The succession issue has come to the fore since he underwent cancer treatment in Germany during 2014-15. Since returning to Oman, he has appeared in public only on major occasions or to meet visiting foreign leaders. As in the other GCC states, formal political parties are not allowed. When it was formed in 1991, the body had 59 seats, and was gradually expanded to its current 85 seats. Also in 2011, Qaboos instituted elections for municipal councils. By mid-2012, the government had calmed the unrest through a combination of reforms and punishments, including expanding the powers of the Oman Council; appointing several members of the Consultative Council as ministers; giving the office of the public prosecutor autonomy and consumers additional protections; naming an additional woman minister; ordering that additional public sector jobs be created; increasing the minimum wage; making grants to unemployed job seekers; and arresting journalists, bloggers, and other activists for "defaming the Sultan," "illegal gathering," or violating the country's cyber laws. The U.S. reaction to the unrest in Oman was muted, possibly because Oman is a key ally of the United States and perhaps because the unrest appeared relatively minor. Small demonstrations occurred again for two weeks in January 2018. About 5% of Oman's population are Shiite Muslims. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, but did not conduct any airstrikes against that group. Oman strongly opposed the Saudi-led move in June 2017 to isolate Qatar over a number of policy disagreements. Iran

Omani leaders assert that engagement with Iran better mitigates the potential threat from that country than confrontation—a stance that has positioned Oman as a mediator in several regional conflicts in which Iran or its proxies are involved. And, Oman was the only GCC state not to downgrade relations with Iran in January 2016 in solidarity with Saudi Arabia when the Kingdom broke relations with Iran in connection with the dispute over the Saudi execution of dissident Shiite cleric Nimr Al Nimr. As the only GCC state that has not joined the Saudi-led Arab coalition fighting to restore the Hadi government and with its ties to Iran, Oman has become a mediator of the Yemen conflict. Oman has hosted talks between U.S. diplomats and Houthi representatives, and brokered the release of several captives there, including the November 2016 release of a U.S. Marine veteran who was detained by the Houthis in April 2015. 2151) to secure the border with Yemen. Oman as a Go-Between for the United States and Iran

U.S. officials have used the Oman-Iran relationship to reach out to Iranian officials when doing so has been deemed in the U.S. interest. The U.S-Iran meetings accelerated after Sultan Qaboos's August 25-27, 2013, visit to Iran. Cooperation against the Islamic State Organization and on Syria and Iraq

Oman, along with the other GCC states, joined the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State in 2014. In the Syria internal conflict, possibly because of its relations with Iran, Oman has refrained from backing rebel groups against Iran's close ally, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, and instead focused on mediation. In December 1994, it became the first Gulf state to officially host a visit by an Israeli prime minister (Yitzhak Rabin), and it hosted then Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996. On October 25, 2018, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos. On March 24, 2019, Oman and the United States signed a "Strategic Framework Agreement" that expands the U.S.-Oman facilities access agreements by allowing U.S. forces to use the ports of Al Duqm (see above) and Salalah. Participation in Middle East Strategic Alliance . Oman has shown its support for major U.S. operations in the region by making its facilities available consistently. Oman has received small amounts of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) that have been used to help purchase U.S. equipment, and Oman is eligible for grant U.S. excess defense articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Despite Oman's efforts to diversify its economy, oil exports still generate over 70% of government revenues and nearly 50% of its gross domestic product (GDP). U.S.-Oman Economic Relations

The United States is Oman's fourth-largest trading partner.
The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman's ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad during 2014-2015, and his frail appearance in public appearance fuels speculation about succession. He does continue to meet with visiting leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years.
Oman has tended to position itself as a mediator of regional conflicts, and generally avoids joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions such as that in Yemen. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad's regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar.
Oman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman's ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing re-imposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran's efforts to ship weapons across Oman's borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Prior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but does not significantly limit Qaboos's role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs helped calm the unrest. Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states since 2011 by increasing press censorship and arresting critics of the government who use social media.
The periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman's economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman's access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman's efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.