FRA also oversees  safety of intercity passenger and commuter railroads that operate over  tracks owned by freight railroads and other entities. FRA Has a Centralized Safety Oversight Framework While FTA Is Implementing a State- Based Approach

FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while  FTA is implementing changes to the rail transit oversight program,  established in federal statute, which relies on states to monitor and  enforce safety. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) the  establishment of safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight  activities, such as audits and investigations, based on those regulations,  and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are  addressed (see fig. In  addition to its public transportation safety program regulations, FTA also  has regulations governing its drug and alcohol testing program. FRA’s and FTA’s oversight activities also include regular audits of, and  communication with, the rail operators under their oversight. More specifically, FRA inspectors, and state safety agencies in FTA’s  oversight program, regularly examine records of rail operators’ internal  inspections to identify safety deficiencies. FRA’s and FTA’s Approaches to Rail Safety Oversight Have Strengths and Limitations, and FTA Can Improve Implementation of Its New Authorities

FRA and FTA’s approaches to their rail safety oversight missions each  have strengths and limitations, including how the agencies develop safety  regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. FTA has made some  progress toward developing appropriate safety regulations, such as  identifying subjects for potential regulatory action. FTA, though, has not  provided states guidance for these efforts. Though FTA has made progress assessing the state of rail transit safety  standards, a limitation of FTA’s rail transit safety oversight program is the  lack of federal rail transit safety regulations, which may contribute to  inconsistent safety practices across the rail transit industry, according to  studies we reviewed and discussions with rail operators and stakeholder  organizations. In the materials  FTA provided to states, it said that it intends to provide guidance to states  on risk-based inspections but did not provide us with a plan or timeline for  doing so. Without guidance from FTA, state safety agencies may not develop  effective risk-based inspection programs and thus not use their resources  efficiently. Enforcement: FRA Utilizes Various Mechanisms; FTA Has No Process or Methodology to Assess the Effectiveness of State Safety Agency Enforcement

A strength of FRA’s safety oversight program is that the agency has and  utilizes clear enforcement authority, according to NTSB and stakeholders  we spoke with. Though federal law requires that state safety agencies have enforcement  authorities over the safety of the rail transit entities they oversee, a  limitation of FTA’s approach is that FTA has not developed a method to  evaluate the effectiveness of states’ enforcement practices. As a result, deficiencies may remain for  long periods of time, potentially contributing to safety incidents. In particular,  without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based  inspection programs, state safety agencies may not use limited resources  efficiently, risking that important safety issues will go undetected. Recommendations

We are making the following two recommendations to FTA:
The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should create a plan, with  a timeline, for developing guidance for state safety agencies about  how to develop and implement a risk-based inspection program. (Recommendation 1)
The Office of Transit Safety and Oversight should develop and  communicate a method for how it will monitor the effectiveness of the  enforcement authorities and practices of state safety agencies. In e-mails, NTSB and WMATA provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided with additional authority to oversee the safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA is now implementing this authority. The DOT's Office of Inspector General has reported, though, that FTA faces challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, has long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads.
GAO was asked to review various rail safety and oversight issues, including the differences between FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. This report examines (1) key characteristics of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and limitations of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. GAO assessed FRA's and FTA's information about rail safety oversight activities against guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, leading practices developed by the transit industry, and federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including rail operators chosen based on mode, size, and location.

What GAO Found

The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA's program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure).
There are strengths and limitations to FRA's and FTA's approaches to their safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with generally agreed, that strengths of FRA's rail safety oversight program include its safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and support to states' safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies' enforcement is effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, potentially contributing to safety incidents.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FTA (1) create a plan, with timeline, for developing risk-based inspection guidance for state safety agencies, and (2) develop and communicate a method for how FTA will monitor whether state safety agencies' enforcement practices are effective. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and WMATA provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.