Navy and Marine Corps Units Completed Training for Certain Amphibious Operations Priorities but Not Others, and Efforts to Mitigate Training Shortfalls Are Incomplete

Navy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an ARG-MEU  completed their required training for amphibious operations, but several  factors have limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training  for other amphibious operations–related priorities. However, while the Marine Corps has completed amphibious operations  training for the MEU, based on our review of unit-level readiness data  from fiscal year 2014 through 2016 we found that the service has been  unable to fully accomplish training for its other amphibious operations  priorities, which include home-station unit training to support contingency  requirements, service-level exercises, and experimentation and concept  development for amphibious operations. As a result, the unit will likely not conduct  amphibious operations during its predeployment training. Efforts to Identify and Address Amphibious Training Shortfalls Lack Strategic Training and Risk-Management Practices

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to mitigate the  training shortfall for their amphibious operations priorities, but these  efforts are incomplete because they have not prioritized available training  resources, systematically evaluated among potential training resource  alternatives to accomplish the services’ amphibious operations training  priorities, or monitored progress toward achieving the priorities. More Comprehensively Incorporating Collaboration Practices Would Further Naval Integration Efforts for Amphibious Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve  coordination between the two services, but the services have not fully  incorporated leading collaboration practices that would help drive efforts  to improve naval integration for amphibious operations. The Marine Corps’ front-end planning process to support the acquisition  of virtual training devices has gaps because the service does not have  specific policies to ensure the process considers key factors. In addition, while the Navy and  Marine Corps have taken a number of positive steps to improve  coordination between the two services, they need to define and articulate  common outcomes for naval integration. To more effectively and efficiently integrate virtual training devices into  operational training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop guidance for the  development and use of virtual training devices that includes developing requirements for virtual training devices that consider and  document training tasks and objectives, required proficiency, and  available training time;  setting target usage rates and collecting usage data; and  conducting effectiveness analysis of virtual training devices that  defines a consistent process for performing the analysis, including the  selection of the devices to be evaluated, guidelines on conducting the  analysis, and the data that should be collected and assessed. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this report are to determine the extent to which (1) the  Navy and Marine Corps have completed training for amphibious  operations priorities and taken steps to mitigate any training shortfalls, (2)  the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ efforts to improve naval integration for  amphibious operations incorporate leading collaborative practices, and  (3) the Marine Corps has integrated selected virtual training devices into  its operational training. This report is a public version of a classified report that we issued in  August 2017. Therefore, this report omits classified information  on select Marine Corps units’ ability to complete training for amphibious  operations. See below for the list of 23 Marine Corps  units. We interviewed Navy and Marine  Corps officials to discuss any factors that limited their ability to conduct  training for amphibious operations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy and Marine Corps have identified a need to improve their ability to conduct amphibious operations—an operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force.
Senate and House reports accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included provisions for GAO to review Navy and Marine Corps training. This report examines the extent to which (1) the Navy and Marine Corps have completed training for amphibious operations priorities and taken steps to mitigate any training shortfalls, (2) these services' efforts to improve naval integration for amphibious operations incorporate leading collaboration practices, and (3) the Marine Corps has integrated selected virtual training devices into operational training. GAO analyzed training initiatives; interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of officials from 23 units that were selected based on their training plans; analyzed training completion data; and selected a nongeneralizable sample of six virtual training devices to review based on factors such as target audience.
This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2017. Information that DOD deemed classified has been omitted.

What GAO Found

Navy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) completed their required training for amphibious operations, but other Marine Corps units have been limited in their ability to conduct training for other amphibious operations–related priorities. GAO found that several factors, to include the decline in the fleet of the Navy's amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 31 today limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training for other priorities, such as recurring training for home-station units (see figure). As a result, training completion for amphibious operations was low for some but not all Marine Corps units from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The services have taken steps to address amphibious training shortfalls, such as more comprehensively determining units that require training. However, these efforts are incomplete because the services do not have an approach to prioritize available training resources, evaluate training resource alternatives, and monitor progress towards achieving priorities. Thus, the services are not well positioned to mitigate any training shortfalls.
The Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve coordination between the two services, but have not fully incorporated leading collaboration practices to improve integration of the two services—naval integration—for amphibious operations. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have not defined and articulated common outcomes for naval integration that would help them align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.
The Marine Corps has taken steps to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, but gaps remain in its process to develop and use them. GAO found that for selected virtual training devices, the Marine Corps did not conduct front-end analysis that considered key factors, such as the specific training tasks that a device would accomplish; consider device usage data to support its investment decisions; or evaluate the effectiveness of existing virtual training devices because of weaknesses in the service's guidance. As a result, the Marine Corps risks investing in devices that are not cost-effective and whose value to operational training is undetermined.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy and Marine Corps develop an approach for amphibious operations training and define and articulate common outcomes for naval integration; and that the Marine Corps develop guidance for the development and use of its virtual training devices. The Department of Defense concurred.