Current Program Contracts

In September 2014, NASA awarded firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing  and SpaceX, valued at up to $4.2 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively, for  the Commercial Crew Transportation Capability phase. Prior GAO Work

In our February 2017 report, we evaluated the progress made by the two  contractors on the Commercial Crew Program and found the following:
Both of the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors had made  progress developing their crew transportation systems, but both also  had aggressive development schedules that were increasingly under  pressure. In order to ensure that the United States had continued access to the ISS  if the Commercial Crew Program’s contractors experienced additional  schedule delays, we recommended in our February 2017 report that the  NASA Administrator develop a contingency plan for maintaining a  presence on the ISS beyond 2018, including options to purchase  additional Russian Soyuz seats, and report to Congress on the results. Further delays are likely as the Commercial  Crew Program’s schedule risk analysis shows that the certification  milestone is likely to further slip. Contractors Continue to Make Progress, but Risks Remain

Boeing and SpaceX have continued to make progress finalizing their  designs and building hardware as they work toward their certification  milestones. Program’s Schedule Risk Analysis Indicates More Delays Likely to Certification Milestone

Both contractors have notified NASA that their certification milestones  have slipped to January 2019 for Boeing and February 2019 for SpaceX,  but the Commercial Crew Program’s schedule risk analysis indicates  more delays are likely. This analysis identifies a range for each  contractor, with an earliest and latest possible completion date, as well as  an average. The analysis’s average  certification date was December 2019 for Boeing and January 2020 for  SpaceX. Moreover,  NASA has not yet developed a contingency plan to address the potential  gaps that these delays could have on U.S. access to the ISS after 2019. Use the crewed flight tests as operational flights to transport U.S.  astronauts to and from the ISS. NASA does not have a  consistent approach for how to incorporate key inputs to assess this  metric, which means the agency as a whole may not clearly capture or  document its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew. Workload has also been a concern for two of NASA’s  independent review organizations. NASA Lacks a Consistent Approach to Assess Key Safety Metric

One mechanism the program put in place to assess the overall safety of  each spacecraft—loss of crew—has been a focus of the Aerospace  Safety Advisory Panel, Members of Congress, our prior work, and the  program itself. Loss of crew captures the probability of death or  permanent disability to one or more crew members. Instead, the risk tolerance that NASA is  accepting with loss of crew varies based upon which entity is presenting  the results of its probabilistic safety analysis. Specifically, management should define risk tolerances in  specific and measurable terms, so they are clearly stated and can be  measured. NASA must balance safety with acceptable risk for human spaceflight. As a result, we found that the contractors frequently delay  dates for key events. NASA partially concurred with our recommendation that the Chief of  Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Associate Administrator for  Human Exploration and Operations, the Commercial Crew Program  Manager, and the Commercial Crew Program Contracting Officer should  collectively determine and document how the agency will determine its  risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew before the agency  certification review. NASA stated that ultimately the Commercial  Crew Program is accountable for ensuring that the contractors’ systems  meet the loss of crew value in this certification requirements document,  which is a loss of crew value of 1 in 270. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the extent to which the  contractors have made progress towards meeting the National  Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) certification  requirements and NASA’s plans to help ensure continued access to the  International Space Station (ISS); and (2) how NASA’s certification  process addresses safety of the contractors’ crew transportation systems.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX, worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion, to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the ISS. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure. The contractors were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 2017.
A House report accompanying H.R. 5393 included a provision for GAO to review the progress of NASA's human exploration programs. This report examines the Commercial Crew Program, including (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification and (2) how NASA's certification process addresses safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems. GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation and spoke with officials from NASA, the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, SpaceX, and two of NASA's independent review bodies that provide oversight.

What GAO Found

Both of the Commercial Crew Program's contractors, Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), are making progress finalizing designs and building hardware for their crew transportation systems, but both contractors continue to delay their certification milestone (see figure). Certification is the process that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will use to ensure that each contractor's system meets its requirements for human spaceflight for the Commercial Crew Program.
Further delays are likely as the Commercial Crew Program's schedule risk analysis shows that the certification milestone is likely to slip. The analysis identifies a range for each contractor, with an earliest and latest possible completion date, as well as an average. The average certification date was December 2019 for Boeing and January 2020 for SpaceX, according to the program's April 2018 analysis. Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Additional delays could result in a gap in U.S. access to the space station as NASA has contracted for seats on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft only through November 2019. NASA is considering potential options, but it does not have a contingency plan for ensuring uninterrupted U.S. access.
NASA's certification process addresses the safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems through several mechanisms, but there are factors that complicate the process. One of these factors is the loss of crew metric that was put in place to capture the probability of death or permanent disability to an astronaut. NASA has not identified a consistent approach for how to assess loss of crew. As a result, officials across NASA have multiple ways of assessing the metric that may yield different results. Consequently, the risk tolerance level that NASA is accepting with loss of crew varies based upon which entity is presenting the results of its assessment. Federal internal controls state that management should define risk tolerances so they are clear and measurable. Without a consistent approach for assessing the metric, the agency as a whole may not clearly capture or document its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations, including that NASA develop a contingency plan for ensuring a U.S. presence on the ISS and clarify how it will determine its risk tolerance for loss of crew. NASA concurred with three recommendations; partially concurred on the recommendation related to loss of crew; and non-concurred with a recommendation to report its schedule analysis to Congress. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.