For  example, the F-22 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-air missions  and the F-35 is focused on, and more capable in, air-to-ground missions. Figure 3 shows the basing locations of the F-22 fleet, and the numbers of  aircraft at each base. Small F-22 Squadrons and Wings Exacerbate Aircraft Availability Challenges

With 18 to 21 primary mission aircraft per F-22 squadron, and 1 or 2 F-22  squadrons per wing, the Air Force has been unable to gain the  maintenance and supply efficiencies associated with its larger traditional  squadrons and wings, and this has contributed to low aircraft availability  rates. The Air Force is planning to organize its active duty F-35 fleet into  traditional sized squadrons with 2 or 3 squadrons per wing. Larger squadrons and wings create efficiencies  because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air  Force officials. The Air Force organizes its F- 22 squadrons and other fighter squadrons based on a model where a  squadron deploys to a single forward location, according to Air Force  officials. For example, one of the F-22’s UTCs is designed  to have only 6 of a squadron’s 21 aircraft but contains almost 50 percent  of the squadron’s equipment, approximately 40 percent of the squadron’s  maintenance personnel and 60 percent of its operational personnel. The officials noted that during “split operations,” the  portion of the squadron remaining at home struggles to keep aircraft  available for missions. The Air Force Has Not Comprehensively Assessed F-22 Organizational Structure since 2010

While the Air Force reviews F-22 operations and sustainment needs as  part of the annual programming and budgeting process within DOD, the  Air Force has not comprehensively assessed whether the current F-22  organizational structure is the optimal structure to support combatant  commander needs since 2010, according to Air Force officials. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment  of the F-22 organizational structure that identifies and assesses  alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, the Air Force may  be forgoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical  F-22 fleet to support current and future combatant commander high-end  air superiority needs. Air Force Utilization of F-22s Reduces Pilot High-End Air Superiority Training Opportunities

The Air Force’s utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited its pilots’  opportunities to train for their high-end air superiority missions, and  contributed to F-22 pilots not meeting their training requirements. F-22 Pilots Are Not Meeting Minimum Training Requirements Necessary for Their Air Superiority Missions

F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for  the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and  service officials. Furthermore, F-22 units are often directed to participate in exercises as  part of Air Force efforts to build relationships with partners. However, due  to security concerns regarding exposing the F-22’s unique capabilities, F- 22 pilots may be restricted from flying the aircraft the way they would in  combat, according to Air Force officials. As a result, the value of the  training is reduced and these types of exercises can result in the F-22  pilots developing bad habits that must be corrected in future training,  according to Air Force officials. Classified details regarding the current and  projected operational requirements for the F-22 are included in the  classified version of this report. This mission  requires certain air bases have fully fueled, fully armed jets ready at all  times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. According to Air Force officials, the alert mission does not  require the high-end capabilities provided by the F-22 and currently F- 15C and F-16 squadrons are filling alert mission requirements in other  parts of the United States. With no other operational Air Force fighter  squadrons currently based in Hawaii and Alaska, the alert mission falls to  the F-22 units. Operational Deployments Diminish F-22 Pilots’ Ability to Train for High-End Air Superiority Missions

The Air Force also deploys F-22s outside of the United States to address  combatant commander requirements and these deployments also reduce  the time available for F-22 pilots to conduct home station training for their  high-end air superiority missions. However, the Air Force’s determination that it does not make  economic or operational sense to restart F-22 production means that the  Air Force has to find other ways to improve its F-22 fleet’s ability to  address high-end air superiority challenges. This effort could consider alternatives such as: reducing  exercise events that do not contribute to F-22 pilot high-end air superiority  training, increasing external adversary air support so all F-22 pilots can  use their available limited sorties to conduct high-end air superiority  training rather than having a significant portion of the F-22 pilots providing  training support, and finding alternatives to using F-22 units for alert  missions, and other missions that do not require the jet’s unique  capabilities or prepare F-22 pilots for their primary missions. Contact points for our  Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on  the last page of this report.
Why GAO Did This Study

The F-22 was designed and fielded as the Air Force's premier air-to-air fighter. The small fleet of 186 F-22s is central to the Air Force's ability to accomplish its air superiority mission in high threat areas. While the Air Force has focused on other missions over the last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying to refocus on overcoming advanced threats, even as it continues to support ongoing operations. Though the recent introduction of the F-35 gives the Air Force another advanced fighter, the F-35 is primarily designed for the air-to-ground missions and so is intended to complement but not replace the F-22.
Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons. This report examines the extent to which the Air Force's (1) organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes availability of aircraft and (2) utilization of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training. GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, analyzed maintenance data and training information for the F-22, evaluated the use of F-22s during deployments, and interviewed agency officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in April 2018. Information DOD deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Found

The Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability is constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization. For example, stealth is a central feature of the F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s are available for missions. Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated by the Air Force's decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units—18 or 21 primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing. Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Moreover, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location. However, it generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to keep aircraft available for missions at home. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel, according to service officials. The Air Force has not reassessed the structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat environments.
The Air Force's utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year. However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22's unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. For example, F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—a mission that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority skills. Without examining and implementing options to improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority challenges it expects to face.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force reassess its F-22 organizational structure to determine alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, and identify ways to increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for high-end air superiority missions. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.