The law established the  procedures for making recommendations for base closures and  realignments and originally required DOD to submit a 6-year force- structure plan and base its closure and realignment decisions on that  plan. In  2001, when Congress authorized a BRAC round to begin in 2005, it  required DOD to submit a force-structure plan to cover a 20-year period  and an infrastructure inventory with its budget-justification documents for  fiscal year 2005 before proceeding with the extensive data gathering  efforts and analysis associated with the BRAC process. Military services used different metrics to evaluate installations in  similar mission categories. DOD’s 2017 Infrastructure Capacity Report Addressed or Partially Addressed the Required Elements

DOD’s 2017 infrastructure capacity report addressed or partially  addressed the five required elements from section 2815 of the NDAA for  Fiscal Year 2016. DOD’s report partially addressed the requirement to include a description  of the infrastructure capacity required to support the force structure  because the report describes only a small portion of the capacity needed. For example, in the case of Air Force large aircraft installations, the  needed infrastructure was described in terms of the square yards of  apron space needed to support the assigned aircraft, but did not describe  other infrastructure needs such as aircraft hangars, maintenance  facilities, and administrative space used by squadrons assigned to the  installation. DOD’s Excess Capacity Methodology and Analysis Has Limitations That Affect the Accuracy and Analytical Sufficiency of the Estimate

DOD’s excess capacity methodology and analysis has limitations that  affect the accuracy and analytical sufficiency of the estimate. Specifically,  DOD’s use of a 1989 baseline for excess capacity results in inaccurate  estimates of excess capacity; DOD’s methodology included assumptions  that were not always reasonable; and DOD’s approach to estimating  excess capacity is not always sufficient or implemented consistently  across the military departments. In  addition, as discussed below, DOD facility standards and requirements  have been updated and new weapon systems have been introduced,  which can affect the amount and type of infrastructure needed. Second, as implemented, DOD’s estimate of excess capacity may be  overstated because its methodology did not account for any potential  shortfalls in capacity—not having enough infrastructure to support the  mission—and did not provide a rationale for this approach in its  calculations. DOD’s 2017 infrastructure  capacity analysis identifies zero percent excess capacity in nearly half (14  of 32) of the installation categories that needed more capacity—included  in the analysis, including 8 or 12 Navy installation categories. In addition, because most installations  support more than one mission and have more infrastructure present than  the mission category metric measures, including potential capacity  shortfall in its analysis could provide DOD and Congress with a more  accurate estimate of excess capacity. DOD’s Method for Estimating Excess Capacity Is Not Always Sufficient or Implemented Consistently

DOD’s method for estimating excess capacity across the department is  not sufficient because it is based on a nongeneralizable sample and  therefore its reported estimates cannot be generalized to describe excess  capacity across the department. Second, the military departments did not follow a consistent approach  when calculating excess capacity. Without developing  guidance for the military departments, the estimate of excess capacity  may not be based on consistent methods across the department,  resulting in inaccurate estimates. Without  improvements to DOD’s method of estimating excess capacity, DOD is  not providing the information that Congress requires to make decisions  concerning the management of excess infrastructure capacity within the  department. Moreover, the combined effect of neither DOD nor Congress  having the information means that DOD will continue to experience  challenges with funding related to its infrastructure and potential excess  costs. (Recommendation 3)

	Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD) for  comment. DOD concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with  the other two recommendations. Generally Accepted Research Standards

Standard   used in GAO’s  review? DOD’s report does   not include range of options for force- structureplans and categorical  infrastructure inventory. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Its Efforts to Identify  Unutilized and Underutilized Facilities.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has used the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process primarily to reduce excess infrastructure capacity, transform the force, and produce cost savings. DOD completed hundreds of base closures and realignments in previous BRAC rounds and intends to work with Congress to address remaining excess capacity. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 required DOD to submit, among other things, a force structure plan and a categorical infrastructure inventory of worldwide military installations. In response, DOD submitted its infrastructure capacity report to Congress in October 2017.
The NDAA included a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD's report for accuracy and analytical sufficiency. In this report, GAO evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD's report included the required elements, and (2) DOD's methodology and analysis result in accurate and analytically sufficient information on excess capacity. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD's 2017 report and compared it with the statutory requirements and generally accepted research standards. GAO also interviewed DOD and military service officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense's (DOD) 2017 infrastructure capacity report addressed four of five required elements from section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016. Specifically, DOD's report addressed the elements requiring it to submit
a force-structure plan,
a categorical inventory of worldwide military installations,
a discussion of categories of excess infrastructure, and
an assessment of the value of retaining certain excess infrastructure.
DOD's report partially addressed the element to include a description of the infrastructure capacity required to support the force structure. Specifically, DOD's report did not provide a complete picture of the infrastructure needed. For example, infrastructure at Air Force large aircraft installations was described by square yards of apron space, but did not include other infrastructure needs such as aircraft hangars and maintenance facilities.
DOD's excess capacity methodology and analysis has three key limitations that affect the accuracy and analytical sufficiency of the estimate. Specifically:
DOD used a 1989 baseline for excess capacity that may lead to inaccurate results. This 1989 baseline does not reflect updates in DOD facility standards and requirements or requirements associated with new weapon systems.
DOD's excess capacity methodology includes assumptions, such as not accounting for potential shortfalls—not having enough infrastructure to support the mission—that may not be reasonable. Specifically, when DOD's calculation identifies shortfall in capacity, DOD concludes that no excess capacity exists. As a result, DOD's analysis identifies no excess capacity in nearly half (14 of 32) mission categories. However, most installations support more than one mission and have more infrastructure present than the installation category metric measures. Thus, including potential capacity shortfalls could provide DOD and Congress with a more accurate estimate of excess capacity upon which to base decisions concerning the management of base infrastructure and excess capacity.
DOD's method for estimating excess capacity is not always sufficient because the installation selection process does not result in a generalizable sample. Furthermore, DOD's method is not always implemented effectively because the military departments did not follow a consistent approach.
According to DOD officials, specific department-wide guidance concerning DOD's methods for selecting installations in its analysis does not exist. Moreover, without developing guidance, the estimate of excess capacity may not be based on consistent methods across the department, resulting in inaccurate estimates. Furthermore, neither DOD nor Congress will have the necessary information to make decisions concerning the management of excess infrastructure capacity across the department.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making three recommendations to DOD to update the baseline; use reasonable assumptions; and develop guidance to improve its methods for estimating excess capacity. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one recommendation, partially concurred with two recommendations, and plans to incorporate them in any future capacity analysis.