Delays to OCX of more than 5 years led the Air Force to create two  additional programs in 2016 and 2017 to modify the current GPS ground  system to control GPS III satellites and provide a limited M-code  broadcast. DOD concurred with the four recommendations on OCX and  partially concurred on the MGUE recommendation. Acquisition Risks Persist on GPS III Satellites but Do Not Threaten Sustainment of the Constellation in the Short Term

The Air Force has made some progress toward ensuring continued  constellation sustainment since our September 2015 report and should be  able to sustain the current service because of the length of life of the  current satellites. Short-Term Risk Mitigation: Nearly 2 Years of Schedule Buffer to When First GPS III Satellite Needed

Recent data show that the current satellites in the GPS constellation are  expected to remain operational longer than previously projected, creating  an additional, nearly 2-year schedule buffer before the first GPS III  satellite needs to be operational to sustain the current GPS constellation  capability. Greater Coordination Needed to Prevent Duplication of Effort Developing and Fielding M-code Receivers

While technology development for the M-code receiver cards is  underway, DOD has developed preliminary—but incomplete—plans to  fully develop and field M-code receiver cards across the more than 700  weapon systems that will need to make the transition from the current  technology. DOD has prepared initial cost and schedule estimates for  department-wide fielding for a fraction of these weapon systems. The military services are working to mitigate some of these development  challenges. DOD Has Begun Cost and Schedule Planning; Full Cost Is Unknown but Likely to be Many Billions of Dollars

DOD has begun collecting preliminary information on M-code  requirements for individual weapon systems. Additionally, the  preliminary estimates to develop and procure M-code receivers on  selected weapon systems do not all include funding beyond fiscal year  2021 that will be needed for further development, integration, and  procurement. However, we will  continue to monitor DOD’s cost and schedule planning. DOD Risks Duplication of Effort Integrating and Testing M-code Receiver Cards

The level of development and procurement effort beyond MGUE  increments 1 and 2 is significant and will require close coordination  among the military services, MDA, and SOCOM. After the Air Force develops initial  cards for both sizes, the breadth and complexity of this acquisition will  multiply, as the offices responsible for upgrading hundreds of weapon  systems begin their own individual efforts to further develop and test the  cards so they work for the unique needs of their specific system. DOD does not have a developed plan in place to help ensure that  common design solutions are employed and that DOD avoids duplication  of effort as multiple entities separately mature receiver cards. DOD therefore risks paying to repeatedly  find design solutions to solve common problems because each program  office is likely to undertake its own uncoordinated development effort. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To determine the extent to which there are acquisition risks to sustaining  the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation, we reviewed  the Air Force GPS quarterly reports, program acquisition baselines,  integrated master schedules, acquisition strategies, software  development plans, test plans, and other documents to the extent they  existed for GPS III, Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX),  and Contingency Operations (COps) programs. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) faces  acquisition challenges developing a new ground system to control the  broadcast of a modernized GPS signal, we reviewed Air Force program  plans and documentation related to cost, schedule, acquisition strategies,  technology development, and major challenges to delivering M-code  Early Use (MCEU) and OCX blocks 1 and 2. Additionally, to understand the extent to which DOD has a plan  for implementing M-code for the warfighter, we analyzed DOD  Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) plans and other DOD  memorandum on GPS receiver cards.
Why GAO Did This Study

GPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to civilian and military users who depend on this satellite-based system. Since 2000, DOD—led by the Air Force—has been working to modernize GPS and to keep the current system of satellites—known as the GPS constellation—operational, although these efforts have experienced cost and schedule growth.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 contained a provision that the Air Force provide reports to GAO on GPS acquisition programs and that GAO brief the congressional defense committees. GAO briefed the committees in 2016 and 2017. This report summarizes and expands on information presented in those briefings.
This report assesses the extent to which DOD faces acquisition challenges (1) sustaining the GPS constellation; (2) developing a new ground control system; and (3) developing and fielding modernized receivers. GAO analyzed GPS quarterly acquisition reports and data, acquisition strategies, software and test plans, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition of the next generation Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, known as GPS III, faces a number of acquisition challenges, but these challenges do not threaten DOD's ability to continue operating the current GPS system, which DOD refers to as the constellation, in the near term. Projections for how long the current constellation will be fully capable have increased by nearly 2 years to June 2021, affording some buffer to offset any additional satellite delays. While the first GPS III satellite has a known parts problem, six follow-on satellites—which do not—are currently scheduled to be launched by June 2021.
DOD is relying on a high-risk acquisition schedule to develop a new ground system, known as OCX, to control the broadcast of a modernized military GPS signal. OCX remains at risk for further delays and cost growth. To mitigate continuing delays to the new ground control system, the Air Force has begun a second new program—Military-code (M-code) Early Use—to deliver an interim, limited broadcast encrypted GPS signal for military use by modifying the current ground system. GAO will continue to monitor OCX progress.
DOD has made some progress on initial testing of the receiver cards needed to utilize the M-code signal. However, additional development is necessary to make M-code work with over 700 weapon systems that require it. DOD has begun initial planning for some weapon systems, but more remains to be done to understand the cost and schedule needed to transition to M-code receivers. The preliminary estimate for integrating and testing a fraction of the weapon systems that need the receiver cards is over $2.5 billion through fiscal year 2021 with only 28 fully and 72 partially funded (see figure). The cost will increase by billions when as yet unfunded weapon systems are included.
The level of development and procurement effort beyond the initial receiver cards is significant and will require close coordination across DOD. After the Air Force develops initial cards, the breadth and complexity of this acquisition will multiply, as the offices responsible for upgrading hundreds of weapon systems begin their own individual efforts to further develop and test the cards. However, DOD does not have an organization assigned to collect test data, lessons learned, and design solutions so that common design solutions are employed to avoid duplication of effort as multiple entities separately mature receiver cards. DOD therefore risks paying to repeatedly find design solutions to solve common problems because each program office is likely to undertake its own uncoordinated development effort.

What GAO Recommends

DOD should assign responsibility to an organization to collect test data, lessons learned, and design solutions so they may be shared. DOD concurred with the recommendation.