NASA’s Exploration Systems Development (ESD) organization is  responsible for directing development of the three individual human  spaceflight programs—SLS, Orion, and EGS—into a human space  exploration system. The integration of these programs is key because all  three systems must work together for a successful launch. EM-1 is planned as an uncrewed test flight currently  planned for no earlier than October 2019 that will fly about 70,000  kilometers beyond the moon. Further, NASA  stated that, in fall 2017, it planned to establish a new launch readiness  date. This new approach offers some cost and potential  efficiency benefits. NASA is already contractually obligating money on SLS and EGS for EM- 2, but the lack of cost and schedule baselines for these programs will  make it difficult to assess progress over time. The three programs themselves perform the hardware and  software integration activities. To that end, we have made recommendations in the past on the need for  NASA to baseline the programs’ costs for capabilities beyond EM-1;  however, a significant amount of time has passed without NASA taking  steps to fully implement these recommendations. Because  NASA has not implemented our recommendations, it may now be  appropriate for Congress to take action to require EM-2 cost and  schedule baselines for SLS and EGS, and separate cost and schedule  baselines for additional capabilities developed for Orion, SLS, and EGS  for missions beyond EM-2. Additionally, agency officials said that dual-hat roles are a commonplace  practice at NASA and cited other factors in support of the approach,  including that:  it would not be an efficient use of resources to have an independent  technical authority with no program responsibilities because that  person would be unlikely to have sufficient program knowledge to  provide useful insight and could slow the program’s progress; a technical authority that does not consider cost and schedule is not  helpful to the program because it is unrealistic to disregard those  aspects of program management; a strong dissenting opinion process is in place and allows for issues to  be raised through various levels to the Administrator level within  NASA; and
ESD receives additional independent oversight through three NASA  internal organizations—the independent review teams that provide  independent assessments of a program’s technical and programmatic  status and health at key points in its life cycle; the NASA Engineering  and Safety Center that conducts independent safety and mission  success-related testing, analysis, and assessments of NASA’s high- risk projects; and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) that  independently oversees NASA’s safety performance. By overlapping technical authority and  programmatic responsibilities, NASA will continue to run the risk of  creating an environment of competing interests for the ESD engineering  and S&MA technical authorities. ESD Risk Posture Has Improved, but Key Risk Areas Remain for the Integration Effort

Despite the development and integration challenges associated with a  new human spaceflight capability, ESD has improved its overall cross- program risk posture over the past 2 years. All three programs continue to manage such individual program risks,  which is to be expected of programs of this size and complexity. Furthermore, ESD reports show that delays and content deferral in the  Orion and SLS software development continue to affect EGS software  development and could delay launch readiness. In responding to a draft of our report, NASA partially concurred with our  recommendation that the Exploration Systems Development (ESD)  organization should no longer dual-hat individuals with both programmatic  and technical authority responsibilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report assesses (1) the benefits and challenges of the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) approach for integrating  and assessing the programmatic and technical readiness of Orion, SLS,  and EGS; and (2) the extent to which the Exploration Systems  Development (ESD) organization is managing cross-program risks that  could affect launch readiness. To assess the reliability of the  data, we reviewed related documentation and interviewed knowledgeable  agency officials.
Why GAO Did This Study

NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. All three programs (SLS, Orion, and EGS) are working toward a launch readiness date of no earlier than October 2019 for the first test flight. Each program is a complex technical and programmatic endeavor. Because all three programs must work together for launch, NASA must integrate the hardware and software from the separate programs into a working system capable of meeting its goals for deep space exploration.
The House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the progress of NASA's human space exploration programs. This report assesses (1) the benefits and challenges of NASA's approach for integrating these three programs and (2) the extent to which cross-program risks could affect launch readiness. GAO examined NASA policies, the results of design reviews, risk data, and other program documentation and interviewed NASA and other officials.

What GAO Found

The approach that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is using to integrate its three human spaceflight programs into one system ready for launch offers some benefits, but it also introduces oversight challenges. To manage and integrate the three programs—the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle; the Orion crew capsule; and supporting ground systems (EGS)—NASA's Exploration Systems Development (ESD) organization is using a more streamlined approach than has been used with other programs, and officials GAO spoke with believe that this approach provides cost savings and greater efficiency. However, GAO found two key challenges to the approach:
The approach makes it difficult to assess progress against cost and schedule baselines. SLS and EGS are baselined only to the first test flight. In May 2014, GAO recommended that NASA baseline the programs' cost and schedule beyond the first test flight. NASA has not implemented these recommendations nor does it plan to; hence, it is contractually obligating billions of dollars for capabilities for the second flight and beyond without establishing baselines necessary to measure program performance.
The approach has dual-hatted positions, with individuals in two programmatic engineering and safety roles also performing oversight of those areas. As the image below shows, this presents an environment of competing interests.
These dual roles subject the technical authorities to cost and schedule pressures that potentially impair their independence. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board found in 2003 that this type of tenuous balance between programmatic and technical pressures was a contributing factor to that Space Shuttle accident.
NASA has lowered its overall cross-program risk posture over the past 2 years, but risk areas—related to software development and verification and validation, which are critical to ensuring the integrated body works as expected—remain. For example, delays and content deferral in Orion and SLS software development continue to affect ground systems software development and could delay launch readiness. GAO will continue to monitor these risks.

What GAO Recommends

Congress should consider directing NASA to establish baselines for SLS and EGS's missions beyond the first test flight. NASA's ESD organization should no longer dual-hat officials with programmatic and technical authority responsibilities. NASA partially concurred with our recommendation and plans to address it in the next year. But NASA did not address the need for the technical authority to be independent from programmatic responsibilities for cost and schedule. GAO continues to believe that this component of the recommendation is critical.