	Background

Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at  sea that have resulted in serious damage to Navy ships and the loss of  17 sailors (see figure 1). Since 2006,  the Navy has doubled the percentage of the fleet assigned to overseas  homeports. According to the Navy, homeporting ships overseas is an efficient method  for providing forward presence and rapid crisis response. In addition, the  operational schedules the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limit  dedicated training and maintenance periods, resulting in difficulty keeping  crews fully trained and ships maintained. In May 2015, we also found that high operational tempo for ships  homeported overseas limits the time for crew training when compared  with training time for ships homeported in the United States. We found that, at the time of our 2015 review, there  were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of  the cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious ships homeported in Yokosuka  and Sasebo, Japan. As a result, these crews did not have all of their  needed training and certifications. As of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for  cruiser and destroyer crews homeported in Japan had expired, and over  two-thirds of the expired certifications—including mobility-seamanship  and air warfare—had been expired for 5 months or more. This represents  more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare  certifications for these ships since our May 2015 report. In 2015, Navy officials acknowledged an increasing number of  casualty reports on Navy ships and a worsening trend in material ship  condition. Size and Composition of Ship Crews May Contribute to Sailor Overwork and Create Readiness and Safety Risks

In the early 2000s, the Navy made several changes to its process for  determining the size and composition of ship crews that may contribute to  sailor overwork and create readiness and safety risks. The Navy eventually  reassessed and reversed some of the changes it had made during this  period—known as “optimal manning”—but it continued to use a workweek  standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and  does not account for in-port workload—both of which may be leading to  sailors being overworked. DOD concurred with our recommendations, stating that it is  committed to ensuring that the Navy’s manpower requirements are  current and analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and  future surface fleet. The Navy’s Inability to Complete Ship Maintenance on Time Hampers Its Efforts to Rebuild Readiness

To address its persistently low readiness levels, the Navy began  implementing a revised operational schedule in November 2014, which it  referred to as the optimized fleet response plan. However, in May 2016, we found that the Navy was having difficulty in  implementing its new schedule as intended. We updated these data for the purposes of  this testimony to include maintenance availabilities completed through the  end of fiscal year 2016 and found continued difficulty completing  maintenance on time for key portions of the Navy fleet (see figure 7):
Aircraft Carriers (CVNs): In fiscal years 2011 through 2016,  maintenance overruns on 18 of 21 (86 percent) aircraft carriers  resulted in a total of 1,103 lost operational days—days that ships were  not available for operations—the equivalent of losing the use of 0.5  aircraft carriers each year. However, high demand for naval presence will continue to put  pressure on a fleet that is already stretched thin across the globe. Looking to the future, the Navy has plans to grow its fleet by as much as  30 percent, but it has not yet shown the ability to adequately man,  maintain, and operate the current fleet. These readiness problems need  to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement our  recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks  associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the  factors used to size ship crews, and applying sound planning and  sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In  addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that  the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training,  and other challenges. Appendix I: Implementation Status of Prior GAO Recommendations Cited in this Testimony

Over the past three years, we issued several reports related to Navy  readiness cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with  all of these recommendations but has implemented only one of them to  date.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships.
This statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges.
In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues; GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data.

What GAO Found

GAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include:
Degraded readiness of ships homeported overseas : Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan—including certifications for seamanship—had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented.
Crew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week.
Inability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations).
Looking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made 11 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process.