DOD provides both personnel and funding to support its efforts in  Afghanistan. In this  report, we refer to the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security  Forces as specialized forces, and the other components of the ANDSF as  conventional forces. Enhanced vehicle maintenance efforts. DOD Has Some Information on ANDSF Specialized Forces’ Ability to Operate and Maintain U.S.-Purchased Equipment but Has Limited Reliable Information on Its Conventional Forces

		DOD Advisors Embedded with Specialized Forces Provide Some Information on Those Forces’ Capabilities

DOD collects some reliable information about the operation and  maintenance abilities of ANDSF specialized forces, in part because  advisors are embedded at the tactical level with the specialized forces,  according to DOD officials. See appendix II for more information on the Afghan Air Force’s  ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters. DOD Advisors Have Limited Contact with Conventional Forces in the Field, Yielding Little Information on Their Ability to Operate and Maintain Equipment

U.S. and coalition forces perform high-level assessments of the ANDSF  conventional forces’ capabilities at the corps and zone levels but do not  assess their tactical abilities, such as the ability to operate and maintain  equipment, according to DOD officials. DOD officials acknowledged that some  of the plans described above that DOD and the ANDSF have begun  implementing to address capability gaps may provide opportunities for  DOD to collect more reliable information on the conventional forces’  ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. While DOD  has reported the ANDSF have improved in several capability areas, they  continue to face critical capability gaps, impeding their ability to maintain  security and stability in Afghanistan independent of U.S. and coalition  forces. The Department of  State had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

House Report 114-537 associated with the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us to  review the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces’ (ANDSF)  capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon  systems and equipment. This report is a public version of a sensitive  report that we issued on September 20, 2018. This version includes information on the other two  objectives: (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and  capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about  the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To identify what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and  capability gaps, we reviewed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  and DOD documents and reports, such as DOD’s semiannual Section  1225 reports to Congress, produced after the start of the NATO-led  Resolute Support mission on January 1, 2015. To determine the extent to which DOD has information about the  ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, we  reviewed DOD documents and reports and interviewed DOD officials in  the United States and Afghanistan, including DOD officials who advise the ANDSF.
Why GAO Did This Study

Developing independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future.
House Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan.
This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Found

Since the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years.
While DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable.
GAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation.