Congress also debated, but did not authorize, the use of force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack. In September 2014, the United States began air strikes in Syria, with the stated goal of preventing the Islamic State from using Syria as a base for its operations in neighboring Iraq. CJTF-OIR came to encompass more than 70 countries, and has bolstered the efforts of local Syrian partner forces against the Islamic State. In early 2019, the White House announced that several hundred U.S. troops would remain in Syria. U.S. officials have stated that the United States will not fund reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political solution is reached in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254. Amid significant territorial losses by the Islamic State and Syrian opposition groups since 2015 and parallel military gains by the Syrian government and coalition partner forces, U.S. policymakers face a number of questions and potential decision points related to the following factors:

		Counter-IS operations and the presence of U.S. military personnel in Syria

The announcement by President Trump in December 2018 that U.S. forces would withdraw from Syria was welcomed by the Syrian government and its Russian and Iranian partners, along with observers who questioned the necessity, utility, and legality of continued U.S. operations. Members of the 116 th Congress may seek clarification on the Administration's strategy to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. (See Figure 3 and Figure 4 .) The FY2019 NDAA ( P.L. The future of U.S.-administered stabilization and other assistance programs in formerly opposition-held areas of Syria and areas currently held by U.S. partner forces is in question, in light of both the Asad government's reassertion of control in many areas, the planned reduction of U.S. military forces, and the December 2018 withdrawal of State Department and USAID personnel from northern Syria. While the United States continues to call for a political settlement to the conflict, the U.S. intelligence community has assessed that Asad is "unlikely to negotiate himself from power" or make meaningful concession to the opposition:
The regime's momentum, combined with continued support from Russia and Iran, almost certainly has given Syrian President Bashar al-Asad little incentive to make anything more than token concessions to the opposition or to adhere to UN resolutions on constitutional changes that Asad perceives would hurt his regime. As of March 2019, total U.S. humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis since 2011 had reached more than $9.5 billion. In the fall of 2018, Administration officials began to articulate a three-track Syria strategy which included seeking the enduring defeat of the Islamic State, achieving a political settlement to the Syrian civil war based on the terms of UNSCR 2254, and inducing the departure of all Iranian-commanded forces from Syria. Since U.S. military action against the Islamic State began in June 2014, starting in Iraq and then spreading to Syria, Congress also has debated the need for enactment of a new IS-specific authorization for use of military force. U.S. forces have operated in Syria for train and equip program purposes as well as to advise and assist U.S. partner forces, whether or not those specific partner forces were trained and/or armed under the train and equip program. FY2020 Defense Funding Request

The Administration's FY2020 request seeks $300 million in CTEF funds to equip and sustain "vetted Syrian opposition (VSO) forces," including Internal Security Forces. Since 2012, the United States has provided nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition groups. Nonlethal and Stabilization Aid to Syria: 2017-2019

Since FY2012, successive Administrations and Congresses have taken evolving approaches to requests and appropriations of funds for assistance and stabilization programs in Syria. FY2019 . However, the Administration still calls for a political settlement to the Syria conflict based on UNSCR 2254—which requires the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of U.N.-supervised elections.
Since 2011, the Syria conflict has presented significant policy challenges for the United States. (For a brief conflict summary, see Figure 2). U.S. policy toward Syria since 2014 has prioritized counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL/ISIS), but also has included nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition groups, diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the civil war, and humanitarian aid to Syria and regional countries affected by refugee outflows. U.S. forces deployed to Syria have trained, equipped, and advised local partners under special authorization from Congress and have worked primarily "by, with, and through" those local partners to retake nearly all areas formerly held by the Islamic State.
Following an internal policy review, Administration officials in late 2018 had described U.S. policy toward Syria as seeking (1) the enduring defeat of the Islamic State; (2) a political settlement to the Syrian civil war; and (3) the withdrawal of Iranian-commanded forces. President Trump's December 2018 announcement that U.S. forces had defeated the Islamic State and would leave Syria appeared to signal the start of a new U.S. approach. However, in February 2019, the White House stated that several hundred U.S. troops would remain in Syria, and the President is requesting $300 million in FY2020 defense funding to continue to equip and sustain Syrian partner forces. The FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-232) required the Administration to clarify its Syria strategy and report on current programs in order to obligate FY2019 defense funds for train and equip purposes in Syria.
The United States continues to advocate for a negotiated settlement between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and Syrian opposition forces in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 (which calls for the drafting of a new constitution and U.N.-supervised elections). However, the Asad government's use of force to retake most opposition-held areas of Syria has reduced pressure on Damascus to negotiate, and U.S. intelligence officials in 2019 assessed that Asad has little incentive to make significant concessions to the opposition. U.S. officials have stated that the United States will not contribute aid to reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political solution is reached.
The United States has directed more than $9.1 billion toward Syria-related humanitarian assistance, and Congress has appropriated billions more for security and stabilization initiatives in Syria and neighboring countries. The Defense Department has not disaggregated the costs of military operations in Syria from the overall cost of the counter-IS campaign in Syria and Iraq (known as Operation Inherent Resolve, OIR), which had reached $28.5 billion by September 2018.
The 115th Congress considered proposals to authorize or restrict the use of force against the Islamic State and in response to Syrian government chemical weapons attacks, but did not enact any Syria-specific use of force authorizations. The 116th Congress may seek clarification from the Administration concerning its overall Syria policy, plans for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, the U.S role in ensuring a lasting defeat for the Islamic State, U.S. investments and approaches to postconflict stabilization, the future of Syrian refugees and U.S. partners inside Syria, and the challenges of dealing with the Iran- and Russia-aligned Asad government.