Status of NASA’s Major Telescope Projects

NASA’s current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three  projects—WFIRST, TESS, and JWST—that vary in cost, complexity, and  phase of the acquisition life cycle. We have reported for several years on the JWST project, which has  experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. Following this review, Congress in November 2011 placed an $8 billion  cap on the formulation and development costs for the project and NASA  rebaselined JWST with a life-cycle cost estimate of $8.835 billion that  included additional money for operations and a planned launch in October  2018. Our ongoing work indicates that these three projects are each making  progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle, but also face  challenges in execution. Table 1 provides more details about the current  acquisition phase, cost, and schedule status of NASA’s major space  telescope projects based on our ongoing work. For example, the study team found that  NASA’s current forecasted funding profile for the WFIRST project would  require the project to slow down activities starting in fiscal year 2020,  which would result in an increase in development cost and schedule. Given the risks associated with the  integration and test work ahead, coupled with a level of schedule  reserves that is currently well below the level stated in the procedural  requirements issued by the NASA center responsible for managing  JWST, additional delays to the project’s revised launch readiness date of  June 2019 are likely. As a result, the funding available under the  Congressional cost cap of $8 billion may be inadequate as the contractor  will need to continue to retain higher workforce levels for longer than  expected to prepare the mission for a delayed launch. Nevertheless, the extent  to which NASA has adopted some of the following lessons learned within  its portfolio of major projects is mixed, and NASA has an opportunity to  strengthen its program management of major acquisitions, including its  space telescopes, by doing so. Twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviewers found  that the program’s planned cost reserves were inadequate. We have found, however,  that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects— most notably with its human spaceflight projects, including the Space  Launch System, Orion Crew Capsule, and associated ground systems— and similar outcomes to the JWST project have started to emerge with  these projects. For example, we found in July 2016 that the Orion program planned to  maintain very low levels of annual cost reserves until 2018. We found that it was unlikely that the programs would  achieve the planned launch readiness date and recommended that NASA  reassess the date. NASA concurred with this recommendation;  however, we recently closed the recommendation because NASA had not  taken steps to implement it and the amount of time remaining before  launch would not have allowed the benefit of implementing the  recommendation to be realized. In summary, NASA continues to make progress developing its space  telescopes to help understand the universe and our place in it. But much  like other major projects that NASA is developing, there continues to be  an opportunity for NASA to learn from JWST and other projects that have  suffered from cost overruns and schedule delays.
Why GAO Did This Study

Acquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA, although GAO has reported on improvements the agency has made in recent years. Three space telescope projects are the key enablers for NASA to achieve its astrophysics' science goals, which include seeking to understand the universe. In its fiscal year 2018 budget request, NASA asked for about $697 million for these three projects, which represents over 50 percent of NASA's budget for its astrophysics' major projects. In total, these projects represent an expected investment of at least $12.4 billion.
This statement reflects preliminary observations on (1) the current status and cost of NASA's major telescope projects and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its telescope projects. This statement is based on ongoing work on JWST and ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects. Both reports are planned to be published in Spring 2018. This statement is also based on past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects, and NASA input.

What GAO Found

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle.
GAO's ongoing work indicates that these projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle but also face some challenges. For example, the current launch date for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reflects a 57-60-month delay from the project's original schedule. GAO's preliminary observations indicate this project still has significant integration and testing to complete, with very little schedule reserve remaining to account for delays. Therefore, additional delays beyond the delay of up to 8 months recently announced are likely, and funding available under the $8 billion Congressional cost cap for formulation and development may be inadequate.
There are a number of lessons learned from its acquisitions that NASA could consider to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes for its telescope projects, as well as for its larger portfolio of projects, such as its human spaceflight projects. For example, twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviews found that the program was not holding adequate cost and schedule reserves. GAO has found that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects, and similar outcomes to JWST have started to emerge. For example, NASA did not incorporate this lesson with its human spaceflight programs. In July 2016 and April 2017, GAO found that these programs were holding inadequate levels of cost and schedule reserves to cover unexpected cost increases or delays. In April 2017, GAO recommended that NASA reassess the date of the programs' first test flight. NASA concurred and, in November 2017, announced a launch delay of up to 19 months.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement, but has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA has generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and taken steps to implement them.