These organizations include the following:
NDERG: Established in 2014 by the Secretary of Defense to  ensure the long-term health of the nuclear enterprise by  addressing resourcing, personnel, organizational, and enterprise  policy issues identified in the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. DOD Has Made Progress in Implementing and Tracking Recommendations, Including Evaluating and Documenting Key Risks

DOD continues to make progress in implementing the recommendations  from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and has made improvements in  tracking and evaluating this progress. DOD has also made progress in implementing the recommendations from  the 2015 NC3 report. 2). Military Services Have Begun to Track and Evaluate the Risks Associated with Open 2014 Recommendations

The military departments and other DOD components are responsible for  tracking and evaluating the implementation status of the 2014 nuclear  enterprise reviews’ recommendations; CAPE is providing guidance to aid  these efforts. In January 2018, in response to  our 2017 recommendation, CAPE issued additional guidance to improve  the identification, assessment, and documentation of risks related to  implementing the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews’ recommendations. The guidance also notes that components should update risk  assessments periodically as progress is made and new data become  available. Based on information in the tracking tool, the Air Force and the  Navy have lead responsibility for the 85 sub-recommendations for which  risk information is identified in the tracking tool. Since we last reported, in October 2017, DOD  has closed 3 additional recommendations. In July 2018, in response to our October 2017 recommendation, the DOD  CIO issued guidance to improve the tracking and evaluation of DOD’s  progress in implementing the recommendations of the 2015 NC3 report. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise, but Key Oversight Groups Lack Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and Methods for Communication and Collaboration Military Services Have Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise

DOD and the military services have taken steps to improve oversight of  the defense nuclear enterprise, in part in response to recommendations  from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. Further, DOD NC3 oversight guidance  has not been updated to reflect evolving NC3 oversight roles and  responsibilities and to include methods for communicating and  collaborating with other nuclear enterprise oversight groups. The NDERG Lacks Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities and Approaches for Communicating and Collaborating with Other Nuclear Oversight Groups

While the Deputy Secretary of Defense was designated as chairman of  the NDERG, DOD guidance does not define the membership, roles, and  responsibilities of the NDERG or identify methods for how the NDERG  and its working and oversight groups should communicate and  collaborate with other nuclear enterprise oversight groups. Additionally, clear  roles and responsibilities and methods for communication and  collaboration could better position senior leaders to effectively manage  resourcing and risk across the department. NC3 Governance Reform Initiative, February – May 2018: In  response to the Nuclear Posture Review, the Joint Staff  conducted a review of NC3 governance identifying problems with  the current NC3 enterprise governance construct and suggested  changes to address these problems. In its comments,  reproduced in appendix I, DOD concurred with all four of our  recommendations. We are providing copies of this report to the appropriate congressional  committees, and to the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment; the Chairman of the Joint  Chiefs of Staff; the Secretaries of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air  Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commander, U.S.  Strategic Command; the Department of Defense Chief Information  Officer; and the Director of the Office of Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD's nuclear enterprise. These reviews identified problems with leadership, organization, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other shortcomings that adversely affected the nuclear deterrence mission. The reviews also made recommendations to address these problems. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on NC3 systems, which resulted in additional recommendations.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes for addressing these recommendations. This report addresses the extent to which DOD and the military services have (1) made progress in the implementation, tracking, and evaluation—including identifying and documenting risk—of the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 NC3 report and (2) improved oversight of the defense nuclear enterprise and managed roles, responsibilities, and collaboration among various organizations. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed agency officials from DOD and the military services.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in implementing the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and a 2015 nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) review and has improved its tracking and evaluation of this progress. For example, since GAO last reported—in October 2017—an additional 74 of the 247 sub-recommendations from the 2014 reviews have been closed; 96 remain open. In January 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) issued guidance to aid the military services in identifying, assessing, and documenting risks associated with the 2014 recommendations, such as unintended consequences from their implementation. The guidance calls on them to update their risk assessments periodically as new data become available. The Air Force and Navy have begun to provide risk information in CAPE's and their own tracking tools. In July 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, DOD's Chief Information Officer issued guidance to improve tracking and evaluation of progress in implementing the 2015 recommendations.
DOD and the military services have taken steps to improve oversight of the nuclear enterprise in response to the 2014 reviews but lack clear roles and responsibilities and methods for collaboration. The Secretary of Defense created the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) in 2014 to ensure the long-term health of the nuclear enterprise by addressing resourcing, personnel, organizational, and enterprise policy issues. However, DOD guidance has not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the NDERG or provided methods for the NDERG to communicate and collaborate with other nuclear oversight organizations, including those shown in the figure. Nor has NC3 oversight guidance been updated to reflect changes in roles and responsibilities and to include methods for communication and collaboration among NC3 oversight groups. In the absence of defined roles and responsibilities for the NDERG and NC3 oversight bodies and methods for how the NDERG and NC3 oversight groups are to communicate and collaborate, senior leaders may not be in a position to effectively manage resourcing and risk across the department.

What GAO Recommends

GAO makes four recommendations for DOD to clarify roles, responsibilities, and methods of communication and collaboration for both the NDERG and NC3 oversight bodies. DOD concurred with all four recommendations and provided information about planned actions to implement them.