T his report examines the President's authority to terminate the United States' international obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) without further action from Congress. It also examines whether the NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements the agreement in domestic law, would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. obligations under the agreement. In analyzing these issues, the report focuses on three related questions: (1) whether, under international law, the President may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval; (2) whether, under domestic law, the President, relying on constitutional or statutory authority, may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally; and (3) whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. international obligations under the agreement. Brief Background on NAFTA

NAFTA is an international trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that became effective on January 1, 1994. The agreement includes market-opening provisions that remove tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, as well as other rules affecting trade in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and trade in services. On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Ambassador Robert Lighthizer notified Congress that the Administration intended to renegotiate NAFTA. More than a year later, following the conclusion of the negotiations, President Trump signed a proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), along with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico. President Trump has at times suggested that he will withdraw the United States from NAFTA unilaterally if Congress does not approve the USMCA. It thus appears that if the President (i.e., the "head of state" for the United States) communicated a notice of withdrawal from NAFTA to Canada and Mexico, and such notice became effective at least six months later, it would terminate the United States' obligations under the agreement as a matter of international law. It is difficult to predict how a court might resolve such a challenge, as U.S. courts have uniformly avoided answering whether the U.S. Constitution authorizes the President to terminate an international pact without express congressional approval. Given this extensive framework for legislative approval and implementation of trade agreements, a court might find it unlikely that Congress implicitly authorized the President to withdraw from NAFTA without further congressional action. Because no court has yet interpreted Section 125(a), the scope of the President's power under this provision would be an issue of first impression. Presidential Authority to Impose Barriers to Trade with NAFTA Parties Under Sections 125 and 301

Although neither Section 125 nor Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 appears to authorize the Executive to terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA, these statutory provisions appear to grant broad authority to the executive branch to impose barriers to trade on goods and services from Canada and Mexico under domestic law. Although such provisions appear to furnish the executive branch with broad authority to suspend or terminate individual trade concessions, the Executive's actions under these provisions could be subject to challenge before international and domestic tribunals. Whether the NAFTA Implementation Act Would Remain in Effect After Termination of U.S. NAFTA Obligations

The NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements NAFTA in domestic law, would likely remain in effect if the President successfully terminated the United States' international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally. Under Supreme Court precedent, the repealing of statutes generally must conform to the same bicameral and presentment process set forth in Article I that is used to enact new legislation. Interpreting Sections 109(b) and 415 to authorize the President to terminate portions of the NAFTA Implementation Act by withdrawing the United States from NAFTA would raise the question of whether Congress's delegation of such authority to the President violates separation-of-powers principles by contravening the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which, as noted above, requires that legislation be passed by Congress and presented to the President for his signature or veto in order to become law.
NAFTA is an international trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that became effective on January 1, 1994. The agreement includes market-opening provisions that remove tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, as well as other rules affecting trade in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and trade in services. Congress approved and implemented NAFTA in domestic law in the NAFTA Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057). On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer notified Congress that the Administration intended to renegotiate NAFTA. More than a year later, following the conclusion of the negotiations, President Trump signed a proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), along with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico. President Trump has at times suggested that he will withdraw the United States from NAFTA unilaterally if Congress does not approve the USMCA.
This report examines the President's authority to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without further action from Congress. It also examines whether the NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements the agreement in domestic law, would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. obligations under the agreement. In analyzing these issues, the report focuses on three related questions: (1) whether, under international law, the President may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval; (2) whether, under domestic law, the President, relying on constitutional or statutory authority, may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally; and (3) whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. international obligations under the agreement.
With regard to the first question, under international law, the President appears to be able to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval by delivering six months' notice of withdrawal to Canada and Mexico, provided such notice later becomes effective (e.g., assuming that a court does not enjoin the Executive from issuing the notice or declare such issuance unlawful).
The answer to the second question is less clear, however, and would require a reviewing court to confront several complicated issues of first impression, including the scope of the President's constitutional authority and statutory authority to terminate an international agreement. Justiciability questions may prevent a court from definitively answering the constitutional questions, leaving the resolution of the President's constitutional authority to the political process. With regard to the statutory question, while legal commentators have raised various arguments with respect to the President's domestic legal authority to terminate U.S. NAFTA international obligations unilaterally, it does not appear that any statute expressly affords the President with the authority to terminate NAFTA on his own. It is unclear whether Congress's enactment of an extensive legal framework providing for legislative consideration, approval, and implementation of trade agreements indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize the President implicitly to withdraw from NAFTA without further congressional action. Nonetheless, as explained below, provisions of federal law such as Sections 125 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 may provide the Executive with broad authority to suspend individual trade concessions granted to NAFTA countries and thereby establish barriers to trade with Canada and Mexico. At the same time, the Executive's use of such authority would, however, likely be subject to review on various grounds by domestic or international tribunals.
Finally, whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect after termination of U.S. obligations under NAFTA would be informed by Supreme Court precedent generally requiring the repeal of statutes to conform to the same bicameral process set forth in Article I of the Constitution that is used to enact new legislation. Accordingly, as an initial matter, it would appear that the President lacks authority to terminate the domestic effect of the NAFTA Implementation Act without going through the full legislative process for repeal. Thus, the Act appears to remain in effect unless Congress has, consistent with the Constitution, delegated to the President authority to terminate its provisions or made such provisions "self-terminating."