Navy and Marine Corps Units Completed Training for Certain Amphibious Operations Priorities but Not Others Due to Several Factors

In our September 2017 report, we found that Navy and Marine Corps  units deploying as part of ARG-MEUs completed required training for  amphibious operations, but the Marine Corps has been unable to  consistently accomplish training for other service amphibious operations  priorities. However, we also reported that based on our review of unit-level  readiness data from fiscal year 2014 through 2016, Marine Corps units  were unable to fully accomplish training for other amphibious operations  priorities. The Navy and Marine Corps Have Taken Some Steps to Identify and Address Amphibious Training Shortfalls, but These Efforts Are Incomplete

		Services’ Approach Does Not Incorporate Strategic Training and Leading Risk Management Practices

In our September 2017 report, we identified some steps that the Navy  and Marine Corps have taken to mitigate the training shortfall for their  amphibious operations priorities, such as by better defining the amount of  amphibious operations capabilities and capacity needed to achieve the  services’ wartime requirements. For Marine Corps units not scheduled for a MEU  deployment, officials described an ad hoc process to allocate any  remaining available amphibious ship training time among home- station units. In our September 2017 report, we recommended that the Navy and  Marine Corps develop an approach to prioritize available training  resources, systematically evaluate among training resource alternatives  to achieve amphibious operations priorities, and monitor progress toward  achieving them. The Marine Corps’ process for conducting front- end planning and analysis to support the acquisition of its virtual  training devices does not include consideration of critical factors for  integrating virtual training devices into operational training, such as  the specific training tasks the device is intended to address, how the  device would be used to meet proficiency goals, or available time for  units to train with the device. Without a well-defined process to consistently  evaluate the effectiveness of virtual training devices for training, the  Marine Corps risks investing in devices whose value to operational  training is undetermined. Incorporating Collaboration Practices would Further Naval Integration Efforts for Amphibious Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve  coordination between the two services, to include issuing strategic  documents that discuss the importance of improving naval integration and  establishing mechanisms to coordinate their amphibious operations  training capabilities. However, in our September 2017 report we found  that the services have not fully incorporated leading collaboration  practices that would help drive efforts to improve naval integration. Common outcomes and joint strategy. Leverage resources to maximize training opportunities.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training ( GAO-17-789 ).

What GAO Found

Navy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) completed their required training for amphibious operations, but other Marine Corps units have been limited in their ability to conduct training for other amphibious operations–related priorities. GAO found that several factors, to include the decline in the fleet of the Navy's amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 31 today limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training for other priorities, such as recurring training for home-station units (see figure). As a result, training completion for amphibious operations was low for some but not all Marine Corps units from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The services have taken steps to address amphibious training shortfalls, such as more comprehensively determining units that require training. However, these efforts are incomplete because the services do not have an approach to prioritize available training resources, evaluate training resource alternatives, and monitor progress towards achieving priorities. Thus, the services are not well positioned to mitigate any training shortfalls.
The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve coordination between the two services, but have not fully incorporated leading collaboration practices to improve integration of the two services—naval integration—for amphibious operations. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have not defined and articulated common outcomes for naval integration that would help them align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.
The Marine Corps has taken steps to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, but gaps remain in its process to develop and use them. GAO found that for selected virtual training devices, the Marine Corps did not conduct front-end analysis that considered key factors, such as the specific training tasks that a device would accomplish; consider device usage data to support its investment decisions; or evaluate the effectiveness of existing virtual training devices because of weaknesses in the service's guidance. As a result, the Marine Corps risks investing in devices that are not cost-effective and whose value to operational training is undetermined.