	Introduction

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." This provision requires that a federal prosecutor, in order to charge a suspect with a serious federal crime, secure the assent of an independent investigative and deliberative body comprising citizens drawn from the jurisdiction in which the crime would be tried. Federal grand juries serve two primary functions: (1) they aid federal prosecutors in investigating possible crimes by issuing subpoenas for documents, physical evidence, and witness testimony; and (2) they determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a criminal suspect with the crime or crimes under investigation. Traditionally, the grand jury has done its work in secret. Secrecy prevents those under scrutiny from fleeing or importuning the grand jurors, encourages full disclosure by witnesses, and protects the innocent from unwarranted prosecution, among other things. The long-established rule of grand jury secrecy is enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides that government attorneys and the jurors themselves, among others, "must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury." Accordingly, as a general matter, persons and entities external to the grand jury process are precluded from obtaining transcripts of grand jury testimony or other documents or information that would reveal "what took place" in the proceedings, even if the grand jury has concluded its work and even if the information is sought pursuant to otherwise-valid legal processes. At times, the rule of grand jury secrecy has come into tension with Congress's power of inquiry when an arm of the legislative branch has sought protected materials pursuant to its oversight function. For example, some courts have determined that the information barrier established in Rule 6(e) extends to congressional inquiries, noting that the Rule "contains no reservations in favor of . . . congressional access to grand jury materials" that would otherwise remain secret. Nevertheless, the rule of grand jury secrecy is subject to a number of exceptions, both codified and judicially crafted, that permit grand jury information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (usually only with prior judicial authorization). And because Rule 6(e) covers only "matters occurring before the grand jury," courts have recognized that documents and information are not independently insulated from disclosure merely because they happen to have been presented to, or considered by, a grand jury. As such, even if Rule 6(e) generally limits congressional access to grand jury information, Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to seek materials connected to a grand jury investigation. Courts in this camp have pointed to various justifications for recognizing such extra-textual judicial authority to breach grand jury secrecy, including that
courts have always had supervisory authority over the grand juries that they impanel, which historically included the discretion to determine when grand jury materials should be released; the advent of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not eliminate a court's supervisory authority as a general matter, meaning that courts may still take certain actions that are consistent with, though not explicitly authorized by, the Rules; Rule 6(e)(2)(B)'s list of persons who are prohibited from disclosing a matter occurring before the grand jury does not include the court itself; Rule 6(e)(3)(E)'s list of circumstances in which a court "may" authorize disclosure does not indicate that those circumstances are exclusive, and the presence of limiting language elsewhere in Rule 6 suggests its absence in (e)(3)(E) was intentional; and the history of the Rules and Advisory Committee notes indicates that Rule 6(e) was meant to be responsive to and reflective of common exceptions that courts developed of their own volition over time. Congress has also previously considered legislation that would have expressly permitted a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters to congressional committees, though the congressional-access provision ultimately did not become law. . . a judicial proceeding"). Legal Considerations for Congress

Past Congresses, faced with potential limitations on the ability to obtain grand jury materials, have considered legislation that would amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to, among other things, permit a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters "upon a showing of substantial need" to "any committee of Congress .
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." This provision requires that a federal prosecutor, in order to charge a suspect with a serious federal crime, secure the assent of an independent investigative and deliberative body comprising citizens drawn from the jurisdiction in which the crime would be tried. Federal grand juries serve two primary functions: (1) they aid federal prosecutors in investigating possible crimes by issuing subpoenas for documents, physical evidence, and witness testimony; and (2) they determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a criminal suspect with the crime or crimes under investigation.
Traditionally, the grand jury has conducted its work in secret. Secrecy prevents those under scrutiny from fleeing or importuning the grand jurors, encourages full disclosure by witnesses, and protects the innocent from unwarranted prosecution, among other things. The long-established rule of grand jury secrecy is enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides that government attorneys and the jurors themselves, among others, "must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury." Accordingly, as a general matter, persons and entities external to the grand jury process are precluded from obtaining transcripts of grand jury testimony or other documents or information that would reveal what took place in the proceedings, even if the grand jury has concluded its work and even if the information is sought pursuant to otherwise-valid legal processes.
At times, the rule of grand jury secrecy has come into tension with Congress's power of inquiry when an arm of the legislative branch has sought protected materials pursuant to its oversight function. For instance, some courts have determined that the information barrier established in Rule 6(e) extends to congressional inquiries, observing that the Rule contains no reservations for congressional access to grand jury materials that would otherwise remain secret. Nevertheless, the rule of grand jury secrecy is subject to a number of exceptions, both codified and judicially crafted, that permit grand jury information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (usually only with prior judicial authorization). Perhaps the most significant of these for congressional purposes are (1) the exception that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding," and (2) the exception, recognized by a few courts, that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters in special or exceptional circumstances. In turn, some courts have determined that one or both of these exceptions applies to congressional requests for grand jury materials in the context of impeachment proceedings, though there is authority to the contrary.
Additionally, because Rule 6(e) covers only "matters occurring before the grand jury," courts have recognized that documents and information are not independently insulated from disclosure merely because they happen to have been presented to, or considered by, a grand jury. As such, even if Rule 6(e) generally limits congressional access to grand jury information, Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to seek materials connected to a grand jury investigation.
Prior Congresses have considered legislation that would have expressly permitted a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters to congressional committees on a showing of substantial need. However, in response to such proposals, the executive branch has voiced concerns that the legislation would raise due-process and separation-of-powers issues and potentially undermine the proper functioning of federal grand juries. These concerns may have resulted in Congress declining to alter Rule 6(e). As a result, to the extent Rule 6(e) constrains Congress's ability to conduct oversight, legislation seeking to amend the rules governing grand jury secrecy in a way that would give Congress independent access to grand jury materials may raise additional legal and pragmatic issues for the legislative branch to consider.