Figure 1 depicts NASA’s life cycle for space flight projects. At the time of our review in May 2018, NASA had a portfolio of 26 major  projects (see table 1). NASA Acquisition Management as a High- Risk Area

NASA acquisition management is an area that we monitor on our high- risk list. In more recent years we have found that NASA’s leadership was focused  on improving acquisition outcomes and had taken some steps to improve  its management. We believe that many of these steps NASA has taken contributed to the  largely positive trend of cost and schedule performance for NASA’s  portfolio of major projects between 2013 and 2017. Further, in our 2016 and 2017 assessments of major projects, we found  that while the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio was  improving, a number of large, complex projects were in or would soon be  entering the integration and test phase—the phase in development that  often reveals unforeseen challenges that can lead to cost and schedule  growth. In May 2017, projects in this phase included all three human  spaceflight programs and the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). Portfolio Cost and Schedule Deteriorated but Extent of Cost Growth Is Unknown

The cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio of major projects  deteriorated between May 2017 and May 2018, but the extent of cost  growth is unknown. NASA lacks a current cost estimate for its Orion crew  capsule—one of the largest programs in the portfolio—but expects the  program will exceed its cost baseline when NASA updates the program’s  life-cycle cost estimate. In our May 2018 report, we found that 7 of 17 NASA major projects had  stayed within cost and schedule estimates since our 2017 annual  assessment of major projects, but 9 projects experienced cost growth or  schedule delays and cost growth is expected for the Orion program. The deteriorating cost and schedule performance of the portfolio in 2018  is the result of  four projects—SLS, EGS, SGSS, and Mars 2020—addressing  technical challenges that were compounded by risky programmatic  decisions;  two projects—JWST and ICESat-2—experiencing delays due to  technical challenges identified during integration and test; and  three projects—NISAR, ICON, and GRACE-FO—experiencing cost  growth or delays largely due to factors outside of the projects’ control. For example, NASA managers noted  concerns with contractor plans and staffing estimates in 2013 during  project confirmation. First, as we found in February 2018, the project delayed its launch  readiness date by up to 8 months primarily due to the integration of  the various spacecraft elements taking longer than expected. For  example, in December 2012, we recommended the JWST project  update its JCL. NASA Is Likely to Encounter Additional Cost Growth and Schedule Delays

The composition of the portfolio in the coming years is expected to  include large and complex projects, putting NASA at risk of continued  cost increases and schedule delays. But even with these efforts, NASA’s cost and schedule performance may  be further tested in upcoming years as some expensive, complex projects  linger in the portfolio longer than expected. In closing, NASA continues to make improvements to the acquisition  management of its portfolio of major projects. However, the deterioration  of the cost and schedule performance of NASA’s portfolio this year and  the likelihood of additional cost growth and schedule delays demonstrate  the need for NASA to continue to take actions to further reduce  acquisition risk as we and others have recommended. Orion is planned to launch atop NASA’s  Space Launch System.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO designated NASA's acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990 after a history of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in many of NASA's major projects. In more recent years, GAO found that NASA had taken some steps to improve its management, and, in May 2017, GAO found that projects were continuing a generally positive trend of limiting cost and schedule growth. But at the same time, GAO noted that many of these projects, including some of the most expensive ones, were approaching the phase in their life cycles when cost and schedule growth is most likely.
This statement summarizes GAO's 2018 findings from its 10th annual snapshot of how well NASA is planning and executing its major acquisition projects, and describes (1) the cost and schedule performance of NASA's portfolio of major projects and (2) the extent to which NASA faces risks for further cost increases and schedule delays. To conduct its review for the 2018 report, GAO-18-280SP , GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and other data for NASA's 26 major projects, each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million; reviewed monthly project status reports; and interviewed NASA officials.

What GAO Found

The cost and schedule performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) portfolio of major projects has deteriorated, but the extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown. NASA expects cost growth for the Orion crew capsule—one of the largest projects in the portfolio—but does not have a current cost estimate. In addition, the average launch delay for the portfolio was 12 months, the highest delay GAO has reported in its 10 years of assessing major NASA projects (see figure below).
The deterioration in portfolio performance was the result of 9 of the 17 projects in development experiencing cost or schedule growth.
Four projects encountered technical issues that were compounded by risky program management decisions. For example, the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems programs are large-scale, technically complex human spaceflight programs, and NASA managed them to aggressive schedules and with insufficient levels of cost and schedule reserves. This made it more difficult for the programs to operate within their committed baseline cost and schedule estimates.
Two projects ran into technical challenges that resulted in delays in the integration and test phase. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that the James Webb Space Telescope project encountered delays primarily due to the integration of the various spacecraft elements taking longer than expected, as well as the need to resolve technical issues during testing. GAO has previously found that integration and testing is when projects are most at risk of incurring cost and schedule growth.
Three projects experienced cost growth or schedule delays due to factors outside of the projects' control, such as delays related to their launch vehicles.
NASA continues to face increased risk of cost and schedule growth in future years due to new, large and complex projects that will enter the portfolio and expensive projects remaining in the portfolio longer than expected.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. GAO has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA generally agreed with these recommendations, but has not fully addressed some of them. GAO continues to believe they should be fully addressed.