	Background

The GRF EXORD generally establishes the GRF as a set, or “menu,” of  forces from the military services—each of which possesses unique  capabilities—that the Secretary of Defense can deploy rapidly anywhere  in the world. DOD Has Generally Used the GRF to Augment Combatant Command Capabilities and Has Not Assessed the Risk on Its Ability to Respond as a Joint Force

According to an official from the Joint Staff office responsible for  managing the GRF across DOD, since 2010 DOD has used the GRF 35  times in support of worldwide contingencies—with 32 of those uses  involving individual GRF units being deployed in support of or to augment  combatant commander needs. The predominant use—32 of 35 deployments—of individual GRF units to  augment a combatant commander’s needs has, in turn, diminished the  set of units available for mission scenarios related to the GRF’s use as a  tailorable joint force, and accordingly the capabilities available for  inclusion under a GRF joint task force. For example, Joint Staff officials  stated that DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit designated for  the GRF to a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility  to augment that combatant command’s missile defense capabilities. Therefore, during the  ballistic missile defense unit’s deployment, the particular capability that  unit supplied to the GRF was not available as part of a tailorable joint  force to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency—the other  broad intended use of the GRF. Without conducting a risk assessment and  taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing either of the  GRF’s uses, DOD’s attempt to satisfy one of the two intended uses of the  GRF may inadvertently hamper the other intended use. GRF Units Have Trained Individually to Meet GRF Missions, but They Have Not Trained as Part of an Integrated Joint Force

GRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but there are no GRF- specific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have limited  opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to  DOD officials. Despite the challenges encountered during the exercise, Army officials  told us that exercises, such as the Deployment Readiness Exercise  conducted at Fort Bragg, are important because they give units from  different services the opportunity to identify challenges and develop  solutions. As a result, these exercises can enhance the GRF’s joint task  force capability. According to Army officials, a major factor inhibiting joint training  exercises focused at GRF-assigned units as a joint task force is the fact  that it can be difficult to get other services to agree to participate in  service-sponsored events because—as the Institute for Defense Analysis  study pointed out—services lack the authority to direct other services to  supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those forces are  currently on a GRF rotation. Moreover, since the disestablishment of U.S.  Joint Forces Command in 2011, which was responsible, among other  things, for being the lead agent for joint force training, there is no single  commander with the authority to require joint force training. Without an entity having the responsibility and authority to plan, direct,  and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRF-assigned units  deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks undermining the  effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force in  response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies. DOD has not  assessed the risks it assumes by its reliance upon the GRF for  augmenting combatant commanders’ forces as opposed to having the  GRF-assigned units available for allocation to a joint task force in  response to a contingency. Additionally, without a  designated authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training for  GRF-assigned units as appropriate, DOD has not developed GRF- specific joint training exercises or fully integrated the GRF into existing  joint exercises. Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making the following three recommendations to DOD:
The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff, should assess the risks to accomplishing both of  the GRF’s uses: that is, its use as an augmentation capability  available as needed to individual geographic combatant commands;  and its use as a tailorable joint force available for rapid response to a  specific threat. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which (1)  Department of Defense (DOD) has used the Global Response Force  (GRF) and assessed any risks associated with its use; and (2) GRF- assigned units are trained to meet GRF missions, both individually and as  a joint force.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD must be able to rapidly deploy forces to respond to a range of worldwide contingencies, and in 2007 it established the GRF to enhance that capability. The GRF is a set, or “menu,” of forces from the military services, each of which possesses unique capabilities, and which the Secretary of Defense can deploy rapidly anywhere in the world.
House Report 114-537, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to evaluate challenges DOD may be facing regarding the GRF. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has used the GRF, and assessed any risks associated with its use of the GRF; and (2) GRF-assigned units are trained to meet GRF missions individually and as a joint force. GAO reviewed GRF deployment information from 2010 to 2017 and the GRF Execute Order, observed a training exercise, and interviewed knowledgeable officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense's (DOD) Global Response Force (GRF) has two distinct uses: one is to enhance DOD's ability to rapidly deploy forces in response to a range of worldwide contingencies with a tailorable joint force; and the other is to provide a set, or “menu,” of units that combatant commands can request to augment their capabilities in light of unexpected challenges when requirements exceed their capabilities. Since 2010, according to officials, DOD has used the GRF 35 times in support of worldwide contingencies, with 32 of those times involving deployment of individual GRF units to augment combatant commander needs, and 3 times involving their use as part of a joint task force. This predominant use of individual GRF units to augment combatant commanders' needs has diminished the set of units available for mission scenarios related to the GRF's use as a tailorable joint force. For example, when DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit as a part of the GRF to augment a combatant command's missile defense capabilities, the particular capability it supplied to the GRF was not available for participation in a tailorable joint force to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency, if such an event occurred. DOD does not know what risks it assumes to readiness for GRF mission scenarios due to its general reliance upon the GRF as an augmentation capability available to individual geographic combatant commands, because DOD has not assessed those risks. Without conducting a risk assessment and taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing the GRF's intended uses, DOD's attempt to satisfy one of the uses (that is, individual GRF-assigned units assisting combatant commands) may hamper the other use (that is, deployment of a joint task force for a contingency).
GRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but DOD does not conduct any GRF-specific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have limited opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to DOD officials. While the GRF Execute Order calls for integrating elements of the GRF into existing joint training, the military services lack the authority to direct other services to supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those forces are currently on a GRF rotation. Moreover, since the disestablishment in 2011 of U.S. Joint Forces Command—which, among other things, was the lead agent for joint force training—and because units designated for the GRF mission may be assigned to different combatant commands or may be service-retained, no single commander has the authority to require joint force training of GRF units. As a result, no joint training exercises are specifically designed to exercise GRF units as a joint task force. Army officials told GAO that joint exercises are important because they give individual units from different services the opportunity to identify challenges and develop solutions, thereby enhancing the GRF's joint task force capability. Without an entity having the responsibility and authority to plan, direct, and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRF-assigned units deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks undermining the effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force in response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD (1) assess the risks assumed in its reliance upon the GRF as both an augmentation capability and a tailorable joint force; (2) design appropriate responses following the risk assessment; and (3) designate an authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training as appropriate for GRF-assigned units. DOD concurred with GAO's three recommendations.