettled in another country 3: holding that once the government presents some evidence indicating that asylum is unavailable on the grounds of firm resettlement the petitioner bears the burden of proving that such ground does not apply 4: holding that the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears the burden of proving that grounds for this action exist", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "336, 341 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617, 122 S.Ct. 1640). Others have read Lapides to \"state a more general rule.\u201d Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int\u2019l Software, Inc., 653 F.3d 448, 460-71 (7th Cir. 2011) (relying largely on Lapides to hold that the State plaintiff waived its immunity to counterclaims filed against it in federal court); see also Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2005) (discerning \u201cno evident basis in law or judicial administration for severely limiting [Lapides\u2019s] general principles ... to a small sub-set of federal cases[,] including only state-law claims in respect to which a state has waived immunity therefrom in state court\u201d); Estes v. Wyo. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 302 F.3d 1200, 1205 n.1, 1206 (10th Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Still others have held that, by removing a Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff waived an argument that the defendant voluntarily waived its eleventh amendment immunity by removing the case from state to federal court by failing to raise it before the district court even though an intervening supreme court decision clarified the law in the plaintiffs favor 1: holding that state waived its eleventh amendment immunity by filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings 2: holding the language of  5518e insufficient as a waiver of eleventh amendment immunity to federal claims in federal court 3: holding that states removal to federal court voluntarily invoked the federal courts jurisdiction waiving eleventh amendment immunity 4: holding that state defendant waived eleventh amendment immunity to a federal claim by removing to federal court", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that has long encouraged law enforcement officers to consider obtaining a warrant \u201cwhenever practicable.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. ' When You attempted to shut the door because he believed that he was going to be robbed or otherwise harmed, the agents forced it open and unlawfully entered his home without permission. The officers then identified themselves as federal agents and demanded to see everyone\u2019s identification. Such actions plainly constitute a seizure of You because an objective person in You\u2019s position would not feel at liberty \u201cto ignore the police presence and go about his business.\u201d Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (quoting Michigan v. Chestemut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)). See also Glover, 957 F.2d at 1008 (<HOLDING>) (quotation marks, citations, and alterations Holdings: 0: holding that in determining whether a seizure has occurred a court must consider if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave 1: holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 2: recognizing that a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave 3: holding that progressive intrusion into defendants privacy was of such a nature that a reasonable person would not believe that he or she was free to end the encounter 4: holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and of all authority over its property and effects.\u201d Hamzavi v. Bowen, 126 Md.App. 492, 730 A.2d 274, 276-77 (1999) (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, for all practical purposes, Plaintiff has no title to the Lease, no authority to perform the Lease, no power to modify the Lease, and no power to initiate any other action based upon the Lease. Gov\u2019t Reply at 6-7. Accordingly, Plaintiff also has no standing to seek an interpretation of the Lease. Id. at 7. The fact that the Receivership Order reserved Plaintiffs right to prosecute this lawsuit is insufficient to confer standing. Id. The right to sue for a declaratory judgment cannot be segregated from the Lease, control of which resides in the Receiver. Propat Int\u2019l Corp. v. RPost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1190-94 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In Propat, the appellate court explained Holdings: 0: holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement 1: holding in a patent infringement case that plaintiff lacked standing where it held a conditional right to license a patent and enforce license agreements but did not have the right to transfer the patent 2: holding a nonparty to a patent infringement suit who funded an unsuccessful challenge to a patent could not file a subsequent lawsuit again challenging the patent 3: holding that where patent owner licensor retained substantial rights under license agreement licensee did not have an independent right to sue for infringement 4: holding patent policy incorporated by reference into patent agreement", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "balance should be struck in favor of admissibility. Thus, in reviewing issues under Rule 403, [this court looks] at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.\u201d Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344 n. 8 (quotations and citations omitted). Certain types of evidence of uncharged criminal activity are not considered \u201cextrinsic\u201d under Rule 404(b) and are admissible. Id. at 1344. This evidence falls outside of the scope of Rule 404(b) when it is: (1) an unchai'ged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or evidence under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1515-16 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). This evidence also satisfies the requirement Holdings: 0: holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal 1: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper 2: holding that structural evidence showing the inception of the conspiracy prior to the charged activities was admissible under rule 404b 3: holding testimony admissible as showing context of relationship with coconspirator prior to conspiracy 4: holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and an account for appellee and specifically provided that neither party had any right, control, or interest in the account of the other. The fact that appellee elected not to take her \u201csingle sum distribution\u201d in 2007 or early 2008, which she admits she chose not to do because she disputed the amount, did not transform her segregated account from her sole and separate property into property for which appellant was responsible. The account belonged to her and any detriment due to her tardiness in exercising her legal right to it cannot be borne by appellant where the circuit court made no finding that appellant intentionally interfered with appellee\u2019s property right. This is consistent with other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 841 So.2d 695 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Allen v. Allen, 118 N.C.App. 455, 455 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that  522f doesnot permit a debtor to avoid a lien granted to the debtors former spouse under a divorce decree that extinguishes all previous interests the parties had in the property and in no event secures more than the spouses former interest 1: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate 2: holding that absent an actionable injury to one spouse the other spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium 3: holding that a former spouse may not have an interest in the other spouses 12assets or earnings after the final judgment of dissolution 4: holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "lacking a prosecutor, the judge himself must fill the role, leading to an unacceptable confusion of roles and a violation of the separation of powers. See Young, 481 U.S. at 815-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2141-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Although the question is not free from doubt, we believe that not all out-of-court contempt proceedings are fatally flawed by the failure to appoint a prosecutor. Where, as here, the judge is impartial and the evidence is so simple that the judge is not diverted from the role of impartial judge and factfinder, we are not convinced that a prosecutor must be appointed. See People v. Carlucci, 23 Cal.3d 249, 590 P.2d 15, 152 Cal.Rptr. 439 (1979) (prosecutor not required for traffic infractions). Cf. Figueroa Ruiz v. Delgado, 359 F.2d 718 (1st Cir.1966) (<HOLDING>). This is not the same situation as in Young, Holdings: 0: recognizing defendants right to due process includes the right to present a defense by crossexamining witnesses 1: holding that in light of defendants attack on credibility of states witnesses prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument when he implied states witnesses were credible 2: holding that the prosecutor is not required to provide the defense with the names of rebuttal witnesses because until the defense case has been presented the state cannot know of witnesses needed for rebuttal 3: holding unconstitutional procedure in the puerto rico local courts where no prosecutor was appointed and the judge acted regularly in place of any prosecutor calling and examining all prosecution witnesses and crossexamining defense witnesses 4: holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "arrest charge because it was a distinct offense from the charges for which she was convicted. Specifically, plaintiff was convicted of harassment (relating to her conduct prior to the arrest) and criminal mischief (relating to her conduct once in the patrol car, when she kicked out the rear window). The resisting arrest charge, however, related to conduct that occurred at the time of her arrest in the residence. The elements and the alleged conduct relating to the resisting arrest are separate and distinct from the conduct underlying th 7 (MJL), 1995 WL 222206, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.13, 1995) (finding malicious prosecution claim for disorderly conduct charge not barred by convictions for resisting arrest and theft of services); Graebe v. Falcetta, 726 F.Supp. 36, 39 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>), aff'd mem., 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.1991). The Holdings: 0: holding the same for malicious prosecution 1: holding that conviction on misdemeanor assault charge did not bar malicious prosecution claim for misdemeanor resisting arrest charge 2: holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute 3: holding that conviction for speeding did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim arising from acquittal on charges of resisting arrest and attempted escape 4: holding that unlike malicious prosecution claim false arrest claim accrues on the date of the arrest", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "negligence of a physician precludes the manufacturer\u2019s liability for failure to warn of risks of off-label use). Id. at 194-95. Cases from other federal courts applying state law have expressly found that a pharmaceutical manufacturer had a duty to warn of risks associated with off-label use. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 370-71 (5th Cir.2006) (under Texas law, plaintiffs can pursue failure to warn action despite off-label use of drug); Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham, 583 F.Supp.2d 602, 628-29 (E.D.Pa.2008) (con- eluding, under New Jersey law, that manufacturer owed duty to warn of dangers associated with off-label uses of drugs where manufacture knows or should have known of danger of side effects); Southern v. Pfizer, Inc., 471 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1218 (N.D.Ala.2006) (<HOLDING>); Woodbury v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., Civ. A. No. Holdings: 0: holding that a brand manufacturer of prescription drugs cannot be held liable for injuries suffered by consumers who ingested only the generic form of a drug under florida law 1: holding that where the adequacy of warnings associated with prescription drugs is at issue the failure of the manufacturer to exercise reasonable care to warn of dangers ie the manufacturers negligence is the only recognized basis of liability 2: recognizing under illinois law that pharmaceutical manufacturer has duty to warn of any dangers associated with offlabel use of product if such dangers were reasonably known 3: holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution 4: recognizing under alabama law that drugs manufacturer owed duty to warn about potential dangers of using prescription drug for an offlabel to patients prescribing physician by drugs manufacturer", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "compel production of documents, without affording time for the production and review of the requested documents. The record does not reveal that Mixson objected to the court\u2019s consideration of the motion for summary judgment or that the court denied a motion for continuance pending further discovery. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for our review. See Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 309 S.C. 114, 420 S.E.2d 495 (1992) (stating whether court erred in granting summary judgment while appellants had motion to compel outstanding was not preserved when appellants failed to move for a continuance and did not request motion for summary judgment be held in abeyance until after ruling on discovery motion); Pryor v. Northwest Apartments, Ltd., 321 S.C. 524, 469 S.E.2d 630 (Ct.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing reasons, Holdings: 0: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing 1: holding whether judge erred in granting summary judgment because discovery requests were outstanding was not preserved when appellant did not ask for a continuance to complete discovery 2: holding that the defendants discovery requests were untimely because they were not served in time for the responses to be due before the discovery deadline 3: holding that plaintiffs right to argue a need for discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment was preserved since plaintiff moved to vacate summary judgment ten days later and included precisely the discovery needed and not generalized statements of necessary discovery 4: holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "provided stone to smooth eroded portions of Fairview Street. Defendant has admitted installing a stop sign at Fairview and West Main Street. Accordingly, defendant is responsible for maintaining Fairview Street on \u201csubstantially the same basis and in the same manner as such service [] [was] provided within the rest of the municipality prior to annexation.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-35(3)a; see In re Annexation Ordinance, 255 N.C. 633, 645, 122 S.E.2d 690, 699 (1961) (construing statutory equivalent of Section 160A-35(3)a, held \u201cprimary duty of street maintenance in the area in question, after annexation, is upon the city, and it must in good faith make plans to maintain the streets, whether paved or unpaved\u201d); Hooper v. City of Wilmington, 42 N.C. App. 548, 550, 257 S.E.2d 142, 143 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The key issue is whether defendant has Holdings: 0: holding annexation ordinance only voidable due to procedural irregularities 1: holding that where various ditches and drainage systems in a watershed were in existence prior to annexation of area the city accepted them by use or maintenance 2: holding that annexation was a nullity because it was not obtained with consent of requisite number of voters in area to be annexed and consequently jurisdiction was lacking 3: holding annexation ordinance void 4: holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Ill.Dec. 647, 574 N.E.2d 760, 764 (1991). Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma Nevada and Massachusetts require proof under their consumer fraud acts of defendant\u2019s knowledge of the falsity of its affirmative representations. Idaho Code \u00a7 48-603; State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 101, 101 Idaho 447, 615 P.2d 116 (1980); Kansas Stat. Ann. \u00a7 50-626(b)(1) Waggener v. Seever Systems, Inc., 233 Kan. 517, 522, 664 P.2d 813 (1983); Okla Stat. Ann. Tit. 15 \u00a7 753(5) and (7); Murray v. D & J Motor Co., Inc., 958 P.2d 823, 832 (Okla.Civ.App.1998); Nev.Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 598. 0915 (amended by 1999, Nevada Laws, Ch. 604 (A.B.431); State ex rel. List v. AAA Auto Leasing & Rental, Inc., 93 Nev. 483, 568 P.2d 1230 (1977); Bond Leather Co., Inc. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 928, 935 442 (<HOLDING>). Michigan requires proof under its consumer Holdings: 0: holding that nothing in the legislative history of the pennsylvania consumer fraud act suggests that the legislature ever intended statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional elements of reliance and causation and accordingly in order to maintain a class action suit under the pennsylvania consumer fraud act a plaintiff must allege reliance 1: holding that the punitive provisions of the delaware consumer fraud act were not applicable to attorney conduct occurring within the practice of law given the state supreme courts inherent constitutional and statutory authority to discipline members of the state bar noting the lack of consensus in different jurisdictions as to the applicability of state consumer fraud acts to attorney conduct 2: holding commercial franchises are not covered by new jersey consumer fraud act because they are businesses and not consumer goods 3: recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act 4: holding that illinoiss consumer fraud act did not apply to the claim that attorneys charged excessive fees for legal services because the attorneyclient relationship was the subject of regulation by the state supreme court and the legislature did not specify that it intended the consumer fraud act to apply to the role of attorneys in relation to their clients", "references": ["1", "4", "2", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and not appealable). Furthermore, under Crowson, this transfer order could never, by itself, be ap-pealable. Crowson states that an interlocutory probate order may be made final and appealable \u201cby a severance order, if it meets the severance criteria!)]\u201d 897 S.W.2d at 783. However, unlike the partial summary judgment order in Crowson, which the court held was made final and appealable by a severance order, id., the transfer order in this case could not be subject to a severance order. The partial summary judgment order in Crowson resolved a claim that could properly be severed. Id. The transfer order, on the other hand, does not resolve a \u201cclaim\u201d at all, and is thus not severable. See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Currier, 885 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex.App.\u2014Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Under Crowson, the transfer order in this Holdings: 0: holding that an order granting a motion or application to compel arbitration is nonappealable because it is not listed in the uaa arbitration provision and because it is not a final order 1: holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial 2: holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 3: holding order granting a new trial is not a final appealable order because it does not terminate the action or any of the claims or parties in the action 4: holding that an order granting a motion to compel discovery could not be severed because it does not address a claim that may be severed under the rules", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "if it alters the substantive law on which the parties relied. See Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986); see also Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); cf. Archer v. Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 622 (1964). Law is substantive if it \u201ccreates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and ... may give rise to a cause for action, as distinguished from adjective law which pertains to and prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.\u201d Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d at 593-94. Other jurisdictions have held similar statutes to be substantive. Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal.App.3d 810, 230 Cal.Rptr. 102 (Cal.App. 1st Dist.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Holdings: 0: holding that joint and several liability for entire actual loss could have been imposed on each fraud defendant as condition of probation 1: holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages 2: holding that a lump sum verdict on punitive damages against all defendants was improper since there can be no joint and several liability or contribution 3: recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several 4: holding proposition 51 which eliminated joint and several liability for noneconomic damages to have prospective effect only", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of the lawsuit. See id. In its motion for rehearing, the Employees contend that we should construe Section 101.106(e) as applying to official capacity claims for intentional torts because we have held that the Section 101.106(f) does not include official capacity claims for intentional torts. Compare Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 253 S.W.3d at 659 (interpreting Section 101.106(e) and stating, \u201cBecause the Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenue for common- law recovery against the government, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed to be \u2018under [the Tort Claims Act]\u2019 for purposes of section 101.106\u201d) with Williams v. Nealon, 199 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex.App.-Houston[lst Dist.] 2006) (<HOLDING>); see also Menefee v. Medlen, No. Holdings: 0: recognizing that any claims compensable under the act could not be brought by nonemployee spouse except for intentional tort claims 1: holding that this language applies to tort claims brought under the federal tort claims act  against a contractor who has a selfdetermination contract 2: holding that garcia applies to section 101106 but holding that a declaratory judgment action is not brought under the texas tort claims act 3: holding section 101106f cannot be used by employees to obtain dismissal of common law intentional tort claims because those claims could not have been brought under the texas tort claims act 4: holding that tort actions brought against a state actor must be brought in the illinois court of claims and the district courts dismissal of such claims was proper", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "arise only after a duty has been found.\u201d) (citations omitted). The D.C. Court of Appeals has acknowledged this criticism of D.C. negligence law, yet has continued to apply the analytical framework as is. See Beretta, 872 A.2d at 641 n. 4. Accordingly, the Court \"appl[ies] the law of the District of Columbia as its own courts would apply it\u201d and does not \u201csecond-guess the analytical framework those courts have erected.\u201d Workman, 320 F.3d at 265. 11 . Workman opined that \u201cthe cases suggest a sliding scale: If the relationship between the parties strongly suggests a duty of protection, then specific evidence of foreseeability is less important, whereas if the relationship is not the type that entails a duty of protection, then the evidentiary hurdle is higher.\u201d Workman, 320 F.3d at 264 (<HOLDING>). The Circuit referenced only the relationship Holdings: 0: holding that a contractor had no duty of care to a third party under a premises liability theory because the contractor was not a landowner or occupier but expressing no opinion as to whether the contractor owed a duty to the third party under general negligence principles because the third partys legal theory was restricted to premises liability 1: holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution 2: holding that an international relief organization owed no duty to protect aid contractor from murder by thirdparty somalis 3: holding that contractor owed general negligence duty to thirdparty by dangerous condition contractor created on road 4: holding that physicians owed a duty to protect an infant against rhsensitization", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the doctrine of respondeat superior, acts of conspiracy, and breach of contract. 2 . Jackson does not challenge numerous other decisions of the District Court \u2014 many of which were part of the orders she challenges. All grounds of appeal related to those unchallenged decisions \u2014 whether within or without the challenged orders \u2014 are waived on appeal. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.1993); see also Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Assoc., 243 F.3d 145, 151 n. 1 (3d Cir.2001); F.D.I.C. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir.2000). 3 . \"We exercise plenary review over the District Court\u2019s dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).\u201d Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir.2001). 4 . Consequently, Ali v. Rutgers does not change the result here. 166 N.J. 280, 287, 765 A.2d 714 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Jackson makes a \"hostile work Holdings: 0: recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act 1: holding sixyear statute of limitations applies to adea actions involving federal employees 2: holding that a sixyear statute of limitations applies in cases where the operative facts arose both before and after july 27 1993 3: holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional 4: holding that while the two year personal injury statute of limitations is proper for claims under the new jersey law against discrimination hjsa  10513 the decision would be applied prospectively only and thus claims arising before july 27 1993 are governed by the sixyear general statute of limitations hjsa 2a141", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "seek injunctive relief including a claim for medical monitoring.... Plaintiffs do not argue that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(2), and in any event, Rule 23(b)(2) certification is improper since the primary relief sought is damages.\u201d); Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 484 (23(b)(2) certification is not appropriate where the \u201csubstantial majority of relief requested [was] monetary in nature.\u201d); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 552 (E.D.La.1995), rev. on other grounds, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.1996) (Where \u201cmedical-monitoring program sought by plaintiffs is but one type of relief sought among many\u201d including \u201ccompensatory, statutory and punitive damages,\u201d plaintiffs primarily sought monetary damages.); Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97c8641, 2001 WL 290603 (N.D.Ill.2001) (<HOLDING>). Even those courts that have found the Holdings: 0: holding that class seeking monetary damages in addition to medical monitoring did not seek certification pursuant to 23b2 only 23b3 1: holding that plaintiffs request for courtsupervised program requiring ongoing elaborate medical monitoring of class members exposed to contaminated groundwater qualified as injunctive relief and the court could properly certify the class under rule 23b2 2: recognizing that the need for individual damages determinations does not in and of itself require denial of a motion for certification under rule 23b3 3: holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages 4: holding that class certification is not appropriate because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the calculation of individualized actual economic damages if any suffered by the class members can be performed in accordance with the predominance requirement of rule 23b3", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at the conclusion of jury selection, but she never walked through it. Several courts have held that such a failure to reurge a motion for a change of venue during jury selection constitutes waiver. See, e.g., Gomez v. McGrath, 2005 WL 2072029 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2005) (in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the federal district court noted that the state appellate court had rejected the claim of error by the trial court on the ground that petitioner had waived a change of venue claim \u201cby failing to renew the motion after the trial court denied it without prejudice to its renewal after the jury had been voir dired on issues related to the motion\u201d) (citing People v. Gomez, No. C019221, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal.Ct.App. Nov. 1, 1997)); Green v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 81, 580 S.E.2d 834 (Va.2003) (<HOLDING>) cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1194, 124 S.Ct. 1448, Holdings: 0: holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion 1: holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue 2: holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived 3: holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified 4: holding that trial court erred in denying motion for judgment of acquittal when state failed to prove venue", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Petitioner raises two issues on appeal. First, Petitioner contends that INS\u2019s use of a test case to provide a final ruling on a business related immigration issue should be set aside under the Administrative Procedures Act (\u201cAPA\u201d) because it unreasonably delayed final agency action and was arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 706. Although the District Court for the District of Columbia sympathized with Petitioner\u2019s predicament, see Transport Robert, 940 F.Supp. at 341-342 (stating that an \u201cagency must be more responsive to those it regulates\u201d), we must reject his claim. The APA simply does not govern immigration proceedings under the INA and may not be used to challenge the hearing provisions of the INA. Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 132, 112 S.Ct. 515, 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309, 75 Holdings: 0: holding that the emergence of a credible claim of extraneous influence on a jury imposed a duty on the district court to conduct a remmer hearing despite the fact that the defendants had not expressly requested such a hearing below 1: holding that noncompete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where 1 the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working and 2 the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment 2: holding that the mvra supersedes certain provisions in erisa 3: holding that ina expressly supersedes hearing provisions of the apa 4: holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "A federal district court in New York recently described the state of the law in this area by stating that, \u201c[b]y now, it should be abundantly clear that the duty to preserve means what it says and that a failure to preserve records \u2014 paper or electronic \u2014 and to search in the right places for those records, will inevitably result in the spoliation of evidence.\u201d Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y.2010). A court may impose sanctions for spoliation, with the traditional and most typical remedy for spoliation being the drawing of an \u201cadverse inference\u201d that the destroyed evidence would have been favorable to the opposing side. See Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F.Supp.2d 598, 615-17 (S.D.Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>); United Med. Supply, 77 Fed.Cl. at 263. In its Holdings: 0: holding that spoliation may be a basis for a cause of action where a third party has negligently destroyed material evidence but stating that jury charges that presume missing evidence weighs against the spoliator and discovery sanctions  are available when spoliation is charged against an opposing party 1: holding that an adverseinference jury instruction was an appropriate sanction for spoliation of evidence 2: recognizing a tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence 3: holding that to consider whether to apply a spoliation sanction the evidence must be relevant to an issue in the case and the party who destroyed the evidence must be under a duty to preserve the evidence 4: holding no intentional spoliation occurred where defendant was not on notice that evidence was relevant to claim", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "but, rather, what degree of suspicion they reasonably could attach to the utterance in light of the surrounding circumstances. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 128, 120 S.Ct. 673; Stanley, 915 F.2d at 57. Using commonsense judgment, an objectively reasonable officer plausibly could have concluded \u2014 as Officer Hyland did \u2014 that the belligerence of the response indicated more than mere annoyance. So viewed, the response supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, e.g., Soares, 521 F.3d at 121; Romain, 393 F.3d at 72. Put another way, the hostile response, along with the background information possessed by the officer and his own experience, was enough to ground a reasonable suspicion that the man he originally had thought was a victim might be a shooter. See Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (<HOLDING>); Sowers, 136 F.3d at 27 (similar). Once that Holdings: 0: holding officers involved in investigatory raid entitled to immunity 1: holding that officers may consistent with the fourth amendment conduct a brief investigatory stop when they have a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot 2: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop 3: holding that a tip may provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop 4: recognizing that investigatory officers may shift the focus in order to remain responsive to emerging facts", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "you will have to go to the second floor\u201d or \u201cI am sorry, you are going to have to walk up stairs.\u201d (Kantrowitz Depo. at 107:22-108:7.) Although one of these administrators (Jennifer Bumford) was consulted by Dr. Lloyd when he was conducting his evaluation of plaintiff, it is undisputed that neither of these employees were the ultimate decision-makers with respect to the decision to abolish plaintiffs position. Indeed, when considered in the context of all the evidence, these alleged remarks are too \u201cremote and oblique .... in relation to the employer\u2019s adverse action\u201d to permit a reasonable jury to find for plaintiff. Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 966, 968-69 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, given the undisputed facts \u2014 Holdings: 0: holding defendant failed to meet burden for acceptance of responsibility reduction where he objected in the psi but only made arguments at sentencing without offering evidence 1: holding that to meet his burden the plaintiff must show more than a few isolated incidents and that evidence solely of sporadic discrimination does not suffice 2: holding plaintiff failed to meet de minimis burden where he introduced only two isolated comments made by individuals who had no involvement in his termination 3: holding that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof because he offered absolutely no evidence to support his claim that the costs of arbitration will deny him an effective forum to vindicate his statutory rights 4: holding that because plaintiff could not establish which portions of the tapes had been played in court plaintiff failed to meet his burden", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and arrival of the witnesses, see Richardson, 639 F.Supp.2d at 289, it is too much of a stretch to say that circumstances of Pierre-Louis\u2019s initial viewing are equivalent to \u201c[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification\u201d that \u201chas been widely con demned.\u201d Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added). In the light of the significant leeway to which the state courts are entitled, we hold that the state courts\u2019 conclusion that Pierre-Louis\u2019s accidental, spontaneous identification of Richardson upon entering the police station was insufficiently suggestive to trigger further due process inquiry was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See United States v. Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d 1, 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>); Mock, 472 F.2d at 621 (holding that a robbery Holdings: 0: holding that to protect defendants sixth amendment rights a court must determine whether witness identification testimony was tainted by impermissibly suggestive procedures 1: holding that a showup identification was not impermissibly suggestive where it took place immediately after the unlawful conduct and was necessary to avoid arresting the wrong person 2: holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive 3: holding that a spontaneous accidental identification by two law enforcement officials of a suspect in handcuffs upon their return to the police station was not impermissibly suggestive 4: holding that police executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect from his home and brought him in handcuffs to the police station for questioning", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Pharmacy II has no justiciable interest in the payment of funds out of the account. When determining whether Pharmacy II has standing, we must determine whether Pharmacy II has a \u201c \u2018cause of action, which involves the combination of a right on the part of the plaintiff and a violation of such right by defendant.\u2019 \u201d See Exxon Corp v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied) (quoting Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976)). A party has standing when it is personally aggrieved. Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 661. \u201cStanding deals with whether a litigant is the proper person to bring a lawsuit, not whether that party can ultimately prevail on the claims asserted.\u201d Faulkner v. Bost, 137 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.); see also Hunt, 664 S.W.2d at 324 (<HOLDING>). A partnership has standing to file suit in Holdings: 0: holding it is a question of fact 1: holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law 2: holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact 3: holding the question of standing is distinct from the question of proof and once the plaintiffs alleged an interest peculiar to themselves and distinguishable from the public generally they were entitled to a factual hearing 4: holding that the plaintiffs in an election case were not required to show a substantial injury distinct from that suffered by the public in general", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Fletcher, \u00a7 8144; Great American Insur. Co. v. Byrd & Watkins Constr., Inc., 63 poration\u2019s failure to comply with the dissolution statutes voids the dissolution as to a creditor whose rights have been prejudiced, thereby permitting the creditor to sue the corporation after more than two years following the date of dissolution. United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc., 837 F.Supp. 946, 952-53 (N.D.Ind.1993); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. B.J. Carney & Company, 797 F.Supp. 1472, 1478 (D.Minn.1992); Alpine Property Owners Ass\u2019n v. Mountaintop Dev. Go., 179 W.Va. 12, 365 S.E.2d 57, 64-65 (1987); South Carolina Dept. of Social Serv. v. Winyah Nursing Homes, Inc., 282 S.C. 556, 320 S.E.2d 464, 468 (Ct.App.1984). Cf. Licht v. Association Serv., Inc., 236 Neb. 616, 463 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1990) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, it is undisputed that Holdings: 0: holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice 1: holding that the state was estopped to argue that the 90day notice period  expired on a date prior to the expiration date it cited to the claimant 2: holding that where employee was aware of dissolution abatement of claims provision applied even in absence of written notice because employee had actual notice 3: holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date 4: holding that where claimant had actual notice of corporate dissolution limitation period began on date of dissolution despite failure to provide written notice", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the public interest.\u201d If we jump to such a high level of abstraction, it becomes impossible to determine whether the employee was truly acting within the proper scope of his job-related activities. Consequently, we consider a government official\u2019s actions at the minimum level of generality necessary to remove the constitutional taint. In considering whether an act of allegedly excessive force fell within a police officer\u2019s duties, for example, we do not ask whether police have the right to use excessive force. We also do not immediately jump to a high level of generality and ask whether police are responsible for enforcing the law or promoting the public interest. We instead ask whether they have the power to attempt to effectuate arrests. See, e.g., Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1194 (<HOLDING>). After det\u00e9rmining that an official is engaged Holdings: 0: holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force 1: holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force 2: holding that the initial stop by officer was based on reasonable suspicion that defendant was impersonating a police officer although another officer arrested defendant for privacy act violation 3: holding in an excessive force suit there can be no doubt that the police officer defendant was acting in his discretionary capacity when he arrested plaintiff 4: holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since  951 requirements were satisfied", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "The district court did not err in considering the PSR and attached documents in order to determine if Mendoza\u2019s conviction for conspiring to launder money was an aggravated felony. The PSR and the attached documents show that Mendoza was charged with money laundering under 18 USC \u00a7 1956 and pleaded guilty to that count. The evidence submitted to the district court also shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mendoza\u2019s money laundering involved more than $10,000. See United States v. Teuschler, 689 F.3d 397, 399 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the relevant and reliable evidence that the facts support a sentencing enhancement.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 153-55 (5th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). The PSR given to the court described the Holdings: 0: holding that the unit of prosecution under  666a1a is  5000 or more from whatever source in any one year period in which the government or agency at issue receives more than 10000 in federal aid 1: holding that motor carrier exemption applied to plaintiffs that performed maintenance on a fleet that consisted of vehicles weighing both more and less than 10000 pounds 2: recognizing that cjlearly buie requires more than ignorance or a constant assumption that more than one person is present in a residence 3: holding that more than notice to a defendant is required 4: holding that section 1101a43d requires that the money laundering involve more than 10000 not that 10000 or more was tainted", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "requirement. Id. at 1339. The Defendants argue that Irene did not necessarily have to go home in order to perform her work duties. That is, because she had not yet actually been paged, she was not required to go home. Therefore, she would not have gone home if not for personal reasons, taking her trip out of the \u201cdual purposes\u201d exception. A reasonable fact-finder, however, could conclude that Irene had ample business reasons to travel to her home even in advance of an actual page. Again, it was quite likely she would be paged; she could answer pages swiftly from her home; she was evaluated based on the timeliness of her responses; and it advantaged MONY to have pages answered quickly. See Martin v. Hasbrouck Heights Bldg. Loan & San Ass\u2019n, 132 N.J.L. 569, 41 A.2d 898, 900 (1945) (<HOLDING>); Egloff v. Ob-Gyn Assocs. of N. N.Y., 245 Holdings: 0: holding in applying dual purpose test borrowed from new york that it was irrelevant that the claimant could have made his business appointments somewhere other than his home office 1: holding that the board is not required to articulate irrelevant factors when applying the douglas analysis 2: holding that there was a sufficiently direct relationship between restricting the defendants selfemployment as a roofer and his bank fraud conviction when the defendant used his roofing business to facilitate the fraud and after his initial sentence he failed to provide information about his business activities to his probation officer 3: holding an individual who makes a timely challenge to a judicial officer based on the appointments clause is entitled to a determination of the merits of his claim 4: holding that defendant was not resident of his mothers household even though his drivers license listed his mothers address and he received mail there because he expressed a belief that his residence was in a different location than his mothers home he rented and occupied his own residence and he testified that he was only living with his mother after expiration of his lease until he could find another place to live", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "relationship\u201d exception is drawn from Restatement \u00a7 315, which provides: \u201cThere is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless \u201c(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person\u2019s conduct, or \u201c(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The relationship between Ms. Patterson (the \u201cactor\u201d) and Marquette (the \u201cthird person\u201d) was that of grandmother and adult grandson. This familial relationship imposed no duty on the elderly Ms. Patterson to control Marquette. See, e.g., Bell & Hudson, P.C. v. Buhl Realty Co., 185 Mich.App. 714, 462 N.W.2d 851 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The relationship between Ms. Patterson (the Holdings: 0: holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts 1: holding familial relationship insufficient to impose a duty on defendant to protect plaintiff from wrongful acts of defendants family member 2: holding that duty to protect from criminal acts does not arise in the absence of a foreseeable risk of harm 3: holding that a hospitals relationship to the family of deceased gives rise to a duty to avoid emotional harm from handling of remains 4: holding that a residential landlord has no duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "which could not be searched in the absence of \u201cjoint access or control for most purposes\u201d over them by Ms. Bakker. Mr. Kelley\u2019s privacy interest in his bedroom is not diminished by the fact that Ms. Bakker had access to other areas of the apartment; similarly, the police may not search a bedroom merely because other areas of the apartment may lawfully be searched. Precedent makes clear that Ms. Bakker could validly consent to a warrant-less search of Mr. Kelley\u2019s bedroom only if she had \u201cjoint access and control for most purposes\u201d over the bedroom itself. See Cunningham, 352 F.2d at 4-5 (noting that the validity of consent is analyzed according to the particular area to be searched and the extent of the housemate\u2019s access to that particular area); see also Heisman, 503 F.2d at 1288 (<HOLDING>). The majority blatantly ignores these cases, Holdings: 0: holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom 1: holding consent invalid when a housemate had unlimited access to the common areas of the apartment but only limited access to her housemates bedroom 2: holding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building 3: holding that a wife validly consented to a search of the garage when she was married to the defendant was part owner of the home and had unlimited access to all areas 4: recognizing common law right of access to judicial documents", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Holland conversational questions, to which Holland did not respond, such as whether they could speak with him, how he was doing, where he had been, when he got back to town, and whether he lived in the area. The only question that indicated the officers suspected Holland of criminal activity was whether he was carrying any firearms. However, there was nothing in the record demonstrating that the officers\u2019 questions or tone of voice indicated that Holland had to stop and respond to the officers. While Detective Bridges testified that he talked \u201csomewhat loud[ly],\u201d he also testified that he did so \u201c[i]n order to be heard\u201d and that, at the time, he was thirty feet away from Holland, who continued walking away from the officers. Cf. United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 123 (4th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Turning to the remaining Mendenhall factors, Holdings: 0: holding that no seizure occurred where officer approached the suspect at the bus stop mentioned that he was investigating a bank robbery asked the suspect what he was doing in the area and for his identification and otherwise gave no indication that the suspect was not free to leave or to refuse to respond to questioning 1: holding that an officer engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation when he asked a suspect to identify clothing found at a crime scene after the suspect was in custody and had invoked his right to silence regardless of the officers intentions 2: holding that there was no clearly established law when suspect refused to allow officers to handcuff him and when suspect died after prolonged taser usage because precedent had not staked out a bright line 3: holding that seizure occurred when officers prolonged and persistent questioning after the suspect had conveyed an unequivocal unwillingness to engage in further conversation with the officer 4: holding no seizure occurred when after defendant began to walk away officer directed him to stop", "references": ["0", "2", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "that while only \u201clegal provocation\u201d can give rise to perfect or imperfect self defense, lesser forms of provocation exist that may negate premeditation and deliberation and thereby reduce first-degree murder to second-degree murder. See State v. Watson, 338 N.C. 168, 177, 449 S.E.2d 694, 700 (stating that \u201cwords or conduct . . . may be enough to arouse a sudden and sufficient passion in the perpetrator to negate deliberation and reduce a homicide to murder in the second degree\u201d), reconsideration and stay of mandate denied, 338 N.C. 623, 457 S.E.2d 302 (1994), and cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1071, 131 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1995); Sta ing second-degree murder is a general intent crime and, therefore, attempted second-degree murder exists); Fenstermaker v. State, 912 P.2d 653 (Idaho App. 1995) (<HOLDING>); People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 1995) Holdings: 0: holding no offense of attempted seconddegree murder where seconddegree murder defined only as unintentional but reckless killing of another under circumstances manifesting indifference to human life 1: holding no offense of attempted seconddegree murder where statute allows conviction without proof of intent to kill 2: holding no offense of attempted seconddegree murder where that crime is defined as an unpremeditated depravedheart offense 3: holding offense of attempted seconddegree murder exists where there is evidence defendant intended to kill 4: holding jury instruction on lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter by act which required finding of intent to kill constituted fundamental error and required reversal of defendants conviction for seconddegree murder", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "seconds elapsed from the time the police first had Ms. Munoz Wolfson in their grasp \u2014 before plaintiff began to interfere \u2014 until Officer Frost placed plaintiff on the hood of the car. Video 2 at 0:21-:35. As defendants note, plaintiff had no right to physically interfere with her friend\u2019s arrest, Defs.\u2019 Mem. at 10, and even plaintiff acknowledges that such interference would have constituted a violation of D.C.Code \u00a7 22^105(b), which was the eventual charge. See PL\u2019s Opp. at 12. In this rapidly developing situation, where plaintiff was interfering with an arrest and resisting police custody, it was objectively reasonable for Officer Frost to quickly and forcefully place her on the hood of the car to maintain control over her. See Stevens v. Stover, 727 F.Supp. 668, 671 (D.D.C.1990) (<HOLDING>). It was also reasonable for Officer Frost to Holdings: 0: recognizing that police officers may use reasonable force to make a lawful arrest 1: recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest 2: holding that compliance with an officers orders is a material fact when deciding whether the officers use of force was reasonable 3: holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force 4: holding that an officers use of force against a plaintiff was objectively reasonable considering the force the plaintiff herself exercised in resisting police custody", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "common-law causes of action for libel and slander (Claim # B), the Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over those defendants. Meridian Int\u2019l Logistics, 939 F.2d at 744-45. D. Sovereign Immunity Plaintiff alleges that defendant SEC is liable in some manner for \u201coutrageous government conduct\u201d in connection with the libel and slander cause of action, Claim # 3. (Complaint, p. 4). As a preliminary matter, \u201coutrageous government conduct\u201d fails to constitute a cognizable claim. To the extent plaintiff attempts to state a constitutional claim for damages against defendant SEC, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider such a claim against an agency of the federal government. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, \u2014 U.S. -, \u2014- -, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1005-06, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 356 Holdings: 0: holding that a bivens cause of action cannot be maintained against a federal agency 1: holding ftca claim barred bivens claim the moment judgment was entered against the government 2: holding that no bivens claim existed against a defendant bank that supplied information required by law to the federal bureau of investigations 3: holding that a bivens claim cannot be brought against a federal agency 4: holding that an action brought pursuant to  1983 cannot lie against federal officers", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "for review is DENIED. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 2 . Zhang v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 343 (5th Cir.2005). 3 . Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir.1997). 4 . Id. at 304; Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.1994). 5 . Roy V. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992)). 6 . Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 306 (5th Cir.2005); 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 208.13(b). 7 . 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A); see also Shehu v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 436 (5th Cir.2006). 8 . 8 C.F.R. \u00a7 208.16(b)(1)(A). 9 . See Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). 10 . See Shehu, 443 F.3d at 436 (upholding Holdings: 0: holding that incidents of harassment and unfulfilled threats of injury are not persecution absent physical harm 1: holding that to constitute persecution harm must be more than harassment 2: holding that stonethrowing denigration harassment and threats ordinarily do not amount to persecution 3: holding that harassment threats and one beating did not constitute persecution 4: holding that threats standing alone generally do not constitute past persecution", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Corp. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 181 W.Va. 473, 383 S.E.2d 277 (1989). In K-Mart, 181 W.Va. at 477, 383 S.E.2d at 281, fn. 6, quoting Conaway, 178 W.Va. at 171, 358 S.E.2d at 430, we stated that the non-diseriminatory reason given in rebuttal \u201cneed not be one which the judge or jury would have acted upon\u201d and \u201ccan be any other reason except that the [complainant] was a member of a protected class.\u201d In order to overcome a showing of non-discriminatory reason, the complainant must demonstrate by a preponderate of evidence that the claimed non-diseriminatory reason was merely a pretext. Syl. Pt. 4, Conaivay. Pretext may be demonstrated by showing that the articulated reasons were implausible. Syl. Pt. 5, Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Even if we were to assume that a prima facie Holdings: 0: holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict 1: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict 2: holding that after a nondiscriminatory justification for action is articulated a plaintiff need not show more than the articulated reasons were implausible and thus pretexual in order to defeat a motion for directed verdict 3: holding a directed verdict motion stating specific grounds is a prerequisite for a subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 4: holding that plaintiff need only point to sufficient evidence to support an inference that the employer did not act for its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "jury would have to speculate to estimate those contributions. See Gilman v. C.W. Dart Hardware Co., 42 Mont. 96, 111 P. 550, 551 (1910) (quoting Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 N.Y. 504, 18 N.E. 108 (1888)). Accordingly, we do not believe that the speculative nature of loss-of-inheritance damages would prevent them from being awarded by a Montana court. Other federal courts construing uncertain state law have found loss-of-inheritance damages to be available, despite the absence of an express state court ruling on the subject and despite the fact that such damages are speculative. In O\u2019Toole v. United States, 242 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.1957), for example, the court first determined that the case law of Delaware did not specifically allow or disallow such da upp. 873, 874 (W.D.Mo.1983) (<HOLDING>). The Government argues that Swanson v. Holdings: 0: holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor 1: holding that a plaintiff may receive both treble damages under rico and state law punitive damages for the same course of conduct 2: holding that punitive damages could not be granted because punitive damages are a matter of substantive law and substantive state law  must yield to federal limitations 3: holding that erisa  502a3 does not allow for extraeontractual damages including damages for emotional distress 4: holding that better view is to allow such damages although state law unclear", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "at trial. See, Foreword Magazine, Inc. v. OverDrive, Inc., 2011 WL 5169384, at *2 (W.D.Mich. Oct. 31, 2011) (\u201cthe 2010 amendments to Rule 56 ... eliminated the unequivocal requirement that documents submitted in support of a summary judgment motion must be authenticated,\u201d and thus, \u201cthe objection contemplated by the amended Rule is not that the material \u2018has not\u2019 been submitted in admissible form, but that it \u2018cannot\u2019 be\u201d). Leaving aside that any of the signatories to the lease could authenticate it, the lease for the condominium was in the loan file that CFS submitted to FAMC, and Mr. Brilliant acknowledged in this deposition that the lease for the Newell property was submitted to CFS\u2019s post closing department. See, United States v. Komasa, 767 F.3d 151, 156-7 (2nd Cir.2014) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lock, 411 Fed.Appx. 5, 7 Holdings: 0: holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa 1: holding that mortgage loan files may be selfauthenticating documents 2: holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage 3: holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage 4: holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "that the Board should be \u201cafforded a strong presumption of good faith.\u201d Id. \u201c[G]reat deference is given to the good faith determinations of school boards on decisions of whether to renew a teacher\u2019s contract.\u201d Wuest, 2000 SD 42 at \u00b6 12, 607 N.W.2d at 915-16. \u201cThe burden is on the person challenging a board\u2019s decision to overcome the presumption that the board was acting in good faith.\u201d Nordhagen v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist., 474 N.W.2d 510, 513 (S.D.1991). Gauer has not carried her burden on this necessary showing of bias by the Board, which would sustain a violation of her due process rights. [\u00b6 12.] Further, we note that the Board did not attempt to deceive or withhold information from Gauer, which, if done, could have violated her due process rights. See Strain, 447 N.W.2d at 335-36 (<HOLDING>). The Board disclosed the reasons for Holdings: 0: holding that is a violation of due process for the prosecution to fail to disclose evidence favorable to an accused that is material to guilt or punishment 1: holding that a conviction violated due process because the prosecutor knowingly refused to disclose crucial exculpatory evidence to the defendant 2: holding that a career teachers substantive due process rights were not violated when the school board decided not to renew her contract due to concerns about her performance 3: holding that a teachers consensual sexual relationship with a fifteenyearold student constituted a violation of the students substantive due process rights 4: holding board did not fail to disclose exculpatory information in violation of teachers due process rights", "references": ["0", "1", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Court law. See Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 823 (11th Cir.2011) (\"Because Borden has not sufficiently pled facts that would establish prejudice-cumulative or otherwise-we decline to elaborate further on [a cumulative-effect ineffective assistance of counsel claim] for fear of issuing an advisory opinion on a hypothetical issue.\"). Finally, the state court's rejection of Sneed's appellate-counsel-ineffectiveness claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. As we've already discussed, none of Sneed's challenged alleged errors, so far as they are encompassed in the COA, are meritorious; as a result, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to have raised them on direct appeal. See Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Sneed was not prejudiced by Holdings: 0: holding counsel was not deficient for declining to make a meritless argument 1: holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue 2: holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument 3: holding that appellate counsel is not required to raise meritless issues on appeal 4: holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim", "references": ["1", "2", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the 1998 Trust Agreement). Mr. Pettinati, Jr. exercised that trustee power to defend BASR\u2019s 1999 tax returns and the 1998 Gift Trust\u2019s tax liability. 3. BASR\u2019s Litigation Costs Are \u201cReasonable.\u201d Because BASR is a \u201cprevailing party,\u201d that \u201cincurred\u201d litigation costs, the next step in the court\u2019s analysis to determine whether the litigation costs requested for this case are \u201creasonable.\u201d I.R.C. \u00a7 7430 provides that a \u201cprevailing party\u201d may be awarded \u201creasonable litigation costs\u201d incurred during a tax case. See I.R.C. \u00a7 7430(a)(2) (emphasis added)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the court has \u201cbroad discretion\u201d in determining whether litigation costs requested are \u201creasonable.\u201d See Wagner v. Shinseki, 640 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). a. BASR\u2019s Attorneys Spent A \u201cReasonable\u201d Holdings: 0: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees 1: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency 2: holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees 3: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees 4: holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Valenzuela-Bemal, the demonstration of materiality can be established even where circumstances prevent a witness from being interviewed. 458 U.S. at 871, 102 S.Ct. 3440 (explaining that despite inability to \"make any avowal of how witness may testify\u201d in absence of interview, materiality may nonetheless be demonstrated by proffer of events to which witness might testify and relevance of such events to crime). 14 . At the same time, we recognize that even if Ms. Day had been called to the stand, she may have similarly ended up being held in contempt of court without having provided the testimony that Appellant sought to elicit from her. That, however, is not the concern at which the demonstration o ders, 206 W.Va. 544, 526 S.E.2d 320 (1999) (<HOLDING>). 16 .We note with appreciation that the State Holdings: 0: recognizing danger of unfair prejudice resulting from fifth amendment invocation injurys presence is not so great when the defense rather than the government seeks to draw inferences from a witnesss silence  1: holding that juveniles request for parent is invocation of fifth amendment rights 2: holding that trial court may draw adverse inference from habeas petitioners silence as result of fifth amendment invocation during deposition 3: holding adverse inference permissible in the face of defendants repeated invocation of fifth amendment privilege in discovery responses 4: holding that substantive use of prearrest silence is contrary to fifth amendment", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the Derouin residence. This testimony corroborates the accuracy of Michelle\u2019s prior statement. The only facts going against admission are from Michelle\u2019s testimony. Her testimony alone, under Alvarado, is not enough to support suppression of the statement when there are sufficient indicia of the statements accuracy to admit it. CONCLUSION The trial court abused its discretion in failing to properly apply Alvarado. In applying Alvarado\u2019s totality of the circumstances test to this case, we find sufficient indicia of its reliability and admit Michelle\u2019s past recorded recollection. The issue here is not whether the statement is admissible, but the weight to be accorded to the statement in the face of Michelle\u2019s current testimony. We remand for further proceeding W.2d[ 298,] 302 [(1980)] (<HOLDING>). Understandably, where a prior statement was Holdings: 0: holding that hearsay within a police report was inadmissible 1: holding that police report of witnesss statement was inadmissible because witness had not adopted report as accurate when matter was fresh in his memory 2: holding that denying admission of police officers typewritten notes of witnesss statement was proper where witness never adopted statements as true and accurate 3: holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible 4: holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "He opined that Dr. Gerber could not legitimately refer Endicott because he never treated Endicott. II. The dispositive question is whether Dr. Gerber made a valid referral to Dr. Lusk. The rule is well settled that an employee may change a treating physician when referred by the authorized treating physician, when confronted with an emergency, or when given permission by the commission or the employer. Biafore v. Kitchin Equipment Co., 18 Va.App. 474, 478-79, 445 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1994); Shenandoah Products, Inc. v. Whitlock, 15 Va.App. 207, 210, 421 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1992). The issue whether a treating physician has made a valid referral of his patient to another physician for treatment is a factual question. Daniel Construction Co. v. Baker, 229 Va. 453, 456, 331 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1985) (<HOLDING>); Jensen Press v. Ale, 1 Va.App. 153, 159, 336 Holdings: 0: holding that credible evidence supported the commissions factual finding that the treating physician referred claimant to the pain clinic 1: holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record 2: holding substantial evidence supported jury finding of abuse of process 3: holding that if a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record then the finding is supported by substantial evidence 4: holding that the commissions finding that  dr troup referred the claimant to dr rezba  is supported by evidence", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "finds that Mook in talking with Webb, talked with Webb in a manner that was consistent with the Hospital\u2019s policies. The undisputed evidence establishes that Mook only provided Webb with the dates of Toney\u2019s employment, Toney\u2019s position and the reason why Toney left the Hospital. The Hospital would not be arguing that Mook\u2019s statements were outside the scope of her employment had the information given by Mook to Webb been correct and accurate. Accordingly, in light of Mook\u2019s false statements given as a supervisor at the Hospital to Webb, the Hospital cannot now retroactively discharge Mook as a representative of the Hospital in an attempt to shield itself from Title VII liability. See Buechele v. St Mary\u2019s Hosp. Decatur, 156 Ill.App.3d 637, 109 Ill.Dec. 83, 509 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1987) (<HOLDING>). Applying the criteria set out in Illinois Holdings: 0: holding that a party can be held liable for securities fraud on an agency or a respondeat superior theory 1: holding that the liability reform act preempted in part the common law doctrine of respondeat superior 2: holding that respondeat superior liability may attach if an employee criticizes a coemployee in bad faith in a report filed with a state agency 3: recognizing respondeat superior liability 4: holding that county liability under  1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the pornographic materials that Ogletree stored in his back yard storage shed along with his four-wheeler. Furthermore, D. C. described at trial the act that formed the basis of the charge concerning her. And the state presented evidence that Ogletree had groped the breasts of two other women without their consent. Moreover, the trial court charged the jury fully as to what constituted evidence, including instructing them that evidence did not include the questions asked by the lawyers. \u201cAll things considered, including the strength of the State\u2019s evidence in this case, we conclude that it is highly probable that [any] trial court[ ] error in failing to comply with OC 2d 512) (2005) (citations omitted). 4 See Jackson, supra; Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642, 646 (4) (670 SE2d 425) (2008) (<HOLDING>); OCGA \u00a7 24-4-8 (2011) (\u201cThe testimony of a Holdings: 0: holding that beyond reasonable doubt standard not required in termination cases 1: holding that evidence as stipulated at a trial was sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty under standard of jackson supra 2: holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that appellant was deprived of a fair trial where the jury was instructed in such a way that it was not required to find at least two elements of the offense of capital murder to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "as a matter of law. Not surprisingly, Mrs. Kimmel strongly opposes Western Reserve\u2019s characterization of the alleged misrepresentations and further contests whether any alleged misrepresentations were in fact material to Western Reserve\u2019s coverage determination. Both parties have offered extensive argument and evidence in the form of affidavits and documentation in support of their positions. Western Reserve has offered the report of an expert, and Mrs. Kimmel has countered with an affidavit from Mr. Kimmel\u2019s treating physician. As noted earlier, a material misrepresentation on an application for life insurance will void any coverage under the terms of a conditional receipt. Primerica, 678 N.E.2d at 1142-43; see also Foster v. Auto-Owners Ins., Co., 703 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Ind.1998) (<HOLDING>). \u201cA representation is material if the fact Holdings: 0: holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application 1: holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer 2: recognizing that a material misrepresentation or omission of fact in an insurance application relied on by the insurer in issuing a policy renders the coverage voidable at the insurance companys option 3: recognizing an insurers right to rescind an insurance contract where the insured has made fraudulent or material misrepresentation in insurance application 4: holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "He therefore is not entitled to contribution from his co-guarantors at this time. Finding that Rogers is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we hereby reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Rogers. Reversed. BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur. 1 . This amount equals 50% (Small's share in Patriot's Place) of $77,723.52 (the amount Rogers paid to Monroe Bank on behalf of Patriot's Place) plus 40.43% (Small's share of Plainfield Place) of $10,360.39 (the amount Rogers paid to Busey Bank on behalf of Plain-field Place). 2 . To hold otherwise would result in a claim for contribution being asserted upon each and every payment made toward a debt until the debt is discharged. But cf. Afolabi v. Atlantic Mortg. & Inv. Corp., 849 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). Of course, this is not to say that the Holdings: 0: holding that prior foreclosure actions do not preclude successive foreclosure actions where there are subsequent and separate defaults 1: holding that the actions were not actions of public and general applicability but were actions directed principally and primarily at plaintiffs 2: holding that adea class actions are optin actions under  216b not optout actions subject to rule 23 3: holding that a class action tolls the statute of limitations only for subsequent individual actions not for subsequent class actions 4: holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "and Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985). 164 . City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality); Gonzalez v. Ysleta ISD, 996 F.2d 745, 752-60 (5th Cir.1993); Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d at 245; and Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir.1992). 165 . See Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir.1997), cert. pending; Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d at 244-45; Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 F.2d at 92; Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d at 94; Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1192 (5th Ci D.Tex.1990), (<HOLDING>). 182 . A lawsuit which does not appear Holdings: 0: holding that filing an answer  does not invoke the status as a defendant in plaintiffs lawsuit 1: holding that default judgment could not be rendered after the defendant had served plaintiff with a copy of a motion to dismiss that had not then been filed 2: holding that a default judgment could not be rendered after defendants counsel telephoned plaintiffs attorney to request additional time within which to answer 3: holding that a default judgment could not be rendered without satisfying the procedural requirements of rule 55b2 fedrcivp after the defendant had made an appearance in the lawsuit by filing an answer in state court in a case that had been removed to federal court 4: holding that after all federal claims had been dismissed if the district court does decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction these state claims shall be remanded to state court rather than dismissed because this case was originally filed in state court and removed to federal court", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "to that of Defendant, who masterminded the plot. \u00b6 66 It was Dan, however, who actually stabbed Lynne, and it was David who stood to directly benefit from Lynne\u2019s death and had the closest familial relationship to her. Neither Dan nor David received a death sentence. We dealt with a similar disparity problem in State v. Mann, in which the disparity was not considered mitigating because the person treated lightly was only an accomplice and Mann was the actual killer. 188 Ariz. 220, 230, 934 P.2d 784, 794 (1997). In the present case, the actual killer got the life sentence, and Defendant, who was not the actual killer, was sentenced to death \u2014 the opposite of what justified the disparate treatment in Mann. See also State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335 at 348, 690 P.2d 54 at 68 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The disparity in the present case must be Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant sold no stock at all this suggested that there was no insider information from which to benefit and there was not a strong inference of scienter 1: holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable 2: holding that there was no actual prejudice where the defendant has the functional equivalent of the notice required 3: holding there was no mitigation where defendant but not accomplices did actual killing which involved strangling and stabbing 4: holding that there was no standing where the prospective future candidacy of a former congressman was involved", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in determining that dismissal was in the best interests of creditors and is entitled to substantial deference as to its choice of remedies. Furthermore, as the Debtor has not argued that conversion of the case to chapter 7 would have been more appropriate than dismissal, we need go no further to plumb its reasoning with respect to its choice of one remedy over another. B. Section 109(g) \u201cSection 109 sets forth who may be a debtor under title 11.\u201d In re Inesta Quinones, 73 B.R. 333, 336 (Bankr.D.P.R.1987). T at the conduct was deliberate.\u201d In re Lee, No. 11-8053, 2012 WL 1324234, at *9-10 (6th Cir. BAP Apr. 18, 2012) (citing In re Nelkovski, 46 B.R. 542, 544 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1985)); see also In re Pike, 258 B.R. 876, 883 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2001) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). Here, the bankruptcy court Holdings: 0: holding that 8 cfr  10032c3ii applies to changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation and not changed personal circumstances in the united states 1: holding that an alien failed to qualify for the changed circumstances exception by asserting only that his personal circumstances had changed by the birth of a child 2: holding that successive filings in the absence of changed circumstances justified a 180day disqualification 3: holding that a change in personal circumstances is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances for the purpose of 8 cfr  10032c3h 4: holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or writs of error coram nobis. See, e.g., United States v. McClelland, 941 F.2d 999, 1002 (9th Cir.1991) (coram nobis review); United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (habeas corpus review); United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (3rd Cir.1989) (coram nobis review); United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1074-75 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3190, 105 L.Ed.2d 699 (1989) (same); United States v. Shelton, 848 F.2d 1485, 1489-90 (10th Cir.1988) (habeas corpus review); Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 455 (2nd Cir.1988) (same). But see United States v. Callanan, 671 F.Supp. 487, 493 (E.D.Mich. 1987), rev\u2019d in relevant part, 881 F.2d 229, 232 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1816, 108 L.Ed.2d 946 (1990) (<HOLDING>). This Court holds that Hubbard should be Holdings: 0: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 1: holding that the act is not retroactive 2: holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence   3: holding mcnally not to be retroactive in habeas corpus proceeding reversed on appeal 4: holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape", "references": ["2", "1", "0", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "shortly after R.S. submitted to blood testing in September 1994. Also, R.S. should have been notified of the November 1994 shelter hearing. At a minimum, had R.S. been contacted at either of these times, he would have been able to begin establishing a relationship with J.M., and the bond that now exists between J.M. and his foster parents \u2014 the exact bond which the trial court now relies upon to support J.M.\u2019s continued placement with the foster parents \u2014 -may never have developed. It is a perverse operation of the system that allows the State, acting through the offices of DFS and ORS, to keep R.S. in the dark as to J.M.\u2019s foster placement and then use the time J.M. has been in foster care as evidence of abandonment against R.S. Cf. In re M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) (<HOLDING>). The majority states that \u201cthe juvenile court Holdings: 0: holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended 1: holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent  although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction  over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper 2: recognizing that a foster parent may attain the status of psychological parent when the relationship is not temporary in duration and exists with the consent and encouragement of a childs legal parent or guardian 3: holding the termination of parental rights does not necessarily mean that all bonds are broken between parent and child a court may allow some continued communication between the parent and children pending adoption and even after adoption if it determines that such contact is in the childrens best interest 4: holding a parent is excused from maintaining contact with his or her children when the failure to maintain contact is caused by the involuntary confinement of the parent and the parent is precluded from contacting the children during such confinement", "references": ["2", "3", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "did not, assert before the district court. See B & T Masonry Constr. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir.2004) (explaining that legal theories not squarely raised below are not preserved for appeal). In all events, the plaintiffs equitable claims have too little substance. The plaintiff concedes the existence of a valid express contract between the parties-and the existence of such a contract bars the application of the equitable doctrines that he belatedly invokes. See Boswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 414 Mass. 241, 606 N.E.2d 1336, 1342 (1993) (explaining that where a valid contract exists, \u201cthe law need not create a quantum meruit right to receive compensation for services rendered\u201d); Zarum v. Brass Mill Materials Corp., 334 Mass. 81, 134 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1956) (<HOLDING>); id. (noting that an express contract leaves Holdings: 0: holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law 1: holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant 2: holding that an implied contract may not be found if there is an express contract between the same parties on the same subject matter quoting 42 cjs implied and constructive contracts  34 p 33 3: holding that quasicontractual relief is unavailable where an express contract covers the subject matter 4: holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "on various claims arising from Combs\u2019s treatment by Washington state prison officials. We affirm. The district court properly entered summary judgment for defendants on Combs\u2019s free exercise claims brought under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983. See U.S. Const. amend. I. Reviewing the record de novo, Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008), we agree with the district court\u2019s conclusion that no disputed question of material fact exists as to whether prison officials intentionally and substantially burdened Combs\u2019s right freely to exercise his fundamentalist Jewish faith. The sporadic mistakes in kosher food preparation principles here resulted from inadvertence and did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>). A prison policy that refused to provide Combs Holdings: 0: holding that a statute which prohibited unreasonable interference with access to a courthouse was a valid law  and the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection 1: holding that religionneutral law that is generally applicable does not violate free exercise clause despite incidental effect on religious practice 2: holding that  relatively shortterm and sporadic  intrusions on an inmates prayer activities did not constitute a substantial burden on inmates free exercise of his religion 3: holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment 4: holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "an equal protection violation under this theory. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Engquist does not compel a different result. In that case, the Court identified two exceptions to the class of one theory of equal protection. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603-05, 128 S.Ct. 2146; Avila v. Pappas, 591 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.2010) (discussing Engquist). First, Engquist held that \u201cdisputes related to a public employee\u2019s interactions with superiors or co-workers never may be litigated as class-of-one claims under the equal protection clause.\u201d Avila, 591 F.3d at 554. Second, it held that \u201cclass-of-one claims cannot rest on governmental activity that is discretionary by design,\u201d such as prosecutorial charging decisions. Id.; see also Srail v. Village of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 945 (7th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs\u2019 claim does not implicate a public Holdings: 0: holding that there is no independent tort duty because the exact same conduct is described in both the contract and tort claims and the exact same facts and circumstances are at play which is indicative of    overlapping duties 1: holding that article x  2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially 2: holding that villages decision to extend water mains to some communities and not others was the exact type of individualized and discretionary decisionmaking to which the engquist court was referring 3: holding that the plaintiffs sexualharassment claim that she was touched numerous times instead of providing exact dates or the exact number of instances did not prevent her allegations from raising a genuine issue of material fact 4: holding that federal jurisdiction over  2241 petitions does not extend to review of discretionary determinations by the ij and the bia", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "when Klayman was severely indebted to the Government. Acts of Omission on Klayman\u2019s Part It is not only affirmative acts which may constitute evasion. Section 523(a)(1)(C) encompasses acts of culpable omission as well as acts of commission. Fegeley, 118 F.3d at 983 citing In re Bruner, 55 F.3d 195 (5th Cir.1995) and In re Toti, 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir.1994). It is the Government\u2019s position that over an eight year period Klayman earned over $1.5 million from Herkly yet made no payment whatsoever towards the tax debt. Gov .) (explaining that debtors\u2019 silence regarding why they did not make any tax payments notwithstanding their considerable income has direct bearing on whether their conduct warranted excepting tax debt from, discharge); U.S. v. Doyle, 276 F.Supp.2d 415, 424 (W.D.Pa.2003) (<HOLDING>) In summary, the record plainly reveals that Holdings: 0: holding that the taxpayer has the burden to prove the governments tax assessment is incorrect 1: holding that it is well established that a taxpayer has no right to insist upon the same erroneous treatment afforded a similarly situated taxpayer in the past 2: holding that even where taxpayer did not have the financial means to pay all of the taxes owed the taxpayer still willfully evaded tax obligation 3: holding that irs may not levy against bank account of delinquent taxpayer held in tenancy by the entirety where taxpayer did not have unilateral right to withdraw funds 4: holding that in a proceeding to recover taxes from a nonbankrupt taxpayer the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his taxes complied with the internal revenue code", "references": ["1", "4", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "from the heading used in Gibson so as to put purchasers on notice that some or all of the fee paid for the extended warranty was going not to the warranty provider, but to Viking. We disagree. It should first be observed that the stated purpose of TILA is to give consumers a functional understanding of what exactly it will cost them to use credit, as well as to provide meaningful and accurate disclosures of costs associated with consumer credit purchases. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1601. Plaintiffs have aptly observed that the sufficiency of TILA-mandated disclosures is to be viewed from the standpoint of an ordinary consumer, not the perspective of a Federal Reserve Board member, federal judge, or English professor. See Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>); In re Cook, 76 B.R. 661, 664 (Bkrtcy., Holdings: 0: holding that a credit transaction is not a consumer debt when it is incurred with a profit motive 1: holding that the fcras provision that a lender may only use and obtain consumer credit information for the purpose of making a firm offer of credit requires that the lender offer something of value as an extension of credit alone 2: holding that the proper perspective in analyzing tila disclosures is that of ordinary laypersons engaged in consumer credit transactions 3: recognizing statutory credit 4: holding that debt under the fdcpa is limited to liability arising out of consensual consumer transactions and not tortious activity", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "at 10 (citing City of Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.1969)); see also DuPuy, 396 S.W.2d at 110 (stating that construction of viaduct, which deprived landowner of \u201creasonable access,\u201d entitled him to compensation under the constitution). Here, the relevant jurisdictional facts are largely undisputed. The parties\u2019 central dispute concerns whether GAR has an actionable vested property interest, i.e., an easement of access through the alley and over the State\u2019s property. See City of Houston v. Northwood Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 73 S.W.3d 304, 311 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (\u201c[A] plaintiff asserting a claim under article I, section 17 must show that it has a \u2018vested\u2019 property interest.\u201d); Carson v. State, 117 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex.App.\u2014Austin 2003, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). GAR asserts that it \u201chas a vested property Holdings: 0: recognizing that publicly targeting a property for condemnation resulting in economic damage to the owner generally does not give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of action unless there is some direct restriction on use of the property 1: holding that there is no right to monetary compensation for a regulatory taking in an inverse condemnation action 2: holding that allegations that states lease and actions that resulted in taking of oil and gas were sufficient to state claim for inverse condemnation 3: recognizing that plaintiff must have vested legal right of access and not merely historical permissive use to have actionable inverse condemnation claim 4: recognizing no right to damages if landowner retains reasonable access to property after a condemnation", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Rule 403 is narrowly circumscribed.\u201d United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1989) (quotation marks omitted)). As evidence becomes more essential, its probative value becomes greater. King, 713 F.2d at 631. Rule 403\u2019s major function is \u201climited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.\u201d United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 875 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.1979)). Testimony merely intended to bolster a party\u2019s case is more easily excluded under Rule 403 than testimony that forms a critical part of that case. See United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). A. Burden Shifting In ordinary cases under Holdings: 0: holding that evidence regarding the 510k process and enforcement should be excluded under rule 403 1: holding that evidence necessary to the governments rebuttal of a defendants case could not be excluded under rule 403 but could have been if it was introduced only to bolster the prosecutions case 2: holding that evidence of a defendants prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement if the jury was instructed that the evidence could not be used for the purposes of determining guilt 3: holding grooming evidence inadmissible under r 403 under the facts of the case but not foreclosing admissibility in every case and not addressing r 702 4: holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of the crime, the error was harmless. Ibid. Other jurisdictions appear to be in accord. See State v. Preston, 121 N.H. 147, 427 A.2d 32 (1981). (New Hampshire\u2019s Rape Shield Law only excludes evidence of prior sexual activity of the victim and not evidence of the victim\u2019s virginity. Such evidence is admissible even if lack of consent is not raised by the defense. Id. at 149-150, 427 A.2d 32); and see State v. Singleton, 102 N.M. 66, 691 P.2d 67 (Ct.App.1984). (New Mexico\u2019s Rape Shield Law does not preclude evidence of a victim\u2019s virginity since that \u201cevidence of a victim\u2019s virginity is relevant in cases involving alleged forcible criminal sexual penetration where the consent of the victim is at issue.\u201d Id. at 70, 691 P.2d 67); and see People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 1017 (Colo.App.1983); (<HOLDING>). At least two other courts have concluded that Holdings: 0: holding that a rape shield statute was not ex post facto when it barred evidence of a prior sexual relationship that was admissible before enactment of the statute 1: holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 2: holding that mistake as to the age of the victim is no defense to statutory rape 3: holding statute does not preclude victims family from testifying as to the difficulties encountered by victim following accident 4: holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "imprisonment being the punishment for murder rendere nt to justify a determination of involuntariness or lack of knowledge. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684, 693 (1969); Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 653-57, 628 A.2d 735; State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 402-05, 388 A.2d 218 (1978); State v. Lapointe, 237 Conn. 694, 678 A.2d 942, 960-61, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 484, 136 L.Ed.2d 378 (1996); State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153, 158-59 (S.C.1996), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 988, 136 L.Ed.2d 870 (1997). Moreover, a misrepresentation by police does not render a confession or waiver involuntary unless the misrepresentation actually induced the confession. People v. Benson, 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 841-43, 802 P.2d 330, 344-45 (1990) (<HOLDING>). The statement by Detective Musiello is not Holdings: 0: holding that comment by officer that case was not deatheligible did not render confession involuntary because comment did not cause defendant to confess 1: holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence 2: holding officers failure to obtain a written waiver from defendant did not render his oral waiver or subsequent confession involuntary 3: holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail 4: holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\"suspended\u201d rather than terminated when she remarried, and that if her second marriage were to end through divorce, annulment or the death of her second husband, then she would again receive pension benefits. Based upon this theory, she then argues that \"[l]ogic compels the same result when the forfeiture provision was removed by the 1977 amendment,\u201d as \"[h]er right was only in suspension until her second marriage either ended or legislation changed the legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d However, as DRS aptly points out, Olesen\u2019s theory that her benefits were merely suspended requires leaps of both logic and legal analysis. Not only is her theory grounded upon the law of other states, as Washington courts have not decided s hts Comm\u2019n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wn. App. 609, 617, 694 P.2d 697 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 13 Orland, supra, at 880 n.135. 14 48 Wn.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a statute that created a counselorclient privilege should not be retroactively applied to records created prior to the statute because of the presumption against retroactivity 1: holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case 2: holding that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases  pending on direct review  with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break with the past 3: holding amendment to statute permitting administrative body to award up to 1000 in damages in discrimination cases applied retroactively because it created a supplemental remedy for enforcement of a preexisting right 4: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "a money satisfaction of such interest. [11 U.S.C.A \u00a7 363(b)(1), (f).] We initially note that \u00a7 363 does not speak of a sale \u201cfree and clear of all claims,\u201d but refers to a sale \u201cfree and clear of any interest in such property____\u201d 11 U.S.C.A \u00a7 363(f). The relevant question is whether \u00a7 363(f) applies to plaintiffs\u2019 suit predicated on a theory of strict liability. There appears to be authority which would permit plaintiffs claim. See Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc., 75 B.R. 944, 948 (Bank. N.D.Ohio t persuasive. A suit against a corporation that purchased a debtor\u2019s assets is not a claim against a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding and therefore does not affect the Code\u2019s priority scheme. See, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). We are also persuaded based upon the Holdings: 0: holding that existence of entity coverage was sufficient to bring proceeds into estate notwithstanding absence of claim against debtor corporation 1: holding that  727a2a does not apply to the transfer of the assets of a corporation in which the debtor is a shareholder 2: holding that a lawsuit against a corporation that purchased assets from a bankrupt is not a claim against the debtor 3: holding that the trustee could not bring a claim against sole shareholders of bankrupt corporation where shareholders had not looted or otherwise injured the corporation 4: holding that an answer that asserts a counterclaim against a plaintiff who then becomes a bankruptcy debtor is an action or proceeding against the debtor within the meaning of  362a1 notwithstanding the fact that the debtor initiated the lawsuit", "references": ["0", "4", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and 401(3).\u201d To support a conviction of criminal contempt for violation of a court order, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully violated a decree that was clear and left no uncertainty in the minds of those that heard it. See Richmond Black Police Officers Ass\u2019n v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123, 129 (4th Cir.1977). Linney maintains that the district court\u2019s \u201cstatement of its expectations regarding him\u201d was \u201cnot a definite, clear, and specific order.\u201d Brief of Appellant at 17. Linney contends that after hearing the above instructions he believed that jury selection for the Twitty case would begin the next day and so in leaving Asheville he did not willfully violate any court order. Cf. United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). He claims that he flew to Raleigh with the Holdings: 0: holding that outofstate plaintiff had procured his own absence at trial of his case where record contained no intimation that his absence resulted from any reason other than his own volition 1: holding that a lawyers willful absence from his clients trial is contemptuous 2: holding that loss of contingency fees that lawyers might have earned from other clients was not foreseeable and directly traceable to clients failure to pay amounts due under contract 3: holding that lawyers who were necessary witnesses in the case under rule 37 were not prohibited from representing their clients in all pretrial matters including discovery 4: holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "reliability. Id. at 628-29. Courts around the country tend to agree with the holdings in Wheat and Walshire, finding a tip has the requisite indicia of reliability under the Fourth Amendment when the anonymous tipster relates that he or she has personally observed erratic driving open to public view. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 38 Cal.4th 1078, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810, 815-16 (2006) (finding the likelihood of harassment or an insincere or unreliable report of drunk driving is \u201csignificantly reduced\u201d by the fact a phoned-in report involves an anonymous tipster providing \u201ca contemporaneous event of reckless driving presumably viewed by the caller\u201d and a predictive \u201canalysis is more appropriate in cases involving tips of concealed criminal behavior such as p 516, 519, 527-28 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Cases holding an anonymous tip had the Holdings: 0: holding that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability that an individual is carrying a gun is not enough to justify a terry stop 1: holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk 2: holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description 3: holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability when the caller described his or her observations as reckless driving 4: holding that anonymous call that gave police no predictive information to corroborate tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify stop and frisk", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "or, alternatively, under 101.106(f). Section 101.106(a) provides: The filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter. Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. \u00a7 101.106(a). The trial court dismissed Dr. Sotelo from the suit without stating which provision it relied on. Dr. Sotelo could have been properly dismissed under section 101.106(a) because Kamel\u2019s addition of UTHSCH as a defendant constituted an \u201cirrevocable election\u201d that barred \u201cany suit or recovery ... against any individual employee of the governmental unit.\u201d See id.; see also Hintz, 305 S.W.3d at 769 (<HOLDING>); Villasan v. O\u2019Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752, 759 Holdings: 0: holding plaintiffs election to sue entity foreclosed any possibility of adding employee in future pleadings 1: holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings 2: holding that plaintiffs do not lose their right to sue for damages sustained within statute of limitations period by failing to sue on earlier incidents in timely manner 3: holding that employers have standing to sue 4: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "waive any of the requirements of rule 3.112. As pointed out by the FACDL, a capital defendant rarely retains private counsel and most private attorneys who would undertake such representation already meet the rule 3.112 standards. Further, if exceptional circumstances require representation by private counsel not meeting the requirements of the rule, the court may allow the representation in accordance with subdivision (k)., As to conflict counsel or the public defenders, we can see no valid reason to allow an indigent defendant to waive the requirements of the rule as they apply to these court-appointed attorneys. An indigent defendant does not have a right to insist on representation by an attorney appointed by the court at taxpayer expense. Cfi Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, there is legitimate concern that Holdings: 0: recognizing that a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford 1: holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator 2: holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires 3: holding that when the prosecuting attorney    refuses to afford counsel to a county board in defense of an action    mandamus would be an appropriate remedy 4: holding that defendants response i cant  i cant afford it when informed that an attorney would be provided for him if he could not afford one did not without further explanation amount to a clear unambiguous or unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "4 . The Civil Code articles dealing with obligations were extensively revised in 1984. The articles in effect before the 1984 revisions apply here. We will apply them throughout this opinion. 5 . Nine months into the first year of the plan, the Diocese and Gallagher modified the contract by agreeing that the Diocese would establish an additional loss fund of $200,000 and pay an extra premium. However, we do not see the parties' modification here as a new contract. As Gallagher stated in its endorsement, the parties here merely agreed to ''amend[]\u201d the \"aggregate sum agreed hereon in respect of the first period of insurance, from July 1, 1981 to July 1, 1982.\u201d Because this amendment did not create a new contract, it did not discharge Gallagher's original express warranty. See id. (<HOLDING>). 6 . Gallagher also claims that there is a Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract 1: holding that for a suit to be brought in the venue in which the contract was to be performed the contract must expressly state where the performance of the contract was to occur 2: holding that parties who agreed to substitute a hotwater heating system for the hotair system stipulated in contract did not make a new contract but only amended the existing contract 3: holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract 4: holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Given that the relevant regulations define the appropriate decisional unit as those who were considered for jobs in the same process as the terminated employees, those 208 employees constitute the appropriate decisional unit, and our inquiry is complete. Appellees finally argue that, regardless of the OWBPA\u2019s informational requirements, the releases fail because they neglected to state the eligibility factors that McDonald\u2019s used to determine who would be eligible for the termination program. This issue was not raised or decided in the district court and was therefore not raised in the order certifying the case for interlocutory appeal. We accordingly lack jurisdiction to decide the issue. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 677-78, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) (<HOLDING>); see also Schlumberger Techs., Inc. v. Wiley, Holdings: 0: holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa 1: holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to   636b1  has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc  1292b  2000  2: holding that under 28 usc  1292b the appellate courts may review only matters in the order not all issues in the case 3: holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc  1291 4: holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court", "references": ["0", "4", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "(2001) (where death results from firearm offense, the applicable homicide offense level applies). With conviction of an additional count, however, the applicable guideline range may be reached by the imposition of consecutive sentences on the multiple counts of conviction. See id \u00a7 5G1.2(d). It is doubtless true that an important advantage to the defendant of the plea agreement was that by the dismissal of Count Two, her maximum punishment was capped at ten years imprisonment, which is the statutory maximum for Count One. If she is convicted of Count Two, she faces imprisonment greater than ten years. Nevertheless, it does no violence to due process to hold the defendant to her bargain under the circumstances of this case. See Hentz v. Hargett, 71 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). IV Therefore, for the reasons stated in this Holdings: 0: holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea 1: holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw guilty plea filed three weeks after entering the plea 2: holding that no constitutional violation occurred where state prosecutor did not allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea and reinstated additional charges after defendant violated plea agreement by failing to testify truthfully at codefendants trial 3: holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant 4: holding that a defendant who is allowed to withdraw his plea must either withdraw his plea to all charges or to none when his plea to all charges was part of an agreement with the state", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "fee. The bottom of the notices contained a detachable section for plaintiffs to provide their credit card information to pay the debt. On Avila\u2019s notice, this section again.stated her \u201ccurrent balance.\u201d Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging that the collection notices violated the FDGPA. They claimed, among other things, that the collection notices were misleading because they stated the \u201ccurrent balance,\u201d but did not disclose that the balance might- increase due to interest and , fees. They alleged that they believed from reading the notice that the \u201ccurrent balance\u201d was \u201cstatic\u201d and that their \u201cpayment of that amount would satisfy [the debt] irrespective of when [the] payment was remitted.\u201d App\u2019x at 31, 100. Avila alle V-3057 (JS), 2010 WL 2771832, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2010) (<HOLDING>), and Adlam v. FMS, Inc., No. 09 CIV. Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiffs allegation that debt collectors attempted to collect on a debt to a condominium association notwithstanding their knowledge that plaintiff did not really owe that debt to the condominium was sufficient to state a claim under the fdutpa 1: holding that debt collectors have no obligation to warn a consumer that her debt may increase over time 2: holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred  is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt 3: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 4: holding that a debtor has primarily consumer debts if the aggregate amount of consumer debt is more than 50 of the total debt", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "at the Riverview Terrace Apartments. Thus, on June 4, 2005, Officer Bickel arranged to have J.P. and his mother go to the police station so that he could question J.P. about the barn arson. During the suppression hearing and dispositional hearing, Officer Bickel testified that his questioning during the June 4 interview was limited solely to a discussion of the barn fire. Subsequently, on June 13, 2005, the State filed a petition alleging that J.P. was a delinquent child for committing acts that would be aiding in arson under cause number Cause # 53. Thus, when J.P. was questioned about the barn fire, he had not been charged with aiding in arson and, indeed, could not have even asserted a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for that offense. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (<HOLDING>). Although J.P. had asserted a Sixth Amendment Holdings: 0: holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings 1: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 2: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel 3: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not attach until a prosecution is commenced that is at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings 4: holding defendants sixth amendment right to counsel which applies only to criminal cases did not attach when juvenile petition for abuse and neglect was filed", "references": ["0", "4", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "P.3d 149, 152 (2009). Y. Analysis A. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction over the Petition for Judicial Review The Idaho Constitution allows the Legislature to delimit the district courts\u2019 appellate jurisdiction. Idaho Const. art. V, \u00a7 20. Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless expressly authorized by statute. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1). Without an enabling statute, the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Williams, 149 Idaho 675, 678-79, 239 P.3d 780, 783-84 (2010) (dismissing a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because no statute authorized an appeal); Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 147 Idaho 424, 431-32, 210 P.3d 532, 539-40 (2009) (same); cf. Regan v. Kootenai Cnty., 140 Idaho 721, 726, 100 P.3d 615, 620 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Respondents filed a petition for judicial Holdings: 0: holding appealable district courts order dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction due to determination of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction 1: holding the order is only reviewable if actually considered by the district court 2: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction 3: holding that a reviewable final order is necessary for subjectmatter jurisdiction 4: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "436, 454 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation mark omitted). It is true that many of Bayerische\u2019s allegations in the Amended Complaint, standing alone, fail to meet this high bar. The allegations about how Aladdin added specific Reference Entities to the Reference Portfolio that were \u201crecklessly\u201d exposed to the housing market and that experienced Credit Events appear to be pleading gross negligence by hindsight. Cf. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir.2000) (\u201c[W]e have refused to allow plaintiffs to proceed with allegations of fraud by hindsight. Corporate officials need not be clairvoyant....\u201d (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Mosher-Simons v. County of Allegany, No. 17 94-CV-374S, 1997 WL 662512, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor do such allegations suggest that Holdings: 0: holding plaintiff cannot plead gross negligence through hindsight 1: holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case 2: holding that to rebut presumption plaintiff need only allege specific facts not plead evidence 3: holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract 4: holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to allege affirmative misconduct on the part of the government", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Lloyds had 108 customers with Tennessee addresses between 1964 and 2002; (2) Lloyds had a correspondent relationship with AmSouth Bank of Tennessee for the purpose of sending and receiving wire transfers at the direction of its customers, which included three SWIFT wire transfers related to this case that were sent at customers\u2019 directions through AmSouth; (3) Lloyds\u2019 representatives visited the Tennessee offices of three subsidiaries of national corporations on eight occasions, between November 1999 and June 2004, in connection with line of credit/loan syndicates, whereby Lloyd han random, fortuitous, and attenuated contacts that fail to establish that Lloyds purposefully directed its conduct at Tennessee. See, e.g., Gregurek v. Swope Motors, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 882 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N. Carolina v. Holdings: 0: holding insurer was not obligated to repair the damaged automobile to both its preaccident condition and market value concluding that permitting coverage of diminished value would render meaningless the insurers clear policy right to repair rather than pay actual cash value 1: holding that auto repair shop was not subject to general jurisdiction where its employees attended occasional automobile auctions in tennessee and 17 out of its 29500 customers had tennessee addresses 2: holding that customers of registered representative were customers of memberfirm 3: holding as a general rule that a bank and its customers do not have a special or confidential relationship 4: holding that remedy of repair and service did not fail of its essential purpose when seller provided warranty service on the product and accomplished repair", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "papers. When QCBT did not offer the testimony, Kircher did not lodge an objection to the testimony contained in the offer of proof and the court never issued a final ruling on the admissibility of this testimony. Thus, the general rule regarding error preservation for a motion in limine applies. Because QCBT did not offer the testimony contained in the offer of proof, the court never had a chance to rule on the admissi bility of the evidence; therefore, QCBT failed to preserve error as to the admissibility of Bolt\u2019s testimony on the work papers and other issues unrelated to the ultimate issue of negligence. See, e.g., Johnson, 481 N.W.2d at 317 (\u201cIf the evidence is not offered, there is nothing preserved to review on appeal.\u201d); State v. Delaney, 526 N.W.2d 170, 177 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>). IV. The District Court\u2019s Ruling Concerning Holdings: 0: holding error was not preserved where the courts ruling was not unequivocal and whether the evidence offered by the state fell within the parameters of the ruling was uncertain 1: holding if an appellant conceded trial courts ruling was not prejudicial he could not assert on appeal the ruling denied him a fair trial 2: holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered 3: holding that appellate court reviewing trial courts habeas corpus ruling must review record evidence in light most favorable to ruling and uphold ruling absent abuse of discretion 4: holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "2009-2012. Although Morillion and Rutti both focused on employer control, both gave heightened consideration to the fact that the employer transportation was mandatory. Rutti, 596 F.3d at 1061-1062; Moril-lion, 22 Cal.4th at 587-588, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139. Moreover, Plaintiff has directed this Court to no case, and the Court\u2019s research has yielded no case, where an employee has been found to be subject to an employer\u2019s control where the plaintiff voluntarily elected to commute in the employer\u2019s vehicle. Cf. Campbell v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 WL 5302217, *7 (C.D.Cal.2013) (denying Best Buy\u2019s motion for summary judgment due, in part, to a disputed issue of fact as to whether a home-start was required); Alcantar v. Hobart Service, 2012 WL 6539547, *1, *3-4 (C.D.Cal.2012) (<HOLDING>); Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal.App.4th Holdings: 0: holding that commute time in company vehicle  even where use of the vehicle was restricted nonpersonal uses was not compensable because it was optional 1: holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes 2: holding a stop was effected where officers vehicle blocked defendants vehicle from proceeding 3: holding that time was not compensable where the employer provided but did not require use of a shuttle 4: holding that time was compensable where the crew was required to travel in the employers vehicle to job sites", "references": ["2", "3", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "of the LUCKY mark within the reasonably foreseeable future during the short period of alleged nonuse. See 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1127; Electro Source, 458 F.3d at 935. AFFIRMED. WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with our opinion resolving this appeal, but write separately on the burden-of-proof issue. We have held that under the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1051-1127 (1946), the burden of proving abandonment is \u201cstrict.\u201d Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.1982). We have also indicated that this strict burden is equivalent to a \u201chigh\u201d one. See Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.1976), citing Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). Despite these statements, Judge McKeown Holdings: 0: holding that defendant failed to meet the burden of strict proof required to show abandonment 1: holding defendant failed to preserve burden of proof issue for appeal 2: holding district court order of restitution failed for lack of proof when government failed to meet burden 3: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant 4: holding that the state failed to meet its burden when the record failed to show that the jurors would or would not be available after a weeks continuance", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "claim. Further, the Commonwealth argues that Elliott has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court abused its discretion by denying ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal. We further agree with the Commonwealth that Elliott has not demonstrated good cause for further discovery on this issue. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2) (providing that discovery in a first counseled petition in a death penalty case is only permitted upon leave of court after a showing of good cause). Elliott offers no explanation regarding what further evidence or documentation exists to support his request. Thus, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion by denying Elliott discovery additional to that already provided by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183, 30 A.3d 426, 484 (2011) (<HOLDING>). Issue VIII Instruction on Lie Detector Test Holdings: 0: holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation 1: holding that production of documents without seeking a protective order waives the right to such an order unless there is a showing of good cause for the delay 2: holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment 3: holding that conjecture that opportunity to review homicide file might yield exculpatory evidence is inadequate to demonstrate good cause for discovery 4: holding that speculation that production of requested documents might reveal exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish good cause for discovery", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "given present effect to Waggoner\u2019s pre-limitations-period actions is insufficient to make Waggoner\u2019s otherwise unrelated actions similar in kind to Toomey and Carr\u2019s decisions. Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (\u201c[T]he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists.\u201d). Waggoner\u2019s pre-limitations-period conduct may have been frequent enough and sufficiently similar to Waggoner\u2019s conduct within the limitations period, but the situation reached a degree of permanence long before August 7, 2012. As early as April 2010, Fahnestock was allegedly pressured to take the CFR position. See Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara, 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 660, 668 (2002) (<HOLDING>). And, by June 2010, when Fahnestock complained Holdings: 0: holding that a state of permanence was reached when the citys only response to plaintiffs complaint about the loss of job duties was to give her the opportunity to transfer out of the department 1: holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendants failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an adverse personnel action and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendants failure to transfer her 2: holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless  related to his job duties 3: holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action 4: holding that the plaintiffs challenge to a state law affecting the performance of her job duties was mooted when she left state employment", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (refusing to distinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the Brady context); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (refusing to distinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct). Accordingly, we recognized in Davis that sometimes, newly-discovered impeachment evidence may be so powerful that, if it were to be believed by the trier of fact, it could render the witness\u2019 testimony totally incredible. In such a case, if the witness\u2019 testimony were uncorroborated and provided the only evidence of an essential element of the government\u2019s case, the impeachment evidence would be \u2018material\u2019 under [the Harrington test]. 960 F.2d at 825; see also Taglia, 922 F.2d at 415 (<HOLDING>); 3 Wright et al., supra, \u00a7 557, at 560, 563 Holdings: 0: holding that the movant was not entitled to new trial under rule 59 based on a defense which if properly placed in issue would have affected the course of the jury trial 1: holding that a new trial would be warranted under rule 33 if it were discovered after trial that the governments star witness was utterly unworthy of being believed because he had lied consistently in a string of previous cases 2: holding that there is a presumption that new evidence discovered by criminal defendant after trial is over would not change outcome of trial 3: holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed 4: holding that affidavit from a new witness was not newly discovered evidence because trial counsel knew of the existence of the witness before trial trial counsel with due diligence could have discovered the evidence", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "real covenant typically endures as long as the estate with which it runs. Id. We noted that the terms of the covenant in that case stated that the covenantor was to maintain the tile permanently. 'We also noted that continued maintenance of the drain was vital to keeping the covenantees's land arable. Id. Given the perpetual nature of the covenant in question and the importance of the drain to the covenantees's enjoyment of their land, we concluded that the parties intended that the covenantor's duty to maintain the drain and its tile extended beyond the useful life of the original tile. Id. In other words, we determined that the covenantor might be required to install new tile as part of its permanent maintenance obligation. See also Rhodes v. Mummery, 48 Ind. 216, 1874 WL 5865 (1874) (<HOLDING>); Ponsler v. Union Traction Co. of Indiana, 76 Holdings: 0: holding that the word maintained may properly be construed to require a fence to be rebuilt as well as repaired 1: holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled 2: holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed and reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of coverage 3: holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy 4: holding 1 that the district court properly construed one  1983 claim as a habeas petition but improperly summarily dismissed it and 2 that the district court should have construed another  1983 claim as a habeas petition", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "600 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Ala.Civ.App.1992) (accord). Admittedly, this court has issued numerous opinions since Ex parte DCH Regional Medical Center that have declared judgments nonfinal for failing to completely resolve the employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. See, e.g., Norment Sec. Group v. Chaney, 938 So.2d 424, 425 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (judgment finding that employee sufficiently notified employer of injury held to be nonfinal for failing to ascertain and declare other aspects of claim); International Paper Co. v. Bracknell, 854 So.2d 116, 118 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (dismissing appeal from order that decided liability and temporary-disability-benefits issues but failed to address permanent-disability claim); USA Motor Express, Inc. v. Renner, 853 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (<HOLDING>); and International Paper Co. v. Dempsey, 844 Holdings: 0: holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment 1: holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal 2: holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable 3: holding that order finding that injury arose out of and in the course of the employment and awarding medical benefits was interlocutory order that would not support appeal 4: holding that an order awarding attorney fees is not appealable and instead the proper appeal lies from the judgment or amended judgment entered on the order", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "and the difficulty in detecting the crime, the legislature could have reasonably determined that a severe penalty was required for the offense of disclosing confidential lottery information. Furthermore, we are not free \u201cto set aside the legislative determination as to the appropriate penalty merely because it seems too severe.\u201d State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d at 112. In light of the presumption of constitutionality of statutes, and the heavy burden on the party asserting unconstitutionality, we are not convinced that the penalty for disclosure of confidential lottery information violates the proportionality provision of the Indiana Constitution. See e.g., Cole v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1049; Balls v. State, 725 N.E.2d 450; see also Ponciano v. State, 851 N.E.2d 305, 308 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 Holdings: 0: holding that the statement i have a gun would cause a reasonable teller to fear being shot and that the phrase i am willing to use it would make a fear of death even more likely 1: recognizing threeyear loss position as strong evidence that at the beginning of the class period it was more likely than not that the company would not be able to realize dta 2: holding that to reopen a case an alien must show that the new evidence would likely change the result 3: holding relevance of evidence is established by any showing however slight that the evidence makes it more or less likely that the defendant committed the crime in question 4: holding that the elevated class c felony penalty for the offense of criminal recklessness by shooting a firearm from a vehicle into a place where people are likely to gather did not shock public sentiment or violate the judgment of reasonable people because among other things the use of a vehicle would make it less likely that the person would be identified which in turn would make it more likely that the offense would be committed", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "F.2d 65, 67 (9th Cir. 1971). Trial courts must generally exercise their discretion in favor of awarding prejudgment interest in admiralty tort claims. Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1987). As a general rule, prejudgment interest should be awarded in admiralty cases \u2014 not as a penalty, but as compensation for the use of funds to which the claimant was rightfully entitled. Discretion to deny prejudgment interest is created only when there are \u2018peculiar circumstances\u2019 that would make it inequitable for the losing party to be forced to pay prejudgment interest. Id. at 1550 (quoting Noritake Co. v. M/V Hellenic Champion, 627 F.2d 724, 728 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980)); see also City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat\u2019l. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Where \u201cpeculiar circumstances\u201d justify the Holdings: 0: holding that a court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest in erisa cases where appropriate but it is not axiomatic that such interest should be awarded simply because  the prevailing party has demonstrated entitlement to the funds 1: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases except in peculiar or exceptional circumstances 2: recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts 3: holding in the absence of exceptional circumstances deference should be given to trial court 4: holding that prejudgment interest should be awarded when the claimant has been denied the use of money which was legally due", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "a substantive due process claim in this case, where the Contracts Clause provides a specific source of constitutional protection against the government conduct of which they complain. Id. at 1318. IV Finally, we turn to the Lessees\u2019 contention that the City\u2019s alleged violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause violate \u00a7 1983. As an initial matter, we note that from the face of the Lessees\u2019 complaint and their subsequent filings in the district court, it is unclear whether they have preserved a claim for damages under \u00a7 1983 in the event the district court determines on remand that a constitutional violation has occurred. Nevertheless, both the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause may give rise to a claim under \u00a7 1983. See S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 886-87 (<HOLDING>); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims 1: holding that a contracts clause violation may support a  1983 claim 2: holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law 3: holding that there was no conflict between a contracts arbitration clause and its venue clause 4: recognizing such a claim under  1983", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "of Count I should be affirmed, I believe the district court\u2019s reliance on Rooker-Feldman was misplaced because Dodson alleges injuries caused by UAMS \u2014 not injuries caused by a state-court judgment. I would affirm the district court judgment with regard to Count I under the state-law doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. I concur in the majority\u2019s remand as to Count II. I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction It is well established that lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over straightforward appeals from a state-court judgment even though they may otherwise be empowered to adjudicate the dispute; such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with the U.S. Supreme Court. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, Holdings: 0: holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar 1: holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision 2: holding that federal district court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the decision of a district of columbia high court determining application of a local rule to the case before it 3: holding that district court lacked power to decide personal jurisdiction issue already decided by district of columbia superior court 4: holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review  of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "of operability at issue here were not created with any specific case in mind. These operability certificates are intended to document the regular business function of maintaining a particular breathalyzer machine. As such, these documents are properly admissible as a business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). Other jurisdictions that have considered this issue have come to a similar conclusion. Our appellate colleagues in New York succinctly expressed the underlying rationale supporting the application of the business record exemption: The certificates were prepared in the course of the certifier\u2019s routine official duties and \u201csystematically\u201d produced \u201cin the conduct of ... business\u201d ... to fulfill an official mandate that the machines be maintained in working order. A .Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 Holdings: 0: holding that certifications of a breathtest machine are nontestimonial because they are not prepared for any specific defendant or any specific litigation 1: holding that warrants of deportation were properly characterized as nontestimonial official records that were prepared independent of this litigation and were not prepared to prove facts for use in future criminal prosecutions 2: holding that certified records of maintenance are nontestimonial and are not prepared for any particular defendant 3: holding that the certifications of accuracy of the breathalyzer machine are nontestimonial business records free from confrontation clause scrutiny 4: holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "name before the Agents entered. The Court finds that no knock-and-announce violation occurred. Agent Beck-man testified that the entry team knocked on the garage door, announced their presence, and waited before entering. Although she did not hear what the Agents were saying and thought someone was calling her name, Mrs. Thompson\u2019s testimony was consistent with the Agents\u2019 having announced their presence prior to entry. Moreover, even if the Court found that the executing agents failed to knock-and-announce their presence before executing the warrant, Thompson is not entitled to suppression because \u201c[suppression is not a remedy for violation of the knock-and-an-nounee rule.\u201d United States v. Roberge, 565 F.3d 1005, 1010 (6th Cir.2009); see also Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Thompson\u2019s request for suppression Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply to immigration proceedings 1: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to proceedings other than criminal trials 2: holding that a violation of  6103 does not require the application of the exclusionary rule 3: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to knockandannounce violations 4: holding that exclusionary rule does apply to civil forfeiture proceedings", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Ronnie, I wanted to ask you, since you were the breadwinner for your family, how has this affected it? [Burke:] It\u2019s affected everything. We had to \u2014 we had to pull my daughter out of college. She was in the sorority and drill team and all of this stuff. We had to pull her out of college. We almost lost our home. We have been paying it for 20 years, we almost lost it. I had to borrow money from my sister, from my mother. Nancy borrowed some money from her mother. We got behind on all of our bills. All of it. It just \u2014 it changed everything. Burke\u2019s testimony is not inconsistent with the receipt of insurance benefits because the testimony was limited to the financial hardship suffered as a result of his reduced earning capacity, not his medical expenses. See Snyder, 191 S.W.3d at 423 (<HOLDING>); Macias, 917 S.W.2d at 374 (holding that Holdings: 0: holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy 1: holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act 2: holding that jury should decide whether plaintiffs testimony proved reasonable and necessary medical expenses 3: holding that plaintiffs wifes testimony that she did not have money to pay for her husbands surgeries did not open door to collateral source testimony because large portion of plaintiffs future medical expenses would not be covered by insurance 4: holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "notice requesting comments on a petition that could potentially result in a change in the FCC\u2019s position is simply not enough of a reason for this Court to stay this action. As described above, courts ch. ten weigh the benefits of applying the doctrine against the potential litigation costs resulting from complications and delay. See Nat\u2019l Communs. Assn\u2019n, 46 F.3d at 223; see also Roberts v. Chemlawn Corp., 716 F.Supp. 364, 365 (N.D.Ill.1989); Frydman, 2011 WL 2560221, at *7. A stay will not serve judicial economy here. The defendants have not offered any evidence or argument to suggest that if the FCC were to change its position that change would apply retroactively to the pending litigation. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 703 F.3d 388, Holdings: 0: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 1: holding that agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless congress has so authorized the administrative agency and the language of the regulations require it 2: holding that epa regulations do not allow the agency to act contrary to federal statute 3: holding that a motion for administrative reconsideration which congress did not order the agency to entertain which the agency dismissed in relevant part on procedural grounds and which the petitioner filed over sixty days after the agency acted cannot effectively extend  retroactively the thirtyday period congress specified for judicial review petitions 4: holding that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff sent a letter to the attorney general grieving the initial agency determination instead of following the administrative appeal process specified by agency regulations", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "its own First Amendment rights were infringed, id. at 955, 104 S.Ct. 2839, the Court concluded that the company had overbreadth standing to pursue the claim. The Court reasoned that, as a result of the statute, charities were reluctant to contract with the plaintiff because it charged fees in excess of 25% and that the plaintiffs impetus to challenge the statute was therefore consonant with the charities\u2019 First Amendment interests. Id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839 (\u201cThe activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson\u2019s interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents.\u201d); see also Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, Mothershed alleges that the Holdings: 0: holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner 1: holding that the owner of an adult entertainment establishment had overbreadth standing to pursue a first amendment challenge against provisions of an ordinance that required the employees of such establishments to obtain a license because the licensing scheme  although not directly applicable to the owner  threatened his businesss viability 2: recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination 3: holding the fact that an exempt owner who acquired legal title after date when liability for current taxes had accrued was the equitable owner did not make the exemption applicable 4: holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "vehicle. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-500, 93 S.Ct. 1827. For present purposes, the answer to the declaratory relief versus habeas riddle is suggested by Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379, 381 (7th Cir.1991), where we held that \u201c[i]f the prisoner is seeking what can fairly be described as a quantum change in the level of custody-whether outright freedom, or freedom subject to the limited reporting and financial constraints of bond or parole or probation ... then habeas corpus is his remedy. But if he is seeking a different program or location or environment, then he is challenging the conditions rather than the fact of his confinement and his remedy is under civil rights law.\u201d Id. See also Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 954, 120 S.Ct. 379 (<HOLDING>). Bunn argues that his claim indeed does relate Holdings: 0: holding that habeas is the proper vehicle for presenting a claim if but only if the prisoner is seeking to get out of custody in a meaningful sense 1: holding that a state prisoner must bring his claim in habeas only if by prevailing he would necessarily prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement 2: holding a claim is waived when there is no meaningful argument on the claim in the opening brief 3: holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over habeas petition by federal prisoner seeking to challenge ins detainer because detainer is merely a notice and lodging thereof does not constitute custody for habeas purposes 4: holding that in context of patent claim at issue if means only if", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "written notices of the seizure of item 5 to the address on Norcross Lane (which were returned stamped \u201cRETURNED TO SENDER, INSUFFICIENT AD DRESS\u201d) and to an address on North \u201cD\u201d Street in Philadelphia (which were accepted for delivery). Notice of the seizure of item 5 was published in USA Today on March 31, April 7, and April 14, 1999. Rodriguez failed to respond to the notices or assert a timely claim to the items, which were administratively forfeited. We conclude that publication of the notices in USA Today satisfies the notice by publication requirement. There is no merit to Rodriguez\u2019s argument that the DEA had an obligation to determine whether he was a subscriber before choosing a newspaper of general circulation. See United States v. Robinson, 434 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the notices sent by certified Holdings: 0: holding that governments choice to publish notice in the new york times did not violate statutory publication requirements even though publication in the houston chronicle would have been more likely to provide notice to the claimant 1: holding publication notice in the wall street journal adequate under bankruptcy law 2: holding that substantive changes made by administrative agencies in regulations are required to comply with certain notice and comment requirements which include publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking in the federal register an opportunity for interested persons to comment on that notice and after consideration of these comments publication of the final rule with a general statement of its basis and purpose citing 5 usc  553b c 3: recognizing that as to notice publication in the laws of florida or the florida statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions 4: holding publication in local and national editions of the new york times sufficient notice to claimant in pennsylvania", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "not rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or.interests of third parties .., would exclude a case.such as this from initiation in federal court.\u201d) (emphasis added). 47 . See Tex. Const. art. II, \u00a7 1. 48 . Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex.Crim. 453, 457, 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944). 49 . See Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (No justiciable controversy exists under Article III of the United States Constitution when the parties ask for an advisory opinion.). 50 . See supra n. 12. 51 . See also Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (indicating the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III prevents advisory opinions); Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (<HOLDING>). 52 . At oral argument, the State claimed that Holdings: 0: holding that a claim under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine will not succeed unless  the challenged statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the court 1: recognizing the application of overbreadth doctrine to state laws and explaining that because first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity 2: holding that overbreadth claimant must still show that enforcement of the challenged statute against him is actual or imminent and quoting prime media v city of brentwood 485 f3d 343 350 6th cir 2007 because overbreadth creates an exception only to the prudential standing inquiry the supreme court has made clear that the injury in fact requirement still applies to overbreadth claims under the first amendment 3: holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact  2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision 4: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "the trial court did not comply -with this recommendation. Moreover, when a party requests certification, there is generally a hearing, accompanied by extensive documentation, depositions, admissions, interrogatories, affidavits, and oral testimony. Warner, supra, at 94, 521 N.E.2d at 1094-1095. Here, there were some general discovery materials and affidavits for the court to rely on, but the parties agreed that a hearing was unnecessary. As the trial court must assume the truth of allegations in the complaint and not consider the merits of the case, we must conclude that the court relied on virtually \u201cundisputed\u201d facts when deciding the Civ.R. 23 motion. See Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 233, 12 OBR 313, 315-316, 466 N.E.2d 875, 877-878 (<HOLDING>), and Ungerbuhler v. Butler Rural Elec. Coop., Holdings: 0: holding that no subsequent class actions may benefit from tolling when class certification has been denied 1: holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action 2: holding that tolling applies to a subsequent class action when class certification was granted in a prior case 3: holding that a courts considerations do not involve the actions merits when it decides the propriety of class certification 4: holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "in the State court proceeding.\u201d 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d). Sneed first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase because he failed to investigate the possibility that Sneed has organic brain damage and the possibility that he had been sexually abused as a child. The district court found that his counsel had produced a \u201cwealth\u201d of mitigation evidence (and recounted the testimony of 17 separate defense witnesses, including three psychological experts) and held that counsel\u2019s investigation was sufficient. On appeal, Sneed contends that his counsel was obliged to discover the brain damage and sex abuse, and produce evidence of how it would mitigate the murder. The government counters that even Sneed\u2019s own post-conviction psychologi 3, 18-19, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (<HOLDING>). In the present case, Sneed\u2019s counsel produced Holdings: 0: holding performance not deficient because counsel gathered a substantial amount of information and then made a reasonable decision not to pursue additional sources 1: holding that trial counsels performance was not deficient for failing to give a mental health expert additional information because the expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that the collateral data would not have changed his testimony 2: holding that to demonstrate deficient performance a petitioner must show counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed a defendant by the sixth amendment 3: holding that state courts factual finding that counsel made a strategic decision not to investigate further a mental illness that if reasonable would make counsels investigation not deficient was reasonable under aedpa review 4: holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "are income taxes for which the deadline for filing a return, \u201cincluding extensions\u201d falls within three years before the filing date of the petition. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 507(a)(8)(A)(i). In the instant case, the deadline for filing a federal income tax return for calender year 1992 was extended until October 15, 1993. See IRS Memorandum, Exhibit \u201c1\u201d. While this date clearly lies outside of the three year lookback period provided by the statute, the running of such period was suspended during the pendency of the Debtor\u2019s prior bankruptcy case. In re Taylor, 81 F.3d 20 (3d Cir.1996); In re DiCamillo, 186 B.R. 59 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1995) (Raslavich, J.); accord, Montoya v. United States (In re Montoya), 965 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.1992); see also, West v. United States (In re West), 5 F.3d 423 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), certiorari denied, 511 U.S. 1081, 114 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that time period of article iii of the iad tolled during the pendency of defendants motion to dismiss 1: holding that the 240 day assessment period provided by code  507a7aii  now code  507a8aii  was tolled during the pendency of the debtors prior chapter 13 ease 2: holding that limitations period in section 13  214a of the code applies over limitations period for contribution actions found in section 13  204 of the code because former provision is more specific 3: holding that the limitations period is likewise not tolled during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the supreme court 4: holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "rate because they reasonably chose Minneapolis counsel after TCBY sued them. The [defendants] point out that they are Minnesota residents who were forced to litigate the case in Arkansas under the agreement\u2019s forum selection clause, and they were unfamiliar with Arkansas counsel. [T]he district court could have properly based the fee award on the higher Minneapolis rates....\u201d). 7 . Indeed, Polk said that the panel was simply applying established law. And when we decided Polk, circuit precedent was clear that district courts had considerable flexibility in setting the relevant legal community for purposes of determining the hourly rate to be used in calculating the presumptively reasonable fee. See, e.g., Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm\u2019rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). 8 . Were a strict forum rule the settled law Holdings: 0: holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees 1: holding that the district court in setting fees appropriately relied upon prevailing market rates in the eastern district of new york where the case was commenced and litigated 2: holding that the district court should have looked to prevailing rates in the area 3: holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate 4: holding that absent other evidence of prevailing market rates the district judge may establish a reasonable rate based on his familiarity with the prevailing rates in the area", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that aiding and abetting contains a separate mens rea element \u2014 a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking \u2014 and a separate actus reus element\u2014 proof that the defendant participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. However, this argument overlooks Idaho\u2019s statutory abolition of the distinction between accessories and principals. Idaho Code \u00a7 19-1430 provides: Distinction between accessories and principals abolished. \u2014 The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between principa .3d 203, 211 (D.C.Cir.2008) (\u201cAiding and abetting is not a separate offense; it is only a theory of liability \u2014 one ground upon which the jury may find him liable for the charged offense.\u201d); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Londono-Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Holdings: 0: holding that the protection of the double jeopardy clause does not preclude a defendant from being charged under a statute  defining as the criminal offense a discrete act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a distinguishable discrete act that is a separate violation of the statute 1: holding that an implicit congressional intent to impose  aiding and abetting liability could not plausibly be inferred from the statutory silence in  10b of the securities exchange act of 1934 2: holding aiding and abetting is not a discrete criminal offense 3: holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for aiding and abetting a robbery resulting in murder 4: holding that a private plaintiff is not entitled to maintain an aiding and abetting action under  10b or rule 10b  5", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "process; who threatens, abuses or otherwise intimidates or attempts to intimidate a school employee or a pupil; or who willfully disobeys a school employee; or who uses abusive or profane language directed at a school employee. (g) For the purposes of this section: (1) \u201cPupil or student\u201d shall include any child, youth or adult who is enrolled in any instructional program ... under public school direction [.] ... and (2) \u201cteacher\u201d shall mean all professional educators as defined in section one, article one of this ehapter[.j According to this statute, Ms. Cobb stands in loco parentis to her students and was authorized and, arguably, required to impose appropriate discipline when and where needed. See Syl. Pt. 4, Smith v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 170 W.Va. 593, 295 S.E.2d 680 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Rogliano v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 176 Holdings: 0: holding that a public school cannot compel students to perform the pledge of allegiance 1: recognizing that picture of jesus christ in public school impaired use of school by students and visitors 2: holding in loco parentis doctrine codified in w vacode  18a51 does not prohibit certain forms of physical punishment in disciplining public school students 3: holding that the defendant school officials did not create the students danger or increase their risk of harm where female students were physically verbally and sexually molested by male students in a unisex bathroom and in a darkroom 4: holding that school district policy requiring that students obtain the review and approval of school officials prior to distributing any written material violated free speech rights of students", "references": ["0", "1", "3", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "and with intent to commit a crime\u201d with the language that elevates the crime of burglary to a first-degree offense. Specifically, the State notes that in the provision elevating the burglary to first-degree when the burglar possesses a dangerous weapon upon \u201centering or at any time while in the building,\u201d there is no mens rea attached to the requirement of possession. The State argues that the district court therefore erred in reading an additional mens rea requirement into the first-degree burglary statute. The State acknowledges that we have, in some limited instances, held that a mens rea element must be implied in particular criminal statutes notwithstanding the absence of any express mens rea language in those statutes. See State v. Ndi-kum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 818, 821 (Minn.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn.2000) Holdings: 0: holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession 1: recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession 2: holding that the phrase possession or custody in  5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession 3: holding that the term carry requires knowing possession and bearing movement conveyance or transportation of the firearm 4: recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "32, nor Rule 60(b) was applicable to juvenile-delinquency proceedings. W.B.S. appealed. W.B.S. contends on appeal'that the circuit court erred in dismissing both his Rule 60(b) motion and his Rule 32 petition. He argues that he should be allowed to seek relief under one of the above procedures. I. With regard to W.B.S.\u2019s claim that Rule 60(b) provides a possible mechanism by which a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent may challenge the effectiveness of his or her counsel, that claim is without merit. Although he argues in his brief on appeal that he should be allowed to seek relief under Rule 60(b), W.B.S; correctly recognizes that juvenile-delinquency proceedings are \u201cquasi-criminal in nature.\u201d (W.B.S.\u2019s brief, p. 10). See also Driskill v. State, 376 So.2d 678, 679 (Ala.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because juvenile-delinquency proceedings are Holdings: 0: holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings and noting the rules incompatibility with the streamlined administrative nature of such proceedings 1: recognizing the quasicriminal nature of delinquency proceedings 2: holding that probation revocation proceedings are clearly not criminal proceedings 3: holding that private attorney who acted as courtappointed counsel for child in state juvenile delinquency proceedings was not acting under color of state law 4: recognizing a right of access to civil proceedings", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). However, under Florida law, whether a condition precedent is at issue is not relevant to contract formation. Instead, even in the words of the case relied upon by the Holding Corporations, Ketchian, a condition precedent arises as a \u201cdefense of non-performance.\u201d Id. at 396; see also Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1096 (Fla.2010) (\u201c[A] defending party\u2019s assertion that a plaintiff has failed to satisfy conditions precedent necessary to trigger contractual duties under an existing agreement is generally viewed as an affirmative defense, for which the defensive pleader has the burden of pleading and persuasion.\u201d) (emphasis in original); cf. Christian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 163 F.Supp.2d 260, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (<HOLDING>). As such, the issue is not one of contract Holdings: 0: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership 1: holding under new york law that conditions precedent are not a defense to contract formation 2: holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york 3: holding that new york law did not preclude an arbitrators award of punitive damages despite a new york choice of law provision because there was no indication in the contract that the parties intended to limit their remedies in arbitration 4: holding that new york law applies to this matter", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "become damaged as a consequence, there is no allegation in the complaint, nor any arguable factual support for an allegation that the product did not perform as represented within the short term of plaintiffs use or that damages were sustained by plaintiff. In Briehl v. General Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir.1999), a case upon which defendants rely, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for the reason that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled damages. The opinion in Briehl reflects that the plaintiffs, owners of certain models of GM vehicles, had filed a class action complaint asserting claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty and violation of s ) (<HOLDING>); Khan v. Shiley Inc., 217 Cal.App.3d 848, 857, Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim 1: holding that because plaintiffs iied claim is based on the facts that support plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim plaintiffs iied claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed 2: holding that if plaintiffs could not establish that the particular agent orange causing injury to the plaintiff was manufactured by that defendant then the burden would shift to each defendant to establish that its product could not have caused the plaintiffs injury or alternatively that it should only be responsible for a proportion of the damage 3: holding estoppel claim could not lie in tort where the facts that support the claim could not support a claim for fraud or misrepresentation 4: holding that plaintiffs failure to warn claim could not proceed independent of plaintiffs aemld claim", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at trial with respect to its counterclaim, McLaughlin could then, on appeal, press her interesting argument that there can be no counterclaim by an employer against an employee under the Jones Act. Had the District Court denied PMD the right to file the counterclaim or had it granted summary judgment to McLaughlin on PMD\u2019s counterclaim, the rights and liabilities of the parties may well have been conclusively determined, in which case the District Court\u2019s decision would have been appealable. See Nautilus Motor, 85 F.3d at 109-10 & n. 3 (finding appellate jurisdiction pursuant to \u00a7 1292(a)(3) to consider a decision holding plaintiff liable on defendant\u2019s counterclaim that alleged plaintiff was solely responsible for the grounding of its tanker, but le (8th Cir.1964) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Because the District Court Holdings: 0: holding that partial summary judgment is not a final appealable judgment when it did not settle completely any of the matters in controversy or adjudicate completely the rights and liabilities of the parties 1: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment is interlocutory even though trial judge had stated that there was no just reason for delay because denial of motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of defendants rights and the appeal did not affect defendants substantial rights 2: holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable  3: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable 4: holding that denial of motion for summary judgment not appealable because did not determine any rights and liabilities", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "that summary judgment in favor of defendants for the reasons relied upon by the district court was inappropriate, on remand, the district court was not enjoined from granting defendants summary judgment on some other ground including the ground that prima facie tort is not recognized as a valid cause of action under Pennsylvania law, a ground specifically not considered by the district court. See In re Carl M. Mazzocone, 200 B.R. 568, 572 (E.D.Pa.1996) (\u201c \u2018the mandate rule applies ... only to those issues that were decided by the appellate court\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa., 14 F.3d 848, 857 (3d Cir.), stay denied, 510 U.S. 1309, 114 S.Ct. 909, 127 L.Ed.2d 352 (1994) & citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 950 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>)). (2) While the Third Circuit and the Holdings: 0: holding that a trial court is free to make any order or direction in further progress of the case not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate court as to any question not settled by the appellate decision 1: holding that the decision of the appellate court establishes the law of the case and it must be followed by the trial court on remand 2: holding an appellate decision becomes the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any further appeals in the same case 3: holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings 4: holding an appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision and may affirm on any ground on which additional factual findings are not required", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "original). It serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it \u201cis a form of punishment for criminal conduct.\u201d Songer v. State, 327 Md. 42, 46, 607 A.2d 557, 559 (1992). Second, it is intended to rehabilitate the defendant. Anne Arundel County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 329 Md. 677, 685, 621 A.2d 427, 431 (1993) (citing Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)). Lastly, it affords \u201cthe aggrieved victim recompense for monetary loss.\u201d Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)). In Maryland, restitution may be ordered, with qualifications, as a direct sentence for a crime or delinquent act, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by the underlying sentencing or remedial statute. \u00a7 ll-603(a). Sentencing courts also ma 176, 1181 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 433, 488 A.2d Holdings: 0: holding that possession of a drivers license is irrelevant to the offense of failing to present a license which is completed by failing to present the license when requested to do so by an officer 1: holding that department of transportation did not have control of motorists drivers license because although the department of transportation may have had a duty to recall the motorists license this authority to revoke does not involve physical possession or actual control sufficient to bring the license within the ambit of the personal property exception to sovereign immunity 2: holding improper a probation order under  641a of article 27 forbidding a defendant from driving even if the maryland transit authority which had specific regulatory power over drivers license suspensions under the transportation article gives the defendant a license 3: holding that home detention as a condi tion of probation under  641a of article 27 is improper without explicit statutory authorization 4: holding that probation order under  641a of article 27 was an illegal sentence when it ordered restitution to be paid by a defendant to a victim of an alleged crime for which the defendant was not convicted", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the trial judge exceeded his authority in making any modification effective through the child\u2019s nineteenth birthday. \u201cOne of the basic rules of construction of contracts is that the law in force at the date of making a contract determines the rights of the parties under the contract.\u201d Paul, 214 Va. at 653, 203 S.E.2d at 125. The law in effect in 1993 contained a clause, found in former Code \u00a7 20-107.2, that is substantially similar to current Code \u00a7 20-124.2(C). That statute also authorized a judge to order support for a child until the age of nineteen or the child\u2019s graduation from high school. Therefore, although the trial judge did not cite the correct statute, the remedy he applied is contemplated by the agreement in this case. See Paul, 214 Va. at 653, 203 S.E.2d at 125 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed 1: holding that federal statutes and regulations can form the basis of a breach of contract claim if expressly incorporated into the contract 2: holding as much 3: holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made 4: holding that the law in effect at the time a contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "jury was discharged, therefore it has waived any error. Point of error five is overruled. In points of error six, seven, and eight, the City claims the trial court erred in awarding Shiba attorney\u2019s fees because: (1) there was no statutory authority imposing liability on the City for attorney\u2019s fees, (2) there was no evidence Shiba presented his claim for attorney\u2019s fees to the City, and (3) Shiba failed to segregate the attorney\u2019s fees for his defense from those for his counterclaim. Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion in order to preserve a complaint for appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; Moody Nat. Bank v. Riebschlager, 946 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tex.App.\u2014Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied) (<HOLDING>). The City did not object at any time to Holdings: 0: holding under former rule 52a appellant must object to alleged error in the trial court or such error is waived 1: holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object 2: holding that a defendant who fails to object to an error at a plea colloquy hearing must satisfy the plain error rule 3: holding that where the record is insufficient to show that the alleged error occurred the presumption that the trial court acted without error must prevail 4: holding that where the appellant has failed to demonstrate error the court is not required to search the record for an error", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Berber-Tinoco, we must give due credence to officers who \u201cmay make reasonable deductions and inferences based on their experience and specialized training that might well elude an untrained person.\u201d Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d at 1087 (quotation marks omitted). Finally, Palos-Marquez argues that the BIC agents\u2019 observation that the pickup\u2019s occupants appeared \u201cnervous and shaky\u201d occurred after he had been seized, and therefore cannot be included in the reasonable suspicion analysis. This is incorrect, as the record indicates that the BIC agents\u2019 observations were made prior to Palos-Marquez\u2019s stop. Accordingly, these observations provide another relevant consideration in the reasonable suspicion equation. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (<HOLDING>); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. Holdings: 0: holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law 1: holding that passenger conduct can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion 2: holding detention of passenger for warrant check violated fourth amendment absent reasonable suspicion 3: holding that nervous evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion 4: recognizing that furtive gestures undertaken in response to police presence can serve as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "including \u201cyou gotta talk to us\u201d or made declarative statements such as \u201ctalk to me ... just tell me,\u201d we consider as we must the context in which those words were used. See Alston, supra, 204 N.J. at 626-27, 10 A.3d 880 (observing that meaning of vernacular or of colloquial expressions may only be evident from context and tone). None of those statements implied that defendant was required to respond; each was made in conjunction with an entirely permissible effort to persuade defendant that he would feel better, and could get the weight of the guilty knowledge of the crime off of his conscience, by explaining what had happened. Those efforts are not constitutionally infirm. Miller, supra, 76 N.J. at 398-99, 388 A.2d 218; see State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462-63, 874 A.2d 546 (2005) (<HOLDING>); State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654-56, 628 Holdings: 0: holding that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of an allegedly coerced interrogation where the taped interrogation was played for jurors and the defendant crossexamined the witness at length about the interrogation 1: holding that once the right to counsel is invoked custodial interrogation must cease until the suspects attorney is present 2: holding that lengthy intermittent interrogation is not inherently coercive and not sufficient in itself to overbear suspects will 3: holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of miranda  4: holding that illiteracy is not of itself sufficient to prove fraud", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Rangen, 351 F.2d at 858; Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power, 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir.1943). But see Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir.1985) (\u201cThere is good reason to question whether Congress intended to sweep commercial bribery within the ambit of section 2(c).\u201d). The Second Circuit has never reached the question of whether \u2014 and under what circumstances \u2014 commercial \u25a0 bribery can form the basis of a claim under \u00a7 2(c). And we find that we need not decide the issue here. Even assuming that' a \u00a7 2(c) claim could be based on commercial bribery, a necessary requirement for stating such a claim would be allegations sufficient to establish commercial bribery. See, e.g., Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 630 F.2d 379, 387-88 (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the allegations in the Blue Holdings: 0: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property 1: holding that a competitive commercial purpose is not of itself improper 2: holding that a  2c claim based on commercial bribery requires proof of commercial bribery 3: holding that evidence did not establish commercial bribery because there was no proof of inducement 4: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "\u201c[tjhere is little tactical wisdom in counsel resting on his hands and assuming the government would help make the defense case for him\u201d); Barrow, 398 F.3d at 605 (rejecting claim that counsel\u2019s failure to present any evidence was legitimate strategic move). In any event, the \u201cstrategy\u201d failed, as a competent attorney might expect: the officers unanimously and consistently stated that they had not coerced Bynum. And without the admission to coercion that Graddick had hoped the officers would give, he was left with no evidence that Bynum\u2019s confessions were coerced. A motion to suppress allegedly involuntary confessions cannot succeed without at least some evidence that the confessions were coerced. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (<HOLDING>); Conner v. McBride, 375 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Holdings: 0: holding that indiana courts will only engage in statutory interpretation if the language of the statute is ambiguous 1: holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights 2: holding that confession is involuntary only if police coercion or overreaching overbore the accuseds will and caused the confession 3: recognizing that the accuseds right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system 4: holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction", "references": ["4", "0", "1", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "price of Heartland stock moved above that price. Ps.Br. at 20. This allegation, and the part of the amended complaint on which it is based, are insufficient to give rise to a strong inference of fraud. Addressing only the terse contention set forth in the response brief, it is unclear why, if Jupiter and Sprague were motivated to commit fraud, Jupiter did not exercise its conversion rights during the third quarter of 1996, at a time when plaintiffs allege the stock was trading higher than the strike price and when defendants allegedly already knew Heartland\u2019s true financial condition and the impact that disclosure would have on the company and the price of its stock. Plaintiffs have failed to plead a strong inference of fraudulent intent on this basis. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 623-24 (<HOLDING>). Y Because the court holds that plaintiffs\u2019 \u00a7 Holdings: 0: recognizing that a misrepresentation need not be driven by an improper motive and does not require an intent to commit fraud 1: holding that stock sales by one defendant of approximately 8000 shares for profit of 173000 raised strong inference of fraudulent intent 2: holding that where knowledgeable insiders did not sell stock at a time that would have taken advantage of allegedly fraudulent statements there was not a strong inference of scienter 3: holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter 4: holding that court was unwilling to piece together speculative inferences to conclude that the defendant had a true motive to commit fraud where under plaintiffs theory defendant would have acted irrationally by depressing stock price and concluding that plaintiffs had failed under pslra to plead strong inference of fraudulent intent", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "CURIAM. Affirmed. See Williams v. State, 919 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). SAWAYA, ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., Holdings: 0: holding that defendants waived any challenge to the trial courts failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 1: holding that a trial courts failure to hold a sheppard hearing may be considered harmless if the allegations in the rule 3170z motion are conclusively refuted by the record 2: holding that where the coercion alleged to enter a plea is legally insufficient or conclusively refuted by the record there is no need to hold an evidentiary hearing or appoint conflictfree counsel 3: holding that there is no need for an evidentiary hearing when the petitioners habeas submissions demonstrate that the petitioner is conclusively entitled to relief in such circumstances an evidentiary hearing would be a waste of judicial resources 4: holding that a postconviction claim that is refuted by the record is without merit", "references": ["3", "0", "1", "4", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that a prud\u00e9nt man acting in a like capacity and familiar with\u2019 such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 1104(a)(1)(B). As the Fourth Circuit has maintained, \u201c[t]he fiduciary obligations of the trustees to the participants and beneficiaries of [an ERISA] plan are '... the highest known to the law.\u201d Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 356 (4th Cir.2014), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2887, 192 L.Ed.2d 924 (2015) (quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n. 8 (2d Cir.1982)). The Fourth-Circuit also stated: Congress enacted ERISA to protect \u201cthe interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obl ir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Holdings: 0: holding no fiduciary breach where plaintiffs argued plan should only offer institutional funds 1: holding that plan servicer which provided 401k plan a menu of investment options was not a fiduciary because parties contract required servicer to give the plan notice of and opportunity to reject any changes to the menu 2: holding no breach where unisys did not offer exclusively retail class funds in fact the unisys plan contains a variety of investment options 3: holding that general plan language did not make investment in employer stock merely permissible where specific plan provisions required that such an option be offered 4: holding that insurer was a fiduciary to a 401k plan because the insurer had the ability to substitute investment options and the plan had no meaningful opportunity to reject substitutions because of the penalty charges associated with doing so", "references": ["4", "3", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "that the award should be reduced. For this reason, we reverse that part of the appellate court judgment holding that the trial court erred in reducing Judy\u2019s maintenance award. B. Trial Court\u2019s Order for Nonmodifiable and Nonreviewable Maintenance Steven next contends the Act gives trial courts discretion to make maintenance awards nonreviewable and nonmodifiable. The appellate court found that the trial court exceeded its authority under section 510 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2004)) in making Judy\u2019s maintenance award nonmodifiable and nonreviewable. Section 502(f) (750 ILCS 5/502(f) (West 2004)) states that the parties to a marital settlement agreement may agree to make maintenance nonmodifiable and nonreviewable. See In re Marriage of Kozloff, 101 Ill. 2d 526, 533-34 (1984) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the appellate court that, Holdings: 0: recognizing that if the homeowner complies with the conditions of the tpp the lender breaches the contract by failing to provide a permanent modification agreement by the modification effective date 1: holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance 2: recognizing that recipient spouses improved financial security will support modification of maintenance award 3: holding appellants failure to plead affirmative defense of modification precluded trial court from considering evidence of oral modification at summary judgment hearing 4: holding that court lacked jurisdiction to modify visitation where it dismissed the modification petition", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "supports his contract claims by alleging that the government\u2019s criminal prosecution established \u201can implied or constructive trust relationship\u201d between himself and the government, Compl. \u00b6 9, and that his incarceration has resulted in a contract that binds Mr. Bobka \u201cto the government\u2019s terms,\u201d Compl. \u00b6 15, This court, however, lacks jurisdiction over both constructive trust claims, see Frank & Breslow, LLP v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. 65, 68 (1999) (citations omitted), and implied-in-law contract claims where a party alleges that \u201cthe law imposes a duty in order to prevent injustice,\u201d International Data Prod. Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1; Murray v. United States, 817 F.2d 1580, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Milas v. United States, 42 Fed.Cl. 704, 710 (1999) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted), aff'd, 217 F.3d 854 (Fed. Holdings: 0: holding that the court lacks jurisdiction over sixth amendment claims because the sixth amendment is not moneymandating 1: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel 2: holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing 3: holding the sixth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment 4: holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "capacity. In re Club Zippers, Inc., Adversary No. 04-01033, Docket No. 5, Ex. 58, \u00b6 IX. Therefore, the first three elements of Nikoloutsos are met because the complaint is a writing that contains a demand on the debtor by the creditor and evidences an intent to hold the debtor liable. Furthermore, the removal of Plaintiffs\u2019 state court claim constitutes a filing of Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint in satisfaction of the fourth element of Nikoloutsos because the complaint was filed as part of the Debtor\u2019s Notice of Removal of an Adversary Proceeding. Finally, the fifth element of Nikoloutsos is met because allowance of the claim is equitable under the circumstances. The Nikoloutsos court explained that equity requires \u201cbeing flexible when justice requires.\u201d 199 F.3d at 237. In th 2 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>); In re Scott, 67 B.R. 1011, 1013 Holdings: 0: holding that when a creditor files a proof of claim the bankruptcy court has core jurisdiction to determine that claim even if it was a prepetition contract claim arising under state law 1: holding that a motion to liftthe bankruptcy stay in order to pursue a claim is an informal proof of claim 2: holding that bankruptcy court order that a stay applied to a particular party was a final order and noting that bankruptcy court orders lifting or denying relief from an automatic stay are final for purposes of appeal 3: holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added 4: holding dismissal is not precluded by bankruptcy stay", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "Similarly, an agency\u2019s \u201cno effect\u201d determination under, the Endangered Species Act must be upheld unless arbitrary and capricious. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir.1996). Ninth Circuit jurisprudence distinguishes between the level of deference afforded to agency decisions that are primarily legal in nature and that afforded to decisions that are factual. Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass\u2019n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir.1995) (\u2018We find that it makes sense to distinguish the strong level of deference we accord an agency in deciding factual or technical matters from that to be accorded in disputes involving predominately legal questions.\u201d); see Northcoast Envtl. Ctr. v. Glickman, 136 F.3d 660, 667 (9th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). In the Ninth Circuit, \u201c[a]n agency\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding that the less deferential skidmore standard was a more appropriate standard to be applied to an agencys unpublished opinion 1: holding that the reasonableness standard applies to the final sentence not to each individual decision made during the sentencing process 2: holding that the less deferential standard of reasonableness applies to threshold agency decisions that certain activities are not subject to nepas procedures 3: holding that the standard of review for an award of statutory damages is even more deferential than an abuse of discretion standard 4: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard", "references": ["4", "1", "3", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Court recognized that even when a motion for summary judgment omits one of multiple causes of action, the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment may still be upheld on appeal when the \u201comitted ground was intertwined with, and precluded by, a ground addressed in the motion.\u201d G & H Towing Co., 347 S.W.3d at 297. In particular, the Court recognized that even when a trial court errs in granting a no-evidence summary judgment on a cause of action not expressly presented in the summary judgment motion, that error is considered harmless when the record clearly reveals that omitted cause of action was precluded as a matter of law by other grounds clearly raised and addressed by the trial court. Id. at 297-98; see also Zarzosa v. Flynn, 266 SW.3d 614, 621 (Tex.App.\u2014El Paso 2008, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We have already determined that McCollum Holdings: 0: holding reversal would be meaningless because questioned recovery precluded as a matter of law 1: holding that the trustees preference actions against each of the defendants was precluded as a matter of law by the debtors earlier assumption of its agreements with them  2: holding that notice provided by plaintiff that alleged she  was injured  as result of fall was insufficient as matter of law and precluded invocation of savings clause 3: holding that it may be decided as a matter of law 4: holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "court found, Frison was actively involved at his market, continually reminded his vendors that he was in charge, and even involved himself in regulating the prices of counterfeit goods. Frison\u2019s attempt to carve out a niche for the truly passive landlord is unavailing on the facts of this case. Even if Frison had been a less active landlord, a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that intentionally selling counterfeit products at a flea market, or willfully infringing copyrighted works at the market for financial gain, could result in criminal liability, and that intentionally aiding and abetting such conduct could result in the same. See United States v. White, 882 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Knutson v. Brewer, 619 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1980)) (<HOLDING>). Frison makes no meaningful argument Holdings: 0: holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct 1: holding that it is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent that is tortious malicious or even criminal or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress the conduct itself must be extreme and outrageous 2: holding that in a fifth amendment challenge pjrovided that conduct is of a sort widely known among the lay public to be criminal  a person is not entitled to clear notice that the conduct violates a particular criminal statute it is enough that he knows that what he is about to do is probably or certainly criminal 3: holding that when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer who is already subject to a search condition pursuant to his probation agreement is engaged in criminal activity then there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationers  privacy interests is reasonable 4: recognizing that when an informant is shown to be right about some things he is probably right about other facts that he has alleged including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "not to investigate her. This is not a case where the client was ignorant of his opportunities and unaware of his lawyer\u2019s errors. Contreras actually fired Gustavo Acevedo, the court-appointed lawyer, and replaced him with Zaney. Contreras claims that other lawyers heard him assert the investigation defense, but in a decade he has not produced that testimony, and the jury heard Contreras from the stand explain his actions. He had an opportunity then to tell his story his way, but he did not mention advice of counsel. Even if it were true that Zaney did not present the investigation defense, he is presumed to have omitted it because it is no defense rather than in an attempt to obscure his malpractice. See generally Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L,Ed.2d 987 (1983)(<HOLDING>) Just as every error at trial can be twisted Holdings: 0: recognizing that grounds for substitution under  3599 exist when an attorneys personal interests prevent her from advancing her clients best arguments 1: holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence 2: holding clients independent voluntary decision to dismiss products liability suit precluded finding that attorneys alleged negligent preparation of case proximately caused clients injury 3: holding that attorneys and not clients choose the arguments to present 4: recognizing an attorneys right to conduct the clients case with a certain degree of privacy", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.\u201d Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). \u201cA ruling\u2019s error is clear if, at the time it was made, a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit established its erroneous character.\u201d United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C.Cir.2012). But Martinez has pointed to no clear precedent that would have entitled him to advance notice of the government\u2019s intention to seek a specific sentencing adjustment, which he concedes \u00a7 3B1.1 provides, as opposed to a departure. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(h) (requiring advance notice before a court \u201cdepart\u00eds] from the applicable sentencing range\u201d (emphasis added)); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 (2008) (<HOLDING>). The district court did not abuse its Holdings: 0: holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines 1: holding that rule 32hs notice requirement applies by its terms only to departures from a guidelines range 2: holding that despite the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines they remain the starting point and the initial benchmark of a district courts sentencing analysis the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process and that failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range  or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceemdashincluding an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range constitutes significant procedural error  3: holding notice no longer required even for traditional departures 4: holding that by its terms rule 50 applies only to jury trials", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "payable.\u201d Id. at 1, Further, the Mortgage provides that Debtors\u2019 promise to pay Villa Donna \u201cat the place for payment and according to the terms of payment the principal amount plus interest at the rates stated above. All unpaid amounts shall be due by the final scheduled payment date.\u201d Id. at 2. Explicitly, the Mortgage provides for prepayment, stating that \u201c[o]n any ,.. permitted prepayment, any such excess shall be canceled automatically as of the ... prepayment or, if already paid, credited on the principal of the debt, or if the principal of the debt had been paid, refunded.\u201d Id. at 6. Our sister court examined whether paying off a home mortgage during the life of a chapter 13 plan would violate \u00a7 1322(b)(2). In re Gaetje, 2015 WL 3825972, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) (<HOLDING>); see also In re Bellamy, 126 B.R. 134, 135-36 Holdings: 0: holding that there is no impermissible modification of the note because the very terms of the note allow for prepayment without a penalty 1: holding that when a mortgage contains a provision specifically allowing full prepayment early repayment is not an impermissible modification 2: holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt 3: holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa 4: holding mortgage lenders claim for a postdefault postacceleration prepayment premium pursuant to escape clause in mortgage documents that prohibited debtor from evading prepayment fee by tendering full amount of debt postforeclosure had to be disallowed because the debtor in proposing to pay mortgage debt over time in plan of reorganization was not tendering full amount of debt and was not attempting to prepay this accelerated debt", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "C. Procedural Due Process In Count III, Wilson alleges that he was deprived of property and liberty without procedural due process when his DNA specimen was collected and his DNA profile disclosed in CODIS without a predeprivation hearing. The district court rejected the claim, observing that due process is a flexible concept and concluding that, since Wilson had diminished privacy interests as a prisoner, the degree of intrusion was minimal, and the risk of erroneous deprivation was slight, no pre-deprivation hearing was required. In support, the district court observed that the Sixth Circuit has already upheld the Ohio DNA statute against procedural due process challenge in an unpublished opinion, Williams v. Dep\u2019t of Rehabilitation and Correction, 3 Fed.Appx. 415, 417 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). In addition, the district court cited similar Holdings: 0: holding that collection of a dna blood sample was a de minimis taking not entitled to extensive due process protections 1: recognizing that in prior decisions the court had used the term inconclusive to mean that dna evidence did not exclude an individual but clarifying that in the future the term inconclusive would be used only when a dna sample does not contain enough dna to draw a conclusion dna is degraded or for other reasons a dna test yields no results or the examiner draws no conclusion 2: holding that due process protections do not apply where a public employee is not fired 3: holding that fiveday suspension was not a de minimis deprivation 4: holding that retroactively applying new version of dna act authorizing collection of defendants dna as a condition of supervised release did not constitute a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum", "references": ["4", "2", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "on her behalf was in her best interests. \u00b6 37 Pender filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for failure to comply with the statute of limitations. After the trial court granted his motion, Pender obtained a judgment against Renee for $86.00 in costs. \u00b6 38 Renee, through new counsel, filed a malpractice action against Moak on January 17, 2001. The parties settled the case, and Moak paid Renee $20,000 as a condition of settlement. \u00b639 These facts reveal additional serious ethical misconduct. Moak disregarded his duty of loyalty owed to Jacob Luster, his former client, by initiating a cause of action against him in the same matter as the prior representation without consent. See Ariz. R. Sup.Ct. 42, ER 1.9; Foulke v. Knuck, 162 Ariz. 517, 522, 784 P.2d 723, 728 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Also, by filing the complaint without Renee\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding er 19a prohibits subsequent representation of an individual whose interests are substantially adverse to those of the former client 1: holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client  where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client 2: holding attorneys motion to intervene in former clients tort suit untimely because attorney had clear and early notice that former client would not adequately represent his interests 3: holding that an individual whose ability to lift is substantially impaired qualifies as a disabled person within the meaning of the ada 4: holding that an attorney whose office staff incorrectly instructed a client that he need not appear in court for trial provided incompetent representation", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the disqualifying factors exists under section 3\u20149008 involves the exercise of the court\u2019s discretion. McNulty, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 704. The authority of a special State\u2019s Attorney is strictly limited to the special matter for which he was appointed. Lavin v. Board of Commissioners, 245 Ill. 496, 501-02 (1910). It is proper for a court to disqualify a special State\u2019s Attorney as \u201cunable to attend\u201d to his duties when he is unwilling to represent the interests of the county board. See People ex rel. Narczewski v. Bureau County Merit Comm\u2019n, 154 Ill. App. 3d 732, 737 (1987) (stating that court could appoint a special State\u2019s Attorney when State\u2019s Attorney was unwilling to represent the interests of the commission); Suburban Cook County Regional Office of Education, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 575 (<HOLDING>). Respondent was appointed in this case to Holdings: 0: holding that application of section 39008 is proper when states attorney is unwilling to support the position of a public body 1: holding that an attorney is a fiduciary under section 523a4 2: holding that a states governor and attorney general were not proper defendants when they had no power to enforce the challenged statute 3: holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo 4: holding that hearing is appropriate when application contains assertions of fact that a petitioner is in a position to establish by competent evidence", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "that, \u201c \u2018[d]uring and in relation to any drug trafficking crime, a person who uses, wears, carries, or transports a firearm is guilty of a separate felony....\u2019\u201d Id. at 143 n. 3, 626 A.2d 946 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals reversed the petitioner\u2019s conviction under the statute, holding that \u201c \u2018use\u2019 requires that the defendant \u2018carry out a purpose or action\u2019 or \u2018make instrumental to an end or process\u2019 or \u2018apply to advantage\u2019 the firearm.\u201d Id. at 157, 626 A.2d 946 (citation omitted). Notably, the codification at issue in Harris did not contain a provision comparable to C.L. \u00a7 5-621(b)(l), which makes it a crime to \u201cpossess a firearm under sufficient circumstances to constitute a nexus to the drug trafficking crime.\u201d (Emphasis added.) See Johnson, 154 Md.App. at 306, 839 A.2d 769 (<HOLDING>). In its interpretation of Art. 27, \u00a7 281A(b), Holdings: 0: holding that a firearm could be used both to protect the defendants spouse and to facilitate the defendants drug trafficking crimes 1: recognizing that the terms controlled substance offense and drug trafficking offense have nearly identical ussg definitions and using past decisions interpreting drug trafficking offense to analyze a challenge involving a controlled substance offense because the issues raised in those past decisions were closely analogous to the issue in the present case 2: recognizing that in 1996 in response to harris the general assembly amended section 281ab by expanding the crime to include a person who possesses a firearm in conjunction with a drug trafficking offense 3: recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking 4: holding that carries a firearm includes one who knowingly possesses and conveys a firearm in a vehicle", "references": ["3", "4", "1", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.\u201d 16 U.S.C. \u00a7 1532(6, 20). The term \u201cspecies\u201d includes \u201cany subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.\u201d Id. \u00a7 1532(16). The term \u201cdistinct population segment\u201d (\u201cDPS\u201d) is not defined in the ESA, but has been interpreted in a 1996 joint policy issued by FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service (\u201cNMFS\u201d). See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population Segments Under the Endangered Species Act (\u201cDPS Policy\u201d), 61 Fed.Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996); see also Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The DPS Policy identifies three elements to Holdings: 0: holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury 1: holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine 2: recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties 3: holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo 4: holding that the dps policy is a reasonable construction of distinct population segment ", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "the possible certification of settlement classes that need not meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(4) (Draft Aug. 15, 1996); see also Samuel Estreicher, Foreword, Federal Class Actions After 30 Years, 71 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 6 & n.26 (1996) (noting that proposed (b)(4) category would allow trial courts to certify class actions for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met for trial); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 13 (1996) (discussing proposed changes to Rule 23). We observe that this idea has met with substantial opposition from a number of quarters. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 786-94 (3d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 88, 133 Holdings: 0: recognizing district courts authority to police class member contacts and to prohibit defendant from engaging in unsupervised unilateral communications with plaintiff class members to solicit exclusion requests from rule 23 class 1: holding that under present rule settlement class must meet all rule 23 requirements and expressing concern about dangers of overrewarding attorneys and undereompensating class members 2: holding that class claims that fail to meet the requirements of rule 23 may be properly dismissed by granting a rule 12b6 motion 3: holding that a class could not be certified because the definition made class members impossible to identify prior to individualized factfinding and litigation and thereby failed to satisfy one of the basic requirements for a class action under rule 23 4: holding that entry of settlement decree without notice to putative class members violated the due process rights of the class members", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "whom must be a physician) to determine whether the HMO\u2019s actions were \u201creasonable.\u201d These distinctions are fatal to the external review law. The external review hearing more closely resembles \u201ccontract interpretation or evidentiary litigation before a neutral arbiter\u201d than \u201ca practice (having nothing to do with arbitration) of obtaining another medical opinion.\u201d Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 383, 122 S.Ct. 2151. More damaging, however, is the right of either party to seek judicial review. For example, a claimant who is denied benefits pursuant to Hawaii\u2019s external review law can appeal that denial to the courts, allowing for a judicial determination of the claimant\u2019s entitlement to benefits. This is precisely the type of adjudication barred by Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (<HOLDING>). See HRS \u00a7 432E-6; 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. Holdings: 0: holding that  1132a is the exclusive vehicle for actions by erisaplan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits 1: holding erisa preempts state contract and tort actions based on improper processing of claims for benefits 2: holding negligent misrepresentation claim was not preempted because it neither sought benefits under plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits 3: holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted 4: holding that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan are removable to federal court", "references": ["3", "1", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "tract ten in 1996. In 1996, Hawkins alone owned tracts four, five, and eight. Hawkins and thirty-three relatives owned tract ten. Hawking's share of tract ten was a mere 1/120th interest in that thirteen and one-third acres. We fail to see how unity of title could exist when Hawkins owned a one hundred percent interest in tracts four, five, and eight, but owned less than a one percent interest in tract ten. Finally, an easement of necessity arises, if ever, only at the time that the parcel is divided and only becaus ite unity of title required for implication of an easement of necessity, we need not determine whether Cockrell established the required necessity. The trial court's judgment denying Cockrell's claim was not contrary to law. See, eg., McConmell, 5746 N.E.2d at 1302 (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Holdings: 0: holding that the trial court did not err when it refused to find an implied easement by necessity because the plaintiff did not demonstrate necessity 1: holding that the trial court did not err by granting defendants motion for summary judgment 2: holding that an easement agreement and an unrecorded easement plan created an easement 3: holding that trial court did not err 4: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "right to privacy has been violated. Powell, 175 F.3d at 112. Here, however, plaintiff does not allege, and the record does not indicate, that word of plaintiffs condition spread through the prison as a result of the in-cell exam or that he experienced discriminatory or violent action from other inmates. See Leon v. Johnson, 96 F.Supp.2d 244, 252 (W.D.N.Y.2000) (no constitutional violation of inmate\u2019s right to privacy where plaintiff failed to present evidence that the nature of his condition was disclosed to other inmates). Nor is this is a ease in which plaintiff claims his right to bodily privacy was violated by the presence of a staff member of the opposite sex. Both the physician and nurse were men, as was plaintiffs cellmate. See Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); Covino, 967 F.2d at 78 (same); Colman v. Holdings: 0: recognizing inmates limited right to bodily privacy that included freedom from involuntary viewing of private parts of the body by guards of the opposite sex 1: recognizing that the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private 2: recognizing private right of action 3: recognizing privacy interest in medical records requested under freedom of information act 4: recognizing state constitutional right of individual privacy that    may be asserted to prevent unwanted infringements of bodily integrity", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "\u201c(1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.\u201d Id. at 1489 (footnote omitted) (quoting Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of our cases indicated that a three-judge panel could rely on these exceptions to overrule the law of an earlier published opinion, so long as no subsequent panel had yet relied on it. See id. at 1492-93; see also Mendenhall v. NTSB, 213 F.3d 464, 469 n. 3 (9th Cir.2000); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. d X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005) (<HOLDING>). 5 . See Articles of Confederation of 1781, Holdings: 0: holding that when a statutes terms are clear and unambiguous on their face there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning 1: holding that to foreclose a conflicting agency interpretation a prior court decision must hold that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 2: holding that the doctrine of contemporaneous construction means that where an administrative agency has the responsibility of interpreting a statute that is in some manner ambiguous the agency is restricted to any longstanding construction of the provisions of the statute it has made previously  3: holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion 4: holding that if words of statute are unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "bid was superior to RHJI\u2019s. 8 . This was the same spreadsheet presented to the special committee at the second meeting earlier that day. The two bids were based on the same APA (HHI's bid was submitted as a mark-up of the RHJI APA). As explained in greater detail below, the two bids were similar in all respects except three, most critically that the RHJI bid consisted of a $32 million cash component, while the HHI bid consisted of a $ . S.D.N.Y. 1994) (agreement subject to \u00a7 363(b)(1) \"is not enforceable absent notice and a hearing\u201d). 11 . Indeed, Donohoe testified at the July 27, 2009 hearing that RHJI would only be entitled to the break-up fee and expense reimbursement if the Court granted the Motion to Construe. 12 . See also In re Wintex, Inc., 158 B.R. 540, 545-47 (D.Mass.1992) (<HOLDING>). 13 . See also In re Broadmoor Place Invs., Holdings: 0: holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe 1: holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell 2: holding that bankruptcy court properly considered competing bid that topped initial offer by less than 5 even though the topping bid did not comply with bid procedures order requiring counteroffers to exceed the initial offer by at least 10 3: holding because an initial order contemplated the subsequent entry of a judgment the initial order was not considered a final adjudication 4: recognizing that negotiations after initial acceptance of a bid postponed the date of the final award ", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "financial standards specified by the Secretary,\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1395w-3(b)(2)(A)(ii) \u2014 the text itself provides no more guidance beyond this general statement. Where Congress \u201chas \u2018not specified the level of specificity expected of the agency, the agency is entitled to broad deference in picking a suitable level.\u2019 \u201d Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA 493 F.3d 207, 217 (D.C.Cir.2007); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 235 (D.C.Cir.2000) (\u201c[W]e accord agencies broad deference in choosing the level of generality at which to articulate rules.\u201d). Similarly, if the underlying statutory language does not require a particular methodology, the Court cannot demand that the agency implement such a test. See New Mexico v. EPA 114 F.3d 290, 295 (D.C.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, for example, in Cement Kiln the D.C. Holdings: 0: holding that epa need not incorporate particular tests when evaluating applications if relevant statutory language does not explicitly require such tests 1: holding that these tests are directed at ensuring that particular anticompetitive mechanisms operate because of a deliberate and intended state policy 2: holding that blood tests do not infringe significant privacy interests 3: holding breachofcontract claim preempted because contract did not explicitly incorporate a federallaw provision 4: holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "the validity of his prior conviction or its use to increase his sentence, operates to give the defendant enough information for him to decide intelligently and knowingly whether to plead guilty or go to trial, knowing in advance the consequences of a potential guilty verdict. E.g., United States v. Williams, 584 F.3d 714, 715 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Morales, 560 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.2009) (per curiam); United States v. Arnold, 467 F.3d 880, 887 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Hamilton, 208 F.3d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Kennedy, 133 F.3d 53, 59 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Williams, 59 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 407 (8th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 512 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 252 Holdings: 0: recognizing this presumption 1: recognizing this method 2: recognizing this distinction 3: recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly 4: recognizing this rule", "references": ["0", "2", "1", "4", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "see 40 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 124.10-.14, public participation requirements related to lists of impaired waters, see 40 C.F.R. \u00a7 130.7(d)(2), and public participation requirements for States and the EPA in the water quality standards revision process, see 40 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 131.20-.22. The Cities nonetheless argue that EPA has violated a nondiscretionary duty by declining to encourage public participation as to the 2009 Document in two ways: by recommending that New Hampshire use the 2009 Document without adopting it as state law and by precluding plaintiffs from participating in a federally-funded peer review of the Document that EPA conducted at New Hampshire\u2019s request. A nondiscretionary duty must be \u201cclear-cut\u201d in addition to being mandatory. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C.Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). The D.C. Circuit has recognized that a Holdings: 0: holding that nonreadily ascertainable requirement imposes merely a general duty  that is not actionable under the clean air acts citizen suit provision 1: holding that puffery is not actionable under the securities laws 2: holding that an actionable  20a claim must be preceded by an actionable primary violation under  10b 3: holding that a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination that is actionable under the statute 4: holding that section 890041 is not a jurisdictional requirement rather a requirement to maintain suit", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "1998) (\u00a7 1983 claim); Russo v. Palmer, 990 F.Supp. 1047, 1050 (N.D.Ill. 1998) (\u00a7 1983 claim); White v. Fauver, 19 F.Supp.2d 305 (D.N.J.1998) (\u00a7 1983 claim); Davis v. Woehrer, 32 F.Supp.2d 1078 (E.D.Wis.1999) (\u00a7 1983 claim). 10 . \u00a7 1997e(a), prior to its amendment by the PLRA, provided as follows: (1) [s]ubject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to [42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983] by an adult convicted of a crime confi ress. As Senator Hatch explained, the PLRA was enacted to \u201cwrest control of our prisons from the lawyers and the inmates and return that control to competent administrators appointed to look out for society's interests as weM as the legitimate needs of prisoners.\u201d 141 Cong. Rec. S14408-01, S14418 (1995). See also Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1327, n. 11, 1327 (<HOLDING>). 20 . Strictly construing the exhaustion Holdings: 0: holding that va must follow its own regulations 1: holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference 2: holding that although the bankruptcy court is the preferred forum because of its greater expertise state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 3: holding that the board is not free to ignore its own regulations 4: holding that exhaustion benefits courts because the prison systems expertise is first utilized in interpreting its own regulations and applying them to the facts", "references": ["1", "3", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "community as a whole ..., but benefits instead primarily a definite segment thereof, namely, the funeral service industry by providing for it competently trained personnel\u201d); Milward v. Paschen, 16 Ill.2d 302, 157 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1959) (denying tax exemption to foundation that \u201cserve[d] mortuary profession[] and [was] designated to bring greater commercial success to that profession\u201d); Winona Sch. v. Department of Revenue, 211 Ill.App.3d 565, 156 Ill.Dec. 47, 570 N.E.2d 523, 527 (1991) (denying real-estate tax exemption to operator of private photography school because operator \u201cdid not provide[ ] comprehensive course of study\u201d), cert. denied, 141 Ill.2d 562, 162 Ill.Dec. 511, 580 N.E.2d 137 (1991); American Ass\u2019n of Cereal Chemists v. County of Dakota, 454 N.W.2d 912, 915-16 (Minn.1990) (<HOLDING>); Nebraska State Bar Found. v. Lancaster County Holdings: 0: holding that to be exempt from property tax as a public or charitable use the property must meet the american museum test 1: holding that a charitable organizations religious purposes will not remove it from the purview of a property tax exemption 2: holding american association of cereal chemists and american phytopathological society was not entitled to realestate tax exemption as seminaries of learning even though their primary purpose was educational because the offerings were restricted to the limited area the organizations promote 3: holding that cemetery owned and operated by association of churches was not entitled to unemployment compensation tax exemption because services it provided were the same as those of secular cemeteries and therefore its primary purpose was not religious 4: holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "0", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "of the Holtee loading process. See Bluebonnet I, 266 F.3d at 1355; Indiana Michigan Power Co., 422 F.3d at 1373. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that if they are not awarded cask loading costs, they will be forced to pay for cask loading twice, as they will have to load DOE casks in the future when DOE performs. Pis.\u2019 Post-Trial Br. 54-55. None of Plaintiffs\u2019 canistered fuel is acceptable for pickup by DOE without an amendment to the Standard Contract, and neither party knows what the terms of any amendment to the Standard Contract might be. While Plaintiffs may incur additional damages in the future due to the Government\u2019s failure to perform, that potential does not entitle them to damages now. See Yankee Atomic, 536 F.3d at 1281-82; see also Indiana Michigan Power Co., 422 F.3d at 1376-78 (<HOLDING>). For the above reasons, the Court denies Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff had standing to pursue its takings claim while granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment that the government was liable for partial breach of contract 1: recognizing that where a plaintiff failed to perform because of the defendants breach the plaintiff could recover damages caused by the defendants breach 2: holding that in a partial breach case the plaintiff cannot recover prospective damages for anticipated future nonperformance 3: holding that the government was liable for partial breach of contract 4: holding that if the breach of an entire contract is only partial the plaintiff can recover only such damages as he or she has sustained leaving prospective damages to a later suit in the event of further breaches", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of other sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984); see also Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.2002); Huertas v. United States Dep\u2019t of Educ., 408 Fed.Appx. 639 (3d Cir.2010) (not published). The court must balance the factors and need not find that all of them weigh against plaintiff in order to dismiss the action. Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190 (3d Cir. 2002). Because dismissal for failure to prosecute involves a factual inquiry, it can be appropriate even if some of the Poulis factors are not satisfied. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir.1988); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int\u2019l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 696 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). IV. DISCUSSION The court finds that the Holdings: 0: holding a sentencing court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in  3553a 1: holding that ninemonth period not sufficient to weigh in favor of finding closedended continuity 2: holding that not all poulis factors must weigh in favor of dismissal 3: recognizing trial court should not weigh evidence 4: holding upward deviation reasonable where supported by proper factors even though some  3553a factors operated in defendants favor", "references": ["0", "1", "4", "3", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "doctors\u2019 actions vis-a-vis the \u00a7 2151.421 report shock the conscience because they: 1) deliberately, intentionally, and recklessly, 2) fabricated evidence that 3) was false, and 4) in so doing, they went beyond their roles as diagnosticians and treatment providers, thereby supplanting CSB\u2019s function as investigator of child abuse. For the reasons discussed in the following subsections, I conclude that plaintiffs have failed to plead any of the components of their substantive due process claim adequately. ii. Mens Re First, with regard to plaintiffs\u2019 assertions about the defendants\u2019 state of mind, the insufficiency under Iqbal/Twom-bly, supra, of conclusory allegations applies to claims about mindset. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 377 (6th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Warren v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov\u2019t, Holdings: 0: holding vague and conclusory allegations of nefarious intent and motivation are insufficient to state a claim 1: holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient 2: holding vague allegations of bias insufficient 3: holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim 4: holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir.1993) (\u201cA person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence .... \u201d). The Court agrees wit d Cir.2003) (involving misapplication as a career offender, but pointing out that there was no suggestion the crimes were not violent felonies). Duval does not claim to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced or innocent of the predicate crimes upon which his ACCA status was based; instead, he claims to be actually innocent of being an armed career criminal. He claims that his assault does not qualify as a violent felony, making it legally ineligible for the ACCA. Some courts have rejected similar claims. The Fourth Circuit held, \u201cThis argument ... is not cognizable as a claim of actual innocence.\u201d Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284 (<HOLDING>). See also McKay, 657 F.3d at 1199 (\u201c[E]ven if Holdings: 0: holding that  2255 movant claiming his prior conviction for assault was not a violent felony did not qualify for actual innocence exception 1: holding that burglary is violent felony 2: holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense 3: holding a burglary must be of a building or structure in order to qualify as a violent felony for acca purposes 4: holding that fourthdegree aggravated assault is a violent felony", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "is to examine, in light of agistrate in issuing search warrant \u201cis to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the warrant\u2019s supporting affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place\u201d). However, when an affidavit in support of a search warrant based on information obtained from an informant fails to state when the affiant received the information from the informant, when the informant obtained his information, or when the incident described took place, the affidavit is inadequate to support the issuance of a search warrant. See Schmidt v. State, 659 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Here, Officer Brinson\u2019s affidavit supporting Holdings: 0: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 1: holding that all data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of the affidavit 2: holding affidavit insufficient when it failed to state when affiant received information from informant when informant obtained information or when described incident took place 3: holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit 4: holding affidavit that failed to recite when incident described took place insufficient to support issuance of search warrant", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.\u201d Id. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194. Specifically, the Court noted that prison administrators must be free to take measures to ensure the safety of staff, personnel, and visitors to the prison, which would be impossible if prisoners had any expectation of privacy in their cells. Id. at 526-28, 104 S.Ct. 3194. Although the Court stated: \u201cWe hold that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell,\u201d id. at 536, 104 S.Ct. 3194, it remains unclear whether the holding is limited by the rationale of preserving institutional safety. [\u00b6 18 9 N.W.2d 216, 220-21 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Courts have also held that Hudson\u2019s Fourth Holdings: 0: recognizing that police officers generally do not need warrant to search person they have lawfully arrested 1: holding that although the automobile exception is based in part on exigence where police have probable cause to search a ear they need not get a search warrant even if they have the time and opportunity 2: holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant 3: holding that inventory search could not be condemned insofar as department policy permitted opening box for the standard purposes of inventory searches 4: holding that police do not need probable cause or a warrant to search items that have already been searched for inventory purposes", "references": ["1", "0", "3", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "to provide \u201cmethods for determining just compensation\u201d under this section, section 633(b)(1)(D), and would have required that such regulations consider the extent of physical occupation, the long-term damage, and the extent of interference with normal use and enjoyment of the property caused by the cable system. The House Committee Report explains that this subsection of section 633 was a conscious attempt to create a mechanism for providing just compensation to property owners. See House Report No. 934 at 80-81; 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 4717-18. The Report states that Congress included the compensation mechanism \u201c[i]n order to comply with the constitutional requirements\u201d of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (<HOLDING>). House Report No. 934 at 81; 1984 U.S.Code Holdings: 0: holding that a new york law requiring building owners to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their premises constituted a taking 1: holding that new york law granting cable television companies right to place wires across private property worked a taking of private property 2: holding that a new york law which required a landlord to permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities on his property was a taking 3: holding that new yorks law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to place cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking even though the facilities occupied at most only vk cubic feet of the landlords property 4: recognizing private right of action", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "was the colonists\u2019 response to the unlimited intrusions by the British government into their privacy in the 1700s. Using a Writ of Assistance, British customs officials were able to enter any home and search the premises for evide he requirement for particularized and focused suspicion as a prerequisite for search. Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 2564-65, 153 L.Ed.2d 735, 744 (2002); Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); Natl. Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1391, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, 703 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives\u2019 Ass\u2019n. 489 U.S., 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 3 L.Ed.2d at 670-71 (<HOLDING>); drug testing of students, Earls, 536 U.S. at Holdings: 0: holding that reinstatement of the grievant a railroad employee terminated for drug and alcohol use violated the welldefined and dominant public policy against a railroads employment of individuals whose impaired judgment due to the use of drugs or alcohol could seriously threaten public safety and placed the railroad at risk of violating the federal railroad administration regulations 1: holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation 2: holding that random drug testing for student athletes did not violate their fourth amendment rights 3: holding railroad regulation requiring random drug testing without particularized suspicion to be reasonable in light of connection to public safety 4: recognizing a selfevaluative privilege to railroad companys investigation of an accident in light of the publics stake in the improvement of railroad safety", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "MLS is the \u201cperson\u201d that used the \u201centerprise\u201d of USSF to engage in racketeering activities. See, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1961(3) and 1961(4). ChampionsWorld alleges that since about 1993, MLS has exerted control over USSF and sought to perpetuate the false premise that USSF has legal authority to govern U.S. professional soccer. MLS officials allegedly drafted the USSF policy of charging sanctioning fees and performance bonds of MLS\u2019s competitors, such as ChampionsWorld. ChampionsWorld alleges that MLS committed extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1951, obtaining money from ChampionsWorld on at least two dozen occasions by the wrongful use of fear through economic threats and the color of official right. See, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 261, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992) (<HOLDING>). ChampionsWorld also alleges mail and wire Holdings: 0: holding that congress cannot confer the executives standing to enforce public rights on private individuals through citizensuit provisions 1: recognizing that congress desired a broad definition of a claim  2: holding that a bop definition of nonviolent offense was legislative because it did not merely explain statutory meaning but expanded the reach of a regulation to bar offenders from early release 3: holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision 4: holding that congress has expanded eommonlawr definition of extortion to include acts by private individuals", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "0", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "in tension with the great weight of Massachusetts contract law. The central mantra of that law is that contract terms must be interpreted according to their plain meaning. See, e.g., S. Union Co., 941 N.E.2d at 640. Only if their meaning is indeterminate may the court look to a provision\u2019s broader purpose for clarification. Id. Section 7.3(c) plainly applies to monetary recoveries only. Even if this is because the parties considered no other kind, that omission does not render the scope of \u00a7 7.3(c)\u2014which imposes an affirmative obligation on BSC\u2014ambiguous. The contract simply does not require BSC to share the proceeds of a settlement-in-kind, and we cannot supplement the contract terms. Cf. Winchester Gables, Inc. v. Host Marriott Corp., 70 Mass.App.Ct. 585, 875 N.E.2d 527, 535 (2007) (<HOLDING>). It is true that this reading allows BSC to Holdings: 0: holding that the more substantively oppressive the contract term the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable and vice versa 1: holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract 2: holding that an additional term did not materially alter the contract because the plaintiff cannot profess to be surprised by an additional term in an invoice when the price quotation contained the identical term 3: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance 4: holding that although the literal application of the contract to an unforeseen situation produced an extreme result the court is not free to substitute a more rational term", "references": ["2", "0", "1", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "complaint to state a claim for recovery. See Hartwell, supra. However, by not responding to the requests, Defendant admitted the matters requested, including, inter alia, that (1) there was a valid contract for the sale of the property that is the subject of this litigation, (2) Plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to close on the agreed upon date or within a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) Defendant failed to appear for the scheduled closing or to sign the documents necessary for the closing to be completed, as required by the contract. From these admissions, Plaintiffs established the elements of their breach of contract claim against Defendant. See Lake Mary Ltd. P\u2019ship v. Johnston, 145 N.C. App. 525, 536, 551 S.E.2d 546, 554 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (<HOLDING>), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 363, 557 S.E.2d Holdings: 0: holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action 1: recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract 2: recognizing that breach of contract cause of action accrues at time of the breach 3: holding that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the breach 4: holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim", "references": ["4", "3", "2", "0", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "analysis. No statute or court-ordered bar kept Roy\u2019s trial counsel out of the courtroom for those seven minutes following lunch on the second day of trial. And no statute or court order interfered with the ability of Roy\u2019s counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. 2. The Gonzalez-Lopez, Woods, and Williams Decisions The dissenting opinion also relies heavily on the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), which did not involve an attorney\u2019s brief absence from the courtroom. Instead, it involved a complete violation of \u201cthe right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.\u201d Id. at 144, 126 S.Ct. at 2561; see id. at 143-44, 126 S.Ct. at 2561 (<HOLDING>); \u215b at 146, 126 S.Ct. at 2562 (\u201c[T]he right at Holdings: 0: holding that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to counsel at trial 1: recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel 2: holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel embodies the right to effective assistance of counsel 3: holding that the district courts erroneous rulings violated respondents sixth amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing 4: holding that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "may not be based on \u201csubjective opinions about future \u2018quality of life\u2019 of a . . . disabled person.\u201d 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 app. A state may avoid the regulations by electing not to receive CAPTA funds. Neither party has briefed the applicability of CAPTA in this case. According to public records, Washington State is a recipient of CAPTA funds. See Office of Family & Children\u2019s Ombudsman, available at http://www.govemor.wa.gov/ofco/gal/galsum.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). 4 The Natural Death Act recognizes the right of a competent adult to refuse, by advance directive, life-sustaining medical treatment when the adult is in a terminal or permanently unconscious condition. RCW 70.122.030. The act does not apply here because Liam is not a competent adult. 5 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (<HOLDING>); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 Holdings: 0: holding that a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 1: recognizing the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 2: holding that a prisoners loss of privileges for thirty days was not a property right that would constitute a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest 3: recognizing a competent persons constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing lifesaving medical intervention 4: holding parental rights are constitutionally protected fundamental interest", "references": ["4", "1", "2", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "an individual may never place his income in a Special Needs Trust. Appellant's Br. at 22. The SMM rules provide that an individual\u2019s income stream may be placed in a Special Needs Trust and sheltered from post-eligibility consideration if the income is irrevocably assigned to the trust. See SMM 3259.7(B)(1) Note. Wong has not invoked this rule, see Appellant\u2019s Br. at 34, and we therefore need not determine whether the Social Security Act's anti-alienation provision would prevent Wong from irrevocably assigning his SSDI income to a Special Needs Trust in this way. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407(a) (\"The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity.\u201d); see also Reames v. Oklahoma, 411 F.3d 1164, 1172-73 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We need only note that, regardless of whether Holdings: 0: holding that  407a prevents ssdi recipient from assigning benefits to special needs trust 1: holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust 2: holding that  407a imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits 3: holding that the express language of  407a and the clear intent of congress that social security benefits not be attachable 4: holding that drug testing of customs employees falls within the special needs exception for similar reasons", "references": ["1", "2", "4", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted. Hansuld II, \u00b6 10, 245 P.3d at 298 (quoting Hansuld I, \u00b6 15, 81 P.3d at 218). [\u00b6 37] Although the Miners appear to contest only the second element, we will address each element separately. 1. Unified Ownership followed by Separating Conveyance [\u00b6 38] The evidence in the record is clear that Ms. Jaycox owned all of Lot 1 before she divided the lot for financing the construction of apartment buildings on the North Parcel and the South Parcel. Although Ms. Jaycox had encumbered the North and South Parcels with mortgages in 2005, under Wyoming law, her ownership interest remained unified until 2008 when the North and South Parcels were sold in foreclosure. See Robinson Mercantile Co. v. Davis, 26 Wyo. 484, 187 P. 931, 932 (1920) (<HOLDING>). In 2008, when the parcels were sold to the Holdings: 0: holding that foreclosure of prior mortgage extinguished second mortgage 1: holding that in wyoming the mortgage simply creates a lien upon the land and it must be sold on foreclosure to pass the title 2: holding that despite foreclosure judgment providing that the holder of a junior mortgage had no interest in or lien on or claim to said premises the lack of foreclosure sale meant that the junior mortgage was not extinguished 3: holding that even though the complaint sought money damages and land was actually recovered the attorneys lien attached to the land 4: holding that the note and the mortgage must coexist to give the mortgage validity", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "or any Tennessee official, attesting to the authenticity and accuracy of the material therein contained. Counsel for appellant timely objected to this document as not being in compliance with the Parole Board\u2019s rules. The objection was overruled, and the document admitted into evidence. The State contends that this issue does not rise to the level of a due process violation. The State cites language from the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, \u2014, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), wherein that court indicated \u201cthat the search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.\u201d Sandin involved a defendant who (<HOLDING>); McGriff v. Board of Probation and Parole, 149 Holdings: 0: holding exclusion was harmless error 1: holding that denial of a prerevocation parole violation hearing harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error 3: holding that any error in parole board not following its rules regarding notice of hearing was harmless 4: holding that disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission was harmless error", "references": ["2", "4", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "the counse- lee and is unable to provide the appropriate counseling. Doctor Frederick M. Miller, a psychiatrist, testified in the jury trial that the beneficial counseling Bohrer needed at age twelve had been postponed for six years as a direct result of DeHart\u2019s failure to afford her proper counseling. His opinion was that DeHart\u2019s counseling activities aggravated her already poor relationship with her parents, made her susceptible to the sexual conduct DeHart pursued, impaired her ability to trust others, and contributed to her emotional and physical distress. DeHart should have recognized the boundaries of the counseling relationship, advised her to seek another counselor, and ceased counseling her. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 700, 702 (Minn.l990)(<HOLDING>). Instead, DeHart breached the boundaries of Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage 1: holding that insurance agents owe no duty to procure coverage for persons with no written or oral agreement with the agent to procure coverage or who have never contacted the agent about insurance coverage 2: holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination 3: holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed 4: recognizing insurance coverage for counselors inappropriate response to his counselees best interest", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "Moreover, Alvin\u2019s contention that by the end of 1995 the Provost\u2019s Office had simply stopped deal ing with him is not supported. Rather, Alvin was indisputedly the party that ended the process when he precipitously wrote to Maher, informing him that he would be pursuing his complaints through litigation. There is no other way to read this letter. Furthermore, Alvin did not even attempt to pursue an appeal of the conflict of interest decision (or refusal to decide, as he characterizes it) through the grievance process provided in the Faculty Handbook. Therefore, even if we were to accept his argument that the Provost\u2019s office had failed him through direct review of Suzuki\u2019s decision, he was obligated to trigger the formal process before bringing this claim. See Dykes, 68 F.3d at 1571 (<HOLDING>). D. Other Claims Alvin admittedly did not Holdings: 0: holding that 18month delay in filing forfeiture action did not violate due process 1: holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court 2: holding that the effective date of an award of secondary service connection was evidence that the secretary considered the claim before the varo at that time 3: holding that filing of a verified complaint was similar to a policeman filing an arrest warrant and did not initiate judicial process 4: holding that failure of lower levels of process do not justify skipping secondary levels before filing a federal action", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "years triggered a Miller individualized sentencing hearing. 836 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Iowa 2013). After the Ragland-Null-Pearson trio, we went on to consider juvenile sentencing under the Iowa Constitution in a number of other cases. In Lyle, we held that all mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for juveniles are unconstitutional under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. 854 N.W.2d at 400. We also summarized the background of change in the area of juvenile sentencing reform and touched on the topic of parole briefly. Id. at 399-400. We noted that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the opportunity for parole lessens the severity of a sentence. Id. at 399; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280-81, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1142-43, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (<HOLDING>). We ultimately concluded that the \u201cheart of Holdings: 0: holding that the state courts decision to uphold the parole boards denial of parole was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 1: holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission 2: holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available  life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole 3: recognizing the opportunity for parole however slim mollifies the severity of the sentence 4: holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity", "references": ["2", "1", "4", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "Luzviminida Metzala, a native and ci 0) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Metzala\u2019s contention that the in absentia Holdings: 0: holding that a party is not bound by the testimony of a witness it calls 1: holding that a panel of this court is bound by a holding of a prior panel but is not bound by a prior panels dicta 2: holding a party is bound by a concession in his brief 3: holding that agency is bound by its regulations 4: holding that each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyeragent", "references": ["0", "2", "3", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "topic, the court must then look to the third prong of the McMahon Framework: whether there is an inherent conflict between each purpose of the two federal acts.\u201d Id. Of the three indicia of congressional intent, Debtor asserts that only the third applies here: that an inherent conflict exists between the proposed arbitration and the Bankruptcy Code\u2019s underlying purpose. The Sixth Circuit has not addressed the McMahon exception in the bankruptcy context. However, opinions from other circuits and a bankruptcy court within this circuit provide instructive analyses. Some cases finding no inherent conflict betw\u00e9en arbitration and the Bankruptcy Code\u2019s underlying purpose focus on the lack of an underlying bankruptcy issue impacting plaintiffs claims. See, e.g., Mintze, 434 F.3d at 231-32 (<HOLDING>); No Place Like Home, 559 B.R. at 875 (finding Holdings: 0: holding that bankruptcy courts have inherent power to sanction and affirming sanctions imposed by bankruptcy court against a nonparty 1: holding that the bankruptcy court has the inherent power to award sanctions for badfaith conduct in a bankruptcy court proceeding 2: recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtors exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under bankruptcy code 3: holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or 4: holding that because debt or did not raise statutory claims created by the bankruptcy code there was no bankruptcy issue to be decided and no inherent conflict with arbitration", "references": ["3", "0", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "a prosecutor cannot misstate the law. See, e.g., Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (prosecutor misstated State\u2019s burden of proof on defensive issue). Zuniga teaches that evidence of guilt can preponderate in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 485. Thus, contrary to the prosecutor\u2019s argument, the notion exists that a jury can believe \u2014 by a preponderance of the evidence \u2014 that the defendant is guilty but the State did not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of proof that must be met. We conclude that the trial court erred in overruling Abbott\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s statement. Cfi Gore v. State, 719 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1998) (<HOLDING>). The law on the burden of proof is Holdings: 0: holding that the following prosecutors argument misstated the burden of proof and was error its simple and it comes down to this in simplicity if you believe his story hes not guilty if you believe hes lying to you hes guilty its that simple 1: holding that it is not extortion to threaten economic harm when you have a legal right to engage in the activity you threaten 2: holding the prosecutors argument if it was there they can bring it to you was not an improper jury argument 3: holding that if you do not qualify under the hup test you never get to the statute 4: holding that prosecutors remarks that defense counsel was a zealot in the courtroom and thank god hes a defense attorney and not part of the government were improper", "references": ["1", "4", "3", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "at *7 (S.D.Oh. Apr. 7, 2009) (finding that plaintiff did not step outside her role as human resources manager where she alerted the company about alleged FLSA violations as part of her job duties and did not complain about these alleged violations on behalf of herself or other women employees from a standpoint adversarial to the company); Bradford v. UPMC, Civ. A. No. 04-316, 2008 WL 191706, at *4 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 18, 2008) (noting that neither investiga tions of another employee\u2019s EEO complaint regarding racial discrimination nor her recommendations to supervisors regarding the complaint constitutes protected activity, as plaintiff was not stepping outside her role as human resources manager); Cook v. CTC Comm\u2019ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 06-58, 2007 WL 3284337, at *6 (D.N.H. Oct. 30, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Hill v. Belk Stores Svcs., Inc., Civ. A. No. Holdings: 0: holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination 1: holding that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon a showing that she was a member of the protected group she was qualified and capable of doing her job she was discharged and that her manager called her old woman thus evincing agebased animus sufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent 2: holding that a plaintiff can show that she is qualified by presenting credible evidence that she continued to possess the objective qualifications she held when she was hired 3: holding that in order to show protected activity the plaintiff had to establish that she acted outside of her role as a human resources manager when she advocated on behalf of an employees userra rights 4: holding that in order for plaintiff to prove that she was similarly situated to three other employees she had to demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other employees", "references": ["2", "4", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "of the detec id not present evidence of flight or any other evidence to support an inference of his consciousness of guilt, Elliott argues that it was error for the trial court to prevent him from establishing a lack of consciousness of guilt. He concludes that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue on direct appeal this meritorious and preserved claim, and that, had counsel raised the issue on appeal, there is a reasonable probability that this Court would have granted a new trial. The PCRA court denied relief on this claim, finding that the trial court\u2019s instruction was proper, considering the case law rendering references to lie detector tests inadmissible. PCRA Court Opinion, Oct. 13, 2010, at 15 (citing Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325, 333 (1971) (<HOLDING>)). The PCRA court further emphasized that trial Holdings: 0: holding that the rule in pennsylvania is that reference to a lie detector test or the result thereof which raises inferences concerning the guilt or innocence of a defendant is inadmissible 1: holding that the apprendi rule was not implicated because a juvenile transfer proceeding does not involve sentencing or a determination of guilt or innocence 2: holding a consequence instruction is not necessary because the consequences of the verdict have no bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant 3: holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof  which is the subject of litigation 4: holding that an informants identity does not need to be disclosed unless the defendant demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the anonymous informant could give evidence on the issue of guilt or innocence which might result in the defendants exoneration", "references": ["2", "4", "3", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "Judge. 1 . Both parties read A.R.S. \u00a7 11-974 as limiting fee and cost awards pursuant to A.R.S. \u00a711-972(A) to condemnation proceedings initiated and abandoned in the course of projects for which \"federal financial assistance is to defray all, or part of, the costs____\u201d See A.R.S. \u00a7 11-974(A). The parties debate whether any part of the costs of the Sedona sewer extension project was to be federally defrayed within the meaning of the statute. We need not consider the matter of federal funding, however, because we conclude that these condemnation proceedings were not abandoned by the City. In the absence of an abandonment of proceedings, questions of federal funding are immaterial. 2 . See Montgomery County v. McQuary, 26 Ohio Misc. 239, 265 N.E.2d 812, 814 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1971) (<HOLDING>). 3 . County of Kern v. Galatas, 200 Cal.App.2d Holdings: 0: holding that since defendant failed to timely remove the original complaint which was removable based on federal question jurisdiction defendant thereby waived its right to file a subsequent removal even though the complaint was amended to add a new federal claim where the amendment to the complaint did not change the nature of the action so as to constitute a substantially new suit since the new allegations and claims were not substantially different from those in the original complaint 1: holding that amendment of condemnors original complaint to substitute a new and different easement route was tantamount to abandonment of the original proceeding 2: holding original complaint was admission where it alleged an accident occurred on a different date than the amended complaint 3: holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations 4: holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "notes it is a violation of California law to ride on highways without seat-belts, and that therefore GET should be held liable for his injuries given it was responsible to provide a motoreoaeh with seatbelts. C. Defendant GET\u2019s Reply GET contends Ramage fails to rebut GET\u2019s showing that no question of material fact exists regarding GET\u2019s liability for breach of warranty, negligence and negligent selection. First, GET contends that Ramage\u2019s argument that the disclaimer is not printed in sufficient size is frivolous as is Ramage\u2019s contention that he did not know the significance of what he was signing. Scrugham Affidavit, Exhibit B. The only requirement is that the disclaimer be \u201creasonably communicated.\u201d Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 910 (3rd Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Ramage\u2019s claim that he did not read Holdings: 0: holding that ontrack dormitory rooms for racetrack employees were homes under the fourth amendment even though they were small temporary located near stables and accessible to track authorities by master keys 1: holding that police officers statements concerning hazardous conditions at a firing range were made within their official duties since they were obligated to report that type of information up the chain of command 2: holding that contractual conditions printed on cruise ticket were valid even though they were in small type 3: holding that film negatives and master recordings were tangible personal property even though they were valued in part for their intellectual content because they were also physically useful in the manufacturing process 4: holding invalid claims amended to include structures not within the invention described in the application even though the variations were small", "references": ["3", "4", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "psychological, financial and cultural reasons women do not bring complaints or drop them prior to hearings). That is why the Legislature deemed the certification of the applicant to be sufficient and why it specifically did not require a prior domestic violence order as a basis for ACP protection. N.J.S.A. 47:4-4(a). We think the same reasoning is applicable when a litigant seeks address confidentiality in a judicial proceeding involving custody and visitation: the failure of a party to institute or to pursue a domestic violence proceeding to conclusion is of no consequence. To be sure, the entry of a prior domestic violence restraining order adjudicating a claim may be given preclusive effect by a court, if warranted. J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J.Super. 387, 392, 706 A.2d 203 (App.Div.1998) (<HOLDING>). However, that is a far cry from the Holdings: 0: holding that plaintiff was precluded under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel from relitigating in proceedings under prevention of domestic violence act allegations which had been decided adversely to her in earlier hearing 1: holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award 2: holding that previous domestic violence finding did not have res judicata effect in proceeding to modify visitation because domestic violence and visitation modification proceedings are different causes of action 3: recognizing exception to application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles to decisions of administrative proceedings where there has been manifest error in the record 4: holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes", "references": ["1", "3", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "to Bickham or any individual, however, and could apply equally to the settling defendant Acock or others. The jury charge, as proposed by Francis, did not include a question asking the jury to determine whether Bickham was Coastal\u2019s employee. See Comm. on PatteRN Jury Charges, State Bae of Tex., Agency and Special Relationships, Texas Patteen JURY Charges PJC (7.1) (2002 ed.) (question concerning status as employee); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 279 (waiver of grounds or defenses not submitted to jury). The charge Francis submitted did not sufficiently present Bickham\u2019s claimed status as an employee or agent and completely disregarded the status that the record indicates Bickham held, that of an independent contractor. See Oliver v. Marsh, 899 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1995, no writ) (<HOLDING>); see also Comm, on PatteRN JURY Charges, State Holdings: 0: holding that the disputed issue with respect to the state law bar was properly submitted to the jury 1: recognizing that status as independent contractor presents inferential rebuttal issue that is properly submitted to jury by instruction rather than question 2: holding that when agreement is reasonably susceptible to more than one construction issue is properly submitted to jury for resolution as a matter of fact 3: holding it is reversible error for a trial court to exclude a definition on new and independent cause an inferential rebuttal defense when supported by the evidence 4: holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question", "references": ["2", "0", "3", "4", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "presumed to be reasonable. United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir.2006) (citing, in part, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). 11 . Even if Defendant's repeated denial of relevant conduct were insufficient to deny him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the court would nonetheless decline to grant him such a reduction. The court was deeply troubled that Defendant called his mother to testify as an alibi witness. Ms. Bradford's testimony was not credible. It was patently false. The court believes Ms. Bradford perjured herself and that Defendant knowingly presented the court with a false alibi. This also indicates a lack of acceptance of responsibility. Cf. United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1038 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Lato, 934 F.2d 1080, 1083 Holdings: 0: holding that a defendant should not receive an acceptance of responsibility adjustment when there is contradicting obstructive conduct 1: holding that courts mention of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility to defense counsel was not reversible error 2: holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility despite his plea of guilty where he attempted to suborn perjury 3: holding defendant was not entitled to acceptance of responsibility in part because he suborned perjury 4: holding that defendant was not entitled to reduction for acceptance of responsibility where he failed to fully account for the proceeds of his crime and attempted to delay a longscheduled hearing based on an incredible claim of innocence", "references": ["1", "0", "4", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1367(c)(3). Plaintiffs now appeal. Analysis 1. The Stored Communications Act provides a cause of action against anyone who \u201cintentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided ... and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2701(a)(1), 2707(a). \u201c[Electronic storage\u201d means either \u201ctemporary, intermediate storage ... incidental to ... electronic transmission,\u201d or \u201cstorage ... for purposes of backup protection.\u201d Id. \u00a7 2510(17). The Act exempts, inter alia, conduct \u201cauthorized ... by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service,\u201d i Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We interpret federal statutes in light of the Holdings: 0: holding that district court is not required to word jury instructions in any particular way so long as it correctly states the law 1: holding that reasonable access includes general facility access without notice and patient access with twentyfour hour notice 2: holding that attendance is a minimum function of any job 3: holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact 4: holding access unauthorized where it is not in any way related tothe systems intended function", "references": ["1", "0", "2", "3", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "desired immediate relief based on his perceived need to avoid irreparable harm of losing his driving privilege, the trial court inappropriately acquiesced in his attorney\u2019s tactic of bypassing the Maryland Rules and the law of injunction. The circuit court\u2019s premature adjudication, enjoining the MVA to grant the relief Baptist sought, was produced as a result of the procedural shortcomings of Baptist\u2019s lawsuit. We need not resolve all of the claims lodged by MVA to reach the conclusion that the proceedings below were patently flawed. Among other things, the court issued a permanent injunction after an unrecorded, twenty-minute telephonic hearing, without affording the MVA the opportunity for a trial on the merits. See NCAA v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 301 Md. 574, 483 A.2d 1272 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we have no idea as to the basis Holdings: 0: recognizing the importance of a determination on the merits with respect to the issuance of a permanent injunction 1: holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success 2: recognizing a permanent injunction as a means of ordering specific performance 3: recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability 4: holding that the failure of the applicant to file a bond before the issuance of the temporary injunction renders the injunction void ab initio", "references": ["3", "1", "2", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "The key question is whether the named plaintiffs have been \u201cexcluded from participation in or ... denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of [the TEA].\u201d Id. To answer that question, we must decide whether driver education is a service, program, or activity of the TEA. We hold that it is not, although this is a close question for which the statutes, regulations, and case law provide little concrete guidance. Starting with the plain text of Title II of the ADA, the phrase \u201cservices, programs, or activities of a public entity\u201d is undefined. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase with reference to what \u201cservices, programs, or activities\u201d are provided by the public entity. See Pa. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Here, the TEA itself does not teach driver Holdings: 0: holding that a physician under contract with north carolina to provide medical services to prison inmates was a state actor for purposes of  1983 1: holding that venue was proper in kansas because both of the defendants conducted many of their activities with the plaintiff through the mail despite that fact that the defendants activities may have been more substantial in california 2: holding that prisons have programs services or activities because they provide inmates with many recreational activities medical services and educational and vocational programs  3: holding that conversion would lie for copying and taking of computer programs even if defendant never took the tapes embodying the programs 4: holding that employers knowledge of employees injury followed by the employers failure to provide the necessary medical services sufficient to impose liability upon the employer for medical services selected by the employee", "references": ["4", "3", "0", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "The court, however, did not suggest that any hearing was required before termination of the contract itself. In the case at bar, of course, only the contract was terminated, Dr. Boucvalt was not deprived of his medical staff privileges. We decline to apply the predeprivation hearing requirement of Louder-mill/Roth/Sindermann so as to federalize all contract law. See Casey v. Depetrillo, 697 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir.1983); Findeisen, 749 F.2d at 240-41 (concurring opinion); Vail, 706 F.2d at 1456 (dissenting opinion). In the present case, the traditional postdeprivation contract remedy constitutes all the process that was due. Cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1917, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (<HOLDING>). If Boucvalt was entitled to some Holdings: 0: holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy 1: holding that postdeprivation tort remedy constitutes all the process that is due for unauthorized negligent and intentional torts by state officials 2: holding that meaningful postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to remedy unauthorized intentional deprivations of inmates property 3: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional 4: holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies", "references": ["4", "0", "3", "2", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "WL 549077 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Feb.27, 2003, no pet.) (after stating Young standard of review, court conducted ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, rejected claim but court did not explain reasoning concerning Young waiver issue); Starr v. State, No. 13-99-381-CR, 2000 WL 34253854, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, Apr. 13, 2000, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (same). 5 . On appeal, appellant does not appear to request a new trial on guilt-innocence, but instead requests in his prayer for relief that we order the State to reinstate its 15-year plea offer and order the trial court to allow him to replead guilty. 6 . Nothing in this opinion restricts appellant\u2019s right to a writ of habeas corpus review. See Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) Holdings: 0: holding appellant who pleads guilty to offense may file application for writ of habeas corpus alleging denial of effective assistance of counsel on ground that attorney did not convey pleabargain offer made by state 1: holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims 2: holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus 3: holding that court had jurisdiction to consider appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief even though trial court proceeded to adjudicate appellant guilty before hearing his writ 4: holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape", "references": ["3", "4", "2", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "then it should consider whether that complaint includes sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief against any of the individual defendants in their personal capacities in connection with the two constitutional claims we have remanded for further proceedings. b.Appointment of counsel On the day he filed his complaint, De-Brew also filed a motion to appoint counsel. The district court never expressly ruled on that motion, and DeBrew argues the court erred by not considering the matter. We are unable to determine from the record whether the district court overlooked the motion or whether it intended implicitly to deny the motion when it denied DeBrew\u2019s request to proceed in for-ma pauperis. On remand the district court should rule expressly on DeBrew\u2019s mo Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>); see also Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 Holdings: 0: holding that where a defendant fails to challenge his plea in district court he must establish plain error 1: holding that it is the burden of the party who failed to preserve his argument to demonstrate plain error 2: holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent 3: recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice 4: holding it was plain error for the district court to allow an imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action", "references": ["3", "2", "0", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "inquiring whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue. Clearly it has not. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101 et seq. (\u201cINA\u201d), does not define the term \u201cspouse,\u201d nor does it dictate criteria for the USCIS to use in examining the validity of a marriage. Thus, USCIS has had to interpret the ambiguous terms of the INA to determine what choice of law rule to apply when determining the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes. Turning to the second step of the Chevron analysis, the Court finds that US-CIS\u2019s interpretation of the INA is reasonable. In determining whether a marriage is valid for immigration purposes, USCIS applies the laws of the place where the marriage was celebrated. See, e.g., Matter of Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. 453 (BIA 1987) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Bautista, 16 I. & N. Dec. 602, 603 Holdings: 0: recognizing a privacy interest in the intimacies of the marital relationship 1: holding the function of a public utility is controlling not how the term is defined 2: holding that it is not 3: holding family court has wide discretion in determining how marital property is to be distributed 4: holding that the wellestablished rule is that it is the function of the state to determine how its residents may enter into the marital relationship", "references": ["0", "3", "2", "1", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "aggravating circumstances, at least one of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed, includes a finding that \u201c[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.\u201d The trial judge in Pizzuto\u2019s case found that this factor, along with four others, existed beyond a reasonable doubt. The petitioner asserts that this aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court has held that the state must \u201cchannel a [capital] senteneer\u2019s discretion by \u2018clear and objective standards\u2019 that provide \u2018specific and detailed guidance,\u2019 and \u2018make rationally reviewable the proce lding \u201cdepravity of mind\u201d to be unconstitutionally vague language); Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The issue in contention is whether the Idaho Holdings: 0: holding that exceptional depravity is unconstitutionally vague 1: holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague 2: holding that attorney disciplinary rule was unconstitutionally vague as applied 3: holding that  2320 as a whole is not unconstitutionally vague 4: holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague", "references": ["2", "1", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "convinced that it would not.\u201d Neither doctor was present at the Gulf Coast Medical Center at the time KE.W. was taken into custody and neither pointed to any specific actions taken by K.E.W. at the center as a basis for rendering an opinion. Stone cited the incident at the center as a behavior by K.E.W. that made him believe that K.E.W. could be a harm to others, but merely described that KE.W. had an MHMR appointment, had met with Pugh, and had been so threatening that Pugh felt that K.E.W. needed to be immediately admitted to the hospital. S psychiatric expert opinion of a potential danger to others is insufficient to support a commitment\u201d and there must be facts in record to justify conclusion that appellant was likely to cause serious harm); see also Broussard, 827 S.W.2d at 622 (<HOLDING>). Thus KE.W.\u2019s beliefs, and his adherence to Holdings: 0: holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of potential danger to others insufficient to support commitment 1: holding bare allegation of social friendship insufficient 2: holding that bare baseless opinions will not support a judgment 3: holding that an opinion of a potential danger to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard 4: holding that a complaints bare assertions alone were insufficient for certification", "references": ["1", "2", "3", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "9(c) of the Subcontract which makes payment by the Government to Clark a condition precedent to payment by Clark t f Suretyship Principles: An Uncertain Future for \u201cPay-When-Paid\u201d and \u201cPay-If-Paid\u201d Clauses in Public Construction Subcontracts, 38 Pub. Cont. L.J. 47, 53-54 (2008). In gener al, these types of clauses are \u201cused by general contractors to condition payment to their subcontractors upon the general contractor\u2019s receipt of payment from the owner.\u201d Id.; see also MidAmerica Constr., 436 F.3d at 1261-62 (discussion both \u201cpay-when-paid\u201d and \u201cpay-if-paid\u201d clauses). In Maryland, such clauses in subcontracts are generally enforceable, at least in the context of private construction projects. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Brisk Waterproofing Co., Inc., 86 Md.App. 21, 585 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Koprince, supra, at 54, 79 Holdings: 0: holding that a clause making payment by the owner an express condition precedent to payment by the general contractor to the subcontractor was enforceable 1: holding that a provision making all payments to subcontractor by  contractor expressly contingent upon payment for the work by contractor from owner is a payifpaid clause under texas law 2: holding that a paywhenpaid clause does not preclude a subcontractors recovery under the miller act payment bond because the federal legislation conditions payment of the subcontractor not on payment by the government to the contractor but rather on the passage of time from completion of the work or provision of materials 3: holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment  although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment  since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim 4: holding that a subcontractor could not recover on theory of quantum meruit for an implied contract against general contractor where condition precedent to payment under express contract was not satisfied", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "3", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "consisting of conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another . ...\" Wis. Stat. \u00a7 939.25(1). At the time Colstad was initially detained, the officer had neither smelled an odor of intoxicants nor observed Colstad exhibit any other sign of intoxication. There was no indication that Colstad was speeding, driving erratically, or deviating from his lane of traffic. At the same time, the unexplained nature of the colli sion, especially in fight of Colstad's assertion that he was driving slowly and looking out for children, was cause for some suspicion. 3 We note that courts in other jurisdictions permit an investigatory stop for civil infractions. See United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Berge v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d Holdings: 0: holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation 1: holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring 2: holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred 3: holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law 4: holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "not be directly incriminating; a witness may assert the right to remain silent \"[i]f the fact to which he is interrogated forms but one link in the chain of testimony which would convict him.\u201d French v. Venneman, 14 Ind. 282, 283 (1860); cf. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223, 95 L.Ed. 170 (1950) (reiterating chain of evidence test under Fifth Amendment). Indiana and federal law regulating immunized witnvqqvt: arp nbr, parallel Compare In re Caito, 459 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind.1984); Overman v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 488, 143 N.E. 604, 606 (1924) (grant of immunity must protect the witness \"to the same extent\" as the constitutional right); Wilkins, 14 Ind. at 156-57; and Frazee v. State, 58 Ind. 8, 12-13 (1877) (following Wilkins) with Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1661 (<HOLDING>). The state right applies in pretrial settings, Holdings: 0: holding that juveniles request to call parent is assertion of fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination 1: holding that the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination was not prejudiced by a prior administrative proceeding based on the same facts 2: holding that use and derivative use immunity were coextensive with fifth amendment right against selfincrimination and therefore sufficed to compel testimony over assertion of the right 3: holding that defendants exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination 4: holding that the fifth amendments protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment", "references": ["0", "3", "4", "1", "2"], "gold": ["2"]}
+{"input": "Cockrell Hill v. Johnson, 48 S.W.3d 887 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). We disagree. In Johnson, we held that, because an unpaid public official was not a public employee and the alleged violations of law at issue were committed in the elected public official\u2019s personal capacity and did not relate to the affairs of the city itself, the Act did not apply. Id. at 896. In this case, Harkrider was a paid city employee. Further, the fact that both Harkrider and Appellee were police officers weighs in heavily on our decision. The evidence shows that Appellee acted in her official capacity as a police officer when she made the report because police officers are on duty 24 hours a day. See Turnage v. JPI Multifamily, Inc., 64 S.W.3d 614, 621 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Appellee witnessed a felony being committed Holdings: 0: recognizing affirmative duty of a police officer to prevent the violation of constitutional rights by another officer 1: holding that police officers have a duty to prevent crime and arrest offenders 24 hours a day and that a public duty is triggered any time an officer observes a crime even outside the hours of his official work 2: holding police officer is a public official 3: holding that to state a claim for wage violations under the flsa plaintiffs must provide at least some approximation of the overtime hours that defendants required them to work and a time frame for when those hours were worked 4: holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours", "references": ["2", "0", "4", "3", "1"], "gold": ["1"]}
+{"input": "prior occasions, Officer Horn stated that that information had not led to any arrests. Officer Horn failed to elaborate upon the nature of the informant\u2019s prior information or to indicate whether that information had been verified to any degree. Moreover, he did not endeavor to explain why the prior information had not led to any arrests, if indeed the information related to criminal matters. While it is conceivable that, if the information did relate to criminal matters, the police could have chosen to forgo making any arrests for reasons quite apart from any lack of accuracy in the information, such an inference is entirely speculative and finds no support in the record. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 24 Ill.App.3d 932, 321 N.E.2d 696 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill.2d 375, 342 N.E.2d 383 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The record contains little to compensate for Holdings: 0: recognizing that arrests are often delayed in continuing undercover drug operations to protect the identity of confidential informants 1: recognizing the ability of corporations to protect property rights in federal court 2: recognizing drug traffickers will commonly possess firearms to protect their product to protect their drugs to protect their cash to protect their life and even to protect their turf alteration in original internal quotation marks omit ted 3: recognizing the continuing authority of rauscher 4: holding that because a  1326 violation constitutes a continuing offense venue may lie in any district in which the continuing conduct occurred", "references": ["3", "2", "1", "4", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "should likewise provide relief to all those persons. A writ of mandamus is appropriate to compel the City Council to renew the eight-day period in which any and all aggrieved persons may file an administrative appeal. In order to afford fair and equitable relief to all those impacted by the City Council\u2019s unlawful practice, I would grant this petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to recall its writs reinstating the planning commission decision and to issue a new writ of mandamus directing the City Council to provide a new appeal period, in which the City Council must accept for filing the challenges of parties who deem themselves aggrieved. 1 See generally Ham v. District Court, 93 Nev. 409, 416, 566 P.2d 420, 424 (1977) (<HOLDING>); State v. McMillan, 34 Nev. 264, 271, 117 P. Holdings: 0: holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void 1: recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect 2: holding statutory violation sufficient cause 3: recognizing that acts made in violation of statutory authority are void 4: holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable", "references": ["4", "2", "0", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "entered upon the Order of Dismissal against Judge Geiger, and the other order was obviously intended to be final, this appeal is properly before us. See Van Valkenburg v. Paracelsus Healthcare Corp., 2000 ND 38, \u00b6 8 n. 1, 606 N.W.2d 908 (treating order granting summary judgment as appealable final order where order was obviously intended to be final); Greenwood, Greenwood & Greenwood, P.C. v. Klem, 450 N.W.2d 745, 746 (N.D.1990) (treating appeal from order as properly before the Court where- subsequent consistent judgment was entered). [\u00b6 5] The right to appeal in this State is governed solely by statute. Mann v. N.D. Tax Comm\u2019r, 2005 ND 36, \u00b6 7, 692 N.W.2d 490. Without a statutory basis to hear an appeal, this Court must dismiss the appeal. Id. Generally, an order dism 674 N.W.2d 9 (<HOLDING>); Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moor-head Young Men\u2019s Holdings: 0: holding appealable district courts dismissal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction over enrolled tribal members 1: holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case 2: holding that district court had subjectmatter jurisdiction and yet that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction to render the particular judgment 3: holding a district court lost subjectmatter jurisdiction over the merits of the case when it issued an order of dismissal without prejudice 4: holding appealable district courts order dismissing for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction due to determination of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction", "references": ["1", "3", "4", "2", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "each interview that he was required to assist in obtaining travel documents and that he faced criminal prosecution for failing to cooperate, but Budha refused to fill out the application. Although Budha asked for an attorney at the December 16, 2010 meeting, he was not entitled to appointed counsel at that point, and the record does not show that Budha was told during any of the interviews after the removal order that he had a right to remain silent or to appointed counsel. A rational jury could find that Budha was subject to a final order of removal and that he was fully informed of his obligations to cooperate but willfully failed or refused to apply for the travel documents necessary for his removal. See \u00a7 1253(a)(1)(B); United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d 289, 301 (5th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). Next, Budha argues that the Government Holdings: 0: holding that on a review of the sufficiency of the evidence the court determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 1: holding that when an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 2: holding that a verdict must be sustained against a sufficiency of the evidence challenge if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt 3: holding that when conducting a legal sufficiency review the reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 4: holding that in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence in habeas corpus petitions we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt", "references": ["3", "2", "4", "1", "0"], "gold": ["0"]}
+{"input": "purposes and objectives of Congress.\u201d Id. at 1086. The court rejected Ventura\u2019s argument that the savings clause in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act authorized the state ordinance. The court held that the proviso to the savings clause reserved to the states only rights which the states already possessed and a state does not possess the right tb \u201capply local regulations impermissibly conflicting with achievement of a congressionally approved use of federal lands.\u201d Id. Relying on Kleppe, the court concluded, \u201c \u2018[W]here those state laws conflict ... with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: The state laws must recede.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543, 96 S.Ct. at 2293-94). See also State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976) (<HOLDING>). [II38] 4. Mining Act of 1872 Preempts Holdings: 0: holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority 1: holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state consented to be sued in federal court 2: holding that a federal regulation did not create privity of contract between the plaintiff and the government 3: holding that requiring a permit and the restoration of the land after the mining operations had concluded did not preempt federal law however the court did recognize that where a state regulation rendered it impossible to exercise a right granted through federal legislation that state regulation would be in conflict with the federal right 4: holding that a federal court litigant who is forced into state court under pullman may reserve a right to return to federal court in that the plaintiff can preserve the right to the federal forum for federal claims by informing the state court of his or her intention to return following litigation of the state claims in the state court", "references": ["4", "1", "0", "2", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "vulnerable to attack because of, inter alia, her slight stature and her youth was not unconstitutionally vague because \"the jury should have had no difficulty understanding that [the factor] was designed to ask it to consider whether the victim was especially vulnerable to petitioner\u2019s attack\u201d). 33 . United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 414 (5th Cir.1998) (upholding the factor against a challenge that it was both unconstitutionally overbroad and vague), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) (peremptory challenges); Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (upholding the factor against a challenge that it was unconstitutionally vague). 34 . Webster, 162 F.3d at 354 n. 70. 35 . Cf. Jones, 527 U.S. at 401, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (<HOLDING>). 36 . See Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, Holdings: 0: holding although admission of victim impact testimony was error it was harmless in light of strong evidence against defendant 1: holding that use of a victim impact statement during sentencing violated the eighth amendment 2: holding autopsy photograph of victim was admissible even if defendant stipulated identity of victim 3: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized 4: holding the harmed victim need not be the victim of the offense of conviction", "references": ["4", "0", "2", "1", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "504-08, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (distinguishing Weaver) (shifting focus from whether the legislative change \u201cproduces some sort of ambiguous \u2018disadvantage\u2019 \u201d to whether the legislative change \u201calters [the] definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable\u201d). In his report and recommendation, Judge Jarvey thoroughly discussed Davis, Bell and O\u2019Neal. Although he acknowledged Davis represents contrary authority, Judge Jarvey noted a majority of courts \u201chold a conviction under a statute forbidding possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony does not violate the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause even when the felony for which the defendant was convicted took place before the statute was enacted.\u201d See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Holdings: 0: holding no violation of ex post facto clause because enhancement provision increases the punishment for being a felon in possession of a firearm that traveled in or affected interstate commerce and it does not affect the punishment previously meted out to the defendant for the  crimes he committed prior to the effective date of the statute 1: holding that application of guidelines did not violate the ex post facto clause because rico offense was a straddle crime that continued before and after the effective date of the guidelines 2: holding 18 usc  922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause 3: holding for the purposes of 18 usc  924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc  924e2b 4: holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc  922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted", "references": ["0", "3", "1", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}
+{"input": "by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally \"initiate\u201d a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830. However, the latter phrase from that sentence in Hutchins (\"that may ... lead to further interrogation\u201d) does not appear in this section of Bradshaw. 19 . We have been unable to find any Supreme Court case that references the Edwards rule and quotes the phrase \"communication, exchanges, or conversations\" without also linking that particular phrase to actions by the accused. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 407, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 104, 130 S.Ct. 1213 Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Comosona, 848 F.2d Holdings: 0: holding that the plaintiff has set forth a cognizable claim that the officer violated his fourth amendment right when the officer knocked on the plaintiffs motel door and replied that he was maintenance and that he was there to fix the sink 1: holding that following his invocation of counsel fbi agent handed mr comosona a business card and invited him to call collect if he wanted to talk about incident whereupon mr comosona stated that he wanted to continue the interview constituted initiation by mr comosona within the meaning of edwards 2: holding the defendant lacked any expectation of privacy in his cell so the jailer had the right to inspect anything in his cell 3: holding that following his invocation of counsel when mr mccree subsequently knocked on his cell door and stated he had something to say this constituted initiation under edwards 4: holding police violated edwards when they continued questioning a defendant after his initial invocation of the right to counsel even though he responded to the subsequent questioning", "references": ["4", "2", "1", "0", "3"], "gold": ["3"]}
+{"input": "favor of the Board. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the complaint, the Board describes damages to individual unit owners but is silent on how the Board itself was injured. Under the ILSA cause of action, the Board seeks rescission, refunds, costs for \u201ceach purchaser for whom this action is brought,\u201d and injunctive relief and damages \u201cfor itself and for the purchasers.\u201d Presumably, because injury to the Board is not pled in the complaint, defendants have assumed in their motion that the Board cannot meet its injury-in-fact requirement of standing without invoking associational standing. See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (<HOLDING>). The Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Holdings: 0: holding that evidence that defense witnesses were members of the same organization of tax protesters as defendant was properly admitted to show bias 1: holding an organization had standing because some of its individual members did 2: holding that a nonprofit organization lacked standing under unruh because its civil rights had not been personally violated and it failed to show that any of its members would suffer injury 3: holding that an organization whose members were potential targets of future prosecutions had standing to seek injunctive relief 4: holding that an organization whose members are injured may represent those members even where the organization itself cannot show injury", "references": ["3", "1", "0", "2", "4"], "gold": ["4"]}