To help keep these instruments cold, a  multi-layered tennis court-sized sunshield is being developed to protect  the mirrors and instruments from the sun’s heat. This process is known  as a rebaseline. In June 2018, after a series of launch delay announcements due to  technical and workmanship issues identified during spacecraft element  integration, NASA notified Congress that it had again revised the JWST  program’s cost and schedule estimates. NASA Revised Schedule and Cost Commitments to Reflect Prior and Ongoing Technical Challenges

To develop a new schedule for JWST’s 2018 replan, NASA took into  account the remaining integration and test work and added time to the  schedule to address threats that were not yet mitigated. This includes 5.5  months to address an anomaly that occurred on the sunshield’s cover in  2018. Schedule: JWST’s revised launch readiness date of March 2021 reflects  a consideration of the hardware integration and test challenges the  project has experienced, including adding time to:
Add snag guards for the membrane tensioning system—which helps  deploy the sunshield and maintain its correct shape—to prevent  excess cable from snagging,
Repair tears of the sunshield membrane,
Deploy, fold, and stow the sunshield, and
Mitigate contractor schedule threats. As part of its May 2018 study, the IRB reviewed the project’s schedule  and recommended a launch date of March 2021, which was subsequently  reflected in NASA’s new schedule for the program. Cost: The project’s new $9.7 billion life-cycle cost estimate is principally  driven by the schedule extension, which requires keeping the contractor’s  workforce to complete integration and test longer than expected. The associate administrator did not require the project to conduct an  updated Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level (JCL) analysis for this  replan. For example, the  project worked to mitigate a design issue on the frill connections. If the project proceeds with its plan to  conduct only a schedule risk analysis, NASA would be provided only with  an updated probability of meeting its schedule commitments. In addition, government  and industry cost and schedule experts we spoke with noted that  integration and testing is a critical time for a project when problems can  develop. In its June 2018 letter notifying an appropriate congressional committee  of its updated cost and schedule commitments, NASA acknowledged that  recent cost growth for the project will likely impact other science missions. NASA Is Augmenting Oversight of Contractor and Project Performance, and Identified the JWST Project Manager as Responsible for Sustaining Changes

NASA has taken steps to augment oversight of the contractor and project  following the discovery of the embedded design flaws and workmanship  errors that contributed to the project’s most recent schedule delays and  cost increases. Project and Northrop Grumman officials provided an  example of these changes working. The project manager’s continued focus on these  efforts will be important because:
The project is implementing a wide span of improvement efforts,  ranging from more on-site coverage at the contractor facility to cultural  improvements, which will now need to be sustained for an additional  29 months. Conclusions

JWST is one of NASA’s most expensive and complex science projects,  and NASA has invested considerable time and resources on it. The  project first established its cost and schedule baseline in 2009. Conducting a JCL would  better inform decision makers on the status of the project as they  determine whether the project can complete remaining project  development with acceptable risk and within its cost and schedule  constraints.
Why GAO Did This Study

JWST, a large, deployable telescope, is one of NASA's most complex projects and top priorities. The project has delayed its planned launch three times since September 2017 due to problems discovered in testing. In June 2018, NASA approved new cost and schedule estimates for JWST. Since the project established its cost and schedule baselines in 2009, the project's costs have increased by 95 percent and the launch date has been moved back by 81 months.
Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the seventh report. This report assesses (1) the considerations NASA took into account when updating the project's cost and schedule commitments and (2) the extent to which NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, among other issues. GAO reviewed relevant NASA policies, analyzed NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.

What GAO Found

In June 2018, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revised the cost and schedule commitments for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) to reflect known technical challenges, as well as provide additional time to address unanticipated challenges. For example, the revised launch readiness date of March 2021 included 5.5 months to address a design issue for the cover of the sunshield (see image). The purpose of the sunshield is to protect the telescope's mirrors and instruments from the sun's heat. NASA found that hardware on the cover came loose during testing in April 2018. The new cost estimate of $9.7 billion is driven by the schedule extension, which requires keeping the contractor's workforce on board longer than expected.
Before the project enters its final phase of integration and test, it must conduct a review to determine if it can launch within its cost and schedule commitments. As part of this review, the project is not required to update its joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis—an analysis that provides the probability the project can meet its cost and schedule commitments—but government and industry cost and schedule experts have found it is a best practice to do so. Such analysis would provide NASA officials with better information to support decisions on allocating resources, especially in light of the project's recent cost and schedule growth.
NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, and identified the JWST project manager as responsible for monitoring the continued implementation of these changes. Examples of recent changes include increasing on-site presence at the contractor facility and conducting comprehensive audits of design processes. Sustaining focus on these changes through launch will be important if schedule pressures arise later and because of past challenges with communications. GAO will follow up on the project's monitoring of these improvements in future reviews.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends NASA update the project's joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis. NASA concurred with the recommendation made in this report.