This time period can be extended for an additional 60-day period if the Secretary  determines that the additional period is necessary for the convening of  the board. MED approves requests to medically evacuate  U.S. personnel and family members from diplomatic posts. Other State entities. State’s ARB Policy Does Not Ensure that the Office Responsible Is Made Aware of Incidents That May Meet ARB Criteria, Such as Those That Occurred in Cuba

Although M/PRI is responsible for initiating and leading State’s ARB  incident vetting process, State’s ARB policy does not define how M/PRI  should become aware of incidents that may involve injury, loss of life, or  destruction of property. According to State  officials and our analysis, State’s FAM and Foreign Affairs Handbooks do  not establish a policy, procedure, or process for internal communication of  such incidents to M/PRI. This situation puts State at risk of not meeting  statutory time frames for convening an ARB and could result in State  being unable to improve security programs and practices at other U.S.  diplomatic posts, which could affect the response to similar incidents  elsewhere. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for internal  communication to achieve the entity’s objectives and note that  management should document responsibilities through policy. The U.S. Embassy in Havana and Several State Entities Responded to Unexplained Incidents in Cuba Associated with Serious Injury to U.S. According to a former M/PRI official, M/PRI did  not review these CMS communications for other purposes, including to  identify incidents that may meet ARB statute criteria. According to M/PRI officials, a State  official—who previously worked in M/PRI—contacted M/PRI in early  August after seeing media reports to inquire whether they were aware of  the incidents in Cuba. Although several State entities were aware of the  incidents, WHA, DS, and MED did not report the incidents to M/PRI and it  was unclear whether the incidents met the criteria for convening an ARB,  according to officials. M/PRI initiated State’s incident vetting process in August 2017, as  shown in figure 2 below. When M/PRI is not aware of incidents that may  meet the ARB statute criteria, it cannot initiate the incident vetting process  for convening ARBs. Recommendation for Executive Action

To ensure that State’s process allows it to initiate its ARB incident vetting  process in a timely manner, the Secretary of State should revise State’s  policies to define responsibilities for internal communication to M/PRI of  incidents that may involve injury, loss of life, or destruction of property at,  or related to, U.S. missions abroad. In its written comments, State  concurred with our recommendation.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. diplomats and their families in Havana, Cuba, were affected by incidents that were associated with injuries, including hearing loss and brain damage. Over State has reported that over 20 U.S. diplomats and family members in Havana have suffered from medical conditions believed to be connected to the incidents, which began in late 2016 and have continued into 2017. By law, State is generally required to convene an ARB within 1260 days of incidents that result in serious injury at, or related to, a U.S. mission abroad, but the Secretary of State can determine that a 60 day extension is necessary. According to State's policy, M/PRI is responsible for initiating and leading State's ARB incident vetting process.
This report is part of a broader request to review State's response to the incidents in Cuba. In this report, GAO examines the extent to which State's ARB policy ensures that M/PRI is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria. GAO analyzed relevant federal laws, State policies, and other State documents. GAO also interviewed cognizant State officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of State's (State) Accountability Review Board (ARB) policy does not ensure that the responsible office—State's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI)—is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria, such as those that occurred in Cuba and were associated with injuries to U.S. personnel. According to State policy, as soon as M/PRI becomes aware of potentially qualifying incidents, M/PRI will start the process for considering whether the incident warrants an ARB. M/PRI relies on informal communication to identify potentially qualifying incidents to begin the vetting process because State does not have a policy, procedure, or process for internal communication of such incidents to M/PRI, according to State officials and GAO analysis. As illustrated in the figure below, other State entities began responding to the incidents in early 2017, but M/PRI was not made aware of the incidents until mid-August 2017, when a former M/PRI official contacted the office after seeing media reports. If M/PRI is not aware of incidents, it cannot initiate State's ARB incident vetting process. This situation puts State at risk of not meeting statutory time frames for convening an ARB and could result in State being less able to improve security programs and practices at other U.S. diplomatic posts. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for internal communication to achieve the entity's objectives and note that management should document responsibilities through policy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State revise its policies to define responsibilities for internal communication to M/PRI of relevant incidents. State concurred with GAO’s recommendation.